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REPORT ON OPERATION
CONDUCTED BY
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
UNITED STATES ARMY
SICILY
(TROINA - RANDAZZO)
5-14 AUGUST 1943

E. S. Johnston

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Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
A.P.O. #9

15 August 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Operations.

TO : The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

THRU : Commanding General, II Corps, A.P.O. #302.

- Section I -- Authority.
- Section II -- Introduction.
- Section III -- Report of Operations.
- Section IV -- Report on Supply and Evacuation.
- Section V -- Annexes;
 - #1 Map -- Operations of 9th Infantry Division, TROINA - RANDAZZO Campaign.
 - #2 Lessons Learned in the Sicilian Campaign.
 - #3 Tactical Terrain Study, TROINA - RANDAZZO Campaign.
 - #4 Field Orders #7 - 15, Headquarters 9th Infantry Division, TROINA - RANDAZZO Campaign.
 - #5 Detailed Reports of Division Quartermaster, Division Surgeon, Division Engineer, and Division Ordnance Officer.
 - #6 Extract from 9th Infantry Division Artillery Report 6 August - 14 August inclusive.
 - #7 Maps: Sicily (TROINA - RANDAZZO) (Engineer activities plotted) omitted except for War Department copies.

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, this report of operations of the 9th Infantry Division from 5 August 1943 to 14 August 1943 (inclusive) is submitted.

Section II - Introduction

1. Command. During the operation covered by this report the 9th Infantry Division was a part of II Corps, which was in turn a part of the Seventh Army. Commanders involved were as follows:

- a. Seventh Army - Lieutenant General GEORGE S. PATTON, JR.
- b. II Corps -- Lieutenant General OMAR N. BRADLEY.

c. 9th Infantry Division - Major General MANTON S. EDDY.

2. Composition of the 9th Infantry Division. During this operation the 9th Infantry Division was composed of the following units:

a. Organic:

39th Infantry
47th Infantry
60th Infantry
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 9th Infantry Division
Artillery.
26th Field Artillery Battalion (Light)
34th Field Artillery Battalion (Medium)
60th Field Artillery Battalion (Light)
84th Field Artillery Battalion (Light)
9th Reconnaissance Troop
9th Signal Company
9th Medical Battalion
15th Engineer Battalion
709th Ordnance Company (Light Maintenance)
9th Quartermaster Company
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 9th Infantry Division
Provisional Truck Company.

b. Attached

65th Field Artillery Battalion (Armored). 5 August - 14 August
(inclusive)
107th Coast Artillery Battalion (Anti-aircraft) (Automatic
weapons) 5 August - 14 August (inclusive)
91st Reconnaissance Squadron. 6 August - 14 August (inclusive)
4th Tabor Goums (Native French Moroccan Troops, equivalent to
one battalion of infantry). 5 August - 14 August (inclusive);
3rd Chemical Weapons Battalion (less one company, reinforced).
7 August - 14 August (inclusive)

3. Previous Operations. The Division Artillery and the 39th Combat Team (less 26th Field Artillery Battalion) had preceded the Division to SICILY. Those units departed from vicinity MAGENTA, ALGERIA 30 June 1943 for BIZERTE, TUNISIA and arrived at BIZERTE 5 July 1943. The movement was entirely motorized and the total distance was 910 miles, covered in 6 days. The 84th Chemical Weapons Battalion also moved to BIZERTE with the Division Artillery, and was detached from the Division at BIZERTE.

The 39th Combat Team (34th Field Artillery Battalion attached) sailed from BIZERTE on 14 July 1943 and landed at LICATA, SICILY on 15 July 1943. They were then attached to the 82nd Airborne Division and participated with that Division in the reduction of that portion of SICILY west of PALERMO.

Section III - Report of Operations

5 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. At daylight 5 August the 60th Infantry (4th Tabor Goums; Company C, 9th Medical Battalion attached) was assembled in a concealed bivouac northeast of CAPIZZI (4216), with its leading battalion, the 1st, on Hill 1395 (461208).

b. The 47th Infantry was assembled in concealed bivouac vicinity 4311.

c. The 39th Combat Team and the 34th Field Artillery Battalion were still attached to the 1st Infantry Division.

d. The 1st Infantry Division had not yet captured TROINA, but was attacking vigorously.

2. Objectives.

a. It had been hoped by the Corps Commander that the 1st Infantry Division would have captured TROINA by 5 August and that the relief of the 1st Infantry Division by the 9th Infantry Division could be accomplished the night 5-6 August. With this in mind the 60th Infantry had been put in motion along its planned route of advance: CAPIZZI - M PELATO - M CAMOLATO. When the capture of TROINA was not accomplished by 5 August the relief of the 1st Infantry Division was delayed, but the Corps Commander visited the Division Command Post at 1320, 5 August and directed that the advance of the 60th Infantry be continued. If the 1st Infantry Division proved incapable of capturing the strongly held positions at TROINA within the next few days, he planned on moving the entire 9th Infantry Division along the route of the 60th Infantry, and enveloping the TROINA position from the north while the 1st Infantry Division continued its holding attack on TROINA. The Division Commander was directed to keep this contingency in mind.

b. The 60th Infantry was given the objective of M PELATO by daylight 6 August. For artillery support it had the 65th Field Artillery Battalion (Armored) in direct support and the 60th Field Artillery Battalion reinforcing the fires of the 65th Field Artillery Battalion (Armored).

3. Operations.

a. Starting at daylight 5 August, the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry moved out by infiltration towards M PELATO (4922) via Hill 1603 (4722). At 2150 it occupied M PELATO. At dusk the 2nd and 3rd Battalions moved out to occupy Hill 1603 and at 2400 were marching cross-country towards Hill 1603. There was no opposition during the day.

b. The 15th Engineer Battalion moved during the day to a bivouac area south of CAPIZZI and started to work improving the road running south from CAPIZZI and also improving the road behind the 60th Infantry.

4. Results. Although no opposition was met by the 60th Infantry, the movement of the regiment was undoubtedly known to the Germans, and probably affected their withdrawal from the TROINA position on the following day. It certainly caused withdrawal of the German artillery northeast of TROINA, which was supporting the German defense of TROINA. In a letter of commendation to the 60th Infantry, the Commanding General, II Corps, stated as follows: "In its early stages this movement threatened the enemy's artillery and observation and was instrumental in defeating the enemy holding TROINA!"

6 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. During the night of 5-6 August the Germans withdrew from TROINA, and at daylight 6 August there was no opposition in front of the 1st Infantry Division. That Division immediately started advancing to the east through TROINA to secure a line east of TROINA to turn over to the 9th Infantry Division.

b. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions 60th Infantry had moved during the night 5-6 August and occupied Hill 1603 (4722) prior to daylight. The 1st Battalion was still on M PELATO.

2. Objectives.

a. Upon withdrawal of the Germans from TROINA the 9th Infantry Division was ordered by II Corps on the morning of 6 August to effect the relief of the 1st Infantry Division during the night of 6-7 August. The 9th Infantry Division was then directed after the relief to advance in its zone of action driving the enemy to the east.

b. The 47th Infantry (9th Reconnaissance Troop attached) was directed to relieve the 26th Infantry of the 1st Infantry Division on the high ground east of TROINA on the night 6-7 August. After the relief the 47th Infantry was to attack to the east making its main effort on its left (north) flank. Its objective for 7 August was the ridge: Hill 862 (6012) - Hill 999 (5916). It was also made responsible for the right (south) flank of the Division.

c. The 60th Infantry was directed to continue its advance to the east from its present position on the night 6-7 August and to seize M CAM-OLATO (5722) prior to darkness 7 August.

d. The 39th Infantry was ordered to assemble northwest of TROINA in the vicinity of 5012 and await orders in Division Reserve.

3. Operations.

a. The leading elements of the 47th Infantry began moving from their bivouac area at 1245 and at 2308 the 47th Infantry reported that it was in assembly areas immediately behind the line held by the 26th Infantry (nose at 568078 - Hill 1056 (5410) - Hill 872 (5413)) and was prepared to pass through the 26th Infantry at daylight 7 August.

b. At 1830 the 60th Infantry reported that its leading elements were moving out. It was advancing in a column of battalions in the order: 1st, 2nd, 3rd Battalions. At 0215, 7 August the 1st Battalion occupied COLLE BASSO (5221), the 2nd Battalion was on M PELATO, and the 3rd Battalion on a ridge 2000 yards to the west of M PELATO.

c. The 39th Combat Team reverted to Division control at 1200 and immediately began assembling northwest of TROINA.

d. At 1500 the 84th Field Artillery Battalion, in direct support of the 47th Infantry, occupied position in the vicinity 5109 and established liaison with the 47th Infantry. The entire Division Artillery was now in position to support the advance east from TROINA. In addition the 1st Infantry Division Artillery was to remain in position until it ran out of range. Also the 2nd Battalion, 77th Field Artillery (Medium) and four batteries of the 36th Field Artillery (Heavy) were available to reinforce the fires of the Division Artillery.

4. Results: At the end of the day the Division was prepared to relieve the 1st Infantry Division at daylight 7 August with control of the sector passing to the Division when the leading elements of the 47th Infantry passed through the 26th Infantry.

7 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. At daylight 7 August the 47th Infantry was passing through the 26th Infantry.

b. The exact position of the 60th Infantry was unknown due to the lack of communications, but it was definitely to the east of M. PELATO. Actually, as learned later, the 1st Battalion was on COLLE BASSO (5221), the 2nd Battalion was on M. PELATO, and the 3rd Battalion was on a ridge 2000 yards to the west of M. PELATO.

2. Objectives.

a. 47th Infantry - Ridge: Hill 862 (6012) - Hill 999 (5916). After the capture of this ridge it was to be prepared to assist the 60th Infantry in the capture of CESARO (6216) and to capture and occupy CASTO DI BOLO (6813).

b. 60th Infantry - To seize M. CAMOLATO prior to darkness. It was then to be prepared to advance to the southeast and occupy Hill 1008 (6716).

3. Operations.

a. At 0400 the 47th Infantry moved out from its assembly area in a column of battalions in order - 3rd, 2nd, 1st Battalions. At 0741 the forward elements at 5612 (5 kilometers east of TROINA) were receiving scattered artillery fire. The regiment continued to advance, but at 1255 reported that it was held up on the line 572128 - 576148 by heavy artillery fire which seemed to be coming mainly from the high ground to the northeast. It continued to work forward, however, and by darkness held the general line: 598125 - 590135 - 580156.

b. The 60th Infantry continued its advance on M. CAMOLATO at daylight with the 1st Battalion leading. At 0720 as the 1st Battalion was approaching Hill 1382 (5321) the enemy dropped on it without warning, a heavy artillery and mortar concentration. 27 men were killed and over 100 wounded. The Battalion immediately dug in and proceeded to evacuate its dead and wounded. The supporting artillery was displacing at the time and was unable to neutralize the enemy artillery positions, which were in the vicinity of M. CAMOLATO. Also German riflemen and machine guns were dug in on a knoll at 538209 in front of the 1st Battalion. The enemy artillery fire on the 1st Battalion continued and was believed to be directed by observation posts on the high ground to the north, because whenever the Battalion attempted to move out of the fire, the fire was shifted to follow it. The 2nd Battalion had meanwhile moved to 518218 in rear of the 1st Battalion, and the 3rd Battalion had moved to M. PELATO. At 1000 a strong German patrol had ambushed the rear of the 2nd Battalion and caused 5 casualties. During the afternoon the supporting artillery went into position and with observation from a Cub plane neutralized the German artillery in the vicinity of M. CAMOLATO. The Regimental Commander decided to hold all Battalions in place until the enemy positions could be accurately located, and all Battalions were ordered to send out strong patrols at daylight 8 August for that purpose.

c. The 39th Infantry moved to a more suitable bivouac area just northwest of CERAMI and proceeded to rest, clean up, and re-equip.

d. The Division Artillery supported the advance during the day with its missions being almost entirely counterbattery. The enemy batteries were very difficult to locate, being in position in deep ravines just as our own artillery was, and our artillery was unable to completely neutralize them.

Long range artillery interdicted the main road as far back as TROINA while shorter range artillery and 6 barreled rocket guns shelled the infantry attempting to advance.

4. Results:

a. The 47th Infantry occupied its southern objective Hill 862 with Company "I", but its northern objective Hill 999 was still occupied by Germans with the 2nd Battalion in contact with them. Its advance of approximately 7 kilometers during the day succeeded in developing the enemy's defensive position around CESARO and disclosing that the German artillery was sited on the high ground in the vicinity of M. CAMOLATO. These positions lay squarely in the path of the advancing 60th Infantry.

b. The 60th Infantry had failed to attain its objective, M. CAMOLATO, prior to darkness, but its contact with the enemy confirmed the belief that the German artillery was sited on the high ground in the vicinity M. CAMOLATO.

8 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. Neither the 47th Infantry nor the 60th Infantry made any advance during the night of 7 - 8 August. At daylight the 47th Infantry was receiving no fire and the enemy appeared to have withdrawn from its front.

b. On the Division's right flank the British 78th Division had captured ADERNO on 6 August and were advancing north along the ADERNO - BRONTE road with advance elements approximately 3 kilometers north of ADERNO.

2. Objectives.

a. The 47th Infantry was ordered to continue its attack to the east, capturing and occupying the ridge: Hill 794 (6113) - Hill 1017 (6015) on 8 August.

b. The 60th Infantry was ordered to capture and occupy M. CAMOLATO and the high ground in the vicinity on 8 August.

