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
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CHERBOURG

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E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

*Headquarters Ninth Infantry Division
APO No 9*

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EGLISE

REPORT OF OPERATION
CONDUCTED BY
NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
U.S. ARMY

COTENTIN PENINSULA
FRANCE
14 JUNE - 1 JULY 1944

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
A. F. O. 2

14 July 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Operations

TO : The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D. C.

THRU : Commanding General, VII Corps, A. P. O. #307

Section I -- Authority
Section II -- Introduction
Section III -- Report of Operations
Section IV -- Report on Supply and Evacuation
Section V -- Annexes:

#1 - Map, Operations of 9th Infantry Division,
Cotentin Peninsula Campaign

#2 - Lessons Learned in the Cotentin Peninsula
Campaign

#3 - Tactical Terrain Study

#4 - Field Orders Nos. 1 thru 13, Headquarters 9th
Infantry Division

#5 - 9th Infantry Division Artillery Report

#6 - Personnel

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, this report of operations of the 9th Infantry Division from 13 June 1944 to 1 July 1944 (inclusive) is submitted.

Section II - Introduction

1. Command: During the operations covered by this report, the 9th Infantry Division was a part of VII Corps, which in turn was a part of the First Army. Commanders involved were as follows:

- a. First Army - Lieutenant General OMAR N. BRADLEY
- b. VII Corps - Major General JOSEPH L. COLLINS
- c. 9th Infantry Division - Major General MANTON S. EDDY.

2. Composition of the 9th Infantry Division: During this operation the 9th Infantry Division was composed of the following units:

a. Organic

39th Infantry (detached from 11 June 1944 until 15 June 1944)

47th Infantry

60th Infantry

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 9th Infantry Division

Artillery

26th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer)

34th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) (detached from
11 June to 16 June 1944)

60th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) (detached from
11 June until 15 June 1944)

84th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer)

9th Reconnaissance Troop

9th Signal Company

9th Medical Battalion

15th Engineer Battalion (C)

709th Ordnance Company (Light Maintenance)

9th Quartermaster Company

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 9th Infantry Division

b. Attached:

746th Tank Battalion (less Company A) 13 June 1944 - 28 June 1944

746th Tank Battalion 28 June 1944 - 1 July 1944

Batteries A, B, and D (less one platoon each) 376th AAA AW
Battalion (M) 13 June 1944 - 16 June 1944

376th AAA AW Battalion (M) 16 June 1944 - 1 July 1944

87th Chemical Battalion (less one company) 16 June 1944 - 19 June 1944

Companies A and B, 87th Chemical Battalion 28 June 1944 - 1 July 1944

359th Infantry (less one battalion) 15 June 1944 - 17 June 1944

1st Battalion, 359th Infantry 20 June 1944 - 21 June 1944

4th Cavalry Group (less detachments) 20 June 1944 - 1 July 1944

Headquarters 6th Armored Group 15 June 1944 - 16 June 1944

607th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less two companies) 19 June 1944 -
20 June 1944

899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less two companies) 19 June 1944 -
20 June 1944

899th Tank Destroyer Battalion 20 June 1944 - 1 July 1944

Headquarters 188th Field Artillery Group 19 June 1944 - 1 July 1944

172nd Field Artillery Battalion (4.5 inch Gun) 19 June 1944 -
1 July 1944

957th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) 16 June 1944 -
1 July 1944

915th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) 15 June 1944 -
17 June 1944

Battery C, 981st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun)
28 June 1944 - 1 July 1944.

3. Other operations: The 39th Combat Team (less 26th Field Artillery Battalion), with 60th Field Artillery Battalion and 34th Field Artillery Battalion attached, was attached to the 4th Infantry Division for the period 11 - 15 June 1944. The Combat Team was assigned the mission of clearing a portion of the coast, on the 4th Infantry Division's right flank, of the enemy

who was in previously prepared and strongly fortified positions. This mission was successfully completed, and resulted in the capture of QUINEVILLE (370078). These units returned to Division control on 15 June 1944.

4. Movement of the Division from England to France: Commencing 3 June 1944, the Division moved by motor and rail from garrisons in the vicinity of Winchester, Hampshire to marshalling areas in the vicinity of SOUTHAMPTON and WYEMOUTH in preparation for overseas movement. The invasion began early on 6 June 1944 at which time the Division began loading. All units of the Division embarked at SOUTHAMPTON except the 84th Field Artillery Battalion which left from WYEMOUTH, and a portion of the 60th Infantry, which left from DORCHESTER. The Division was split into small craft loads, and the channel crossing was made in 47 Liberty ships, 8 LST's, and 12 LCT's along with units from 4 other divisions and miscellaneous Corps units.

Four advance parties were sent. The first consisted of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who landed on D-Day; the second consisted of the Chief of Staff, Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Provost Marshal, Special Troops Executive and drivers, who landed on D+1; the third consisted of the Commanding General, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Division Quartermaster and several enlisted men, who landed on D+2. The fourth was a billeting party sent for reconnaissance and marking of assembly areas, which landed on D+3. In addition 7 men from the 9th Signal Company landed early on D-Day to act as beach runners.

The main body of the Division sailed from ENGLAND on 7 June, and began debarking at UTAH BEACH (440000) on 10 June; most of Division Headquarters, 39th Infantry, 60th Field Artillery Battalion, and 34th Field Artillery Battalion were unloaded on this day. On the following day the 60th Infantry, and 26th Field Artillery Battalion were partially unloaded, and on 12 June the 47th Infantry and 84th Field Artillery Battalion began unloading. By midnight 13 June, the unloading of the Division had been sufficiently completed so that it could be employed satisfactorily in combat. Small remaining portions of units already landed continued to come ashore during the next few days.

5. Maps: The following maps were used in this operation:

FRANCE 1/25,000, Sheets 31/20 SE, 31/20 SW, 31/18 NE, 31/18 NW,
31/22 SW, 28/22 SE, 28/20 NE, 28/20 NW, 31/20 SE,
31/20 SW.

