

سپیدار حزب زنان ایران

**We are the Sepidar,
standing tall while our roots reach ever deeper.**

We become a sheltering canopy.

We endure both frost and scorching heat.

In mourning broken branches,

we do not bend in defeat;

instead, we rise again, renewed, and in bloom.

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Democracy and Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin

By Kiarash Alinezhad, Human Rights Department

September 15, the International Day of Democracy, is an opportunity to reflect on one of the most fundamental questions facing human societies: How can people live freely, equally, and with their basic rights protected? Democracy is not simply the act of holding elections or choosing representatives. For an election to have genuine meaning, citizens must be able to make their choices freely, express their views without fear, and participate in public life on an equal footing.



Democracy rests on a set of fundamental principles, including political participation, freedom of expression and the press, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of thought and conscience, equality before the law, and an independent judiciary. These rights, however, cannot be protected by words alone. They require accountable institutions, the rule of law, transparency, and meaningful public oversight. For this reason, democracy and human rights are inseparable: they are two sides of the same coin.

Democracy is not simply majority rule. A democratic system must also protect the fundamental rights of minorities, political opponents, and individuals whose views differ from those of the majority. The rule of law means that no person or institution should be above the law, and that every individual is entitled to due process, a fair trial, access to legal counsel, and protection against arbitrary detention.

Without these guarantees, elections alone cannot ensure a democratic society. The true measure of democracy is not only how governments are chosen, but also how power is exercised and how the rights of every citizen are protected.

Iran's contemporary history has included serious violations of human rights, including the suppression of protesters and political opponents and the suffering experienced by their families. Defending human rights means defending the dignity and rights of every human being, regardless of political affiliation, social status, or personal beliefs.

Justice and accountability should not be confused with revenge. Their purpose is to establish the truth, hold those responsible accountable through a fair process, recognize the rights of victims, and help prevent violations from being repeated. Preventing the execution of political prisoners and ensuring that their voices are heard are also part of the broader struggle to protect human rights.

Prince Reza Pahlavi has expressed support for a transition toward a national, secular, and democratic government, emphasizing principles that include Iran's territorial integrity, individual freedoms and equality before the law, separation of

religion and government, and the right of the Iranian people to determine the future form of their government through a democratic process.

Under such a principle, the future political system of Iran would ultimately be determined by the will of the Iranian people. If the people were to freely choose a constitutional monarchy through a democratic process, its legitimacy would derive from that choice. In a parliamentary monarchy, the monarch may serve as a symbol of national unity and continuity, while political authority, legislation, and governmental responsibility remain subject to the constitution and elected institutions.

For many Iranian monarchists and supporters of Prince Reza Pahlavi, support for him is therefore presented as support for a political figure who has emphasized the principle that the Iranian people themselves should determine their country's future.

Ultimately, democracy cannot be measured by the name of a political system alone. The essential questions are straightforward: Can citizens speak freely? Can political opposition operate without fear? Are women and men equal before the law? Are the courts independent? Can the media criticize those in power? Do ethnic and religious minorities enjoy equal rights? And is any individual or institution above the law?

These questions go to the heart of democratic governance. Human rights must be among the fundamental principles guiding Iran's future, regardless of the political system ultimately chosen by its people.

A democratic political culture is one in which a political opponent is not treated as an enemy, criticism is not treated as a crime, political power is understood as a public trust rather than personal ownership, and the law applies equally to everyone.

Justice is not revenge. It is a means of acknowledging the suffering of victims, establishing responsibility, preserving historical truth, and creating the conditions for a future in which violations are less likely to be repeated.

Democracy without freedom is meaningless. Freedom without human rights is unstable. Human rights without the rule of law remain vulnerable, and the rule of law without an independent judiciary is fragile. None of these principles can be sustained without meaningful public participation and the consent of the people.

For those who envision a future Iran in which national unity is respected, government serves the people, the law applies equally to all, and human rights stand above political power, the central question is ultimately not the name of the system but the principles on which it is built.

Democracy and human rights truly are two sides of the same coin — a coin whose value lies not in the name of a government, but in human freedom and dignity, and in the right of the Iranian people to shape their own future.



The Architecture of "Normalization" and Guided Returns

By Leila Fathali

The intense media maneuvering surrounding the actual or potential return of prominent cultural, artistic, and journalistic figures—ranging from the Ministry of Guidance's release of a 100-person list to cases like Mohsen Namjoo and recent speculation regarding Masoud Behnood—should not be viewed as accidental or a matter of personal choice. Rather, this trajectory is part of a comprehensive political-security scenario termed the "Normalization Project." It serves as a tool for the Islamic Republic, relying on "soft repression" to conceal a crisis-ridden reality, an objecting society, and the deepening rift between the state and the public in the wake of violent crackdowns.



