Reintegration or segregation? How perceptions of excombatants and civil society effect reintegration (and peace) in Colombia.

Sam Ling Gibson

Student ID. 130011534

15 April 2016.

Word count; 14,713

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MA in Global Diplomacy of the University of London International Programmes

I have read and understood the plagiarism regulations for students of the University of London International Programmes. I undertake that all material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

I give permission for a copy of my dissertation to be held at the University's discretion, following final examination to be made available for reference.

Signed:

Dated: 15/4/2016.

Table of Contents

Abstract

Considering the likely peace deal between the FARC and the Colombian government, this study offers a timely exploration on the hitherto unexplored relationship between how civil-society, and former FARC excombatants conceive the guerrilla group, and its former-members, against a backdrop of the current peace-process and the broader elements of reintegration, reconciliation, and transitional-justice.

Findings show that despite a widespread desire in a negotiated end to the conflict, most Colombians are not prepared to accept what this actually entails, i.e. the reintegration of a collectively demobilising FARC back into society.

To explore this central paradox, the study juxtaposes the dominant national-narratives—which blur the group and its former-members as terrorists and criminals—with counter-narratives of the excombatants, and empirical evidence to highlight inconstancies within the narratives. Findings show that these lead to profound differences in how the two groups conceive reintegration, and theorises that the current model—akin to reinsertion—will not lead to a fuller reintegration unless national-narratives shift significantly, and the FARC and its excombatants are at a very minimum accepted as citizens in a post-conflict society. Notably, the research finds that rather than the excombatants as presumed, civil society is in fact the main obstacle to reintegration.

Introductory chapter

Life here is pain, a secret pain where they [Colombian civil society] won't accept us...even when we want to leave the conflict behind us (interview with excombatant,25/2/2015).

If they want a peace process but don't want to accept us as neighbours, then it isn't going to work (interview with excombatant,16/9/2015).

They don't know any better, some will enter politics, but the rest will do what they do best; extortion, kidnapping...a life of crime (focus-group with public,10/9/2015).

Back ground and rational to the study
Having endured over five decades of civil war, Colombia finds itself at the critical juncture of being relatively close to a widely-anticipated peace deal resulting from a four year negotiation process between the most prominent insurgent group, the FARC[1], and the Colombian Government. Despite past failures in peace processes between these groups, major policy shifts within both camps over the past few years have precipitated a more optimistic environment which most experts see as favourable to ending the seemingly intractable conflict. This has been encouraged by the Constitutional Courts' 2016 deadline for a final, referendum-verified deal, as well as President Juan Manuel Santos' June 2014 re-election—with a mandate to conclude a negotiated settlement—inferring that a majority of Colombians are willing to accept a negotiated solution to the conflict. This support is evident in more explicit indicators shown in national surveys taken throughout the process (notably LAPOP 2013;2014:2015; Grupo de Memoria Histórica, (GMH),2015).

However, this is contradicted sharply by the fact that a large-section of civil society remains deeply uncomfortable with the realities of this peace agreement, from both macro and micro-perspectives; being against the hypothetical political participation of the FARC, as well as widespread reluctance towards the social reintegration of its excombatants on an individual level—whether as co-workers or neighbours, and even less so as citizens or friends. Put simply, most Colombians favour a negotiated peace yet do not trust the FARC and by extension its former members, which adversely affects the sustainability of the DDR[2] process for the country.

This study aims to explore this central paradox through qualitatively exploring how the excombatants themselves, as well as the wider Colombian public conceive the FARC and its former-members, the current talks, and broader concepts such as reintegration and reconciliation. It finds that much of society's rejection appears to hinge on how the group and its members are perceived. Indeed, an apparent loss of legitimacy of the group in recent years and the pervasive effects of a polarised and highly divisive civil war, have allowed a state-generated delegitimising narrative of 'criminals' and 'terrorists' to take root—invoking emotions not only of mistrust, but of anger and hatred towards the group. Indeed, so potent is this narrative that it has permeated into the collective memory of most of the country and such essentialist images has been roughly projected onto the excombatants themselves, irregardless of the manner or group from which they left, or the lives they live today. This has lead to a stereotyped, misguided, and at times dehumanising-discourse depicting former-fighters as suspicious, mistrustful, and even dangerous. These narratives have become so entrenched that they

---

[1] *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia*
[2] Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration

have distorted the historical truth, evident in the two central assumptions which underpin the discourse surrounding the FARC. Firstly, that the group have lost sight of their original ideals, to the extent that they today seen as illegitimate terrorists; and secondly, that its demobilised-members are irreversible proclivity towards violence and are therefore not conducive towards reintegration back into society.

The affect of the assumed validity of these assumptions is of such a magnitude that it may determine both if a deal is accepted by the public, and is its implementation is viable. Indeed, this study indicates that if the dominant national-narratives mentioned above are accepted as true then reintegration, even in the narrowest sense of a peaceful coexistence will never be achieved. It is imperative, therefore, that outgroup perspectives are examined, even in a polarised climate which has little tolerance for counter-narratives. Comparing these dominant-narratives against the counter-narratives of excombatants and testing their validity against empirical evidence, shows that not only much of the assumptions are flawed, but when they are accepted as true they can become self-fulfilling as the inferred stigmas are attached to excombatants regardless of accuracy. Listening to the lived experiences of the former-fighters themselves, it becomes apparent that such discourses of rejection and discrimination and the insecurity and stigmatisation they cause, are responded to through relatively secret lives, in many cases limiting their inter-personal and inter-group participation within their communities, with some even turning to recidivism. Alongside other challenges, this study finds the current process is more akin to the more limited processes of ´reinsertion´, and theorises that if the narratives surrounding the FARC and its former-members remain uncontested then this will not lead to a more complete reintegration process—as claimed by the current DDR program.

Furthermore, findings here show that far from being the assumed threat to peace—and despite a battery of structural and psychosocial issues—excombatants actually show quite a balanced view of the conflict, acknowledging atrocities on all sides. These counter-narratives also show striking commonalities with the publics´ views, notably; a mutual disagreement regarding the FARC´S current tactics; a widespread recognition of the enduring salience of the original objectives of the group, which broadly correspond to structural factors of socio-economic inequality and political exclusion; an overall belief in the importance of ending the conflict and a common conviction in—albeit a minimalist conception of—the need of reconciliation between former adversaries. These findings suggest that if they are accepted by the public, excombatants have both the potential and desire to become key peacebuilding actors, and provide lessons to policymakers in both Colombia and elsewhere—all the more pertinent considering FARC's collective-demobilisation which will follow a peace agreement.

Drawing from and building upon current DDR research
As expanded upon in the following literature review, many scholars and practitioners in conflict resolution and peacebuilding fields recognise that the negotiated settlement is just the first stage in a wider DDR of excombatants. Previous processes in Colombia, as well as in other parts of the world, have shown the 'D&D' stages—with an emphasis on short-term security concerns such as weapons-reductions—are prioritised over the more complex social elements of the reintegration phase. However, the international DDR norms codified in the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS,20006), the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR,2006), and the Cartagena Contribution to DDR (CIDDR,2009), have all demonstrated that an incomplete reintegration phase negatively effects reconciliation, and can lead to stigmatised populations, and at worst recidivism and a return to conflict.

This study will build from and add to this nascent, yet lacking, ´second-generation´ body of research which recognises the importance of a substantive reintegration phase, whilst avoiding the macro-level of analysis of reintegration determinants used by the majority of existing studies which

have contributed to, and drawn from these guidelines. This approach has often devalued or even excluded the experiences and opinions of important postconflict actors—often addressing excombatants distantly in aggregate through quantitative data. Moreover, little has been done to connect the macro-level findings with micro-level impacts, at times to the detriment of the DDR processes (Muggah,2009;2010;2013).

Consequently, limited literature exists on the micro-level perceptions regarding the conflict in Colombia from the perspectives of ordinary citizens, and particularly of returnees. However, the scant examples of qualitative research that has consulted former-combatants—in Colombia and other processes—have revealed critical understandings into various aspects of DDR, such as; enlistment into and leaving the conflict (Rosenau et al,2014), recidivism (Kaplan & Nussio,2013), reintegration experiences (Nussio,2013; Rozema,2008; Anaya,2007) with Moor (2007) adding a quantitative dimension to this latter aspect.

Understanding micro-level accounts of civil society is also crucial, as "their expectations shape the end of armed-conflict and the implementation of peace agreements" (Rettberg & Ugarriza 2015,4), and to this end various qualitative studies have sought to gauge public perspectives on the FARC (notably Theidon,2009(a); Diálogos de Paz (DDP),2014) and the specific elements of the past and present processes (GMH,2012;2015); Rettberg & Ugarriza,2015), whilst nationally-representative surveys and opinion polls general consider perceptions towards both the peace process and the FARC, and have added a quantitative element to these dynamics (notably LAPOP 2013;2014;2015; La opinion,2016; Ipsos Napoleón Franco (INF),2016).

These bodies of research, as well as previous DDR experiences globally, have shown that the perceptions of civil society and formerly antagonistic groups towards each other can be a key determinant to their social reintegration. However, despite this link being evident, very little comparison of the two bodies of perceptions exists, and the notable exceptions (Prieto 2012 (a);(b)) were carried out before the current process had begun. To the knowledge of this study there exists no material which systematically compares these 2 bodies of perceptions against the context of the current process, or substantially explores the link between perceptions of the FARC and it former-members, and the effect of their reintegration. Therefore an investigation into how these individuals and groups perceive and conceptualise the peace process and actors involved, with an emphasis on the affects on reintegration, is both timely and vital. It is this juncture which this study takes place—the nexus and comparison of micro-level analysis of perceptions and attitudes against the backdrop of the current peace process. To this end, this research employs an academic and narrative context, the former drawing on DDR theory and empirical evidence from past process in Colombia and elsewhere, with the latter employing an inductive and grounded theory methodology (GTM) to generate individual-level, first-hand accounts of the lived-problems and perceptions of former combatants.

The constant comparative and theoretical sampling of the GTM generated three broad categories; the image of the FARC and its individual members (former and current), the expectations and norms (and lived realities) of the current reintegration model, and the aspects regarding the proposed peace deal—notably transitional justice, reconciliation and citizenship. These views were juxtaposed, against evidence for validation, and to help identify, analyse and anticipate current and future barriers to post-conflict social reintegration. In turn, this informs the discussion regarding the as yet undefined criteria in determining social reintegration—specifically highlighting the shortfalls of the present D&D focus, as well as how ´enemy´ discourses and the role of wider-society, are insufficiently considered within the dynamics of the current process.

Structure to the study
Chapter 1 will consist of a methodological overview; ethical considerations, limitations to the study, and the rational for the chosen GTM. To provide an academic underpinning to the study Chapter 2 will begin with a preliminary literature review, providing a background on social-reintegration to frame the current process in Colombia. Chapter 3 will present the results of the study—exploring the defining-narratives regarding the FARC and its former-fighters, comparing with the views of the excombatants themselves and then tested against empirical data—offering some explanation as to how these narratives have become so pervasive and misleading. Chapter 4 will form main part of the analysis of the research, which will examine the hindering effects of these narratives on the current normative and theoretical (and lived) model of reintegration. Chapter 6 will finish with a discussion about the viability of the current model of reintegration, and how citizenship, social reintegration and reconciliation all have a crucial and overlapping role to allow a sustainable mode of reintegration, and more broadly a lasting peace, finishing with a discussion examining how the assumptions can be countered, and relevant contributions to the literature.

Conventions
- In contradiction to a key finding of the study—that ´excombatants´ desire to lose this label to one of ´citizen´—this distinction (used interchangeably with ´demobilised´, ´former-fighter´, and ´returnee´) is necessary to the study for the sake of conceptual clarity.
- Considering that most interviews carried out were with FARC excombatants, it can be assumed that any cited interview is from this core dataset, unless it is specified through additional information, e.g. interview/focus-group with ´victim´, ´paramilitary´, ´public´ etc.
- For the sake of readability, percentages have been rounded-up to 1 decimal point, unless encountered whole in a secondary source.

Chapter 1: Methodology.
  Ethics
This study was aligned with the principles of several relevant research ethics policies, particularly from both from SOAS´ Politics and IR Department—in conjunction with the British International Studies Association and its adherence to the ´Respect Code of Practice´ (RESPECT,2004)—as well as the general SOAS ´Research Ethics Policy´, which states, "that research is conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and professional frameworks, obligations and standards" (SOAS 2015(a),3).

Firstly, the sensitive research context meant that all first-hand data collected (with exceptions of consenting academics) was anonymised through the use of only the interview date in lieu of names. The confidentiality procedure, as well as the nature and uses of the research, were conveyed to interviewees in a clear and understandable way—both orally and through the pre-interview confidentiality agreement which also sought informed consent (see appendix 1). These measures are in-line with both SOAS´ (2015(b)) and the Colombian 2012 Law on Data Protection.

As the above ethics codes stipulate, prioritising the participant's well-being above the objectives of the research is imperative, especially in the focus-groups which contained potentially adversarial groups and individuals. Thus, care was taken to conduct the interviews in a perceived neutral place—an NGO in Bogotá—and where necessary, a debriefing was provided to allow a ´cooling off´ period of reflection and discussion.

<u>Limitations, and rational for GTM.</u>

Limitations to the study will now be examined; not only anticipating their potential impact on the study, but also how they have attempted to be been minimised, and indeed how they informed the GTM adopted. The most notable limitation here is the limited and potentially unrepresentative data-set, however other pitfalls of this type of qualitative research must also be considered, notably response biases and the use of perception-based data.

The scope of the research, and the sensitive and potentially harmful security situation in Colombia discounted any first-hand research with current members of the FARC. Taking this into account, the main data-source consisted of participants of one NGO in Bogotá, who are all past or present members of the DDR program. This was generally with FARC excombatants, but as the research evolved the unit of analysis extended to former paramilitaries, victims of the conflict, the public and other relevant academics. Given this limited data-set, this research does not pretend to be comprehensive nor fully-representative, although at attempt at the latter was attempted by including variation within the sampling procedure in terms of gender, age, year of demobilization, region of conflict, as well as circumstances of demobilization (e.g. voluntarily, deserted, captured etc).