3. Operations.

a. Receiving no opposition at daylight the 47th Infantry moved to the outskirts of CESARO at 0655. The town and road through town were heavily mined, and demolitions were numerous on the road - both blown bridges and craters. All possible Engineer effort was put to work repairing the road and removing mines. At 2000 the 47th Infantry had two Battalions east of CESARO - the 1st Battalion on a ridge just north of road $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of

CESARO and the 2nd Battalion just behind the 1st Battalion. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were receiving scattered artillery and mortar fire. The 3rd Battalion was still west of CESARO at 575130.

b. Patrols sent out at daylight by the 60th Infantry disclosed the fact that the enemy had withdrawn from its front. The Regiment resumed its advance at 1100 in the order 2nd, 1st, and 3rd Battalions - the 2nd Battalion passing through the 1st Battalion. Its progress was greatly hampered by very rugged terrain and fog. Orientation was very difficult and it was finally necessary for the supporting artillery to mark the objective, M. CAMOLATO, with smoke. The 2nd Battalion then headed for M. CAMOLATO and by nightfall had one Company on M. CAMOLATO with the remainder of the Battalion at 565223. The 1st and 3rd Battalions were north of BASILICA (5621).

c. At 0855 the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, which was in Division Reserve in vicinity GAGLIANO, was ordered to have one troop march to TROINA at once. This troop, Troop C, was given the mission of reconnoitering the road north from CESARO to CAMOLATO and establish contact with the 60th Infantry. Upon contacting the 60th Infantry it was to be attached to the 60th Infantry. The troop was delayed by demolitions and mines and at darkness was halted in the outskirts of CESARO by a blown bridge, which was impossible to by-pass.

d. The Division Artillery continued to support the advance of the Division. All battalions were still within supporting range but were approaching their maximum range. However, displacement was impossible for the time being because the road from TROINA to CESARO had many blown bridges around which adequate by-passes had not yet been constructed.

4. Results.

a. The capture of CESARO by the 47th Infantry broke the southern anchor of the SAN AGATA - CESARO position and the 3rd Infantry Division captured SAN AGATA and SAN FRATELLO, the northern anchor during the morning 8 August. The advance of the 60th Infantry on CAMOLATO and its occupation undoubtedly played an important role in the breaking of the SAN AGATA - CESARO position.

b. The British 78th Division entered BRONTE during the morning 8 August. The Germans' next defensive position was now the CAP d'ORLANDO - RANDAZZO position.

9 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. Neither the 47th Infantry nor the 60th Infantry made any advance during the night of 8 - 9 August.

b. The British 78th Division captured BRONTE on the afternoon 8 August and continued its advance on RANDAZZO.

c. The 3rd Infantry Division was making good progress along the coastal road with advance elements approximately half way between SAN AGATA and CAP d'OFLANDO.

2. Objectives.

a. The 47th Infantry was ordered to occupy prior to daylight 9 August, CAST DI BOLO (6813) and Hill 1003 (6716) with one battalion each. It was then to advance from these positions on RANDAZZO on 9 August seizing successive objectives.

b. The 60th Infantry was ordered to occupy M. CAMOLATO and high ground in vicinity prior to daylight 9 August. It was to defend this area with one battalion and the regiment (less one battalion) was to advance on CESARO on 9 August.

c. The 39th Infantry was to be prepared to move, motorized, on two (2) hours notice on CESARO.

3. Operations.

a. At 0600 the 47th Infantry moved forward in a column of battalions in the order - 1st, 2nd, 3rd. At 1020 the leading elements of the 1st Battalion at 680153 were receiving small arms fire from the high ground vicinity 675170 and scattered artillery and mortar fire. At 1400 the 2nd Battalion seized RAPITI (6517) and was receiving small arms fire from its left flank. The 3rd Battalion was ordered by the Regimental Commander at 1030 to seize CAST DI BOLO. One platoon was sent to reconnoiter the objective and met resistance. The Battalion made very little advance forward during the day and at 2000 the Battalion Commander was relieved and the new Battalion Commander ordered to move forward at once during darkness. At darkness the 1st Battalion was still in front of its objective, Hill 1003, receiving small arms fire from the objective and the 2nd Battalion was on RAPITI.

b. At daylight the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry (less one Company already on M. CAMOLATO) moved across the CESARO - SAN AGATA road and the entire Battalion occupied M. CAMOLATO. It was to remain on M. CAMOLATO in a defensive position while the remainder of the Regiment turned south east to advance on CESARO. The Regiment (less 2nd Battalion) came out of the mountains on to the CESARO - SAN AGATA road at 586197 and at 1800 it bivouaced for the night just north of S. TEODORO (6116) with the 1st Battalion at 608177, and the 3rd Battalion at 625180. At 1330 Troop C, 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, which was working north on the road from CESARO had made contact with the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry. The road running north from CESARO was found to be in good condition and free of mines and craters.

c. Starting at 1700 the 39th Infantry moved motorized to an assembly area south of CESARO, vicinity 6213. The Regiment closed in the assembly area at 2300.

d. During the day the 15th Engineer Battalion (less Company C) was moved from CAPAZZI to CESARO and the Division Engineer effort was concentrated behind the 47th Infantry. Company C remained attached to the 60th Infantry.

e. The Division Artillery was still within supporting range all day due to practically no advance of the Infantry, but its displacement forward was still hampered by mines and inadequate by-passes around blown-out bridges.

4. Results.

a. The results of the day were disappointing. The 47th Infantry had failed to take its two objectives as ordered, partially because of lack of aggressiveness on the part of one Battalion Commander. Resistance in the front of the 47th Infantry during the day had been light, consisting of small arms fire and scattered artillery and mortar fire coming mainly from the high ground to the north.

b. The 60th Infantry (less 2nd Battalion) had been allowed to continue its advance on CESARO because it was felt that the operation from there on was to be a pursuit along the CESARO - RANDAZZO road. The Division Commander planned to pursue in a column of regiments, leap-frogging a fresh regiment through any successive defensive positions encountered. All regiments were now in a position to follow this plan.

10 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. The 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry was ordered during the night of 9 - 10 August to pass through the 1st Battalion and occupy Hill 1008. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to occupy CAST DI BOLO during darkness 9 - 10 August. At 0745 the 2nd Battalion reported it was on Hill 1008 and the ridge just west of it. The 3rd Battalion had a long march to make and it was not until 1230 that it was able to occupy CAST DI BOLO. There was only slight resistance to either Battalion's advance.

2. Objectives.

a. The 47th Infantry had been ordered at 2100, 9 August to capture and occupy CAST DI BOLO and Hill 1008 with one Battalion on each prior to daylight 10 August. It was instructed not to advance across the river since it was planned to pass the 39th Infantry through the 47th Infantry on the night 10 - 11 August.

b. The 60th Infantry was ordered to re-occupy with the entire Regiment M. CAMOLATO and the high ground in vicinity. It was to prevent enemy use of the east and west road crossing the road CESARO - SAN AGATA north of M. CAMOLATO, and was also to continue reconnaissance of the road reported running northeast towards LAKE BIVIERE (6328). This re-tracing of the 60th Infantry's steps was ordered during the afternoon 9 August, and was a result of reports indicating that the enemy was not in the process of a complete withdrawal but was merely falling back to another defensive position at Randazzo. It was planned to have the 60th Infantry envelop this position from the north. Also, it was thought necessary to have the high ground which lay between the 3rd Infantry Division on our left and the 9th Infantry Division cleared of enemy by some unit physically passing over it. Most of the artillery fire delaying us seemed always to come from that high ground.

c. The 39th Infantry was ordered to reconnoiter routes to the east of its present bivouac area north of road 120 preparatory to passing through the 47th Infantry on the night 10 - 11 August and attacking toward RANDAZZO.

3. Operations.

a. The 47th Infantry made no movement during daylight 10 August. Patrols were sent across the river and met no opposition but reported many AP and AT mines placed along the road. The bridge across the river was blown and the river bed heavily strewn with mines.

b. The 39th Infantry reconnoitered the 47th Infantry positions during the day and the regiment was alerted to move at 2400.

c. During the day the 60th Infantry (less 2nd Battalion) counter-marched to M. CAMOLATO and at darkness the 1st Battalion was at 580222 and the 3rd Battalion was at 580218. During the day the 2nd Battalion also moved north to secure the road junction of the CESARO - SAN AGATA Road and the road running east to LAKE BIVIERE. This road junction was approximately 2 kilometers north of M. CAMOLATO at 573241. At darkness the 2nd Battalion (less one Company) was at 575245 covering the road junction and one Company was on M. SORO (6126). M. SORO was the dominating observation point of that locality.

d. During the day the Division Artillery moved three Battalions of artillery across practically no roads and into new positions that could support the advance of the 39th Infantry in the morning.

e. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron moved to an assembly area vicinity 6015, southwest of CESARO.

4. Results.

No resistance or fire was received by the Division during the day

and the day was spent re-grouping the Division (including Service Troops) and gathering it for the continued advance on 11 August. Contact with the enemy had been lost. Contact with the British 78th Division was made on our right flank.

11 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. At 0645 leading elements of the 39th Infantry passed through the 47th Infantry.

b. The 60th Infantry began moving at daylight 11 August.

2. Objectives.

a. The 39th Infantry was to march at 0001, 11 August on RANDAZZO, passing through the 47th Infantry. It was given successive objectives between the FIUME SIMETO River and RANDAZZO. Upon arrival at RANDAZZO it was to skirt the town on the north and continue its march via the road leading north from RANDAZZO.

b. The 60th Infantry was ordered to march early 11 August via LAKE BIVIERE (6328) and to capture Hill 1751 (6827) and the high ground in vicinity, and be prepared to continue its advance to the east.

c. The 47th Infantry was to be held in Division Reserve in the positions it held when passed through by the 39th Infantry.

d. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron with the 9th Reconnaissance Troop attached was given the mission of reconnoitering to the front in the Division zone of action, maintaining contact with the enemy.

3. Operations.

a. The advance of the 39th Infantry was slow due to heavy mining. AP mines were planted in the shoulders of the road approximately every twenty yards and belts of AT mines were placed in the road approximately every 50 yards, forcing the troops off the road and to advance over lava flows of MT ETNA. There was no contact during the day and only sporadic long-range artillery fire, mostly interdicting on the road. The ridge formed by Hill 1611 (7926) and Hill 1364 (7922) had been given the code name "Cadillac" and at 2300 the 2nd Battalion was halted 2500 yards west of "Cadillac". The 3rd Battalion was on Hill 1152 (7520) and the 1st Battalion on Hill 1105 (7321).

b. During the morning the 60th Infantry came under scattered long

range artillery fire but it continued to advance and in the early afternoon its leading Battalion, the 2nd Battalion, occupied Hill 1751 (also known as DEL RE). The 1st Battalion continued on and at darkness was about 2 miles east of DEL RE. The 3rd Battalion was just west of DEL RE.

4. Results.

Contact with the enemy was not re-established during the day because of slow progress due to heavy mining and demolitions. However, the 39th Infantry had made an advance of approximately 7 kilometers, and the 60th Infantry an advance of approximately 12 kilometers (map distance). Pressure was being kept on the withdrawing enemy.

12 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. The 3rd Infantry Division on our left had made a successful amphibious landing behind the Germans the morning 11 August and on 12 August were abreast of CAP d'ORLANDO.

b. The British 78th Division was attacking MALETTO the morning 12 August and was meeting opposition.

2. Objectives.

a. The 39th Infantry was to capture RANDAZZO and be prepared to continue its advance to the north.

b. The 60th Infantry was to continue its advance to the northeast on FLORESTA (6932).

c. The 47th Infantry was directed to be prepared to move, motorized, after daylight 12 August.

3. Operations.

a. At daylight the 2nd Battalion, 39th Infantry began receiving heavy machine gun and rifle fire from a dug-in position on Hill 1364 (7922), and was held up. The Regimental Commander decided to contain this position with the 2nd Battalion and envelop it from both flanks - the 3rd Battalion moving north of the position on S. DOMENICA VITTORIA (8424) and the 1st Battalion moving south of the position on RANDAZZO. The 3rd Battalion began moving at 1130 and at darkness was at 778225, receiving only scattered fire. The 1st Battalion moved around the right flank of the 2nd Battalion and at 1600 came under heavy fire. Its advance was checked and at darkness it was at 785196, about 4 miles west of RANDAZZO.

b. The 60th Infantry moved out at daylight in the order 1st, 3rd, 2nd Battalion. Shortly after noon the 1st Battalion, approaching M DEL MORO (7530), came under long range artillery fire. It occupied M. DEL MORO during that afternoon, but the Germans continued to shell the battalion until dark. The 3rd Battalion occupied M. POMARAZZO (7532) during the afternoon. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to pass through the 1st and 3rd Battalions and occupy FLORESTA during the night. It moved out at dusk.

4. Results.

The 39th Infantry was pressing the enemy's delaying position at RANDAZZO and the advance of the 60th Infantry was fast making any position at RANDAZZO untenable.

13 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. The 39th Infantry pushed out patrols during the night 12 - 13 August and at dawn was receiving no fire.

b. At 0500 the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry had occupied FLORESTA, and had also secured the road junction of the CAP d'ORLANDO - RANDAZZO road with the MONTALBANO road at 8430 with a motorized detachment.

c. The British 78th Division had captured MALETTO on the afternoon 12 August and was advancing on RANDAZZO.

2. Objectives.

a. The 39th Infantry was ordered to capture RANDAZZO and hold the town until passed through by the 1st Infantry Division.

b. The 60th Infantry was to hold the high ground vicinity FLORESTA and M. ARRARELLO (8231).

c. The 47th Infantry was to be prepared to move, motorized, after daylight 13 August via route No. 120 to RANDAZZO thence via route No. 116 on M. ARAPELLO.

d. With the capture of RANDAZZO the British 78th Division was to be pinched out. The 1st Infantry Division was to pass through RANDAZZO and continue the advance east from RANDAZZO. The 9th Infantry Division was to turn north and advance along the axis: RANDAZZO - FLORESTA - MONTALBANO (8836) - BASICO (9340) - FURNARI (9845).

3. Operations.

a. At 0940 the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry entered RANDAZZO with no opposition. It pushed on to take up a defensive position about 5 kilometers east of RANDAZZO while the remainder of the regiment remained just west of RANDAZZO. During the day the 1st Battalion was relieved by 2 battalions of the British 78th Division and assembled just east of RANDAZZO. When relieved by the British the 1st Battalion was ordered to move to and defend Hill 924 (8322), north of the FIUME ALCANTARA, but was unable to move there because a bridge, approximately 200 feet long, across the river was completely destroyed. The Battalion remained east of RANDAZZO and sent patrols across the river as far as Hill 924.

b. The 60th Infantry entered FLORESTA at 0800. The Regimental Commander was instructed to leave one battalion at FLORESTA and proceed on MONTALBANO via M. ARRARELLO with the remainder of the regiment. At darkness the 1st Battalion was at 868353, the 2nd Battalion at 800325, the 3rd Battalion at 8635, and the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was in MONTALBANO. There was no opposition, but the road to MONTALBANO needed much engineer work. It was finally necessary to construct a 12 mile by-pass cross-country.

c. The 47th Infantry moved, motorized, to vicinity 7821 (5 miles west of RANDAZZO). It left its old bivouac area at 0830 and closed in the new area at 1500.