The industry of "normalization" and fabricated calm thrives on generating controversy over the return of iconic figures like Mohsen Namjoo and Masoud Behnood, as well as exploiting the "100-person expatriate list." Through these means, the Islamic Republic seeks to inject a manufactured psychological message of "an end to the crisis" and "state leniency" into domestic discourse and international public opinion, aiming to break its diplomatic isolation. This media spotlight on the 100-person list and the "will-they-or-won't-they" narratives around Namjoo or Behnood functions as a deliberate distraction from fundamental demands, justice for victims' families, and crushing socio-economic crises. The political apparatus attempts to use these high-profile names and returns as a filter to neutralize international reports of repression and project a facade of tolerance.

Security amnesties and institutionalized discrimination stem from a condescending, tiered view of citizenship. While safe-passage letters and dedicated channels are arranged for figures on the 100-person list or those serving promotional utility, nameless protesters, teachers, students, workers, and civil activists face harsh judicial sentences, imprisonment, and disenfranchisement. The entry of individuals such as Mohsen Namjoo and Masoud Behnood, or the inclusion of names on the state's 100-person return list, is contingent upon accepting dictated frameworks and expressing implicit remorse. This process strips the individual of independent critique, reducing them to a pawn in a spectacle of "Islamic mercy" and eroding their credibility.

The secret goal of the security apparatus is the attrition of social capital and the propagation of collective despair, built on inducing feelings of betrayal, futility, and frustration within the protesting populace. Witnessing the integration of prominent figures like Mohsen Namjoo or Masoud Behnood into state-directed scenarios—and the publication of 100-person engineering lists—deepens hopelessness regarding meaningful change. These actions signal directly to diaspora movements, aiming to fracture, undermine trust within, and destabilize the protest, investigative, and solidarity potential in exile. The regime attempts to utilize the normalization of these figures to relegate costs, victims, and ongoing societal struggles to oblivion.

The fundamental contradiction lies in the fact that normalization cannot co-exist with repression, nor can a society's condition be mended through staged spectacles, curated 100-person lists, or political maneuvers centered on figures like Mohsen Namjoo and Masoud Behnood. Genuine normalization in a volatile society requires halting the machinery of repression. This necessitates the total abolition of censorship and the guarantee of freedom of expression for all citizens (rather than selective immunity for a 100-person list), an end to systematic oppression, the dissolution of Revolutionary Courts, the release of all political and conscientious prisoners, and the recognition of the right to self-determination and peaceful protest without facing armed violence.


The project of "repatriating prominent figures and crafting an image of normalization" reflects a clear confession of a deep legitimacy crisis within the Islamic Republic, rather than a display of authority. A structure forced to rely on 100-person lists and the staged return of critical figures like Mohsen Namjoo and Masoud Behnood to prove its stability has inherently acknowledged that society rejects its fundamental existence and framework. These promotional projects, regardless of their scale, cannot bridge the deep gulf between a protesting society and the state; they will merely be recorded as failed performances in the history of popular resistance.



The Collapse Puzzle: When “1984” Steps Out of the Book

By M.H. Labafbashi

Sometimes we read a book years ago and assume that we were reading a fictional story about the future; but years later, we suddenly begin seeing some of the concepts from that book in the news around us. George Orwell's 1984 is precisely this kind of work. It is a novel about a government that does not settle for controlling the behavior of its citizens; rather, it seeks to control truth, language, memory, and even the way people perceive reality. The Orwell Foundation also describes 1984 as a work about totalitarianism, “doublethink,” “Newspeak,” and the power of government to rewrite reality.



Today in Iran, comparing the Islamic Republic with the world of 1984 does not mean that Iran is exactly the same as Orwell's fictional system; such a comparison would be an oversimplification, especially given that the situation in Iran is even more severe. But some of the mechanisms Orwell warned about are worth comparing. Control of the narrative, pressure on historical memory, the use of education to shape the minds of the next generation, surveillance of opponents, and efforts to limit society's access to narratives beyond the government's control all come together to create a picture that cannot simply be ignored.

