



WP2 Reports

Report On the Sphere of Economy



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1. Introduction

The aims of the WP2 Research is to collect and analyze information on the impact of migrant population in Europe on 3 different areas: the migrants' contribution to European economic value, including innovative entrepreneurship and new products; the added value of migrants in the European social context, including the way they contribute to social cohesion, support and solidarity; the ways migrants contribute to European cultural diversity, including the production of new cultural models, and the co-creation of cultural products.

Notably, migration is not new in Europe, although it has undergone significant changes caused by the economic crisis of 2007-2008 and by the political, economic and social events that happened on the periphery of EU, in particular South Saharan Africa and the Middle East. This report analyzes and summarizes the information collected from the 12 Country Reports produced by the Max partners based on the guidelines described in the research proposal concerning the migration phenomenon in Europe from an economic point of view.

The main comment we can anticipate so far on the results of the investigations carried out in the Country Reports is the absence of a common vision of the migratory phenomenon. There are many reasons explaining the lack of a unique picture regarding migration in the EU.

The first element of a puzzle difficult to compose is the dimension reached by the migration flows internationally as well as in Europe. The number of international migrants has increased in the last 10 years by 51 million, reaching 272 million in 2019 and this number continues to increase in both developed and developing countries. Approximately, 3.5 per cent of the world population is made up by migrants, 2.8 per cent in 2000 (UNDESA, Population Facts, September 2019).

The figures concerning EU28 show that in 2018 there were more than 22 million non-EU citizens (third country nationals, TCNs), 4.4 per cent of total EU population (Eurostat, 2019). Compare to the arrival in EU in 2015 and 2016 (more than 1.2 million in both years as a consequence of the refugee crisis), the migration flows in 2017 and 2018 have dropped by 50 per cent due to the introduction of more restrictive policies launched by many European states to stop saving lives at sea, close harbors, protect borders, return irregular migrants, create more legal corridors for migration.

The distribution of migrants in EU countries is also much diversified. The highest number of foreigners residing in the EU on 1 January 2018 is in Germany (9.7 million people), United Kingdom (6.3 million),

Italy (5.1 million), France (4.7 million) and Spain (4.6 million). Foreigners residing in these five Member States represent 76% of the total number of foreigners in the EU-28, while the population of the same five Member States represents 63% of the EU-28 population.

In terms of the share of migrants on EU Member's State, the resident population picture looks very different. Cyprus, Austria, Estonia, Malta, Latvia, Belgium, Ireland and Germany have a considerable share of foreigners (10% or more of the total residents); Spain, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Italy and France between 9 to 6 per cent; Poland and Romania less than 1%; Lithuania 0.9%.

If we look at the country origin of migrants, we observe other relevant differences. In Czech Republic migrant are mostly originally from Ukraine (117.480 persons), Slovakia (111.804) and Vietnam (59.808), and alone they represent 54.9 per cent of all foreigners with a residence permit, followed by Russians (36.840), Germans (21.261), Polish (20.669), Bulgarians (13.795), Romanians (12.562), US citizens (9.556), Mongolians (7.900) and British (6.698). Russian and Ukrainian are also the prominent third-country group of migrants in Estonia with 1.272 and 1.037 people respectively, followed by Asia (505), Afghanistan (109), the American continent (173) and Oceania (112). With regard to the Netherlands, of the estimated 20.510 asylum seekers in 2018 the largest groups are represented by Syrians, Iranians and Eritreans, followed by Turks and Algerians (recently increase in number) and Moldovans and Yemenis. Moreover, Syrian represent roughly a third (51.338) of the total request of asylum in Sweden. In France, migrants come from Maghreb, Southern Europe, and Africa, notably, people from Sub-Saharan Africa French ex-colonies like Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal. Other ex-French colonies in South East Asian, such as Cambodia and Laotian Vietnam, represent the country of origin of the lowest group of newly French citizen, to which more recently migrants from Eastern Europe and Turkey have joined. In Italy, the largest foreign communities are the Romanians (1.206.938 people, 23 per cent of total immigrants), the Albanians (441.027, 8.4 per cent of the total) and the Moroccans (422.980, 8 per cent). Finally, in Spain new citizenship are originally from Morocco (520), followed by Nicaragua (237), Colombia (224) and Ecuador (194), Dominican Republic (149), Peru (69), Algeria (67), Romania (65).

The second element of the migration puzzle is within this phenomenon where we find highly educated migrants, unskilled workers, temporary or seasonal migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, family reunion migrants, people leaving their country for climate change, violation of human rights, no medical care, religious or ethnic discrimination. It follows that answering to the needs, aims, inclusion attitudes, cultural background, languages and work adaptability, qualification of migrants coming from countries very different from social, human and cultural perspectives, requires by the destination countries the implementation of wide range of diversified inclusion policies. This means that at the country level each EU member's State should have an integrated approach to migrant inclusion, as well as policies (nationals and locals) with adequate financial resources, aimed at their fully participation in economic, social and cultural life of the country where they have decided to live.

The intensification of violence, the prevailing idea and the political vote attitudes recently emerged in many EU countries against migrants, considered as a threat and the origin of all the problems, show that we are far away from applying balanced solutions aiming to prevent the division of populations between the EU citizens, who are guaranteed specific rights and the non-EU citizens, whose rights are denied or not fully respected.

A third element comes from the different political climate and social environment borne towards migrants in the countries of destination. The reaction of the institutions, the restrictive legislatures and administrative norms introduced to reduce migration flows and to freeze the freedom of labor migrant mobility, together with the changed attitudes and perceptions in a large number of EU population towards migrants, as confirmed by media inquiries, NGOs and many investigations launched at national and European levels, are a clear manifestation of a political exploitation of the migrants behavior, specially emphasized by anti-immigration political parties and journals, not aimed at moderation and social justice defense.

The resulting consequences are the increased cases of discrimination and inequalities emerging in different fields : in the labor market, where migrants receive lower wages, work in activities more dangerous to health and without any form of insurance; in the education access where the low knowledge of the country's language is one of the main constraints on finding a job or where the premature early school leaving of the youngest highlights a clear difficulty of insertion in the educational processes promoted by public training institutions; in the housing access where migrants find higher costs, worst living conditions, overcrowding rates; in the increasing raids against individuals because of the color of their skin.

The information and data presented in the Country Reports on migration impact reflect many of the critical elements here described, with an additional difficulty that is present in some of the Central-Eastern EU States most hostile to migratory flows: the attitude of national-local institutions of not making available the statistical data required for the analysis of the impact of migrants. The picture of migration coming from the Country Reports remains consequently

limited, uncompleted and fragmented in experiences highly diversified at the national and local level.

Commenting the impact of migration on the European economic sectors, which is the aim of the following WP2 Research Report, we may draw some introductory remarks that may help the reading and comprehension of the Country Reports.

The first comment goes to the limited weight attributed to the economic impact of migration in most of the analysis carried out in the national Reports, probably due to the activities of the NGOs involved in

Max project mainly oriented towards the provision of social and humanitarian services for migrants. This limit does not necessarily present a negative outcome, but an area of research that needs a more in depth investigation as required by the European Commission: to look at migratory flows not with the rational lens of the experts but with the intention to draw a different narrative and a different public image of the migratory phenomenon. Economy is behind migration flows and it is one of the main reasons in the movement of the labor forces. Still, a significant part of public opinion show a growing opposition towards migration because of wrong or ill-informed perceptions.

It appears evident from the analysis carried out so far that in the narrative and reporting prevailing today in the media and in the public opinion, but also in the speeches supporting the positions of those who are in favor or against the migratory flows, the information given on the economic contribution of migrants is very limited or incompletely reported. Every year, very good research and reports outcomes are published in international and national scientific journals emphasizing the positive role played by migrants in sustaining the economic growth of the country where they work and live. Unfortunately, the dissemination of this primary information reaches a very limited audience, mainly among the researchers, the experts and the institutions who work on this field.

The second remark, which partly follows from the first, concerns the difficulty of separating the analysis of the economic impact from the social and cultural ones. The interrelationships between these different impacts produced by the human activities are manifold, they may have different characteristics, develop effects at different times and places, but this does not mean they have not direct connections. The perception of the intensity and direction of these interrelationships is certainly the most critical outcome emerging from the analysis of the impact of the migratory phenomenon in the economic, social and cultural sphere. It is no coincidence if the language used in the mainstream media and the opinions reported on the migratory phenomenon, even by the institutions responsible for detecting these phenomena (Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey, 2019), do not highlight all the connections existing between behaviors that are only apparently disconnected but that imply a wide range of reactions and sentiments influencing the dynamics of the perception on migrants observed in specific behavioral contexts.

Bringing out the limits encountered in our analysis, describing the different patterns of migrant inclusion emerging from the Country Reports, analyzing the perceptions that need to be modified and/or deepened to seize the contribution provided by migrants in the European context are the objectives of the first three Research reports.

We believe that the process of inclusion of migrants require long implementation times, high human efforts and huge financial resources but doing limited, uncompleted and incoherent interventions or,

even worst, behaving against migration lead to much more economic, social and cultural costs in all the EU members States (EU, Sustainable Inclusion Of Migrants Into Society And Labor Markets, 2019).

2. The Economy of Migration

One of the problems we face in analyzing migration flows consists in obtaining, at both international, European and national level, reliable and comparable data. The data relating to the migrant population are collected through a multiplicity of different sources, including national censuses, population and labor force surveys. Hence, a problem of harmonization of data, also determined by the absence of a definition and classification criterion regarding migration flows. Secondly, the available data on the migratory phenomenon may be underestimated due to the difficulties in identifying the movements of irregular workforces in the host countries. Currently, the availability of data relating to irregular migrants is one of the main challenges facing international organizations, but also a limit for government authorities who are called to implement the policy measures to ensure efficient management of this phenomenon.

To these difficulties in the collection of data relating to the consistency of migratory flows is added a further complex task linked to the assessment of the impacts generated by migrants, through different channels, both the origin and destination countries. The focus of the present analysis is on the economic impact of migration flows in the hosting countries. Although the literature on this area of research is extremely broad, there is not a consensus on the main outcomes. There are empirical research that emphasize economic positive impacts and others that find very low, or even null or negative impacts. The differences on the outcomes may come from many reasons: the methodology used for the impact evaluation, the characteristics of the migrants, the economy of the destination country, the length and consistency of migrants integration process.

Empirical research has focused mainly on two specific aspects: the effects generated by migratory flows on the macro variables in the destination countries, GDP, labor market and productivity mainly, and the effects induced on the public finance, taxes and social contributions paid by migrants.

Impact on Output: Migration can affect GDP in three main ways, through an increase in the working age population, greater demand for goods and services and an increase in the productivity of the average worker. The impact on aggregate output is generally positive, because some immigrants start working shortly after arrival, thereby directly contributing to output, while consumption by immigrants increases demand in the host country, which stimulates output at least in the short term (People On the Move: Migration and Mobility in the European Union, Bruegel 2018). The literature on this topic is vast and the migrant's impact on the economic variables has been evaluated from different perspectives. Interesting outcomes are available from the following researches: openness to trade and migration has increased the per-capita income of EU countries (Ortega, Peri 2014; Alesina et al 2016); high-skilled migrants have a positive effect on innovation and welfare in the receiving countries (Alesina et al 2016; Di Giovanni et al 2015; Fassio et al 2015). Others scholars have evaluated the redistribution effect of migrants impact on the economy or the contribution of their consumption of goods and services on the aggregate demand.

This report summarizes the experiences related to the impact of migrants on the labor market in 12 Member States.

Labour Market Impact: The notion that *"immigrants are taking our jobs"* is often cited in various news outlets and was especially prominent during the Brexit referendum and during elections campaigns in France and the Netherlands in 2017. Alongside security and terrorism concerns, the majority of Europeans are worried about the impact of refugee inflows on labour market outcomes for natives (**People on the Move: Migration and Mobility in the European Union, Bruegel 2018**).

Most of the research on the migration impact on native employment and wages bring evidence that immigrants do not take jobs from natives or reduce salary levels of native workers. The migrant impact on the labour market seems to depend more on the immigrants' education and skill and on labour market conditions and regulations. Highly skilled migrants, especially in the most advanced sectors with higher labour demand, are more than welcome in EU countries, while migrants with lower qualifications may face barriers to entry.

Some competition between native and migrant workers may arise in low-skilled jobs with negative consequences in terms of wages reduction. According to Shierholz (2010), the main question is whether immigrant workers can be considered as substitutes or complementary to native workers. In the first case, a large flow of low-skilled immigrants can cause damage to the wage levels of the low-skilled native workers in the host country. If, on the other hand, immigrants and natives have complementary skill levels, it is much less likely that a *shock* one group's job offer will damage the other. Empirical evidence supports both positions, although the majority of studies seem to suggest that immigration does not have a significant effect on the labor market of the destination country (Pekkala Kerr and Kerr, 2011; Edo, Rapaport, 2017).

Different Labour Market Impact: Some empirical works find evidence of a negative impact of immigration on native wages (Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2013; Dustmann, Frattini and Preston, 2013; Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler, 2016), while others find no effect (Card, 1990; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Peri and Sparber, 2009). There is also some evidence of increases in wages for select groups of natives (Beerli and Peri, 2015). Rowthorn (2015), in an analysis of the impacts of immigration on the UK labour market, concludes that competition from immigrants might result in lower wages for low-skilled local workers, including previous immigrants (**People on the Move: Migration and Mobility in the European Union, Bruegel 2018**).

Still, migrants face many difficulties entering in the labour market.

In 2018, 22.3 million third-country nationals (TCNs), 4.4 per cent of EU population, were living in EU, but if we look at their participation in the labour market we see that the overall migrant employment rate is lower (67 per cent) than the native-born population (73 per cent). The labour market gap between migrants and natives is mainly due to the level of education: the lower it is for migrants, more chances to find a less-skilled job in comparison to natives.


Quoted from a recent EC publication (**Sustainable Inclusion of Migrants into Society and Labour Market, ICF 2019**): *“Almost 25% of migrants are highly educated, however over 40% are overqualified for the job they do. While, in general, highly educated migrants tend to have a higher employment rate, however, formal education alone does not guarantee inclusion into the labour market. For instance, employment outcomes are particularly negative for highly educated migrants with foreign qualifications that are not fully recognized in the host country. On the other hand, 20% of migrants have a very low level of education, which may mean that their potential might be wasted”*.

Refugees and asylum seekers, with lower language knowledge, health, cultural and legal obstacles, often face additional barriers in the labour market (Eurostat 2018). An additional discrimination regards low-skilled women's work (Fig.1). While low-skilled male migrants find jobs in temporary work programs or in seasonal sectors, as construction, landscaping, agriculture, low-skilled women have less alternatives as they work mainly providing domestic or care services in private households where the level of protection at work is very low.

Fig.1 Male Labor Force Participation Rate, 2017


Female Labor Force Participation Rate, 2017

Figure 89. Male Labor Force Participation Rate: OECD Economies , 2017, %



Source: Citi Research; OECD (2018)

Figure 90. Female Labor Force Participation Rate: OECD Economies, 2017, %



Source: Citi Research; OECD (2018)

The Fiscal Impact: With the growing inflow of migrants in OECD countries, the question of the net fiscal effect of immigration is becoming more and more relevant in terms of migration policies and budget spending. The net fiscal impact is commonly described as the difference between the contributions immigrants make to the public finances through taxes and other social contributions, and the benefits received. Most of the literature finds that the fiscal impact of immigration is relatively small, in the magnitude of ± 1 percent of GDP. (People on the Move: Migration and Mobility in the European Union, Bruegel 2018).

Another topic, less explored by literature, concerns the implications of immigration for the public finances of the host country. On the one hand, it could be argued that the less favorable employment prospects lead immigrants to depend on the social security system in greater proportion than to native workers. There is a theoretical possibility that the social security and redistributive institutions in force in the host countries favor immigrants, removing potential resources from the natives. Some authors discuss the existence of a “welfare magnet effect”, according to which migrants are *ex ante* attracted to countries with higher social protection. On the other hand, since immigrants are concentrated in the active segment of the population and contribute to public revenue, immigration could favor the financial sustainability of the social protection systems of the host country.

The empirical analysis of the impact of immigration on public finance of the host countries is not easy to investigate because the estimates vary significantly according to assumptions, econometric techniques and data used (Pekkala Kerr and Kerr, 2011).