4. Results.

RANDAZZO had been captured and the Division was prepared to continue its advance along its indicated axis (see par. 2. d.).

14 August 1943

1. Position of Troops at Daylight.

a. On the coastal road the 3rd Infantry Division was advancing rapidly with slight resistance.

2. Objectives.

a. The 39th Infantry was to remain in its present position (vicinity RANDAZZO).

b. The 47th Infantry was to be prepared to move after daylight 14 August, motorized, via route No. 120 - FA DFL RE (6827) - FLORESTA (7932) - M. ARRARELLO (8331) - MONTALBANO (8836), relieving 60th Infantry in vicinity MONTALBANO. This route had to be reconnoitered as it was doubtful whether or not it existed. The route through RANDAZZO over which the 47th Infantry

had been ordered at 2100 12 August to be prepared to move, had been changed to the above route because the road through RANDAZZO was blocked by demolished buildings. The bridge over the FIUME ALCANTARA had also been blown.

c. The 60th Infantry was to capture MONTALBANO and defend the high ground in the vicinity with priority to approaches from the northeast.

3. Operations.

a. At 1035 a message was received from the Corps Commander that the rapid progress of the 3rd Infantry Division on the north caused a complete change of plans for use of this Division. The 47th Infantry was to remain in place. The 60th Infantry was to push light elements along its present route until contact was gained with the 3rd Division, probably in vicinity FURNARIA (9845).

b. The 60th Infantry continued its advance to the northeast and established contact with the 3rd Infantry Division, through Troop C, 91st. ~~to~~ Reconnaissance Squadron attached to it, at 1650, 14 August in the vicinity FURNARI. It then halted in place in the vicinity of BASICO.

4. Results.

The Sicilian Campaign was now over for the 9th Infantry Division. All units were instructed to remain in place and to prepare for a motor movement to the west.

Section IV - Supply and Evacuation

1. Supply.

a. Troops of the 9th Infantry Division were adequately supplied at all times in this campaign, even though the supply routes and conditions were the most difficult yet encountered.

b. The time and distance factor in the transportation of rations made it necessary to maintain a three (3) day reserve in the Division Quartermaster dumps and a two (2) day reserve in the Infantry units at all times. Many times the second day's ration was enroute to the Companies prior to the return of the first train and prior to the arrival of the daily delivery of rations. Unit distribution was used to allow the Unit Service Company to devote its entire efforts to the delivery of supplies to the forward units. Supplies were delivered as far forward as possible in 2½-ton trucks and then to the Companies by 1/4-ton trucks and mule pack trains. The Mule Head was moved forward as fast as the road could be constructed and the tactical situation would permit. At times it moved daily. Food was available at all times for the men.

c. Due to the inability to feed and water the animals in the forward area it was necessary to have extra mules to allow for a rotation so that they could be fed, watered, and rested. The mules were procured locally through the Carabinieri and the Mayor. The rental and purchase price was established

by Seventh Army. Pack saddles were procured through Army supply channels and were supplemented by captured saddles. Forage was procured through local dealers.

d. The ammunition expenditure for the Division for the period August 4th - 14th was 438.4 tons. Based on the NATOUSA unit of Fire dated August 5, 1943, this amounts to the following Units of Fire:

Small Arms	1.0 Unit
Infantry Mortar (81mm & 60mm)	0.26 Unit
Artillery	1.3 Unit

g. The gasoline consumption was considerably less than in the Tunisian Campaign, due to the lack of roads, smaller unit sectors and less terrain suitable for cross country operation of vehicles (See Quartermaster Annex). The average daily consumption of gasoline per vehicle for the period August 4th to 14th was 4 gallons.

2. Ordnance Maintenance.

a. The operation of the Division in mountains with steep road grades and heavy loads produced an unusually high number of engine (bearings) and transfer case failures. From the period August 7th to 31st, 167 major and 403 minor vehicular repair jobs were discharged by the 709th Ordnance Company Shops.

b. Considerable difficulty was encountered in keeping many of the 155mm Howitzers, M1918, of the Division Medium Artillery Battalion, in action, as most of these weapons had reached the end of their normal life. Repairs to 105mm artillery pieces of the Division during the period August 7th to 31st were 16 major and 99 minor jobs.

c. 1497 repairs to small arms and 32 repairs to Infantry Mortars were made in the Division during combat.

d. A total of 17 General Purpose vehicles and 2 trailers were lost during combat due to mines and artillery fire.

e. A total of 142 small arms weapons; 3 155mm Howitzers, M1918, 1 105mm Howitzer, M2A1; and 479 other miscellaneous major items of ordnance equipment were rendered unserviceable requiring replacement.

3. Evacuation.

a. Evacuation was accomplished by the use of pack mules with litter saddles or by hand litter when it was impossible to use mules; and then by litter jocks to ambulances (See Medical Annex). One Clearing Platoon supported the Collecting Company that was attached to the 60th Infantry Regiment.

b. The following is a summary of casualties evacuated during the period

August 4th to 14th inclusive:

	Killed		Wounded	Disease	Injury	Exhaustion	Grand Total
	Off	EM					
Evacuated ---	4	89	326	556	126	100	1108
Duty -----			109	192	20	15	336
Div. Total --	4	89	435	748	146	115	1537

4. Burial.

a. Bodies of all 9th Division dead were buried in the 9th Division Cometary at TROINA. At the close of the campaign the bodies were moved and interred in the permanent cemetery at CARONIA.

5. Salvage and Captured Materiel.

a. The enemy made a practice of using "booby traps" on materiel they were unable to evacuate. In view of this, captured materiel was not moved by Division Troops unless it obstructed the movement of the Division. Upon completion of the campaign, an area was assigned the Division and salvage crews collected all salvage in this area.

6. Traffic

The narrow, winding mountainous roads and numerous by-passes around blown bridges made traffic control on convoy operations a major problem. It was necessary at times to limit traffic to one-way due to the hairpin turns and the fact that large trucks had to back up and make a second turn to get around curves. Priority was given to the movement of Troops.

7. Construction and Maintenance of Roads.

a. Construction and maintenance of roads and the removal of mines was one of our major problems (See Engineer Annex). The 15th Engineer Battalion did an excellent job of constructing by-passes and building new trails for supply routes. The following is a tabulation of the work performed by the 15th Engineer Battalion during the period August 5th to 15th:


Miles new road constructed	45
Miles road repaired and maintained	14
Ruined bridges by-passed	15
Craters filled	4
Miles road cleared of mines	30
Gallons water distributed	1,050,000

8. Service Troops and Trains.

a. Service Troops and Trains were pushed as far forward as possible at all times to hold the time distance from supply installations to combat troops to a minimum. There were 425 mules in the pack trains of the Division, 261 of which were used by the 60th Infantry.

9. Surplus Baggage.

a. Surplus baggage was stored in a covered warehouse at TERMINI-
IMEPESE prior to the movement of the troops to the forward area.


M. S. EDDY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

SECTION V

ANNEXES

HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

ANNEX NO. 1

MAP OF OPERATIONS OF 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

SICILY (TROINA - RANDAZZO CAMPAIGN)

OPERATIONS OF 9th INF DIV. TROINA-RANDAZZO CAMPAIGN


LEGEND

TAKEN FROM MAP: ITALY 1:100,000 (SHEETS 253-261-26)



- 3rd INF
- 4th INF
- 5th INF

MAIN ROADS — SECONDARY ROADS ---
NEW ROAD CONSTRUCTED BY 15th ENGR BN.
STREAMS ~~~~~



ANNEX NO. 2

LESSONS LEARNED IN THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
A.P.O. # 9

4 September 1943

SUBJECT: Report on Combat Experiences and Battle Lessons for Training
Purposes Learned During the Sicilian Campaign.

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO #758.
Thru: Commanding General, II Corps, APO #302.

SECTION I: TACTICAL PRINCIPLES

1. The tactical principles learned in the Tunisian Campaign were confirmed generally in the Sicilian Campaign. These principles have been discussed in detail in the report submitted to AFHQ on 21 June 1943 on the lessons learned from the Tunisian Campaign. In brief the tactical principles which have been confirmed are as follows:

- a. Dominant observation must be seized.
- b. Accurate G-2 information must be furnished the commander to allow him to make a sound decision and plan.
- c. Mines and the threat of them slows up movement more than does hostile fire.
- d. Infantry must use their organic weapons and request artillery support only when resistance cannot be dealt with locally.
- e. When fired on infantry units from the squad to the battalion must advance by fire and movement, using enveloping tactics whenever possible.

SECTION II: INFANTRY TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

1. Maintaining Contact. Failure to keep contact during an enemy withdrawal allows time for a well organized occupation of a previously prepared position. Troops must push forward immediately when contact is lost in spite of demolitions and mines. Infantry must move forward cross-country removing mines themselves and supplying themselves by mule or with light transportation. Each rifle company must have organically at least three mine detectors, which are kept forward with the company, and all personnel should be trained in removing mines and booby traps. Care must be taken in by-passing road blocks and blown bridges. They are always mined.

2. Advancing under Artillery Fire. Infantry should be taught and convinced that they must keep advancing under light artillery fire, and it should be hammered home to them that if they keep advancing in a dispersed formation they will take less casualties than if they halt and give the enemy artillery a fixed target on which to adjust and concentrate.

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3. Fresh Reserves. After three days under fire infantry front-line troops pass the peak of their efficiency. Unit commanders should keep this fact in mind, holding out a fresh reserve at all times, rotating that reserve, and keeping the reserve in as protected a position as possible in keeping with the tactical situation.

4. Enemy Order of Battle. All men should have training in enemy order of battle and the more elementary phases of his tactical doctrines. It is possible to teach men to recognize the force opposing them which will greatly increase their self-confidence. A few artillery pieces and mortars firing rapidly can give untrained men the impression that they are opposing a large force.

5. Long Range Foot Patrols. In advance of large bodies (that is, up to include a regiment) through sparsely defended country but where certain organized centers of resistance are encountered in the advance, both time and lives can be saved by maintaining long range foot reconnaissance ahead of the body of troops. This foot reconnaissance should be executed by small patrols, stripped for rapid movement, and equipped with radios. As long as the advance is not being seriously impeded, the main body can move as a fast column over existing trails and roads, and not be concerned with having to move semi-deployed; this is the time saver, and naturally allows coverage of more territory in a given time.

6. Heavy Weapons Company. The Heavy Weapons Company must be the base of advance of the entire battalion. Therefore, to facilitate the advance of the battalion it must be driven home to those responsible for the organization and equipment of the infantry battalion that heavy weapons cannot be man-handled and still keep up with the advance of rifle companies. Weapons carriers can go only so far in mountainous terrain and their use is limited. Their use is also limited by swamps and jungles in other types of terrain. In many instances in this campaign and in the Tunisian Campaign, the weapons carrier drew hostile artillery fire, and from that point the heavy weapons had to be carried by personnel unless pack mules were furnished. Whenever pack mules could be secured or spared from supply functions they were furnished to heavy weapons companies, and in such instances the heavy weapons companies had no trouble keeping up with the rifle companies. Whenever the heavy weapons had to be carried by hand, the heavy weapons company usually lagged behind, and in one instance this had serious consequences. One battalion, which had advanced well ahead of its heavy weapons company, surprised and took a German position early in the morning. Shortly afterwards the battalion, which had only two rifles companies forward was forced to defend the position against a German counterattack without the support of its heavy weapons company. The battalion was driven from the position. It is recommended that heavy weapons companies should have as part of their standard equipment the necessary pack equipment to be used when packing heavy weapons becomes necessary. Mules were always easily secured in North Africa and Sicily, and mules or horses will be available in Europe.

7. Cannon Company. It is again recommended that the weapon of the infantry cannon company be a 75mm howitzer (Pack) as a towed load with the three-quarter ton truck as a prime mover. This weapon can be broken down and transferred to mules when necessary and becomes a truly accompanying gun wherever the infantry may go. During this campaign all three of the infantry cannon companies were equipped with eight 75mm pack howitzers. These were especially valuable in the 60th Infantry Cannon Company when the 60th Infantry was advancing over very

rugged terrain with the Engineers building a road behind it. In one instance it was impossible for the supporting artillery to support the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry; this battalion was supported by the Cannon Company equipped with the pack howitzers.

SECTION III: ARTILLERY TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

1. Attack of the Nebelwerfer Rocket Gun. The attack of the nebelwerfer (rocket gun) because of the fleeting nature of the target demands special attention. The nebelwerfer can limber and move out of position within three minutes after a close round - this speed of withdrawal demands either a very rapid adjustment and immediate fire for effect or else on adjustment on a point 400 or 500 yards away and a surprise transfer going into effect immediately. Speed or surprise is the only way to catch them in position where you can hit them. One observer reported that while he was adjusting on a rocket gun, and before he could go into effect the gun was limbered up and got away - fortunately however the rocket gun opened up immediately after from a position only 500 yards away - the observer shifted over going into effect at once and destroyed the gun. It has been reported from all observers that the gun has a tremendous flash; some estimate the flame shoots 30 yards high. This fact greatly facilitates location of this weapon.

2. Cub Plane Organization. It has been found in normal operations that the Air OP Sections of the battalions and of Division Artillery can be better employed if kept under the immediate control of Division Artillery Headquarters. The reasons for that conviction are:

- a. To insure coverage of the front at all times.
- b. To avoid duplication of missions.
- c. To distribute as evenly as possible for the stress of flying among all the pilots and all the planes.
- d. To provide a uniform standard of training.
- e. To provide a working arrangement on mess and administration.
- f. One Division Artillery Air OP simplifies the problem of communications. At present the Air OP Sections in Division Artillery have ten airplanes. It has been found through two campaigns that some of those are not only unnecessary but in the way. We feel that seven planes would answer the purpose just as well and provide much less maintenance. It should be understood of course, whenever a battalion is separated from Division Artillery on an independent mission, that it will take its own planes and section along with it. The complete sections under Division Artillery control should be so arranged that this break-down could be easily and quickly made when the occasion arises.