This limited data-set, as well as limited existing qualitative micro-level research with excombatants in Colombia, provide the main rational for the use of a qualitative methodology for data collection and analysis, specifically one following the procedures of the GTM developed by Corbin & Strauss (1990;1994;2008). Accordingly, data-collection is reflexive and inductive in the sense that initial interviews allow the emergence of possible theoretical concepts, which are tested against and drive further data collection (ibid,1994,280). This method thus provides a highly valid data in which "representativeness of concepts, not of persons, is crucial" (ibid,1990,9) and therefore allows, "people to let others know what they are thinking, and allows information to be shared and categorised to reflect the salient issues to participants" (Berg 2001,16).

The nature of the study—i.e. that of a social phenomena (reintegration), also involving what would appear to be polarised views made the methodology all the more appropriate. As GTM can help to identify and explain the causes, consequences, and articulation of social phenomena, and therefore, "provides a flexible, yet carefully thorough set of procedures for researchers to use when trying to understand complex problems or events in context" (Dillon 2012,7). The highly polarised and divisive attitudes in Colombian further favoured GTM´s emphasis on theoretical sensitivity; as following and being reflexive to the data attempts to uncover insights without prejudice (Corbin & Strauss,1990;2008). This does not however, adhered to the original GTM principle of no prior consultation of existing literature (see Glasner & Strauss,1967), indeed there is an increasing recognition that a literature review is necessary prior to the investigation in order to frame and provide focus to the study (McCallin,2006; Hallberg,2010; Dunne,2011). The review should, however, be limited in scope, as by nature the methodology follows avenues which are difficult to anticipate, and, moreover, "the researcher does not want to be so steeped in the literature that he or she is constrained and even stifled by it" (Corbin & Strauss 2008,27). Thus, other sources (academic and otherwise) should be used in a comparative, reflexive way alongside data collection, to "inform our analysis rather than to direct it" (ibid,26). Therefore, a preliminary literature review provides a contextual second chapter, with subsequent parts taken reflexively according to the data-collection, included where relevant within the data analysis and, to a lesser extent, discussion section.

The complementary use of observations (taken through in-interview field notes) was employed, to minimise validity drawbacks of relying on using perceptions alone—notably response biases as a result of participants providing answers they deem to be more desirable to society (social desirability response-bias), or the researcher (the Hawthorne effect) (Jones & Alony 2011,103). As recommended by Leary (2001,95), further minimisation of such biases was sought through the use of neutrally worded and unambiguous questions and assurances of anonymity. Additionally, the use of secondary qualitative and quantitative data (perception and non-perception based) would help in cross-referencing and concept testing of primary data.

Data collection and analysis procedure

The canons of GTM stipulate that data collection and analysis is conducted through 3 levels of coding which allows concepts to be the extracted from raw data, and developed according to their properties and dimensions. First, *open coding* allows the generation and identification of initial concepts, by fracturing the data into words, phrases or sentences (indicators), and interpreted and placed into concepts that both represent and are supported by the ideas contained in data (Corbin & Strauss 2008,89). During the second stage, initial codes and concepts (and later categories and core categories) from initial interviews are compared to new codes and concepts uncovered in subsequent interviews. This *axial coding* thus allows concepts to be tested, developed, and related to other concepts—*constant comparative analysis*. During the third stage of *selective coding*, these tested concepts, "that pertain to the same phenomenon may be grouped to form categories" (ibid,1990,8). Constant comparison continues here, and "facilitates the linking and densification of categories" (ibid,2008,46), leading to the grouping of categories into a more abstract *core* category which should explain "most of the variation which represents the participants' major concerns" (Jones & Alony 2011,107). This comparison continues until no new categories emerge (*conceptual saturation*), indicated by a second feedback mechanism; *theoretical sampling* which allows emerging concepts, categories and core categories to inform and be tested against the selection of subsequent interviews and data-sources. Finally, we can see possible theory emerging, consisting of plausible relationships proposed among generated concepts and sets of concepts (Corbin & Strauss 1994,278; 2008,36).

Following this methodology, interviews with the core-subjects—FARC excombatants—were carried out in between February 2015 and March 2016, which involved a prolonged period of interaction with the group, meeting several times with many participants as the research evolved. Initial interviews were open and unstructured and were framed as such to allow for concepts and categories to emerge. These interviews were translated and transcribed and coded following the aforementioned procedures.

Chapter 2: DDR and DDR in Colombia.

Since the early 1990s there has been an reduction in overall levels of armed-conflict between and within states globally (Human Security Report,2013; Muggah & Krause,2010), in tandem with increases of peace-keeping and peace-building initiatives that have often accompanied these transitions to peace. From diverse perspectives of criminology, psychology, peace studies, conflict resolution and developmental fields, empirical ´lessons learned´ have shown that DDR is the most effective transitional mechanism for achieving a long-term peace, reducing the likelihood of future conflict recurrence and increasing the likelihood of a post-conflict reintegration (for instance Kingma,1997). Principally under the auspices of the UN, over sixty DDR programs have taken place within this timeframe (Muggah 2009,6), and international guidelines have emerged as the aforementioned ´best practice´ standards to DDR.

Reflecting broader shifts in DDR, a more maximalist, development-orientated approach has gradually came to be favoured over the focus on short-term security and military objectives of earlier efforts—or ´disarmament´ and ´demobilisation´ (Muggah,2010)—which the IDDRS describes as removing combatants from their weapons and military structures (2006,2). The third, reintegration stage can be conceptually divided into the social, economic, and political assimilation of demobilised-combatants into society, and is, "a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development…by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income" (ibid). Reintegration aims to allow former combatants to feel part of and be accepted by society (Ugarriza,2009), and is thus linked to identity-transformation and ultimately reconciliation between antagonistic parties (CCDDR,2009; SIDDR,2006).

In terms of reconciliation within this reintegration stage, adherents of a more maximalist notion argue variously that to achieve a lasting peace, approaches should encompass; forgiveness, of both excombatants in themselves (Theidon,2009(b)) and between former-adversaries and their victims (Moloney,2014; Prieto,2012(a)), acknowledging and clarifying historical facts (De Greiff,2006), empathy, hope, and even love (Galtung,1996). Whereas more modest conceptions centre on the goal of ´peaceful coexistence´, allowing society to proceed with a ´normal´ life (Bloomfield et al,2003).

The transformations called for by such a maximalist approach to DDR involve changes in the mentality of society (Flórez 1997,171) amounting to, "social engineering" and therefore a "formidably daunting" and long-term task (Muggah 2009,14). These complexities have thus led to a focus on the more technical and tangible D&D aspects within peacekeeping mandates (Özerdem,2012).
    A ´second-generation´ of DDR analysts have demonstrated across many country-specific studies that this traditional military-cantered approach does not equate to a long-term sustainable peace, as it fails to address the underlying structural dimensions which are often the root causes of the conflicts themselves (for instance (IEGAP,2013) which can directly affect levels of recidivism and the development of a post-conflict society (Kingma,1997). This is supported by empirical evidence showing that a simple D&D approach has contributed to the fact that since 1990, however almost half of the countries where a peace-agreement has been signed, have returned to conflict within five years (McMullin,2013(a)). Most practitioners—alongside the international standards—
therefore continue to call for a ´scaling up´ of reintegration programs (for instance UN Secretary General,2011).

The more recent ´third-generation´ of DDR literature—with an emphasis on micro-level individual excombatants—seeks to further explore and explain the complex challenges faced by demobilising combatants—encountering common findings across distinct processes, the crux of which being widespread accounts of systematic discrimination and rejection against the returnees (Boersch-Supan,2008; Kingma 1997,5). McMullin notes that often returnees are depicted either through a ´threat narrative´ portraying them as unconducive to post-conflict peace, or a ´resentment narrative´ in which unaddressed underlying causes to the conflict result in a "reintegration into poverty" where they are competing for scarce resources in receiving communities (2013(a),3).These narratives, often in combination, have often resulted in quite divisive stereotyping of returnees, often unfounded or exaggerated. To name a few examples, ´distrustful´ in Uganda (JRP 2008,5), ´lazy and dangerous´ in Sierra Leone (interview with Konyima,2015), and ´organised criminals´ in Bosnia (Nussio,2015). Whilst these challenges hinder their reintegration into civilian life, conversely, comprehensive DDR programmes have been shown to improve reintegration, and more broadly, reconciliation and

development issues, for instance in South Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia (Kingma & BICC,2001; Pugel,2006).

<u>DDR in Colombia; background to the conflict</u>
The underlying causes to the conflicts are structural, based on socio-economic inequalities–rooted in unequal land distribution and political exclusion (Holguin,2010). Extreme political polarisation erupted into ´*The Violence*´ period in 1948, which saw brutal fighting along a liberal/conservative dividing line. Throughout the 1960s the two conflicting parties transformed into guerrilla groups on one side—advocating wealth and land redistribution—and anticommunist paramilitary on the other, backed by the Colombian State and wealthy landowners, and later the US (Kohn,2005). These divisions and fighting have continued, in varying degrees, ever since, with both sides rightly accused of extensive human rights violations, drug-trafficking, and war crimes (ICC,2012).

In 2002 Álvaro Uribe was elected with a mandate for an iron-fist military stance against insurgency, and the blurring of counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism allowed for the majority of the resources from the US funded ´Plan Colombia´ to be used in fighting leftist insurgent groups—particularly the FARC—rather the indented narcotrafficking (GMH,2015). The resultant ´Democratic Security´ policy combined a securitising discourse which reduced the group to "terrorists and narco-traffickers" and "the first and most important threat" to the country (PCSD 2007,48;23), and—amidst criticisms of high numbers of civilian displacements and human rights atrocities—with a huge military expansion reversed the FARC's hitherto strategic advantage (ICC,2012). Elected in 2010, Juan Manuel Santos, has continued the hard-line security policies of his predecessor, however, manifest in the initiation of a negotiated settlement with the FARC in 2012, appears to be a recognition of what Zartman & Berman (1982) describe as a ´mutually hurting stalemate´, that is, a situation of mutual and painful loss where no party can win militarily, at least in the short/medium term.

Preceding the current diplomatic effort, a series of seemingly perpetual conflicts with armed insurgents in past decades have also came with various attempts at DDR processes, which Theidon (2009(a),8)) refers to as, "Colombia's serial search for peace"—with a cumulative 46,000 demobilised combatants as a result, from both sides of the conflict (Coletta et al 2008,62). The notable collective-processes have been with the M-19[3] guerrilla group in the late 1980s, followed by several smaller insurgent groups, and the AUC[4] paramilitary group from 2003-2006.

Through a peace process which included significant input to the revised 1991 constitution, the M-19 achieved genuine political participation at a national-level and was over-time generally accepted by society as a legitimate political player (Holguin,2010; Guáqueta,2007).
In contrast, the modus operandi of the AUC shifted from self-defence of the wealthy landowners, to one that was specifically anti-insurgent in scope. Part of this strategy included undermining the FARC's social support through systematically assassinating individuals and social movements who were perceived to be sympathetic to the guerrilla's cause (Kohn,2005). The groups decision to officially demobilise in a highly favourable peace and transitional-justice process[5] which was widely criticised for its near impunity. Indeed to date only 37 demobilised paramilitaries have been convicted out of 70,000 crimes confessed (Human Rights Watch,2015). The groups record, as well as the transition of around 12-17% of its former-members into more fractured neoparamilitary structures,

---

[3] *19th of April Movement*
[4] *United Self-Defences of Colombia*
[5] See the 2005 Law 975.

termed BACRIM[6] (IEGAP 2013,50)—left the groups credibility and legitimacy to be increasingly questioned by much of Colombian society (Gutierrez,2010).

Aside from these collective processes, there is an ongoing process of individual DDR, which incentivises active-combatants to desert individually through the lure of reintegration benefits, aiming to help the reintegration of former fighters through providing access to education, psycho-social support, healthcare, job training, monthly stipends, grants for micro-business initiatives, as well as legal and security advice (IEGAP 2013,43-44). Between 2002-2010, 20,748 individuals were reported to demobilise in this way (Nussio & Kaplan 2013,12).

DDR policy in Colombia
Following the paradigmatic shift in international DDR guidelines, the Colombian government has created and developed a substantive DDR policy in which, alongside some notable transition justice measures[7], strives for reconciliation at interpersonal, intergroup and national levels (Prieto 2012(a),527;(b),7)) and has increasingly focused on the social inclusion of excombatants through community-level reintegration efforts (CONPES 2008,26). Similarly is an explicit recognition that the failure of these measures hinders coexistence and reconciliation at a community level, whilst increasing the risks recidivism amongst returnees (Ibid,18).

Qualitative work with former-fighters from past and present demobilisation processes has shown significant inter and intra-group variations, including notable differences in perceived legitimacy, and shifts in the groups image, often becoming exaggerated and distorted over time (Guáqueta,2007). However, such is the dichotomised nature of Colombia society, many of these perceived differences in terms of legitimacy and credibility have become diluted, or even forgotten when it comes to how the excombatants are received post-demobilisation, revealing striking similarities in the challenges experienced by the demobilising fighters across-groups. This ´third-generation´ research focuses on excombatants and micro-level relations and has identified recurring themes from past and current reintegration efforts. Chiming with many of the aforementioned findings of other country-specific studies, notable findings are summarised below, using the findings of Moor,(2007); ACR,(2011); CCDDR,(2009); Anaya,(2007); Prieto,(2012(a)); Nussio,(2011(b));(2012(a)):

- Excombatants limited work skills and low education levels mean that gaining employment is difficult, and when acquired it is usually informal—exacerbated by a weak capacity for labour absorption in the economy.
- In terms of further education—there is a widespread concern over limited scholarships, and lack of assistance or flexibility in combining studies with employment.
- Regarding insecurity—excombatants feel unprotected and exposed to a variety of potential threats. As a result, the high rates of excombatants being murdered has been a constant.
- Based on the assumption that they committed violent acts in the conflict and these violent traits are sticky and carried back into civilian life, receiving-communities perceive returnees with fear and suspicion.
- Cumulatively from these challenges, many former-combatants feel a widespread rejection and stigmatization from society at large, leading to many struggling with daily-life and the pressures to return to illegality, which are compounded by psychological issues, from before, during, and even after the conflict.

---

[6] *Criminal Gangs*
[7] Notably Law 1424 of 2010, Decree 1391 of 2011 and Law 1448 of 2011 (see Articles 44, 105, 111).