The most recent analyzes reveal that the average net cost or benefit of a single immigrant turns out to be very limited. In OECD countries, immigrants pay less taxes and social contributions but receive less benefit than native workers (OECD, 2013). In Sweden, the migrant fiscal impact has become negative

since the mid-1980s due to the change in the characteristics of the migrant workers (Ekberg, 2009); in Norway, short-term immigrants represent a fiscal surplus while in the long-term immigrants, due to family reunification, produce a burden for the public budget (Furnaletto, Robstand 2016); in France the impact depends on the migrant working lifetime, negative in the short term period and slightly positive in the long run (Chojnicki, 2013); in Italy the migrant fiscal contribution to public budget, despite the progressive increase in reception costs (asylum seekers, repatriations, rescue services at sea, language courses and health costs) is positive (MEF, 2018).

3. The Country Reports

In this section, we summarize the main information extracted from the Country Reports on two different, but interrelated, areas of investigation concerning migrants in hosting countries: the politics of migration and the impact on labour market. The relationship existing between the political and economic events connected to migration is a topic well known and widely discussed today in the media and in public debates. With the growing number of irregular migrants entering in Europe and the recent 2015-refugee crisis, the migration policies in many EU member States have become more restrictive. The consequences of the restrictive migration policies impact directly and indirectly on the economy through different channels: the direction and timing of economic integration policies, the procedures for migrants entry and stay in the labour market, the influence of anti-immigration sentiment on the public opinion, the discrimination effects on regular migrants workers. The incoming divergent migratory pressures experienced in EU countries may be explained by different historical events, or cultural, religious and institutional issues, including the geographical proximity, as in the case of Greece and Italy, to unstable and conflicting countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Nobody can forecast how many migrants, irregulars, refugees and asylum seekers will come in the future but the consequences of economic and financial globalization on one hand, and the political instability on the periphery of Europe on the other hand, will bring pressure on migrants to leave their origin countries and reach a better and safely place where to live.

3.1 Belgium

The Politics of Migration

2018 Belgium Annual Report on Migration (European Migration Network, 2019). Immigration and international protection issues fall under the competence of the federal government. Integration is mainly the competence of the Communities. In Wallonia, this competence is transferred to the Region. Economic migration – which used to be a mixed competence of the federal state (legislation) and the Regions (implementation of the legislation) - has been further regionalised in the framework of the sixth State reform. The law of 6 January 2014 has transferred a large set of competences from the federal level to the Communities and the

Regions. The Regions and the German-speaking Community are now responsible for the development of an economic migration policy tailored to the needs of their labour market and economy. This includes competence for the legislation, application, control and maintenance of work permits (permits A and B) and professional cards. Furthermore, the Communities now have the possibility to develop their own policies on so-called “student permits”. These permits will be needed to obtain a residence permit, which means that Communities can now play an important role in the policy on student migration. The federal state remains responsible for the entry and the right of foreigners to reside on the Belgian territory, as well as for work permits C (work permits issued to migrants with a temporary residence permit for other reasons than “employment”, such as asylum seekers).

The central law regarding migration and asylum issues in Belgium is the law of 15 December 1980 on the entry on the territory, residence, settlement and removal of foreign nationals (hereafter called the “Immigration Act”), also governing the procedure for international protection and the competences of the institutions for international protection. The royal decree of 8 October 1981 on the entry on the territory, residence, settlement and removal of foreign nationals implements the Immigration Act. Both the Immigration Act and the Royal decree have been modified many times since their adoption. Reception conditions for applicants for international protection and for other categories of foreign nationals are regulated by the law of 12 January 2007.

Following the transposition in 2018 of three EU Directives and of the Single Permit Directive, the different Belgian Institutions competent in the field of asylum and migration (Federal State, Regions and German-speaking Community) agreed on a cooperation agreement on the coordination of the policies on work permits and residence permits and the standards regarding the employment and residence of foreign

workers. This cooperation agreement was then approved by the different Parliaments and entered into force on 3 January 2019.

Among the changes introduced by the EU Directives, we find a combined procedure and single permit for economic migrants who come to work and stay in Belgium for more than 90 days. This means that third country nationals who intend to come to Belgium to work for more than 90 days, in principle need to apply for a single (work and residence) permit via their employer in the competent Region. In case the work permit and the residence permit are approved (respectively by the Region and the Immigration Office) the third country national receives one single work and residence permit. In practice, all residence permits issued starting from 3 January 2019 will contain information on the access to the labour market: 'limited', 'unlimited', or 'no' access.

Important developments have been introduced in Flanders to attract foreign talent and fill the gap concerning shortage occupation simplifying the access for labour migrants executing specific 'medium-skilled' jobs; right to work without labour permit for students and for migrants family members with residence card A; new asylum procedures. The Brussels' and Walloon governments have not yet made any changes to the outdated labour migration policy they adopted from the federal government

The Labour Market

Regarding the labor market, the "participation of immigrants has become a significant political concern in Belgium like other European countries facing a huge refugee flow". The regions (Brussels, Wallonia, and Flanders) are responsible for the employment integration and monitoring job search efforts of migrants and refugees. Each region has its own organization : Actiris is a regional employment agency of Brussels ; Le Forem is a regional employment agency of Wallonia ; VDAB is the Flanders' employment agency.

Despite the many institutions that have competences in migration, no specific institution supports the employment of refugees and asylum seekers. They have access to the regional employment agencies (Actiris, Le Forem or VDAB) or municipal employment support networks, such as job centres and socio-professional integration services (ISP) of the public social action centres (CPAS). These three agencies are responsible for promoting integration of asylum seekers in the labor market. Unlike the two other regional bodies, Actiris does not have a cooperation agreement with the federal authorities. It follows that Belgian labour market is relatively easy and quick to reach for migrants, including refugee (Lens,2018).

However, according to the OECD (2016), Belgian labor market is among the most tightly regulated and most strongly institutionalized European labor market. For example, temporary contracts and other

nonstandard employment such as night and weekend work are comparatively tightly restricted in the Belgian labor market. Certain segments of the labor market especially the service sector jobs are very small in Belgium. These jobs generally require little formal training and that come with few additional benefits, and they are very rare in Belgium. Thus, this is one of the main reasons for creating a fundamental tension and the employment gap between foreign-born and Belgian-born people. It is one of the highest of the European Union (Corluy & Verbist, 2014; Jean et al., 2010; Pina et al., 2015).

Apparently connected to aforementioned, “it is seen that the large majority of refugees, in the first years after their arrival to Belgium, has no connection to the Belgian social security system”. Starting from the end of the first fase and the beginning of the third, the dependency on social security system start to rise consistently, and after this transition phase that approximately takes 4 years, “refugees’ dependency on social assistance begins to decline and participation to the employment fluctuates. 52% of them seem to work as employed or self-employed person after eight years stay.”

In Belgium, another question is balancing the existing social rights and protections with the goal of integrating refugees into the labor market, since the country is a social state offering accessible social rights and services to the refugees and has signed important International and European Conventions. Among the various strategies proposed, we found interesting a program targets the people of immigrants background aged between 18-30, Duo for job, offering mentoring to non-Belgians aged 18 to 30, then also to Belgian young people of immigrant origin. Initially this initiative was implemented in Brussels than extended in three big cities of Belgium; Antwerp, Liège and Ghent. According to the Duo for job annual report 2016, nearly half of the mentees who attend this program, after one year were employed.

In order to limit the bureaucratic impact on the recruitment of immigrant workers, a task force with private and voluntary associations, created by the not-for-profit organisation Fédération des Entreprises de Belgique (FEB), has been set up, with a focus on access to the labor market for asylum seekers and refugees in coordination with other stakeholders in the sector, which has led to the creation of a recruitment guide for employers. Attention is also paid to problems arising from lack of skills and the lack of recognition of work and training qualifications.

Contribution to the economy (A Common Home, Migration and Development in Belgium, Caritas 2019). Belgium Migration contributes to the economic development of contemporary Belgium in various ways. One of the great benefits of migration is the change in the variety of goods available to consumers (Aubry et al. 2016). The food industry is a sector that appears particularly praised by transnational entrepreneurs. There are many examples of migrants opening restaurants or importing gourmet products for specialized food stores. Different researchers (see e.g. Martiniello and Bousetta 2008) have also demonstrated that many migrants capitalised on their connections with their country of origin in order to develop cross-country economic activities. By providing information on the respective market systems of their countries of origin and of residence, migrants favour bilateral trade between them. Bignandi (2018) found out that, globally, a 10% increase of migrants from a specific country in a Belgian region led to an increase of 1.2% of the region's exports from and 3.6% of its imports to the country in question. Migrants also represent an important source of workforce. According to OECD statistics, the employment rate of migrants in 2017 was 56.5%. Many migrants are entrepreneurs and create their own jobs. In 2016, around 16.1% of immigrants were self-employed, compared to 13.1% of native residents (OECD/UE 2017). This entrepreneurship generates jobs for native Belgian workers. Approximately 30% of self-employed migrants born outside of the EU have employees. Concerning the question whether migration has an effect on the salary and quality of natives' jobs there is actually no study assessing this in the case in Belgium (ibid).

3.2 Czech Republic

Migration and integration fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs takes part in labour market integration and job vacancies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for short and long-stay visa applications. Foreign Police is dealing with short-term visas and registration of foreigners upon arrival. The Ministry of Industry and Trade is in charge of unique regimes to help labour shortage (more in the chapter “Migrants in economy”). Ministry of Education is responsible for education aspect of integration (Czech language courses, requalification, etc.). Ministry of Finances controls employment of foreigners. The essential Czech document of Integration Policy is the Concept of Integration of Foreigners where specific measures and tools to update integration policy are described. Every year the Ministry of Interior submits the implementation report and suggestions for the new Concept. The Ministry of Interior’s long-term priority is to support integration policy at regional and local level, where the integration process is actually taking place. The main objective is to engage local governments and respective stakeholders in integration efforts and to create suitable conditions for co-existence and prospering the diversity. In order to improve access to information the Ministry of Interior established network of integration centres, where foreigners are provided legal and social services, job counselling, Czech language courses, interpreting, sociocultural courses, community events.

The Politics of Migration

Until 1990s there was basically no legal way to migrate in the country. Migration policy was based on individual cases. Only after the 1993 and the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union, the country has become a promising destination for migrants (from 2000 until 2008 the number of migrants doubled and reached 450 000 people). Reacting to the economic crisis in 2008, migration policy become restrictive and ever since, every year there are new novels and new rules of migration policy, which make difficult for foreigners to orient in the legislative framework. NGOs, dealing with migration issue, are always updated on this issue and are the best source of information for foreigners.

The Czech State integration policy emphasizes the orientation of migrants promoting information before leaving the country of origin and after their arrival in the Czech Republic.

Pre-departure measures, promoted by the project named “Next Stop the Czech Republic”, include information materials (brochures, video) at Czech embassies in the origin countries and are intended primarily for third-country nationals who are considering long-term residence in the Czech Republic. After the arrival, the project named “Welcome to the Czech Republic” promotes adaptation integration

courses, where migrants can learn about their rights and obligations in the Czech Republic, find a way to solve practical problems or prevent intercultural misunderstandings.

For foreigners with long-term residence and permanent residence socio-cultural orientation courses are available, organized by network of integration centers, aiming to help migrants with more specific issues, like submitting taxes, acquiring citizenship, delivering a baby in the Czech Republic.

As elsewhere in Europe, where anti-immigration movements have gained a new toehold, the country in recent years has witnessed rising polarization of politics and society around migration issues. As a result, and despite the fact that the refugee crisis produced very small inflows of migrants into the country, the recently policies adopted by the government are based on a security paradigm that is focused on migration control and greater selectivity of immigrants. Being one of just five countries voting against the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration in December 2018, the country is a member of the Visegrad alliance with Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, advocating strong anti-immigration positions in the international and European arena.

The Labour Market


The Czech economy is growing at a decent pace and unemployment in 2019 (2.2 per cent) is among the lowest in Europe. The number of foreigners in the labour market has increased significantly in recent years in connection with the growth of the economy since 2014 and the shortage of workforce. Today, it is by far the most attractive destination for migrants in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. In 2017, just under 5 percent (524,000) of the population of 10.6 million was comprised of legally resident migrants—up from less than 1 percent in 1993. Estimates of the number of unauthorized migrants stretch from 15,000 to 300,000, depending on the forms of irregularity studied. The country has experienced since 2013 a major demand for foreign labor as economic stability and resumed prosperity resulted in many new migrants. Between 2016 and 2017, the country saw an increase of 90,000 workers, as measured through employee registrations (Drbohlav, Janurová, MIS 2019).

Most of the third-country nationals, summing up to 35.5 per cent of foreign workers, are Ukrainian (117.000), Vietnamese (60.000) and Russians (37.000) (Czech Statistical Office, 2019). Geographically, the highest number of foreign workers with employment status has been recorded in Prague (37 % percent of the country's migrants). As a result, there has been a strong demand for both skilled and unskilled labor that is not being met through the domestic labor force (Graf.1).

Third country nationals have regulated access to the labour market. In order to be employed they need many document such as relevant work permit and residence permit with employment purpose from the Labour Office. Some of the work permits are dual, meaning they combine both types of permits together (for example employee card). Work permits can be issued in the following forms: employee card (dual

or non-dual intended for long-term residence in the Czech Republic for employment purpose on specific assigned job position; blue card (dual) designed for long-term stay of highly qualified foreigners; work permit issued by the Labour Office on the basis of other reason of stay (studies, family reunification, etc.); seasonal work (short term for 3 months, and long-term for up to 6 months). Furthermore, there are a number of cases where a work permit (or employee card or blue card) is not required or the work permit is issued irrespective of the labour market situation (in particular, for spiritual churches, university academics, performers, some athletes, international transport workers).

Fig.2 Structure of labour shortage according to qualification requirements, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2018



Specific employment programs have been launched in collaboration with different ministries for the entry and employment of foreign investors in the country; for highly qualified employees in the service and public sectors from Ukraine. Even with new regimes and big quotas for several “allowed” countries, the problem of illegal employment remains. Many foreigners arrive with visas from other EU member states or come with visa free regime, and remain in the Czech Republic in the “grey zone” with no legal employment, residence permit, and insurance, and thus no rights and status. Recruitment agencies, intermediaries, and dishonest employers abuse this case, and as a result, the data on foreigners is far away from true. According to the Association of Employment Agencies, there are up to 250.000 “illegal”

foreigners in the Czech Republic, who are not mentioned anywhere. Big fines are imposed to employers and companies when caught with illegal third-country employment procedures, and foreigners expelled for 5 years from the country. Still the situation is going on.

One of the main barriers to get the desired job is the limited knowledge of Czech language. Positions with higher qualifications, often require good knowledge of spoken and written Czech. Without knowing the language and understanding how the labour market works, and how to enter (CV, interview, work culture etc.) finding the suitable job can be very difficult. Because of this, a lot of foreigners rely to diasporas and communities, who share the same language. Very often and for years migrants work in ethnic owned businesses, living in the bubble with no possibility/will/time to integrate. NGOs are doing their best to react to this situation with services of job counselling, job clubs, specific courses and also raising their awareness of their rights and obligations, as well as on protecting the labour migrants against. In Particular, the Centre for Integration of Foreigners (CIF) has led many projects finalized to integrate immigrant worker into the labour market, proposing a permanent social service, not just projects with a limited time frame.


Job Requalification

Very often foreigners cannot access higher qualification jobs because skills are missing, or they fail to recognize the qualifications from their home country. Career guidance is very important in selecting specific requalification as their quality and price differ a lot. From the practical experience of foreigners, it is wiser to use the services of job counselling at non-governmental organizations, and then seek support at the Labour Office as their approach is more individual.

Some occupations in the Czech Republic need professional certificate (hairstylist, cosmetics, bus driver, etc.). Requalification allows obtaining such a paper, and saves time and costs for future employer, making the foreigner more attractive for hiring. unfair practices by employers and intermediaries.

The migrant work (Migration and Integration in Czechia: Policy Advances and the Hand Brake of Populism, MPI 2019). The migrant employee contracts registered at labor offices in 2017 were 472.000, 48 percent in semi-skilled occupations, 31 percent in unskilled work, and the remainder in skilled occupations (Fig.3) In addition, 87,000 valid trade licenses were held by migrants. Individuals may be holders of multiple trade licenses or employment contracts, or both, so these figures should not be understood as representative of the total number of working migrants.