3. The 4.5 Gun. Every division artillery needs one battery of 4.5 guns as an integral part of its medium battalion. The fact is that all German artillery, except the 105mm Howitzer, has a 16000 yard range equal to our new M1-155 Howitzer. This makes it imperative that in order to gain the advantage we have one battery of guns that can outrange the bulk of the German artillery.

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4. Mine Detectors. The need for a large number of mine detectors in the Field Artillery Battalions was clearly shown during this campaign. Frequently our reconnaissance parties were forced to move ahead of the Engineers clearing the road, and invariably the battalions were forced to clear their own position areas of Toller and "S" mines. A suitable number would be ten detectors for each battalion and four detectors for Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery.

5. Night Reconnaissance and Occupation of Positions. Night movement by the front line infantry as was practiced in this campaign entails a closer liaison between artillery and infantry and may often require reconnaissance for position as well as occupation of position during the dark. With no road obstruction this of course is feasible and with an accurate map study on good maps, can be accomplished. When we consider the amount of mining and demolition encountered during this campaign, movement over roads has been impossible in many cases, and in all cases most hazardous due to mines. During this campaign we have been able to make daylight displacement but when opposition becomes more determined daylight movements will be costly. The solution appears to be limiting infantry advance so that at all times they will have artillery support; secondly, an increase in engineer personnel and tools to the extent where the engineers can follow closely on the heels of the infantry working both day and night.

SECTION IV: RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS

1. Foot Patrols. Reconnaissance troops when given the mission of maintaining contact with the withdrawing enemy must be prepared to follow closely on his heels with foot patrols and the organization of reconnaissance squadrons and reconnaissance troops should be modified to provide foot patrols capable of sustained operations and fighting on foot. The present reconnaissance units are designed to operate and fight from their vehicles. In the Sicilian Campaign the road net being extremely limited and demolitions and mining very heavy, reconnaissance units were delayed through being road-bound and could not maintain contact with the enemy. Portee horse cavalry would have been extremely valuable in this campaign. Contact could have been kept with the enemy by this horse cavalry, more pressure could have been kept on him, and would have eliminated much of his demolitions and mining.

SECTION V: ENGINEERS

In this campaign the 15th Engineer Battalion built over thirty-five (35) miles of road behind the advance of the 60th Infantry. Their performance was outstanding but substitution of the D-7 heavy bulldozer for the D-4 is recommended. The light machine is not powerful or rugged enough for road work in rocky, mountainous terrain.

SECTION VI: SUPPLY AND MISCELLANEOUS

1. Pack Transport. Infantry can advance only so far without receiving its daily supplies of water, ammunition, and food. In this campaign, even in the case of infantry advancing along a main road, the advance was temporarily held up, due, primarily to difficulties of supply. Due to the fact that practically all bridges were blown and the terrain such that motor vehicles could not be used until engineers had constructed long and difficult by-passes, pack mules had to be used. A better solution for transporting supplies, ammunition and heavy weapons in mountainous terrain must be devised. The time wasted in going long

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distances by truck to procure mules might well be a vital factor in the success or failure of an operation. A conglomeration of pack equipment was finally collected that was neither adequate nor efficient. Inexperienced packers did the best they could and the drain on manpower to furnish packers and mule loaders was quite heavy. To obviate these difficulties in future operations the following recommendations are submitted:


a. Provide organized pack trains for any operation where mountainous terrain is to be encountered. These units could be in Corps or Army reserve to be attached to divisions as needed. (The British Army follows this plan)

b. In case organized pack units are not available, provide a stock of American pack equipment, including special pack saddles for the six loads of the 75mm mountain howitzer and for the heavy weapons of the infantry. Again, this stock could be held in Army dumps to be issued as needed.

c. Provide units with pack equipment and mules on a loan basis during their training period before an operation in order that instruction in packing may be given.

2. Movement of Equipment by Water. The movement of the Division from North Africa to Sicily was far simpler than that of units from the United States to Africa. This was due to the fact that all organic transportation was placed aboard ships carrying full loads of equipment, ammunition, etc. No crating was required except for the small amount of equipment that accompanied troops on the personnel ships. Loading was accomplished very quickly; drivers sailed on cargo ships with their vehicles and unloading was very easy since no cargo had to be handled. Four days after the division (less 1 RCT and the artillery that had preceded the rest of the division) started unloading all units had closed in an assembly area one hundred and ten miles from the base port. The only assistance furnished was 100 trucks from 7th Army to shuttle infantry foot elements. Seven freighters were unloaded, loaded trucks moving off the docks in convoy as soon as unloaded. It is estimated that, had all equipment been boxed or crated at least twice the unloading time would have been required. Also, the bulk would have been such as to require extra transportation for hauling. Uncrating and re-assembly of equipment would have caused further delay. It is estimated that at least ten days would have elapsed before the division was ready for action, whereas the division went into action on the fifth day after arrival of the convoy.

It is strongly recommended that in all overseas shipments of large units, shipping be allotted exclusively to the unit and all equipment be loaded in the vehicles, except that needed on shipboard or immediately on landing (such as field ranges, unit records, typewriters, etc.).


M. S. EDDY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "C"

ANNEX NO. 3

TACTICAL TERRAIN STUDY

SICILY (TROINA - RANDAZZO CAMPAIGN)

TACTICAL STUDY OF THE TERRAINFirst Phase

1. PURPOSE AND OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS.

a. This study has been prepared to accompany the first phase of the tactical operation of the 9th Infantry Division, which envisages an advance as far to the east as the general line: CAST. DI BOLO 6813 - hill 1008, 6716. The map used is Italy 100,000 Sheet 261. The study is limited to the area between the 41 and 70 north and south grids, and the 08 and 27 east and west grid.

b. The mission of the command is to drive east from the vicinity of TROINA 5209 toward RANDAZZO 8320.

c. The enemy capabilities are to defend along the ridge: M. CAMOLATO 5722 - CESARO 6216; to delay along the road: TROINA - CESARO and to the east; and to counterattack locally when essential terrain has been lost, particularly from the north against the M. CAMOLATO area.

2. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA.

a. Drainage system. The principal streams in the area are the F. SIMOTO, flowing generally from north to south, and its principal tributary, the F. TROINA, flowing generally from west to east, and entering the F. SIMOTO southeast of the final objectives for this phase. At this season of the year it is improbable that either presents a serious obstacle. There are numerous small tributaries to both streams, generally at right angles to the main rivers.

b. Ridge System. Two principal ridge lines exist. The first runs east and west between M. PELATO and M. CAMOLATO, thence northeast to M. SORO 6126. The second extends from the northwest through M. CAMOLATO southeast to CESARO, thence to the east to hill 1008, thence to the southwest to CAST. DI BOLO. In addition, there are numerous small ridges between the minor tributaries to the two main rivers.

c. Routes. There are two main routes, the main east and west road through TROINA and CESARO toward RANDAZZO; and the north-south road joining the first at CESARO. Both are extremely winding but without excessive grades. Route 120 (east and west) is 6 meters wide or over, metalled, two way. The north-south road is 5 meters wide or over, metalled, mostly two way. Numerous mule tracks exist. Certain of these are reported to be ancient routes, paved with stone, and may be usable by light motor transportation.

d. General nature of the terrain. Extremely hilly and mountainous, with steep slopes and deep valleys which make progress slow and fatiguing. The lower slopes of the mountains are generally bare, with some vegetation in the valleys and on the higher slopes.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN.

For purposes of discussion the area will be subdivided in accordance with the contemplated tactical operations as follows:

Sub area "A": To include the ridge system M. FELATO - M. CAMOLATO - CESARO - hill 1008.

Sub area "B": To include the terrain on either side of Route 120 as far south as the F. TROINA.

Sub area "A".

a. Avenues of approach and lines of communication. Along that portion of the ridge between M. CAMOLATO and CESARO lines of communication are adequate. Elsewhere communications are limited to mule tracks, more or less usable by light vehicles. The area is entered from the west via the road through CAPIZZI, and from the north by the main north-south road. Unconfirmed reports indicate that a usable motor track from the east joins this road in the vicinity of FOFSO TEL LUPO 5528.

b. Obstacles. The sub area abounds in natural obstacles, which will probably be augmented by artificial construction in the form of weapons emplacements and demolitions on the usable routes.

c. Concealment and cover. Non-existent for large bodies of troops. Small groups may be concealed in the numerous folds of the ground.

d. Observation. Apparently excellent in all portions of the sub area.

e. Fields of fire. Apparently excellent for all weapons.

Sub area "B".

a. Avenues of approach and lines of communication. Route 120 affords access to the area from the east and west, and the road from CESARO from the north. There are also numerous more or less usable mule tracks in the area.

b. Obstacles, concealment and cover, observation, and fields of fire are essentially the same as discussed under sub area "A".

4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES.

a. The group of hills: TCRNITORE, 5620, approximately 1550 meters; BASILICA, 5621, 1520 meters; and DELIA CERABA 5420, 1571 meters, which dominate approaches from the west toward M. CAMOLATO, and which must be occupied, or otherwise controlled, by an attacker while advancing on M. CAMOLATO.

b. M. CAMOLATO, 1529 meters, which controls road approaches from the north and south, and dominates the valley of the T. CATO to the southeast.

c. M. DELLABATE 6117, 1371 meters, which dominates CESARO from the north and south, and dominates the valley of the T. CATO to the southeast.

d. REGABAPITI 6516, approximately 1300 meters, which controls CESARO from the east.

e. Hill 1008 which overlooks the valley of the F. SIMOTO north of Route 120.

f. Objectives during an advance to the east through sub area "B":

Hill 925, 5511 - hill 897, 5513.
Hill 849, 5713 - hill 984, 5715.
Hill 862, 6012 - hill 999, 5915.
Hill 794, 6113 - hill 1017, 6015.
Nose at 622150.

g. CAST. DI BOLO, 925 meters, which overlooks the valley of the P. SIMOTO south of Route 120.

h. Ridge 1242, 6410, which dominates the valley of the F. TROINA from the south, and the northern slopes of that valley as far as route 120.

5. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN.

a. It is probable that the Germans will defend the hill mass: BASILICA-M. CAMOLATO - TORNITORE with at least a battalion. It is possible that his defenses in this area will extend as far to the west as DELIA CERASA, or they may not extend west of M. CAMOLATO. In either event, this hill mass must be in our possession before the advance is resumed to the southeast. Furthermore, until the threat of hostile reaction from the north is removed, such as by the capture of S. AGATA by the 3rd Infantry Division, it will be necessary to hold M. CAMOLATO strongly after the advance to the southeast is resumed.

b. The chief bar to advance to the east between CESARO and hill 1008 will probably be RGA RAPITI, which dominates the entire approach and is precipitous on its southern face. It is probable that the Germans will defend this position, if by no larger than delaying forces.

c. Progress between M. CAMOLATO and M. DELLABATE should be relatively easy until hill 1400, 5819, is reached, where hostile delaying action may be encountered. The Germans will almost certainly hold M. DELLABATE strongly, in an effort to protect CESARO.

d. Advance eastward through sub area "B" will necessarily be at right angles to a large number of cross compartments and intervening ridges of greater or lesser height. If these are defended by delaying or larger forces, progress of the attacker will be slow and difficult. Since the general slope in the sub area is from north to south, flanking action against the successive positions, in nearly every case, should be more successful if conducted from the north.

e. It is doubtful if Ridge 1242 will be defended, especially if the progress of the Canadian Corps and our reconnaissance elements on our south flank keep abreast of us. However, due to the dominating character of this ridge it may have to be occupied before progress north of the F. TROINA can be attempted.

Second Phase

1. PURPOSE AND OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS.

a. This study has been prepared to accompany the 2nd phase of the tactical operation of the 9th Infantry Division through the area east of the road: CESARO 6216 - FOFSA ISL LUPO 5527, and north of route No. 120. The map used is Italy 100,000, sheet 261. The study is limited to the area between the 50 and 80 north and south grids, and the 15 and 30 east and west grids.

b. It is assumed that the mission of the command will be to drive the enemy from the mountainous area included in the study, thus facilitating the advance of other units along the more direct routes toward RANDAZZO 8320.

c. The enemy capabilities are to defend along the line: M. SORO 6126 - hill 1083, 6821, where defensive dispositions have been reported; to delay along existing or suspected trails and routes; and to counter-attack locally when essential terrain has been lost, particularly after he has been driven from hill 1623, 5725; M. SORO; or hill 1751, 6827.

d. The commander's decision has not yet been rendered. It is presumed that it will be to advance the division along the main ridge line extending from hill 1623 through M. SORO, hill 1751, and to the northeast, prepared to turn suitable forces as required to the southeast from this ridge line to relieve pressure on those troops who are advancing on RANDAZZO.

2. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA.

a. Drainage System. Large streams do not exist in the area. There are however, a large number of small creeks which drain from north to south across the southern slopes of the main ridge and from south to north across the northern slopes. Chief among these is the T. MANTELLO,

generally along the 70 grid line and the T. DELLA SURACEHK, generally between the 74 and 75 grid lines.

b. Ridge System. There are five principal ridge systems, one running generally east and west and four running north and south. The east and west system begins at hill 1623, runs through M. SORO; hill 1751; hill 1542, 7128 thence to the northeast. The north and south ridges are as follows:

M. SORO - hill 1083
Hill 1751 - hill 1395, 7223
Hill 1544, 7228 - hill 1611, 7427 - hill 1481, 7525
Hill 1441, 7828 - hill 1611, 7926 - hill 1364, 7922

c. Routes. There are only two routes in the area definitely known to exist, that between CESARO and FOSSA DEL LUPO and that leading north from the junction at 720183. The map indicates two unimproved routes leading respectively northeast and northwest from RUMMOLO 7819, and numerous mule tracks throughout the area. Intelligence reports indicate that the Germans have improved a route suitable for that vehicular traffic which crosses generally the main east and west ridge line; and one or more north and south routes connecting this with route 120. Of the latter, two follow the hill 1751 - hill 1395 ridge.

d. General Nature of the Terrain. Extremely hilly and mountainous with steep slopes and deep valleys which make progress slow and fatiguing. The lower slopes of the mountains are generally bare with considerable forests on the higher elevations.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN.

a. Avenues of approach and lines of communication. The area may be entered from the west via CAPIZZI 4217 and the newly constructed route via PELATO 4922. Entrance from the south is restricted to the north and south routes previously discussed. Entrance from the east is restricted to the improved track across the main ridge line.

b. Obstacles. The area abounds in natural obstacles which will probably be augmented by artificial construction in the form of weapons emplacements and demolitions and mines on the useful routes.

c. Concealment and cover. The numerous valleys and woods on the upper slopes afford adequate cover and concealment for numerous troops.

d. Observation and fields of fire. Apparently excellent to the northwest and southeast for long range weapons in all positions of the area. Limited to the east. Fields of fire for small arms may be restricted in the higher mountains.