Perhaps one of the clearest examples today is a system introduced under the name “Elaj.” Published reports indicate that the system was designed to identify and report Iranians opposed to the Islamic Republic living abroad, and that it even displayed information such as the place of residence, occupation, social media accounts, and relatives' information of some individuals. It was announced that those operating the system were asking people to submit additional information about the individuals identified, and they claimed that some cases had been forwarded for legal action; however, the system's own figures and claims cannot be independently verified.

But “Elaj” is important not only because of its content; its very short lifespan is also questionable. The system experienced disruptions approximately one day after its introduction and was then reportedly taken offline even from inside Iran; its operators also confirmed this. We still do not know the exact cause of what happened. Nevertheless, it appears that the very existence of such a system carried a clear message: Iranians opposed to the regime, even if they are thousands of kilometers away, should feel that the government can see them. This is the point at which “Elaj” moves from being a potential information-gathering tool to becoming a potential instrument of psychological intimidation.

In 1984, however, the issue is not merely the control of opponents; the more important issue is the control of the next generation. Orwell shows that a government that wants to remain in power forever does not think only about today; it must ensure that the next generation also sees

the same reality that the government defines. For this reason, what is happening in Iran's schools these days may be more important than many political news stories. On September 16, the Minister of Education described the Student Basij as one of the “best and most vital educational capacities of the country” and spoke of its role in organizational, intellectual, jihadist, and field activities. This comes at a time when the Student Basij organization also holds programs such as “Yavaran-e Velayat,” aimed at training commanders for resistance units in schools.

This part deserves closer attention: school is no longer merely a place for teaching mathematics, science, and literature; at least within part of the new official policy, school is also becoming an environment for ideological education and the organization of students. A report published today by Iran International also describes an intensification of the militarization of schools, the presence of the Student Basij, and even reports of a teacher wearing a Basij military uniform at a school in Isfahan. If such a trend expands, the issue is no longer merely ideological education, but the introduction of security and military symbols into the educational environment of children.

This is where the concept of “doublethink” in 1984 becomes important. Imagine a child who hears one account of history, protests, the situation in the country, or Iran's future from their parents at home; then encounters a completely different account at school. If the gap becomes too wide, the child does not necessarily have to choose one of the two narratives; they may learn to say one thing at home and something else at school. This is the danger that requires attention. Not because every teacher or every school is necessarily an instrument of government propaganda, but because turning education into a battleground between competing narratives can affect a child's trust in their family, their school, and even the very concept of truth.

“Jan-Fada” is another piece of this picture, although on the other side of it. On Friday, the Islamic Republic held a large-scale military exercise in Tehran, and state media called it the “313,000-member Jan-Fada Iran Exercise.” The government has claimed that a very large number of people have registered for the program, but the actual number of participants and the method used to calculate it remain questionable. Images also show the organized participation of children and teenagers in the event. Under such circumstances, “Jan-Fada” can be viewed not merely as a military exercise, but as an attempt to construct a public image of a society supposedly prepared to defend and sacrifice itself for the ruling structure.

And perhaps this is where the difference between 1984 and Iran today becomes clearer. In Orwell's novel, the government wants to control the past in order to control the present, and to control the present in order to control the future. In Iran today, a set of actions can also be examined from a similar perspective: “Elaj” to monitor opponents abroad; “Jan-Fada” to display unity and readiness at home; and the expanding role of the Basij in schools to influence the next generation. It cannot be proven that all of these actions are part of a single plan; however, they appear to share one common element: an attempt to control the narrative, control memory, and control behavior.

And perhaps this is the most dangerous part of the story. Governments do not disappear only when they lose the streets; sometimes, before that happens, they target society's ability to distinguish truth from the official narrative. If a child cannot question what they read in a textbook, if a family is afraid to share its memories, if an opponent abroad feels that they are being watched, and if the government simultaneously constructs an image of “public sacrifice” at home, the issue is no longer merely a political crisis; it becomes a battle over memory and truth.

In 1984, Orwell warned of a society in which the government does not merely want people to obey; it wants to determine what reality is. Today, it cannot be said that Iran has become exactly like 1984; but when schools, the media, social media, opponents abroad, and even historical memory all become subjects of political control, the comparison is no longer merely literary. Perhaps the greatest resistance to such a system is preserving memory; documenting what happened, asking questions, comparing narratives, and refusing to allow any government to define the past on behalf of the people. And perhaps that is why the sentence that should remain in our minds above all is neither about “Jan-Fada” nor about “Elaj”; it is about memory:


A government that cannot build the present for its people may try to rewrite the past for the next generation. But a nation that preserves its memory will not allow its history to be written by power.