Fig. 3 Migrants Employment by Sector in Czechia, 2017



Several trends are worth mentioning:

- There is segmentation and specialization in the Czech labor market, and individual immigrant groups have found specific niches. For example, Vietnamese immigrants tend to own small businesses such as food stores or nail shops, while Ukrainians can be found in the construction sector. -The full value of human capital is often not captured, with tertiary-education migrants arriving with higher education levels than required for their work in the Czech labor market. This underemployment occurs for 45 percent of Ukrainian workers and 21 percent of tertiary-educated migrant workers overall.
- Labor migrants supplement rather than compete with Czech workers, who are less willing to work in unskilled, low-paid occupations (particularly the "3D" dirty, dangerous, and demeaning jobs)
- Companies usually hire foreign workers via recruitment agencies or other mediators. This often leads to the exploitation of migrants in terms of fees and working conditions.
- Just three migrant groups had significant representation among businessmen or trade license holders in 2017: the Vietnamese and Ukrainians, 22.000 each; Slovaks 17.000.

3.3 Estonia

The Politics of Migration

EMN, Annual Report on Migration and Asylum Estonia 2018. The primary institution responsible for migration and asylum policy-making is the Estonian Ministry of the Interior. These policies are mainly implemented by the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB), which is involved in processing of all applications of TCN s (including asylum seekers, persons staying in the country illegally, as well as applicants for residence permits and applying Estonian citizenship) and citizens of the European Union. The Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for policy-making regarding services for the beneficiaries of international protection, unaccompanied minors as well as victims of trafficking in human beings, while the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications develops policies in relation to skilled migration. The entry of aliens, their stay, residence and employment as well as the bases for legal liability of aliens, the border regime, are regulated by the Aliens Act. There are also numerous regulations of the ministers responsible for the area (e.g. the Welcoming Programme regulation, the Establishment of state register of granting international protection and statutes for maintenance of register, etc.).

Since regaining independence Estonian immigration policy essentially has been characterised as conservative. (Siseministeerium 2013). Restrictions on immigration, such as the annual immigration quota and specific grounds (working, studying, family reunification) for granting residence permits were already set up in the process of Estonia regaining independence. These main instruments, although revised over time, based on EU legislation and labour market needs, are still in effect in Estonian immigration policy today. The conservative approach to migration following re-independence was a reaction to large-scale immigration during the Soviet time, which resulted in one of the largest foreign populations in Europe.

The level of the immigration quota has not been changed significantly since it was established, however the list of groups who are allowed to settle in Estonia outside the quota has been expanded (for US and

Japan citizens, for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland natives in Europe). Currently the quota is applied only to labour migrants from third countries, who make up about a tenth of the total immigration to Estonia and less than a third of the immigration from third countries. As of 2017 labour migrants coming to work in the ICT sector or in a start-up company are exempt from the quota. In addition, there are other types of residence permits based on specific exceptions and on international law (e.g. applicants for international protection, victims of human trafficking) (Asari & Maasing, 2017). From 2013, the country has been actively reforming and simplifying its legislation to attract qualified foreign workers to counter-balancing the consequences of an ageing population and a high number of emigrants. In 2015, for the first time in 25 years, Estonia experienced greater immigration than emigration. Since the current population is about 1.4 million people and there are no evidences that the birth rates are increasing, to avoid soon a labor shortage the country needs to register a positive net migration.

Migrants in Estonia belong to four categories: people returning to Estonia, people from territory of the former Soviet Union (e.g. Russia and Ukraine), people from EU Member States, and people from the rest of the world. About half of all immigrants come from the first group, while those coming from EU Member States and the rest of the world each make up about one-tenth of the incoming population.

In the Country report, a specific mention is made to the problem of the refugee's integration in the Estonian society. While the majority of refugees, as reported in the interview conducted by the UNHCR (2016), said that they had not suffered serious problems with xenophobia and intolerance, the Russian-speaking refugees mentioned that the ethnic and linguistic division of Estonian society is actually an additional barrier for integration, alongside the obstacles mentioned in relation to housing, residence permits and language learning.

A more advised integration policy is needed towards the Russian-speaking population increasing its contribution in the labour market through the unification of the school system, still divided into Russian and Estonian-medium schools, as well as other policies that


Estonia must introduce active immigration policy (Population Migration and Estonia: Adapting in an Age of Immigration, Seney, Baldwin Hess 2018). Immigration should play a role in addressing the labour gap, as increasing labour force participation and birth rates cannot do it alone. Therefore, an active immigration policy is needed that both encourages Estonians to return to their homeland and selectively introduces new migrants into the country based on labour needs. Although the decline of the working-age population will likely mean an increasing need for manual workers, smart technology and automation may eliminate many less desirable blue-collar jobs. As part of the strategy for ensuring social cohesion, the report argues that immigrants must not be seen as simply a labour force that has entered the country to carry out the jobs that Estonians want to avoid. Rather, an active immigration policy should facilitate social integration by luring immigrants with digital literacy, creativity, and skills.

encourage larger families, extend the retirement age, and find work for under-employed populations (Estonian Human Development Report 2016-2017).

The Labour Market

The labour market sectors of where third-country nationals are predominantly occupied are construction, manufacturing, transportation, information and communication technologies, agriculture and seasonal jobs. Although the largest number of TNCs in the country are male, there is no specific differentiation between in the employment rates by sex, although statistics show that the majority of third-country nationals coming to Estonia for employment are males. (European Migration Network. *Labour Market Integration of Third Country Nationals in the EU Member States*).

Fig. 4 First-time Residence Permits in Estonia




In 2018, there was an increase in the number of visas and residence permits issued for business purposes due to the new startup-related legislation adopted in 2017. Since its launch two years ago, 1108 companies have applied for the 'startup' status and altogether 931 individuals have relocated to Estonia or have been granted the right to do so.

The number of incoming start-uppers shows a positive trend – while 167 employees and 107 founders settled to Estonia in 2017, the numbers were significantly higher in 2018 – i.e., 483 employees and 174 founders, amounting to an increase of 236%.

The most popular start-up industries in Estonia are financial technology, business software, software as a service, medical technology, consumer goods, hospitality, agricultural technology, educational technology and energy sector. (EMN Annual Report on Migration and Asylum). The Estonian immigrant population overall manifests lower employment and higher unemployment rates compared to the native-born population. This situation is not specific to Estonia; it is common in most EU countries.

Differences in employment and unemployment rates between native and immigrant populations are bigger in the Northern and Western European countries that are the most attractive to immigrants, than in Estonia (Eurostat 2016).

Fig. 5 Unemployment rates in Estonia, 2017



(European Migration Network: *Labour Market Integration of Third Country Nationals in EU Member States*)

The regulation of labour migration in Estonia is primarily based on the protection of the domestic labour market and the preference for a qualified labour force. To this end, there are also qualitative restrictions on the foreign labour force, in addition to quota restriction. The most significant of these is the salary threshold that came into effect in 2008. The main aim of the threshold was to allow only immigration of highly-qualified workers that Estonia was lacking and preventing the replacement of the domestic labour force with cheap foreign work-ers.

For this purpose, employers were given the obligation to pay third country national a salary that is more than a quarter of the national average. Today this requirement has been relaxed to the Estonian average (Asari & Maasing, 2017).

Refugees generally have access to the labour market, with a few exceptions comprising jobs reserved for Estonian citizens or nationals of other Member States. However, the strict Estonian language requirements that apply, even for relatively simple jobs that require minimal interaction with customers, could prove to be an obstacle in practice for those who have not yet learned the language. According to the experience of the EUIF (Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund) representative, being fluent in Estonian is not a prerequisite to take up a job (except for professions, where speaking Estonian is needed

in order to fulfil the tasks given). Rather, it is more important that the employer and employee find a common language in which to communicate (UNHCR).

The flexible and comparatively less regulated labour market in Estonia provides easy and simple access to employment for refugees. For employers, refugees are relatively easy to employ, as there are significantly less administrative or bureaucratic requirements than for other third country nationals. Essentially, refugees are treated in the same way as Estonian residents, and most training programmes and services are provided only in Estonian or in Russian, requiring a fairly high level of language skills in order to fully enjoy those services. Estonian Refugee Council highlighted this as a significant barrier to access to vocational education (including courses provided by EUIF) (UNHCR).

According to the EMN 2016 study, most refugees find permanent work within nine months from receiving the residence permit. They are mostly employed in production and service areas in Estonia, in manufacturing companies, laundry services, construction of wooden houses, cleaning and caretaking. (UNHCR).

3.4 France

The Politics of Migration

EU, ORGANISATION OF MIGRATION AND ASYLUM SYSTEM IN FRANCE, 2019. The Ministry of Interior is competent for managing migration flows; for regulations related to visas, foreign nationals' entry, stay and work in France; for reception and support integration and access to nationality; for the fight against illegal employment and illegal migration and for asylum policies. The General Directorate for Foreign Nationals in France coordinates the Directorates in charge of migration and asylum and the Directorate in charge of accompanying foreign nationals and citizenship issues within the Ministry of the Interior. It also exercises the State's control on two entities: the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII), the State operator responsible for the integration of newly-arrived migrants, and the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) handling asylum procedures. France had the reputation into the early 20th century of being the European country most open to immigrants, including political refugees. This reputation changed in the late 20th century, when opposition rose to continued immigration from Africa. Several major reforms have been implemented since 2015 regarding the right of asylum, the convergence of French procedures with the European law, the improvement of reception conditions, the creation of a large number of accommodation places to facilitate the process and the fluidity of the accommodation system, the integration system of third-country nationals arriving for their first stay in France, the process for assistance in return and re-integration of migrants, the fight against irregular migration and smuggling. France intends to help fight trafficking through development assistance, job creation through entrepreneurship and support for education, higher education and research in Africa.

In November 2019, French authorities announced the country's first foreign worker quotas for non-European Union immigrants to fill lower-level labor gaps in areas such as construction, bakeries and health care. Prime Minister Edouard Philippe, in announcing the quota system, said France needed to "take back control" of its immigration policy. "Taking back control of our migration policy means fighting back against abuses of the right of asylum, against irregular migration," Other measures were also

announced by the Prime Minister including the delaying access to health care for new asylum-seekers and the dismantling Paris-area squatter camps.

The government's announcement comes as France has seen a steady increase in asylum-seekers, up 22% in 2018, to reach nearly 123,000. While the numbers are modest compared with the country's population of 67 million, the message of out-of-control migration resonates, particularly in the wake of Europe's 2015 migrant crisis.

The Labour Market

Immigrants in France are a major component of the country's economy as they produce and consume. They are indeed active in the French society as they consist of more than 10 per cent of total workload and thus account for 6 per cent of GDP. Immigration provides skilled and unskilled labor, both are useful because there is a shortage of qualified workers in sectors, such as medical sector, and in non-qualified sectors. Non-qualified labor is extremely crucial for the present and future economy of the country as the workforce ages and the European low birth rate leads to a lack of labor in the long term. Furthermore, the contribution of a young immigrant labor that is initially unskilled gradually becomes more and more, turning themselves into skilled labor.

First generation immigrants are now accorded permits of various tenure from 1 year to 10 years. Only direct dependants are allowed to follow the head of the household immigrant. For second-generation, naturalization comes from the right of soil. Any one born in France is granted with French citizenship, but this right becomes effective most of the time when children are older than 18 years only.

According to the Employment Survey, 29.4 million people aged 15 to 64 living in Metropolitan France are active in 2018. Within this active population, there are 3.1 million immigrants according to the definition of the High Council for Integration (HCI). Immigrant workers therefore represent 10.5% of the total working population in France, of which almost 70% come from countries

The Migration Triangle: Narratives, Justice and the Politics of Migration in France, D'Amato, Lavizzari 2019.

Despite the historical relevance of migratory questions in France, the recent, so-called 'migration crisis'¹ has become highly politicised in the country, occupying a predominant role in the public debate and, above all, in political competition. In 2016 alone, France rejected 63,390 people at the border while receiving a total of 78,400 new applications for international protection, ranking fifth in the world for the number of applications (Eurostat 2017). France has also been one of the main European countries involved in the management of migrants crossing borders, along with the United Kingdom and Italy. For instance, between 60 and 150 migrants are halted by patrols every day along the French-Italian border, with up to 95 percent being turned back to Italy (ANCI 2017). Yet, despite the attention dedicated to the management of migration, we know very little about how migration has been discussed domestically and what kind of narratives competed in addressing the issue. This is true for political and media discourse alike. Indeed, the way French media discussed key moments of the recent phenomenon has remained almost completely underexplored.

outside the EU. The same Employment survey indicates an activity rate of immigrants aged 15 to 64 from 69.2%. This level is slightly lower than that of non-immigrants, at 72.3%, although the latter are more often in the course of studies or training (11.2% instead 5.1%).

If we focus on 25 to 54 year olds, the gap in the participation rate becomes much larger, reaching 13 percentage points (76.5% instead of 89.3%). In addition, the differences in the participation rate vis-à-vis non-immigrants differ significantly by sex. In 2018, the participation rate of immigrant women aged 25 to 54 was 20 percentage points lower than that non-immigrants (65.9% instead of 85.8%). The difference between men and women, of 7 points for non-immigrants, thus reaches 23 points in the case of immigrants. However, immigrant women also experienced strong growth in their participation in the labor market over the past forty years. The likelihood of immigrant women being inactive was 4 times higher than that of immigrant men in 2003 compared to 60 times in 1968.

Immigrants represent 14,1 % of the unemployed persons, while they constitute only 9 % of the working population (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies INSEE), and the rate of migrant unemployment aged 25 to 54 is 15.3 per cent, more than twice that of the same age of French population. The overexposure of immigrants to the risk of unemployment is more pronounced for women. In 2018, the unemployment rate for immigrant men was quite significantly lower than that for immigrant women (16.8% compared to 14,1 per cent)), while for non-immigrants the difference was much more slight (with respectively 7, 0% and 7.5%) (France Stratégie, Rapport July 2019)¹. INSEE² clarified in this regard that "for immigrants, the difference between the unemployment rates of men and women varies according to geographic origin".

The analysis of the immigrant population according to socio-professional category shows, from the Employment survey, that in 2017, immigrants mainly work in manual or white-collar jobs: 61% versus 48% non-immigrant workers in employment. If 45% of active immigrant men are workers, compared to 32% of non-immigrant men, almost half of women immigrant women, on the other hand, are employed: 47.5% against 42.7% non-immigrant women.

Immigrants are clearly underrepresented in the professions intermediaries (13% instead of 26% of non-immigrants). The gaps are smaller with regard to professions "managers and intellectual professions", where they are slightly under-represented (14% instead of 17%), and "Artisans, traders and entrepreneurs", where they are slightly overrepresented (8% instead of 6%). The over-representation of the self-employed among immigrants is very classic and is seen in other countries. It is frequently interpreted as the result of a strategy of circumventing the difficulties of integration into salaried employment, even if it is also explained by the frequency of self-employed activities in certain countries

¹ Insee (2012), *Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France*

² France Stratégie (2019), *The impact of immigration in the labor market, public finances and growth*

of origin, or even by predispositions of immigrants in the case of independent professions with a strong entrepreneurial dimension.

**Fig. 6 – Immigrants and non-immigrants by socio-professional category.
Labor force aged 15 or over. Whole France, 2017.**

	Immigrants	Non-immigrants
Farmers	1 %	2 %
Craftsmen, traders and business leaders	8 %	6 %
Managers and higher intellectual professions	14 %	17 %
Intermediate professions	13 %	26 %
Employees	29 %	27 %
Workers	32 %	21 %
Unemployed people who have never worked³	3 %	1 %
Not specified	1 %	0 %
Total (thousands)	3.080	26.588


Source : Insee, enquête Emploi en continu 2017

Irregular immigrants are characterized by a high activity rate, but a low-skilled activity in the sectors with higher intellectual skills. More specifically, with regard to irregular immigrants in France, "63% of them are manual workers (34% of whom work in low-skilled positions) and 27% work in the service sector. Only one out of ten regularized workers find a more qualified job, for example technician or in an intermediate profession. Overall, 39% of foreign workers regularized in 2009 work in the retail, hospitality and catering, 22% in construction, 12% in business services and 12% in household services"³.

Always related to the labor market, immigration is also often accused of being responsible for unemployment. However, the link between unemployment and immigration is far from obvious. As can be seen from the Fig.2, immigration rate and unemployment rate are in an inverse proportion.

³ OCDE (2014), *Gérer les migrations économiques pour mieux répondre aux besoins du marché du travail*, op. cit., p. 137.

