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Headquarters Ninth Infantry Division

APC No 9

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REPORT ON OPERATION

CONDUCTED BY

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITED STATES ARMY

SOUTHERN TUNISIA

26 MARCH - 8 APRIL 1943

E. S. Johnston

E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

UNCLASSIFIED



[REDACTED]

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1479
5 October 1943

SUBJECT: Reports on Operations, 9th Infantry Division,
Southern Tunisia, Northern Tunisia and Sicily.

TO: Commandant, Command and General Staff School,
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

1. The enclosed copy No. 19, "Report on Operation
conducted by 9th Infantry Division, U. S. A., Southern
Tunisia", was received by this office in error. As indi-
cated in the enclosed copy of letter forwarding this
document, it was intended for the Commandant, Command
and General Staff School.

2. Please sign the enclosed receipt and return to
this office.

For the Acting Commandant:

Charles E. Lewis

CHARLES E. LEWIS,
Lieut. Col., Inf.,
Executive Officer.

2 Incls.

Letter dated 22 Sept. 1943
Copy #19 "Report on Operation
by 9th Inf. Div."



[REDACTED]

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO #9, c/o Postmaster, New York, NY

22 September 1943

SUBJECT: Reports on Operations, 9th Infantry Division.
Southern TUNISIA, Northern TUNISIA and SICILY.

TO :

✓ The Commandant, Army War College, Washington 25, D. C.	Copy No. 18
The Commandant, The Command & General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.	" " 19
The Commandant, The Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia.	" " 20
The Commandant, The Field Artillery School, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma.	" " 21
The Commandant, The Cavalry School, Ft. Riley, Kansas.	" " 22
The Commandant, The Signal School, Ft. Monmouth, Red Bank, N. J.	" " 23
The Commandant, The Engineer School, Ft. Belvoir, Va.	" " 24
The Commandant, The Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Penna.	" " 25
The Superintendent, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.	" " 26

1. Attached hereto as inclosures 1, 2 and 3 are Reports on Operations, 9th Infantry Division, for the above named operations. These reports are in addition to copies forwarded to higher headquarters and are furnished for your information.


2. Request that attached receipt be signed and returned.

For the Commanding General:

G. B. BARTH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

Inclosures - Reports on Operations, 9th Inf. Div.

- #1 - Southern TUNISIA
 - #2 - Northern TUNISIA
 - #3 - SICILY
 - #4 - Receipt for Secret Document
- [REDACTED]



HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION

A. P. O. #9

Report on the Operation
conducted by

THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION, U.S.A.

in

Southern Tunisia

26 March - 8 April 1943



HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
A. P. C. #9

25 August 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Operations

TO : The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

THRU : Commanding General, II Corps, APO #302

Section I --- Authority
Section II --- General
Section III --- Operation
Section IV --- Highlights
Section V --- Conclusions
Section VI --- Final Observations

Appendix A --- Field Orders
Appendix B --- Terrain Study
Appendix C --- Artillery

SECTION I -- AUTHORITY

1. In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, a report of operation of the 9th Infantry Division from 26 March to 8 April is submitted.

SECTION II -- GENERAL

2. Command. During the operation covered in this report, the 9th Infantry Division was a part of II Corps, which was, in turn, a component of the 18th Army Group.

- a. Commanding the 9th Inf. Div. --- Maj.-Gen. M.S. Eddy
- b. Commanding II Corps --- Lt.-Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.
- c. Commanding 18th Army Group --- Gen. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander

3. Directives. Directives from 18th Army Group to II Corps were as follows:

(1) Use 9th Division in conjunction with 1st Infantry Division for an attack on the Gafsa-Gabes axis with a view to opening the pass north of Hill 369 (near Kilometer Post 110) to permit passage of 1st Armored Division. This attack to be in three phases as follows:

- a. 1st Phase - Secure the road junction north of Djebel Berda and

the hills north and south thereof.

b. 2nd Phase - Secure position as far forward as the pass between Djebel Chemsî and Djebel Ben Krier, thus opening the path for the advance of the 1st Armored Division to the vicinity of Djebel Tebaga Fatnassa.

c. 3rd Phase - Advance of 1st Armored Division through pass to Djebel Tebaga Fatnassa, from which it would operate against the lines of communication of the Germans. (This phase to be initiated only on order from 18th Army Group.)

(2) To insure the integrity of Maknassy, leave one medium tank battalion, the 60th Combat Team, and two additional artillery battalions in the vicinity of Maknassy.

(3) Firm base (Abiod - Sbiba) to be moved to the line Gafsa-Sbeitla.

(4) 34th Infantry Division to move from Sbeitla on Fondouk.

(5) Attack to begin on 27 or 28 March depending on when it could be mounted.

4. Division Objectives. The 9th Infantry Division objective was Hill 369.

5. Supposed Location of Enemy Prior to Operation. On 15 March, Rommel's main force, consisting of four Italian infantry divisions, two German infantry divisions, and the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, together with service and supporting troops, was believed to be concentrated along, or in support of, the Mareth positions. The Centauro Division was believed to be in the Gafsa area. Task forces held the passes at Faid, Maknassy and Fondouk. These positions were well-organized for defense. The 10th Panzer Division was not definitely located, but was believed to be in general reserve somewhere in the Sfax area.

6. Terrain Study. A complete study of the terrain over which this operation was conducted is attached to this Report as Appendix B.

7. Immediate Intelligence Prior to Operation. Intelligence reports from adjacent units indicated that the eastern extremities of Djebel Berda, including Hills 369 and 290, were but lightly held by the Germans.

8. Division Plan of Operation. II Corps originally ordered the attack for 27 March. This was changed to 28 March by Corps Chief-of-Staff at a conference at II Corps Headquarters at Gafsa on the afternoon of 26 March. As originally ordered in Field Order #16 (see Appendix A) the Division was to attack at 0400, 27 March, with regiments in column, 47th Infantry leading. The 47th Infantry was to be followed by the 39th Infantry, which was to advance by bounds and

to be committed only on Division order.

The amended plan of attack, as ordered in Field Order #16 (Corrected) (see Appendix A) called for the Division to attack at 0600, 28 March. To avoid a frontal attack in the open terrain, the plan called for assembly at the eastern base of Djebel Berda. The 47th Infantry was to move to the east along the northern base of Djebel Berda and to capture Hill 369 from the west. Due to the open and featureless plain to the north of Djebel Berda, which was wholly under observation by the enemy on the heights, this was considered the only possible route of advance. It was planned that one battalion should advance along El Kreroua, and one along Djebel Lettouchi. A third battalion was to follow the left assault battalion in regimental reserve. The 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, was to follow the 47th Infantry by bounds and was to be committed only on Division order. The 39th Infantry (less 1st Battalion), motorized, was to assemble in the rear of 2772 as a Division reserve. The Division artillery, augmented by the 17th Field Artillery (less one battalion), was to support the attack, opening fire at 0600 the day of the attack.

9. Composition of the 9th Infantry Division. During the operation covered by this report, the 9th Infantry Division consisted of the following units:

a. Assigned:

- 9th Signal Company (less detachment)
- 9th Quartermaster Company
- 15th Engineer Battalion (less Company "C")
- 709th Ordnance Company
- 39th Infantry
- 47th Infantry
- Hq. & Hq. Battery, Division Artillery
- 26th F.A. Battalion
- 34th F.A. Battalion
- 84th F.A. Battalion
- Hq. & Hq. Company, 9th Infantry Division
- Military Police Platoon
- 9th Medical Battalion (less Company "C")

b. Attached:

- 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion
- 17th F.A. Regiment (less 1st Battalion)
- Hq. Detachment and Battery "A", 107th C.A. Battalion (AA)
- Battery "B", 106th C.A. Battalion (AA)

c. Detached:

- 60th Infantry
- 60th F.A. Battalion
- Company "C", 15th Engineer Battalion
- Company "C", 9th Medical Battalion
- Provisional Truck Company
- 9th Reconnaissance Troop
- Det., 9th Signal Co. (10 linesmen and 5 radio operators)

d. General:

The 9th Infantry Division entered this engagement less one of its Combat Teams, the 60th RCT, which had been detached some days before for the operations near Maknassy. Another Combat Team, the 39th RCT, had not served with the Division for a period of nearly six months, during a large share of which time it had been employed on the lines of communications, stretched on a front of approximately five hundred miles. Reduced therefore to six, and for several days to five infantry battalions, the Division found itself severely handicapped. Moreover, the maps which were available were such that they introduced an ever-present hazard of grave error; and the enemy holding the high ground as he did, made it impossible to move the artillery or assault troops into position except at night.

SECTION -- OPERATION

10. MARCH 27:

a. The attack had originally been planned to take place at daybreak this date, but by early afternoon of the 26 March it was foreseen that the bulk of the Division could not possibly be in position in time. Accordingly, on 26 March, at a conference in Gafsa, the Chief-of-Staff of II Corps ordered the attack postponed 24 hours.

11. MARCH 28:

a. The 47th Infantry, which had moved into assembly positions (see Map, Appendix A) 26-27 March, began its advance to the east by moonlight in the early morning hours of 28 March in a column of battalions. By 0600 the regiment had reached a point about one mile west of El Hamra, which was through error reported to be Hill 369. Its leading battalion was soon stopped by fire from that ridge, but the 3rd Battalion, the second in the column, maneuvered to the south and the ridge was captured. The last battalion in column, the 2nd, prior to daylight had been directed to maneuver still further to the south through the scattered and difficult terrain near Djebels Lettouchi and Kreroua. While it was still dark this battalion was caught in a pocket by devastating fire and the personnel of one complete company (Company "E", 47th Infantry) was killed or captured. The location of the remainder of the battalion was not ascertained for the next thirty-six hours. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, which had followed the 47th, was committed on Division order and instructed to extend the envelopment further to the south. This battalion became lost and was not engaged on the first day.

b. Plans made at this time for the resumption of the attack on 29 March called for the movement of the 2nd Battalion, 39th Infantry, for an assault against Hill 369 from the north under cover of darkness. Effective at daybreak, the attack of this battalion was to be assisted by the two battalions of the 47th on El Hamra. The remainder of the 39th Infantry, now reduced to one battalion (the 3rd) was to remain in its present position in

Division reserve. The location of the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, and of the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry, were at this time undetermined.

12. MARCH 29:

a. Pursuant to the Division plan the 2nd Battalion, 39th Infantry, moved in trucks southeast along the El Guettar-Gabes Road. Perhaps due to faulty reconnaissance, this truck movement was caught by heavy enemy fire from Hill 290 as it approached that hill. The battalion sustained heavy losses and was badly demoralized, the bulk withdrawing to its original position.

b. During the daylight hours this date, the 47th Infantry improved its positions on the El Hamra ridge. By noon of this day, however, it had become apparent that the Division had encountered an extremely heavily fortified position, and by 1700 it was also apparent that the attack had been definitely stopped until regrouping and reorganization could be effected. Later developments during the battle and a later examination of these hills were conclusive in indicating that this area had been heavily fortified over a long period and developed into a virtual fortress. The natural strength of the position had been augmented by numerous emplacements, many of which had been dug into solid rock.

c. The 9th Division was informed by Corps that Colonel Benson had been placed in command of an Armored Task Force to go through the 1st and 9th Divisions under Corps control. The artillery of the 1st and 9th Divisions, in addition to Corps artillery, prepared to support Benson's force.

13. MARCH 30:

a. Regrouping and reorganization was partially effected during the night 29-30 March, and it was planned to continue the attack of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 47th Infantry, to the east, employing the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, to envelope from the south around the right (south) flank of the 47th Infantry. The 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry, on this date was detached from the Division and for the next two days operated as a part of the 1st Armored Division. The partly reorganized 2nd Battalion, 39th Infantry, was employed in Division reserve.

b. Units of the 1st Armored Division debouched through the 9th Division area about noon this date along the Gafsa-Gabes road in the direction of Gabes. The 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry, as mentioned above, was attached to this force, which shortly ran into heavy artillery fire and lost five tanks.

c. It was erroneously reported by 1400 this date, that the Division objective, Hill 369, had been captured but that resistance remained in small pockets and wadis in the hills which had been by-passed by the attacking echelons.

14. MARCH 31:

a. It now became apparent that the report of the capture of the Division objective on 30 March was in error. The hill which was taken on this date was 290 and not 369. Faulty map (see comment on page 5) did not show Hill 290.

b. Corps ordered that the 9th Division renew the attack at 1600 this date. The attack was launched at 1800, with the 1st Armored putting on a coordinated attack left of the Maknassy position. The 47th Infantry's attempt to take Hill 369 was unsuccessful, and the day was ended without appreciable progress.

15. APRIL 1:

a. The 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry, was returned to Division control and placed in reserve, north of the 47th Infantry.

b. Unsuccessful efforts were made by the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, on the extreme right, to capture Hill 772.

c. The enemy made a heavy air attack in the El Guettar sector, but casualties were comparatively few.

d. The 9th Division was notified by Corps to initiate the second phase of operations as had been previously outlined by the Commanding General, 18th Army Group. In this phase it was to secure positions as far forward as the pass between Djebel Chensi and Djebel Ben Krier, thus opening the path for the advance of the 1st Armored Division to the vicinity of Djebel Tebaga Fatnassa. Strict compliance with this directive was impossible however, since the position of the Division was still west of Hills 369 and 772 which were desperately resisting capture.

16. APRIL 2:

a. There was little change in the situation as a whole this date. The 1st and 9th Divisions moved forward to attempt to carry out the second phase of the attack. The Armored Force moved up and established contact during the afternoon. Heavy winds in the vicinity of Thelepte air field prevented air support until late afternoon.

b. The 9th Division continued to battle unsuccessfully for Hills 369 and 772, suffering many casualties.