Fungal Infections, Symptoms and Treatment

By Dr. Mina Imangholi, Health and Wealth Department

One of the most common diseases at any age and anywhere can be an infection caused by fungi.



It can be boldly said that every human being contracts a fungal infection at least once in their lifetime.

Global statistics put this figure at around 75 percent.

_Humidity and heat, hormonal factors, the use of certain medications and a weakened immune system can be named as the main causes of fungal infection.

This disease is divided into two categories: primary and secondary.

Primary infection:

_This common type is transmitted directly by a specific type of fungus.

Secondary infection:

_Is transmitted indirectly by other factors, for example the use of antibiotics (especially in women, it causes fungal infection in the genitals), or Chemotherapie, Transplantation.

A fungal infection can present itself locally (on the skin, nails or vagina) or systemically (in the lungs, liver, eyes).

Among the different types, the following can be mentioned:

_Fungal infection in the mouth, or thrush (Soor):

This type of fungus (*Candida albicans*), which is mostly seen in infants and young children, can also be observed at older ages, and Nystatin solution is used in its treatment.

_Vaginal fungal infection:

The most common type of fungus (*Candida albicans*) in women; every woman on average at least once in her lifetime suffers from itching and inflammation, or even a thick white discharge that sometimes also has a bad odor.

For its treatment, vaginal creams and vaginal tablets are mostly used in combination.

Clotrimazole and nystatin are the most common active ingredients in this treatment.

Also, the use of probiotics in the form of oral capsules and vaginal suppositories is of particular importance for those who get a fungal infection more than four times a year, because a change in pH also plays an important role in contracting a fungal infection.

Simultaneous treatment of the spouse or partner with vaginal creams is also recommended.

Excessive hygiene and washing with scented soaps and chemicals, as well as unsuitable underwear fabric, or overly tight clothing can be factors in the onset of fungal infection.

_Skin fungus:

This type of fungus is also considered one of the most common forms of skin infection, which, as a result of excessive fungal growth in a humid and warm environment, is accompanied by itching and inflammation of the skin and sometimes by a change in skin color. In its treatment, in the early stages, active ingredients such as clotrimazole, nystatin, terbinafine and also cortisol are used.

In cases where the infection becomes advanced, tablets can be taken as diagnosed by a doctor.

_Nail fungus:

Discoloration of the nail, yellow or white and in some cases even brown, or brittleness of the nail, excessive thickening or thinning of the nail can be signs of fungus.

For its treatment in the early stages, nail lacquers containing active ingredients such as amorolfine, ciclopirox, and bifonazole are among the best.

This treatment method lasts from six weeks to three months.

In general treatment, active ingredients such as:

Imidazol, Clotrimazol, Ketoconazol, Fluconazol, Amphotericin B, Griseofulvin, Itraconazol, Nystatin, Flucytosin, Miconazol, Terbinafin

are prescribed in various forms, locally or systemically.

For example, amphotericin and griseofulvin, fluconazole, itraconazole are prescribed as tablets, while clotrimazole and ketoconazole are used topically.

Among the best antifungal drugs, the Imidazoles can be named, such as:

clotrimazole, miconazole, imidazole, ketoconazole

It should be noted that in the first stage of treatment, topical use of a cream for up to two weeks without seeing a doctor is acceptable (provided the symptoms of the disease are not advanced), and after that, if no improvement is achieved, the tablets mentioned are used.

Overall, it can be said that keeping the skin dry and clean and washing towels, bed sheets and underwear at a temperature of 60 degrees Celsius can play a very important role in preventing fungal infection.



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Diplomacy as an Extension of the Struggle

By Ali Soltani

The continuity of a political struggle cannot be measured solely by repeated slogans or the number of public gatherings. A more important question is how a political movement connects its objectives to concrete plans, organization, and international engagement. The participation of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi in the Cyrus the Great 2 gathering in Toronto and the annual Concordia Summit in New York brought two different aspects of this question into focus. In Toronto, the main audience consisted of the families of those killed in the struggle, Iranians living abroad, and pro-democracy opposition groups seeking an end to the Islamic Republic. In New York, discussions about Iran's future took place before politicians and international audiences. The connection between these two appearances lies in the effort to transform the demand for Iran's freedom into an issue with organizational, political, and diplomatic dimensions. At Concordia, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi recalled his 46 years of political activity and his willingness to defend Iran during Iraq's invasion, describing service to his homeland as a responsibility independent of his royal background. His remarks provide a basis for examining the relationship between his long record of political activity and the changing methods of struggle under present circumstances.