Figure 7 – Immigration / Unemployment ratio



Source: <http://www.bsi-economics.org/625-immigration-france-impacts-econ>

The idea that immigration is responsible for a wage cuts or rising unemployment is based on strong assumptions, particularly that of homogeneity of the work factor. There is no evidence that migratory flows lead to lower wages or higher unemployment among the natives. On average 40 % of the immigrants living in France, and 17 % of their descendants bring a grant their region of origin. It is particularly the case for the populations stemming from Sub-Saharan Africa.⁷

We explain it by the fact of specific social orders that attach strongly the individuals to their roots. The extended family remains the socioeconomic unity of base and the village of origin a place of reference and exchanges of the solidarities. Nevertheless, the study of hourly pays shows that the immigrants and the descendants of immigrants perceive on average an hourly payment lower than those of the majority population.

3.5 Germany

The Politics of Migration

The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, 2019. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) of the Ministry of Interior leads the governance of asylum, migration and integration issues in Germany. It is in charge of the asylum procedure, the promotion and coordination of integration measures, data collection and research, while local actors are often responsible for implementing its measures. In addition, the Federal Employment Agency, a self-administered public body, is in charge of integrating people into the labour market while the Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration assists the Federal Government in developing its integration policy as well as in promoting the coexistence of all residents of Germany and the integration of immigrants. In the past few years, German public institutions, at federal, state and local level, had to face big challenges due to the large number of refugees arriving in the country. The action taken mainly concerned asylum and refugee policy. The guiding principle was to strike a balance between controlling and effectively managing migration on the one hand and swiftly and successfully integrating refugees entitled to stay in Germany on the other. A lot has been done when it comes to integrating refugees, but a great deal still remains to be done in this area.


A total of 890,000 refugees arrived in Germany in 2015, more than twice as many as in 1992, an event largely unforeseen that represented a stress test both at the administrative and regulatory level. Inter-agency measures and structures were developed in order to be able to get through this phase, staffing levels in the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees were increased and administrative workflows in the asylum procedure were modified. Numerous legal changes were also made: the list of safe countries of origin was updated, obstacles to deportation removed, integration courses opened up to asylum seekers and prospects for residence improved for those whose deportation has been temporarily suspended. Asylum

and refugee policy thus combines elements which tighten existing regulations with others which relax them. One core feature of measures taken was greater differentiation according to prospects for residence in Germany. Refugees with good prospects for being allowed to stay in Germany can now already begin integration measures whilst their asylum application is being processed. Asylum seekers from countries with a lower recognition rate are, by contrast, not initially given priority treatment when it comes to integration measures, because they will have to return to their countries of origin if their asylum application is rejected. Other measures introduced by the Federal Government concerned the

opening of integration to asylum seekers, the improvement of the prospects for the residence of those whose deportation was temporarily suspended, the updating of the list of safe countries of origin, the removal of obstacles to deportation.

Regarding the family reunification, for many years the most relevant entry channel to Germany, the changes introduced concerned the reunification for those granted subsidiary protection. In 2018, a two-stage procedure was introduced and the number of people permitted to come to Germany under family reunification rules limited to 1,000 per month: first those family members are identified who are entitled to join relatives who are already in Germany; then those who will be permitted entry are picked out based on integration considerations.

Fig.9 New Asylum Applications in Germany



To integrate the social inclusion of populations with migrant background, German governments have so far set up integration plans (the National Integration Plan of 2007 and the National Action Plan on Integration of 2012) focused on education, training, employment, and cultural integration, while created

instruments to render the results of the integration policy measurable. More recently, the Meseberg Declaration on Integration adopted by the Federal Cabinet in May 2016 outlined the Government policy based on a 2-ways principle: offering support, training and job opportunities to foreigners but also requiring efforts in return and highlighting their duties.

The Labour Market

The legal basis for access to the labour market is laid down in the Asylum Act, the Residence Act and the Employment Ordinance. As a rule, it is not possible for asylum seekers to participate in integration programmes until they have formally applied for asylum. Several months elapse between the first

The State of Refugee Integration in Germany in 2019, Stefan Trines, Research Editor, WENR, 2019.

The integration on the labour market of the estimated 1,3 million refugees arrived in the country in 2015-2016 represents an enormous challenge for Germany and, although the decision to open the country's border in 2015 has given rise to the growth of populist and xenophobic movements, this policy is getting successful because many of them are at work or are attending university courses, thus helping to reduce the country's labor shortages. Despite the high number of refugees—most of whom are entitled to public welfare payments—the number of welfare recipients in Germany has actually dropped in recent years. Despite the Germany attempts to halt additional refugee and migrant inflows by tightening its asylum regulations, the total number of humanitarian migrants in the country keeps rising. Germany continues to receive the highest number of asylum applications in the European Union. While the number of new asylum applications in Germany in 2018 has dropped nearly to levels last seen before 2015, the total number of people seeking asylum or other forms of protected status increased by 5 percent in 2017, reaching 1.7 million, according to the latest official statistics. Of these, 1.2 million had been granted permission to stay in Germany as of December 2017, most of them from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Most refugees coming to Germany continue to be young men, 84 percent of new asylum seekers in 2017 were under the age of 35, and 60 percent were male. Only a small percentage had formal occupational qualifications or academic degrees.

Of these, 1,2 million had been granted permission to stay in Germany as of December 2017, most of them from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

registration and the application.⁴ Basically, recognised asylum seekers are allowed to work without restriction as employees or to set up a self-employment business. Persons with residence permit or tolerance and with good prospects of staying have access to integration and professional language courses.


Integration into the German labour market is difficult without a school-leaving certificate and completed vocational training. Of the 60,000 people who arrived for work from non-EU countries in 2017, around 23,000 had not passed a professional apprenticeship. Especially for young adult refugees, post-qualification can increase their chances. In April 2019, NRW therefore adopted the "Getting Started in Training and Work" initiative (state funding: € 50 million).

The public costs resulting from this inflow is very high. Federal expenditures allotted to asylum seekers resources equal to €20.8 billion in 2018, a little more than 6 percent of the entire federal budget. That's a slight decrease from €21.2 billion in 2017, but more than in 2016, when the government spent €20.5 billion. It should be noted, though, that while most of the allocation go to housing, social security benefits, and integration initiatives, about 1/3 is spent on preventive measures to help stem the outflow of refugees from their countries of origin go to housing, social security benefits, and integration initiatives, about 1/3 is spent on preventive measures to help stem the outflow of refugees from their countries of origin.

The refugee employment has increased significantly since early 2017. Between October 2017 and October 2018 alone, the number of employed asylees from the top eight sending countries alone grew by 47 percent, from 203,000 to 298,000 [Fig.10]. The number officially looking for work or who were underemployed decreased by 6.7 and 10.6 percent respectively, between December 2017 and December 2018.

⁴ Asylum seekers receive a residence permit with their application for asylum, which they retain throughout the entire asylum procedure. This entitles them to live in Germany with a residence obligation until the decision on the asylum application has been made. The Employment Agency can support asylum seekers with good prospects of staying⁴ in Germany at an early stage. After three months, they are free to choose their place of residence and can be allowed to work. There is no waiting period for vocational training in a state-recognised regulated profession, for voluntary service or for highly qualified persons (netNRW Report on Desk Researches, 2019).

Fig.10 Full-time Employed Asylees from the Top Eight Sending Countries (October 2013-October 2018)



To find employment for most of the asylum seekers into gainful is a difficult task, given the lack of German language abilities, occupational experience, and skills among many refugees. While between 8,500 and 10,000 refugees entered the German labor force each month in 2018, researchers forecast that some 50 percent of the recent refugees will still be unemployed five years after their arrival. That percentage is estimated to drop to 25 percent only after 14 years. In addition, about one-third of employed refugees are temporary workers without long-term contracts, and the majority of them are working in low-skilled, low-paying occupations.

“ The German government supports the integration of refugees into higher education through the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and other institutions. Measures adopted include increased counseling and academic advising for refugees, expanded capacity for the evaluation of refugee credentials, and funding for language and academic bridging courses at universities, and so-called *Studienkollegs* which are generally one-year courses that combine language training with education in basic knowledge and terminology of the intended major. These measures have begun to bear fruit. While it is difficult to quantify the number of refugees enrolled at German universities because higher education institutions don't collect data on refugee status, surveys by the Rector's Conference, Germany's university association, show that the number of newly enrolled refugees jumped from merely 205 in 2015/16 to 3,788 in the 2018/19 winter semester. In total, the number of refugees who enrolled at German universities is said to have increased almost 10-fold over the past three years, from 1,100 in

2016 to around 10,000 in 2019. Syrians are by far the largest group among these students—they are now the sixth-largest group of foreign-educated students in Germany (up from being the 16th largest in 2017). According to the latest available statistics, the number of Syrian nationals enrolled in German universities increased by 69 percent between 2017 and 2018, from 5,090 to 8,618 “**(The State of Refugee Integration in Germany in 2019, Stefan Trines, Research Editor, WENR, 2019).**”

For young refugees there are several funding instruments of the Federal Government, the Federal Employment Agency and the State of North Rhine-Westphalia for (preparatory) integration into the training and labour market [G.I.B. NRW 2019]. Since 12/2016, “Care for Integration” in NRW has been a specific support programme for migrants who wish to work in nursing care for the elderly.

The “Willkommenslotsen” are supposed to show in companies the possibility of securing skilled workers through refugees and advise them in all practical questions (placement, contact persons, etc.). The welcome pilots are located at the chambers of commerce and non-profit organisations. Interested companies should be put in a position to make recruitment decisions with knowledge of the general conditions applicable to the training and employment of refugees. In 2018, the welcome pilots in NRW reached a total of 2,361 placement places for refugees, be it in work shadowing, internships, entry qualifications, apprenticeship or employment. The good figures of the previous year were by far exceeded.

In the present time, the law on the immigration of skilled workers (that will be changed in March 2020) restricts labour migration to “bottleneck professions”: although anyone with a qualified vocational qualification can apply for a visa, “a specific job offer has to be available and the vocational qualification has to be recognised”, with the sole exception of IT specialist which have a special regulation. With certification of at least 3 years of IT professional experience, a worker does not need to go through a recognition procedure for the visa.

Although priority checks may be reintroduced for individual professions or sectors following the necessity of labour market, qualified migrant workers and refugees do not need to have a priority claim. “Previously, the employment agency had to check whether an EU citizen to the job to be awarded”. Residence permits for the purpose of apprenticeship, formation or vocational training on the job will still need such priority check.

A special attention is made for the female refugee and they can be considered the “engine in the integration process”. Evidence suggest that young immigrant woman prefer education ahead of “working at all costs” and “training before work”. Furthermore, at January 2018 around 65,000 women are registered by employment agencies and job centres. Their origin is from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Eritrea, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia. “A quarter of women with a flight context are mothers with a child

under three years of age”, but unfortunately, evidence suggest that there are only a few language courses with childcare for the target group of mothers.

Migrant-led family businesses have an important integration function on the German labour market. About every tenth company is a migrant-run family business and they employ an above-average number of employees with a migrant background.

Contrary to the widespread picture that migrants are predominantly active in economically marginalised sectors, the study by [Bijedić et. al 2017] found that migrant-led family businesses are at least as frequently active in knowledge-intensive areas (e.g. financial services, insurance, IT, freelance professions) as other family businesses. In addition, they tend to introduce innovations more frequently and also use foreign sales markets more frequently. The family businesses of migrants who operate domestically, on the other hand, rarely focus on customers of the same ethnic group.

Demographic change is affecting Germany's economic performance - and economists and labour market experts expect that only long-term migration can secure Germany's prosperity. The Bertelsmann Foundation published figures to this fact in January 2019.⁵ According to the figures, the German economy will need millions of more workers from abroad in the next four decades. Between 2018 and 2035, approximately 98,000 more migrants from third countries would have to immigrate to Germany each year.

Entrepreneurial activity of migrants in Germany

Available studies and statistical surveys on enterprises and self-employment of migrants in Germany do not distinguish within the broad group of persons with a migrant background.

The proportion of self-employed entrepreneurs in Germany and of persons with a migrant background, following the result of the study published by the Bertelsmann Foundation and Prognos in 2016⁶, averages about 10% of the working population in Germany. Among the self-employed with a migrant background, 80 percent are in the service sectors. Although the proportion of self-employed with a migrant background in commerce and the hotel and restaurant industry in 2014 was still significantly higher (by one third) than the proportion of those without a migrant background, the proportion of self-employed with a migrant background in the service sector is still higher. However, this gap is bridging year by year. A much larger share are entrepreneurs in other sectors, including knowledge-intensive industries and manufacturing. For 2014, the Bertelsmann Foundation and Prognos AG estimated the number of migrant entrepreneurs at over 2 million. Their average monthly net income was between 40% and 95% above the average earned income of employees with a migrant background (higher

⁵ <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article188621949/Migration-Wie-viele-Zuwanderer-braucht-der-deutsche-Arbeitsmarkt.html>

⁶ Migrant Entrepreneurs in Germany from 2005 to 2014, Sachs, Hoch, Munch, Steidle, 2016

entrepreneurial income correlates with company size and number of employees). The extent and economic success of entrepreneurship increases with the proportion of highly qualified founders. In any case, companies run by migrants make a very significant contribution to employment in Germany. In 2014, at least 1.3 million employees were employed by migrant companies, a figure which corresponds to an increase of 36 percent over a decade.

3.6 Greece

The Politics of Migration

Greece has a new center-right government since the summer of 2019. Its approach to migration differs sharply from its predecessor's, as more controls and constraints are imposed on asylum seekers. The political agenda of Mitsotakis predecessor, Alexis Tsipras, who took office in 2015 when nearly a million migrants and refugees arrived in Greece to escape from war and violence in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, had a more humanitarian approach to the asylum-seekers. Soon, due also to the heavy economic crisis and the austerity programs imposed by the European Union, the country did not have the resources nor the staff to deal with the massive influx of new arrivals. The reduction in the number of refugees came in 2016 after the EU controversial deal reached with Turkey for a tighten control over its borders in exchange for an EU financial support for holding refugees and migrants in Turkey camps. On Oct. 31 of 2019, the government passed a new asylum law aiming at speeding up the processing of asylum claims; facilitating the return back to Turkey of those whose claims are rejected; and allowing a smoother integration into Greek society for those whose claims are approved. This law is strongly criticized by Amnesty International, the Greek Forum for Refugees and NGOs for lowering vulnerability standards for victims of torture, excluding people with PTSD from those considered vulnerable, normalizing the detention of unaccompanied children under 'protective custody,' and negatively changing the standards for the protection of unaccompanied minors who are older than 15.

New Democracy's policy on migration is in line with other Southern European countries. It is also consistent with many initiatives, and messaging implemented over the past several years to make Europe as unattractive as possible to migrants. Meanwhile, to enforce the new law, Mitsotakis government has increasingly empowered the police, at the expense of civilian agencies. After shuttering the Ministry of Migration over the summer, it transferred responsibility for migration to the Ministry of Civil Protection, which oversees the national police force. The government is also planning to replace the three largest camps on the islands with "detention centers." Asylum-seekers will not be allowed to move freely in and out of these centers, as they can currently in some camps. These closed detention centers will force vulnerable people, including unaccompanied minors, into what the International Rescue Committee calls "prison-like conditions" for up to 18 months.). According to the Greek Council of Refugees, detention conditions for third-country nationals in Greece, including asylum seekers, do not meet the basic standards (prolonged detention, poor hygiene conditions, overcapacity, etc.) (from **For Migrants and Refugees, Greece Has Become Hostile Territory**, Sarah Souli, *World Politics Review*, Jan, 15, 2020).

The Labour Market

According to the 2011 national census, the population of Greece was approximately 10.8 million. It is estimated that, before the crisis, there were over one million foreign immigrants working in Greece. However, after a few years, foreign workers and their families started to leave due to the slump in the labour market and in particular in the building industry. The latest official figures show that over the five-year recession (2009-2013), 33% of jobs held by foreigners were lost. According to recent ELSTAT figures, there are 567,669 immigrants residing legally in Greece,⁷ including 79,500 refugees and migrants,⁸ of whom approximately 75-80% are economically active.

Immigration legislation, as codified by Law 4375/2016, lays down the conditions for employing foreign workers lawfully and protects their employment and insurance rights. The law established that all international protection beneficiaries and applicants have access to wage employment or self-employment on the same terms and conditions with Greek nationals, provided that they have a valid residence permit, but because of the crisis and the national unemployment rates, very few of them make use of this provision.