17. APRIL 3:

a. In mid-afternoon this date a heavy artillery concentration, participated in by all of the artillery with the 9th Division plus much of Corps and 1st Division artillery, was placed on Hill 369, with the intention of assisting the 47th Infantry in the capture of the Hill. The infantry, however, was slow in following the artillery preparation, and while some units made progress, the net results were not encouraging.

b. The 18th Army Group sent a directive to Corps stating that as soon as the British 8th Army succeeded in breaking through the Akarit position, the 9th Division was to move to the V British Corps' left flank, to take over the part of the front nearest the sea.

18. APRIL 4:

a. Having failed the previous day to take Hill 369, it was now planned to capture the hill by infiltration tactics. The entire day was spent in maneuvering to favorable ground but the hill was not taken.

b. The 47th Infantry sent out two patrols that got to Hill 369 but encountered wired-in positions and returned.

c. The 9th Division continued its attack on Djebel Lettouchi but failed to take it. The Derbyshire Yeomanry were ordered to join the 9th British Corps, being relieved in their area by the 9th Reconnaissance Troop. Enemy batteries were very active on our front.

d. At 2000 this date, Companies "A" and "B", plus the S-1, S-2, and S-3 sections of Headquarters Company, 15th Engineers, occupied a defensive position as infantry. This position was just south of the El Guettar-Gabes road and about three miles east of El Guettar. The mission was to prepare and occupy the position in order to resist a threatened mechanized counter-attack. The position was prepared and dug in by 2330. The following morning a message was received to prepare to pursue the enemy, and trucks were alerted, but this contingency failed to materialize.

19. APRIL 5:

a. Beginning the night of 5 April, the 47th Infantry was directed to send one rifle platoon, reinforced by light machine guns, forward to positions within supporting distance of the regimental main line of resistance, where, under cover of darkness, the platoons were to dig in and hold their positions until reinforced by other elements of their companies. The 2nd Battalion, 39th Infantry, moving forward on the right of the 47th Infantry was to adopt similar tactics in an attempt to progress along the summit of Djebel Lettouchi. The 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, was to continue its efforts to capture Hill 772.

b. This plan was never actually put into operation because G-2 reports indicated that the Germans were being heavily reinforced and that a counter-attack could be expected on that afternoon or at daylight the following morning. Accordingly, to meet this eventuality, all elements of the Division were held awaiting this attack.

c. At this time the Division order of battle, from left to right, was as follows:

The 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry, was on Hill 290, where it had been subjected to almost continuous shelling for a period of a week. The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 47th Infantry, left to right on El Hamra. The 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry, on the northwestern ridge of Djebel Lettouchi. The

1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, on the western slopes of Hill 772. The 2nd Battalion, 39th Infantry, in Division reserve in Oued El Beida. This battalion had prepared plans to (1) occupy a defensive position along the trail leading northwest from Djebel Lettouchi, or (2) to counter-attack to the northeast should the Germans force the pass north of Hill 369.

20. APRIL 6:

a. No attack by the Germans developed and there were early indications of withdrawal of some enemy elements during the night 5-6 April.

b. The 9th Division, and the 1st Infantry Division on its left, were ordered to attack and secure the general north-and-south line through north-south grid Y415.

c. At 1820 this date, orders were received by Companies "A" and "B", with the S-1, S-2, and S-3 sections of Headquarters Company, 15 Engineers, to move to a position on El Hamra and relieve the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry, with a mission to hold and defend.

21. APRIL 7:

a. By 0500 this date the relief by the 15th Engineers was completed and the position was completely organized for defense. During the day, however, it was definitely established that the enemy had withdrawn, and the Battalion, (less Company "C", which was at Maknassy) prepared to move back to bivouac near Bou Chebka for rest, reorganization and re-equipping.

b. It became evident from aerial reconnaissance and reports from our patrols that the Germans had completely evacuated Djebel Berda, and a general withdrawal was suspected.

c. The 39th Infantry and the 47th Infantry made a rapid advance to the east, which was almost totally unopposed.

d. By the afternoon of this day the Division had reached its objective along the road east of Hill 369.

e. The 15th Engineer Battalion, which had been assembled on El Hamra to support the 47th Infantry, was ordered forward as far as crossroads 99, but these orders were later countermanded.

f. During the night of this date, as elements of the 1st Division moved into 9th Division territory, the 9th began to withdraw, and advance elements proceeded to the Bou Chebka area.

g. 18th Army Group instructed Corps that the move of the 9th Division from the Bou Chebka area would not begin earlier than 10 April.

22. APRIL 8:

a. The 9th Division continued its move to the Bou Chebka area, occupying

the same general area which it had occupied less than a month before.

23. APRIL 9:

a. By this date the 9th Division (less 60th RCT) was completely assembled in the Bou Chebka area, where replacements were received and equipment distributed.

b. 18th Army Group instructed II Corps that the Corps would consist, for the next operation, initially of the 9th and 34th Infantry Divisions and one Armored Combat Command, together with the necessary corps service and supporting troops.

c. The proposed objective for II Corps on the north front was given as Bizerte. The Commanding General II Corps emphasized the necessity of assigning II Corps an objective important enough to assure full recognition of the part United States Army forces had played during the entire Tunisian campaign.

24. APRIL 10:

a. Maknassy Pass was cleared and orders were issued for the 60th RCT to rejoin the 9th Infantry Division.

b. Advance elements of the 9th Division departed for the northern front where the Division was to relieve the British 46th Division.

SECTION IV -- HIGHLIGHTS

25. PERSONNEL LOSSES:

UNIT*

	W. I. A.	K. I. A.	M. I. A.	INJURED	EXH'T.	DISEASE	RET. TO DUTY	
	Shell	GSW			STATES		FRM. CLRNG. STA.	
39th Infantry	214	67	39	84	58	103	66	95
47th Infantry	415	146	75	232	118	89	28	310
9th Div. Arty.						1		
26th F.A. Bn.	10	2			3	1	1	8
34th F.A. Bn.	1	1	1		6	4	3	1
84th F.A. Bn.	7	1	2			4	1	2
15th Eng. Bn.							3	
9th Med. Bn.	4				1	3	1	6
Special Troops	4		3			1	8	3
TOTAL FOR DIV.	655	217	120	316	186	207	111	425

*The losses of the 60th RCT, detached during this operation, are not included in this report.

26. LOSS OF BATTALION COMMANDERS:

During this operation the casualty rate among infantry battalion commanders was extremely heavy. During the battle, of the six infantry battalion commanders present, five were rendered ineffective by wound, injury, capture or other reasons. These were:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>
47th Infantry, 1st Bn.	Major Herbert N. Turner	Injured in Action
47th Infantry, 2nd Bn.	Lt.-Col. Louis Gershenow	Captured in Action
47th Infantry, 3rd Bn.	Lt.-Col. John B. Evans	WIA - Evac. to U.S.A.
39th Infantry, 2nd Bn.	Lt.-Col. Walter M. Oakes	Missing in Action
39th Infantry, 3rd Bn.	Lt.-Col. John T. Keeley	Exhaustion State

27. SIGNAL OPERATIONS:

a. Terrain. In this action it was found that the rocky nature of the ground made wire lines apt to break and snare more often than usual, while the lack of cover made the use of $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton vehicles necessary. Thus, the work of repair crews that need the normal aid of a 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck became much more difficult. Too, the large number of tracked vehicles in this section caused a far greater number of cuts and breaks than could possibly have been foreseen, -- a situation which was solved by having several lines to a unit so that the circuit could be constantly kept open. Also, when a tank movement was anticipated, a jeep with a trouble shooting unit was sent to follow the attack. At one point in the engagement, the 47th Infantry repair crews became so exhausted that a detail of one officer and sixteen enlisted men from Division was sent to help them. As the attack progressed, the rugged nature of the terrain made it necessary to carry wire forward by hand.

b. Message Service. Message service was routine in this battle, with one exception. With constant danger from strafing planes it was found advisable to send two men in each jeep, rather than one as had been customary, to provide lookout protection.

c. Switchboard. The switchboard at Division was dug in seven or eight feet and, thus protected, it was able to continue operations under the most difficult conditions.

28. MEDICAL OPERATIONS:

a. Terrain and Weather. The terrain encountered by the medical units was, of course, identical with that over which the infantry regiments were fighting: sparsely vegetated and without cover except for that afforded by defilade of rocks and wadis. The weather during the day was hot, and the air was frequently filled with swirling dust and sand. At night the temperature fell so suddenly that the men in the front lines had difficulty in keeping warm with the limited amount of equipment they carried.

b. Evacuation. Evacuation was accomplished from the forward areas as much as possible by the use of litter jeeps. Due to the rugged terrain, this at

times necessitated hand-litter carrying to a point at which the patients could be transferred to the jeep. Mules were used on a small scale, but hand-littering of patients to an advanced ambulance loading-post, with infrequent use of the wheeled litter-carrier, was the mainstay of the forward evacuation system. Night evacuation, which was the rule, was accomplished by the use of trucks, ambulances and litter-jeeps, and it was necessary for the battalion aid-stations to care for the wounded throughout the day in slit trenches, since enemy air activity was pronounced twenty-four hours a day. In one twenty-four hour period there were over thirty enemy raids, all of which resulted in bombs being dropped within sight of the stations.

c. Treatment. It was observed that approximately 90% of the casualties had taken, on their own initiative, the sulfa drugs contained in their First Aid packet, prior to being seen by medical personnel. In the clearing-stations, walking-wounded and the more seriously wounded were treated separately, and the shock cases treated together systematically with plasma averaging about 1000 cc per patient. In general only such measures were taken as would insure comfortable transportation of the wounded to the rear. All wounds were checked for bleeding, sucking chest wounds were sutured against a gauze pack, splints were checked and adjusted to insure against impairment of circulation. Morphine and plasma were given as needed. Hot fluids and light foods were given freely. (The men often appeared more interested in the food than in their wounds.) During the latter part of the operation, when casualties began to decrease, the exhaustion states were held in the Clearing Station and treated with heavy sedation. Approximately 40% of these patients were returned to their original duty.

d. Exhaustion States. The number of exhaustion-states was low. Factors contributing to exhaustion seemed to be:

- (1) Fatigue.
- (2) Loss of officers. (In some units the number of cases increased with the number of officer losses.)
- (3) Exhaustion states in officers. (These seemed to have an infectious effect upon the men.)

e. Collecting Companies. During the battle of El Guettar, the collecting companies evacuated 1095 casualties from the battlefield. (From 1200, 28 March, to 1200, 8 April, 1943.) After hostilities ceased and the enemy withdrew, the collecting companies went over the battlefields to assist burial parties in locating and disposing of our own and enemy dead.

29. ENGINEERS:

a. Organization. During this operation Company "C", 15th Engineers,

was attached to the 60th RCT at Makassy.

b. Activities. Little engineer work was required during this battle and consisted principally of small mine-detection parties for checking and clearance of routes.

c. Operation. On 4 April, at 2000, Companies "A" and "B", with the S-1, S-2, and S-3 sections of Headquarters Company occupied a defensive position as infantry. This position was just south of the El Guettar-Gabes road and about three miles east of El Guettar. The mission was to prepare and occupy the position in order to resist a threatened mechanized counter-attack. The 1st Engineer Battalion occupied a position on our left. The position was prepared and dug in by 2330. The following morning a message was received to prepare to pursue the enemy and trucks were alerted, but this contingency failed to materialize.

On 6 April, at 1820, orders were received to move to a position on El Hamra and relieve the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry, with a mission to hold and defend. By 0500, 7 April, the relief was completed and the position fully organized for defense. During that day it was definitely determined that the enemy had withdrawn and trucks were ordered up to the position. The following morning the Battalion, less Company "C", moved back to bivouac near Bou Chebka for rest, reorganization, and re-equipping.

30. ARTILLERY:

a. A detailed artillery Report of Operations is attached hereto as Appendix "C"

31. MILITARY POLICE:

a. Duties. During this battle the Military Police of the Division were used to operate the CP guard, regulate traffic, furnish special convoy details, maintain camouflage discipline, provide personnel for traffic-control points and as special guard for the Commanding General, maintain straggler patrols and a prisoner-of-war control station.

b. Stragglers and Prisoners.

(1) Straggler patrols covered the main roads (trails, ravines, river beds, and so on, should be covered too, but in this instance sufficient personnel was lacking) from the Division CP to advance of the light artillery positions and as far back as Corps Headquarters, returning stragglers to their units. In this operation a number of Arabs, more of a nuisance than a menace, were apprehended in forward positions and returned to the prisoner-of-war control station for interrogation before being turned over to the French police.

(2) During this battle the Military Police processed a total of 505 prisoners: 58 Germans and 447 Italians

32. GRAVES REGISTRATION:

a. During this operation the cemetery was located at Gafsa. Native labor was recruited by the Graves Registration Officer when necessary, and 177 soldiers of the 9th Division were buried there. The problem of sufficient personnel was at times acute at the Graves Registration Office when all the duties of the section, implicit and implied, of the section pressed for attention simultaneously.

33. RECONNAISSANCE TROOP:

a. During this operation the 9th Reconnaissance Troop was detached from the Division and operated under Corps control in the Faid Pass sector where it relieved the British Derbyshire Yeomanry on a 35-mile front. A separate report of this action is being rendered by this unit.

34. ORDNANCE:

a. Units Serviced. Units serviced by the 9th Division Ordnance (709th Ordnance LM Company) during this operation included the ten major units of this Division, plus four attached units, including a tank-destroyer battalion and two anti-aircraft units.

b. Vehicles Serviced. Vehicles serviced during this operation included all types of government vehicles.

c. Maintenance. A total of 265 major repair jobs (jobs requiring at least one and one-half hours' time) were done during this period. Examples of this type of work included replacing a clutch assembly on a 2½-ton GMC truck; rebuilding a 2½-ton motor; replacing front and rear bogies on a 2½-ton truck.

d. Artillery Weapons. The number of artillery pieces in the Division for this operation were:

24	105mm howitzers
12	105mm howitzers (2nd Bn., 17th F.A. attached)
12	155mm howitzers
4	105mm howitzers, self-propelled
16	75mm howitzers, pack
18	75mm guns, self-propelled
<u>54</u>	37mm anti-tank guns
140	

e. Ammunition Expenditure. During this operation a total of 1489 tons of ammunition was expended. The distribution was as follows:

219,466	rounds 30-cal. (5-rd clips for 03-rifle)
311,220	rounds 30-cal. (8-rd clips for M-1 rifle)
411,750	rounds MG ammunition 30-cal.
129,783	rounds MG ammunition 50-cal.