FRANCE 1/50,000, Sheets 5E/2, 6E/1, 5E/4, 6E/3, 6E/4.

6. Initial plan: The Division was alerted by the Commanding General at 0625, 13 June 1944, to be prepared to pass through the 90th Infantry Division and drive westward across the DOUVE RIVER in order to block off the COTENTIN PENINSULA west of the PRAIRIES MARECAGEUSES (160900).

The total strength of the enemy in the 9th Division sector was estimated not to exceed the equivalent of two infantry regiments supported by three or four battalions of artillery and perhaps miscellaneous personnel such as AA troops. The 90th Infantry Division was to turn northwest and

attack abreast of the 9th Infantry Division on the North, and the 82nd Airborne Division on the South. The 9th Division's attack was scheduled to jump off at 1000 on 14 June in column of regiments, with 60th Infantry in assault. For boundaries, line of departure, scheme of maneuver, and objectives see overlay to Field Order No. 1. The attached tanks of the 746th Tank Battalion were to be employed by the 60th Infantry primarily as roving artillery pieces; the 9th Reconnaissance troop was ordered to maintain contact between the left (south) flank of the 60th Infantry and the right (north) flank of the 82nd Airborne Division.

Section III - Report of Operations

1. 14 June 1944

a. Division Command Post: 304956

b. During the night of 13 - 14 June, the Division moved to assembly areas.

c. The 60th Infantry (in assault) jumped off at 1000 as scheduled. The regiment advanced initially in column of battalions because the narrow width of the Division sector compelled the regiment to break through first and then expand later when space would no longer limit the ability to maneuver. Scattered resistance was met initially, but this was overcome and the advance continued according to plan. During the afternoon the advance was delayed by heavy machine gun fire from the town of RENOUF (265950), but the town was captured by 2000 after a Division Artillery concentration was fired upon it. The 2nd Battalion after proceeding rapidly West astride the road from RENOUF (265950) to la BONNEVILLE (250950) reached the high ground (250960) north of BONNEVILLE; the 3rd Battalion was held up slightly to the rear. The 2nd Battalion had suffered moderate casualties.

d. The 47th Infantry (not completely ashore) was in Division Reserve in vicinity 291947, the 1st Battalion being under Division control as an immediate reserve. Activity during the day was limited to patrols sent Northward toward GOURBESVILLE (283981).

e. Division Artillery (less 60th Field Artillery Battalion) supported the infantry with considerable fire on close-in targets and counterbattery missions. Three enemy batteries were neutralized as well as a large number of infantry positions.

f. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop maintained contact between 60th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Division on the left (south) flank, and the 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) on the right (north) flank.

g. Front lines at 2400 14 June were 248957 - 250965 - 251973; no advance was made after darkness.

2. 15 June 1944

a. Division CP: 304956

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b. The advance toward the Division objective designated in Field Order No. 1 continued at 0500. The importance of jumping off promptly and pushing vigorously forward was stressed by the Commanding General, due to the fact that a new German division was reported on its way to our sector, and any delay in our advance would result in resistance stiffened by reinforcements. The time of attacks by the 82nd Airborne Division and 90th Infantry Division was coordinated with ours.

c. The 60th Infantry with 1st Battalion 47th Infantry attached began its advance at daylight. Enemy tanks in vicinity of 269975 moving South were reported at 0745 by the 90th Division; these were fired upon by antitank guns and rocket launchers of the 60th Infantry. About sixteen tanks were encountered and by 0840 they had withdrawn toward ORGLANDES (254984). Two 60th Infantry antitank guns were knocked out.

d. The original objective of the 60th Infantry, the high ground West of ORGLANDES, was re-designated by the Commanding General at 1000 as the objective of the 47th Infantry which was ordered to attack on the right of the 60th Infantry. The new objective for the 60th Infantry was REIGNEVILLE (236968), the 1st Bn 47th Infantry reverting to control of the 47th Infantry. This change was made in order to facilitate the capture of the Division objective. The 39th Combat Team was returned to Division control from attachment to 4th Infantry Division at 1000 in Division Reserve and at 1230 began to arrive in the assembly area formerly occupied by the 47th Infantry. The 47th Infantry jumped off at 1300.

e. The 1st Battalion 60th Infantry passed through the 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry and reached the line 236970 - 241974 when it was counter-attacked from the Northwest by an enemy battalion supported by 4 tanks. About 500 yards were lost, but immediately regained by a counterattack from the regrouped 2nd Battalion. By 1625 the 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry was in vicinity of REIGNEVILLE (236968). The advance of this battalion was stopped until the 47th Infantry was abreast. The 47th Infantry reached their objective by 2000, and the enemy appeared to be withdrawing in that area. No further advance was made by either regiment during the night but there was vigorous patrolling West to the DOUVE RIVER.

f. The 39th Infantry was assembled in Division Reserve by 2400.

3. 16 June 1944

a. Division CP: 304956 until 2000 - 261957 after 2000.

b. Intermediate objectives were assigned each infantry regiment in order to expedite the crossing of the DOUVE RIVER and the cutting off of the COTENTIN PENINSULA. The plan called for an advance with four regiments in line to seize the lettered objectives shown on the field order overlay attached. The 87th Chemical Battalion (less one company) was attached to the 39th Infantry; the 2nd Battalion 47th Infantry and the 746th Tank Battalion were instructed to await orders as Division Reserve in the position shown on overlay to Field Order No. 2. The time of attack (from front line

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positions occupied the day before) was set at 0500, except for the 39th Infantry which was to jump off at 1100 from the positions shown on the field order overlay. The 82nd Airborne Division on the left and the 90th Infantry Division (less 359th Infantry and 915th Field Artillery Battalion) on the right were to attack in conjunction with the 9th Division at 0800.