4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES.

a. Hill 1623 which controls the junction of the east and west trail with the CESARO road, which is the western terminus of the main east and west ridge, and which must be in the hands of an attacker before an advance is begun against M. SORO.

b. M. SORO, the highest elevation in the area, and the northern anchor of the suspected hostile defense line.

c. Hill 1751 and the high ground to the northeast and southeast, which controls the center portion of the east and west trail and also the off-shoots of this trail which lead to the south. The convergence of mule tracks at a point about two miles southeast of this hill is significant of the importance of this area.

d. Hill 1611, 7427, the dominating feature on its ridge.

e. Hill 1611, 7926, the dominating feature on its ridge.

5. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN.

a. It is probable that the Germans will defend hill 1623, its approaches from the south and the saddle between it and M. SORO. Occupation of this high ground, therefore, is a prerequisite to an attack against the right (north) flank of the German position.

b. Capture of M. SORO will probably cause the evacuation of the position anchored there.

c. The terrain lends itself to delaying action during an advance via the trail between M. SORO and hill 1751.

d. The hill mass, of which hill 1751 is the dominating feature, must be seized before further progress to the east is attempted or in the event it is decided to divert all or a portion of the forces to the south. Slopes appear to be relatively uniform, but tend to favor enveloping action from the northwest.

e. It is doubtful that the Germans will hold either of the hill 1611 ridges unless it be to hinder the use of the trail or road which runs north from junction at 620183, or to gain observation over route 120. If he occupies these ridges, approach to them will be facilitated if made from the north.

ANNEX NO. 4

FIELD ORDERS NO. 7 - 15

HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION

SICILY (TROINA - RANDAZZO CAMPAIGN)

[REDACTED]

Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials: *AK*
Date: 5 Aug 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
1800 5 Aug 1943

FO #7

MAPS: ITALY 1:100,000, Sheets 260 and 261

1.
 - a. (1) Total enemy strength in SICILY is estimated to be three Divs plus some odd German and Italian units. In the II Corps Sector the enemy is occupying what is believed to be his bridgehead defense line running generally SAN AGATA-CESARO-ADERNO. A switch position covering TROINA in front of this line is being defended. The TROINA position and the line SAN FRATELLO-CESARO can be defended with a probable maximum of 12 normal Bns, at 75% strength.

(2) Enemy units in front of the 9th Inf Div include a portion of the 29th Motorized Div and the major portion of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Div (formerly Div SICILY and 15th Panzer Div), possibly reinforced by the 1st Bn 382nd PGR and part of the 215th Panzer Abt (Tank Bn). Italian Inf is not believed capable or willing to fight. Normal corps and Div Arty is not believed available, only an estimated equivalent of 4 Bns (2 German, 2 Italian) plus a Nebelwerfer (6 barrel rocket guns) Bn being on the entire II Corps front.

(3) Fatigue and supply difficulties probably have reduced the enemy to 50% combat efficiency.
 - b. (1) The 1st Inf Div is attacking the enemy position at TROINA.

(2) The 3rd Inf Div is on our left advancing to the east along the coastal road.

(3) The British XXX Corps is on our right attacking east to capture ADERNO.
2. This Div (less 39th Inf, 26th FA Bn and 34th FA Bn) with 65th FA Bn (Armd) attached, will move into positions as shown on attached overlay, enveloping the north flank of the enemy's TROINA position, prepared for an attack to the east.
3.
 - a. 60th Inf (4th Tabor Goums; Co C, 9th Med Bn atchd) - See overlay.
 - b. 47th Inf - See overlay.
 - c. Div Arty (107th CA Bn (AA) atchd) -
 - (1) Provide AA protection of roads in the Div sector.

S [REDACTED]

(2) 65th FA Bn (Armd) (to be atchd to Div at later date) direct support of 60th Inf.

(3) 60th FA Bn reinforcing fires of 65th FA Bn (Armd).

(4) 84th FA Bn general support.

d. 9th Rcn Tr - remain in present position.

e. 4th Tabor Goums - Atchd to 60th Inf.

f. 15th Engr Bn - See Adm O #1. All effort will be used to assist 60th Inf.

g. 107th CA Bn (AA) - Atchd to Div Arty.

x. (1) Strict AA discipline and camouflage discipline will be observed by all units. Vehicles and installations must be well dispersed at all times because of lack of cover in this sector.

4. See Adm O No. 1.

5. a. See Index IA-14 to SOI, Hq 9th Inf Div.

b. Div CP at 430122.

c. Axes Sig Com - Div to be announced; 60th Inf - 448182 - 5021 - 5423.

[Signature]

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
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| 9. 39th Inf | 22. Rear Echelon |
| 10. 47th Inf | |
| 11. 60th Inf | |
| 12. 9th Rcn Tr | |
| 13. G-1 | |

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



3
4
9

60th INF ASSEMBLY AREA
TROOPS WILL MOVE
TOWARD 6 AUG
OBJECTIVE PRIOR
TO DARKNESS 5 AUG

M. PELATO

M. CAMOLATO

OBJECTIVE-60th INF
BY DAYLIGHT 6 AUG

OBJECTIVE-50th INF
BY DARKNESS 7 AUG

ONE BN. 50th INF TO REMAIN ON HIGH
GROUND UNTIL 3rd INF DIV CAPTURES
S. AGATA

RANDIZZO

HILL 1000

FINAL OBJECTIVE
50th INF

REAR

BOUNDARY

SPERLINGA

NICOSIA

ASSEMBLY AREA
47th INF

CERAMI

TRONJA

CEBARE

NEW ROAD CONSTRUCTED BY 15th ENGR BN

SEVENTH
XXX
EIGHTH

HQ 9th INF DIV
Aug 5th 1943

Overlay to accompany
FO #7

Map: ITALY 1:100,000 sheets
260 & 261

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S-3

EDDY
C-3

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FLORESTA

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Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials : *AP*
Date : 6 Aug 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
1600 6 Aug 1943

FO #8

MAPS: ITALY 1:100,000, Sheets 260 & 261

1. a. (1) In the II Corps sector the enemy is occupying what is believed to be his bridgehead defense line running generally SAN AGATA-CESARO-ADERNO. He has been forced to withdraw from his switch position covering TROINA, and ADERNO is seriously threatened. Captured documents, prisoners' and civilians' statements indicate the possibility of the enemy attempting to hold on a line running roughly thru BASILICA (5522) through a point midway on the TROINA-CESARO Road, to ADERNO. It is indicated the enemy has forces along the road running north from MT CAMOLATO, with outposts on the high ground west of CAMOLATO.
 - (2) The road east of TROINA is badly cratered.
 - (3) Enemy order of battle in front of the 9th Inf Div is unchanged from FO #7, with addition of Marsch Bn Brindisi reinforcing PGR 1 and PGR 3 of the 15th Panzer Div. All units are depleted in strength and fatigued, but the German will to fight desperately still exists.
- b. (1) The 3rd Inf Div is on our left flank and is attacking enemy defensive posns at S AGATA.
 - (2) The British XXX Corps is on our right attacking east to capture ADERNO and has captured the road junction at 700958.
 - (3) The 18th Inf, under II Corps control, will protect the right flank of the Div from a defensive posn astride the TROINA-ADERNO Road.
2. This Div (65th FA Bn (Armd); 91st Rcn Sqdn; 107th CA Bn (AA); 4th Tabor Goums atchd) will relieve the 1st Inf Div and advance in its zone of action driving the enemy to the east.
3. a. 47th Inf (9th Rcn Tr atchd) - Relieving 26th Inf (1st Inf Div) on high ground east of TROINA on the night 6-7 Aug, will attack to the east. Making its main attack on its left (north) flank it will capture the ridge: Hill 862,, 6012 - Hill 999, 5916 on 7 Aug. It will then be prepared to assist 60th Inf in capture of CESARO, 6216, and to capture and occupy CASTO DI BOLO, 6813. It will protect the right (south) flank of the Div.

b. 60th Inf (4th Tabor Goums, Co C 9th Med Bn atchd) - Continuing its advance to the east from its present posns on the night 6-7 Aug will seize M CAMOLATO, 5722, on 7 Aug. It will then be prepared to advance to the southeast, capture CESARO, with assistance 47th Inf, and capture and occupy Hill 1008, 6716. It will protect the left (north) flank of Div.

c. 39th Inf - Assemble northwest of TROINA vic 5012 and await orders in Div Res.

d. Div Arty (65th FA Bn (Armd); 107th CA Bn (AA) atchd) -

(1) 60th FA Bn - Direct support of 60th Inf.

(2) 65th FA Bn (Armd) - General support and will answer all calls for fire from the 60th FA Bn.

(3) 84th FA Bn - Direct support of 47th Inf.

(4) 26th FA Bn - General support and will answer all calls for fire from the 84th FA Bn.

(5) 34th FA Bn - General support.

(6) Provide AA protection of roads in the Div sector.

(7) Establish liaison with 1st Canadian Div.

e. 9th Ren Tr - Atchd to 47th Inf.

f. 4th Tabor Goums - Atchd to 60th Inf.

g. 15th Engr Bn - See Adm O #2.

h. 107th CA Bn (AA) - Atchd to Div Arty.

i. 91st Ren Sqdn - Assemble vic GAGLIANO in Div Res.

x. (1) Strict AA and camouflage discipline will be observed by all units. Vehicles and installations must be well dispersed at all times because of lack of cover in this sector.

(2) Div Bdry - See overlay, FO #7.


(3) Bdry between 47th Inf and 60th Inf - Hill 1234 at 463148 - Hill 1053 at 539160 - RJ at 623161 - road CESARO-RANDAZZO (incl to 47th Inf.).

4. See Adm O #2.

5. a. See Index 1A-14 to SOI.

- ~~SECRET~~
- b. Div CP - No change.
 - c. (1) Axes of Div Sig Com - TROINA-CESARÓ Road.
(2) Axes 60th Inf Sig Com - 448182-5021-5423.

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- 3rd Inf Div
- XXX Corps

Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials : *ARR*
Date : 7 Aug 1943

Reg 9th Inf Div
APO #9
2000 7 Aug 1943

FO #9

MAPS: ITALY 1:100,000, Sheets 260 & 261

1.
 - a. (1) In the 9th Inf Div sector the enemy appears to be fighting a delaying action along a general line W of BASILICA - Point midway on TROINA - CESARO ROAD - to north of ADERNO. He has been driven from ADERNO. A line running NW and SE of 7121 is indicated, extent unknown.

(2) Enemy battle order unchanged from FO #8, with addition of one badly depleted motorized battalion in the CESARO Area. One bn Hermann Goering Engineers reported to be in BRONTE, presumably capable of reinforcing CESARO. There has been light motor and personnel movement toward CESARO.

(3) Enemy artillery has been effective and some batteries have been outranging our artillery.
 - b. (1) 3d Inf Div on our left flank is attacking enemy posns at SAN AGATA. 15th Inf was counterattacked by the enemy 6 Aug and driven west of FURIANO. 30th Inf is attacking S. FRATELLO in a northeasterly direction.

(2) The British 30th Corps on our right flank captured ADERNO on 6 Aug and the 78th British Div is advancing north along the ADERNO - BRONTE Road. Advance elements along the 00 grid line.
2. No change.
3.
 - a. 47th Inf (9th Rcn Tr atchd) - Continue attack to the E, capturing and occupying the ridge: Hill 794, 6113 - Hill 1017, 6015 on 8 Aug.
 - b. 60th Inf (4th Tabor Goums; Co C, 9th Med Bn atchd) - Capture and occupy M. CAMOLATO 5722, and high ground in vic on 8 Aug.
 - c. 39th Inf assemble NW of CERAMI vic 4213 and await orders in Div Res.
 - d. Div Arty - no change

- ~~SECRET~~
- e. 9th Ren Tr - no change.
 - f. 4th Tabor Goums - no change.
 - g. 15th Engr Bn - no change
 - h. 107th CA Bn (AA) - no change.
 - i. 91st Ren Sqdn - no change.
 - x. No change.
4. See Adm O #2.
5. No change.

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Div Surg
Div Ord O
Div QM
Rear Echelon (AG)
3d Inf Div
XXX British Corps
1st Inf Div

Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials : *AB*
Date : 8 Aug 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
2200 8 Aug 1943

FO #10

MAPS: ITALY 1:100,000 Sheets 260 & 261.

1.
 - a. (1) It is estimated that the enemy is withdrawing toward MESSINA, and that he is fighting a stubborn rear guard action with small forces upon successive commanding positions. He is using Nebelwerfer rocket guns, mortars, limited artillery and mines to accomplish his delaying mission. He is not believed capable of carrying out his probable original intention to stand in force on the line CAPE ORLANDO - RANDAZZO.
 - b. (1) 3rd Inf Div on our left flank has captured SAN AGATA and SAN FRATELLO with adv elements on the coastal road on the 58 grid line.