3,425 hand grenades, fragmentary
 83,700 rounds 45-cal ball (T sub-MG and pistol)
 1,652 rounds 75mm gun, s.c., HE
 498 rounds 75mm gun (AP)
 3,208 rounds 75mm howitzer (Fuze M48)
 20 rounds 75mm howitzer (Fuze M57, smoke)
 744 rounds 40mm (AA)
 30,255 rounds 105mm howitzer (Fuze M48)
 4,778 rounds 105mm howitzer (Fuze M54)
 3,953 rounds 105mm howitzer (Fuze M57, smoke)
 2,233 rounds 155mm howitzer (HE)
 208 rounds 155mm howitzer (smoke)
 2,727 rounds 81mm mortar (heavy)
 10,844 rounds 81mm mortar
 6,884 rounds 60mm mortar

The biggest days in this operation for ammunition expenditures were:

April 1 - 562 rounds 155mm howitzer (HE)
 April 3 - 5,075 rounds 81mm mortar (light)
 April 3 - 5,884 rounds 105mm howitzer (Fuze M48)

35. QUARTERMASTER:

a. Point of Supply. During this operation the point of supply for the 9th Division Quartermaster was at Gafsa.

b. Rations. Rations were furnished by types as follows:

<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>Brit. Compo.</u>
422,576	160,526	800	57,741

c. PX Supplies. A total of 872,894 items of PX supplies (gum, shaving cream, tooth powder, soap, etc.) were issued.

d. Gas, Oil, and Lubricants. The following amounts of gasoline, oil and lubricants were issued:

<u>Gasoline (V-80)</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Grease</u>	<u>Hypoid (Universal)</u>
194,635 gals.	3,458 gls.	1,952 pounds	680 gals.

SECTION V - CONCLUSIONS

As a result of the action the following lessons were learned:

(1) Early seizure of the dominating observation is an essential prerequisite for a successful advance. As long as such observation remains in the hands of the enemy, further progress is impossible. An examination


of the area over which this battle was fought will at once indicate the dominating characteristics of Hill 772, which was undoubtedly the key to the position. Although small detachments of the Division, including artillery observers, occupied this hill early in the battle, they did not maintain their positions there and the significance of the hill was not fully realized until later. This hill is the focus from which radiates three subordinate hog-back ridges, namely Djebel Lettouchi Djebel El Kreroua, and Draa Saade El Hamra, all of which lead more or less directly towards Hills 369 and 290. Had the initial attack been planned to capture Hill 772 and then to work generally east along the connecting ridges toward Hill 369, it is possible that the positions might have been captured despite the handicaps under which the Division was laboring.

(2) Early reconnaissance and an opportunity for commanders of all grades to perfect their plans and to issue orders are essential. Such an opportunity was not afforded prior to this operation, a fact which in some cases led to devastating results.

(3) A determined enemy cannot be blasted out of a prepared position with artillery fire, however effective that fire may be. And the artillery of the 9th Division, with its attached units, gave a convincing demonstration of effective fire. The artillery fire must be followed so closely by the advance of infantry that the defenders, driven into their holes by the artillery fire, will not be able to man their weapons after the artillery fire lifts, in time to withstand effectively the infantry assault.


SECTION VI - FINAL OBSERVATION

The 9th Infantry Division, operating for the first time as a Division, had entered the Battle of El Guettar severely handicapped. Despite this fact, and despite the fact that the Division was guilty of the mistakes expected of a unit in its initial engagement with the enemy, the operation proved to be an eventual success. The conduct of the individual soldier was reassuring and gratifying. Opposing crafty and veteran soldiers, our troops showed courage and ability. With one battle behind them, they were now ready to enter the next operation a wiser and more able fighting unit.


M. S. EDDY
Major General, U. S. A.
Commanding

A P P E N D I X "A"

Field Orders



Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials :
Date : 27 March 1943

F O #16


MAPS: TUNISIA, 1:200,000

1.
 - a. See overlay.
 - b. See overlay.
2. This Div will attack 280400, with Regts in column, 47th Inf leading. Objective, direction of attack, boundaries, See overlay.
3.
 - a. 47th Inf will start attack from assembly areas, securing high ground of Y3160 - Y3361 and objective.
39th Inf follow attack by bounds behind 47th Inf and will be committed only on Division order.
 - b. Field Arty. Support attack.
 - (1) 26th F A Bn and 17th F A (-1st Bn) direct support of 47th Inf.
 - (2) 84th and 34th F A Bns. - general support.
 - (3) One half of Div Arty will be capable of reinforcing the fires of the Arty of the 1st Inf Div.
 - (4) Registration prior to attack from new positions prohibited.
 - (5) Hq & Btry "A" 107th CA Bn (AA) (with Btry B 106th CA Bn (AA) attached) attached to 9th Inf Div Arty.
 - c. 894th TD Bn. under Div control move 271900 to assembly area by route indicated. Mission, Div reserve.
 - d. 15th Engr Bn
 - (1) Be prepared to execute any desired demolitions on Div order.
 - (2) Be prepared to detect and remove any mine fields encountered.
4. Adm Instructions - See Adm O # 12
5.
 - a. Sig. - See Index 1A-4 SOI
 - b. Div C.P. - See overlay.
 - c. Axis Sig Com EL GUETTAR - B. ZELLOUDJA
 - x. Rad silence for stations moving to new locations until 280400.

EDDY
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

SUNDIN
G-3




MAP: TUNISIA 1:200,000
(GAFSA SHEET #17
EL AYACHA SHEET #18)

ANNEX #1 TO ACCOMPANY FO #16
27 MARCH 1943

OFFICIAL:
Sundin
SUNDIN
G-3

EDDY
COM'DG



Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials :
Date : 27 March 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
271600, March 1943

F O #16 (Corrected Copy)

MAPS: TUNISIA, 1:200,000

1.
 - a. See overlay.
 - b. See overlay.
2. This Div will attack at 280600, 47th Inf leading, followed by 1st Bn, 39th Inf. Objective, direction of attack, boundaries - See overlay.
3.
 - a. 47th Inf will start attack from positions occupied by 280600, securing high ground of Y3160 - Y3361 and objective.
1st Bn, 39th Inf follow attack by bounds behind 47th Inf and will be committed only on Div order.
39th Inf (less 1st Bn) Co "A" 15th Engr Bn attached will be motor-ized and held in mobile reserve vicinity EL GUETTAR.
 - b. Field Arty - Support attack.
 - (1) 26th F A Bn and 17th F A (-1st Bn) direct support of 47th Inf.
 - (2) 84th F A and 34th F A Bns - general support.
 - (3) One half of Div Arty will be capable of reinforcing fires of the Arty of the 1st Div.
 - (4) Registration prior to attack from new positions prohibited.
 - (5) Hq & Btry A 107th CA Bn(AA) (with Btry B 106th CA Bn(AA) attached) attached to 9th Inf Div Arty.
 - c. 894th TD Bn under Div Control move 27 March to assembly area by route indicated, mission Div reserve.
 - d. 15th Engr Bn
 - (1) Be prepared, on Div order, to repair bridges and craters and remove any mine fields encountered.
 - (2) Co A, 15th Engr Bn attached to 39th Inf (less 1st Bn)
4. Adm Instructions - See Adm O #12
5.
 - a. Sig - See Index 1A-4 SOI
 - b. Div C.P. - See overlay
 - c. Axis Sig Com EL GUETTAR - B. ZELLOUJJA
 - x. Rad silence for stations moving to new locations until 280400.

EDDY
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

SUNDIN
G-3

SECRET

A P P E N D I X "B"

T e r r a i n S t u d y o n

El Guettar Campaign

TERRAIN STUDY - EL GUETTAR CAMPAIGN

1. Purpose and Other Limiting Considerations.

a. This study, prepared primarily to accompany the official report of the tactical operations of the 9th Infantry Division (reinforced) (less detachments) during the engagements southeast of El Guettar, covers the general area south of the El Guettar-Gabes road and between the 25 and 45 north and south grid lines. The map employed is Tunisia 1/100,000, El Ayacha Sheet.

b. The mission of the command was to capture the high ground south of the pass approximately 13 miles southeast of El Guettar and to seize, in conjunction with the 1st Infantry Division on the left, an objective east of the pass.

c. The enemy capabilities in the area were believed to be as follows:

(1) To defend the high ground on either side of the pass in conformity with his usual tactical doctrine.

(2) To counterattack northwest through the pass.

(3) To withdraw to the east.

d. The decision of the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division was to attack the hill mass at the eastern extremity of Djebel Berda from the west, successively reducing the various ridges, djebels, and hills which constitute that hill mass, preparatory to advancing over the eastern plain.

2. General Topography of the Area.

a. Drainage system. There are no streams in the area but there are a large number of dry stream beds, or wadis, which played an important part in the operation.

b. Ridge system. The main hill mass in the area is the Djebel Berda. The eastern extremities of this djebel are extremely complicated in conformation and played an important part in the operation. The dominating peak is Hill 772. Other heights of importance are Draa Saada El Hamra extending northeast from Hill 772 and terminating on Hill 290; Djebel Lettouchi, which terminates at its southern extremity on Hill 361 and Djebel El Kreroua, which terminates at its eastern extremity on Hill 369. All elevations are in meters.

c. Routes.

(1) Railroads. None.

(2) Roads. One improved, in excellent condition, runs southeast El Guettar in the direction of Gabes. Just east of Hill 369 an unimproved road in fair condition turns off to the southeast. The map indicates various tracks crossing Djebel Berda from northwest to southeast. These are not in existence, but many tracks of similiar type criss-cross the high ground in every direction.

d. General Nature of the Terrain. The area may be sharply sub-divided into the mountainous sub-area included at Djebel Berda and its spurs to the east, and the flat plain to the north. The mountainous area is steep, rugged, badly eroded into numerous difficult gorges, and almost completely destitute of vegetation. The plain is perfectly flat desert, also without vegetation, and cut with dry wadis.

3. Military Aspects of the Terrain.

a. The plain.

(1) The main highway previously mentioned bisects this area from northwest to southeast. There are also many cross-country tracks leading in many directions.

(2) There are no serious obstacles to cross-country movement in the area.

(3) The only cover and concealment in the area is that afforded by the dry wadis.

(4) Observation is excellent over the entire area.

(5) Fields of fire for all weapons are excellent.

(6) The area lends itself readily to mechanized operations. It does not favor defensive dispositions.

b. Djebel Berda.

(1) There are no routes of communication in this area except those afforded by numerous difficult trails. The numerous gulches and valleys afford many avenues of approach, but these are habitually dominated by the high ground along their borders.

(2) The area abounds in natural obstacles and lends itself admirably to defense by weak forces. In addition the Germans had improved that natural strength of the position by extensive mine fields, and by weapons and personnel emplacements, especially in the vicinity of Hills 290 and 369, and other eastern spurs of the djebel.

(3) Excellent concealment and cover are available. This in general favors the defensive since offensive operations are necessarily limited by the great difficulties of maintaining direction through the extremely complicated ground forms which exist, and the physical difficulty of scaling the heights, many of which are nearly precipitous.

(4) Observation, especially from the highest peaks and from Hill 369 to the northwest, is excellent. Possession of these heights therefore is essential in either offensive or defensive operations.

(5) Fields of fire are generally excellent.

(6) In general the djebel, and particularly the eastern extremity thereof, is a natural fortress capable of being defended by minimum forces for an indefinite period.

4. Critical Terrain Features. The critical terrain features in the area for either combatant are as follows:

a. Hill 772 which dominates the entire area, and from which, like spokes from a hub, radiate the three important spurs of Draa Saada El Hamra, Djebel El Kreroua, and Djebel Lettouchi,

b. Hill 290 which blocks the western entrance to the El Guettar pass.

c. Hill 369 which completely controls the valley between it and Draa Saada El Hamra and also, while in the hands of a defender, prohibits the passage of mechanized or other troops through the pass.

5. Tactical Effects of the Terrain. An attempt to capture Draa Saada El Hamra (including Hill 290) or Djebel El Kreroua (including Hill 369) by a direct assault against their northwestern faces, considering the necessity of approach across the open plain and valley, will be almost certain to result in costly failure. Each of these ridges, together with Djebel Lettouchi, should be attacked by first gaining a foothold on their westernmost extremities, and then progressing along their summits. Furthermore the attack on all three ridges must be made by suitable forces simultaneously, since they are all mutually supporting. Before such an operation is begun, however, Hill 772 must be in the hands of the attacker, since this height controls all the observation in the area. The sequence of advance should be, therefore, (1) the capture of Hill 772 and, (2) a simultaneous attack along the crests of Draa Saada El Hamra, Djebel El Kreroua and Djebel Lettouchi, with the object of capturing Hills 290, 369, and 361.

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A P P E N D I X "C"

Report on Artillery Operations

(Section #29 of El Guettar Report)

ARTILLERY REPORT

1. GENERAL. Units of the 9th Division Artillery (less the 60th F.A. Bn. which had been detached) moved on 25-26 March to bivouac areas in the vicinity of Gafsa. Unit commanders made map and terrain reconnaissance 26 March, but, upon returning to the Artillery CP, which had been established in the palm grove at El Guettar, they were informed that the attack had been postponed 24 hours, and that units would remain in bivouac for the night 26-27 March.