We can thus surmise that this third-generation of DDR research in Colombia has identified and offered explanation to these significant challenges and the complexities of long-term reintegration back into society— notably highlighting the shortfalls of the process(es) in Colombia, and how DDR has been incomplete by both national and international standards—specifically that it resembles a D&D approach, as it has not been "accompanied by processes of reconciliation" (Flórez 1997,171). In this respect, Colombia DDR programmatic policy echoes in many ways these theoretical and normative gaps that we see between the international standards and DDR practice in reality. Even by the governments own admission, the community-based reintegration efforts leave excombatants continuing to, "face barriers to their social, economic and community reintegration" (CONPES 2008,18).

What is both striking and explanatory towards this theoretical-programmatic gap, is the role of image and legitimacy, and how misguided stereotypes and assumptions have evolved and pervaded—to the point that they appear to significantly influence the present-model of reintegration and current process. The following chapters will explore these assumptions, from the perspectives of both returnees and the Colombian public, to ascertain their validity and effects on the current and post-deal reintegration processes.

Chapter 3; Findings/results/data analysis

In the following, this study presents the core categories of the research that emerged as a result of the thematic analysis described above, that is, the relationship between perceptions, stigmatisation, and reintegration of the FARC and its excombatants. What emerged from conversations with the public was a tendency for most to fall back upon generalised assumptions about the group and its former-members—the crux of which being the groups perceived loss of legitimacy as political actors, and that its former members carry perceived negative and violent traits into their postconflict lives. These assumptions will be discussed below, and robustly tested against existing studies, as well as the counter-assumptions from the excombatants, who, provide widespread accounts detailing discrimination and stigmatisation, security and (mis)trust, and recidivism.

Principal assumptions regarding the FARC and its former fighters
Assumption 1; *rebels without a cause*

Widespread public assumption	The evidence	Excombatants counter-narrative
Assumption 1: That the FARC started with good intentions of trying to change genuine structural inequalities in the country, but are now generalised illegitimate terrorists, constituting the principal perpetrators of violence in the conflict today.	FARC can (implicitly) be considered terrorists in terms of their current tactics. Structural conditions to war continue to be salient. They are not the worst perpetrator of violence in the conflict, by a significant margin.	Counter-narrative: a likewise recognition of the enduring structural conditions for insurgency, as well as the FARC's departure from their original ideals, yet, a belief that the group receive a disproportional amount of blame for the problems in the country.

Insert 1; public and excombatants perspectives of the FARC vs. evidence.

When asked about their views of the FARC and its former-combatants, my initial focus-groups with the public (10/9/2015; 12/9/2015) gave vague labels such as ´terrorists´—a typical depiction being, "[m]ost of us believe the FARC are a bunch of terrorists and have lost their cause a long time ago". To try and uncover the understandings behind this terminology, and the illegitimacy they connected to it, subsequent focus-groups (26/9/2015; 23/9/2015) were probed to compare the FARC with the demobilised M-19 (guerrilla) and AUC (paramilitary) groups—with several notable findings. There was

recognition, even appreciation of the original ideals of the FARC, and the largely-structural conditions for the conflict which continue today. This corresponds broadly with national sentiments—with surveys finding 79.6% observing widespread corruption, 48% and 47.8% unsatisfied with public education, and their personal economic situation respectively, and 66.9% believing major land-redistribution necessary (LAPOP 2013,111; 2014,41;65;90).

   A typical response from the sample was; "FARC and M-19 both started as armed-guerrillas, based on revolutionary ideologies wanting drastic change". However, the perceived differences in the objectives and tactics of the two groups led to a clear divergence in how they are depicted;

[They] decided to surrender and through a series of negotiations and became the M-19 political party, which currently holds a place in congress, but FARC turned into terrorists when they started attacking civilians with bombs, drug-dealing and kidnapping.

10/12 of the respondents referred implicitly or explicitly to these terrorist tactics, which correspond with scholarly distinctions such as Wilkinson (1999), and Ganor´s (2002), where "[t]he guerrilla fighter's targets are military ones, while the terrorist deliberately targets civilians (ibid,287). When compared to the AUC, the focus-groups were more divided. Despite viewing the brutal tactics employed by the paramilitary groups as morally reprehensible, some of the respondents expressed the view that the means justify the ends, "in defending the country against the FARC," and that overall the FARC are both the principal source of violence in the country and the least legitimate armed-group. This has been supported through cross-national surveys—an IPSOS poll in 2007 (see Bourdieu,2008) found the proportion of the general public viewing the group responsible for most violence in the conflict, whether paramilitary, FARC, or the Colombian State to be 5, 47, and 23 percent respectively. This was echoed in a study by GMH (2012,23) finding perceived responsibility at 6/32/16%, supported in widespread negative conceptions of the FARC being ´plain delinquents´ (82%, ibid (see also El Tiempo,2016)).

Excombatant´s image of the FARC:
Similar to public opinion, there was a widespread appreciation of the structural roots to the conflict with the returnees consulted. Principally—and with some variation—these causes were poverty, inequality, violence and insecurity, and a weak or non-existent state presence in many regions. These given causes to the conflict largely correspond with the returnees reasons for enlistment (with the addition of revenge, childhood abuse and forced recruitment), and contributed to the notion that armed insurgency was the only, or at least most effective, way "to improve this country" (interview,10/5/2015).

Although the returnees generally adhered to the continued salience of the FARC's ideals—i.e. the roots to the conflict—the group's Marxist revolutionary ideology does not necessarily translate into their post-conflict political outlook, which generally becomes less radical with time. Indeed, with the exception of one recently captured excombatant, there were various criticisms of the group's present modus operandi, and a broad agreement that this indicated the group's departure from its original values. As evidence, many of them pointed to the groups involvement in narcotrafficking and kidnapping, as evidence that, "[a]t first the organisation was a benefit to the rural population, but now its ideology is lost almost completely…they have made many mistakes and damaged many families and have to respond to that" (Interview,15/7/2015).

Alongside this critical view of the group was a frustration of the widespread depiction of the group as the principal cause and enactor of violence in the conflict, and therefore that responsibility should be proportional and in line to the evidence; "if we look closely, all groups sometimes kill, rape and make people ´disappear´…and don't fulfil the laws…but it's seen as ´he's a guerrilla member, kill him´. Why is the law different with a soldier?" (interview,15/8/2015). These sentiments resounded in their general agreement with the proposed transitional-justice measures for a collectively demobilising FARC, notably the proposals aims to punish perpetrators of human rights abuses, not only of demobilising FARC, but also the State and other paramilitary groups (see Brown,(2015) and Neuman,(2015) for details).

Insert 2; Venn diagram on differences and commonalities on how perceptions of the FARC.

Returning to our first assumption, *rather than the fundamentalist image depicted, how the excombatants conceive their former group was for the most part balanced, and self-critical—* increasingly so with time out of the conflict, and regardless of if they voluntarily demobilised or not. We have noticeable agreement between the returnees and the public recognising the validity of the original ideals of the FARC, and that the underlying conditions for the conflict remain both salient and unresolved. Moreover, there is a general view that the group has become disconnected from the revolutionary ideals that guided them previously, and thus its legitimacy.

Are they the murdering, kidnapping, drug-dealing terrorists that the narrative implies? Various studies on organised crime attest to some of this—revealing that around 14% of their revenue comes from kidnapping, around 60% from drugs-related activities, and the remainder through illegal-extraction industries and extortion (Gurney,2015; McDermott,2013; Ramsey,2012). Although the excombatants wouldn't use the term, many of them—as well as the public—recognise parts of the organisation's present operations as ´terroristic´, in accordance to the aforementioned theories.

In examining the public's assumption that the FARC are the main perpetrators of violence in the country today, we depart from the returnee's views, as well as empiricism. In lieu of comprehensive, reliable data of overall violence committed by the various actors in the conflict, a variety of sources and categories of violence was used to calculate a means-based average[8]. This analysis—visualised below in insert 3—found that 71.1/75.8% of violence (cumulative/present levels) can be attributed to the paramilitaries, with only 23/13.8% to the FARC (with the remaining 5.7/10.1% to the State). Therefore, this part of the assumption is flawed; they neither did, nor do constitute the main perpetrators of violence, both in aggregate and—with the exception of cumulative kidnappings—by indicator. The same analysis, however, does show that the FARC could be termed as terrorists in terms of their current tactics, which appears to contribute to an exaggerated stereotype of the group.

Insert 3: Perceptions versus factual evidence regarding violence committed by that and non-state groups in the conflict (% based on total and politically motivated killings, human rights violations, kidnappings, massacres and forced displacements).

In juxtaposing the M-19´s perceived legitimately vis-à-vis that of the ´terroristic´ FARC reveals further contradictions in the narrative. It is documented that although less militaristic, the group did engage in the same illicit activities which have earned the FARC the moniker of ´terrorists´. For instance the group used kidnapping, more extensively than the FARC, even in aggregate terms (GMH 2013(b),11), and were allegedly the first insurgent-group to engage in narcotrafficking and arms-for-drugs deals (Guáqueta,2007). This, according to the erstwhile leader Carlos Pizarro, contravened many of the groups fundamental ethics (García-Durán et al 2008,16).

Assumption 2; how excombatants are viewed; not conducive to peace.

Widespread public assumption	The evidence	Excombatants counter-narrative
Assumption 2: excombatants will maintain their perceived inherent violent ways, and are therefore going to turn to a life of crime rather than reintegrate back into society.	Excombatants not inherently violent- most don't choose life of crime. Reintegration is limited, but not necessarily through excombatants actions, and is affected by the assumptions and stigmatising narratives. …	Counter-narrative: excombatants demobilise and strive for a reintegrated crime-free life, despite challenges of stigmatisation, discrimination, and even victimisation. …

Insert 4; public and excombatants perspectives of the FARC excombatants vs. evidence.

---

[8] see Annex 2 for details

Within my focus-groups with the public, there was a range of opinion regarding former FARC members, from the unknown to describing them as ´fundamentalists´, but this image was generally based on a narrative of fear, suspicion and threat, and was essentialist in this sense that often did not separate the excombatants from their former group; with the most typical being: ´criminals´, ´delinquents´ and ´dangerous´. Underlying this depiction was the assumption that the demobilising-combatants will bring and use such negative personality traits, as well as their skills in arms and fighting etc, back into society, or simply that they are unable, often undeserving of rehabilitation;

Do you think that someone who has being killing for the last 20 years can come and start selling empanadas on the street?!…Once a killer, always a killer (focus-group with public,12/9/2015).

This narrative resounds with various national survey findings; 84% believe that excombatants increase insecurity, 41% are scared of excombatants, and 81% don't trust them (Prieto 2012(a),71; CNC,2008 in Nussio,2015)—all amounting to a widespread view that when excombatants demobilise they threaten security and even coexistence in receiving communities (Anaya,2007).

Excombatants´ image of excombatants
Contrary to the their portrayal as being unwilling to leave the conflict and reintegrate back into society, the counter-narrative from the returnees questions this assumed affiliation with their former group, and suggests an existence of daily hardship effected by educational/employment issues, emotional problems, security and (mistrust), and risks of recidivism, and stigmatisation, which will be explored below.

In line with other studies in chapter 2, was a frustration amongst many of the respondents that they were often pigeonholed with their former group, and that that many of the perceived negative stigmas of the FARC were often projected onto them after demobilising; "honestly I think that they don't differentiate us from the FARC (interview,15/7/2015). Another participant, during one of the focus-groups noted that, "[r]ecently, some guys went to steal and unfortunately they were demobilized so it gave the [local] media the chance to say: ´all demobilized are thieves´", to which another responded, "if they put something on television which says the FARC are guilty of something, there're people who believe that you as an excombatant are guilty of that!" (group interview,25/9/2015). Conversely, the excoms saw a clear distinction between active and former FARC combatants, "[T]here's a separation and transition that people don't understand, they believe that all demobilised are all very bad or murderers just because we were there, in the conflict" (interview,15/7/2015).

Employment, education and culture shocks
Firstly, in terms of and employment and education, the excombatants frequently referred to an almost systematic discrimination on two levels. Firstly, that their experiences from the conflict are not transferable or conducive to getting a job in a city. As one highlighted, "when they say, ´well, tell us about your experience´, you can't tell them, ´look, the only experience I've got is carrying a gun and all I know is how to use it´" (Interview,24/6/2015). They are not resentful about this and generally accept it as part of the reintegration transition; however, some participants criticised the appropriacy and limited level of the training and education opportunities offered to them as part of the DDR program;

We're from the countryside and don't know anything about the city…you're not taught to catch the bus, get health insurance, where and who to live with. In fact, the first time I went out to the road I saw so many cars that it left me terrified (interview,15/6/2015).

As alluded to above, reintegration difficulties are compounded as fighters leave the support systems of the their former groups, and, as (Anaya 2007,185) points out, are passing, "from a collectivistic rural-military life to an individualistic urban life as civilians", with the concept of ´separate´ having both psychosocial and social connotations (Soeters 2005,67);

I saw the armed group as my family…they gave us clothes, food, shelter. In a huge city like Bogotá it's difficult to rebuild these social networks…when I arrived to Bogotá we [me and my son] almost starved…I struggled to adapt to life and tried to return to the FARC (interview,15/9/2015).

This inappropriacy of skills, coupled with employment discrimination and cultural issues upon arrival, leads Thorsell to conclude that most excombatants are not offered a genuine opportunity for economic reintegration (2013,195-196). Indeed, Arjona & Kalyvas (2006,51) found that only 10% of excoms have employment, and as reported by several of my participants, the vast majority are pushed into the informal sector (ibid). Not only does this often imply unsatisfactory pay and conditions, but has been linked to recidivism with both demobilising guerrilla (Anaya,2007) and paramilitary groups (Nussio,2011(b)).

Security and (mis)trust
As with the public, the returnees also expressed feelings of insecurity. The causes, sources and manifestations of these fears, however, differ and varied amongst those consulted. As found by Prieto (2012(a),71)—unlike receiving communities—my participants did not see other excombatants as a major security-risk. The principal threats were perceived to be from their former armed-group (if they deserted), and/or a paramilitary/BACRIM group, in retaliation to their former ties with insurgent groups or as a result of refusing to re-enter into a life of organized crime (interviews,24/6/2015; 2/7/2015; 16/9/2015). These higher levels of perceived risk compared to non-excombatant community members reflects other research, with Prieto (2012(a),54;71) finding that 76.5% of excombatants had been threatened in their neighbourhood (versus 11% of their community members), and these threats are real—with close to 5% of returnees being murdered (ACR,2008 in Nussio,2015).