c. The 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry jumped off as scheduled at 0500 making excellent progress against moderate opposition. The 2nd Battalion was committed at 1100, proceeding rapidly Westward to STE. COLOMBE (200986), taking the bridges across the DOUVE RIVER intact. By 2100 the DOUVE had been crossed and a bridgehead on the Western side of the river firmly established; this battalion overcame several counterattacks during the day, inflicting severe losses on the enemy. The 3rd Battalion reached the DOUVE against light opposition and reinforced the bridgehead before dark. The 1st Battalion, moving up between the 47th and 60th Infantry Regiments, was engaged in several fire fights during the day but by dark reached the DOUVE RIVER on the Eastern side of the bridgehead.

d. The 47th Infantry, 3rd Battalion and 1st Battalion abreast, jumped off at 0530, reaching HAUTEVILLE BOGAGE (238987) by 1620. Stiff resistance was encountered but a defensive position astride the ST. SAUVEUR (193945)-VALOGNES (243082) road was established by dark. By 2400 the 2nd Battalion had been placed in an all round defensive position in HAUTEVILLE BOGAGE (238987). The 3rd Battalion stopped at 226979 and the 2nd Battalion took a defensive position facing North to protect the Division's right flank.

e. The 39th Infantry mopped up positions on the right flank formerly in the 90th Division area, and attacked ORGLANDES (254984) which the enemy held strongly. The town was not entirely captured, and the regiment remained in position in the vicinity of 260980. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop protected the right flank of the 39th Infantry.

f. The Division Artillery fired numerous close support missions for the infantry and neutralized 5 enemy batteries and several self-propelled guns during the day.

4. 17 June 1944

a. Division CP: 304956 until 1900 - 213970 after 1900.

b. The 39th Infantry resumed its attack on ORGLANDES (254984) which was occupied after strong artillery and mortar fire had reduced opposition. The 1st Battalion cleared the town and then moved to STE. COLOMBE (200986) where it was attached to the 60th Infantry. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions occupied positions at HAUTEVILLE BOGAGE (238987), BINIVILLE (235991) and on the high ground northeast of STE. COLOMBE (200985) astride the VALOGNES (243080)-ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (195946) road in order to protect the Division's right flank until relieved by the advance of the 90th Division to the Northwest.

c. The 47th Infantry moved to the Southwest during the night, and passing through the bridgehead of the 82nd Airborne Division at ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE, occupied points West of ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE with very slight opposition. At 2200, the 1st Battalion had reached G. de HUANVILLE (097909) thereby severing the LA HAYE DU PUIITS (178080) - BARNEVILLE SUR-MER (030949)

Road and cutting the COTENTIN Peninsula. The 2nd Battalion had reached Hill 40 (128919) at dark and the 3rd Battalion was moving South from 149925. This accomplishment bottled up the enemy in the North of the Peninsula and prevented reinforcements from reaching him from the South.

d. The 60th Infantry, protected by fighter cover for several hours after first light, continued its advance Westward against slight resistance. By dark the 1st and 2nd Battalions had reached the high ground overlooking the main BRICQUEBEC (125044) - BARNEVILLE (032948) road.

5. 18 June 1944

a. Division CP: 213970 until 1845 - 151979 after 1845.

b. In order to make doubly sure that the Peninsula was cut on this day, thus preventing the Germans' escape from the Peninsula, K Company of the 3rd Battalion had been loaded aboard tank destroyers and tanks, and ordered by the Corps Commander to move on BARNEVILLE early in the morning. The rest of the battalion followed on foot, protecting the flanks. The enemy in BARNEVILLE, completely surprised by this sudden assault on their strongly defended positions, resisted fiercely for a brief period and then withdrew. A counterattack with armor was attempted by the enemy but K Company's rocket launchers, anti-tank grenades and attached tanks forced the enemy into a disordered rout.

c. Objectives had been assigned in Field Order #3 to complete the cutting off of the COTENTIN Peninsula, with the 82nd Airborne Division protecting the Southern flank and the 90th Infantry Division protecting the northern flank. These objectives were reached with little opposition, but three strong early morning counterattacks were made by the trapped 77th German Infantry Division in futile efforts to break through to the mainland. The 47th Infantry had already reached their objectives before the Field Order was issued, consequently they improved their positions in accordance with verbal orders of the Commanding General. The 60th Infantry held their positions against all counterattacks.

d. The first counterattack was a desperate attempt at breakthrough down the BRICQUEBEC (125045) - BARNEVILLE (033948) road. A column of vehicles, infantry and artillery attacked the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 60th Infantry. A fierce artillery concentration from all available guns was brought down by Division Artillery on the head of this column at a Crossroad at 054984. The concentration then was adjusted so as to creep up the congested road inch by inch from the crossroads to a point 5 miles to the northwest. The infantry completed the devastation with small arms and anti-tank fire. A reconnaissance later determined that the following destruction was inflicted on the enemy (Mileages are given northeast from the crossroads):

- 0.2 Miles 1 - truck, 1 - howitzer, 6 - horse, 1 - caisson.
- 0.3 Miles 1 - 2½ ton truck, 3 - bikes
- 0.4 Miles 1 - halftrack
- 0.5 Miles 1 - mortar, 4 - horses, 1 - ammunition wagon
- 0.6 Miles 2 - half-track prime movers, 1 - 57mm gun, 1 - 105mm howitzer.