During the day of 27 March, the unit commanders continued reconnaissance, and at 1300, the 26th F.A. Bn., followed by the 2nd Bn., 17th F.A., moved to the south and east around Chott El Guettar to a bivouac in wadis south of the Chott. At dusk they occupied the positions that had been previously selected. The 84th F.A. Bn. had been supporting the 1st Division. They remained in their same positions and shifted their support to the 9th Division. The 34th F.A. Bn. left their bivouac at dusk and followed the 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry, to positions along the Gafsa-Gabes Road.

2. REPORT.

a. 28 MARCH. All positions were thoroughly dug in and preparations were made to support the attack at 0600, 28 March. No registration was permitted until after 0600, and radio silence was ordered until that time. The 2nd Bn., 17th F.A., and the 26th F.A. Bn. were placed in direct support of the 47th Infantry. The 84th F.A. Bn. was placed in general support along with the 34th F.A. Bn. 150 rounds of ammunition was ordered dumped at the gun positions, and the trains were to be replenished at the Gafsa Dp. immediately.

No plan of offensive fires was permitted by the situation. All units sent forward observers out to be in position to support the attack by observed fire. The firing throughout the day was light. Some battery positions were located and fired upon. At 0835 the Commanding Officer, 26th F.A. Bn., requested permission to displace forward. This was granted and Battery "A" was sent forward. This battery was shelled while on the road but no damage was done and the battery occupied the position. Later the remainder of the Battalion moved to the new position. No other unit moved forward throughout the day. Harassing fires were fired throughout the night on lines of communication.

b. 29 MARCH. Early on the morning of this date the attack was continued. The enemy was driven back along the entire line. Artillery fire delivered was considerably increased and was reported as very effective. Battery "C" of the 34th F.A. Bn. which had moved forward at 0300 to positions in the vicinity of 30698-68156, was heavily shelled throughout the day. Enemy artillery registered on each gun and tried to knock the battery out. Damage was very slight, one two-and-one-half ton truck of the AA being destroyed. The advance was again halted by the enemy, and the positions were stabilized for the night. The enemy was continually harassed

by our artillery fire throughout the night. The Division and Division Artillery CPs were harassed by enemy planes throughout the night, their planes being overhead at least eight consecutive times through the night. Battery "C" established a dummy position at the point where they were shelled and moved about 500 yards to a new position.

c. 30 MARCH. The morning of this date a planned 20-minute offensive fire was prepared to launch the infantry attack at 0600. Requests were made to Corps Artillery for additional artillery support, and the 178th F.A. Bn (155 howitzers) and the 1st Bn., 17th F.A. (155 howitzers) and the 1st Bn, 36th F.A. (155 gun) were assigned to assist in the preparation. Fifteen battalion concentrations and six battery concentrations were placed on Djebel Kreroua, Djebel Lettouchi and some fire on Hill 369. The infantry advanced and were able to take part of Djebel Lettouchi. They were then driven from their position by a determined enemy counter-attack. Continued heavy fighting was experienced during the day. Throughout the day the enemy artillery fired on the dummy position established by Battery "C", 34th F.A. Bn. They hit a can of gasoline left at the position and started a fire. This was evidently taken as a hit on a battery, for the enemy continued to shell the position throughout the day and waste a large amount of ammunition. Survey of the front lines by the artillery survey party proved that the infantry had not reached their objective. Bombing of the Division and Division Artillery CPs continued throughout the night. Mostly the raids were of a harassing nature and were continuous throughout the night.

d. 31 MARCH. The action was very light this date. The infantry attempted to filter through enemy lines. The artillery fired very few rounds most of which were fired on targets of opportunity and harassing missions. Enemy air activity was almost continuous throughout most of the day. The attacks were mainly of a harassing nature and were very ineffective. The Division CP and Division Artillery CP were again harassed continuously throughout the night by enemy planes circling and dropping flares and bombs. Damage was slight and effect was poor as personnel had learned to sleep in trenches. An amusing incident of the day was the surrender of 100 Italians to one man from the 34th F.A. Bn.

e. 1 APRIL. On this date the action continued to be light. Enemy tanks were reported several times throughout the day. Several of these were destroyed by artillery fire at maximum ranges. The 34th F.A. destroyed one 88mm gun, and the 26th F.A. Bn. fired on enemy personnel with excellent effect. The day was marked by considerable shelling by enemy artillery and by considerable air activity. The CPs of Division and Division Artillery were again harassed during the night, but on a decreased scale.

f. 2 APRIL. Enemy tank activity increased, and the result was a large number destroyed by artillery fire. The 26th F.A. Bn. destroyed at least eight tanks during the day. Also a number of trucks were destroyed, in addition to a large quantity of enemy equipment. The day's action, if it did nothing else, proved the effectiveness of 105mm fire against tanks at extreme ranges, practically the entire day's firing being at ranges of 10,000 to 12,000 yards. This was true of the entire engagement, due to the lack of cover afforded by the terrain at closer ranges. On the night of 2 April, the Division Artillery survey section surveyed the front lines by firing rockets and triangulating them in. Results were excellent and

the front line battalions were definitely located. The infantry had not reached their objective.

g. 3 APRIL. Firing was normal throughout the day and the enemy seemed to be withdrawing. Fighting was heavy throughout the afternoon, and the artillery fired a considerable number of rounds in a preparation at 1600. The infantry advanced and was able to sieze Djebel Lettouchi. At 1800 the 26th F.A. Bn. was heavily bombed by a flight of 18 JU-88s; 4 ME-109s, and 8 FW-190s. Damage consisted of one 2½-ton slightly damaged and six slight casualties. Reports indicated that our fighter planes and anti-aircraft were very effective, shooting down 14 enemy planes. A point of interest was the attempt of the 4 ME-109s to draw off the Spitfire cover by making a diving attack at another point prior to the attack by the bombers. The Spitfires did not fall for the trap. The 34th F.A. Bn. moved Battery "C" to a new position at 3341-6929.

h. 4 APRIL. This date was again marked by considerable activity by the artillery, the 26th F.A. Bn. again having a field day. During the day it destroyed five tanks, an ammunition dump and several trucks. The 34th F.A. Bn. fired on motor vehicles starting several fires and fired on tanks several times during the day, dispersing the tanks. The air patrol of the day consisted of eighteen P-51s which met no resistance. Air activity definitely had decreased and remained that way for the duration of the engagement.

i. 5 APRIL. Considerable enemy activity was reported throughout the day. Many of the reports were confusing and probably referred to our own tanks. A concentration of about 75 enemy tanks was reported and Corps requested fire of all units placed on it. No artillery observer was available to observe this concentration and it was never verified that it existed. Results were not determined. Division Artillery was prepared to fire on selected concentrations throughout the night to prevent a possible counter-attack. No attack developed and concentrations were not fired. As a whole the firing throughout the day was light.

j. 6 APRIL. Reports began to indicate that the enemy was withdrawing. Firing was on a reduced scale. Enemy tanks and vehicles were reported as moving east toward Gabes. The infantry began an advance on Hill 369 supported by artillery. The tank force also moved forward. Reports indicated that Hill 369 had been abandoned.

k. 7 APRIL. All troops started to move forward. Little if any resistance was encountered. By 1200 Djebel Berda, Hill 772, was taken and troops continued the advance. Djebel Lettouchi was occupied, and at 1518 the tanks of Benson's force were reported in rear of Hill 369. Shortly after this Hill 369 fell, and Benson's force was moving east. At 1705 Benson's force contacted the British 8th Army at 5885, and the Battle of El Guettar was over. At 1730 the 34th F.A. Bn. was ordered to move from their present position to concealed bivouac at Bou Chebka. The Division Artillery Headquarters, the 26th F.A. Bn. and the 84th F.A. Bn. followed the morning of 8 April.

3. AMMUNITION EXPENDED. During the Battle of El Guettar, the units of

the 9th Infantry Division Artillery and attachments fired the following amounts of ammunition:

26th F.A. Bn.	-	14092
84th F.A. Bn.	-	7775
2nd Bn., 17th F.A.	-	5732
34th F.A. Bn.	-	<u>3784</u>
		31583

This does not include the large number of rounds fired by the 1st Division Artillery, and the 13th F.A. Brigade in their excellent support of the Division upon the occasions required.

#

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~~BY AUTHORITY OF
CG, 9TH INF DIV.
INITIALS
DATE~~

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② 15-62

Headquarters Ninth Infantry Division

APP No 9

Classification changed to

RESTRICTED

30 AUG 1944

by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDGS

by *[Signature]*

REPORT ON OPERATION

CONDUCTED BY

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION


UNITED STATES ARMY

NORTHERN TUNISIA

11 APRIL - 8 MAY 1943

E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

~~RESTRICTED~~



HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION

A.P.O. # 9

Report on the Operation


conducted by

THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION, U.S.A.

in

Northern Tunisia

11 April - 8 May 1943



HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
A. P. O. # 9

10 September 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Operations.

TO : The Adjutant General, U.S.Army, Washington, D.C.

THRU : Commanding General, II Corps, APO #302

Section I - Authority
Section II - General
Section III - Operations
Section IV - Results of Operations
Section V - Supply and Evacuation
Section VI - Summary
Section VII - Appendices

(A) Field Orders
(B) Terrain Study
(C) Artillery Report
(D) Map

Section VIII - Annex - Reports on Combat Experience
and Battle Lessons for
Training Purposes.

SECTION I - AUTHORITY

1. In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, a report on the operations conducted by the 9th Infantry Division in northern Tunisia from 11 April to 8 May is hereby submitted.

SECTION II - GENERAL

2. Preceding Operation. The last operation of the 9th Infantry Division preceding that described in this report was in southern Tunisia, near El Guettar, and terminated 8 April 1943.

3. Troops Employed for Allied Offensive in Northern Sector. The 1st and 8th British Armies, and the II U.S. Corps, all under direct command of 18th Army group, were employed in the Allied offensive in the northern sector.

a. The 1st and 8th British Armies included nine British infantry divisions, three British armored divisions, and four French infantry divisions.

b. The II U.S. Corps consisted of three infantry divisions and one armored division, and some 4000 French volunteers and native troops. A fourth infantry division was arriving when the operation ended.

c. The 9th Infantry Division consisted of the following:

ASSIGNED

39th Infantry
~~47th Infantry~~
~~60th Infantry~~
9th Signal Company
9th Medical Battalion
9th Quartermaster Company
9th Reconnaissance Troop
15th Engineer Battalion
709th Ordnance Company
Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery
Hq. & Hq. Company, 9th Infantry Division
26th F.A. Battalion
34th F.A. Battalion
60th F.A. Battalion
84th F.A. Battalion
Military Police Platoon

ATTACHED

91st Reconnaissance Squadron
434th C.A. Battalion (AA)
185th F.A. Bn. (155mm how.) (with 1 Btry. 107th C.A. (AA) attached)
62nd F.A. Battalion
36th F.A. (1 Battery 155mm guns)
Battery "H" - 67th C.A. (AA)
894th Tank Destroyer Battalion
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion (attached 26 April-4 May)
Company "C" - 751st Tank Battalion (attached 5 May-18 May)
20th Engineers (attached 8 May - 20 May)
Corps Franc d'Afrique, consisting of
(a) 3 Infantry Battalions
(b) 1 Marine Battalion
(c) 4 Tabours of Goums

4. Directives. Under authority letter, HQ 18th Army Group, 26 March 1943, to Commanding General II Corps, the 9th Infantry Division was designated to move upon completion of the El Guettar battle to the Sedjenane sector in northern Tunisia, where it was to relieve the 46th British Infantry Division which, at that time, was a part of the V British Corps of the 1st British Army. The 9th Division was later again placed under control of II American Corps on 18 April.

5. Corps Objectives. II Corps was to capture the high ground east and west of Choigui and protect the left flank of British V Corps; capture the Bald and Green Hill positions, exploiting toward Mateur, and seize the high ground dominating RJ 5094. II Corps was then to (a) secure suitable positions for the attack on Bizerte, covering the left flank of 1st Army, and (b) to advance and capture Bizerte, with the cooperation of 1st Army on right flank.

6. Command. II U.S. Corps was to remain under 18th Army Group, but for these operations the actions of II U.S. Corps were to be co-ordinated by British 1st Army, which would issue necessary instructions and orders direct.

7. Commanders. During this operation II Corps was commanded by Major General Omar N. Bradley, who had replaced Lt.-Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. The 9th Infantry Division was commanded by Major General M.S. Eddy. All French troops attached to the 9th Division were commanded by General of Brigade Magnam.

8. Intelligence. Information available at the opening of this operation seemed to indicate that the enemy was weak in artillery (10-15 pieces only was the estimate) and that tanks (some two dozen were reported in reserve on the plains southwest of Tunis) would be used as mobile artillery. His morale was not high except in a few units, but he was intensively organized for defense, with key high ground protected by mine fields and good fields of fire. No strategic infantry reserves were believed to be available.

The Germans held three principal positions in the area, all astride natural approaches. They were (1) the Jefna position, of which Djebel Azzag (3877) (Green Hill), and Djebel Ajred (3872) (Bald Hill) were the main features, heavily fortified and completely dominating approaches along the main and only road from the west and the valley through which it led. (The British had assaulted these hills three times unsuccessfully.) (2) high ground commanding the head of the Sedjenane Valley approximately along grid line 33, of which Djebel Ainchouna (3281) and Djebel Dardys (3489) were the principal features; and (3) the high ground astride a secondary road to the north, of which Ac es Zapa (4295) and Djebel Touro (4397) were the principal features. Field Order #20 issued by this Headquarters (see Appendix "A") indicates the extent of the knowledge of enemy forces in our possession prior to the opening of this operation.

9. Terrain Study. A fully detailed study of the terrain over which this operation was fought is attached hereto as Appendix "B".