Recidivism
As one excombatant described on their arrival to Bogotá, "I don't know how to work, I don't have any career, I only know war" (Interview,16/9/2015). Such skills in conflict, coupled with the challenges to reintegration documented here, amount to a potentially serious temptation to recidivism. Coupled with the higher levels of illegal armed-groups which seek recruitment in the areas of reintegration (Themner,2013; Nussio & Kaplan,2013) the assumptions assertion that recidivism is inevitable appears to be logical, "You arrive and these temptations are wherever you go, always trying to recruit you...you have to resist the challenges and prevail against it (interview,5/6/2015). As this account indicates, challenging the assumption the former-combatants are destined to a life of crime, and in spite of the significant challenges that the demobilised experience in their reintegration back into society, the vast majority of them strongly renounced violence as a problem-solving mechanism. Contrarily, they showed evidence of being risk averse through ´keeping a low profile´ and ´trying to fit in´, echoing the aforementioned studies by Themner and Nussio & Kaplan, and further evidenced by FIP´s (2014) estimation that 14% of excombatants (from all groups) return to crime at some point, with Kaplan & Nussio estimating that ex-guerrillas are 50% less likely to return to crime than former-paramilitaries (2013,18).

Stigma and the victim/victimiser dichotomy
I had to face, and still face discrimination, rejection, and stigmatization by society. ´You're a demobilised, a murderer´. It's hard and it hurts because regardless of anything people or society judge without knowing the history of you or the conflict (interview,3/10/2015).

As seen in the above accounts, the daily challenges of discrimination in work and education, emotional problems, and security all contribute to a post-conflict experience which is shaped by a perception-driven social stigmatisation. So widespread was this perception of social stigmatisation that it was considered the principal obstacle to their efforts to reintegrate back into society. Unsurprisingly, these experiences led to a starkly different conception of other excombatants, compared to those of the public. Excombatants did not consider themselves to be victims explicitly and considered the principal victims of the conflict to be non-excombatants who are affected directly by the conflict. However, the common conditions for enlistment—involving abuse, extreme poverty, forceful abduction, coupled with emotional issues from conflict and post-conflict traumas—do amount to victimhood in accordance the international DDR and criminal justice standards (for instance CCDDR 2009,50; UN,1999;), and arguably, technically by national law[9], but are generally not recognised with this status, which to a degree reflects Fischer's (2012,418) assertion that victimhood is largely determined by dominant societal-discourses. In a focus-group (13/9/2015) one excombatant explained, "this relation between victim and victimizer is complicated and not black and white", with another expounding, that all sectors of society "are effected by this conflict, all wanting to reconstruct their lives". This victim/victimiser blur was further examined in interviews with victims and focus-groups which included victims, who generally agreed, and even understood why combatants would enlist in guerrilla groups, "because of extreme economic problems or threats to their family" (focus-group including victims,6/8/2015).

Insert 5: Venn diagram on differences and commonalities on how perceptions of FARC

---

[9] For instance Article 5 of Law 975 states that the damage must have been carried out by state security services, or "organized armed-groups outside the law".

The second assumption explored—*that excombatant's ´violent tendencies´ from the conflict are carried into society, and will hinder their reintegration into society*, appears to be largely untrue. Excombatants do offend more than non-excombatants, but only fractionally as aforementioned, and the type of crimes committed are generally not the imagined violent criminality bought from the conflict (Nussio & Howe,2012; interview with Nussio,2014).

The excombatants counter-narratives demonstrate a clear distinction between them and their former group, and whilst they agree that societal reintegration is insufficient, it is generally not, as assumed, due to their engagement in criminality. In fact, it appears that the negative preconceptions of them that underlie societal-discourses are the principal obstacle to their reintegration, and that most excombatants are trying to reintegrate despite the significant challenges involved.

In the above comparisons we can see a consensus that the group have degraded over time both in terms of operations and tactics, which affects the group's perceived credibility and legitimacy. However, what is also striking is that same narrative, although not completely baseless, has become exaggerated and distorted, and reified upon the whole group of its former-members. The juxtaposing of the FARC against the perceived legitimacy of the M-19, factual evidence, and a literature-based analysis on narrative-formation offers some explanation to this. Clearly there is evidence in the two assumptions of ´collective amnesia´, in which the a particular national-narrative denies the truth to the public (Posso,2007) using a misrepresentative, stereotyped image to delegitimise and even dehumanise the outgroup (Foucault,1972). This precipitates an ecological fallacy on two-levels—allowing the FARC's traits and actions at an organisational level to become exaggerated and attributed to, firstly its individuals members (as noted by both Nussio,2015 and Gutierrez,2010), and secondly its *ex*-members. In this ´multiplier effect´, disconnects from the truth become more pronounced in scope, time, and audience—from a figure of the FARC being responsible for between 23% of the violence in the country overall, and around 14% at present, six times the number of Colombians believe otherwise (see insert 3 above), that the FARC committed far more violence than the paramilitaries, and despite recidivism rates amongst excombatants being only marginally higher than national averages, we see trust in returnees at only 19% (El Tiempo,2016).

Therefore, the all-encompassing nature of the narratives means that the social dichotomy between excombatant and non-excombatant remains clear, yet not between excombatant and combatant, This—alongside the negative perception of the FARC's current tactics—elucidates as to why the public so strongly perceive them as illegitimate political actors, and also why they do little to distinguish between the FARC, its individual members, and its former members. Therefore, not only do these national-narratives continue to keep the country divided, as we will see in the next chapter they have grave implications for the reintegration and reconciliation of excombatants.

Chapter 4: Reintegration in Colombia, expectations versus reality.
If the dominant-narratives about the FARC and its ex-members set out in chapter 3 are taken at face value as is indicated, then, as one returnee commented, "it is logical that [the public] are afraid of us" (interview,3/10/2015). In turn this has marked adverse effects on reintegration, as this section will examine. This will be done by first asking how these dominant-narratives shape how the public consider how, and even if, reintegration should take place, which will be juxtaposed against the excombatants experiences and conceptions of reintegration, as well as qualitative-empirical data. This not only highlights the flaws of current DDR practise, but also challenges the government's assumption that the current model can lead to a more complete reintegration.

How the public consider reintegration: reinsertion

Based on findings that much of civil society fears, stigmatizes and even resents excombatants affects reintegration in multifarious ways, as underscored in these excerpts from focus-groups with the public on the various components of reintegration—economic and political participation, reconciliation, and justice (focus-groups with the public,12/9/2015; 26/9/2015);

If I worked with an excombatant? Well, I just don't know how that would be, how can you know how they'd behave?

We shouldn't have these criminals in congress; they'll only bring more extortion and corruption to politics.

Most Colombians hate the FARC…so their reintegrating members should expect to be rejected by society who'll not forgive them.

The FARC's been here for more than 50 years and most Colombians think that they'll have to pay for those all things that they did.

To further examine these views on reintegration, we can turn to previous qualitative-data. LAPOP found that 34.6% surveyed believed that the FARC should not be reinserted back into society following a peace-deal (2014,233). When these views are refined using more distinct components of reintegration—programmatic, political and economic integration, and reconciliation—we can see that many Colombians are not only against reintegration, but can and do actively resist it. Fifty-one percent believe that excombatants should not receive any support as part of the DDR program, only 11.2% would vote for a FARC candidate, just over half would employ, and a minority surveyed would not knowingly work with, accept as a neighbour, or want their children to be friends with an excombatant (LAPOP 2013,127; 2014,214;235-240; GMH 2012,57; Prieto 2012(a),226;73). In terms of reconciliation, both Rettberg & Ugarriza (2015) and Prieto (2012(a)) found a majority belief that reconciliation with the guerrillas was possible, however this was defined along the minimal criteria of recognition, acceptance/validation, coexistence and cooperation, and in the case of Prieto, merely ´ending the conflict´.

Conversely, considering a more expansive understanding of reconciliation which included ´forgiveness ´, less than half (47.4%) of respondents thought this to be possible (LAPOP 2014,231), with GMH (2012,58) finding that only 25.8% believed in truth about the conflict as a tool for reconciliation. These views also translate into broad disagreements with the proposed postconflict transitional-justice framework, in which only those found guilty of human-rights violations will receive sentenced of between 5 and 8 years (Neuman,2015).

What does all this data imply? Clearly a much divided response and at best lukewarm attitudes towards if reintegration should happen, and what it should entail, with more scepticism towards more reconciliatory aspects. Therefore, the negative perceptions from the national-narratives do appear to effect how (and if) these groups are received, resembling the *reinsertion* that comes with D&D, rather than *reintegration*. As examined below, the lived experiences of many excombatants correlates with public's expectations that returnees keep a low profile, rejecting the past and ´fitting in´ as ´normal´. This study terms this the ´invisible-citizen´ narrative.

Insert 6: Venn diagram comparing public and excombatants experiences of reintegration as currently practiced.

Excombatants experiences of reintegration (reinsertion); The invisible-citizen narrative
You don't know who might be listening…[Y]ou start thinking ´if I say something, they might know I was part of an armed group´ (Interview,15/9/2015).

This was a common view of returnees; that due various security threats, disassociating themselves from the stigmatising labels of ´FARC´ and ´excombatant´—and therefore their past—was the best path to a safe and normal life. This was often based on negative past experiences, in which their true identity had been discovered, through self-disclosure or otherwise. Such accounts were widespread and varied, both in source and nature, from verbal and physical abuse and threats in their receiving communities;

I don't know how, but when they found out, they made fun of me and my daughter…I was scared that people knew that, and I panicked more because maybe the paramilitaries would find out (ibid).

To accounts of discrimination effecting their ability to work or study;

I'd finished a 4 year technological degree, and with it got a job. After I started working when they found out that I'd been part of an armed-group they fired me. They didn't see that I was in an advanced stage of reintegration, just that I had been part of an armed group (Interview,3/10/2015).

24

Consequently, most of the participants resort to the safety mechanism of, "keeping a low profile" (focus-group,9/7/2015), and living fairly secretive lives—often keeping social participation to a minimum;

When everything was clandestine nobody hated me (interview,25/03/2016)

[I]t's easier to be an invisible person (interview,15/8/2015).

Many respondents referred to the effects of this secretive life on daily social interactions. To give several examples from various participants in one particular focus group (2/7/2015);

Not being able to express the way I want is hard.

We tell lies because we are afraid of the rejection of others.

 You put up a shield and because of that many relationships do not work.

Thus, they rarely self-disclosed their true past to non-excombatants. And here the extent of this anonymity varied, with some also avoiding other returnees where possible to avoid the perceived excombatant stigma—as found by Nussio found with former AUC members (2011,590)—whilst others felt safe enough to be honest and have relations, sexual or otherwise, with other excombatants.

Alongside, this narrative of hiding the past (what not to be), is one of what excombatants fell they should, or at least appear to be—what they perceived to be a ´normal´ citizen. Inferred here is a belief that, if they kept quiet about their past, and studied, or worked, they could reintegrate, or at least coexist safely in society. Many of the excombatants therefore equated studying and working with normality and citizenship.

Excombatant perspectives

- reintegration should be along the lines of national and international standards, at a minimum involving acceptance.
- reintegration/ citizenship is a 2-way street
- involves them forgiving others, and getting a second chance
- residual memory and traumas

Public perspectives

- Onus is on excombatants to become well behaved 'invisible citizens'
- divided on if reconciliation is possible
- does not involve being friends or pardoning excombatants
- not allowing kids to be friends with excombatants

Overlap (center)

- common agreement that at a minimum reinsertion needs to take place
- citizenship affects reintegration
- limited version of reconciliation needed- mutual forgiveness not required
- recon is long term process

Insert 7: *Venn diagram comparing public and excombatants experiences of reintegration as it should be practiced (a summarised version of the data in appendix 3)*

Excombatants on reintegration ideals: fitting in vs. citizenship and reconciliation
Typically described as ´coexisting´ or ´getting along with each other´, most participants recognised this minimalist-approach of reintegration implied in the narrative as realistic, providing at least physical security. This contrasted, however, with their reintegration ideals, which involved more reconciliatory aspects of, variously, acceptance, trust, some form of forgiveness, and truth, and stressed the important part that the receiving communities had to play within this broader conception of reintegration.

When talking specifically about reconciliation, the participants showed a far greater belief that it was possible than the public—as found by Prieto (2012(a),88)—and frequently talked about the importance of time, and forgiveness in this process. Many referred metaphorically to ´*thorns*´, that is the enduring effects of wartime atrocities and traumas that transpired and are residual, and many emphasised the importance of truth and memory in dealing with these; "in my opinion, to forgive is not to forget, is to remember helps with that pain," said one participant (ex-FARC) in the same focus-group comprising of ex-FARC and ex-paramilitary (10/27/2015), to which another (ex-paramilitary) added, "but that even with these *thorns*…you can work and live together the same community".

As these findings show—similar to one of Anaya's (2007) findings on reconciliation—there were general feelings of remorse and regret for actions committed during the conflict, and a broad recognition that excombatants felt it important to forgive any wrong that was done to them during war,

and an understanding that change must begin with themselves; "if I can forgive myself, then I can forgive others" (Interview,15/9/2015). Similarly, most of the victims consulted also saw "forgiving the one who has hurt us and move on" as a key part of reconciliation (Interview with victim,2/9/2015). However, another of Anaya's findings—that many former guerrillas "needed the forgiveness of civilians" (p185)—was not detected. Despite being repentant for any wrongdoings, most of my participants stopped short of this expansive notion of reconciliation; willing to forgive but not expecting forgiveness reciprocally. Some of the victims also supported this view, with one noting that "acceptance in society is not presumed, but each excombatant needs to earn it" (10/10/2015). It was precisely this acceptance and a ´second chance´ that the returnees desired most, and that society recognises them as citizens, or at the very least "accept people as they *are*…and not be carried away by what they *were*" (Interview,15/9/2015).

Regardless of the conceptual variance in the scope of reintegration—from the more minimalist notion of what is viable, to more expansive idealistic notions involving forgiveness—what is clear is that these all include some degree of reciprocal reconciliation from the public. Thus reintegration is a two-way street that involves all of society, and cannot be done solely through the efforts of the demobilised themselves. Indeed, many spoke of the public being invaluable support mechanisms in the reintegration process. Although outweighed by the negative experiences, when they had been open about their past, some reported positive experiences of acceptance, and even embracement through their participation as citizens (interviews,29/7/2015; 15/9/2015; 3/10/2015);

I participate in meetings within the community, I'm a member of the board actually and I like it. I feel good, I feel like a citizen and I feel I can contribute too.