- 0.7 Miles 1 - half-track, 1 - gun
- 0.8 Miles 1 - half-track prime mover, 2 - guns, 2 - light cars,
1 - truck
- 1.0 Miles 2 - trucks, 4 - horses, 1 - personnel
- 1.1 Miles 1 - truck, 1 - 105mm gun
- 1.5 Miles 1 - light machine gun
- 1.7 Miles 2 - wagons, 1 - supply truck, 1 - gun, 1 ammunition trailer
- 1.8 Miles 2 - mortars
- 2.0 Miles 1 - light machine gun
- 2.2 Miles 1 - horse drawn ammunition wagon, 1 - mortar
- 2.3 Miles 2 - ammunition carriers
- 2.4 Miles 1 - wagon
- 2.7 Miles 1 - car, 1 - prime mover for 57mm gun, 1 - horse,
2 - caissons
- 2.8 Miles 1 - caisson, 1 - light machine gun, 1 - motorcycle,
1 tractor motor bike, 1 - 57mm gun and chassis
- 3.0 Miles 1 - motorcycle, 1 - horse-drawn ammunition wagon
- 3.2 Miles 1 - staff car
- 3.3 Miles 1 - horse, 1 - ration truck
- 3.5 Miles 1 - motorcycle and sidecar
- 3.6 Miles 1 - truck
- 3.7 Miles 1 - truck
- 3.9 Miles 1 - car, 1 - UXB
- 4.0 Miles 3 - prime movers, 2 - guns, 1 - horse, 2 - trucks, 1 - 105
truck, 2 - caissons, 1 - wire supply truck
- 4.2 Miles 1 - supply truck
- 4.3 Miles 4 - caissons
- 4.4 Miles 1 - prime mover, 4 - caissons, 8 - horses, 1 - UXB,
1 - gun caisson, 1 - staff car
- 4.5 Miles 1 - light tank
- 4.9 Miles 30 - horses, 2 - prime movers, 6 - horse drawn carriages,
2 - ammunition trailers. (Road at this point is impassable due to the debris.)

e. The second counterattack was against road blocks which the 60th Infantry had established along the SEYB River in order to protect their lines of communication. The two most western ones were at 106009 and 120008, points which covered the road leading South from BRICQUEBEC (125044). Each of these was defended by one platoon of the Anti-tank Company and one half of the Anti-tank Mine Platoon, which had laid demolition charges and mines on each of the bridges at these points. At 0300 two German vehicles ran over the minefield at 106009 and at the same time some German infantry tried to infiltrate past the road block but were driven off by machine gun fire and by the anti-tank guns firing high explosive ammunition. Simultaneously, attempts to infiltrate past the road block at 120008 were driven off and the bridges blown to prevent any breakthrough. At 0500 elements identified as being part of the 77th German Division Artillery attempted another breakthrough on the road block at 106009. This attack was led by a track vehicle towing a 152mm gun; the 60th Infantry anti-tank gun crews immediately brought small arms fire on the enemy and either killed or wounded the enemy gun crew, forcing the vehicle into the ditch; then the column of vehicles following this gun was taken under fire by the anti-tank guns; the leading vehicles were destroyed, and the enemy personnel fled

in wild disorder. During this encounter officers belonging to the staff of the 77th German Infantry Division were captured, and their Commanding General narrowly missed being captured. Prisoners later related that they had been ordered to withdraw on this route, as their reconnaissance had reported that this road, leading to BARNEVILLE SUR MER (030949), was clear.

f. The third counterattack was against the reserve battalion (1st Battalion, 39th Infantry attached) in vicinity of 085995. The enemy was able to penetrate the Division sector and cross the SEYE River at this point because road blocks had not been established at 145017 as prescribed by the Commanding General. Consequently, the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry and 60th Field Artillery Battalion were surprised by the unexpected attack, but valor and cool-headedness prevented the enemy from breaking through. German Military Police had been captured during the previous afternoon and they supplied information indicating that the enemy might attempt a breakthrough at this point. Therefore, some preparations had been made. The attack by a German regiment occurred at 0430 A.M. on the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry and the 60th Field Artillery Battalion, which had gone into position astride the road about 1000 yards west of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU. The 60th Field Artillery Battalion withdrew to a new position 1000 yards further to the west while a small detachment of artillerymen covered the withdrawal of each battery by engaging the enemy with small arms fire. This withdrawal was made because effective direct fire could not be delivered from the original position; from the new position strong battalion concentrations were laid on the enemy at short ranges by accurate map data. The 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, hastily organized their defenses to meet tank thrusts which were repelled with rocket fire, and to meet a strong enveloping sweep on the left followed by a strong flank attack on the right. The battalion withdrew to more favorable positions while a delaying action was fought, and communication was re-established so that a "Zombie" (Division Artillery Concentration) could be called for. This concentration was delivered, and the battalion counterattacked immediately afterwards, regaining the lost ground and routing the enemy who left 300 dead. The 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry lost only 36 men.

g. The 39th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) moved from vicinity of HAUTTEVILLE BOCAGE (238987) to a new position in the vicinity of BLANDAMOUR (163980) in order to close the road from the north and to protect the right flank of the Division.

h. The 47th Infantry, having reached PORT BAIL (068895) and NEUVILLE AN BRAUMONT (138908) performed the actual cutting of the peninsula, and was the first unit to reach the sea. At 2100 the 47th Infantry was relieved by the 357th Infantry (90th Division) preparatory to moving into Division Reserve. This movement (to the vicinity 110960) was begun at once and continued throughout the night. Prior to this movement, a pocket of several hundred Germans was encountered at CANVILLE (115201, and was cleared up after heavy skirmishing.

6. 19 June 1944

a. Division CP: 151979.

b. In accordance with the corps plan, the 9th Division attack to capture CHERBOURG (140230) in conjunction with the 4th and 79th Infantry Divisions was scheduled to begin at 0500, 19 June. The 60th Infantry and 39th Infantry were assigned the lettered objectives shown on overlay to Field Order #4 and were to attack abreast. The 47th Infantry was ordered to move to the valley of the BABEUF River south of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (135985) as Division Reserve. One company of the 746th Tank Battalion was attached to the 60th Infantry, the remainder awaiting orders in Division Reserve near ST JEAN DU BOIS (135974). The 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less two companies) and 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less two companies) were assigned the missions of protecting the 39th Infantry and 60th Infantry, respectively, against armor.

c. 1/25,000 maps with detailed overprints of the German defenses, which had been located by air reconnaissance and military intelligence before the invasion, proved of particular value in the operation from this point onward. The information provided by these maps was extremely accurate and was most useful to the Commanding General in making plans, as well as to all units of the Division in selecting targets, selecting schemes of maneuver, etc.

d. The 60th Infantry crossed the Line of Departure with two battalions abreast at 0500; no contact was made with the enemy. Very light opposition was met throughout the day, and by 2100 the Regiment had reached the following points: 1st Battalion, ST GERMAIN DE GAILLARD (017067); 2nd Battalion, 045094; 3rd Battalion, 015132.

e. The 39th Infantry secured their objectives, including the town of BRICQUEBEC (125044), against very slight opposition and occupied the following points: 1st Battalion, Hill 130 (108129); 2nd Battalion, Hill 104 (095147); 3rd Battalion, ST CHRISTOPHE DU FOC (050142).

f. The 47th Infantry moved to CROSVILLE (047092) in Division Reserve and in preparation for the attack on 20 June.