Labour mobility in Greece is also limited compared to other European countries. This is due to the exceptionally high rate of owner-occupied housing (80%) and to social and cultural factors in which immediate and wider family connections play an important role and constitute an informal but exceptionally strong network of social protection. It is also because the unemployment rate is higher among foreigners living in Greece than among Greek nationals. Indeed, according to data from 2018

Refugee Integration in Mainland Greece: Prospects and Challenges, Dimitris Skeplaris, Policy Brief, March 2018. The Greek state currently faces the major challenges of a shrinking labour market and an ongoing restructuring of labour relations, which hinder, the already problematic, economic integration of legally residing third country nationals (TCNs). In principle, legally residing TCNs enjoy equal access to the labour market as Greek nationals, with a few exceptions (e.g. restricted access to public sector jobs). In practice, however, legally residing TCNs are still mainly employed in low-skilled and high-precariousness jobs, while they also face large percentages of unemployment. Besides the nominal right to labour market access, legally residing TCNs receive virtually no additional support to get oriented, trained or recognised in their field of work, which was the case even before the financial crisis. More than eight years into the financial crisis, the majority of legally employed TCNs are mainly occupied in the sectors of hotels and restaurants, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade as unskilled/manual labourers and small professionals and salespersons in stores and outdoor markets.


⁷ EURES. Available at

<https://ec.europa.eu/eures/main.jsp?catId=2589&countryId=GR&acro=Imi&lang=en®ionId=GR0&nu>
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⁸ UNHCR. Fact Sheet – Greece. 1-31 May 2019. Available at
<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/70066>

(Fig.11), Greece has the highest unemployment rate for persons born outside the EU with 29%, i.e. roughly 30% higher than the unemployment rate for Greek nationals.⁹

Fig.11 Unemployment rates for the population aged 20-64 by country of birth, 2018 (%)



Note: ranked on total unemployment rate (for all places of birth). Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia: EU-born and non-EU-born, not available.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: EU-born, not available. Iceland: non-EU born, not available.
(*) EU-born: low reliability.
(*) EU-born and non-EU-born: low reliability.
(*) Other than in the reporting Member State.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: ifsa_urgacob)

eurostat

In Greece, the UNHCR provides cash assistance as part of the ESTIA programme, with funds from the European Commission. Cash assistance aims to restore dignity and empower asylum-seekers and refugees who can now choose how to cover their basic needs. The programme also contributes directly to the economy of the host community through the purchase of services and goods. Since April 2017, 116,776 eligible individuals have received cash assistance in Greece at least once. Eligibility is assessed based on the individual's date of entry in the country, legal status and current location. Of the 70,000 individuals who received cash assistance in May 2019, 13,338 have international protection in Greece. Out of 34,474 families, 22% were women, 40% men and 38% children; moreover, 32% were single adults, while 31% were families of five members or more. The majority of TCNs receiving cash assistance come from Syria (29%), Afghanistan (24%) and Iraq (19%).

⁹ Eurostat. Available at [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Unemployment_rates_for_the_population_aged_20-64_years,_by_country_of_birth,_2018_\(%25\)_v2.png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Unemployment_rates_for_the_population_aged_20-64_years,_by_country_of_birth,_2018_(%25)_v2.png)

Overall, the impact of migration on the Greek economy seem to depend on two key factors; first, whether these persons carry knowledge and qualifications (i.e. human capital), and, second, the degree to which they can integrate into the Greek society and become economically productive.¹⁰

On that note, the result of a study conducted in 2016 by the IOM, showed that migrants and refugees traveling along the Eastern Mediterranean route, in which the entry point to the EU is Greece, have a considerably high educational background. More precisely, 50% of the respondents reported having obtained secondary level of education, while 20% reported having obtained primary education and 17% - tertiary education.

¹⁰ Euronews. Available at <https://www.euronews.com/2016/10/20/greece-gets-economic-boost-from-refugee-aid>

3.7 Italy

The Politics of Migration

Governance of Migrant Integration in Italy, European Commission 2019. At the national level, responsibility for the governance of integration policies is shared between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. Within the Ministry of Interior, the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration deals with issues concerning the protection of civil rights, including those related to immigration, asylum, citizenship, and religion. The Ministry of Labour and Social Policies oversees the monitoring and evaluation of migrants' socioeconomic integration. It publishes annual reports on migrants' integration in the labour market and their access to protection and pension schemes. Integration now largely falls under the competences of regional governments, which enjoy full autonomy in policy planning and implementation, resulting in a multilevel governance framework. Within the policy framework set by regional governments, municipalities hold the main responsibilities in terms of defining concrete integration measures and policy implementation. Before 1990 immigration was mainly managed through administrative regulations. It was only after the mid-1990s that salience of the immigration issue led to an organic law to identify key priorities and regulate migrants' integration (Migration Policy Planning 1998-2000). Among the main amending provisions introduced since then, the most important is the Bossi-Fini law (189/2002) which significantly reformed rules related to legal and irregular migration, with a more restrictive approach. Asylum laws in Italy largely result from the transposition of the EU directives on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and their recast versions. The "Salvini Decree" adopted in November 2018 abolished humanitarian protection permits, which had been granted to vulnerable people, families or single women with children, and people who had suffered trauma during their journey to Italy. The law draws also a clear division between the reception system for asylum seekers and the one for beneficiaries of international protection. The two reception systems are no longer communicating and become in all respects two parallel systems. In June 2019, a new decree was introduced to reinforce the powers of the Ministry of the Interior on immigration aiming to put an end to NGOs rescue missions in the central Mediterranean.

The conflicting directions taken by the migration policies in Italy over the past 20 years reflect not only a change of political directions in the perception of the role of migrants in contemporary Italian society as well as an organizational and reaction modality to external and internal events affecting our country accustomed to react not in a structural way but through the typical modality of the emergency approach. This conflicting and contradictory political behavior has emerged in particular in the management of the


unexpected growing migratory flows that have interested in the last years a country, Italy, historically accustomed to seeing its citizens emigrating abroad for work and study reasons.

Between January 2013 and July 2018, about 685,000 foreigners reached the Italian coast by sea through irregular channels, while in the previous 8 year sea arrivals averaged 20.000 per year (Fig.12). The stop in sea arrivals began with the change in the national strategy introduced from 2017 to modify and restrict the access and permanence of migrants in the country. The contraction of the Italian labour market and the subsequent high unemployment rate in the country have induced the government to largely reduce the quota available for regular migrant workers, which now amount to only a few thousands.

The TCNs resident in Italy on 1st January of 2019 are more than 3.6 million, approximately 6% of the total population. In 2018 the residence permits issued were 242.000, of which 50.7% for family reunification, 26.8% for humanitarian reasons and 9.1% for studies.

The political anti-immigration agenda of the Italian 5-Star Movement and the right-wing League Party coalition government, has exposed Italy to widespread criticism and potential legal consequences from international organizations, NGOs, European partners and national judicial authorities. The new PD-5 Star administration has announced a softer anti-immigration policy to resume negotiations with EU, to rethink the Dublin regulation and to reach a consensus on a European management of the migration problem.

Fig.12 Irregular sea arrivals to Italy, 2002-2007



Source: Ministry of the Interior, UNHCR

The Labour Market

Migrants play an important role in Italy by offsetting the effects of negative demographic trends such as workforce ageing and decline as well as more general depopulation. This is clear evident in the economy. In 2018 the foreign population within the working age of 20-64 represented 10,6% of total employment; In addition to 2,422,864 employed people, the total included 405,816 job seekers (-7% compared to 2016) as well as 1,149,281 inactive people (Ministry of Labour 2018). At a more detailed level, the Italian labour market of foreign workers seems to be split in two: non-EU foreigners show better performance than EU ones regarding increased employability (respectively +1.3% and 0.1%), new hires (13.7% against 1.6%) and unemployment reduction (-3.6% against -0.5).

The importance of foreign workers is evident in various economic domains. Migrant workforce is particularly concentrated in low-wage service segments such as the domestic and care sectors, the hotel and restaurant sectors, agriculture, construction, manufacturing, small-scale urban services and commerce. Foreign workers are overwhelmingly employed as employees in someone else's company, and generally concentrated in low-skilled jobs – more than 70% are hired as manual workers (Ministry of Labour 2018).

The data about the migrant professional labour market reveal a waste of human capital since foreign workers are mostly employed in activities where they are either overqualified or overeducated. The devaluation of the migrants work is particularly evident in the informal and unregulated Italian economy, if not linked to illicit or criminal activities.

The presence of foreign workers plays a role of utmost importance in various economic sectors: the incidence rate of employees shows significant sectoral differences. In the category "Other collective and personal services", the presence of non-native workers is rather relevant: in 2018 the percentage was equal to 36.6%, with a clear prevalence of the non-EU labour workforce. In some sectors migrants replaced the local native workers, as in the case of urban small trade, domestic and care work or secondary industrial processing and subcontracting. In other sectors (construction sector, cleaning companies, commercial non-ethnic activities etc.) migrant enterprises coexist and compete with local enterprises.

According to the annual report on foreigners in the Italian labour market produced by the Italian Ministry of Labour (2018), “over the last few years, the foreign component in the labour market has become key in the Italian economy, not only because of the importance that foreign workers have had and continue to have in the performance of specific tasks, but also by virtue of the compensatory effect they have determined: [...] up until 2015,8 [both] the EU and non-EU labour force have been able to offset the contraction of employment that affected the Italian component” (**Italian Ministry of Labour Report 2018**).

Almost 90% of foreign workers is an employee and slightly less than 80% of them works as manual worker. The professional segmentation, and therefore the prevalence of purely manual profiles among the foreign labour forces confirmed by the limited presence of workers employed in leadership roles and in similar positions: just 0.4% of those employed are managers and 0.8% are executives compared to 1.9% and 5.9% among Italians (Italian Ministry of Labour, IX Annual Report, The foreigners in the Italian labour market, 2019).

The employment condition of foreign women is more problematic, as demonstrated by the main statistical indexes: the employment rate lies at 56.0% among EU nationals and 46.9% among non-EU, the unemployment rate is 15.2% among EU nationals and 17.1% among non-EU, while the inactivity rate is 33.8% among EU and 43.1% among non-EU. Nowadays, foreign women experience similar difficulties as those that Italian women experienced in past decades during their complex path towards their socio-economic emancipation. Some of the main points emerging from the data analysis are: burdens of care and family ties; insufficient participation in the labour market; limited professional mobility; low wages.

In this scenario, inactive non-EU women represent a particularly problematic target. They represent a group of women typically young (an average age of 35 years old against the 40 years old of Italians), married (about 70%), often mothers (about 64%), mainly poorly educated (more than 65% with only a junior high school qualification), constrained to burdens of care and family commitments (over 52%) and mostly without any work experience. The 67.5% of inactive non-EU national women have never worked in their life, against 52.3% of Italians and 41.9% of EU citizens (Italian Ministry of Labour 2019).

Migrant entrepreneurs in Italy

The report produced by Censis in 2019, returns an important map on immigrant entrepreneurs in Italy. 447.422 entrepreneurs born overseas perform their business activity in Italy, making up 14.6% of the total enterprise owners operating in the country. They are a very important community that has grown even during the years of economic crisis and the 81.1% of them were born outside the European Union. Within this community, 103.501 are women, the 23.1% of all enterprise owners operating in Italy.

Over 40% of all immigrant entrepreneurs come from just four countries: Morocco (14.5%), China (11.4%), Romanian (10.7%) and Albanian (7.0%). The biggest growth in recent years has come from the Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities. Around half the number of immigrant entrepreneurs operate in northern regions of the country. The leading region is Lombardy, followed by Latium and Tuscany. At a provincial level, Rome is the most popular destination, followed by Milan and Turin. The province that has the largest incidence of immigrant owners of enterprises is Prato, where nearly 50% of entrepreneurs were born overseas.

At present, 9.6% of total companies and 16.5% of those with sole proprietorship belong to foreigners. The main nationalities involved are Moroccans (14.7%), Chinese (11.3%), Romanians (10.6%), Albanians (6.9%), Bangladesh (6.7%), Senegalese (4.3%), Egyptians (4.0%). Each national group tends to be present in particular sectors, which may reflect ethnic segmentation (Table.): trade and retail is largely prevalent among Senegalese (89.2%), Moroccans (73.3%) and Bangladeshi (66.8%); construction activities are preponderant among Albanians (72%), Romanians (64.4%) and Egyptians (42%); manufacturing represents a core activity for more than one third of Chinese companies (CeSPI 2018).

Table.1 The presence of immigrant enterprises in Italy in 2017

Sector	Number of immigrant enterprises	Total number of enterprises	% of immigrant enterprises
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	14,666	729,996	7.4%
Manufacturing activities	28,479	236,077	12.1%
Construction	132,376	823,584	16.1%
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles	209,556	1,543,307	14%
Transportation and storage	12,365	161,993	7.6%
Activities of accommodation and catering services	46,594	444,690	10.5%
Rental, travel agencies, business support services	30,494	151,607	20.1%
Other services (services for the person)	21,086	238,534	8.8%
Real estate activities	5,802	286,281	2.0%
Professional, scientific and technical activities	4,039	64,867	6.2%
Information and communication	3,627	10,795	33.6%
Other	34,810	207	0.6%
TOTAL	587,499	6,090,481	9.6%

Source: Unioncamere-Momdoimpresa 2018.

Migrant workers in the agriculture sector

In 2018 there are 370.327 immigrants working in the agriculture sector, of which 48.1% work in only 15 Italian provinces. The first provinces are Bolzano (5.7%), Verona (5%), Foggia (4.9%) and Latina (4,1%). The most active immigrant communities are Albanians, Indians, Moroccans, Senegalese and Pakistanis. Nigerians workers also show a remarkable increase: during the past three years (2016-2018) Nigerian immigrants working in agriculture have increased from 2.786 to 9.709 units, becoming a more and more important migration component in the national agriculture.

Thousands of immigrant women and men are responsible for growing and collecting the agricultural produces in Italy. In the past years, immigrants used to start to work in agriculture when they arrived and then, once their administrative migration procedures were regularised, moving in search of other more remunerative jobs. Due to economic crisis and to the complexity of the migration policies, the seasonal work in agriculture has become for many migrants the only chance to work. But the working conditions in this sector are characterized by the “Agromafia” phenomenon, the structure of exploitation and the criminal system behind it. The workers are paid according to the amount of vegetables they collect rather than the time spent at work, or they are paid €12 for eight hours’ work under the supervision of Caporali (illegal people recruiting them). They live in the shantytowns, isolated from city centers, without water or proper standards of hygiene, sanitation, or health services. Most of immigrant seasonal agriculture workers live in ghettos, real shantytown, far from the cities. In Southern Italy it has been estimated a presence of more than 50 of these settlements accounting between 58.000 and 63.000 agricultural workers, of which around 12.500-17.500 live in slums. This situation prevents any process of economic and social inclusion.

3.8 The Neetherlands


The Politics of Migration

Governance of Migrant Integration in the Netherlands, European Commission 2019. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is the competent authority leading the governance of migrant integration at the national level. The civic integration exams are coordinated by the Institute for the Implementation of Education DUO, which is part of the Ministry of Education. On the other hand, municipalities have an implementing role in the participation certificate and the naturalisation ceremonies. Local authorities further have a big role in the integration of newcomers (housing, social services and social assistance, school education, etc). The Netherlands implemented its first strategy in the 1980s to integrate those guest workers who ended up had permanently establishing in the country. The Dutch government then introduced a two-track policy consisting of social-economic integration and support for identity-development and group-wide emancipation. The latest coalition agreement of October 2017 has accentuated this active vision of migrants' integration and accelerated their entry into the labour market. The agreement planned to eliminate low literacy in this population group. Based on this agreement, a new Integration Policy was drafted. Political events and debates after 2017, along with the increased inflow of refugee and economic migrants in the country and the rise of far-right populists' parties, have accelerated the tension between moderate political forces and anti-immigration sentiment, but mainly against Muslim workers. However, the actual situation regarding migration in the Netherlands is quite different from these public perceptions, and how migration is portrayed and framed by populist discourse. The Dutch government is today promoting a more inclusive policy towards those in need of protection, while for all other TCNs workers the approach is to follow the EU agreements and lows to fight illegal immigration and to help to return in their origin countries the migrants who have not the right of asylum.