Two of my friends at college found out, and it was a beautiful experience because they didn't discriminate, and they told me ´I was an inspiring example to them´.

In my job [as a nurse] I'd tell bits of my difficult past to patients who were very sick…which motivated them to get through their difficult situations…I felt like a useful instrument in society.

Contested notions of citizenship and reintegration
As with the assumptions regarding the FARC and its ex-members, when examining reintegration we can also see substantive differences in normative understandings and expectations between the Colombian public and returnees, as well as official DDR policy. From the perspective of the excombatants, there is a clear gap between how excoms *understand* and *desire* reintegration and how they *enact* it (reinsertion). The publics´ expectation of reintegration—coupled with security threats—means that excombatants conform to the invisible-citizen narrative which is far-removed from any meaningful reintegration. As Anaya (2007,185) concludes;

Although the programme offers the combatants alternative possibilities to war, there is still a long way to go before they can be fully reintegrated into civilian life and a process of national reconciliation achieved.

Previous research has found that a vast majority of individuals in receiving communities had not knowingly worked, or attended a social event, or even been aware of the existence of returnees (Prieto,2012(b); CNC,2011 in Nussio & Kaplan,2012), leading the latter authors to describe present reintegration practise as ´social segregation´ (p12). Such experiences, argue Herrera & González (2013)

demonstrate that a successful reintegration is usually invisible or camouflaged in the daily life of the community, something that the excombatants surveyed were acutely aware of;

Its like no-one knows we're the ones who drive your taxis, look after your children, construct your houses and then protect them [as security guards] (interview,3/10/2015).

These indicators of reintegration all point to a reintegration-model which approximates more what both international and national standards recognise as *reinsertion* (part of the D&D stage) (IDDRS,2006; CIDDR,2009), which the government recognised should be a temporary process, precluding reintegration (CONPES 2008,3). These shortcomings are all the more conspicuous when the taking into account how returnees think reintegration *should* be, which at a minimum involve some sort degree of acceptance and tolerance from the receiving community. This is a long way from the States´ and international goals of reintegration, "whereby excombatants move away from the roles and positions that defined them during the conflict to identifying themselves as citizens and members of the community" and that the excombatants feel part of and "are accepted as active members of their communities" (SIDDR 2006,27;37). Moreover, these two components are clearly interdependent, and underscore the differences between reinsertion and reintegration, shedding doubt on the assertion that one leads to the other;

How do we integrate into society? Where does this label change? How can we be accepted? I've already earned a place in society, working, studying, raising a child single-handedly...and society has to have to accept me as a citizen (interview,25/2/2015).

Such rejection were themes central to how returnees felt stigmatised and taken wrongly in society, showing a two-way casual link between the publics misperceptions towards them, and their reintegration into society. Firstly that the latent stigma attached to excombatants as a threat means that society refuses to accept them socially, which according to chief presidential adviser on reintegration, Alejandro Eder—echoing the findings above—leads to discrimination in both receiving-communities and employment (Moloney,2014). Not only does stigma effect how they are received, but also how they attempt to reintegrate—with many participants frustrated as they are willing to participate socially, but potential rejection, stigmatisation, and security concerns largely holds them back. This appears to be limiting how excombatants are able to identify and act as citizens, paradoxically leaving them feeling rejected and unaccepted as legitimate citizens and yearning for more in terms of reintegration into society;

I think that if the person studies, work, communicates with other people, they're going to be a good citizen, but even with this we can't be citizens if we're not accepted. Reintegration means giving us the opportunity to be here (Interview,19/6/2015).

These narratives thus appear to be self-fulfilling; the stigmatization and insecurity they generate appears to mould how excombatants feel they are expected to (and do) reintegrate. Nina (2009) posits that as long as labels of ´excombatants´ remain, those returning populations will perceive themselves as stigmatised, and feel rejected, which subsequently means that returnees participate less which negatively effects community-level coexistence (Nussio & Kaplan,2012). The anecdotes of these participants—who both attempted to engage in dialogically with the wider community—capture this paradox perfectly (interviews,3/10/2015; 25/03/2016);

When people found out, they suddenly stopped buying from my shop…for the community I was just a person that was part of the conflict.

[R]eactions have usually been positive, but once the president of a community action board told me ´you don't get to have a say around here because you were a murdering guerrilla´.

Identity issues with the invisible-citizen narrative
The more the invisible-citizen narrative is scrutinised, the more it begins to unravel, revealing the flaws and limits of the reinsertion model. The two components of the invisible-citizen narrative (hiding the past and embracing a normal life), are adopted as necessary by the excombatants as the most viable means of—an albeit limited—reintegration. However, the assumption in much of the literature that with reintegration, "a combatant becomes a citizen" (Casas-Casas & Gúzman-Gómez 2010,63) is too simplistic and overemphasises the role of individual returnees over the rest of society. Indeed there is sufficient evidence above; to suggest that hiding the past may in fact hinder reintegration, which raises doubts to whether the current model can lead to a more substantive reintegration.

As Rodríguez-López et al argue, the identity-transition involved of "breaking with the past" is a psycho-social mechanism, "perceived as a way of solidifying their commitment to the goal of reintegration into wider society" (2015,183). This was somewhat evident within discussions about citizenship with the returnees; when asked about identity, most participants (despite a fair bit of hesitation), said they feel they are citizens, rather than excombatants (and rarely both). In these conversations, the tendency was to emphasise being as removed as possible to the FARC and its former-members, stressing instead what they perceived to be ´normal´ behaviour; typically, "studying, working, having a family…a normal citizen" (Interview,15/6/2015). This desire—considering the national-narratives and security factors—is understandable. However, it is this same logic which underpins the paradoxy of the invisible-citizen narrative; that for the most part to be accepted as a citizen hinges upon keeping the past a secret. It is noteworthy that the majority of the participants that reported satisfaction in being recognised as citizens had not revealed their true identity as an excombatant. This paradox is manifest in other notable tensions and contradictions within the narrative.

Firstly, the excombatants generally avoided questions directly concerned with the actual conflict, even after weeks or months of talking to them. However, considering that aspects of the conflict did emerge—through other topics of discussion (notably reconciliation), as well as in the more charged-dynamics of the focus groups—suggests that it is plausible that their initial avoidance of talking about the conflict is in responding in a perceived socially-acceptable fashion to the perceived necessity of the invisible-citizen narrative, and not that they have transcended their psychological-identity and traumatic past as an excombatant. Therefore we see to some extent a disconnect between the pragmatic emotional needs of the excombatants and normative expectations of the invisible-citizen narrative.

Another glaring contradiction in the narrative is the commonplace finding that—particularly with the younger members—participants generally limited their relations (intimate or otherwise) to other former-combatants, echoing Wohl & Sambanis´ findings that returnees often had higher levels of trust in other excombatants than the general public (2010,60). This resounded in the respondents typical explanations, "[b]ecause we can feel more accepted", and, "we can speak freely about the past", and "you can feel safer" (Focus groups of ex-FARC and ex-paramilitary,27/10/2015; 10/7/2015). These

relationships were generally between guerrillas, or between paramilitaries, however there were references to relationships which transcended this divide.

Such intra-group relations, however, clashed with the returnees own reintegration ideals. For instance, in the same focus-group—adding to the ideals aforementioned—one participant asserted that reintegration should entail;

Going to the movies, eating ice-cream, having a partner that's not necessarily a demobilised, that's part of reintegration into society.

These contradictions suggest that the identity transitions involved in the invisible-citizen narrative are responsive to societal norms and expectations (as well as security issues), and not realistic, or always genuine. The problem with the narrative is that although the guise of the invisible-citizen narrative does allow for a limited and generally peaceful coexistence, it also dictates an effort to appear to be a normal citizen which means a secretive, often mistrustful life in which the past is concealed. The fact that excombatants seek to be seen as a good citizen by covering up their past, yet many feel safer to have relations with other excombatants, highlights the flawed nature of the narrative, and divide between how returnees live reintegration and how they conceive it.

This indicates that the indicators of successful reintegration—which are driven by the negative narratives—in the current model, i.e. fitting in and forgetting the past, does not constitute a true reintegration for the vast majority of former fighters. This leaves the majority of the participants with signs of identity issues, where they are in an emotional-identity limbo in which they reject their past identities and embrace those of citizens, yet they also feel rejected and not accepted as such. In such polarised environments, "[e]nemy images are usually black and white" (Maiese,2003), which does not allow for the long-term multiple-transitions and multiple-identities involved in the transition from combatant to citizen (Theidon,2009(a));

After I demobilised I always thought that I should turn the page and be a citizen. But after more than 12 years I'm just beginning to lose the excombatant logo (interview,25/03/2016).

Considered these contradictions in the invisible-citizen narrative—alongside previous studies which have found that a lack of genuine social reintegration makes this identity transition immeasurably more difficult (Bowd & Özerdem,2013)—then it is reasonable to conclude that reinsertion as it is currently practiced is neither a short-term or a "route to reintegration" as contended by the government (CONPES 2008,3).

Chapter 5; Discussion and concluding remarks: *Scope and sequencing of DDR—addressing citizenship and national-narratives*

Using experiential insights to locate and explain complex socio-cultural aspects that construct attitudes, this study has contributed to the limited, yet growing micro-level literature concerning returnees. These perspectives have shown both a discursive and critical questioning towards the pervasive and misguided assumptions of the dominant-narratives which essentialises them and their former group as negatively effecting security and social cohesion. On the contrary those consulted desire a sustainable and legitimate means of earning a living, and to be accepted as ´citizens´ by society, rather than being rejected as ´excombatants´. These counter-essentialisations shed light on the

contradictions within these national-narratives, further substantiated by the general correspondence with factual evidence.

Whilst we see a more rational recognition of the need for peace and reconciliation and the primacy in breaking this cycle of violence, from both sides, and that reconciliation, even a narrow version of acceptance and coexistence, is needed, this sharply clashes with the more instinctive reaction to fall back on largely negative preconceptions regarding the ´other´, which are in largely driven by these national-stereotypes. When examined, in regards to reintegration, these national-narratives highlighted the flaws and limits to the current reinsertion model, in which we can see pronounced differences between how the public, returnees, and national and international standards interpret reintegration. Ironically perhaps, it is the excombatants´ exaggerated negative image and its stigmatising effects that is the main obstacle to their reintegration.

This final section will examine this impasse, through a discussion regarding the scope and sequencing debates of DDR which emphasises the role of citizenship and the primacy in shifting the national-narratives, in creating the initial conditions for affecting a lasting peace.

Citizenship
Prior research with returnees has touched upon the central components of what here has been termed here the ´invisible-citizen´ narrative. Studying demobilising AUC, Prieto (2012(b)), refers to ´preventative security´, that is, a tendency to minimise social-interaction with strangers, with Nussio (2011), Flórez (1997), and Prieto (2012(a) all observing minimal interaction amongst other excombatants with the AUC, FARC and M-19 groups respectively. The other component of the narrative, which Nussio, describes as, "dedicating oneself to family, education and work" (2011(b),590) has been reported by Anaya (2007) across all demobilising groups. Although the secrecy of not mentioning the past, and the part of fitting into ´normalcy´, have been examined as distinct narratives—as the invisible-citizen narrative has shown—they should be analysed conjointly, as they are together considered necessary to enable a limited reintegration (or reinsertion) into society. Moreover, as has been asserted, the tensions between the two components of the narrative suggest that the current model infers that this cannot lead to a more complete reintegration, and therefore there must be a shift in how citizenship considered in DDR to allow both an acceptance of the past, and the endeavour to be a ´good citizen´ to be take place simultaneously, as is needed in the long-term transition of identities.

Accordingly, citizenship in this context needs to shift from its current conception which corresponds with the liberal-individualist notion, and its focus on creating a single homogenous identity (Marshall,1950) to one which corresponds with the civic-republicanism concept that it is an active and more inclusive practice (Oldfield,1990; Isin & Turner,2002). This broad notion of citizenship is supported by the international DDR standards, that assert the importance of society in not only accepting the identity of returning-fighters, but allowing their participation in receiving communities (IDDRS 2006,2). As a CIDDR's 2009 findings on Sri Lanka noted, the detrimental effects of the excluding Sinhalese narrative show that, "DDR's potential is completely tied to the state's capacity to construct citizenship" (p45), whilst a positive examples in Liberia and Rwanda demonstrated the role in community-level acceptance and returnee participation as central to the success of the reintegration process and the eventual restoration of trust and social capital (Pugel,2006; Bowd & Özerdem,2013). Citizenship, conceived as such to allow counter-narratives/counter-identities, and the acceptance of the outgroup as citizens who can participate, not only intersects, but is reciprocal to the broader crucial components for reconciliation and social reintegration, as they all involve, at a minimum, the active involvement off

all groups of actors, including civil society, and the acceptance of the ´other's´ right to exist as a prerequisite. Indeed, after years of study with excombatants and the public GMH (2015) concluded—the acceptance of the community is as crucial as the returnee's willingness to reintegrate.

As previous studies in Colombia have demonstrated these everyday interactions of social and civic participation, when they occur, allow for the inclusion, acceptance, and the enabling of day-to-day relations with the receiving community, with a corresponding reduction in the of recidivism and insecurity (Holguin,2010; Nussio & Kaplan,2012). This causality, beginning with acceptance, resonates in the (albeit scarce) instances of community-participation of my interviewees, and conversely, rejection has often been cited as a direct cause to returnees leaving receiving-communities (GMH,2012).

However, even these minimum goals contrast with the realities and expectations of reintegration, which reaffirms the case for a more maximalist approach, with a greater consideration of citizenship within its targets of community-level social reintegration in Colombia. However, these broad objectives are already reiterated in national objectives—which emphasise that reconciliation should be simultaneous to community-level social reintegration (CONPES 2008,10;11). Moreover, as this study has shown—regardless of the ideals in any DDR policy—reintegration is only possible if individuals are willing to accept excombatants—whether as neighbours, co-workers, friends, or spouses, and citizens—and therefore any DDR policy must recognise and account for this. As society is presently the greatest obstacle to reintegration this also indicates that they are also potentially the biggest enactors and therefore have a significant responsibility in the process.