7. 20 June 1944

a. Division CP: 151979 until 1035 - 088070 after 1035.

b. The Fortress CHERBOURG Defense Force, consisting of the 243rd Division, which had suffered heavy losses, the 709th Division, and static coastal defense personnel had withdrawn towards CHERBOURG where it was thought that they would defend the town with a perimeter defense on favorable terrain and in prepared defenses. The 9th Division continued its attack on 20 June to capture CHERBOURG by envelopment from the West. The 47th Infantry (passing through the 60th Infantry from Division Reserve) was assigned objectives to the northeast as shown on overlay to Field Order #5. The 60th Infantry (one company, 746th Tank Battalion attached) was assigned objectives which would ultimately place it in position to defend the Division from the northwest, blocking exits from the CAP de la HAGUE (940300). The 1st Battalion, 359th Infantry, attached to the Division by corps order, was assigned a sector for outposts in order to prevent enemy crossings of the DOUVIE River from the east. These outposts were in the vicinity of SOTTEVAST (144100).

c. The 60th Infantry moved out at 0800 with 2nd and 3rd Battalions abreast and 1st Battalion in reserve. VASTEVILLE (030166) was reached without resistance and by noon the Regiment, in the same formation, reached the vicinity of 010205, the only opposition being enemy artillery fire. In accordance with verbal orders of the Commanding General, the Regiment moved out to new objectives at 1915; these objectives were HENNEVILLE (099244), high ground and road junction (012255). Resistance was encountered shortly after moving out and by midnight the following points had been reached: 1st Battalion, 025208; 2nd Battalion, 030209; 3rd Battalion, 012235.

d. The 47th Infantry attacked in column of battalions to the northeast toward the high ground east of HENNEVILLE (097244). Occupation of this objective was prevented by heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. The front line at midnight (1st and 2nd Battalions abreast) had reached 056170 - 073177, and the outer perimeter of the main CHERBOURG defenses had been reached.

e. The 39th Infantry (3rd Battalion) moved to 064144, the other two battalions remaining in place.

f. The 4th Cavalry Group, which had been holding an area between the 9th and 79th Divisions, was attached to the 9th Division, therefore, the east boundary was moved eastward by Corps order to include the area which the 4th Cavalry Group had been holding. This new boundary (as shown on Field Order #5) ran generally through MARTINVEST (110187), HARDINVEST (120165) and railroad bridge at 137116; the old boundary had followed the railroad track all the way.

8. 21 June 1944

a. Division CP: 088070.

b. The plan for 21 June provided that the Division readjust its positions, push reconnaissance of hostile positions to the front, and prepare to continue its advance on CHERBOURG on 22 June.

c. The east boundary was again changed by Corps order back to where it had been previously; it now followed the railroad track again between MARTINVEST (110187) and the railroad bridge at 137116.

d. The 4th Cavalry Group was ordered to move to the northwest flank, relieving the 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry, in order to assist in protecting the Division against a possible attack from the CAP DE LA HAGUE. By evening the 4th Cavalry Group had occupied a dismounted line as follows: 010235 - 012235 - 000230 - 980211.

e. During the night of 21-22 June, the 39th Infantry moved from its positions on the eastern side of the Division sector to an assembly area in the vicinity of 040190. This move was made in order to reinforce the 47th Infantry and give depth to the attack on CHERBOURG.

f. Two squadrons of dive bombers flew a mission at Division request on the strongpoint at 112214.

g. The 47th Infantry, from its positions of the previous day patrolled and probed the enemy defenses vigorously and cleared out pockets; the enemy was active with mortar, artillery and rocket fire.

9. 22 June 1944

a. Division CP: 088070 until 0850 - 027113 after 0850.

b. The attack on 22 June was preceded by an 80-minute aerial bombardment of the CHERBOURG defense area. Thirteen groups of medium and fighter bombers were used by the 9th Tactical Air Force in this operation. In order to ensure the success of the bombardment, the bomblines were marked with white phosphorous by the Division Artillery, and the front lines were marked with panels and yellow smoke. Results of this bombing were very satisfactory, as reconnaissance showed afterward; the enemy appeared demoralized. In addition, the strongpoint, 112214, was again dive-bombed and strafed by two squadrons of P-47's at Division request. This strongpoint was sufficiently reduced by these two missions so that the infantry was able to fight through it with considerably less opposition than had been anticipated.

c. The 47th Infantry jumped off at 1400 at which time the aerial bombardment was concluded, and advancing against stiff resistance from prepared defensive positions and strongpoints, partially took the high ground in vicinity of 089199; the objective of the Regiment had almost been reached. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions proceeded abreast, closely following pre-arranged artillery concentrations fired on call by the 84th Field Artillery Battalion. A strongpoint at BOGUENVILLE (068188) was reduced by artillery fire and by tank destroyer fire. Other strongpoints and centers of resistance were reduced in a similar manner, and numerous prisoners were taken. By 2400 the following positions were occupied: 1st Battalion, 078181; 2nd Battalion, 082205; 3rd Battalion, 088195. The advance of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions continued during the night.

d. The 60th Infantry advanced as planned, meeting heavy resistance along the road running southeast from ST CROIX HAGUE (034238) in the area northeast of ACQUEVILLE (048203). Two counterattacks were repulsed as the advance progressed to the following points: 1st Battalion, 055213; 2nd Battalion, 059219; 3rd Battalion, 046209.

e. The 39th Infantry (assembled in vicinity 040190) was not committed.