10. Division Objectives. The initial Division objectives were to capture the enemy position at Djebel Ajred, J3775, as the first objective,

and RJ J4983 as the second objective, and then to exploit in the direction of Mateur. The Division was also to seize the high ground dominating RJ J5094. The Corps Franc d'Afrique, attached to the Division, was to seize this latter objective.

11. Previous Operations in This Sector. The British 46th Division, which the 9th Infantry Division relieved, consisted of but two brigades, and had been holding positions generally west of the 27 grid line, and between the 73 and 83 grid lines for some weeks following a successful advance from the west.

12. Movement Into Position. The first elements of the 9th Division left the Bou Chebka area on 9 April, proceeding to Roumes Souk, and during the period 12-16 April the relief of the British 46th Division was completed. The 47th Infantry was first to go in, relieving the southern (138th) brigade of the British 46th Division generally astride the main road at 0200 hours the morning of 13 April. On 14 April, at 0400 hours, the 2nd Platoon of the 9th Reconnaissance Troop moved from their CP (which was established $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Sedjenane) to the vicinity of Bazina, Tunisia, where it relieved the British 46th Reconnaissance Squadron at 0500, with the mission of counter-reconnaissance in the vicinity of Bazina. At noon of the same date, Company "F" of the 47th Infantry was sent to occupy Djebel Tabouna; and on the night of 15-16 April the 39th Infantry relieved the northern brigade of the British 46th Division, just south of the Sedjenane Valley. The 60th Infantry, the last to arrive from the south, was held in concealed bivouac well to the rear just west of Djebel Abiod, until 19 April.

13. Plan of Attack.

a. The Division commander early decided that a frontal assault on the Green-Bald Hill position would be so costly as to be unwarranted. He therefore decided on a scheme of maneuver, whereby the bulk of the Division would be employed in a wide flanking movement through the extremely difficult terrain to the north of the main road, with the object of outflanking the hostile positions and cutting the enemy's lines of communications to the north and northeast. It was realized from the start that such a maneuver would be hampered by the almost total lack of communication throughout the area to be traversed. However, it was anticipated that the Germans would not suspect the attempt of a maneuver of this difficulty provided that our troops could be moved into position without their presence being disclosed. Secrecy therefore, was an essential in order to preserve the element of surprise.

b. In preparation for the attack a meticulous study of the terrain was made, and dominating observation was selected for each of the intermediate objectives to be captured by each regiment each day. While each of these objectives was not always captured on the planned dates, most of them were eventually occupied, and in every case such occupation proved decisive in outflanking the German resistance encountered.

c. It was decided that on the extreme left (north) flank the French troops would move forward between the 60th Infantry on their right and the coast of the Mediterranean, through an area where it was believed the resistance would be the least. One of their main objectives was the seizure of the dominating observation afforded by Kef en Nsour.

d. The 60th Infantry, moving forward by stages under cover of darkness, commencing on the night of 19-20 April, was to initiate its attack from an area generally west of the 30 grid line and north of the Sedjenane Valley. It was assigned four intermediate objectives and one final objective to be captured within a period of five days. Its final objective completely dominated the main north-and-south road.

e. The 39th Infantry, moving forward a short distance to the area generally west of the 28 grid line and south of the Sedjenane Valley, was to attack for the capture of three intermediate objectives and one final objective in a period of five days. Its final objective likewise completely dominated the main road.

f. The 47th Infantry, moving forward to the area just west of the 32 grid line and astride the main road, would conduct a holding attack against the enemy's main position atop Green and Bald Hills. It would employ one battalion on its right (south) flank for a limited objective attack on D-day, but no serious attempt was to be made for the reduction of the German main position until the advance of the 39th and 60th Infantry had outflanked these positions to the northeast.

g. The 1st American Infantry Division would occupy the position on the right (south) flank of the 9th Division, but there would be a gap of some $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles separating the two units. To fill this gap the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was to relieve Company "P" of the 47th Infantry on Djebel Tabouna and the 9th Reconnaissance Troop in the vicinity of Bazina, and be employed with instructions to maintain contact with the 47th Infantry on the north and the 1st Infantry Division on the south. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was also instructed to reconnoiter actively and vigorously to the east in an effort to divert the attention of the Germans from the north.

h. The extreme width of the front, approximately 28 miles, posed a difficult problem for the Artillery Commander, who would be forced to scatter his units widely. As a solution the light battalions were employed in their normal roles in direct support of the three infantry regiments, the 26th with the 39th Infantry, the 84th F.A. Bn. with the 47th Infantry, and the 60th F.A. Bn. with the 60th Infantry. The medium and heavy artillery were divided into two groups, one to be employed on the south and the other on the north. But even though the units were widely separated on this front, artillery control was centralized until the pursuit phase commenced. Many of the artillery positions were inadequately protected by

infantry, however, particularly in the Sedjenane Valley. In an effort to remedy this situation, the 9th Reconnaissance Troop, the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the Division Artillery and largely employed on protective missions in the Sedjenane Valley.

i. It was anticipated that supply difficulties to the north would be insurmountable without special arrangements. The French had reported with virtually no transportation. A small number of trucks were turned over to them from the Division pool. A total of three-hundred mules was obtained for supply purposes, and for several days the 39th Infantry and 60th Infantry were forced to rely on this means of transportation almost completely.

SECTION III - OPERATIONS

14. APRIL 11:

a. II Corps troops on the move northward for re-grouping and the beginning of a new offensive.

b. The 9th Division, with the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 434th CA Battalion (AA) attached, ordered to Roumes Souk from Tebessa this date.

15. APRIL 12:

a. On this date Field Order #19, Headquarters 9th Infantry Division, was issued, directing the Division to relieve the 46th British Division in place in the Sedjenane sector. The 4th British Division was to be on our right, and the 3rd Battalion Corps Franc d'Afrique (attached to the 9th Division) in the Cape Serrat area on our left. (A copy of this Field Order is attached hereto in Appendix "A".)

b. The forward CP moved to Djebel Abiod from Bou Chebka.

16. APRIL 13:

a. The 60th RCT rejoined the 9th Division, arriving in bivouac at Bou Chebka by midnight this date, less one infantry battalion.

b. At 0200 hours this date the 47th Infantry relieved the southern (138th) brigade of the British 46th Division.

17. APRIL 14:

a. At 0400 hours this date the 2nd Platoon of the 9th Reconnaissance Troop moved to the vicinity of Bazina, Tunisia, where it relieved the British 46th Reconnaissance Squadron at 0500.

b. At noon this date Company "F" of the 47th Infantry was sent to occupy Djebel Tabouna.

c. The battalion of the 60th RCT which had remained at Maknassy area to police the battlefield, arrived at Bou Chebka by midnight this date.

d. At the same time, the detail of 100 officers and men policing the El Guettar battlefield arrived at Bou Chebka and were attached to the 60th CT for the move north.

18. APRIL 15:

a. Little activity. The 84th F.A. Battalion fired seven missions (290 rounds) with excellent effect.

b. The 39th Infantry relieved the northern brigade of the British 46th Division, just south of the Sedjenane Valley, this night.

19. APRIL 16:

a. The 60th RCT arrived at Roumes Souk 5:30 p.m. The plan was to move north on the 18-19 April.

b. The 28th Signal (Radio Intelligence) Company was attached.

20. APRIL 17:

a. 91st Reconnaissance attached to the 9th Division.

21. APRIL 18:

a. At 1800 hours II Corps assumed command of all troops within Corps boundary, relieving British V Corps of this command.

b. The 60th RCT moved from Roumes Souk to a concealed bivouac west of Djebel Abiod.

c. British Stirling, Halifax and Lancaster bombers operated at night in this area.

22. APRIL 19:

a. This night two battalions of the 60th RCT moved forward under cover of darkness so as to be in the vicinity of 1177 by daylight

of 20 April.

23. APRIL 20:

a. Continuing its move forward stage by stage the 60th RCT moved again this night beginning at 1930 hours so that by daylight 21 April two battalions would be in the vicinity of 2288 and one battalion in the vicinity of 1177.

b. 9th Division Headquarters (Forward echelon) closed its CP at 2000 hours and arrived in the new area vicinity of Sedjenane at 2230 hours.

c. Field Order #20, Headquarters 9th Infantry Division, was issued this date, and put the 1st American Division on our right for the pending operation, instead of the 4th British Division as recorded in Field Order #19. (Copies of Field Orders #19 and #20, as well as Annex #1 and Annex #2, are attached hereto in Appendix "A").

24. APRIL 21:

a. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, covering the $6\frac{1}{2}$ -mile gap between the 9th Infantry Division, and the 1st Division on its right (south), received urgent instructions from Division G-2: "You will actively and vigorously push reconnaissance tonight (21-22 April). Enemy capable of attack at any time. Little contact over entire sector all day."

b. Timed to reach its assembly area by daylight 22 April, the 60th RCT moved out after dark on foot, on the final stage of its move into position.

25. APRIL 22:

a. By daylight this date all units were in their attack positions and all plans had been perfected.

b. Command of the north sector reverted to the Commanding Officer (General of Brigade Magnan) Corps Franc d'Afrique, effective on the opening of the CP, CFA, this morning. (Corps Franc had previously been attached to 60th Infantry.)

26. APRIL 23:

a. The attack started at 0530 this date. By 1100 it was reported that all regiments had reached their D-day objectives with little opposition. Orders were issued accordingly to press on to the D-plus-1 objectives.

b. It later developed that this satisfactory report was true on the north and south flanks. It was not true in the center where the 39th Infantry had encountered heavy resistance on the dominating hill, Djebel Ainchouna. By nightfall, its leading elements were in a state of confusion and had only reach the lower slopes of the Djebel.

c. Col. J. Trimble Brown was relieved as commander of the 39th Infantry and Brigadier General Donald A. Stroh, Assistant Division Commander, assumed command until such a time as the requested replacement could be received from II Corps.

d. During the afternoon the 60th Infantry on the left, meeting increased terrain difficulties but little opposition, reached a point about mid-way between their D-day and D-plus-1 objectives.

e. The Corps Franc d'Afrique by evening of the first day was held up by resistance on Hill 107 (3493).

D+1

27. APRIL 24: On this date the Corps Franc, with the support of an additional battalion of light artillery, captured Hill 107, where enemy resistance had been encountered the previous day.

b. The 60th Infantry occupied Djebel Dardyss (3489). Progress however was slow because of the steepness of the hills and the thickness of the vegetation, which was so bad at times that the men had to crawl on hands and knees to penetrate it.

c. A German force estimated at a battalion counter-attacked the 2nd Battalion of the 60th Infantry in an effort to retake the hill. They were beaten off by rifle and machine-gun fire, and a later advance by the 60th over the ground the enemy had occupied revealed a count of 116 enemy dead in the area.

d. The 39th Infantry resumed its attack on Ainchouna and reached the summit. Here its leading battalion was seriously opposed by heavy enemy fire from the north and east. Several senior officers became casualties and it was only by the superior leadership of a junior captain (Capt. Conrad V. Anderson) that the battalion was able to retain its precarious hold on the mountain.

e. The 47th Infantry, in accordance with plan, made no advance during the day.

f. Activities on the front of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron were again limited to patrol action.

28. APRIL 25:

a. On this date the situation on the north flank indicated the possibility of a German counter-attack. This did not materialize.

b. The 60th Infantry held their position during this day, moving

up supplies and preparing an advance on 26 April.

c. The Corps Franc likewise held their positions.

d. The 39th Infantry, employing a fresh battalion and with excellent field artillery support, completed the occupation of the summit of Djebel Ainchouna, driving out strong German defense forces.

e. The 47th Infantry advanced two companies about a mile to the east without serious difficulty and seized Hills 502 and 598.

f. The fall of Ainchouna deprived the Germans of much of their observation over Sedjenane Valley. It was possible thereafter to push reconnaissance with mechanized elements well to the east in this valley.

29. APRIL 26: D+3

a. By this date it was evident that the Corps Franc was not sufficiently powerful to continue its advance abreast of the 60th Infantry and to reach the eastern exit of the Sedjenane Valley.

b. Division G-2 reported prisoner-of-war information indicating the presence of an enemy position on Djebel Cheniti.

c. The direction of the advance of the 60th Infantry was accordingly changed toward the northeast, to assist the Corps Franc by outflanking the Ac es Zapa (4295) and Djebel Touro (4397) position from the south.

d. The 39th Infantry was to continue its enveloping movement to the east and southeast.

e. The above plan resulted in divergent attacks on the part of these two regiments with an ever-widening gap on their interior flanks. While such a gap implied a serious element of danger, it was felt that the Germans could not counter-attack through it with any degree of strength.

f. The 39th Infantry advanced two battalions to Djebel El Akrat (3480) the D-plus-1 objective of this regiment, thus resuming the step-by step advance as planned.

g. Activity in the 47th Infantry zone was limited to patrolling in the direction of Green-Bald Hills where it was ascertained that no signs of German withdrawal were yet evident. Apparently he had not yet become alarmed by the progress of our enveloping forces.

h. Col. William L. Ritter was assigned to the 39th Infantry this date as Regimental Commander.

30. APRIL 27: D+4

a. Little progress was made on 27 April except in the zone of the 39th Infantry where a battalion was successfully advanced to the Hill 382, Ridge, 3681. This resulted in the regiment's being disposed in column of battalions from east to west, with the 2nd Battalion on Hill 382, Ridge, 3681; the 3rd Battalion on Djebel El Akrat; and the 1st Battalion on Djebel Ainchouna.

b. German reaction to the advance of the 39th Infantry now became marked and the 2nd Battalion, which continued to hold this position for the next week, was constantly subjected to mortar and artillery fire.