A Sierra Leonean proverb ´there is no bad bush to throw away a bad child´ was embraced in the erstwhile post-conflict reintegration, and is instructive in our case, as the implication is that within the dynamics of community life, regardless of the troubles an individual has (or is perceived to have), the community has a collective responsibility to accept them and not ´throw them out´ (to the bush) (interviews with Gibson,(2016) and Konyima,(2016)). Resounding with a returnee, "society wants peace but has to understand what this means, living and accepting your former enemies" (interview,3/10/2015).

Therefore to offer something more concrete and tangible in terms of policy recommendations, and considering the extent of the evidence that perceptions effect reintegration, and that national-narratives have key part in this, first, these narratives have to change and the gap between such polarised views needs to be addressed. Indeed as this study has shown this is not only key to, but actually a prerequisite to something that can be described as reintegration.

Narrative change
The entrenched polarised views detailed in this study appear to substantiate Foucault's assertion that the traditional elites of Colombian have maintained power through the construction of a national-narrative based on historical inaccuracies, exclusion and delegitimisation of the outgroup, strongly evident in Uribe´s terrorist-threat narrative (ICC 2012,40). Although Santos has shifted this discourse to one that recognises the group as armed political adversaries (Zapata,2014), so established is the exclusionary-narrative, that a significant shift in public sentiment has not yet coincided with this, to the extent that it jeopardises an effective DDR process.

One possible explanation for this are the contradictions in Santo's discourse of ´peace´—for instance the ongoing domestic security policy is accompanied with the language of his predecessors; to militarily "neutralise" the "threat" to the country (Santos,2013). Moreover, this is aggravated by some

members of the governments administration, who continue to refer to the group as ´terrorists´ and ´bandits´ (Zapata,2014), which resounds at the DDR policy-level;

The great majority of demobilised posses psychosocial attributes and values which limit the possibility of social interaction; in other words, they're not prepared to live within the confines of social rules within the legal framework (CONPES 2008,20).

Therefore an effort should be made to continue to construct and reinforce a consistent narrative which is conducive to the current process, which at the minimum humanises and offers some degree of credibility to the group, which by extension will increase legitimacy of its former-members, and, as we will see below, the peace process itself.

Although the FARC are committing far less violent acts at present (see appendix 2), each act receives disproportionate negative media, and social-media coverage (DDP 2014,5), and is exacerbated by a media which has been criticised for accepting as fact government reports regarding human rights violations in the conflict (Leech,2008). They should therefore be more sensitive to the realities of this impartial media coverage and similarly be consistent to their own rhetoric of peace, particularly as these actions are not only noticed by the public, but they adversely affect confidence in the peace process in general. For instance, the groups declaration to cease kidnappings in 2012, despite an all time historic low, they are still occurring (23 cases reported in 2014, Pais Libre,2014). Similarly, despite an enormous and unprecedented drop in military activity (ibid), when they do engage in combat—for example their responsibility in the killing of 11 soldiers killed April 2015—public opinion responds significantly, with both polls in La Semana (2015) and Ipsos Napoleón Franco (2016) reporting a corresponding drop in support for the peace process by around 15-20%.

Similarly, on the governments part, a recent slump in support in the peace-process has been linked to the perceived governments responsibility (or inaction) in recent plummet in economic growth with 80% of Colombians seeing the economy in a bad, or very bad situation, (Ipsos Napoleón Franco 2016,9), which for the first time has taken centre stage over security-related problems since beginning of peace talks (LAPOP 2013;2014;2015), reaffirming the necessity of structural reforms alongside a national-narrative change.

This attests to DDP (2014) study of trust and public opinion formation in the current process—in which they find a strong, and reciprocal relationship between trust in the parties at negotiating table, and support and legitimacy the wider peace process, which is informed largely through their rhetoric and actions, at both around and away from the negotiating table. Accordingly, actions perceive as being positive effect significant rises in support for the process, for instance when the group later announcement of a unilateral ceasefire in July 2015, confidence in the process gradually rose to around 70% (El Espectador,2015).

<u>Historical truth</u>
In a similar vein, as we saw with the grossly distorted perception-versus-facts examination of the responsibility of violence in the country which perceptions of the group and its excombatants, as well as their reintegration. If we accept Olick's theory of macro-level ´official´ memory shaping ´vernacular´ memory and De Greiff's (2006) and Fischer's (2011) assertion that top-down truth-seeking can tackling the one-sided, selective and polarised views, as valid, as the above discourse-formation analysis attests

to, then part of the necessary narrative-shift therefore needs to incorporate and emphasise some sort of historical truth.

Again, official DDR policy appears to subscribe to this (CONPES 2008,38); as well as other transitional-justice legislation[10] which all emphasise not only the importance of historical truth-seeking in the reconciliation process, but also, with particular reference to Law 975, includes mechanisms to achieving this. However, as found above, something even remotely approaching a shared historical clarification is clearly lacking. This is not for the lack of information available, but more in how it is interpreted. Following Olick and Foucault's theories on top-down discourse formation, if a public accept a dominant-narrative, peddled by a media criticised for a lack of investigative journalism, as they clearly generally do, then the government needs to take the initiative present articulate this information in an accessible manner that presents the conflict, and peace process in a neutral, contextual and understandable way, as oppose to a public which generally feel the talks have been accompanied by excessive secrecy (Ipsos Napoleón Franco,2016).

As Nina (2009) found in the AUC process, there was a reciprocal relationship between dialogically establishing a historical truth, and examining the totalising social categories that exist surrounding the demobilising group. Tellingly, Carlin et al 2016 found that that framing the proposals in the context of the policy outcomes of the AUC process, the public, although desiring some sort of punishment to those who did atrocities, did not agree that the group should serve shorter sentences than their paramilitary counterparts. It remains to be seen if and how the planned truth commission contributes to this process. Accordingly, it would be wise if it sought to follow the South African model which sought to, discern between factual, narrative and dialogical types of truth (Buikema,2012). This suggests that the conflict between collective memory and historical truth is as important as the conflict raging on the battlefields around Colombia.

<u>Sensitisation and contextualisation offered by counter-narratives.</u>
Another significant finding in this research was that the validation of the Allport's (1979) contact theory (that direct interaction between formerly antagonistic groups can reduce prejudice, lead to positive attitudinal shifts, and enable coexistence). When formerly adversarial groups came together in the focus-groups of ex-FARC and ex-paramilitary, of course their were tensions and heated debates—one recently demobilised (captured) FARC excombatant reacted to an ex-paramilitary in the group (10/7/2015);

When I was two the paramilitaries came and destroyed my home, tortured and killed my mother and raped some young girls. For me that's not human, it's worse than the devil, they're *all* animals that have no values...so I grew up with this evil towards those people...with a desire for revenge.

This not only speaks volumes about the polarised and cyclical nature of the conflict, but also shows (and this was not an isolated example) the use of very social-psychological mechanisms which they argued against- notably—stereotypes, generalisations, and even dehumanisation. However, after several hours of deliberation within the group, a more reconciliatory perspective emerged;

Knowing that a family member died and continuously remembering that they suffered before they died it's hard, but they're already dead and that's when you realise you've got to think about changing yourself...prepare to give your children a place where they no longer suffer from hunger and violence.

---

[10] Notable Law 975—articles 2, 4, 7 and 8.

Although small in sample size, they resound with more extensive studies, for example Nussio & Ugarriza (2015) who found marked positive shifts in attitudes following direct contact between the Colombian public and excombatants. Similarly, although not through direct contact, Carlin et al 2016 found that when asked about the proposed transitional justice policies and a political participation of the group, the perceived legitimacy of such proposals increased when framed with a contextual vignette of the individual perpetrator of the violence, which they explain as aiding understanding and conceptualize the issues at hand.

These do provide clues to if and how these findings can be extrapolated to a group which will be demobilising collectively. We can draw parallels with previous collective demobilizations which similarly include individuals with a whole-range of motives/ ideology/ personality traits etc, and , on a smaller scale, my subjects varied in the sense that they included both deserters and those who had been captured, i.e. had no choice in leaving the group, and regardless of how they left the group, time away from the conflict and contact with former adversaries, and their acceptance within the receiving communities were far more important factors for reintegration and reconciliation. Nussio & Oppenheim (2014), similarly found that anti-social capital levels of collectively demobilised (AUC) diminish with both time, and greater levels of engagement with the community.

However, throughout the last two years we have seen an increasing majority of Colombians that see a negotiated settlement as the best way to end the conflict with the FARC (LAPOP 2013;2014;2015), yet high skepticism towards the talks contradicts correspond with this view. The predictions for yes voter in the referendum currently hovers just above 50% (La Opinión,2016), with even more being against a genuine reintegration and reconciliation with the guerrilla group. Such shifts involve an oceanic magnitude in changing, "mental models and involves changing attitudes, beliefs, values, and even emotions" (Casas-Casas & Guzman-Gomez 2010,60), yet , in part through the above recommendations, this is possible. Although the FARC have an undeniably worse record, and even worse perception within society to begin with. This informs us that a shift in national-narratives and image change of the group and some historical truth about the proportionately of the blame are has to be a priority. As past processes show, how the process, and group are framed during the DDR process effects how they are received in society, and the correlation between the group's actions here will effect its approval and eventual acceptance. as we saw with the M-19, through the process of shared proposals in the negotiations and in the post-deal contribution to the writing of a new constitution, the notion of ´enemy´, ´bandits´, and ´narcos´ was abandoned through state-level narrative construction of inclusively (Flórez 1997,146; interview with Prieto,2015) as was noted in the post-apartheid South African state's use of an inclusive national-identity (Landau,2005).

A lot of us thought that this long and divided conflict wouldn't be resolved, but working together, first with the agreement [Good Friday], then in government, made us realize that you can't let the past become a monster round the neck of the future (conversation with McGuiness,2014).

Although the process will be long and arduous, as this powerful testament from the Northern Ireland experience shows, and with a certain degree of speculation in mind, we can conclude that there is no reason that Colombia cannot do the same, but not before a considerable shift in the corrosive narratives and the associated images and legitimacy of the FARC and its former-fighters, that currently prevent reintegration.

Bibliography

Agencia para la Reintegración Colombiana (ACR) et al., 2011., '*La Vida no Da Tregua Memorias de Desmovilizados. Plan de Acción Coordinado para Comunidades de Acogida en Bogota DC.´* (Bogotá.: Color – Laura).

Allport, G. W. (1979). *The Nature Of Prejudice*. (Reading.: Basic Books).

Anaya, L., 2007. 'Individual Demobilization Process in Colombia: Implementation, Challenges and Former Combatants Perspectives,' *Intervention* 5(3), 179-190.

Arjona, A.M., Kalyvas, S., 2006. *´Preliminary Results of a Survey of Demobilized Combatants in Colombia´,* unpublished manuscript. (New Haven.: Yale University). Available at: http://stathis.research.yale.edu/documents/Report5-06.pdf [accessed February 9th, 2015].

Berg, B.L., 2001. '*Qualitative Research: Methods for the Social Sciences.*' (Boston.: Allyn & Bacon).

Bloomfield, D., et al. 2003. '*Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook.*' (Stockholm.: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance).

Bourdieu. P., 2008. *´Manifestaciones y ONGs,´* De construyendo la Paz en Colombia (OPALC), Available at: http://www.sciencespo.fr/opalc/sites/sciencespo.fr.opalc/files/Manifestaciones.pdf [accessed 19th Febuary 2016].

Bowd, R., Özerdem, A., 2013. ´How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,´ *Journal of Intervention and State* building 7(4), 453-457.

Brown, G., 2015. 'Colombia's peace deals in depth: Transitional justice,' *Colombia Reports*, 23rd September. Available at: http://colombiareports.com/colombias-peace-deals-in-depth-transitional-justice/ [accessed October 5th, 2015].

Buikema, R., 2012. ´Performing Dialogical Truth and Transitional Justice: The role of Art in the Becoming of Post-apartheid South Africa,´ *Memory Studies* 5(3), 282–292.

Carlin, R., et al., 2015. *´Paying for Human Rights Violations: Perceptions of the Colombian Peace Process,´* 3rd August, Open Democracy. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/ryan-e-carlin-jennifer-l-mccoy-jelena-subotic/paying-for-human-rights-violations-pe [accessed 3rd January 2016].

Casas-Casas, A., Guzmán-Gómez, J., 2010. ´The Eternal Yesterday? The Colombian Reintegration Process as Social Dilemma,´ *Papel Politico* (Colombia), 15(1), 47-85.

Coletta, N.T., et al., 2008., *´Interim Stabilization: Balancing Security and Development in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.´* (Stockholm.: Rolf Tryckeri).

Comisión de Seguimiento (a la Política Publica para el Desplazamiento Forzado)., 2008. ´*Séptimo Informe de Verificación Sobre el Cumplimiento de Derechos de la Población en Situación de Desplazamiento*,´ 30th October. (Bogotá.: Comisión de Seguimiento). Available at: http://www.acnur.org/t3/uploads/media/COI_2492.pdf?view=1 [accessed January 15th, 2016].

Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (CONPES)., 2008. CONPES 3554: ´*Política Nacional de Reintegración Social y Económica para Personas y Grupos Armados Ilegales.*´ (Bogota.: Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social). Available at: http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/centro-de-documentacion/Documentos/Documento%20Conpes%203554%20l%20Pol%C3%ADtica%20nacional%20de%20reintegraci%C3%B3n%20social%20y%20econ%C3%B3mica%20para%20personas%20y%20grupos%20armados%20ilegales.pdf [accessed January 9th, 2016].

Corbin, J., Strauss, A., 1990. 'Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons and Evaluative Criteria,' *Qualitative Sociology* 13(1), 3-21. Available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00988593 [accessed 4th August 2015].

---., 1994. ´Grounded Theory Methodology - An Overview´ in Denzin, N.K., & Lincoln, Y.S., (ed*.) Handbook of Qualitative Research*. (London.: Sage Publications).

---., 2008. ´*Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procures for Developing Grounded Theory*,´ 3rd edition. (London.: Sage Publications).

Cuellar, A.C., 2010. ´Ilumina Tanto como Oscurecen: de las Violencias y las Memorias en la Colombia Actual´. In: Rettberg, A. (Ed). 2012. '*Construcción de Paz en Colombia'*. (Bogotá.: Universidad de Los Andes).

De Greiff, P., 2006. *The Handbook of Reparations*. (Oxford.: Oxford University Press).