10. 23 June 1944

a. Division CP: 027113.

b. The 39th Infantry cleaned up two more strongpoints on either side of the road in the vicinity of BOGUENVILLE (068188), which had been by-passed on either side by two companies of the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry, in their advance on the previous day. The 1st Battalion attacked Hill 131 (060195) capturing bunkers and consolidating their positions thereafter. The 2nd Battalion attacked Hills 138 and 150, both in vicinity of 058208, where they

captured emplacements and took many prisoners; at midnight a definsive position on these hills was occupied. The 3rd Battalion was in reserve at 044186. Thus "battle behind a battle" was fought on this day. The Commanding General was obliged to order road blocks established along roads leading from TEURTHEVILLE HAGUE (060173) to the East in order to lessen the possibility of enemy attack as the 79th Division advanced, since the enemy was being squeezed into the 9th Division's sector behind the 47th Infantry front lines.

c. The 47th Infantry continued its attack at 0700; the 1st Battalion was held up all day by concentrated artillery, mortar and small arms fire at 082180. A map showing the entire ring of fortified positions around CHERBOURG was captured; this later proved to be very accurate. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced to 091211 and 093203 respectively taking several hundred prisoners and a large amount of enemy materiel. Through this operation the high ground overlooking CHERBOURG was taken, and the main perimeter defense of the city was broken.

d. The 60th Infantry improved their positions during the morning on the southeastern slope of the hill northwest of FLOTTEMANVILLE HAGUE (069215) and at 2040, after an aerial bombardment, jumped off toward objective 13 (070215 - 063225) in compliance with verbal orders of the Commanding General. An accurate and effective concentration by the 60th Field Artillery Battalion reduced opposition so that the objective was taken by 2225, and by 2400 the following positions were occupied: 1st Battalion, 077224; 2nd Battalion, 075229; 3rd Battalion, 048220.

e. In the evening, starting at 2030, 32 dive-bombers bombed emplaced guns at QUERQUEVILLE (085265) with disastrous effect, as air reconnaissance by Division Artillery planes showed.

11. 24 June 1944

a. Division CP: 027113 until 2000 - 055187 after 2000.

b. The 39th Infantry was ordered to proceed Northeast and attack abreast on the right of the 47th Infantry, assisting the latter in its advance on CHERBOURG. The 60th Infantry was ordered to protect the left (north) flank of the Division from its positions of the previous night. One company of the 746th Tank Battalion was attached to the 60th Infantry, the remainder awaiting orders in Division Reserve.

c. The attack of the 47th Infantry progressed favorably against stiff resistance, penetrating the fortified zone. The 1st Battalion seized road junctions at 082180 and 089174 clearing out a strong point and taking numerous prisoners; the 1st Battalion then cleared up their area, and later assembled in vicinity of 077207 under Division Control as Division Reserve. The 2nd Battalion reached its objective, front lines at midnight being 110237 - 115233; a German motor park was captured with several hundred prisoners and numerous vehicles. The 3rd Battalion after stiff fighting reached a line (114225 - 120220), a few hundred yards short of their objective.

d. The 39th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) advanced at 0800 as planned, encountering light opposition until 1700 when it was pinned down by machine gun and mortar fire from HILL 128 (123216). The 2nd Battalion succeeded in capturing this Hill by 2100 and consolidated positions in the outskirts of CHERBOURG (123218) for the night. The 3rd Battalion reached 127215 after the resistance from Hill 128 was overcome. The 1st Battalion remained in the same position under Division control, as Division Reserve, and as a guard for road blocks established to protect the open eastern flank.

e. The 60th Infantry remained in position, sending out patrols to mop up remnants of enemy strong points in the rear of the Regiment, and to reconnoiter hostile positions to the North and preliminary to an advance in that direction, once CHERBOURG had been taken. Front line units were subjected to artillery and mortar fire throughout the day from hostile positions to the North and West.

12. 25 June 1944

a. Division CP: 055187.

b. The 60th Infantry continued its mission of defending the northern flank of the Division from its previously occupied positions. Active patrolling took place in all units. The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, in vicinity of 060170, taking over control of the various road blocks which had been erected in the Division area on roads leading South and Southwest from CHERBOURG.

c. The 39th Infantry made slight advances on CHERBOURG, being held up by 20mm AA guns, artillery and small arms fire, and street fighting in OCTEVILLE (124217). 3-inch guns of the attached company of the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion destroyed two 88mm guns with direct fire at 118188.

d. Following up a highly successful bombing mission by a squadron of Thunderbolts (P47s), the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry entered CHERBOURG at 1255 from EQUEURDEVILLE (118217) where a strongly defended fortress was reduced with heavy loss to the enemy. During the afternoon the arsenal area was partially cleaned out but the arsenal itself, composed of subterranean fortifications and thick-walled defensive installations, remained a strongpoint. One platoon reached the beach at approximately 115252. This battalion met heavy resistance all the way; their mortars knocked out seven Nebelwerfers, and attached engineers from the 15th Engineer Battalion cleared lanes through three minefields. The 3rd Battalion (Company C attached), 47th Infantry, advanced initially abreast of the 2nd Battalion, but was held up fighting in front of a strongpoint at approximately 122229. Strong artillery concentrations and heavy fighting on the part of the 3rd Battalion failed to reduce this strongpoint by dark. The 1st Battalion began an advance North between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions but all elements of the battalion except Company C were held up at 120236 in front of a strongpoint. Company C continued its advance, and was attached to the 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry, until the 1st Battalion caught up.

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e. In this day's operation, the 47th Infantry broke into the western side of the city. After having cut the COTENTIN Peninsula and having driven rapidly North against strongly defended field fortifications, units of the Division were the first Allied troops to enter the fortress CHERBOURG. The right flank of the Division was still partially exposed, as the 79th Division front lines were not yet abreast of the 47th Infantry.

f. The Air Support Party arranged bombing missions over heavy gun emplacements in GRUCHY (028281) at 2100, and in GREVILLE (015278). These missions proved by later reconnaissance to have had excellent results, as the heavy guns and surrounding installations were completely destroyed.