One of the central themes of the Toronto speech was Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's response to critics who portray changes in political tactics as a retreat or evidence of a lack of planning. He distinguished between maintaining a consistent objective and adapting methods to changing conditions. Increasing pressure on the Islamic Republic, supporting the Iranian people, organizing opposition forces, encouraging members of the regime to break away, and preparing to manage the transition were presented as interconnected elements of his proposed strategy. These ideas were accompanied by an emphasis on patience and careful planning. Increasing political pressure without effective coordination or a plan for transferring power would not, by itself, answer the questions that arise after a change of government. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi also referred to networks inside Iran and what he described as both active and passive defections from the regime. His comments on Mojtaba Khamenei's absence from public view and the lack of publicly released images or recordings of him formed another part of this argument. Set against Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's own continued public appearances and international activities, these remarks introduced a political comparison concerning leadership, the continuity of the struggle, and responses to criticism.

Political organization, however, involves more than changing tactics. Differences among opposition groups are also a central challenge for any political transition. Addressing criticism and what he described as the Islamic Republic's disinformation campaign, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi explained in Toronto that unity does not require everyone to hold identical political beliefs. He identified Iran's territorial integrity, the separation of religion and government, individual freedoms and equal citizenship before the law, and the Iranian people's right to freely determine their future political system as the foundations for cooperation. This approach distinguishes cooperation during a transition from political competition afterward. The presence of the families of those killed in the struggle, the families of the victims of Flight PS752, and Yasmine Pahlavi also brought the human cost of the struggle into focus. At the same time, the participation of Pierre Polievre and other Canadian political figures illustrated a connection between the activities of the Iranian diaspora and the political institutions of their host country. The significance of such gatherings can therefore be examined through

these relationships: keeping the demands of victims' families in the public eye, creating opportunities for cooperation among political groups, and bringing the situation in Iran to the attention of those who influence decisions in their respective countries.

While Toronto focused primarily on the organization and continuity of the struggle, New York raised a different question: What place does Iran's future have in the political and economic calculations of the international community? At the Concordia Summit, held during the week of the United Nations General Assembly, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi connected the situation in Iran to regional security, Western economic prosperity, and European energy independence. Referring to cooperation between Marxists and Islamists during the 1979 uprising, he argued that this alliance helped create the conditions for the spread of Islamic extremism. He also linked proxy wars and the activities of groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis to the policies of the Islamic Republic. Against this background, he outlined the prospect of cooperation with a free Iran in the fields of security and economic development, emphasizing that political change should be driven by the Iranian people rather than depend on the deployment of foreign ground forces. This approach seeks to address Western concerns about the costs and consequences of political change in Iran. Raising these issues in international forums also creates opportunities to present transition plans and examine Iran's future relations with the wider world.

Another aspect of the message delivered in New York was the effort to place the human cost of repression alongside the political calculations of Western governments. During his interview with Martha MacCallum on Fox News, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi referred to 40,000 Iranians killed by the Islamic Republic and emphasized the human cost of repression and the Iranian people's struggle for freedom. The figure is presented here as a claim made in his remarks. Within this framework, the demand to reclaim Iran and the Iranian people's right to determine their own future becomes an issue that extends beyond nuclear negotiations. At Concordia, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi also raised the case of Ali Zarei and the risk of his execution, questioning the moral responsibility of Western democracies and asking whether the international community would stand with the Iranian people or abandon them once again. His warning that the Islamic Republic seeks to buy time through negotiations complemented this message. Together, these remarks raise a question for Western audiences: What place should the demands of the Iranian people and the consequences of domestic repression occupy in policies primarily focused on security negotiations and economic interests? Repeatedly raising this question in international forums is significant beyond the immediate outcome of any single speech, as it can sustain discussion of practical policies toward Iran.

These diplomatic activities have not been limited to Toronto and New York. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's discussions with Angus Taylor, Ted O'Brien, and other members of Australia's Liberal-National Coalition, alongside his interview with ABC Radio National, provided further opportunities to present his proposed plans for the transition. The discussions addressed Iran's potential in energy, mining, agriculture, education, and technology, as well as the Iran Prosperity Project. While explaining his proposed role during the transition, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi emphasized the right of the Iranian people to freely choose their future political system. Considered alongside his appearance at Concordia, these engagements illustrate the importance of sustained diplomacy and the presentation of specific proposals. However, welcoming discussions with a political figure, supporting the demands of the Iranian people, and formally endorsing a particular transition plan are three distinct matters. Assessing the international response to these activities therefore requires attention not only to invitations and speeches, but also to official positions, continued engagement, and any cooperation that results. This distinction is particularly relevant to relations with European countries, where security, energy, and the prospect of future relations with Iran feature in foreign-policy considerations.