31. APRIL 28: D+5

a. By this date supply difficulties in the zone of the 60th Infantry had become so serious that it was hoped to continue the advance to the northeast, close to the valley of the Sedjenane, along which a reasonably passable road led. Such an advance, however, neglected the capture of the dominating terrain to the east, principally that afforded by Kef en Nsour.

b. For the moment logistics triumphed over tactical operations, and the 60th Infantry was directed to move to the northeast, astride the river valley, with the Corps Franc advancing on their left.

c. The 60th was successful in occupying Kef Sahan, 3988, on this date.

d. During the afternoon the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, was moved from its position on Djebel Ainchouna by a circuitous route to the northeast and successfully occupied a position on Hill 377 (3783) preparatory to an advance the following day to Hill 406 (3882).

e. No change resulted in the disposition of the remaining elements of this regiment, nor in those of the 47th Infantry.

32. APRIL 29: D+6

a. On this date it became evident that the Germans were occupying in considerable force the dominant observation east of the zone of advance of the 60th Infantry, and that unless these observers were driven off the advance of the regiment would be impossible. Accordingly, plans were made to turn one battalion to the east against Kef en Nsour, which, it was hoped, could be reached by darkness this date. So great were the supply difficulties however, and so difficult the terrain that it sometimes required two days to progress a mile and bring up the supplies for further progress. Enemy resistance was not great but

Nature provided the greatest of impediments. The 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry, was unable to occupy Kef en Nsour for three days

b. The 39th Infantry on this date was preparing plans for a co-ordinated attack on Hill 406, which was to prove one of the turning points of the entire campaign.

c. The 47th Infantry in its zone continued patrol activity against Green and Bald Hills and succeeded in holding down the German fire from those hills with their own supporting weapons.

33. APRIL 30:

a. The attack of the 39th Infantry on Hill 406 on this date was completely successful. One battalion occupied this hill, and one pushed forward to the east as far as Spur 299 (3982) leaving one battalion on Hill 382. This area completely dominated the complicated terrain just to the south, as well as the road leading northwest toward the head of Sedjenane Valley. It was evidently in this area that the Germans had concentrated many of their supply dumps and other installation for the support of their Green-Bald Hill positions. With the dominant observation in our possession, effective shelling of these installations was possible. In a single day the 26th F.A. Battalion fired over 4,000 rounds with devastating effect. The main German defenses had now been outflanked and, the next day, their withdrawal to the northeast began.

b. Events in the 60th Infantry zone were moving satisfactorily. While the 3rd Battalion was still unable to advance against Kef En Nsour, the 1st Battalion occupied Djebel Guermach (4188) and prepared to advance one company to the east to assist the attack of the 3rd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, moving to the northeast, was abreast of the French on their left, and in a position to assist our allies in seizing the high ground at the eastern exit of the Sedjenane Valley.

c. The gap between the southern flank of the 60th Infantry and the northern flank of the 39th Infantry, because of their divergent attacks, had now been enlarged to about four miles. There were some indications that the Germans would take advantage of this gap, counter-attack through it toward the head of Sedjenane Valley, and relieve the pressure on their main positions. To meet such an eventuality, the light tank company of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was moved to the vicinity of 3086, and dismounted elements of the 9th Reconnaissance Troop, as well as the 894th and 601st Tank Destroyer Battalions, were placed in a defensive position on Djebel Mahata (3885).

d. The 47th Infantry had perfected plans and had made the necessary reconnaissance to move one battalion into the valley north of Green Hill, and to attack that hill from the north on 2 May in connection with the advance by the 39th Infantry.

34. MAY 1:

a. On this date orders were received from II Corps to suspend all further offensive action pending certain re-grouping on the remainder of the Corps front. Accordingly, plans for the attack on Green Hill were suspended and all units prepared to remain in the positions then occupied.

b. The only movement ordered on this day was that of the 9th Reconnaissance Troop from the head of the Sedjenane Valley to a zone on the south flank of the 47th Infantry, where it was to operate in conjunction with the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron in filling the gap between the 47th Infantry and the 34th Infantry Division, which had been committed on the north of the 1st Infantry Division on about 28 April.

c. The 39th Infantry was warned to hold its present position at all costs pending issuance of further instructions.

35. MAY 2:

a. On this date there were definite indications that the Germans were withdrawing in the direction of Mateur. The Corps commander directed that the 9th Division pursue vigorously to the northeast, leaving one infantry regiment to guard the approaches on the south.

b. The capture by the 60th Infantry of Ac es Zapa and Kef en Nsour caused the fall of Kef les Sba and Djebel Touro, and permitted the advance of Corps Franc d'Afrique to Djebel Cheniti.

c. The 39th Infantry was ordered to reorganize in the vicinity of its position (4680-4383) and prepare for movement.

d. A rapid advance was begun all along the line. Patrols were pushed forward and found a large amount of enemy equipment. Kef en Nsour was occupied without resistance.

36. MAY 3:

a. One battalion of the 39th was ordered to move to Hill (433813-435835); one battalion to Hill 299 (392823); and one battalion to maintain its position on Si Ahmed Ben Ali (3779). It was to patrol vigorously toward Hill 375 (389785) and be prepared to occupy it on further orders.

b. The advance all along the line continued.

c. The evening of this date the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Infantry moved by motor from 4092 in Sedjenane Valley, through the 60th Infantry to a position on the north flank at 405917.

37. MAY 4:

a. By 1100 hours this date the remainder of the 47th Infantry was assembled in the vicinity of J390921, preparing to attack to the east.

b. The Corps Franc, generally along the 53 grid line, had found the enemy in strength on Djebel Cheniti (5596), and was unable to advance.

c. The 60th Infantry assembled near the exit of the Sedjenane Valley, with the exception of one battalion which had gained a position on Dar Loubia (4892).

d. The 39th Combat Team, assembled in the area (4680-4383), was preparing to move to seize the main road junction to the east and to reconnoitre toward Mateur. The 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to this Combat Team.

e. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop and the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron were in their previous zones.

f. Company "A", 751st Medium Tank Battalion, having been attached to the Division, was moved to the vicinity of Sir Helia (4196).

g. The 185th F.A. Battalion was detached from us and returned to control of the 34th Infantry Division.

h. The artillery with the Division, less the 26th F.A. Battalion, which was attached to the 39th Infantry, had been moved as far forward as practicable toward the eastern exit of the Sedjenane Valley.

i. Having now advanced approximately 12 miles in 13 days, capturing a total of 815 prisoners together with much material and equipment, the Division had reached the last of the hills leading to Bizerte. It had captured both of its assigned objectives - the Green-Bald Hill area and the RJ at 5094.

j. The Division was now confronted with the difficult task of fighting its way out of these hills with extremely inadequate lines of communication. There was but a single road leading to the east from the Sedjenane Valley. Movements south of this road were totally impossible due to the Garet El Ichkeul. The hills north of the road as far as the seacoast were strongly held by the Germans. Progress on the road, even if it could be made under fire, was impossible for wheeled vehicles due to the fact that the bridge over the Oued Douimiss, on the 54 grid line, had been blown. In other words the Division was confronted with the necessity of advancing across an isthmus less than eight miles wide, with but a single road on the extreme south flank. Of the German positions confronting us, that on Cheniti appeared to be the most formidable. The Germans here adopted their usual tactics of holding strongly the exits of all bottlenecks.

38. MAY 5:

a. It was apparent that efforts must be made to fight for elbow room, to drive the Germans from Cheniti and the hills to the north, and to construct a new road to the northeast, along which artillery could be displaced and supplies moved as the attack progressed. It was fully recognized that a frontal assault on Cheniti would probably be unnecessarily costly, whereas an advance north of that hill might result in outflanking it and making its subsequent capture relatively easy.

b. Accordingly the 47th Infantry was directed to attack on this date for the capture of the line: Hill 131 (5898); Hill 158 (5999); Hill 125 (5700).

c. The attack of the 47th Infantry was begun early on this date, but by dark had made insufficient progress to warrant a direct attack on Cheniti.

d. The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, relieved elements of the Corps Franc west of Cheniti on the night of 5-6 May, and thoroughly reconnoitered approaches from the hill and position areas for supporting weapons.

39. MAY 6:

a. The attack of the 47th Infantry was resumed on this date, and by noon of this day had made sufficient progress to warrant a direct assault on Cheniti.

b. The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, assaulted the northwest slopes of Cheniti with the bayonet shortly after noon this date, the men following artillery concentrations at one hundred yards or less. The attack was completely successful, and by evening Hill 168 (5497) and the saddle between that hill and Hill 207 (5596) were in our possession.

40. MAY 7:

a. Early on this date the 47th Infantry continued its advance to the east against weak opposition and was soon in possession of its objective.

b. The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, completed the capture of Cheniti, and moved to the eastern edge of that ridge.

c. The 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry, moved east along the southern slopes of Cheniti and took position on Hill 114, which was reached without opposition.

d. The capture of Chenibi permitted the repair of the crossing over the Oued Douimiss. Prior to noon, Company "A" 751st Tank Battalion (M), and the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion passed this crossing, moved east and thence north under orders to reconnoiter the hills to the north and to overcome any opposition found therein.

e. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop moved east along the road to Bizerte, removing a mine-field at the road junction at 5796, and continued its reconnaissance to the east.

f. By mid-afternoon all indications pointed to the fact that the Germans not only had withdrawn on the Division front but had also evacuated Bizerte.

g. The mechanized force (Company "A", 751st Tank Battalion (M), and the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion) was ordered into town. They entered Bizerte at 1550. They encountered street sniping and were subjected to artillery fire from enemy positions across the channel to the southwest. They accordingly withdrew early on the night of 7 May to the vicinity of the airport.

h. Just before dark the 47th Infantry was directed to assemble and to move at once to the high ground northwest of Bizert. This move was completed shortly after midnight 7-8 May.

i. At the same hour, one battalion Corps Franc, which had been relieved by the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry and were assembled in reserve, was ordered into position on the left (east) flank of the 47th Infantry. The purpose being to extend to the French the courtesy of being the first to enter Bizerte.

j. The 39th Infantry Combat Team was attached to the 1st Armored Division for operations east of Mateur on this date.

41. MAY 8:

a. By daylight this date the French forces were along the northern exits of Bizerte.

b. The 60th Infantry was moved to the east and occupied the high ground generally along the 61 grid line.

c. On the afternoon of this date reports from II Corps indicated that a large force of Germans had been trapped on the peninsula southeast of Bizerte. Since this force was being attacked from the east, it was surmised that they might make a desperate attempt to escape across the channel into Bizerte. To meet such an eventuality, a provisional force consisting of the 47th Infantry, the Corps Franc, the 84th Field Artillery Battalion; Company "A" 751st Tank Battalion (M); and the 894th T.D. Battalion, was organized to defend the channel and the Mediterranean coast line east of Wadi Meragia.

e. The channel and the coast line in the vicinity of Bizerte was strongly defended with automatic weapons, artillery, and tank destroyer weapons. No attempt at crossing materialized.

42. MAY 9:

a. On this date, and for several more days, the 9th Reconnaissance Troop and infantry patrols thoroughly scoured the country northwest of Bizerte and brought in a few scattered prisoners discovered in that area.

b. The Sedjenane-Bizerte campaign was at an end.

SECTION IV -- RESULTS OF OPERATION

1. In this operation the 9th Division had successfully taken its assigned objectives with a minimum loss of life.

2. The 9th Division had demonstrated that it was able to take advantage of the lessons learned at El Guettar. It had substituted sweat for blood. It had maneuvered the Germans out of one position after another. The wide envelopment to the north undoubtedly came as a complete surprise to the enemy. With one exception when co-ordinated attacks became necessary, as at Ain-Chouna on 25 April, and Cheniti on 6 May, commanders were given ample time to make detailed plans and reconnaissance.

3. Finally, the infantry had learned the important lesson of following artillery concentration closely as was exemplified in the capture of Cheniti the last remaining German defensive position west of Bizerte.

SECTION V -- SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

1. ORDNANCE:

a. Units Serviced. Units serviced by the 9th Division Ordnance during this operation included the ten major units of the Division, and 8 attached units, including Tank Destroyer Battalions, Anti-aircraft Battalions, and the Corps Franc d'Afrique.

b. Vehicles Serviced. Vehicles serviced during this operation included all types of GI vehicles, plus French and English civil and military vehicles.

c. Maintenance. The odd jobs continued to roll in as before and were attended to as promptly as possible. Supports were welded on saddles for mule litter-carrying; a two and one-half ton truck radiator was rebuilt to fit a three-quarter-ton ambulance; sterilizers and an operating spotlight for the surgeon were made.

d. Supply. During this operation, a total of 800 truck tires and tubes were furnished.

e. Repair. A total of 257 major repair jobs (jobs requiring more than one and one-half hours) were done. Examples of this work are the replacement of the clutch on three-quarter-ton ambulance; the replacement of the suspension assembly in a half-track; and the replacement of the tracks on a light tank. An average of 80 guns were repaired per day.

f. Artillery Weapons. The number of artillery pieces in the Division was as follows:

	36	105mm howitzers
	12	155mm howitzers
	4	155mm guns (attached)
	12	75mm pack-howitzers
	18	105mm self-propelled howitzers (attached)
TOTAL	82	

g. Artillery Repair. There were a total of 18 major repair jobs done on artillery pieces.

h. Artillery Ammunition Expended. The artillery expended a total of 6,500 rounds of 155mm ammunition, and 40,500 rounds of 105mm ammunition.

i. Infantry Ammunition Expended. Infantry ammunition expenditure was as follows:

375,400 rounds	rifle ammunition
595,000 rounds	MG ammunition (.30 Cal. and .50 Cal.)
16,112 shells	mortar
248,000 rounds	Cal..45, automatic and sub-MG ammunition
7,300 -	hand grenades

j. Biggest days. The biggest days for expenditure of ammunition were as follows:

Mortars	23 April	4193 shells
105mm howitzers	29 April	6492 rounds
155mm howitzers	27 April	1029 rounds
Cal. .45	30 April	32,000 rounds
Hand grenades	30 April	3429 grenades

2. Quartermaster.

a. Point of Supply. During this operation, the 9th Division Quartermaster drew his supplies from the II Corps supply at Tabarka.

b. Rations. Rations furnished were as follows:

<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>Compo.</u>
494,673	443,555	38,915	19,114	3,822

c. Gas and Oil. Gas and oil furnished was as follows:

<u>V-80</u>	<u>V-87</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Diesel</u>
292,336 Gals.	5,415 Gals.	5,135 Gals.	580 Gals.

d. Lubricants furnished were as follows:

<u>Grease</u>	<u>Hypoid</u>
3,118 lbs.	745 Gals.

e. Forage. Forage furnished for the mules attached to the Medical detachments and to the Corps Franc d'Afrique was as follows:

<u>Hay</u>	<u>Barley</u>
22,977 lbs. ^{11 1/2 Tons}	85,416 lbs. ^{13 Tons}

f. PX Supplies. A total of 210,300 items of PX supply were issued.

g. British Rations. A total of 2,573 British "B" rations were issued.