(2) The British 78th Div on our right flank attacked BRONTE afternoon of 8 Aug.
2. No change.
3.
 - a. 47th Inf (9th Rcn Tr atchd) will occupy prior to daylight 9 Aug, CASTO DI BOLO, 6813 and Hill 1003, 6716, with one bn each. It will be prepared to adv from these posns on RANDAZZO 8320 on 9 Aug, seizing in turn the following successive objectives: ridge south of Hill 1105, 7321; unimproved road east of Hill 1152, 7520; and unimproved road southwest of hill 1364, 7922.
 - b. 60th Inf (Troop C, 91st Rcn Sqdn; 4th Tabor Goums; Co C, 9th Med Bn and Co C, 15th Engr Bn atchd) will occupy M CAMOLOTO 5722 and high ground in vic prior to daylight 9 Aug. It will defend this area with one reinforced bn. The remainder of the regt will adv on CESARO, 6216 on 9 Aug. It will reconnoiter for possible routes to the east thru the mountains northeast of CESARO.
 - c. 39th Inf will be prepared on two hours' notice to move, motorized, on CESARO. Eastern limit of motorized movement will be as directed later.
 - d. Div Arty - no change.
 - e. 9th Rcn Tr - no change.
 - f. 4th Tabor Goums - no change.

g. 15th Engr Bn (less Co C)

(1) To move at daylight 9 Aug vic CESARO to construct by-passes around blown bridges and remove mines on the CESARO - RANDAZZO Road.

(2) Co C atchd to 60th Inf.

h. 107th CA Bn (AA) - no change.

i. 91st Rcn Sqdn -

(1) Troop C - Reconnoiter northwest from CESARO along CESARO - SAN AGATA road making contact with the 60th Inf. Upon making contact with 60th Inf it will become atchd to the 60th Inf.

(2) 91st Rcn Sqdn (less Troop C) - Move 9 Aug from vic GAGLIANO to assembly area southwest of TROINA, vic 5007.

j. 3d Chemical Bn - Remain in Div Res vic 4111 and await orders.

x. (1) Bdry between 47th Inf and 60th Inf: CESARO (inclusive to 47th Inf) Hill 1105, 7321; Hill 1364, 7922.

(2) Arty will have priority on roads.


4. See Adm O #3.

5. a. See Index 1A-14 to SOI.

b. Div CP - 550112.

c. Axes of Div Sig Com - TROINA - CESARO - RANDAZZO Road.

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3d Inf Div
78th British Div

Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials : *11/22*
Date: 9 Aug 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
2100 9 Aug 1943

FO #11

MAPS: ITALY 1:100,000

1. a. No change.

b. (1) 3d Inf Div on our left flank is advancing slowly along the coastal road with adv elements on the 60 grid line.

(2) The British 78th Div on our right flank is advancing along the BRONTE-RANDAZZO Road with adv elements approx 3 kilometers north of BRONTE.

2. No change.

3. a. 47th Inf (9th Rcn Tr atchd) - Capture and occupy CAST DI BOLO, 6813, and hill 1008, 6716, with one bn on each prior to daylight 10 Aug.

b. 60th Inf (Tr C 91st Rcn Sqdn; Co C 15th Engr Bn; Co C 9th Med Bn atchd) -

(1) Reoccupy with entire regt M. CAMOLATO, 5722, and high ground in vic 10 Aug. Prevent enemy use of east and west road crossing the road CESARO-S. AGATA north of M. CAMOLATO. Continue rcn of road reported running northeast toward L. BIVIERE, 6328.

(2) Push rcn to the north of M. CAMOLATO to contact rcn elements of the 3d Inf Div working to the south.

c. 39th Inf - Reconnoiter routes to east of present bivouac area north of road 120 preparatory to passing thru 47th Inf on night 10-11 Aug and attacking thence toward RANDAZZO, 8320.

d. Div Arty - no change.

e. 9th Rcn Tr - no change.

f. 4th Tabor Goums - no change.

g. 15th Engr Bn - no change.

h. 107th CA Bn (AA) - no change.

i. 91st Rcn Sqdn:

(1) Troop C atchd 60th Inf.

(2) 91st Rcn Sqdn (less Troop C) move 10 Aug vic GAGLIANO to an assembly area vic 6015 departing from GAGLIANO at such time that head of column will reach TROINA 0800 10 Aug.

j. 3d Chemical Bn - no change.

x. No change.

4. See Adm O #3.

5. No change.

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Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials: *AB35*
Date: 10 Aug 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
2100 10 Aug 1943

FO #12

MAPS: ITALY 1:100,000 Sheets 261 & 262

1.
 - a. The enemy apparantly has withdrawn from the ridge line generally 6027-6821, and gives evidence of abandoning RANDAZZO, probably to consolidate his forces on a new ridge posn running southeasterly thru SERRA de RE (690276). There are increasingly reliable reports that the enemy's evacuation from SICILY is fully underway, and that his present defense is a series of rear guard actions on suitable terrain.
 - b. (1) 3d Inf Div on our left flank is advancing along the coastal road with adv elements on the 63 grid line.

(2) This div has made contact with the British 78th Div on our right flank which is advancing along the BRONTE-RANDAZZO Road with adv elements approximately 5 kilometers north of BRONTE.
2. No change.
3.
 - a. 39th Inf - March from present bivouac at 0001, 11 Aug on RANDAZZO (8320), passing thru 47th Inf. It will seize in turn the following successive objectives: Ridge south of hill 1105 (7321); unimproved road east of hill 1152 (7520); and unimproved road southwest of hill 1364 (7922). Upon arrival at RANDAZZO it will skirt that town on the north and continue its march via the road leading north from RANDAZZO. Movement of one battalion by motors is authorized.
 - b. 60th Inf (4th Tabor Goums, Co C 9th Med Bn, and Co C 15th Engr Bn atchd) - March early 11 Aug via L. BIVIERE (6328); hill 1478 (6527); and hill 1663 (6727); it will capture hill 1751 (6827) and high ground in the vic, and be prepared to continue its adv to the east.
 - c. 47th Inf - Hold present posns until passed thru by leading elements of 39th Inf. It will then be prepared, on two hours' notice, to advance to the east. It will await orders in present position as Div Res.
 - d. Div Arty - no change.
 - e. 9th Rcn Tr - detached from 47th Inf effective 1600 10 Aug; atchd 91st Rcn Sqdn same time.
 - f. 4th Tabor Goums - no change.

~~SECRET~~

g. 15th Engr Bn - no change.

h. 107th CA Bn (AA) - no change.

i. 91st Rcn Sqdn (9th Rcn Tr atchd):

(1) Troop C detached 60th Inf effective 1600 10 Aug.

(2) To reconnoiter to the front in the Div zone of action maintaining contact with the enemy.

i. 3d Chemical Bn - no change.

x. No change.

4. See Adm O #3.

5. No change.

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- Div Surg O

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Auth: CG 9th Inf Div.
Initials: *ABS*
Date: 11 Aug 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
2200 11 Aug 1943

FO #13

MAPS: ITALY 1:100,000 Sheets 261 & 262

1.
 - a. The enemy is continuing his vigorous rear guard action, but has not indicated his next delaying posn. Major units, such as the 15th Panzer Division, apparently have withdrawn toward MESSINA. Identifications of the small units left as rear guard are obscure. Enemy artillery is being whittled down, but still is capable of severe harassing action. Mines and demolitions will continue to impede our progress.
 - b. (1) 3d Inf Div on our left has adv elements from an amphibious landing operation 7251. The main elements of the 3d Inf Div are abreast of CAP D'ORLANDO.

(2) The 78th British Division on our right flank has advanced to a point approximately 5 kilometers north of BRONTE.
2. No change.
3.
 - a. 39th Inf - Capture RANDAZZO (8320) and be prepared to continue its adv to the north.
 - b. 47th Inf - Be prepared to move, motorized, after daylight 12 Aug.
 - c. 60th Inf (Co C 15th Engr Bn, Co C 9th Med Bn, and 4th Tabor Goums atchd) - Continue adv to the northeast on FLORESTA (6932).
 - d. Div Arty (65th FA Bn (Armd) and 107th CA Bn (AA) atchd) -
 - (1) 26th FA Bn - Direct support 39th Inf.
 - (2) 60th FA Bn - Direct support 60th Inf.
 - (3) 65th FA Bn (Armd) - General support and will answer all calls for fire from 60th FA Bn.
 - (4) 84th FA Bn - Direct support 47th Inf.
 - (5) 34th FA Bn - General support.

- (6) Provide AA protection of roads in Division Sector.
- (7) Establish liaison with 78th British Division Artillery.

e. 9th Rcn Tr:

- (1) Detached from 91st Rcn Sqdn effective 1800 11 Aug.
- (2) Reconnoiter to the north along the road running northeast from RJ at 727171.

f. 4th Tabor Goums - No change.

g. 15th Engr Bn - No change.

h. 107th CA Bn. (AA) - No change.

i. 91st Rcn Sqdn:

- (1) To reconnoiter to the east along the route: RJ at 727171 - RANDAZZO, north from RANDAZZO along the road running north from RANDAZZO in direction FLORESTA.
- (2) To reconnoiter to the east along the ridge road running from RJ at 5725 - north of LAKE BIVIERE - FLORESTA.

j. 3d Cml Bn - No change.

x. Bdry between 39th Inf & 60th Inf - CESARO, hill 1105, 7321; hill 1364; 7922.

4. See Adm O #3.

5. a. See Index 1A-14 to SOI.

b. Div CP - 648150.

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| CO 60th Inf | Div Ord O | 78th British Div |
| | | Div Surg O |

[REDACTED]
Auth: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials: AB
Date: 12 Aug 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
2100 12 Aug 1943

FO #14

MAPS: ITALY 1:100,000 Sheets 261 & 262

1. a. No change.
 - b. (1) 3d Inf Div on our left flank is advancing along the coastal road and has advance elements at the 74 grid line.

(2) The 78th British Div on our right flank has captured MALETTO and is attacking along the MALETTO - RANDAZZO road.
2. No change.
3. a. 39th Inf - Capture RANDAZZO (8320) and hold town until passed thru by leading elements of 1st Inf Div.
 - b. 47th Inf - Be prepared to move, motorized, upon further orders after daylight 13 Aug via route No. 120 to RANDAZZO thence via route No. 116 on M. ARRARELLO (8321).
 - c. 60th Inf (4th Tabor Goums, Co C 9th Med Bn, Co C 15th Engr Bn atchd) - Hold high ground in the vic of FLORESTA (7932) and M. ARRARELLO (8231). Continue reconnaissance northwest and southeast along route No. 116 and secondary road northeast of M. ARRARELLO (8231).
 - d. Div Arty - No change.
 - e. 9th Rcn Tr - No change.
 - f. 4th Tabor Goums - No change.
 - g. 15th Engrs - No change.
 - h. 107th CA Bn (AA) - No change.
 - i. 91st Rcn Sqdn - No change.
 - j. 3d Cml Bn - No change.
 - x. Strict radio security will be maintained by encoding all radio messages which would give any information of value to the enemy.

4. See Adm O #3.
5. No change.

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Div QM O
Rear Echelon (AG)
3d Chemical Bn
91st Rcn Sqdn
3d Inf Div
78th British Div

Auth: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials: *AR*
Date: 13 Aug 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
2200 13 Aug 1943

FO #15

MAPS: ITALY 1:100,000

1. a. The enemy broke contact with our forces during the night and early morning of 12-13 Aug. It is estimated that he is withdrawing to MESSINA depending upon his extensive demolitions and numerous mines to impede our advance for the period necessary to complete his evacuation.
 - b. (1) 3d Inf Div on our left is advancing along the coastal road meeting slight resistance and has advance elements at the 82 easting.
(2) 78th British Div on our right flank is remaining in posn north of MALETTO.
(3) British 13 Corps has advanced to RIPOSTO at the 05 northing.
2. This Div will continue to push forward in its zone of action maintaining contact with the enemy and driving him to the east.
3. a. 39th Inf:
 - (1) 1st Bn when relieved by the British move to and defend hill 924 (8322).
(2) Regiment less 1st Bn remain in present positions.
(3) Maintain contact with 1st Inf Div.b. 47th Inf - Be prepared to move after daylight 14 Aug, motorized, via route No. 120 - FA DEL RE (6827) - FLORESTA (7932) - M. ARRARELLO (8331) - MONTALBANO (8836), relieving 60th Inf in vicinity MONTALBANO.
c. 60th Inf (4th Tabor Goums, Co C 9th Med Bn atchd) - Capture MONTALBANO and defend the high ground in the vicinity with priority to approaches from the northeast.
d. Div Arty - No change.
e. 91st Rcn Sqdn:
 - (1) Tr C precede 60th Inf and reconnoiter toward BASICO (9340) - S. PIERO (8439). This tr will rejoin its sqdn when relieved by 9th Rcn Tr.

(2) 91st Rcn Sqdn (less Tr C) - To be detached from 9th Inf Div and atchd to 1st Inf Div in present location effective upon passage of 18th CT thru 39th Inf.

f. 9th Rcn Tr - March at 0600 14 Aug via CESARO (6216) - road and trail junction in vic of (571251) - FA DEL RE - FLORESTA - M. ARRARELLO - MONTALBANO. Upon arrival vic MONTALBANO it will relieve Tr C 91st Rcn Sqdn and thereafter reconnoiter toward BASICO and S. PIERO.

g. 4th Tabor Goums - No change.

h. 15th Engr Bn - No change.

i. 107th CA Bn (AA) - No change.

j. 3d Cml Bn - No change.

4. See Adm O #3.

5. a. See Index 1A-14 SOI Hq 9th Inf Div.

b. Div CP at 721190.

c. Axes of Div Sig Comm - FA DEL RE (6827) - FLORESTA (7932) - MONTALBANO (8836).