Taken together, these events illustrate two parallel dimensions of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's political activities: establishing a framework for cooperation among Iranians and presenting a vision for Iran's transition to the international community. Adapting tactics without changing the stated objective, responding to critics, defining four shared principles, engaging with the families of those killed in the struggle, presenting economic plans, and seeking international support are all elements of the strategy he has outlined. The continuity of these activities can be examined in relation to his decades of political engagement and his proposed role during the transition. Their practical results, however, will depend on effective organization, the implementation of plans, and the development of concrete cooperation. The importance of Iran's future also extends beyond how the Islamic Republic might come to an end. Any transitional framework must address fundamental questions of accountability, equal citizenship, the prevention of concentrated power, and guarantees that the Iranian people can freely choose their political future. Ultimately, the connection between today's struggle and planning for tomorrow's Iran becomes meaningful when political change is accompanied by institutions designed to prevent the return of discrimination and impunity.



The Day After the Islamic Republic; How Should Iran Be Rebuilt?

By Sheiva Amiri

We sometimes imagine that the hardest moment is the moment a government falls. But perhaps the hardest moment is the morning after, when people wake up and ask: What now? If the Islamic Republic were no longer there tomorrow, who would run the country? What would happen to the banks? How would the salaries of employees and retirees be paid? How would hospitals, schools, water, electricity, and communications continue to operate? How would people's security be protected? These questions show that the end of a government, by itself, does not necessarily mean the beginning of a free and prosperous country. The fall of a political system may happen in a single day, but rebuilding a country takes years. That is why, if we are talking about Iran's future today, we should not only talk about "after the Islamic Republic"; we must also think about the day after.



The first responsibility during a transition is to protect people's lives and security and prevent the collapse of public order. Iran is a large and complex country, and the lives of millions depend on a network of institutions and essential services. Hospitals must continue operating, medicine must reach patients, water and electricity must remain available, airports and transportation must remain functional, and banks must be able to perform their duties. Under such circumstances, a power vacuum can be extremely dangerous. But maintaining order must not become an excuse for reproducing authoritarianism. The transition must be based from the very beginning on the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. One of its most important responsibilities must also be preventing revenge and violence outside the law. If the Iran of the future is to be built on the rule of law, it must demonstrate from its earliest days that justice has replaced revenge. After security, the other major issue is the economy. People do not want only political freedom; they want jobs, income, housing, healthcare, education, and a predictable future for themselves and their children. Years of inflation, economic instability, sanctions, corruption, and extensive government intervention have eroded economic trust. Rebuilding Iran's economy therefore means much more than increasing oil production or building a few factories. Security of property rights, an independent central bank, stable laws, a predictable tax system, combating monopolies, the ability to start businesses, and access to global markets will also be essential. Iran needs capital to prosper, but capital does not enter a country

through money alone. Trust is the most important form of capital that must be rebuilt. If an investor does not know whether the law will change tomorrow or whether their property will remain secure, they will not invest. If an entrepreneur needs a relationship with a government official for every economic decision, a competitive economy cannot emerge.

Perhaps the most important question about Iran's future is not who will stand at the top of the government, but how the power of government will be limited. The Iran of the future needs an independent judiciary, a free press, competitive elections, separation of powers, and accountable institutions. No individual or institution should stand above the law. The separation of religion and government should also mean equality of citizens before the law; religion, sect, gender, ethnicity, or political belief should not determine what rights a citizen has. The government should be strong enough to guarantee security and the rule of law, but limited enough that it cannot interfere in every aspect of citizens' lives. Changing a government becomes meaningful when the relationship between the state and the citizen changes as well. One of Iran's greatest assets is the millions of Iranians living around the world. Over the past four decades, generations of Iranians have built lives in different countries: doctors, engineers, university professors, researchers, artists, managers, and entrepreneurs, many of whom have gained experience living and working in free and competitive environments. This migration has been a major cost for Iran, but at the same time it has created a vast network of human capital and global connections. The Iran of the future must be able to reconnect this capital with the country—not through coercion or slogans, but by creating security, the rule of law, and opportunity. An Iranian doctor living abroad should be able to return to Iran without fear. An entrepreneur should be able to invest. An academic should be able to conduct research freely. And a young Iranian should feel that leaving the country is not their only option for having a better future. The return of Iranians should be a free and attractive choice, not an imposed obligation.