3. Reconnaissance Troop.

a. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop during this operation was employed primarily on missions of patrolling and of filling gaps between attacking units for the purpose of protection against counter-attack.

b. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop operated effectively through mined areas, removing mine fields, and, after overcoming several obstacles, was able to move into Bizerte.

4. Military Police.

a. In this operation prisoner-of-war stations were established at Djebel Abiod, Sedjenane, Melaab el Koura, and Bizerte.

b. Four German prisoners of war were processed at Djebel Abiod before the battle began, and the total prisoners processed during the entire operation were:

German 446
Italian 1071

TOTAL - 1517

5. Graves Registration.

a. The first cemetery established for use by the 9th Division was the Tebarku Military Cemetery. Seven bodies were buried here.

b. The principal cemetery used for this operation was the "Regal Cemetery" at Sedjenane. A total of 92 were buried here. An additional 23 were buried just outside this cemetery, and were moved inside as the cemetery was expanded.

6. Automotive.

a. During this operation the Automotive Section, in conjunction with the Ordnance Company, did the work of both heavy and medium maintenance, as well as the light maintenance for which it is primarily equipped.

b. Servicing units, back of the lines, learned camouflage so well that not one vehicle was lost or damaged due to artillery fire or bombing.

c. Of the number of vehicles lost in this operation 50% were lost by mines; 20% by enemy fire; 20% by drivers' carelessness; 3% by blackout driving; and two percent to enemy aircraft fire.

7. Signal Operations.

a. Installations. Probably the most unusual feature of this operation was the extremely long wire lines, and the greatly extended frontage involved. For example, there was one case where there was a 32-mile circuit laid to Combat Team on the north and a 26-mile circuit laid to a Combat Team on the south. This is in the face of the fact that the usual distances to be expected are from 5 to 15 miles. Such extended distances, however, were characteristic of this particular operation. At times there were 1200 miles of wire on the ground.

b. Messages. In the most intense days of the battle, there were only four tactical messages sent in writing, while switchboard plugs were blowing from the heat. It had been the usual policy to divide the message load (via teletype, telegraph, telephone, etc.), but the possibility of instantly transmitting verbal instructions and reports side-tracked the other methods.

c. Obstacles. In one case, a butterfly bomb landed directly

on fifteen lines and cut them all. In 10 minutes, no less than 8 wire teams were untangling the mess, and, meanwhile, communications went on uninterrupted because a double set of wires had been installed at the beginning, as is the usual policy whenever possible.

d. Radio. Radio conditions were very strange at times because of the great lead content of the mountains. Large and usually very powerful sets were all but inoperative due to such mineral content.

e. Pigeon Service. There was a regular daily delivery of four birds from Corps, but they were not regularly used. One test message from Division to Corps, a distance of approximately 22 miles, took only 30 minutes from the time the message was released until an acknowledgement was received back via teletype.

f. Messenger Service. Messenger service was the exception and was used only to transmit overlays and maps.

g. Casualties. During this operation, the Signal Company lost 8 killed in action, and 4 wounded in action (1 officer, three enlisted men).

8. Artillery. A detailed artillery Report of Operations is attached hereto as Appendix "C".

9. Engineers.

a. The activity of the 15th Engineer Battalion in this operation was considerably in excess of that at El Guettar.

b. The lack of roads in this sector, the difficulty in maintaining adequate supply routes, and routes along which artillery could advance, made the frequent employment of the Engineers on road-building missions necessary.

c. The fact that the enemy demolished numerous bridges in their withdrawal made the construction of bridges, by-passes, and fords another important mission of the Engineers.

d. Near the close of the operation, the 15th Engineer Battalion was attached to the 20th Engineer Regiment, and was employed in mine sweeping, street clearance, and dock construction in and around Bizerte.

e. During the period 15 April - 8 May, the 15th Engineer Battalion accomplished the following:

Roads maintained and repaired:	125 miles
Fords constructed:	17
Bridges built:	2
Craters filled:	5

Roads constructed (new): 70 miles (70% of the new roads were two-strip, with the remainder constructed with passing strips for two-way traffic).

10. Medical Operations.

a. Terrain. The terrain over which the 9th Infantry Division operated in this engagement was featured by steep mountain ranges, heavy and thick underbrush, very little overhead cover, and almost complete absence of roads. The non-availability of roads or paths created a definite problem to our normal supply and evacuation lines. Vehicles were of no value in the forward areas; therefore, most of the medical property and supplies were hand-carried in the forward areas. Throughout this operation, the Engineers were busily engaged in developing trails to be utilized in bringing up supplies and aiding in the evacuation of the wounded.

b. Evacuation. The extremely heavy underbrush and the blackness of the nights impeded night evacuation by litter bearers. Mules were utilized to carry casualties in both the 39th and 60th Infantry areas. It was found necessary to improvise litter-carrying devices on the regular mule saddle, as no cacolets were available. The method found most expedient was that of utilizing two mules in tandem with Signal Corps lance poles fastened to the front and rear mule on the sides of the saddles. This method made it possible to fasten the litter, and at times a blanket, between the two mules. It was found that if a casualty was transported on a single mule that the ride was more rough, and the chances of injuring a patient were greater than with the method of using two mules in tandem. Single mules with a casualty on their back invariably attempted to lie down and roll over in order to relieve the extra weight on their backs. It was found necessary to have at least one medical department man with every two mules in the "casualty convoy" to prevent accidents to the casualties. In addition to the mule litter carry, there were many areas in which the casualties had to be hand-litter carried.

In the 47th Infantry area, a railroad track was located approximately in the center of the area. By removing the tires from two one-half-ton trucks and placing the trucks on the rails, it was found that the collecting company could efficiently evacuate two battalions by this method. The vehicles were placed on the railroad track attached back to back by a small iron bar. In traveling west on the track, the lead vehicle furnished the power for the "casualty train." On the return trip, the other vehicle furnished the power. The gauge of the track accommodated the truck rims nicely. The rails were broken in several places by shell fire, but were readily repaired with wood and sand bags by collecting company personnel. Twelve litter casualties could be carried comfortably on the two trucks. This "casualty train" rode more easily than an ambulance on the road.

c. Litter Bearers. During one coordinated attack, it was found necessary to supplement the collecting companies which were

evacuating the 39th and 60th Infantry Regiments with approximately 100 extra litter bearers each. In order to do this the Division Artillery Band and all surplus or non-essential personnel in staff sections were employed as litter-bearers.

d. Rest Camp. During the early preparation for the battle, when activity was limited to patrolling, the collecting company in the 47th Infantry area established a rest camp for front-line troops. Approximately 75 men were transported each night to this camp where they were provided with a full night's rest, a hot shower bath, and the facilities to write home. They were kept for a period of 24 hours and returned.

e. Collecting Company. The main function of the collecting companies during the battle was the preparation of casualties for their evacuation to the rear. The administration of blood plasma, morphine, sulfanilimide powder to wounds, hot drinks, the control or arresting of hemorrhages, readjustment of splints, and the treatment of shock were the principal medical activities performed in these units.

f. Clearing Company. Exhaustion cases were held during this operation in the clearing station. Treatment of these cases consisted of heavy sedation for a period of two to three days. On the fourth or fifth day, it was found that most of the exhaustion cases could be utilized within the Division area either as litter-bearers or truck-drivers. This "occupational therapy" proved to be an efficient method of building the morale and helping the individuals to regain self-confidence. Approximately 80 to 90 percent of all exhaustion cases were returned to some type of duty within the Division area.


g. Personnel Losses.

UNIT*	W.I.A.	K.I.A.	M.I.A.	INJURED	EXH'T.	DISEASE	RET. DUTY
	Shell	GSW			STATES		FRM. CLRNG. ST.
39th Infantry	112	30	38	4	54	89	118
47th Infantry	43	36	28	2	62	22	104
60th Infantry	164	60	40	1	65	125	147
9th Div. Arty.					1		1
26th F.A. Bn.	2		1	5	6		10
34th F.A. Bn.			1		13	1	15
60th F.A. Bn.	2		1		2		2
84th F.A. Bn.					4		1
15th Engr. Bn.	4	1	1		4		11
9th Med. Bn.	2				4		5
Special Troops	1		2		5	3	15
TOTAL FOR DIV.	330	127	108	12	220	240	429

SECTION VI - SUMMARY

The 9th Infantry Division had entered its first engagement with the enemy, the Battle of El Guettar, greatly handicapped in not having had time for sufficient reconnaissance and in not having all of the units of the Division under Division control. Going through this battle, however, they had learned lesson after lesson, learning them the hard way.

At Sedjenane and all the way to Bizerte, they demonstrated conclusively that they could profit by their former mistakes and take full advantage of the lessons which they had learned. This they did. Time after time they maneuvered the Germans out of strong positions. They continually seized points of observation held by the enemy and, having deprived him of this, continued to drive him back. They followed artillery concentrations closely, with devastating results to the enemy. The individual soldier had proved that he was capable. Commanders of all echelons had proved the same. The 9th Division had definitely become a capable combat unit.



M.S. EDDY
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding

A P P E N D I X "A"

Field Orders

██████████

AUTH: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials:
Date: 12 April 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
12 April 1943

F O #19

(F O #18 dated 12 April 1943 is superseded by this F O.)

MAPS: TUNISIA 1/50,000; Sheets, 4, 5, 10, 11, 17 & 18.

1. a. (1) Enemy. The enemy has recently suffered severe defeats in the TAMERA and SEDJENANE areas and has been forced to fall back on his old defensive positions on the reverse slopes of DJ AZAG J3877 (GREEN HILL) and DJ EL AJRED J3874 (BALD HILL). The GREEN HILL - BALD HILL position is well prepared and naturally strong.

(2) The enemy trs in the area are approx equivalent in strength to three full inf bns. They are made up as follows:

1 and 3 Cos A.30 on GREEN HILL

2 Cos A.30 on BALD HILL

The remnants of T.3 and T.4 are in the area 3873-3872 SOUTH of BALD HILL

The remnants of II Barenthin are probably in the area 3778 NORTH of GREEN HILL

The remnants of III Barenthin are probably allotted in support of the whole sector, while WITZIG's Corps Para Engr Bn XI is responsible for the engineering works of the whole sector.

WITZIG's Bn is also responsible for the patrolling along and to the North of the R. SEDJENANE VALLEY.

b. (1) The 4th British Div is on our right. The bdry between Div will be all inclusive 9th U S Div: RJ J2156 - Pt 436 J2356 - BEL MATBEG J2858 Pt 586 J3762.

(2) 3 Bn Corps Franc D'Afrique in CAPE SERRAT Area on our left and is atchd to this Div.

2. This Div will relieve the 46th British Div in place in the SEDJENANE sector.

3. a. The 47th Inf will relieve the 138th Brigade in place night 12-13 April and will place vic DJ TAMBOUNA one rifle Co reinf with 1 MG Sect and 1 Mort Sect. Trucks for movement will report to RJ H6242 at 1500 Hours 12 April. IP for movement forward - RJ at H7443. Head of Column passes 1730; tail clears 1930.

(2) 3rd Bn Corps Franc D'Afrique is atchd to the 39th Inf.

c. Artillery.

- (1) 84th F A Bn direct support 47th Inf.
- (2) 26th F A Bn direct support 39th Inf.
- (3) 34th F A Bn general support.
- (4) 434th CA Bn (AA) will provide AA protection for field arty gun positions, the road from DJ ABIOD to SEDJENANE, and the Div CP.
- (5) 894th TD Bn will provide one Co in direct support 47th Inf, one Co in direct support 39th Inf, and the Bn less 2 Cos in general support of the Div Sector. The Rcn Co will cover the area between the 39th Inf and the 3rd Bn Corps Franc D'Afrique.

d. 15th Engr Bn will repair and maintain all roads in the Div area.

e. The 9th Rcn Tr will cover the area between the 47th Inf positions and DJ TAMBOUNA, and push vigorous rcn forward.

x. (1) Vigorous and active patrolling will be carried out by all front line units.

(2) Bdry between 39th Inf and 47th Inf as follows: J280793, RJ J223787, RJ J181787.all.

(3) The CG, 9th Inf Div Arty will coordinate anti-tank and anti-aircraft defenses within the Div sector.

4. Adm O No 14.

5. a. See index 1-A6.

b. Div CP opens at J090723 at 141800.

c. Radio silence except for emergency use.

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G-3

DISTRUBUTION:

- | | | |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. G-3 File | 11. Div Surgeon | 21. 9th Rcn Tr |
| 2. V Corps | 12. Hq Comdt | 22. 9th Sig Co |
| 3. CG | 13. Prov Marsh | 23. 9th QM Co |
| 4. Asst CG | 14. Adj Gen | 24. 709th Ord Co |
| 5. C/S | 15. Div Arty (5) | 25. Hq Co 9th Inf Div |
| 6. G-1 | 16. 39th Inf | 26. 894th TD Bn |
| 7. G-2 | 17. 47th Inf | 27. 434th CA Bn(AA) |
| 8. G-4 | 18. 60th Inf | 28. North Irish Horse |
| 9. Div Engr | 19. 15th Engr Bn | 29. 228 Fd Coy |
| 10. Div Sig O | 20. 9th Med Bn | |

Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials :
Date : 20 April 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
20 April 1943

F O #20

MAPS: TUNISIA 1/50,000 Sheets 4, 5, 10, 11, 17, 18.