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Rear Echelon (AG)
3d Chemical Bn
91st Rcn Sqdn
3d Inf Div
78th British Div
1st Inf Div

ANNEX #05

DETAILED REPORTS OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER, DIVISION
SURGEON, DIVISION ENGINEER, AND DIVISION ORDNANCE
OFFICER

DETAILED REPORT OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER

REPORT OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER

1. The following data is submitted covering Quartermaster supply and operations in the SICILIAN Campaign during the period August 4th to 14th inclusive:

a. Class I Supplies issued:

Type C Rations - - - -	150,234
Type K Rations - - - -	7,440
Type U Rations - - - -	72,735
Hospital Rations - - -	1,275
Tobacco Rations - - -	47,552
Candy Rations - - - -	75,246
Toilet Rations - - - -	45,200
Hay, Lbs. - - - - -	3,300
Grain, Lbs. - - - - -	9,913

b. Class II Supplies issued:-
Practically none.

c. Class III supplies issued:-
Gasoline - - 74,099 gallons
Oil - - - - - 1,090 gallons
Gear Lube - - 635 gallons
Grease - - - 635 Lbs.

d. Salvage:-
Practically none.

e. Method of Distribution:-
Truckhead distribution of supplies at the Division DP was used except that for most of the period the 60th Combat Team was given unit distribution, due to its distance from the DP and the time necessary to get trucks over the almost impassable trails to its position.

f. Source of Supplies:-
Supplies, particularly Class I, were obtainable from Army Supply Points wherever available. During the first few days, the forward points were not very well stocked, and supplies were brought forward in division transportation from PALERMO, TERMINI - IMERESE, LICATA, PETRALIA, and CALTANISSETA. Later it was possible to obtain supplies as needed from supply points at NICOSIA and CESARO.

DETAILED REPORT OF DIVISION SURGEON

REPORT OF THE DIVISION SURGEON

The Ninth Infantry Division, as a whole entered combat on 4 August 1943 in the vicinity of NICOSIA, SICILY.

1. 39th Combat Team Activities.

a. The 39th Combat Team moved into this area on 30 July 1943. On 31 July, the Combat Team made contact with the enemy west of CERAMI. From this period to 7 August, the Combat Team engaged in a heavy battle for the town of TROINA. The general displacement of infantry battalions was along the road from CERAMI to TROINA. This road developed into the main supply route and the main route of evacuation.

b. Battalion aid stations followed closely the movement of the battalions and established stations 400 to 800 yards in the rear of the combat area. Stations were established along the lines of natural drift from the battle area, utilizing all available cover and concealment.

c. The terrain was hilly with poor cover. The road from CERAMI forward was subject to enemy fire at will. At times evacuation of forward elements was accomplished only under cover of darkness.

d. A shortage of litter bearers existed at times but the Combat Team Commander was highly cooperative and supplied Infantry men on several occasions to aid in the evacuation.

e. A determined effort was made to treat shock and properly splint fractures in the battalion aid stations. Blood plasma was used liberally.

f. Advance ambulance loading points were established. Casualties were hand carried an average distance of one to two miles. From this point they were transported by litter jeep to the ambulance loading points where they were transferred to ambulances.

g. On 9 August this Combat Team was relieved from its combat duties and bivouaced in the vicinity of CESARO. On 11 August the Combat Team was moved to the vicinity of MELETTO and again established contact with enemy forces. The enemy retreated during the night of 12 August, thus ending the battle.

h. During the campaign, five enlisted men were killed and twenty-eight wounded in the Medical Detachment of the 39th Infantry.

2. Collecting Company Activities - 39th Combat Team.

a. Collecting Stations were established three to five miles in the rear of the combat area. During most of the phases of this campaign, advance ambulance loading points were established. Casualties in general were hand litter carried from the battalion aid station to a point accessible by litter jeeps, where the patients were transferred to the jeep and evacuated to the ambulance loading point. The litter jeep proved very

valuable in this operation, cutting down greatly the distance of hand litter carrying. It was found possible to operate the litter jeep in areas which were inaccessible to ambulances.

b. Many times evacuation to the collecting stations was executed only at night due to enemy artillery fire along the only road of evacuation. Litter jeeps would often run a shelled road with a seriously wounded patient whose condition demanded immediate evacuation.

c. Litter bearers also proved invaluable. In practically every instance the Infantry battalions were deployed considerable distances from roads or trails. This distance was negotiated only by use of litter bearers. The amount of litter bearers in collecting companies proved adequate in most phases of this campaign.

d. Seven (7) enlisted men were evacuated from the collecting company. Two (2) battle casualties, four (4) disease and one (1) injury. Battle casualties and diseases evacuated for the entire Combat Team are consolidated in the Division total.

3. 47th Combat Team Activities.

a. The 47th Combat Team engaged the enemy in the vicinity of TROINA, SICILY on 9 August 1943, and advanced to the vicinity of RANDAZZO. The terrain and medical problems were similar to those described for the 39th Combat Team.

b. The Medical Detachment of the Combat Team entered battle with a shortage of both medical officers and Medical Department enlisted men despite frequent requisitions for same. No medical replacements were received by this or any other Divisional unit during the entire battle.

c. Battalion aid stations were established in the general vicinity of Battalion Command Posts, utilizing all possible cover and concealment. In many instances casualties were evacuated by litter bearers for a period of two to four miles to a point at which the casualty could be transferred to litter jeeps. Other times it was found possible to evacuate forward of the battalion aid stations with the litter jeep.

d. Casualties were handled expeditiously. All cases of shock were treated with blood plasma and held at aid stations until ready for evacuation.

e. All troops of the 47th Infantry carried Atabrin, salt tablets and Halazone in a "C" Ration coffee container. This method proved most satisfactory, particularly in widely separated squads and also for advance reconnaissance units.

f. Losses of Medical Department Personnel: One medical officer wounded in action; one medical department enlisted man killed in action; four enlisted men evacuated with disease.

4. Collecting Company Activities - 47th Combat Team.

a. Collecting stations were established generally two to four miles in the rear of the combat area. Advanced ambulance loading posts were established as well as ambulance shuttles. In most instances casualties were hand carried or transported by the means of wheel litter to an area accessible to litter jeeps or ambulances.

b. In several instances, casualties were kept in protected areas in the vicinity of the battalion aid stations until nightfall. This was necessary due to heavy enemy artillery fire. The normal collecting company litter bearer complement proved adequate in most instances in this campaign.

5. Activities of the 60th Combat Team.

a. This unit, by far, had the most difficult medical problems of any unit in the Division. On 5 August the unit moved to the vicinity of CAPIZZI from this area, by a series of secret night moves, the unit marched east into the mountain area toward MOUNT PELATO. All of this movement was cross-country, the terrain being so rough that it was impossible to move vehicles until the Engineers constructed a trail around the many mountain ranges.

b. In anticipation of a tremendous problem in evacuation, one hundred ten (110) extra litter bearers were attached to this unit. Eight of these litter bearers were obtained from Corps medical units, the remainder was gotten from Divisional units, chiefly the Band.

c. It was planned to station litter bearer squads at approximately 300 to 400 yard intervals and relay casualties back through these litter bearer stations. In addition, plans were drawn for a litter carrier to be attached to mules. The Ordnance Company of this Division cooperated nicely and in a relatively short time we had twenty workable attachments for mules. This litter carrier was constructed along the lines of the French cachelet. This device enabled us to carry two patients on one mule. Prior to completion of these devices, Signal Company lance poles were obtained for keeping the mules in tandem. By means of the lance poles it was possible to carry one casualty between the two mules. The use of both of these devices was made difficult by the heavy vegetation.

d. On 7 August contact was made with the enemy in the vicinity of MOUNT PELATO by the 1st Battalion which received heavy mortar and artillery fire. This was overcome and the unit proceeded eastward toward MOUNT CAMOLATO and then northeast to LAKE BIVIERE and SERRA DEL RE. Enemy resistance was again met by the 1st Battalion in this area. Also the 3rd Battalion received slight enemy shelling. Still on foot the battalions marched to FLORESTA, thence to MONT ALBANO and advanced to BASICO where contact with the 3rd Division was made. At this point the 60th Combat Team was pinched out by the 3rd U. S. Division on the north, and the 1st U. S. Division on the south on 14 August.

e. During all these moves the battalion aid section moved by foot, carried supplies by hand and by mules. Casualties were carried by hand and by mules to the general vicinity of the regimental mule head and thence by litter jeep to the collecting company.

6. Collecting Company Activities.

a. Movement of the collecting company was made extremely difficult due to total lack of roads. The collecting station was originally established on the only trail in the area leading north out of CAPIZZI. During the first two days, collecting company men were kept in the vicinity of the mule head to lead hand litter bearers back to the collecting station. As progress was made with the engineer road, the collecting station moved cross-country and maintained superior contact with the infantry battalions. Many moves were necessary to keep pace with the infantry. On many occasions, the essential equipment for an advance collecting station was transported by means of jeep. The remainder of the equipment being brought up on completion of the road. All personnel of the collecting company deserve the highest praise. They were continually reconnoitering for new routes of approach, taking excellent care of the wounded, and maintaining a remarkably short distance between the combat elements and the station site.

b. As the situation progressed, the trails soon accommodated vehicles and the problem was greatly simplified.

c. The movement of this regiment has again proven the value of and the necessity for strong sturdy litter bearers. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that litter carrying devices for mules be made readily available to any unit engaged in cross-country, mountainous warfare.

7. Clearing Company Activities.

a. Both platoons of the clearing company have been active from the start of combat of this Division. One platoon accompanied the 39th Combat Team on its landing and subsequent battle from LICATA to TROINA. Frequent moves were made in pursuit of the enemy. At times this unit moved as many as three times in a twenty-four hour period. Battle casualties were few during the earlier phase, however, a good number of diseases were encountered. It was the policy of the clearing station to keep as many of these cases as was felt would return to duty within a thirty-six hour period, thereby conserving the fighting strength of the unit. These patients were transported from clearing station site to clearing station site by ambulance and by any available transportation.

b. In the vicinity of NICOSIA, a platoon of the 11th Field Hospital was established in the vicinity of the clearing station. All surgical cases deemed non-transportable were evacuated to this unit. It is felt that the Field Hospital installation is a valuable asset to a clearing station in combat.

c. On 7 August 1943, the 2nd platoon of the clearing company was sent to the north flank of the Division to clear casualties from the 60th Combat Team. This platoon established station at the original site of the

collecting company, approximately three miles north of CAPIZZI. From this area it moved cross-country over the mountains by means of Engineer constructed trails and maintained excellent contact with the combat units. There was no Field Hospital unit with this clearing platoon, therefore it was necessary on several occasions to keep casualties for a period of forty-eight hours or more preparing them for evacuation over the extremely rough terrain.

d. The work of both clearing platoons consisted chiefly of shock treatment and the handling of minor casualties. A large proportion of disease and exhaustion cases were kept and treated in the clearing stations. Several cases of physical exhaustion were received from the 60th Combat Team and successfully returned to duty after a twenty-four hour rest. Mental exhaustions were very few in number. All cases were treated by heavy sedation, using either sodium amytal or phenobarbital. These cases were kept under heavy sedation for at least forty-eight hours and a large percentage were salvaged for future duty with their unit.

e. The clearing platoon supporting the 60th Combat Team moved forward by bounds on several occasions. On each of these moves, the shock and surgical tent with necessary personnel and equipment were moved at least twelve hours before the remainder of the unit. This policy proved very satisfactory in this mountainous area.

8. Field Artillery Medical Activities.

a. The problems of evacuation in the artillery battalions was relatively simple during this entire campaign. Relatively few battle casualties and disease were encountered in any of these units. In the majority of instances the artillery battalion medical detachment evacuated casualties by means of their own ambulances directly to the clearing station.

b. Battalion aid stations for the field artillery battalions were habitually established in the general vicinity of the battalion Command Post. Battery aid men were furnished to each firing battery and to service batteries from the medical detachments.

REPORT OF CASUALTIES DURING THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

4 AUGUST to 14 AUGUST 1943

	WOUNDED		DISEASE	INJURY	EXHAUSTION		TOTAL
	G.S.W.	Shrapnel			Mental	Physical	
39th Infantry							
Total	29	110	202	44	8	16	409
Evacuated	28	74	201	44	8	16	371
Duty	1	36	1	0	0	0	38
47th Infantry							
Total	7	109	185	40	9	9	359
Evacuated	7	82	55	29	7	7	187
Duty	0	27	130	11	2	2	172
60th Infantry							
Total	8	137	168	33	61	4	411
Evacuated	7	103	148	30	56	0	344
Duty	1	34	20	3	5	4	67
Div. Artillery							
Total	0	2	2	1	0	0	5
Evacuated	0	2	2	0	0	0	4
Duty	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
26th F.A. Bn.							
Total	0	16	17	2	3	0	38
Evacuated	0	9	7	1	1	0	18
Duty	0	7	10	1	2	0	20
34th F.A. Bn.							
Total	0	0	25	3	0	0	28
Evacuated	0	0	25	3	0	0	28
Duty	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
60th F.A. Bn.							
Total	0	1	17	2	0	0	20
Evacuated	0	1	17	2	0	0	20
Duty	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
84th F.A. Bn.							
Total	0	1	3	1	0	5	10
Evacuated	0	1	3	1	0	5	10
Duty	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15th Engr. Bn.							
Total	0	10	75	16	0	0	101
Evacuated	0	7	63	12	0	0	82
Duty	0	3	12	4	0	0	19
Special Troops							
Total	0	5	54	4	0	0	63
Evacuated	0	5	35	4	0	0	44
Duty	0	0	19	0	0	0	19
DIV. TOTAL							
Total	44	391	748	146	81	34	1444
Evacuated	42	284	556	126	72	28	1108
Duty	2	107	192	20	9	6	336

DETAILED REPORT OF DIVISION ENGINEER

REPORT OF THE DIVISION ENGINEER

1. The 15th Engineer Battalion (C), less 1st Platoon, Company "A", arrived at PALERMO, SICILY on July 31, 1943 and disembarked on the morning of August 1st. The unloading of vehicles required 3 days. On the 4th, the battalion moved by motor to a bivouac on the main highway midway between NICOSIA and CERAMI. Company "C" made this move as part of the 60th RCT and went into bivouac at LE ROCEDDE on the west bank of the CERAMI River. Immediately upon the arrival of the remainder of the unit, Company "C" reverted to battalion control. The 1st Platoon, Company "A" with one water unit attached, landed on D plus 2 as the engineer detachment of the 39th RCT. As such, it removed mines, constructed by-passes around craters and demolished bridges and performed other tasks required of it by the RCT in its advance from LICATA to CERAMI. This platoon rejoined the battalion on August 7th.