Ultimately, no plan for Iran's future, no matter how detailed or professional, can replace the people of Iran. The transition must provide security, law, and stability so that people can decide about their own future. The form of government, the constitution, economic and social policies, and Iran's relationship with the world should all be openly and transparently debated. No individual, political party, political movement, or foreign power should consider itself the owner of Iran's future. If the Iran of the future is to be democratic, democracy itself must be taken seriously from the very beginning. The purpose of the transition should not be to impose a ready-made answer; it should be to create the conditions for people to freely choose the answer.

Iran after the Islamic Republic will need more than new buildings, new roads, and new factories. It will need trust: trust in the law, trust in the currency, trust in the courts, trust in elections, and trust in the future. And perhaps most importantly, people's trust in the fact that the government is no longer the owner of their lives. Iran one day moves beyond the Islamic Republic, that day will not be the end of the work. It will be the beginning. The beginning of building a country where there is security without authoritarianism; freedom without chaos; an economy without monopolies; prosperity without dependency; and a government that, instead of asking people to serve it, exists to serve the people. The day after the Islamic Republic should be the day when Iranians can, perhaps for the first time in decades, decide not only what kind of government they do not want, but also what kind of Iran they do want. And perhaps the greatest project of Iran's future is this: To build a country whose people no longer have to leave in order to have freedom, security, and a future.



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From “Long Live the Shah” to the Ballot Box: The Prince’s Message at Cyrus II

By Azadeh Sharafi

The “Cyrus II” event in Toronto took place at a time when many Iranians are once again turning their attention to the future of their country and to the path toward transition from the Islamic Republic. At the event, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi delivered a speech centered on the need to adapt to changing circumstances, strengthen the organization of forces opposed to the Islamic Republic, and establish principles for the future of Iran.



One of the first points he emphasized was the need to change methods as circumstances change. Referring to the experiences of recent years and the events that Iranian society has endured, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi stressed that the goal remains clear, but the methods for achieving it must evolve with the changing conditions. In his view, Iranian society today possesses greater experience, awareness, and preparedness, and therefore the country cannot enter a new phase by relying on the same methods of the past.

He then emphasized the importance of national organization and networking, speaking of an organized communications network operating within secure layers of Iranian society—a network that, in his view, the Islamic Republic is unable to stop. He also referred to growing divisions and distrust within the upper levels of the regime and spoke of members of Iran’s civilian and military forces distancing themselves from the government. In his view, this process could create an opportunity to reconnect forces inside Iran with the Iranian people.

In another part of his speech, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi referred to the Islamic Republic’s calls for military training among the population and to external threats, describing these developments as signs of the regime’s lack of confidence in its own forces. In contrast, he emphasized the role of the Iranian people and organized forces inside the country, describing the national networks and channels of communication within Iranian society as an important asset for the next stage.

Perhaps the most significant part of his speech, however, was his discussion of how different forces opposed to the Islamic Republic can work together. He stressed that unity does not mean agreement on every political detail. Rather, cooperation can be built around a set of shared principles. In this framework, he outlined four fundamental principles: the preservation of Iran’s territorial integrity; the separation of religion and government; individual freedoms and equality of all citizens before

the law; and the right of the Iranian people to determine the form of their future government through free and fair elections.

This part of the speech also clarified his view of Iran’s political future. In this framework, the form of government should not be predetermined or imposed outside the will of the people; rather, that choice should ultimately belong to the Iranian nation. What matters during the transition is creating the conditions in which Iranians can freely and fairly decide the future of their country

One of the most striking moments of the event came when the audience began chanting “Javid Shah” — “Long Live the Shah.” Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi did not treat the chant simply as an expression of emotion from the crowd. Instead, he connected it to Iran’s political future and the right of the people to choose. Addressing the audience, he said: “Let us make sure that when the ballot box is established, it becomes a vote—not just a slogan.”

Alongside his emphasis on free elections, this statement gave particular meaning to that powerful moment. A slogan voiced today, if it is to become a lasting political aspiration, must ultimately find its expression through the people’s vote and their ability to determine the future of their country. In this sense, “Javid Shah” was not merely a chant at a political gathering; it reflected the response of an audience that sees Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as a symbol of Iran’s historical continuity and the Pahlavi legacy. His response, however, once again placed the focus on the ballot box and on the choice of the Iranian people.

The name Cyrus the Great itself was also more than simply the title of the event. A gathering centered on Cyrus the Great provided an opportunity to connect Iran’s historical heritage with questions of national identity and the country’s future. Throughout Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s speech, Iran, Iranian identity, and the responsibility of Iranians toward the future of their country remained central themes.