The Labour Market

Migration to the Netherlands is mainly demand driven by needs for labour and skills. The Netherlands is interesting for migrants seeking employment because it has a strong and one of the largest open economies in Europe (OECD 2018b). Of all migrants, most are European citizens that use their right of free movement. The inflow of refugees from outside Europe was much smaller than in many other European countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, France or Sweden (Münz 2018). A more significant group than the refugees are migrants coming for family reunification or family formation (Fig.13)

Fig.13 Number of registered migrants by admission category, the Netherlands, 2008-2016




Source: Statline CBS

The total Dutch labour force at the end of 2017 was 9,042,000 people, of which 11,2 per cent (888.000) has a non Western migrant background.

The unemployment rate for Dutch people is much lower, 3.5%, than the one of TCNs, 9.6%. The majority of migrants are economically active and participate in many sectors of the Dutch economy (Fig.14). The Netherlands is home to numerous multinational corporations in which business people from all over the world are employed. Furthermore, the Dutch educational system attracts many international students and PhD researchers. A consistent number of migrants contribute to the Dutch economy in the low-paid and labour-intensive sectors, such as the cleaning, agricultural and construction sectors that could not survive nowadays without the labour support of migrants. A significant number of migrants are working in the hospitality and care sector, many are also employed in private houses and in other undeclared or informal jobs, outside the protection of labour law. Another recognised pattern in people who do undeclared work is evident in migrant-owned businesses. In order to survive, some business owners employ family members off the books (Kloosterman, Rusinovic and Yeboah 2016).

Fig.14 AOW contribution by migrant background, The Netherlands, 2008-2015



Source: Statline CSB

In 2014, about 20,000 asylum seekers received Dutch asylum residence permits. More than two thirds of this group came from Syria (10,000) or Eritrea (4,000). With this permit, one is allowed to work or to start a business. In mid-2017, 11% of this group in the age group 18-65 years old had a job or was self-employed. Among the afore mentioned 20,000 people, differences are visible; 6% of the Eritreans and 29% of the Afghans were employed. After 1,5 year, 90% of the people who received the asylum residence permit were dependent on government allowance (in Dutch: uitkering); 1 year later this number dropped to 86%. Of the Syrian and Eritrean population, 90% was still depending on government allowance 2.5 years after receiving their residence permit (CBS 2017; CBS 2018). Almost 50% of all employed asylum seekers were in the hospitality sector. Besides, many refugees with a permit have temporary jobs (85%) from out-sourcing agencies. Most have part-time employment contracts (89%) (CBS 2018).

The contribution of older- and middle-aged people, first-generation refugees to the Netherlands is limited in general. The contribution of the second-generation refugees and/or migrants is more substantial. For the first generation, it appears to be difficult to find a job and to integrate well into society. They first have to create stability for their families. After that, they are expected to participate and contribute as well. Mostly, they are keen to work and be supported by the government and non-governmental organisations, but still encounter difficulties. The second generation is generally ready to make the best out of their lives and contribute to a flourishing Dutch economy due to high motivation and expectations of family members.


The percentage of people with a non-western migration background who are in work is lower than among people with a Dutch or new EU background. In 2017, 69 percent of people with new EU backgrounds and 68 percent of people with a native Dutch background were in paid work, compared with 57 percent of people with a non-western background. In the latter group, people with a Surinamese

background were most likely to be in paid employment (62 percent), while people with a Moroccan background were the least likely to have paid work (54 percent).

During the recent economic crisis, there was a relatively significant decline in employment among people with a non-western background. People with an Antillean background in particular had lower employment figures in 2017 than in 2008. Net employment has risen in recent years, although this increase is not equally distributed across all groups. Net employment among people with an Antillean background was still almost as high in 2017 as in 2014.

In the four largest non-western migrant groups in the Netherlands (people with Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean backgrounds), we see a smaller population in work relative to migrants from new EU countries. This is due to the facts that the average age of the new EU groups is lower and that these people migrated more recently and with a higher likelihood that the reason for migrating would be work-related.

Fig.15 Net labour participation by background (% of population aged 15-74)



Migrants' participation in business activities

In 2017 there were 1,429,000 self-employed people in the Netherlands, of which, 154,000 had a Western migrant background and 127,000 a non-Western migrant background. The rest (1,147,000) were citizens with a Dutch background (Statline CBS 2018). In general, the Netherlands has an abundance of self-employed migrants and migrants who started their own business in sectors such as the construction industry, with many East European migrants, and in the food industry with entrepreneurs and self-

employed people from all over the world, but mainly from Southern Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle-East. Furthermore, research conducted among first and second generation migrants demonstrated that first-generation migrants have a more dominant presence in the services sector, such as finance, real estate and insurance, while second-generation migrants are more active in ICT-businesses and in the creative sector (Baycan, Sahin and Nijkamp 2012).

Research Conducted among entrepreneurs from Ghana who arrived in the Netherlands highlighted that most entrepreneurs are highly-educated and speak English fluently. They contribute to the “new urban economy” with small businesses and cognitive-cultural activities (Kloosterman, Rusinovic and Yeboah 2016).

Such cognitive-cultural activities are specified by Otieno Ong’ayo (2016) in his paper on Ghanaians in Dutch cities. He outlined that neighbourhoods with large migrant concentrations in big cities host many businesses owned by migrants. The Ghanaians have a dominant presence in specific neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Almere and The Hague. In such neighbourhoods, they have set up shops, churches and meeting places for clubs and associations. Such establishments foster the creation of close ties within the Ghanaian community and with the country of origin. But these networks also facilitate housing, jobs and social amenities.

All the people who live and work in the Netherlands contribute to the social security of the national welfare system, including people with a migrant background who pay taxes and consume goods and services, participating actively to the country’s prosperity (CSB 2018).

3.9 Poland

The Politics of Migration

Who does what in the field of migration & integration in Poland, Agnieszka Mikulska-Jolles, Hentich Boll Stiftung, WARZAWA 2019. The most important institution dealing with migration in the government is the Ministry of the Interior and Administration with the Analysis and Migration Policy Department. The entities answering to the Ministry are the Border Guard and the Office for Foreigners. The powers of the latter include conducting proceedings concerning international or national protection for foreigners, as well as handling appeals against decisions of voivodeship governors on the regularisation of voluntary migrants. For many years, it has also played an important role in shaping and executing the state's migration policy. The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy is responsible for the policy of foreigner employment, which is probably the most important aspect in the Polish migration context. There are two subsidiary bodies of the Prime Minister's office that serve as platforms of interministerial cooperation at governmental level: the Team on Migration Issues (established in 2007)²⁷ and the recently founded Interministerial Team on Socio-Economic Aspects of Migration Policy.²⁸ The teams comprise high-level representatives of ministries, as well as institutions and central offices. The former team is led by the Minister of the Interior and Administration, while the latter is headed by the undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Investment and Economic Development and was formed for a specifically defined purpose, i.e. to identify the socio-economic priorities of migration policy.

The approach to migration and integration in Poland has changed significantly in recent years. Migration, especially in relation to refugees, has become a political issue since the debate on how to solve the so-called refugee crisis coincided with the campaigns for presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland in 2015. The approach to migration and integration in Poland has changed significantly in recent years. Migration, especially in relation to refugees, has become a political issue since the debate on how to solve the so-called refugee crisis coincided with the campaigns for presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland in 2015. The Law and Justice party, which formed the government in autumn 2015, delivered on its promise not to receive refugees under the system of quotas set in negotiations between the EU Member States. The government went even further in its anti-refugee actions, making it more difficult for people seeking international protection to enter Poland directly via the eastern border, by denying them the possibility to file asylum applications and refusing entry on the grounds of the lack of a document authorising them to do so. Thus, the flow of refugees was stopped, but, at the same time, since 2014, a dynamic influx of voluntary migrants has been observed. This has been facilitated mostly by the needs of the labour market, which is facing labour

shortages with respect to domestic workers. Despite the generally xenophobic rhetoric of the ruling party, no efforts are made to stop labour migration. On the contrary, due to demographic and economic reasons, it is planned to further receive foreign workers.

According to the Eurostat, in 2016 Poland recorded the highest number of employment-related residence permits (almost half a million) for third country nationals among the EU Member States. Apart from Ukraine, they came also from countries as Belorussia, Russia, Vietnam, India and China – to name the most numerous groups registered by the Office for Foreigners. Other estimations based on analysis of mobile phone data pointed out that there were 1.25 million Ukrainians residing in Poland at the beginning of 2019. Poland, as a country whose citizens in the last three decades have significantly contributed to the European migration processes with a diaspora of over 2 million persons, has been transformed from a net-emigration towards to a net-immigration country.

The politicization of immigration gave shape to a strong security threat narrative about the processes of forced migration introducing in the national security policy the assessment to asylum seekers at the Polish border.

The Labour Market

In the last decade, the Polish labour market has undergone major changes. The outcome of Polish accession to the EU and the consequences resulting from it have had a particular impact on the professional activity of Poles (e.g. Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008). In 2004 the labour market in Poland was characterised by the worst indicators of all the 24 EU member-states: the rate of unemployment was 19.1 per cent and the employment rate 57.3 per cent, respectively the highest and lowest values in Europe (Eurostat 2017). These were the main factors, together with the disproportionate wage levels, pushing those of working age out of the country. A high flow of post-accession emigration, the tens of billions of euros in structural funds acquired for social and economic development in the years 2007–2015 and foreign investments, as well as an increase in expenditure on labour market policy, have all significantly contributed to the improvement in the domestic labour market (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). Since 2014, the level of unemployment has been below 10 per cent and a further regular decline has been observed. This is also reflected in GDP growth which, in the last decade, was above the average value for the EU-28. It turns out that the new challenge for the functioning of the labour market lies in a shrinking and ageing labour stock – a consequence of overlapping negative demographic changes (Kiełczewska and Lewandowski 2017).

According to the demographic forecast elaborated in 2018 by the Ministry of Finance for long-term macroeconomic assumptions, the number of people in the post-working age (men aged 65 and over and women aged 60 and over) will be increasing while the number of people in the working age ((men aged 18-64 and women aged 18-59) will be decreasing. The demographic analysis show that migrants are


essentials to maintain the Polish current economic growth rates. In order for the demographic dependency ratio to remain at its current level, the number of foreigners of a working age would have to increase by between 700 000 and 900 000 annually. This is more than the number of foreigners currently registered for pension and disability insurance in total. As a reminder: in 2017 the number of foreigners registered for social insurance increased by 147,000, and in 2018 by 129,000. In terms of Poland's migration needs it means that the number of foreigners in 2028 would have to amount to 6.1 million people, which would constitute over 22% of the working age population, practically one in five people of a working age would be a foreigner.

Ukrainian citizens are the largest group of labour immigrants. Both the data regarding work permits and those connected with employer declarations show clearly the prevailing role of Ukrainians on the Polish labour market. They constitute about 80-90 per cent of the foreign labour force. The prevalence among non-national workers of a single nationality, a phenomenon not observed in any other EU member country, may create problems. As Łukasz Kozłowski says "The impermanence of Ukrainian economic emigration makes it sensitive to immigration policies in other countries. If Germany decided to open the labour market more widely to foreigners from the East, it would be painful for our economy. In Poland, Ukrainians may be employed for up to six months in total in the course of a year, i.e. they must return to their homeland periodically. In addition, we are not able to compete with Western European countries in terms of earnings. In such a situation, it will not make such for foreigners to decide to go to other EU countries¹¹.

Another characteristic of migration in Poland is its temporary character, which distinguishes Poland from other highly developed countries where long-term migration (over 12 months) prevails (Duszczuk and Matuszczyk 2016; Kaczmarczyk 2015b). According to data from the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy, in 2004-2016, there was a significant increase in the number of work permits issued mainly for periods longer than 12 months, from over 12 000 in 2004 to 235 000 by 2017. A definite increase in foreign interest in employment on the Polish labour market is noticeable in the data on employer declarations of intent to employ a foreigner. Between 2007 and 2017 the number of declarations submitted grew from 21 000 to more than 1.82 million – an 87-fold increase (Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy 2018b).

¹¹ "Większość Ukraińców w Polsce pracuje na czarno. Stabilne zatrudnienie wyciągnie ich z szarej strefy?" („Most Ukrainians in Poland work illegally. Will stable employment bring them out of grey economy?”), date of publication: 04. 06. 2018 <https://praca.interia.pl/news-wiekszosc-ukraincow-w-polsce-pracuje-na-czarno-stabilne-zatr,nld,2587770>.

Fig.16 Declaration submitted (right axis) and unemployment rate (left axis) in Poland, 2007-2016



Source: CSO (2017a) and Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy (2018b).

The great interest in Poland labour market is also confirmed by Eurostat data on the numbers of declarations issued. Fig. 16 shows the relationship existing between the declaration submitted by entrepreneurs and the reduction of unemployment. Due to the intensive influx of immigrants after 2013, Poland has become one of the most frequently chosen destinations for labour immigration in the EU (Eurostat 2017).

Type of work undertaken by migrants and their education

Taking into account the number of work permits issued in 2018 according to selected groups of the Classification of Occupations and Specialities, it can be observed that the largest group were industrial workers and craftsmen (35.7% of the total number of permits issued). A significant share was also observed among employees performing simple works (29.4%) and operators and assemblers of machines and devices (21.1%). This means that most foreigners take up jobs requiring low qualifications, although in the context of current earnings in Poland it is not necessarily connected to low wages¹².

¹² Currently, low-paid occupations in Poland are those connected with employment at public institutions. These are e.g. the professions of a teacher, nurse, doctor (no specialisation), lower level officials. Analysis of the labour market shows that manual labour is currently better paid (jobs in the construction sector, industry, etc. - especially workers with specialist qualifications).

Based on research conducted by the Central Statistical Office entitled "Foreigners on the national labour market - regional approach"¹³, we learn that the registers do not provide information on the education of foreigners. In order to determine the characteristics of the foreigner population based on educational level, an appropriate structure was used, developed on the basis of the National Census of 2011. It was assumed that the educational structure has not changed significantly in recent years. According to these assumptions, foreigners are mainly people with degrees in secondary education (over 43%). A significant group are also individuals with higher education degrees (over 36%). Only one in five people has qualifications below secondary education. Foreigners are therefore relatively well-educated and constitute valuable capital from the point of view of the labour market in Poland.

The survey "Attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards the Polish labour market"¹⁴ conducted by the Work Service agency shows that 2/3 of Ukrainian immigrants currently work in Poland on positions below the level of their qualifications, which mainly applies to people with higher education degrees. This means that with the current model of immigration, the potential of people coming into the Polish labour market is not fully exploited and it does not fill staff shortages in specialist professions (doctors, IT industry, research). This is obstructed, among other things, by burdensome and costly procedures of recognition of university diplomas obtained outside Poland.

Working in positions below one's qualifications is a particularly common phenomenon among the female migrant population. The International Labour Organization describes this phenomenon in its report: "There is often a downgrading or waste of human capital and deskilling; women migrants take up jobs mismatched with their educational or skill qualifications. For better income but lower status abroad, the women understate their qualifications in order to secure a job abroad"¹⁵. According to the International Labour Organization, the phenomenon of taking up jobs below one's qualifications is of a discriminatory character in the case of women. We also see them in Poland - migrant women often take up work which involves cleaning, taking care of the elderly or sick, trade. These are low-paid or illegal jobs.

¹³ <https://stat.gov.pl/statystyki-eksperymentalne/kapital-ludzki/cudzoziemcy-na-krajowym-ryнку-pracy-w-ujeciu-regionalnym,6,1.html>

¹⁴ https://porp.pl/uploads/original/g2/2018_09/01e6f0fc7e010cf3518fc7d31b673836.pdf

¹⁵ "Preventing Discrimination, Exploitation and Abuse of Women Migrant Workers", International Labour Organization, Booklet 1, 2003

Table 2 Grey economy and dishonest agents

According to estimates published by the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy and the Social Insurance Institution, a significant number of foreigners work illegally in Poland:

	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total foreign workers	416.300	678.000	983.700	1140.000
Foreigners working in grey economy	232.1	284.900	543.500	570.800

An offer to illegal work is usually made by the employers, as it means that they don't have to pay social security contributions and taxes. Whereas employees get more net income, so they are also interested in this solution. However, by not signing a contract of employment, employees do not have a document that would enable them to exercise their rights in the event of unforeseen circumstances.