13. 26 June 1944

a. Division CP: 055187.

b. On 26 June the attack was continued to complete the occupation of CHERBOURG. The 60th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) was ordered to continue the protection of the Division's northwest flank, and the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, to remain in Division Reserve.

c. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 39th Infantry, took the subterranean naval fortification at SAN SAUVEUR (135225) where General VON SCHLIEBEN, CHERBOURG defense area Commander, and Admiral HENNECKE, as well as their respective staffs, surrendered. The Division Commander was present at this locality and the surrender was made in person to him. When asked if this surrender included the whole CHERBOURG defense, VON SCHLIEBEN replied that he was surrendering only the subterranean fortification at SAN SAUVEUR with the men defending it, and that communications were such that he could not surrender the others even if he wanted to. The 39th Infantry continued mopping up operations and cleared their sector to the harbor.]

d. The 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry, remained in position; the 1st and 3rd Battalions fought all day clearing out machine gun nests and rooftop strongpoints within the city. By dark all organized resistance within the city was crushed except for the arsenal.

14. 27 June 1944

a. Division CP: 055187.

b. General Major SATTLER surrendered the arsenal with his staff and 400 men to the Division Commander at 0930 in response to an ultimatum. At first the Division Commander refused to accept the surrender as General SATTLER withheld information about whether there were mines and booby traps in the arsenal. The surrender was accepted later when the German General relented and stated that on his word as a German Officer, there were no mines or booby traps as far as he knew. In subsequent searches, no mines or booby traps were found.

c. With this surrender, resistance in CHERBOURG ceased, and two German Hospitals were taken with their medical staffs and 2600 patients of whom 150 were American wounded. The Navy was still denied the use of the

harbor because of an isolated fortification manned by a few Germans at the end of the jetty at 147251. This fortification was reduced by artillery fire and a Company of Infantry. In addition, long range coastal guns of high velocity shelled CHERBOURG and Division installations from CAP DE LA HAGUE.

d. Units of the 4th Infantry Division, taking over the occupation of the city, relieved the 39th and 47th Infantry Regiments which moved to the vicinity of TRAISNELIERIE (080230).

e. Three Air Missions were flown on this date at the request of the Air Support Officer. At 1045 two Squadrons of P47s bombed and strafed an ammunition dump at 085261 and three emplaced coastal guns at 061269. The ammunition dump was set on fire and the three guns were neutralized. The third mission, also executed by a Squadron of fighter-bombers was on JOBURG (940292) in which large caliber guns were located. One gun was destroyed.

f. The 60th Infantry took ST CROIX HAGUE 034238.

15. 28 June 1944

a. Division CP: 055187

b. The enemy strength remaining in the CAP DE LA HAGUE was estimated not to exceed 3000, being the remaining elements of the 709th Division, 243th Division, and coastal defense personnel. Later it was found however that the enemy's strength had been underestimated, the true figure being nearly 6000. Determined organized resistance was thought to be probable along the VILVILLE (960237) - CRUCHY (025280) line. The 9th Division regrouped on 28 June in preparation for an attack to the Northwest on 29 June.

c. The 39th Infantry having completed its move into the assembly area shown on overlay to Field Order #11 awaited orders in Division Reserve.

d. The 47th Infantry assembled in an area designated in Field Order #11 pushing reconnaissance forward to the 055 North - South Grid line, in preparation for advance on 29 June along the Northeastern coast on the right of the 60th Infantry.

e. The 60th Infantry occupied the Line of Departure with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions abreast as proscribed in the Field Order - (052258 - STE CROIX - HAGUE - 011222).

f. Three Railway guns at (922313 - 996266 - 985265) were completely destroyed in an Air Support Mission flown by one Squadron of dive bombers and one Squadron of Medium bombers.

16. 29 June 1944

a. Division CP: 055187.

b. There was no change in the 39th Infantry positions as the Regiment remained in Division Reserve in Vicinity of 047226.

c. The remainder of the Division continued its mopping up operations in the Peninsula, advancing to the Northwest against hostile emplace-

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ments and heavy artillery fire. The 47th Infantry took several hundred prisoners and advanced to the following points: 1st Battalion, 044268; 2nd Battalion, 017276; 3rd Battalion, 032279. The 60th Infantry began its attack at 0700 and advanced to the following points: 1st Battalion, 014253; 2nd Battalion, 013256; 3rd Battalion, 009263. Only moderate resistance was encountered throughout the day.

d. Division Artillery fired harassing fires during the night, and numerous long range counterbattery missions on the enemy coastal guns which had been harassing Division installations and traffic. A 20-minute "Zombie" (Division concentration) was fired on enemy tanks, breaking up a counter-attack.

e. Three bombing missions were flown over BEAUMONT HAGUE beginning at 1000. Three squadrons of P47s took part and the effect of bombing was excellent; the strongpoint was reduced to a condition that made it much less of an obstacle to the infantry on 30 June than had been expected. In addition, missions were flown by a squadron of P47s over each of the following heavily fortified positions in the tip of the CAP DE LA HAGUE: East of SEYE (915315); LA BEL ES MARTINS (937325) and 931318. These positions were cleared later by the 39th Infantry, which found them in a demolished condition. In addition to these missions, GREVILLE (015278) was bombed again at the request of the 47th Infantry with good results.