Defensores de Derechos Humanos., 2011. ´*Amenazas Cumplidas*,´ 8th August. (Bogotá.: Factoria Gráfica Editores). Available at: http://prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article6271 [accessed January 19th, 2016].

---., 2016., ´*El Cambio: Informe del Programa Somos Defensores 2015,*´ March. Available at: http://www.somosdefensores.org/attachments/article/137/el-cambio-informe-somosdefensores-2015.pdf [accessed January 19th, 2016].

Diálogos de Paz (DDP)., 2014. ´*Mas de Ano y Medio en la Habana: 3 Claves para Entender la Desconfianza Ciudadana Frente el Proceso Entre el Gobierno de Juan Mañuela Santos y Las FARC*,´ 12th June. Available at: http://dialogosdepaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/An%CC%83o-y-medio-en-La-Habana-3-claves-para-entender-la-desconfianza-ciudadana-frente-al-proceso1.pdf [accessed June 2nd, 2015].

Dillon, D.B., 2012. 'Grounded Theory and Qualitative Research' in Chapelle, C.A., (ed). *The Encyclopaedia of Applied Linguistics* (USA.: Iowa State University). Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405198431.wbeal0486/abstract [accessed 22nd August 2015].

Dunne, C., 2011. ´Place of Literature in Grounded theory,´ *International Journal of Social Research Methodology,* 14(2), 111–124.

El Espectador, 2015. ´*Aumenta Apoyo de Colombianos a Proceso de Paz, Según Encuesta de Pisos*,´ 4th October. Available at: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/aumenta-apoyo-de-colombianos-proceso-de-paz-segun-encue-articulo-590710 [accessed 9th November 2015].

El Tiempo, 2016., ´*El 80 % No Cree que la Paz Se Firme el 23 de Marzo*,´ 1st March. Available at: http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/encuesta-de-gallup-sobre-imagen-y-proceso-de-paz-marzo-de-2016/16525164 [accessed March 5th, 2016].

Fischer, M., 2011. ´*Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice*´, (Berlin.: Berghof Foundation). Available at: http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/fischer_tj_and_rec_handbook.pdf [accessed 9th November 2015].

Fisher, R., 1999. *Interactive Conflict Resolution*. (New York.: Syracase).

Flórez, F.E ., 1997, ´La Dimensión Psicosocial de la Reinserción´ in Castro, M.C., & Diaz, L.D., eds. *Del Ideal y el Goce: Lógicas de la Subjetividad en la Via Guerrillera y Avatares en el Paso a la Vida Civil. (*Bogotá.: Universidad Nacional de Colombia).

Foucault, M., 1972. ´*Archaeology of Knowledge*´. (New York.: Pantheon Books).

Fundación Ideas Para La Paz (FIP)., 2014. '*Return to Legality or Recidivism of Excombatants in Colombia: Dimension of the Phenomenon and Risk Factors*´, Informes FIP 22, June. Available at: http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/centro-de-documentacion/Documentos/Retorno%20a%20la%20legalidad%20o%20reincidencia%20de%20excombatientes%20en%20Colombia%20l%20En%20ingl%C3%A9s.pdf [accessed February 12th, 2015].

---., 2011. ´*Private Sector and Forced Internal Displacement (FID) in Colombia*,´ August. Available at: http://conpaz.uniandes.edu.co/docs/descargar.php?f=./data/documentos/WP_Displacement_in_Colombia.pdf [accessed February 25th, 2016].

Galtung, J., 1996. '*Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace a conflict, Development and Civilization*'. (Oslo.: Thousand Oaks).

Ganor, B., 2002. ´Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?´ *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal* 3(4), 287-384.

García-Durán, M., et al., 2008. '*M-19's Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics: Striving the Keep the Revolution Connected to the People*,' Berghof Transitions series #1, (Berlin.: Berghof Foundation).

GMH (Grupo de Memoria Histórica)., ´*Data on massacres: period 2010-2011*,´ Available at: http://rutasdelconflicto.com/cifras.php [accessed March 25th, 2015].

---., 2012. ´*Encuesta Nacional: Que Piensan los Colombianos después de Siete Anos de Justicia y Paz.*´ (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional). Available at:

http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2012/encuesta.pdf [accessed August 9th, 2014].

---., 2013(a). *´¡BASTA YA! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad.´* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional). Available at: http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/basta-ya-colombia-memorias-de-guerra-y-dignidad-2016.pdf [accessed August 25th, 2015].

---., 2013(b).*´Una Verdad Secuestrada Cuarenta Años de Estadísticas de Secuestro 1970-2010´.* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional). Available at: http://www.pan.org.co/sites/default/files/pdf/CLDN.UNA%20VERDAD%20SECUESTRADA.pdf [accessed August 20th, 2015].

---., 2014. *´Yo Aporto a la Verdad Acuerdos de la contribución a la Verdad y la Verdad Memoria Histórica Resumen.´* Available at: http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/informes/informes-2015-1/resumen-yo-aporto-a-la-verdad [accessed August 10th, 2015].

---., 2015. *´Desmovilización y Reintegración Paramilitar: Panorama Posacuerdos con las AUC.´* (Bogotá.: Imprenta Nacional). Available at: http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2015/desmovilizacionDesarmeReintegracion/desmovilizacion-y-reintegracion-paramilitar.pdf [accessed March 20th, 2015].

Gomez-Suarez, A., Newman, J., 2013. 'Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: Have Santos and FARC Learnt the Lessons from the Past?' *Third World Quarterly* 34(5), 819-837.

Government of Colombia and FARC delegations., 2014. '*Draft set, Colombian Government and FARC Peace Negotiations.´* Available at: http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/proceso-de-paz-estos-son-los-acuerdos-entre-gobierno-farc-en-tres-puntos/403968-3 [accessed September 29th, 2014].

Guáqueta, A., 2007. 'The Way Back in: Reintegrating Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia Then and Now,' *Conflict, Security & Development* 7(3), 417-450.

Gurney, K., 2015. *´Behind Colombia's Dramatic Fall in Kidnappings,´* InSight Crime, 13th January. Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/behind-colombia-dramatic-fall-in-kidnappings [accessed February 5th, 2015].

Gutierrez, F., 2010. *´The Peace Process with the Paramilitaries in Colombia: Sustainability, Proportionality and the Allocation of Guilt.´* In: Bergsmo, M., and Kalmanovitz, P. (eds), 2nd ed., 2010. '*Law in Peace Negotiations'*. (Oslo.: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher).

Hallberg, L.R.M., 2010. *´Some Thoughts about the Literature Review in Grounded Theory Studies,´* *International Journal Qualitative Studies on Health and Well-being*, 5(3), 1.

Herrera, D., González, P., 2013. 'Estado del arte del DDR en Colombia Frente a los Estándares Internacionales en DDR (IDRRA),' *Colombia Internacional* 77(1) 272-302.

Holguin, J., 2010. '*Communitarian Reintegration in DDR Programs: An Analysis of the Community Component of the Reintegration Program in Colombia, 2002-2008*. MA thesis, University of Notre Dame.

Human Rights Watch (HRW)., 2010. ´*Paramilitaries' Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia*.´ (New York.:Human Rights Watch).

---., 2015. ´*Report: Colombia- Dealing Away Justice,*´ 26th September. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-dealing-away-justice [accessed June 4th, 2015].

Human Security Report Project., 2013. ´*Human Security Report 2013.*´ (Vancouver.: Human Security Press). Available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=178122 [accessed 9th December 2015].

Humphreys, M., Weinstein, J.M., 2007. ´Demobilization and Reintegration,´ *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(4), 531-567.

Instituto de Estudios Geoestratégicos y Asuntos Políticos (IEGAP)., 2013. ´*Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración, DDR: Una Introducción Para Colombia*. (Bogotá.: Universidad Militar Nueva Granada). Available at: http://www.iegap-unimilitar.edu.co/images/docs/cuaderno%202013.%20gama%20baja.pdf [accessed July 15th, 2014].

International Criminal Court (ICC)., 2012. ´*Officer of the prosecutors, Situation in Colombia Interim Report*,´ November. Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-35BCFD2A7922/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf [accessed September 4th, 2015].

International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress (CIDDR)., 2009. '*Cartagena Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*.' (Washington.: The World Bank).

Ipsos Napoleón Franco., 2016. ´*Colombia Opina,*´ March. Available at: http://static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/documents/Colombiaopinamarzo.pdf [accessed March 30th, 2016].

Isin, E.F., Turner, B.S., (2002). *Citizenship studies: An introduction: Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. (London.: Sage publications).

Johnson, K. Johnson, M., 2013. ´Colombia: Ending the Forever War,´ *Survival: Global politics and Strategy* 55(1), 67-86.

Jones, M., Alony, I., 2011. 'Guiding the Use of Grounded Theory in Doctoral Studies – An Example from the Australian Film Industry,' *International Journal of Doctoral Studies* 6, 95-114.

Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP)., 2008. ´*JRP Field Note 7 July 2008 1 Complicating Victims and Perpetrators in Uganda*´. Available at: http://justiceandreconciliation.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/JRP_FN7_Dominic-Ongwen.pdf [accessed March 24th, 2015].

Kaplan, O., Nussio, E., 2013. '*Explaining Recidivism of Ex-combatants in Colombia.* ' Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2350318 [accessed September 27th, 2014].

Kingma, K., Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)., 2001. '*Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Post-War and Transition Countries: Trends and Challenges of External Support'*. (Bonn.:BICC).

Koth, M., 2005. ´*To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia´*. (Bonn.:BICC).

Kriesberg, L., 1987. ´Timing and the Initiation of De-Escalation Moves´, *Negotiation Journal* 3(4), 375-384.

Kumar, K., 1999. '*Promoting Social Reconciliation in Postconflict Societies: Selected Lessons from USAID's Experience*,' USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 24. (Washington.: U.S. Agency for International Development).

La Opinión., 2016. ´*Baja el Apoyo al Proceso de Paz y a Santos,´* 2nd March. Available at: http://www.laopinion.com.co/colombia/baja-el-apoyo-al-proceso-de-paz-y-santos-107808#ATHS [accessed March 15th, 2016].

La Semana., 2015. ´*Todo Está a la Baja,´* 2nd May. Available at: http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/gran-encuesta-santos-esta-la-baja/426263-3 [accessed 2nd July 2015].
Landau, L.B., 2005. ´Immigration and the State of Exception: Security and Sovereignty in East and Southern Africa,´ *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34 (2), 325-348.

Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)., 2013. '*Cultura Política de la Democracia en Colombia: Actitudes Democráticas en el Contexto del Proceso de Paz'*. (Bogotá.: Latin American Public Opinion Project). Available at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/Colombia_Country_Report_2013_W_081414.pdf [accessed July 20th, 2014].

---., 2014. '*Cultura Política de la Democracia en Colombia: Dilemas de la Democracia y Desconfianza Institucional en el Marco del Proceso de Paz*. (Bogotá.: Latin American Public Opinion Project). Available at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/AB2014_Colombia_Country_Report_v21_revised_W_06042015.pdf [accessed July 10th, 2015].

---., 2015. '*Cultura Política de la Democracia en Colombia: Actitudes Democráticas en Zonas de Consolidación Territorial. (*Bogotá.: Latin American Public Opinion Project). Available at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/Colombia-Informe-Especial-2015-070915-W.pdf [accessed September 20th, 2015].

Law 975 of 2005, ´Justice and Peace Law´. (Bogotá: Congress of Colombia).

Law 1448 of 2011 ´Victims and Land Restitution Law´. (Bogotá: Congress of Colombia).

Law on Data Protection 2012. (Bogotá: Congress of Colombia).

Leary, M.R., 2001. ´*Introduction to Behavioral Research Methods'*, 3rd ed, (London.: Allyn & Bacon).

Leech, G., 2008. ´*Distorted Perceptions of Colombia's Conflict*,´ 1st June. Available at: http://garryleech.com/2008/06/01/distorted-perceptions-of-colombias-conflict/ [accessed 4th July 2015].

Marshall, T.H., 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class*. (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press).

McCallin, A., 2006. ´Grappling With the Literature in a Grounded Theory Study,´ *The Grounded Theory Review* 5(2/3), 25-42.

McDermott, J., 2013. ´*Criminal Activities of the FARC and Rebel Earnings*,´ InSight Crime, 20th May. Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-criminal-activities-income [accessed February 5th, 2015].

McMullin, J., 2013(a). '*Excombatants and the Post-Conflict State: Challenges of Reintegration'. (*Basingstoke.: Palgrave Macmillan).

Miami Herald. Available at: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/colombia/article3191238.html#storylink= [accessed November 10th, 2015].

Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, República de Colombia., (2007). ´*Política de Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática*´ (PCSD). (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional). Available at: https://www.oas.org/dsp/documentos/politicas_publicas/colombia%202.pdf [accessed September 29th, 2015].

Moloney, A., 2014. ´*Colombian Companies 'Scared' to Employ Ex-combatants – Presidential Adviser,*´ 6th Feb,

Thomson Reuters Foundation. Available at: http://news.trust.org//item/20140206172249-0w57o/ [accessed 2nd January 2015].

Moor, M., 2007., ´A New Start, an Open End: The Reintegration of Individual Demobilized Combatants in Colombia,´ *Intervention* 5(3), 191-202.

Muggah, R., 2009. ´Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War´ (Routledge.: London and New York.

---., 2010. ´*Innovations in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Policy and Research: Reflections on the Last Decade*.´ (Oslo.: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs).

---., 2013. ´Negotiating Disarmament and Demobilisation: A Descriptive Review of the Evidence Colombia *Internacional* 77(1), 19-41.

Muggah, R., Krause, K., 2009. ´Closing the Gap Between Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Insecurity: Towards a Violence Reduction Agenda,´ *International Peacekeeping* 16(1), 136-150.

Neuman, W., 2015. 'Colombia's President Says Peace Talks Overcame Late Surprise,' *New York Times*, September 25th. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/world/americas/colombias-president-says-peace-talks-overcame-late-surprise.html?_r=0 [accessed October 5th, 2015].

Nina, D., 2009. ´El Recuerdo: Memoria, El [no] Pueblo y Pluralidad, Cosmopolitismo Y Construcción Local de Paz´. In *Cosmopolitismo y construcción local de paz XVIII Jornadas Internacionales de Cultura y Paz de Gernika* (Bizkaia.: Centro de Investigación por la Paz). Available at: http://www.gernikagogoratuz.org/web/uploads/documentos/8598be923f47c91023f311aad0e618c6f7c 0bd25.pdf [accessed 19th May 2015].