Foreigners employed in Poland are often exposed to discrimination and exploitation at work. A survey conducted in 2017 among Ukrainian workers for the International Organisation for Migration demonstrated that 22% of respondents had been deceived or exploited by an employer or employment agent. Discrimination mainly involves lower wages and poorer working conditions. According to analyses commissioned by the National Bank of Poland, the wage gap between Polish citizens and immigrants in the Warsaw agglomeration is about 30%. At 15%, the disparity is less significant in smaller towns and cities. Poorer working conditions mostly involve illegal employment, night work, work under civil law contracts instead of employment contracts, and delegating foreigners to perform the most onerous types of work. Monitoring by the State Labour Inspection also found other abuses by employers against foreign workers: failure to observe agreed working hours, to pay overtime and to grant leave.

Moreover, numerous migrants are underemployed. Foreigners often fall victim to dishonest employers or employment agents whose frauds involve the non-payment of wages and illegitimate reduction of earnings by amounts constituting the cost of employment or accommodation of a foreign employee. In extreme cases, the relations between employees and employers or employment agencies can be considered as human trafficking.

A factor conducive to reducing grey and illegal economy is the creation of conditions favourable to permanent residence and legal employment in the long term. This is all the more important because every fourth Ukrainian is considering leaving Poland in the first half of 2019 and migrating to another European country. Germany (69 per cent) and the Czech Republic (15 per cent) are the most frequent

choices, followed by Great Britain (3 per cent in the group of respondents planning to leave Poland), Italy (2 per cent), the USA (2 per cent) and the Scandinavian countries (2 per cent). The respondents also mentioned Canada and Spain. Only 1% are planning to return to Ukraine.

Another commonly observed phenomenon in Poland is the practice of illegal documents entitling the holder to obtain a residence card or a visa (false declarations on the intention to employ a foreigner) being sold by various companies acting as employment agencies in Poland. People who use the service of agents often learn after coming to Poland that the promised job does not exist. In this situation, although they have residence cards or visas issued for the purpose of commencing work, migrants look for a job on their own, on the black market. As a result, a large proportion of employees work illegally. They perform work for employers other than the ones who initially employed them and enabled them to obtain a work permit.

It should also be noted that many foreign workers are unfortunately not aware of their rights and obligations. They are more vulnerable to discrimination at the workplace because they are more dependent on their employer than other workers. And in the event of a conflict with the boss, they don't have enough support. In particular, abuse by employers takes place before the end of the work permit, before the start of the procedure of extending the foreigner's stay in Poland.

3.10 Slovenia

The Politics of Migration

The Directorate for Administrative Internal Affairs, Migration and Naturalisation within the Ministry of the Interior currently leads on the governance of integration issues. The Government also established an Office for the Support and Integration of Migrants in May 2017 ensuring the reception and integration of refugees as well as providing basic integration support to other migrants. It also coordinates the work of relevant state bodies, NGOs and international organisations in the area of integration. On the regional and local level, the role of municipalities in the integration of foreign citizens is quite unclear and limited to housing and school education. The first integration programme on migration has been introduced in Slovenia in 2008, *Initial Integration of Immigrants*, focusing on a mutual introduction course between foreigners and Slovene citizens. In 2019, the government has adopted the *Strategy on Migration*, build on six pillars concerning interdepartment cooperation, a comprehensive long-term approach to migration, procedures for international protection and illegal migration, security issues. Since Slovenia became an EU Member State its immigration policy is largely in line with the EU migration and asylum policy. Nevertheless, as can be observed in official public documents, migrant conditions, due also to economic crisis that has severely affected the country, tend to be worse than the natives and subject to rights violations and abuse (ILO 2015).

The Government, late 2019, has announced the preparation of a migration strategy, and appointed members of an inter-sectorial working group consisting of representatives of relevant ministries, to prepare a strategy until the end of July 2019. The working group preparing the strategy faces a key challenge on how to comprehensively include all relevant aspects of migration in the strategy and how to avoid the reduction of the phenomena of migration to one common denominator, the need to prevent and to manage effectively irregular migrations.

The Labour Market

The most commonly cited reasons for immigration to Slovenia is employment, followed closely by family reunification. In 2018, according to Eurostat, 250.226 people born abroad were residing in Slovenia and moved to Slovenia at some point of their life, meaning that foreign-born individuals represented 12.1% of total Slovene population. 85 % of all foreign-born population living in Slovenia was born in one of the Western Balkan countries, mostly Bosnia and Herzegovina (43 %), followed by Croatia (18%), Serbia (10 %), and North Macedonia and Kosovo (each of them 7 %). The Ministry of the Interior data on residence permits shows an increase of more than 40% in valid residence permits between 2014 to 2018,13 while

the number of newly issued residence permits is rising by a slower pace (26% in same the period). The majority of permits were issued to migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina following the agreement signed by these two countries with Slovenia. It should be noted that in the same year, 62% of citizens EU moved to Slovenia for employment, 7% for study, while family reunification accounted for 17% of all of immigration to Slovenia from EU Member States (database SURS). Internal migration is one of the most common characteristic of migration flows in Slovenia, which means that many people are moving inside the territory of Slovenia. People that change the place of residence every year are well over 100,000 people. Research by Josipovič (2018) on emigration from region shows that most of the people leaving the region are well-educated and skilled, frequently propelling new waves of emigration to the Central region, creating a 'centreperiphery' dichotomy and brain drain. Most immigrant communities are nowadays concentrated in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia and its industrial and commercial centre, and suburbs, as well as the cities of Maribor and Koper. Majority of migrants coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than half from Montenegro and almost forty percent from Serbia is living in Central Slovenia region, while the Albanian community from Kosovo is settled in more disperse way.

CARITAS, Common Home, Slovenia 2019.

In 2016 there were around 47,000 workers posted abroad, most frequently to Germany, Austria, Belgium and Italy. Many of them were posted multiple times (Posted Workers website 2018). The Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (2018) has warned against the poor regulation and control of this area not only in Slovenia but across the EU. Workers, mainly migrants from Western Balkan countries, were posted without valid employment contracts, without or counterfeit A-1 forms or without visas. The temporary residences of posted workers were not registered and nor were construction workers registered in the parity funds SOKA BAU in Germany or BUAK in Austria, etc. The minimum labour rights of workers were violated, forcing workers to work overtime, failing to pay a minimum wage, disregarding the right to rest breaks and recuperation and preventing workers taking their annual leave. This led not only to unfair business practices but also to social dumping and bad reputation for Slovenia. These findings also correspond to concerns raised by Eurofund (2017). Another area where migrants are in a more vulnerable situation are occupational fatalities. In 2017 there were total of 17 workplace fatalities, of which 47% were migrant workers.

Slovenia remains a transit country for people on the move to other Western European countries. One of the reasons is the lack of support from certain diaspora networks, which would ease the transition into labour market and society. This is especially the case for asylum seeking and refugee communities arriving to Slovenia in past years. Most of the diaspora networks and organisations are from Western Balkan.

In Slovenia the primary sectors of employment are the construction sector, followed by manufacturing, transportation and storage¹⁶. As a consequence of the economic crisis affecting the country in the years 2008-2015, there has been a significant decrease in the number of workers permits released in the construction and manufacturing sectors.

Migrant workers are often also over-qualified for the position they are holding. Compared to the majority of the population, studies have shown that non-western immigrants are more likely to work in jobs for which they are overqualified (Larsen et al. 2018). One of the main issues related to overqualification in Slovenia is the recognition of educational qualifications. New procedures have been introduced for people, especially refugees who left their countries without certificates of educational attainment, who are not able to present their certificates. The data of the Business Register of Slovenia analysed in the report, give evidence that foreign women are less represented in the labour market. Among Slovenian women, 82% are employed, 7% self-employed and 10% unemployed, while only 74% of foreign woman workers are employed, 4% are self-employed and 22% are unemployed.

Another obstacle migrants are facing is Slovene language which is relatively hard to learn, but which they need to know in order to be able to fully participate in the labour market and society. The national law requires the knowledge of Slovene language in all work-related communication and documentation, including employment contracts. A special effort has been deliberated by the national authorities for the education of migrant children in Slovenia, considering the fact that in the last decade the share of foreign-born children has increased.

¹⁶ These sectors often include activities in the so-called 3-D jobs, jobs considered dirty, dangerous, and demeaning (Quandt et al., 2013). Migrants working in 3-D precarious arrangements tend to earn less, work longer hours in worse conditions than their non-immigrant peers and are frequently subjected to human rights violations, abuse, human trafficking, and violence (ILO 2015).

3.11 Spain

The Politics of Migration

The main institution responsible for the governance of immigrant integration at national level is the General Secretary of Immigration and Emigration at the Ministry of Labor, Migration and Social Security. Its General Directorate of Integration and Humanitarian Attention is in charge of the functional coordination of relevant actors, while the Sub-Directorate for Integration and Institutional Relations develops and manages procedures for the reception and integration of immigrants. The General Secretary closely works with the Permanent Observatory on Migration, which conducts research on migration-related topics. All the different phases of integration are managed according to a model of multi-level governance that includes the public administration, regional governments (autonomous communities), local entities (town and city councils) and civil society (trade unions, employers' organisations, NGOs and immigrant associations). In addition, each autonomous community has its own integration plan, regulating integration policies in its territory. For much of the 20th century, Spain was a country of emigration, with millions of its nationals moving to countries in the Americas and in North and Western Europe. In the 1980s, however, immigration to Spain began to pick up. Since then, the country has developed a legal framework for labor migration that features the active involvement of employers, trade unions, and regional governments. The current institutional framework for immigrant integration was set by Law 2/2009, which introduced a framework of multi-level governance based on cooperation among central administration institutions, local governments and civil society.

The economic crisis that begun in 2008 and its ongoing effects have put a strain on Spain's migration system. Spain's legal migration system was working well before the crisis, enabling employers to recruit workers for low- and middle-skilled roles in fast-growing sectors such as construction. The demand-driven nature of this system has meant that since the onset of the crisis, there has been a sharp curtailing of opportunities for low- and middle-skilled migration, although the government has embarked in a number of initiatives to encourage high-skilled migration.

While Spain's General Regime accounts for most non-EU migration to Spain, the Collective Management System is an interesting model for cooperation with third countries on migration issues. This system offers a mechanism for admitting migrants from countries with which Spain has signed a bilateral agreement, allowing Spain to deliver on its legal migration pledges to key sending and transit countries – although in practice, this has hinged in the capacity of partner countries to manage migration effectively. Falling demand for foreign labour in Spain, however, risks the complication of these relationships. The country's high unemployment, especially among young people, have prompted the suspension or curtailing of certain pathways for low and middle skilled immigrants. The national government suspended its fund

for immigration in 2012, leaving autonomous communities, provinces and municipalities to make up the shortfall. More recently, a spike in unauthorized maritime arrival to Spain from 2017 onwards may present new challenges as local community's newcomers with potentially complex needs.

Expanding legal migration opportunities has contributed to Spain's close working relationships with key sending or transit countries, such as Morocco, but irregular migration continues to be an issue in Spain. Since the cayuco crisis of 2005-2006, Spain has worked closely with North and West African countries to build their capacity to curb irregular maritime migration, yet it continues, reaching 59,000 sea arrivals in 2018, primarily to mainland Andalusia. As new arrivals have settled across the country, municipalities are grappling with how to meet their specific needs; many are unlikely to qualify for asylum, but return rates remain low. Spain has managed to return some failed asylum seekers and other migrants without legal status to countries with which it has readmission agreements, such as Algeria, Mali, and Morocco, but returns to Sub-Saharan African countries have generally proven difficult to carry out.


In the years to come, top priorities for Spanish immigration policymakers will likely include addressing ongoing irregular migration, the arrival of increasing numbers of Venezuelans¹⁷ fleeing economic and political crisis, and—as sectors such as construction recover—how to adapt entry pathways and labor protections accordingly.

The Labour Market

Spain's immigration population grew dramatically in a period of great economic growth, especially in the real estate sector, during the late 1990s and early 2000s. This led to a significant job creation in a number of low and middle skilled sectors, such as construction, hospitality and domestic services where migrants could find more easily job opportunities (temporary contracts). The Fig.17 shows the increase of Spain immigrants and the change in its composition.

¹⁷ Between 2015 and 2018, the Venezuela-born population registered in Spain increased by 57 per cent. Recognition rates for Venezuelan asylum seekers remain low, but carrying out returns of those who fail to secure asylum is impractical, leading Spain to announce in March 2019 that it would introduce renewable one-year residence permits on humanitarian grounds for Venezuelans whose asylum applications were rejected after 1 January 2014.

Fig.17 Foreign-born persons registered in Spain, by region of birth, 1998-2018




Note: These data cover Spain's foreign-born population and include both foreign nationals and naturalised Spanish citizens. 'Latin America' combines data for the Caribbean and Central America with data for South America; 'Other' combines data for North America and Oceania.

Source: Spain's Labour Migration policies in the Aftermath of Economic Crisis, Migration Policy Institute 2019.

Between 1998 and 2008 the foreign-born population increased by almost six times, but with the incoming economic crisis the unemployment rate among non-EU migrants went up 38 per cent. Some migrant groups were hit harder than others, reflecting the sectors in which they were concentrated. By the second quarter of 2010, unemployment among African migrants (primarily Maroccans), who generally worked in agriculture, construction and low-skilled sectors, reached around 50 per cent. The unemployment rates of Latin American migrants, who generally worked in domestic services, were around 25-30 per cent, while those of Asia and Oceania migrants, who worked mainly in hospitality and retail, were lower than those of the native born. As of 2017, the number of residents permits issued annually remained far below pre-crisis level.

Fig.18 Unemployment rates for non-EU and EU migrants and Spanish nationals, 2007-2017



Source: Eurostat, 'Population by Sex, Age, Country of Birth and Labour Status [lfsa_pgacws]', updated 11 March 2019, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/lfsa_pgacws.

The crisis has also had lasting effects on where migrants are employed. For example, while construction was a key source of employment before the crisis, the foreign-born workforce is now more concentrated in the services sectors. As of 2018, the number of jobs in Spain had yet to recover to their 2008 levels. But there are some signs of recovery; in 2018, jobs in the service sector outpaced those available in 2008, and the employment situation in the construction sector was slowly improving. Demand for foreign workers in parts of the informal economy (such as care services and hospitality) is reportedly also growing, with arrivals coming from Latin America (including Venezuela, Colombia, and Honduras) and several Eastern European and Asian countries with visa-free travel arrangements.

As Spain's economy recovers, with growth in sectors such as construction that have relied in a largely foreign-born workforce, the government may start to increase its quotas for admitting non-EU workers. Policy priorities such as measures to promote the recognition of middle-skilled credentials, which were quietly dropped as the crises took hold, may be picked up once more. When demand for unskilled or semi-skilled workers does start to grow, challenges will

include ensuring adequate protections for labour migrants, particularly those working in the informal economy. Demand for low-skilled foreign workers is in part decided by Spanish nationals' unwilling to work in jobs with low pay or poor working conditions. For example, agricultural producers have relied increasingly on foreign labour since the 1990s, as Spanish nationals sought out jobs in other sectors that would offer better working conditions. In a demand-driven system such as Spain's, policymakers will need to weigh employer request for foreign labour against efforts to ensure suitable labour-market conditions and wages for all workers.

Spain's migration policies

One of the key considerations in Spain's immigration system has been how to meet fast-growing employer needs—and in doing so, lessen the incentives to hire from the informal economy. Before the onset of the crisis, most immigrants entered through the General Regime, established in 1985 to allow employers to sponsor migrants for a specific job, in which appeared to be working well at the time. As with other systems that include labour-market tests, the process for demonstrating that no Spanish worker can fill a vacancy is fairly bureaucratic and time consuming, but not unusually so. The General Regime also offered exemptions to the labour-market test, including through the Catalogue of Hard-to-Fill Occupations and its Unit for Large Companies and Strategic Collectives, established in 2007 to provide an expedited avenue for hiring high-skilled workers in certain industries.

The design of the catalogue allows policymakers to update the system on a quarterly basis in line with local labour-market needs, using data and other input from public employment services to update

shortage occupation lists for each autonomous community. Ultimately, drawing up a shortage occupation list is a political process, requiring policymakers to weigh the quantitative and qualitative information on hand and make a judgement call. But the system in place means that Spain has the ability to respond quickly to changing labour-market needs, as illustrated during the economic crisis. As unemployment rose, the government reduced the occupations listed in the catalogue, from 488 at the start of 2008 to 98 by the end of 2009. Health occupations were initially left on the list, but in 2012, the government whittled the list down to professional athletes and positions in the merchant navy. As of early 2019, the catalogue was still restricted to these niche occupations.