1. a. (1) Enemy forces opposing this Division are of Division MANNTEUFEL, and are of total combined strength approximating four or five battalions. Units identified are as follows:

✓ BARENTHIN REGIMENT, consisting of 3 Bns the third of which is in reserve and probably furnishing personnel to the two in the line. Regiment is below strength, is well equipped with machine guns, AT-guns and some mortars.

AFRIKA 30, ✓ defending the key position BALD HILL-GREEN HILL. Battalion has three companies, severely hit in battle of SEDJENANE. Defensive position well organized.

MARSCH BN 21, which suffered heavily at TAMERA. Equipment includes heavy machine guns and heavy mortars.

2nd BN, 756 MT. REGT, ✓ consisting of three companies, defending SEDJENANE RIVER valley. Companies down to 80-90 men each.

MARSCH BN, strength undetermined.

CORPS PARA ENGS BN L (WITZIG) ✓. Responsible for engineering in sector, and has been patrolling in north. Effective strength 120 men. Uses Arab-German parties for mine laying behind the lines.

VON KOEHNAN, a group of commando-saboteurs which has been operating in the north.

In extreme north is a small force of Italians of 10th BERSAGLIERI, and there may be another Italian unit in the center of our sector.

(2) There is no confirmation of report that Germans have reinforced extreme north.

(3) Enemy is weak in Arty, having an estimated 10-15 pieces. Tanks probably will be used as mobile artillery.

(4) German tanks believed in reserve on plains southwest of TUNIS, to be used when needed. 24 tanks reported behind J6243.

[REDACTED]

(5) Morale of enemy is not high except in certain units, notably 2nd Bn BARENTHIN.

(6) Key high ground is intensively organized for defense, with mine fields, good fields of fire, and dominant observation. Reserves are purely local, with no strategic infantry reserves believed available.

b. The 1st Inf Div is on our right with the mission of making the main effort of II Corps to adv up the Dr BED valley, J55, and capture the high ground EAST and WEST of CHOUGHI, J76.

2. This Div will attack on D-day with two missions, as follows:

a. Capture the enemy position at DJ AJRED, J3775, as the first objective, and RJ J4983 as second objective, and then exploit in the direction of MATEUR.

b. Seize the high ground dominating the RJ J5094.

3. a. The Corps Franc d'Afrique will seize the high ground dominating the RJ at J5094. See overlay.

(1) Command of the NORTH sector (see overlay) will revert to the CO, Corps Franc d'Afrique effective upon opening of the CP, C.F.A. during Am 22 April.

b. 39th Inf - See overlay.

c. 47th Inf - See overlay. Be prepared to resist enemy counter attack from the EAST astride route #7.

d. 60th Inf - See overlay.

e. Div Arty - See Arty Annex.

f. 15th Engr Bn -

(1) Co A in zone of 39th Inf supporting Inf and Arty.

(2) Co B -

(a) 1 Plat in zone of 47th Inf supporting Inf and Arty.

(b) Co B less one Plat in Div Res to be used where required.

(3) Co C in zone of 60th Inf supporting Inf and Arty.

(4) One water unit in each Inf Regt zone and one with rear elements of Div under control of Engr S-4 assisted by Water Supervisor and wtr Rcn Gp of Engr H/S Co.

g. 9th Rcn Tr - See overlay. Maintain contact with 1st Inf Div.

h. 91st Rcn Sqdn - See overlay. Maintain contact between 39th Inf & 60th Inf.

x. (1) Artillery will have priority on roads.

(2) Prior to launching of attack, units will hold present positions at all costs. Positions will be developed and improved with wire and mines. Vigorous patrolling will be maintained.

(3) As the days objectives are taken, each position will be organized for defense preparatory to launching of new attack. TD and AT guns will be pushed forward and dug in.

(4) All units will comply strictly with existing instructions on Signal Security.

(5) All officers and men will be instructed that in event of capture it is imperative for them to preserve complete silence on all matters pertaining to the attack.

4. See Adm O #15.

5. a. See Index 1-A-7.

b. Div CP opens at J200759 at 202200.

c. Axis of Signal Communication - See overlay.

d. (1) Radio silence to be maintained by units on move to assembly areas. To be broken only when contact is established or H plus 4 hours, which ever is first. Radio traffic will be transmitted to Hq of units under radio silence by "F" method on Div Command Channels. Each msg so transmitted will be sent twice.

(2) Commercial circuits will not be used except on authority of Corps Signal Officer.

EDDY
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

SUNDIN
G-3

ANNEX #1 - March Table
ANNEX #2 - Artillery Annex
ANNEX #3 - Overlay.

MAP: TUNISIA 1:200,000

(GAFSA SHEET #17
EL AYACHA SHEET #18)

TO ACCOMPANY FO #16 (CORRECTED)
COPY

27 MARCH 1943

OFFICIAL:

Sundin
SUNDIN
G-3

EDDY
COM'DG

French

Route 894 TD Bn

894 TD Bn

GAFSA

27 (maq)

XX 9
EL GUETTAR

(less 1 Bn)

Strength Unknown

9 (incl)




1239

XX 47

Direction of
Attack

Objective

Mortars and Small groups
on high ground - dispositions
unknown



Hq 9th Inf Div
A P O #9
1610 19 April 1943

ANNEX 1 to F O #20
MOVEMENT ORDER

MAPS: 1:50,000, TUNISIA, Sheets 5 & 6.

ROAD MOVEMENTS

Night of April	Unit	Location by Daylight	Route	Remarks
19-20	Co C 15th Engr Bn	20 April N of SEDJENANE	DJ ABIOD-TAMARA	Head passes DJ ABIOD 1930. Tail clears DJ ABIOD 1941. Clear RJ at 1277 by 2035.
19-20	2 Bns 60th Inf	20 April Vicinity 1177	DJ ABIOD-RJ at 1277	Shuttle - head 1st shuttle pass DJ ABIOD at 1945 Tail clears DJ ABIOD at 2022 Tail clears RJ at 1277 at 2166 Head of second shuttle will not pass DJ ABIOD prior to 2115.
19-20	60th F A	20 April Vicinity 2577	DJ ABIOD - SEDJENANE	Head passes DJ ABIOD at 2025. Tail clears DJ ABIOD at 2111.
20-21	2 Bns 60th Inf	21 April Vicinity 22 88	Foot Trs: RJ at 129771-Trail Junction at 184821 and 231845. Motors: RJ at 1277- SED- JENANE-RJ at 231845.	Movement to commence at 1930. Movement of foot troops and motors be coordinated under direction CO 60th Inf. Motor column will clear SEDJENANE by 2045.
20-21	60th Inf less 2 Bns	21 April Vicinity 1177	1 Bn DJ ABIOD-RJ at 1277. 60th Inf less 3 Bns-DJ ABIOD-SEDJENANE- Vicinity 2288	Shuttle. Movement will begin at 1930. Tail will clear RJ at 094721 by 0030 21 April.
20-21	26th F A Bn	21 April Vicinity 2380	Via SEDJENANE	Head will not enter Route No 7 until point of entry has been cleared by motor elements of 2 Bns 60 th Inf.

~~SECRET~~
Road Movements Cont'd

Night of April	Unit	Location by Daylight	Route	Remarks
20-21	34th F A Bn	21 April Vicinity 2378	Via SEDJENANE	Movement to be coordinated with that of 26th F A Bn by CG 9th Inf Div Arty.
20-21	Fwd Ech Hq 9th Inf Div & Hq 9th Inf Div Arty	21 April Vicinity 1976	Route No 7	Movement will begin at 0100 21 April.
21-22	2 Bns 60th Inf	April 22	-	Details to be announced later.
21-22	1st Bn 60th Inf	22 April Vicinity 2288	Foot Troops: RJ at 129771-Trail Junction at 231845. Motors: RJ at 1277-SED-JENANE- RJ at 231845	Details to be announced later.
21-22	185th F A Bn	22 April Vicinity 2875	Route 7	Arriving on Corps order.
21-22	62d F A Bn	April 22 Vicinity 2180	Route 7-Road North from SEDJENANE	Details to be announced later.
22-23	1 Btry 36th F A	April 23 Vicinity 2675	Route 7	Arriving on Corps order
22-23	9th Recon Tr	April 23 Vicinity 2784	Route 7-Road North from SEDJENANE-CR 229831-CR 252838	Depart at 1930

TACTICAL MOVEMENTS
Not Involving Road Space
On Page 3

[REDACTED]

Road Movements Cont'd

Night of April	Unit	Location by Daylight	Route	Remarks
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TACTICAL MOVEMENTS
Not Involving Road Space

19-20	39th Inf	20 April RHOMD-EL HAMRA-DJ EL GARSIA	-	-
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21-22	47th Inf less 1 Bn	22 April Hill 398 (2976) - Hill 319 (3075) - Hill 533 (3072) - Hill 610 (3171)	-	-
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21-22	1 Bn 47th Inf	22 April Vicinity 2971	-	-
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G-3

ANNEX #2 to F O 20

MARCH TABLE - MAPS 1:50,000, Tunisia Night of 21 - 22 April 1943

UNIT	LOCATION BY DAYLIGHT 22 April	ROUTE	IP	REMARKS
1st & 2nd Bns, 60th Inf	Assembly Area	As selected.		Move by marching to positions clear CAPE SERRAT Road by 2130 to allow passage of 40 trucks of C.F.A.
3rd Bn, 60th Inf	Assembly Area	NORTH SEDJENANE VALLEY Road - to position.	Present Location	March both sides of roads. Motor pass through troops. Start 1930.
60th F A Bn	Vic 2587	Present Position - SEDJENANE, CAPE SERRAT Road - new position.	Present Location	Head Pass IP 2100; tail clear 2120 Clear RJ 212761 by 2140
62nd F A Bn	Vic 2582	Present Bivouac - DJ ABIOD - SEDJENANE - CAPE SERRAT Road - New Position.	Present Location	Head Pass 1930; tail clear 1955 Arrive new position area 2040.
1 Bn, C.F.A. (Corps Franc d' Afrique)	Vic 2290	TABARK - DJ ABIOD - SEDJENANE - CAPE SERRAT ROAD.	TABARKA	Head pass 1800, tail clear DJ ABIOD 1930.

S E R R A T

S E C R E T

Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials :
Date : 4 May 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
2000 4 May 1943

F O #21

MAPS: TUNISIA 1:50,000 Sheets 1,2,3,5,6,7.

1.
 - a. The enemy with an estimated strength of one Bn hold the DJEBEL ECH CHENTI 562970 and DJ ARGERB EL AHMAR 536972. He is weakly supported by Arty, the observation for which is believed to be on DJ IUHKEUL 5687. Guns located near FERFYVILLE.
 - b. (1) Corps Franc d'Afrique hold a line west of OUED DOUIMISS from approximately DJ KHARRATA (5395) to DJ ZOUTINA (5097). TABOURS are operating to NORTH of this.

(2) 1st Armd Div on our right vic MATEUR.
2. This Division will attack the enemy positions on DJEBEL ECH CHENTI 562970 and DJEBEL ARGERD EL AHMAR (536972) on 5 May 1943.
3.
 - a. 47th Inf
 - (1) Move to assembly area previously reconnoitered night 4-5 May.
 - (2) To attack DJEBEL ECH CHENTI and DJEBEL ARGERD EL AHMAR at H-hour (to be announced later), 5 May and when successful exploit to the line Hill 215 (577008) and to Hill 131 (585982).
 - b. 60th Inf - One Bn 60th Inf will be alerted at 0800 hours 5 May and be prepared to move on orders this headquarters to vic 589950. AT Co 60th Inf is detached from Corps Franc d'Afrique, and will rejoin 60th Inf prior to 0800 5 May 1943.
 - c. 39th CT (601st TD Bn attached) will remain in present location prepared to move on Div order.
 - d. Corps Franc d'Afrique - When passed through by 47th Inf, to assemble in present location and patrol NORTHEAST in direction of DJEBEL SIDI AMEUR (535990). Be prepared to attack DJEBEL SIDI AMEUR.
 - e. Division Arty:
 - 60th FA Bn - Direct support of 47th Inf.
 - C Btry 36th FA - General support.
 - 62nd FA Bn - General support.

S E C R E T

f. 9th Rcn Tr at present at SIDI SALEM (475843) will, on Div order, exploit along Route #11 toward BIZERTE. Rcn Co 894th TD Bn exploit SOUTH-EAST along Route #57 toward FERRYVILLE.

g. "A" Co 751st (Med) Tank Bn will move to an area previously reconnoitered in vicinity 4896, starting movement at 0600 5 May, and be prepared to exploit the situation on Div order.

h. 9th Med Bn - One collecting company in direct support 47th Inf.

i. 15th Engr Bn - Will repair blown bridges at OUED DOUIMISS as soon as practicable.

4. See Adm O #16 (To be issued later.)

5. a. See Index IA-8.

b. Div CP at 415923.

EDDY
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

SUNDIN
G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

1 CG II. Corps
1 Asst CG 9th Inf Div
1 C of S 9th Inf Div
5 Div Arty
1 39th Inf
1 47th Inf
1 60th Inf
1 9th Rcn Tr
1 Div Engr
1 G-1
1 G-2
1 G-3 File
1 G-4
1 Div Surg
1 Div Ord O
1 Div Sig O
1 Provost Marshal

Attached Units:

1 Corps Franc d'Afrique
1 B Co 751 Tk (Med)
1 894th TD Bn
1 Rcn Co, 894th TD Bn.