The overall message of the “Cyrus II” speech can be summarized through several key themes: methods must evolve with changing circumstances; national organization and networking must be strengthened; diverse forces can cooperate on the basis of shared principles; and the form of Iran’s future government must ultimately be determined by the Iranian people.

The four principles presented in the speech provide a clear framework for such cooperation: a united Iran, separation of religion and government, freedom and equality for all citizens, and the right of the Iranian people to choose their future.

From this perspective, “Cyrus II” was more than a ceremony commemorating one of the great names in Iranian history. It was also a setting in which a fundamental question about the country’s future was raised once again: After the Islamic Republic, how do Iranians wish to govern their country and determine their political destiny?

The answer articulated by Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi rests on the principle that Iran’s future must ultimately be determined by Iranians themselves and by their own choice—a choice that, in the end, must find its meaning not merely in a slogan, but at the ballot box.



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Consolidating the Diplomatic Standing of the United Opposition

By Leila Kharazi

The strong presence and recent diplomatic meetings of the national leader, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, in Canada, along with consultations with prominent political figures, demonstrate an unprecedented consolidation of the united opposition's diplomatic standing on the international stage. These strategic moves have altered previous equations regarding Iran's political future in favor of the nation's will, showing that the global community no longer views the current regime as the legitimate representative of the Iranian people. The elevated level of formal receptions and dialogues stems from the persistence of domestic struggles combined with active, intelligent diplomacy abroad. This political achievement has transformed the regime's isolation from a passive international issue into an active policy for transition.



The consolidation of this official standing among Western powers has severely restricted the maneuvering capability of those seeking to preserve the tyrannical structure. The new engagements proved that a democratic national alternative for governing future Iran not only exists but possesses a clear platform, popular support, and a robust network of connections at the highest decision-making levels globally. This international acceptance has choked the vital diplomatic arteries of the usurping regime, stripping it of political leverage. The widespread coverage of these visits sent a clear message to the international community that the era of bargaining with human rights violators has ended.

On the other hand, these diplomatic successes have generated a fresh wave of hope, confidence, and solidarity among various sectors of civil society and freedom fighters within the country. The Iranian people, who have endured years of harsh repression and censorship, now see that their demand for justice is heard with respect in the highest international forums. This firm bridge between the internal battleground and national

diplomacy has thrown the regime's repression apparatus into strategic confusion. Neutralizing the regime's propaganda regarding the alleged inefficiency of diaspora struggles stands as one of the most critical achievements of this momentum.

The behavioral coherence and authoritative positions of the united opposition during these consultations discredited the regime's long-standing efforts to portray opposition forces as fragmented. Presenting a clear vision of tomorrow's Iran based on the rule of law, territorial integrity, and economic reconstruction has earned the confidence of global investors and policymakers. The tyrannical regime, which always feared absolute isolation or overthrow, now finds itself confronted by an organized, recognized body possessing national legitimacy. This shift in the balance of power has accelerated the internal collapse of the government's political and propaganda apparatuses.

In this context, the key role and strategic centrality of the national leader, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, in steering this successful diplomacy hold particular prominence. With a precise understanding of international relations, he has managed to translate the Iranian nation's authentic demands for freedom and justice into internationally recognized legal and political language. The national leader's continuous emphasis on preserving national assets, a transition without accumulated violence, and transferring power to a freely elected constituent assembly has imparted unmatched credibility to this movement. This wise guidance has secured international trust in the process of change in Iran.

The global community and democratic governments must now take complementary steps to formalize recognition of the Iranian nation's will and fully delegitimize the regime. Closing diplomatic posts tied to the repression machine, fully designating the system's security organs as terrorist entities, and expelling their affiliates represent the bare minimum legal expectations from free nations. Any delay in decisively supporting a democratic transition will only increase the human and environmental costs of tyrannical rule. The free world must understand that regional stability in the Middle East and global security depend solely on establishing a free and democratic Iran.

The tomorrow of Iran's freedom will mark the return of national dignity, the restoration of international relations based on mutual respect, and economic prosperity. With the fall of the usurping system, the country will emerge from political and economic isolation, becoming a cornerstone of peace and development in the region. Under the shadow of its national leader, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, our homeland will place national diplomacy in the service of its citizens' welfare, security, and pride. The spring of national sovereignty is near, and tomorrow's light will permanently erase the darkness of tyranny and isolation.