While comprising a smaller part of Spain's immigration system, the Collective Management System, whereby employers essentially hire vetted workers, sight unseen, also functioned well before the crisis. It provided a key avenue for hiring seasonal workers from outside the European Union, and it provided employers looking to hire several workers for roles in

hospitality and construction, among other sectors, a way to do so efficiently. One of its strengths was the ability to tailor programmes to meet employers' needs, for example, by offering predeparture training to new hires. As with the General Regime, regions, employers, and trade unions could help manage the programme, both through setting quotas and providing input in the selection process.

3.12 Sweden


The Politics of Migration

Governance of Migrant Integration in Sweden, European Commission 2019. Integration in Sweden is a trans-sectorial issue. Different ministries and agencies work to reach diverse objectives. The Ministry of Justice houses three dedicated migration divisions responsible for the formulation and tracking of migration policy: the division for Migration Law, the division for Management of Migration Affairs, and the division for Migration and Asylum Policy. The division for Management of Migration Affairs oversees the Swedish Migration Agency, which is primarily tasked with implementing immigration and asylum/refugee policy. However, given the focus on labour market insertion, the Ministry of Employment has coordinating responsibility in addition to its own integration-related responsibilities. Its Public Employment Service coordinates the integration programme, creates individual integration plans and decides on individual integration allowances, which are paid for by the Social Insurance Agency. The Ministry of Culture is responsible for preventing and combating discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, religion or other beliefs, and for taking measures against xenophobia and racism. The County Administrative Boards are responsible for coordinating regional and local integration measures. Furthermore, municipalities are in charge of finding accommodation for the newly arrived refugees whom they are obliged to settle on their territories since 2016. They also provide language and civic orientation courses, as well as adult education. For unaccompanied minors with a residence permit, they also appoint legal guardians, if necessary.

During the 2000s, Sweden had a relatively generous refugee policy. There was even a large amount of consensus. This was to change, particularly with the very large arrival of migrants in 2015 seeking international protection. That year around 163.000 migrants came to Sweden (Fig.19). At the outset, this stirred a great interest in civil society and thousands of volunteers helped in receiving these migrants. The media was also positive in its reporting. But this arrival also put a major strain on government and local authorities, and also on the social services when it came to finding housing, places in schools for the children and access to health care. This in turn

provided momentum to Sweden's growing far right party in its ongoing critique of migration as such and together the costs for receiving such a large number of persons rose dramatically.

Fig.19 Asylum applications in Sweden peaked in 2015, driven by Syrian refugees



Source: Swedish Migration Board

Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees in Gothenburg, OECD 2018. The aim of Swedish integration policy can be summarised as *'promoting equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic or cultural background which should be reached through general measures for the whole population'* (Regerungskansliet, 2009[12]). Despite this 'universal approach', integration measures started as early as 1970 when free language training was introduced for all immigrants and since then the rights of immigrants have been systematically extended and immigrants (mainly refugees and family members) have received targeted support in their first years in Sweden (Bakbasel, 2012[5]). Sweden has a long tradition in providing a home for many migrants fleeing war and persecution. Integration politics, other than language training, rarely target labour migrants and are most often oriented towards refugees. Of course, labour migrants benefit from health, social and school services – just like any other Swede – but are not targeted by specific labour integration policies as most of them are already employed.


A temporary law was passed and went into effect on 20 July 2016 for a period of three years. Among other things, this law restricted the issuing of permanent residence visas to a minimum. Instead temporary permits were given, if at all. Family reunification became virtually impossible for asylum seekers with subsidiary form of protection needs, and difficult to obtain for refugees, due to conditionality. While Swedish asylum policy has undoubtedly taken a restrictionist turn, with the center-right coalition adopting the terms of the Sweden Democrats, other aspects of the country's migration

policy remain welcoming. The new minority government formed in January 2019 has agreed to prolong the temporary on aliens another two years, while promising an examination of certain details such as family reunification. However, what is clearly needed is a complete review of this field of law, given the confusing patchwork of amendments, laws and regulations developed over many by differing political majorities (Caritas 2019).

The Labour Market

In 2008, Sweden's labour immigration rules shifted from being government-led to employer-led. Wherefore foreign employment decisions had been made by the Swedish Public Employment Service, the individual employer is now able to recruit candidates regardless of nationality or qualifications, provided that the terms of employment are met. This has facilitated the hiring of foreign workers and allows a much more flexible system that can adapt to meet the labour demands of the Swedish economy. Different agencies have their own formalized criteria for recognizing various foreign qualifications. The National Board of Health and Welfare lists 21 different categories of work, including doctors, dentists, nurses and psychologists. Similarly, the Swedish National Agency for Education provides criteria for teachers and the Swedish Bar Association provides criteria for law-related jobs.


Fig.20 The number of work permits increased in Sweden in the period 2009 2017



Source: Swedish Migration Board

As Sweden began encountering immigrants from non-European regions, the higher employment rates immigrants recorded over native-born Swedes during the guest-worker era began falling beginning in the 1970s, with foreign-born unemployment rates eventually overtaking those of native-born Swedes. The unemployment rate in 2018 was four times higher among those with an immigrant background, which includes those born abroad as well as Swedes whose parents were born abroad.

Fig.21 Unemployment among Swedish-born and foreign-born persons, 2005-2018



Source: Statistics Sweden (Labour Force Surveys)

Whether related to culture or differences in training and work experience, immigrants to Sweden have for a long time experienced severe problems in entering the labor market. The large number of unemployed immigrants tears at the fabric of integration policies. They are overrepresented in fixed time employment (low paid, limited time, jobs that didn't match their competencies) and they are underrepresented in managerial positions. Educated immigrants, especially asylum applicants or refugees, are more likely to be employed in jobs that requires lower competencies than their educational level. In 2018, large numbers of immigrants were actively looking for employment, posing a challenge to the labor-market system in terms of matching job seekers with available jobs. However, there are reports that show that employment in 2017 and 2018 increased mainly among foreign-born Swedes. It is also important to note the role of the labor market demands. In the case of Sweden, there is a labor shortage in certain job categories and it is easy to access to the market if you have the relevant competencies. For example, math teachers, software developers, (RPA) Robotic Process Automatization experts, AI (artificial intelligence) or Data Scientist or nurse have an advantage in the labor market comparing other categories. Since there is a huge demand in the market for these jobs, barriers such poor language skills, lack of networks and discrimination barely become an obstacle for the job market.

Recent research suggests that industries that employ the newly arrived refugees has changed

over time. For example, in 1990s more than 30 percent worked in manufacturing sector while

Sweden: By Turns Welcoming and Restrictive in its Immigration Policy, Admir Skodo, 2018.

The nature of this new era of immigration differs significantly from the guest-worker era. The first major difference lies in the changed power dynamic between unions, the state, and employers. In short, the Swedish corporatist model in which unions have had significant influence over labor policy has been eroded. During the earlier era, guest workers had to be unionized by law, because it ensured that their working conditions were equal to those of their Swedish fellow workers. The unions began seeing their power over immigration labor policy erode following Sweden's entry into the European Economic Area in 1994, its EU accession the following year, and especially EU expansion in 2004 that made it possible for Eastern European workers to freely move to and work in Sweden without having to belong to a union. A second key difference lies in the type of temporary workers most desired: in the 1950s and the 1960s, heavy industry drove demand, while currently, the IT and service sectors predominate. A third, and final, difference lies in policymakers' preference after 2008 that immigrant laborers not only be offered but encouraged to obtain permanent residency. Following the enactment of the 2008 law, labor immigration from non-European countries has increased significantly. Thailand, India, and China are the three largest sending countries.

in 2015 this number has decreased to 5%. In the late years, especially since 2008 and onwards, the care sector, including nurses, nursing assistants, personal assistants and child care workers, became to dominate the immigrant employment. 60 percent of the women and 30 percent of the employed refugees in 2015 worked in this sector. With the aging of the population there may be a great potential for further job growth for refugees in these sectors. Employment in hotel and restaurant sectors has also increased markedly over the years.

Active labor market policy : “Introduction programs” are organized for newly arrived refugees and family immigrants in Sweden. The program includes language education, courses on civic orientation (education on social democratic values, Swedish culture and society etc.) and labor market measures such as labor market training and subsidized employment¹⁸. Public employment service (in coordination with the municipalities) are responsible for the introduction programs. Refugees get their aids if they follow the introduction courses. Newly arrived refugees and family immigrants should register to the Public Employment Service (PES) as soon as they get a residence permit. The PES was given a central role in the labor market establishment of refugees and family immigrants. The program lasts two years but can be extended up to three years. Each individual gets an individual integration plan which stipulates activities they should participate during the introduction period.

In Sweden nearly half of the participants are enrolled in regular education or in employment one year after leaving the introduction program. Majority of the participants get welfare payments from municipalities they are registered. The payment is conditional on participation in certain activities. Statistics show that almost all participants in introduction programs take part in language courses and 87% of men and 83% of women also participate in the labor market program.

Fast track: The fast track is a joint program launched in 2015 by PES, trade unions and employer organizations with the aim of establishing contact between employers and the newly arrived immigrants (with certain skills / qualifications with a shortage of labor). Fast track program includes early validation and assessment of previous education as well as vocational skills. Among those who participate in the program, 40 percent were employed 19-21 months after starting the program. Education efforts have also a large potential to increase human capital and thereby their employment opportunities. According to research comparing the skill level of immigrants and native populations suggests that “the skill gap” is relatively high in Nordic countries. Therefore, it is not surprising that immigrant employment level is relatively low than the natives. When

¹⁸ Calmfors, L & Gassen S. N, 2019: Integrating Immigrants into the Nordic Labour Markets, Nord 2019

comparing the immigrants and natives with similar skill levels then the gap decreased

considerably. This suggest that native – immigrant gaps are primarily a skill question. In other words, the Sweden and the Nordic market at large rewards the immigrant skills.

Extra jobs : In Sweden women are underrepresented in the subsidized employment. One of the reasons for this might be that women are generally underrepresented on job categories which make use of the subsidy at the large extend. In 2015 a new form of subsidized employment was introduced. These extra jobs have mainly targeted the women immigrants. Employers from public sector, nonprofit organizations and organizations dealing with cultural activities receive a subsidy to hire a person who have been un employed for a long time. The length of job can be twelve months with the possibility for an additional twelve months. However, the project faced a budget cut in 2019 and PES stopped the project in January 2019.

The impact of immigration on GDP and Public Finance : In 2018, Swedish Agency for Growth Policy has issued a literature study on “the effects of immigration on economic growth”. The study suggest that immigration has positive effects on the productivity and economic growth. The high skilled immigrants tend to contribute more to these effects. Furthermore, the research shows that immigrants boost Sweden’s performance in the international trade.¹⁹ The empirical studies suggest that immigration contributes to the economic growth. Immigration effects on growth in Sweden have been higher than in many other OECD countries during the period 1986-2006 due to high education levels among immigrants. Increased immigration increase the labor force which leads to potential GDP increasing in the long turn. Therefore, there is a huge economic advantage in immigration in addition to purely humanitarian reasons²⁰.

Regarding Fiscal Impact, some authors refer that the contribution of immigrants In Sweden is positive in terms of social welfare costs (Scocco, Andersons 2015). Others, following the study of Segendorf and Theobald (2019), that the refugees impact on public finance is a cost because their contribution to public finance is not enough to cover the deficit that arises at retirement age. This suggest a negative fiscal impact both on long and short term. On the other side, there are reports suggesting that without immigration the situation could have been problematic from socio economic perspective. Many sectors such large part of healthcare, care of elderly, hotels, restaurants and transport. Therefore, without immigration Sweden’s labor force would decrease significantly with a consequent negative impact not only on those sectors but on the economy at large.

¹⁹ Ejermo, O & Fassio, C, 2018: The effects of immigration on economic growth – a literature study, Tillväxtanalys, Dnr: 2017.

²⁰ Segendorf, O,A & Theobald, Åsa, 2019: Can immigration solve the problem of an aging population?, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2019.

4. Syntesis and Reccomandations

1. The Report on The Sphere of Economy has investigated and compared the experiences gained by the 12 EU member Countries on the migrants's impact on the labour market. The result of this investigation offers a very differentiated picture on the labour policies implemented by these countries showing disomogeneous results in terms of participarion rate in the labour market, unemployment rates, migrant entrepreneurship, women working conditions, employment rights. Most of these differences come from the autonomy that member countries have in the management of integration policy, but also from other issues linked to past migration experiences, labour market models, government and institutional structures.

2. In recent years, migrants are facing an additional barrier, the negative reaction of a increasing number of political parties, media and citizens against the presence of third-country nationals in their countries. These reactions, which have been translated in more accentuatd restrictions of entry, residence procedures, access to the labour market and social services, represent the most visible impedement to the full valorization of foreign work in the economy. It is interesting to note that the12 Countries experienced different attitudes in relation to this topic. After the 2015 massive arrival of migrants seking international protection, the migration policies of the Scandinavian countries, the Iberian peninsula, the European central countries, while introducing more restrictive measures, have not radically changed their welcoming attutude. The policies of the Eastern Europe countries towards migrants have registered a substantial change of direction.

3. All the12 Country Reports confirm the empirical evidences emerged from the numerous studies carried out on the migrant impact on the economy. In particular, the labor market impact depends on the presence of specific conditions existing in the host countries. In the first play, the willingness of public policies, but also of private entrepreneurs, to enhance the opportunities induced by migrants work. All the reports confirm that migrants have contributed in many ways to the development of their economies. They have compensated the negative demographic trends experienced in their countries, especially in those of the Eastern area who have seen the higher decline in the population. They have contributed with their work, despite the global crisis and the hostile environment, to satisfy the internal demand of social personal assistance (in Europe, there are over 8 million declared domestic workers, 91 per cent of whom are women). They have created, as immigrant entrepreneurs, new business initiatives helping to reduce labour shortage and, through the payment of taxes, to sustain the pension system of the hosting countries. It is difficult to immagine, considering also the decrease of the working-age of European population, how these economies could survive without the contribution of the TCNs.

4. A second element, whose relevance has grown significantly in the countries that experienced relevant migrants' flow in relation to their overall population, consists in ensuring an institutional and regulatory environment that contributes to giving effectiveness to labor policies and to maximizing the foreign workers impact on the economic growth. The labour market positive outcomes are closely related to presence of a well-integrated system of migration policies aiming at creating the conditions for their fully integration in the society and ensuring their participation in the implementation and monitoring of all aspects of immigration. When migration policies of the EU countries have not moved in this direction but were implemented to deal mainly with emergencies, the contribution of migrants on the labour market has been more conflicting and with less impact.

5. When commenting or confronting the experiences of the migration impact on the labour market the availability of quantitative and qualitative data is a basic requirement. From the analysis of the Country Reports, a recommendation can be advanced concerning the need to dispose and use more disaggregated, but homogeneous, data. To understand the complexity of information that can be obtained from reading the dynamics recorded by the labor forces, it is necessary to collect data on a wide spectrum of phenomena related to the composition of labour forces (by gender, age, education etc.) and the working conditions prevailing in specific markets or sector of activity. These informations are all the more necessary when the intent is to design migration integration policies able of responding, specifically and sustainably, to the needs of workers and businesses in the countries under observation. Comparative studies based on macro and micro-economic analysis are very useful in this regard.

6. Among the obstacles faced by migrants, the low knowledge of the language and the non recognition of the skill and qualifications of the TCNs, often due to the lack or non validation of the documentation presented, are the most important. All the reports made mention to migrants mostly employed in low-skilled jobs or having a higher level of qualification than their low-skill job requires. Simplify the procedures and time required for the certification of their skills, Improving the language knowledge and ensuring access to education and training for all migrants (asylum seekers, refugees, low-skilled workers and people at risk of exclusion) are a mandatory step to help them to reach a qualified participation in the labour market and to raise their awareness against discriminatory practices or violence attitudes, in particular towards women. Combining language courses with training and education activities (dual systems) has proven to be a positive experience that countries should introduce to improve TCNs access to the labour market.

7. An initiative that has produced positive effects, mentioned in some of the Country Reports and also supported by EU laws (in the "Global Approach to Migration and Mobility" 2011 and the "European Agenda on Migration" 2015), regards the establishment of partnership agreements with the origin countries of migrants. A lesson has been learned in the last decades when dealing with international migration: the origin and destination countries share the same interests and responsibilities. Due to the

complexity of migration and the multiple effects, directly or indirectly, produced in both countries, it is hard to believe possible to get out of these difficulties without working together in finding policies and solutions in the interest of migrants, but also in the interest of pursuing joint development goals, including those related to security and defense of human rights.

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