Nussio, E., 2011. 'Learning from Shortcomings: The Demobilisation of Paramilitaries in Colombia,' *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 6(2), 88-92.

---., 2011 (b). 'How Ex-combatants Talk About Personal Security. Narratives of Former Paramilitaries in Colombia.' Conflict, Security & Development 11(5), 579-606.

---., 2012(a). 'Emotional Legacies of War Among Former Colombian Paramilitaries,' *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 18(4), 369-383.

---., 2013. 'Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración de Excombatientes: Políticas y Actores del Posconflicto,' *Colombia Internacional* 77(1), 8-16.

---., 2015. ´*Excombatants and violence post-conflict: Are the Villains of Yesterday the Main Threat Today?*´ War Economies and Postconflict Criminality Conference, 22nd October, University of Los Andes, Bogotá.

Nussio, E., Howe, K., 2012. ´What if the FARC demobilizes?´ *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 1(1), 56-67.

Nussio, E., Kaplan, O., 2012. '*Community Counts`: The Social Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Colombia*.' Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138188 [accessed October 20th, 2014].

Nussio, E., Ugarriza, J.E., 2015. ´*The Effect of Perspective-giving on Post-conflict Reconciliation. An Experimental Approach*´. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2613944 [accessed 4th October 2015].

Oldfield, A., 1990. ´Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?,´ *The Political Quarterly* 61(2), 177-187.

Oppenheim, B., Nussio, E., 2013. ´*Trusting the Enemy: Confidence in the State Among Ex-Combatants,*´ Households in Conflict Network The Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 144. Available at: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-144.pdf [accessed 2nd January 2015].

Organization of American Status (OAS)., 1999. ´*Tercer Informe de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) Sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Colombia*.´ (Bogotá.: Comisión Colombiana de Juristas). Available at: http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/libros_e_informes/ddhh_en_colombia_3er_informe_de_la_CI DH.pdf [accessed January 10th, 2016].

Özerdem, A., 2012. ´A Re-conceptualisation of Ex-combatant reintegration: ´Social Reintegration´ Approach,´ *Conflict, Security & Development* 12(1), 51-73.

Pais Libre., 2014. *Boletín: Balance de los indicadores de libertad y seguridad en Colombia (2013-2014),´*
Available at: http://www.paislibre.org/index.php/centro-de-documentacion/nuestras-publicaciones
[accessed March 19th, 2016].

Palau, J.C., Mendez, M.L., 2012. ´Balance de los Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilizacion y Reintegracion (DDR)
en Colombia: 1990-2011´. In: Rettberg, A. (Ed). 2012. '*Construcción de Paz en Colombia*'. (Bogotá.:
Universidad de Los Andes).

Posso, C.G., 2007. '*Responsbilidad Ciudadana y Reconcilacion*,' Paper presented at the International
Seminar on Accountability and Reconciliation organized by the Institute for Democracy, Bogotá, September.
Available at: http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/RESPONSABILIDAD-
CIUDADANA-Y-RECONCILIACI%C3%93N-CGP.pdf [accessed 15th May 2015].

Prieto, J.D., 2012(a). '*Guerras, Paces y Vidas Entrelazados.*' (Bogotá.: Universidad de los Andes).

---., 2012(b). 'Together after War While the War Goes on: Victims, Ex-Combatants and Communities in Three
Colombian Cities,´ *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 6, 525-546.

Pugel, J., 2006. '*What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia,*' UNDP Joint Implementation Unit.
(Monrovia.; UNDP).

Pugh, J., 2009. ´The Structure of Negotiation: Lessons from El Salvador for Contemporary Conflict Resolution,´
Negotiation Journal 25, 83–105.

Ramsey, G., 2012. ´*FARC 'Earns $2.4 to $3.5 Billion' From Drugs: Govt,*´ InSight Crime, 20th October. Available
at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/farc-earns-24-to-35-billion-drugs [accessed February 5th,
2015].

RESPECT Code of Practice., 2004. ´*RESPECT Code of Practice for Socio-Economic Research*,´ (Brighton.: Institute
for Employment Studies, European Commission). Available at:
http://www.respectproject.org/code/respect_code.pdf [accessed 20th July 2015].

Rettberg, A., Ugarriza, J.E., 2015. ´*The Real World of Reconciliation: Theory versus Expectations in Colombia*.´
Available at:
https://www.academia.edu/16637635/The_Real_World_of_Reconciliation_Theory_versus_Expectation
s_in_Colombia [accessed October 27th, 2015].

Rodríguez-López, et al., 2015. ´From ex-combatants to citizens: connecting everyday citizenship and social
reintegration in Colombia,´ *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 3 (2), 171–191.

Rosenau, W. et al., 2014. 'Why They Join, Why They Fights and Why They Leave: Learning From Colombia,'
Terrorism and Political Violence 26(2), 277-285.

Rozema, R., 2008. 'Urban DDR-processes: Paramilitaries and Criminal Networks in Medellin, Colombia,´ *Journal
of Latin American Studies* 40(3), 423-452.

Rueda, M.I., 2014. *'Se Necesita Coraje Para Pedir Perdón'*: *Exguerrillero del Eln,* 28th July, El Tiempo. Available at: http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/justicia/carlos-velandia-alias-felipe-torres-habla-de-lo-dificil-que-es-pedir-perdon/14310400 [accessed July 28th, 2015].

SOAS., 2015(a). *´Research Ethics Policy´*, (London.: SOAS University of London). Available at : https://www.soas.ac.uk/researchoffice/ethics/file99610.docx [accessed 15th July 2015].

---., 2015(b). *´Using personal data in research: code of practice for SOAS staff and students´* (draft 6) (London.: SOAS University of London). Available at : http://www.soas.ac.uk/infocomp/dpa/dparesearch/file49912.pdf [accessed 15th August 2015].

Soeters, J.L., 2005. *´Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil Wars.´* (London & New York.: Routledge).

Spear, J., 2006. *´From Political Economies of War to Political Economies of Peace: The Contribution of DDR after Wars of Predation,´* *Contemporary Security Policy* 27(1), 168-189.

Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization Reintegration (SIDDR)., 2006. *'Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation Reintegration: Testing the Principles'*. (Stockholm.: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Theidon, K., 2009(a). 'Reconstructing Masculinities: the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,' *Human Rights Quarterly*, 31(1), 1–34.

---., 2009(b). 'Pasts Imperfect: Reintegrating Former Combatants in Colombia,' *Anthropology News* 50(5), 11-15.

Themner, A., 2013. 'A Leap of Faith: When and How Ex-Combatants Resort to Violence,' *Security Studies* 22(2), 295-329.

Thorsell, S., 2013. 'Towards People Centered Economic Reintegration? An Analysis of the Economic Reintegration Strategy of Demobilised Combatants in Colombia,' *Colombia Internacional* 77, 177-215.

Ugarriza, J.E., 2009. *´Claves para la Reinserción de Excombatientes en Colombia,´* *Revista Zero* 23, 68-71. Available at: http://portal.uexternado.edu.co/pdf/5_revistaZero/ZERO%2023/JuanEstebanUgarriza.pdf [accessed 25th November 2015].

United Nations News Centre., 2010. *´Colombia takes steps on killings but security forces still culpable – UN expert´*, 27th May. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34826#.VvMM6dIrI5g

United Nations., 2006. *´Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards´* (IDDRS). (New York.: UN). Available at: http://cpwg.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/08/UN-2006-IDDRS.pdf [accessed May 10th, 2015].

---., (1999). *´Handbook on Justice for Victims.´* (New York.: UN). Available at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/UNODC_Handbook_on_Justice_for_victims.pdf [accessed 10th October 2015].

---., 2011. ´*Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration Report of the Secretary-General,*´ 21st March, (New York.: UN). Available at: http://www.iddrtg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/11-03-21-SG-Report-DDR-Final1.pdf [accessed 9th October 2015].

Villegas de Posada, C., 2009. 'Motives for the Enlistment and Demobilization of Illegal Armed Combatants in Colombia,' *Peace and Conflict* 15(3), 263-280.

Wilkinson, P., 1999. ´Politics, Diplomacy and Peace Processes: Pathways out of Terrorism*?*´ *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11(4), 66-82.

Wyss. J., 2014*. ´As Colombia Pursues Peace, Victims of the Conflict Struggle with Forgiveness,´* 20th October,

Zapata, K.R., 2013. ´Es *Mejor Tener a las Farc en Política*,´ 24th November, El Mundo. Available at: http://www.elmundo.com/portal/pagina.general.impresion.php?idx=227401 [accessed October 20th, 2015].

Zartman, W., Berman, M.R., 1982. ´*The practical negotiator.*´ (New Haven CT: Yale University Press).

First-hand interviews

Individual interviews with FARC excombatants; 25/2/2015; 25/03/2016; 5/6/2015; 15/6/2015; 19/6/2015; 29/7/2015; 15/9/2015; 16/9/2015; 3/10/2015; 25/03/2016

Individual interviews with victims; 2/9/2015; 29/9/2015; 10/10/2015; Konyima, D., (victim from Sierra Leone) 10/9/2015

Focus group with FARC excombatants; 24/6/2015; 2/7/2015; 9/7/2015; 13/9/2015

Focus group of ex-FARC and ex-paramilitary; 10/7/2015; 27/10/2015

Focus group of excombatants including victims 6/8/2015

Focus group with public; 10/9/2015; 12/9/2015; 23/9/2015; 26/9/2015.

Experts interviewed
Gibson, J., 10/03/2016

McGuiness, M., 31/03/2014

Nussio, E., 8/10/2014

Prieto, J.D. 7/10/2015.

Appendix 1; Form of consent for participants *(English Translation)*

This interview will be used as part of my research which aims to investigate how excombatants reintegrate back into society after conflict. It is part of my Masters research for SOAS University in London, England.

Any information collected will be made anonymous through no recording of names, and all interview data will be kept securely throughout the project, and destroyed when the study is complete.

Subject Declaration

I confirm that I have read the above information about this research project. I agree to my information being used for this purpose and I understand that at any point after the interview, I can contact the researcher and withdraw my consent to participate in the research.

Signature: Date:

Appendix 2; *Perceptions versus evidence regarding violence committed by state and non-state armed groups in Colombia. Figures presented in order of; Paramilitary-neoparamilitary/ FARC (or guerrilla in general where stated) /The Colombian State (including armed forces). Nb, in the case of significant disparities between official and non-official statistics, an effort to obtain both has been made. In lieu of comprehensive data of total violence, an average (mean) based on the figures of various category of violence committed.*

Indicator of violence.	Cumulative throughout conflict (until latest available data)	figures at present (latest available complete year)
total killings	80/12/8 (UN, 2010)	56/0.2/9 (2015- Defensores de Derechos Humanos 2016, 35)
Politically-driven murder	73/17/10 (HRW, 2000)	6/4/2 (2015- Defensores de Derechos Humanos 2016, 24.
Human rights violations	78/20/2 (OAS, 1999)	37/8/21 (Governmental source, CNRR in GMH 2015(a), 435-6)
		59/2/10 (non-governmental- Defensores de Derechos Humanos 2011)
Kidnappings	33/34/0 (GMH 2013(b), 12) (Guerilla)	77.8/9.3/0 (Pais Libre 2014)
Massacres	59/17/8 GMH (2013(a), 36)	84/6/3 (GMH 2010-2011) (Guerilla)
Forced displacement	42.9/18.1/1.3 (until 2005- Comisión de Seguimiento 2008, 27)	22.6/32.8/0.9 (FIP 2011, 11)
Average (mean)	**71.1/23/5.7**	**75.8/13.8/10.1**

Appendix 3; table detailing how reintegration should be practiced, used to provide a summarised version of the data used in *Insert 7; Venn diagram on how reintegration should be practiced*

	Excombatants perspectives	Public perspective	International DDR standards.	National standards
Social reintegration	• To be recognised and have to chance to participate as citizens. • To not live in secret about their past (or at least the option to disclose this information without fear of retribution.	General reluctance to work, socialise, or be neighbours with demobilising excombatants (approximating social segregation).	The creation of social cohesion between ex-combatants and other community members is essential(IDDRS 2006, 4.30; DDR 2009; SIDDR 2006) Needed alongside tackling developmental inequalities, e.g. land reform and security issues (IDDRS 2006, 4.10)	Should be throughout DDR process and as a desired outcome of reintegration, as well as a current shortfall (CONPES 2008).
Political participation	Politics at national level seem with disillusionment, and dangerous. Meaningful SSR could stimulate enthusiasm.	Most See a hypothetical political participation as either illegitimate, with some unwilling to accept any electoral victories (LAPOP 2015)	"peaceful political discourse essential" (SIDDR 2006, 31) and limiting political participation can be a major conflict driver (CCDDR, 57)	Right to participate in mainstream politics (item 2 of the talks agenda, see ´Draft set´ (2014)) and that political guarantees are safeguarded (see point c, of part 3, (ibid).
Reconciliation	Also includes elements of truth, forgiveness (to their victims), trust, and time.	Belief in recognition and acceptance of ´other´ to allow a peaceful coexistence minimum conception.	As with social reintegration, debates exist of breadth and sequencing, but it is emphasised as crucial on some level by international standards, highlighted by failed DDR processes such as Palestine/Israel (Auerbach, 2010).	Throughout (CONPES 2008), and fairly broad in scope, including community-level trust and cooperation, with other legislative policies including historical truth.
Transitional justice	General agreements over limited sentences proposed and inclusion of all actors in the conflict.	Many want excombatants to serve judicial sentences, and that those sentences are longer.	Has to correspond to international law (ICC 2012).	Proposal responds to international law requirements, punishing those guilty of human rights violations (Brown 2015).
Security	Without fear of retribution –physical or otherwise, from state, BACRIM, or community.	That demobilising combatants don't increase security and crime in locality (as an ideal).	DDR should include both taking combatants from military structures and habits, and ensuring their post-conflict security (ISDDR 2006). Moreover, providing security enables other elements of reintegration to take place (SIDDR 2006, 7)	A robust proposed Interim Security Measures (ISM) initiative needed to prevent FARC areas of influence being taken by other illegal-armed groups (third item of the agenda (Draft Set 2014), but also protects demobilising (see standards), which has failed so far (ibid). Security Sector Reform (SSR) on some level is planned, although as yet undisclosed.