2. The main task confronting the engineers was the building of an MSR for a flanking force which was to strike from CAPIZZI in the direction of MT. CAMOLATO. On August 5, preliminary reconnaissance was begun. The road was begun at a point $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles northeast of CAPIZZI. From there it was to follow a route generally LE CHIAPELLE, MT. DI PARDO, MT. DELBECCO, COLLE BASSO, COLLE DELLA CERASO, MT. CAMOLATO. Actual construction was begun on August 6th by Companies "A" and "B" with Company "C" reinforcing them on the 7th. By the end of the 7th the road had reached MT. DI PARDO and by 1800 of the 8th it had been extended to COLLE BASSO. On the afternoon of the 8th, Company "B" was withdrawn and ordered to support the 47th Infantry in the vicinity of CESARO and on the morning of the 9th, Company "A" was ordered to repair the CESARO - MT. CAMOLATO road and to construct a north-south by-pass of CESARO. By 1700 of this latter date, Company "C" completed the road. On the 9th "B" Company cleared mines and filled craters in the main road to a point 1500 yards west of CESARO at which place their activities were stopped by enemy shellfire. A southern by-pass to CESARO was also begun by this company.

3. On the 10th, Company "A" completed its by-pass of CESARO, this extending from a point $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of CESARO generally north through S. TFODORO to PO. D'INTERLE. Company "B"'s southern by-pass extending from a point $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of CESARO southeast to the TROINA River thence along the river bed for $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles then north to RE MERCADANTE was completed on the same date. This latter road was 4 miles long. Also on this date, one platoon of Company "B" was attached to the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron with the remainder going into support of the 39th Infantry, which was to move through the 47th Infantry on the night 10-11 August. One platoon of Company "A" was put in direct support of the 39th. By 0400 of August 11th, Company "B" had cleared the RANDAZZO road of mines to the SIMETO River; by noon an additional $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles had been cleared and 2 bridges by-passed. At 1130, Company "A" reported that the CESARO - MT. CAMOLATO Road was completely open to traffic, the 2 demolished bridges on the road due west of CAMOLATO having been by-passed. Company "A" was then ordered to relieve Company "B" in support of the 39th Infantry. The platoon of Company "B" attached to the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was relieved and the entire company was placed in support of the 47th Infantry.

4. Company "C" on the 10th of August was attached to the 60th RCT and was engaged in road repair and mine clearance and, commencing on the 12th, in the construction of a supply road from PO DI MANGALAVITE to FLORESTA. This road, built through practically impassable territory, was an engineering feat worthy of praise and was finished and made passable for 2½ ton vehicles by evening of the 13th.

5. By 1915 of the 12th, Company "A" had cleared the road of mines and had by-passed bridges to with 3 ¾ miles of RANDAZZO. On the morning of August 13th, our forces entered the city after Company "A" had cleared the road of mines to the junction of the CESARO - RANDAZZO and BRONTE - RANDAZZO Road. By-passes to demolished bridges were constructed at this junction and at the FLASCIO River during the morning.

6. The company was then recalled and held in readiness for a move to the north.

7. Company "B" meanwhile had on August 13th, reconnoitered a north-south MSR extending from the bridge over the SIMETO generally north along the east bank of the TORRENTE MARTELLO thence to PO DI MANGALAVITE. On this road were found 2 demolished bridges, 2 craters and ¼ mile of abatis thickly interspersed with Teller and "S" mines. At 1245 of the 14th the road was opened to traffic. On the 14th, Company "C" reconnoitered possible supply routes for the 60th Infantry from MTE. PARCA to MONTE ALBANO DI ELICONA. Mines were cleared from 6 miles of the PATTI road but when it was found impossible to construct an east-west connecting road to MONTE ALBANO, this work was abandoned. Instead, the route chosen was via MTE. CASTELLAZZO and MTE. GARUGHELLO. The road was completed by 1700 August 15th by Company "A". On the night August 14-15 a large portion of road was blown out at C. FARANA by a delayed land mine. At 1300 of the 15th, this had been repaired by Company "C". Orders cancelling future work were received at noon.

8. During the campaign, 45 miles of new supply road were constructed, 14 miles of road repaired, 15 demolished bridges by-passed, 4 craters filled, ¼ mile of abatis cleared, and 30 miles of road cleared of mines. A total of 1,050,000 gallons of water were distributed.

9. Recommendations.

- a. The D-7 angledozer should replace the R-4.
- b. To insure proper functioning of the battalion, 6 - ½ ton C & R and 14 - ¾ ton weapons carriers are required in addition to TBA transportation.
- c. Engineers must not be attached to RCT's. They should be in support.

DETAILED REPORT OF DIVISION ORDNANCE OFFICER

REPORT OF DIVISION ORDNANCE OFFICER

1. The operations of the 9th Division in the mountains of SICILY due to the steep grades encountered and consequent heavy demands on all vehicles has produced an unusually high number of engine (bearings) and transfer case failures. During the period 7 August to 31 August 1943, 167 major and 403 minor vehicular repair jobs were completed by the 709th Ordnance Company Shops.

2. Considerable difficulty was encountered in keeping many of the 155mm Howitzers M1918 of the Division Medium Artillery Battalion in action as most of these weapons had reached the end of their wearing life. (These fired during their full time in SICILY a total of 4,428 rounds - with from 6 to 12 guns in action). The trail hinge mounts of several 105mm Howitzers M2A1 split off in the rocky terrain. Repairs to artillery pieces of the Division during the period 7 to 31 August were 16 major, 99 minor jobs.

3. 1497 repairs to small arms and 32 repairs to trench mortars were made in the Division during combat.

4. A total of 18 general purpose vehicles and 3 trailers were destroyed by enemy action during combat.

5. A total of 142 small arms weapons and 479 other miscellaneous major items of ordnance equipment (ie: watches, binoculars, etc.) were lost in combat and 3 155mm Howitzers M1918 and 1 105mm Howitzer M2A1 were rendered unserviceable in action sufficiently to require replacement.

6. Ammunition expenditure during the period of operation of the Ninth Division Ammunition Office amounted to 438.4 tons. Using the NATOUSA unit of fire (5 August 1943) this breaks down roughly to the following units of fire expended per gun in the Division during the entire operation:

Small arms ammunition 1 unit; Trench mortar ammunition .26 unit;
Artillery weapons (except 0 for 57mm A.T. gun) 1.3 units.

ANNEX # 9

EXTRACT FROM 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY REPORT

6 AUGUST - 14 AUGUST INCLUSIVE

The 9th Infantry Division Artillery preceded 9th Infantry Division to SICILY. It reverted to control of the 9th Infantry Division on 6 August 1943. The following is an extract of its report of operations in SICILY for the period 6 August - 14 August inclusive.

* * * * E X T R A C T * * * *

1. Operations.

August 6

The Ninth Division moved forward attacking on the left of the 1st Division, 60th Infantry pushing East from CAPIZZI towards CAMOLATO. The 60th Infantry occupied PELATO at 0830 with practically no resistance. 84th Field Artillery Battalion occupied positions in vicinity C4610 and sent liaison forward to join 47th Infantry. 60th Field Artillery Battalion was ordered to reconnoiter positions vicinity of CAPIZZI. Movement to be made on order this evening. 84th Field Artillery Battalion moved to positions vicinity of C510089 at 1500. 32nd Field Artillery Battalion and 2nd Battalion, 77th Field Artillery moved to C511106 at 1800. 60th Field Artillery Battalion moved to positions vicinity C453200 and the 65th Armored Artillery Battalion moved to C440184. Resistance was light all along the line. Some artillery fire was received. The main obstacle to movement was not enemy forces but demolitions and the terrain. The 60th Combat Team advance across country was very difficult and dependent upon the progress of the engineers in construction of a road.

August 7

Enemy artillery fire was the heaviest, of any part of the campaign, during the day. Long range artillery pounded the vicinity of TROINA while shorter ranged guns and 5 and 6 barreled rocket guns fired on our infantry. Practically all fire was by artillery and the missions of our artillery was almost entirely counterbattery. By night our lines had reached to C525215 - C500220 - C590135 - C580156. Patrols were sent forward to CESARO. Artillery positions were as follows: 26th Field Artillery Battalion C565015, 34th Field Artillery Battalion C543096, 60th Field Artillery Battalion C490206, 65th Field Artillery Battalion C466196, 84th Field Artillery C545103. "B" Battery, 36th Field Artillery moved to C531092 with the mission of shelling roads in the vicinity of BRONTE. During the day all units had made an advance of at least 3000 yards and there were strong indications that the enemy was withdrawing his artillery to the Northeast to the vicinity of CAMOLATO.

August 8

Enemy resistance during the day was light. Some artillery fire reported but had small effect. 47th Infantry entered CESARO and the 60th Infantry took CAMOLATO. The only artillery units to move were the 84th Field Artillery Battalion to C570130 and the 65th Field Artillery Battalion to C502192. The road from TROINA to CESARO was heavily mined and all bridges blown. Movement of other artillery units was impossible due to the fact that road was impassable. Division Artillery Command Post moved to C530109.

August 9

Activity very light during day. All movements delayed by bridges being out and mines. Some enemy artillery fire on road East of CESARO and late in the day considerable fire from a 210 millimeter howitzer to the South of CESARO. 47th Infantry had advanced to 0675165 - C681137 and the 60th Infantry to C5822. The 26th Field Artillery Battalion had moved to C6410, the 34th Field Artillery Battalion to C597140 and the 60th Field Artillery Battalion to C510207. The 36th Field Artillery had moved up three more batteries all of which were in the vicinity of C5912.

August 10

During the day there was very little activity. Our artillery did practically no firing as there were practically no targets. Reconnaissance was made for forward positions. 47th Infantry sent patrols to 77 grid line and the 60th Infantry moved to C6126. At 2000 orders were received from Division for the 39th Infantry to pass through 47th Infantry at 2400. This forced movement of three battalions of artillery across practically no roads in order that support could be maintained. 26th Field Artillery Battalion moved across country to positions C678155, 84th Field Artillery Battalion moved to vicinity C6410, 62nd Field Artillery Battalion was placed in direct support of the 26th Field Artillery Battalion and moved to positions in vicinity of C676168. Other units made no change. Division Artillery Command Post still in vicinity of C530110.

August 11

The 39th Infantry passed through the 47th Infantry at CAST di BOLO (690135) and R. NADOU (C6817). Resistance to movement of 39th Infantry was very slight. Some small caliber artillery fire was placed on road by enemy. 60th Infantry advanced without resistance to vicinity of C630285 by 0615. At 1255 the 60th Infantry had reached and occupied SERRA DEL RE (7028) with no contact. British and Canadian forces were pushing to the North towards RANDAZZO from BRONTE and were MALETTO. 60th Infantry captured 4 105 millimeters and 2 - 150 millimeter guns when they took SERRA DEL RE. All units of the artillery displaced forward as follows: 26th Field Artillery Battalion - C737194, 34th Field Artillery Battalion - C703151, 60th Field Artillery Battalion - C654284, 65th Field Artillery Battalion - C645281, 84th Field Artillery Battalion - C693158, 62nd Field Artillery Battalion - C678165. One battery of 36th Field Artillery had advanced to C678138 and could now fire well beyond RANDAZZO. Firing during the day was very light and there was practically no resistance. Division Artillery Command Post moved to vicinity of C645150.

August 12

Resistance during the day was light although there were some enemy artillery firing. Advances were made all along the line. The 60th Infantry reaching FLORESTA with the main body at C7432 to 755300. The 39th Infantry was reported to have taken the hill at 8023 but this was later found to be on the 77 to 78 line. Our artillery had very few targets. 5 enemy rocket guns were located by 26th Field Artillery Battalion and fired on. Guns were probably destroyed as fire was very heavy (500 rounds) and guns did not fire again. "C" Battery, 36th Field Artillery also fired on this target

with good effect. Later an enemy gun was observed firing at C798156. Heavy fire (200 rounds) was placed on this target by the 26th Field Artillery Battalion. The gun, one truck and some ammunition was destroyed and two large fires started. The 65th Field Artillery Battalion moved to C650274 and the 60th Field Artillery Battalion moved to the vicinity of C7520. Two batteries of the 36th Field Artillery were moved to vicinity of C737200.

August 13

During morning 39th Infantry moved forward without contact to meet British at road junction west of RANDAZZO and entered RANDAZZO. Main body of 39th Infantry remained in vicinity of RANDAZZO and patrols pushed forward approximately six miles beyond RANDAZZO. 60th Infantry pushed east from FLORESTA towards MONTE ALBANO without resistance and by night had reached the 88 line. The 65th Field Artillery Battalion and the 60th Field Artillery Battalion had moved to positions in vicinity of C765317. No other units of artillery moved. Division Artillery Command Post moved to C715182. At this point all units but the 60th Combat Team were ordered to stand fast.

August 14

The 60th Infantry moved on toward the Northeast and made contact with the 3rd Division. The 60th Field Artillery Battalion and 65th Field Artillery Battalion moved to positions in vicinity of C8532. All other units moved to bivouac and started to clean up.

2. Statistics. (Covering entire period of Sicilian Campaign)

a. Ammunition Expenditure.

Unit	TYPE OF SHELL					Totals
	M48	M54	M57	155HE	155SM	
26th F. A. Bn.	8758	2938	873			12569
34th F. A. Bn.				3594	108	3702
60th F. A. Bn.	916	17	217			1150
84th F. A. Bn.	1203	13	136			<u>1352</u>
					Total	18773

b. Casualties.

Unit	Disease	Injured	Wounded	Killed in Action
Hq. Btry. Div. Arty.	6	2	4	0
26th F. A. Bn.	55	8	33	4
60th F. A. Bn.	35	2	14	6
34th F. A. Bn.	53	3	6	0
84th F. A. Bn.	27	19	3	0
Totals	176	34	60	10

c. Vehicle Casualties.

Unit	Type Vehicle	Damage
Hq. Btry. Div. Arty.	1/4 T, 4x4 truck	Destroyed by mine.
26th F. A. Bn.	1 T, cargo trailer	Turned in at BIZERTE - broken lunette.
34th F. A. Bn.	4 T, 6x6 truck	Evacuated, worn differential.
	2 1/2 T, 6x6 truck	Evacuated, motor replacement and frame straightening.
	3/4 T, C&R	Destroyed by mine.
	1 T, cargo trailer	While under control 82nd Div. (AB) left at AGRIGENTO at PW enclosure by order of Provost Marshall, 3rd Div. under his guard. Not there when truck returned. Provost Marshall did not help find trailer.