17. 30 June 1944

a. Division CP: 055187.

b. Bombing missions had been planned for known strongpoints and fortifications upon the completion of which the 47th Infantry and 60th Infantry, abreast, were to continue their attack. However, the weather prevented the bombing from taking place, and the attack jumped off after artillery preparations had been fired.

c. The 60th Infantry became engaged in a heavy fire fight shortly after midnight while the 2nd Battalion was passing through the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of 004258. The 3rd Battalion moved forward as scheduled. By 1120 opposition was overcome and the 2nd Battalion had reached BEAUMONT HAGUE (989267) taking 100 prisoners and several 88mm guns. A highly successful bombing mission was flown by 3 squadrons of dive-bombers on the strongpoint LANDES DE JOBURG (958237). By dark, final objectives for the day had been reached, the front lines being generally 940298. This Regiment took about 1000 prisoners during the day.

d. The 47th Infantry also encountered heavy resistance initially, but reached their objectives around midnight against diminishing opposition. The 2nd Battalion had a heavy fire fight in occupying GREVILLE (015278); The 3rd Battalion also had a heavy fire fight in clearing out GRUCHY (026280). The break-through did not come until 1800 and by midnight advance elements reached 975310 and 990295.

e. The 39th Infantry moved to new assembly areas near BEAUMONT HAGUE (989267) in preparation for their attack on 1 July.

18. 1 July 1944

a. Division CP: 055187.

b. The 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry (reinforced) operating under Division control, detrucked near Road Junction 133 (929306) during the night 30 June - 1 July in preparation for their attack on AUDERVILLE (922324). Elements of the 9th Reconnaissance Troops preceding this battalion had already reached the edge of AUDERVILLE, taking several prisoners and securing information of enemy positions from friendly civilians. At 0400 the 3rd Battalion moved north against the town, attaining complete surprise, and by 0500 they secured the objective, reporting "everything here gave up". Patrols were sent further to ST GERMAIN (930323) and COURV (935329). At 1000 the 3rd Battalion reported that 1,000 prisoners had been taken, and that the peninsula was clear of the enemy as far north as AUDERVILLE (922324) and west from there to the coast. In addition the following material was captured:

- 2 10-inch railway guns, 360° traverse.
- 4 155mm Howitzers
- 5 88mm SP guns
- 2 47mm guns
- 10 20mm guns.

The 39th Infantry (less 3rd Battalion) continued their movement to AUDERVILLE at dawn. At 1310 the 39th Infantry reported that their entire area was clear of the enemy.

c. The 47th Infantry continued mopping-up operations in the area secured the previous day, in which they reported "the Germans are just sitting around waiting to be taken". Their area was cleared by 1430.

d. The 60th Infantry reported their sector clear of the enemy at 1400, and at 1500 the 9th Division reported officially to VII Corps that all organized resistance had ceased on the CAP DE LA HAGUE, and that the Division was assembling preparatory to moving South to a bivouac area.

e. In accomplishing the mission of overcoming enemy resistance in the CAP DE LA HAGUE, the 9th Infantry Division had successfully completed its operations in the COTENTIN Peninsula.

19. Day by day take of prisoners:

14 June 1944 --	3	23 June 1944 --	295
15 June 1944 --	43	24 June 1944 --	400
16 June 1944 --	125	25 June 1944 --	1015
17 June 1944 --	173	26 June 1944 --	3095
18 June 1944 --	405	27 June 1944 --	6046
19 June 1944 --	712	28 June 1944 --	454
20 June 1944 --	95	29 June 1944 --	426
21 June 1944 --	37	30 June 1944 --	2077
22 June 1944 --	105	1 July 1944 --	2984

Total 18490

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Of this total, approximately 750 were taken in cutting the peninsula, 11,800 in the advance to CHERBOURG, and 5,940 in the CAP DE LA HAGUE. The VII Corps took a total of 32,018 prisoners from D-Day through 1 July 1944.

Section IV - Supply

1. Supply:

a. Supply operations functioned very smoothly during this campaign and presented no particular problems.

b. Unit distribution of rations was made to the three Infantry Regiments; truckhead distribution to the remainder of the Division and attached troops. Class I supplies were actually issued on the following basis:

10-in-1 Type	66.0%
5-in-1 Type	5%
C Type	28.0%
D Type	2.0%
K Type	3.0%
Hospital Supplement Ration	5.5%

c. Water was abundant throughout the area and the 1/50,000 scale map proved a reliable guide for locating water point set-ups. Normally three water units were in operation with one in reserve. Forward water points were established well forward in the general area of the Division Medium Artillery in order to give combat units maximum service. This also reduced the amount of traffic and the target which vehicles on roads afford enemy aircraft and artillery.

d. Gasoline consumption averaged 4.4 gallons per gas consuming vehicle per day. This average is slightly greater than in SICILY due to the fact that a greater use of vehicles was made possible in NORMANDY by the favorable terrain. It must also be understood that the present T/E allows the Division 17% less gas consuming vehicles than were authorized in SICILY, therefore, the use per vehicle in NORMANDY was greater.

e. Ammunition expended for the period was 1805 tons. Based on ETOUSA Unit of Fire, dated 10 December 1943, this amounts to the following Units of Fire per weapon for the entire 16-day period that this Division was in combat as a whole:

Small Arms:

Carbine	1.1 Units
M1903	2.4 "
M1	3.7 "
M.G, 30 cal.	12.9 "
M.G, 50 cal.	0.1 "
Thompson, Sub-M.G.	8.0 "
Rocket, 2.36", A.T.	2.1 "

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<u>Mortar:</u>	
60mm	242 Units
81mm	69 "
<u>57mm, A.T.</u>	044 "
<u>Artillery:</u>	
105mm (All Types)	790 "
155mm	844 "

Throughout the operation there was a shortage of fragmentation grenades and colored smoke of various types and colors. A Forward ASP (No. 702) was established by the Army, approximately 25 to 35 miles from the using units, but the supply was never sufficient to meet requirements and trucks had to be driven approximately 60 additional miles for their loads. In some cases this resulted in trucks being on the road from 10 to 12 hours before ammunition was delivered to combat units.

2. Ordnance Maintenance:

a. Due to the short campaign and favorable terrain, wear and tear on motor equipment was no greater than that encountered in garrison, excluding losses due to combat. Forty (40) vehicles, or 2% of the Division T/E allowance, were lost due to combat. Sixty-five (65) percent of these were 1/4 ton trucks.

b. Great use of small arms, especially Browning Automatic Rifles and 81mm Mortars in this operation, produced an unprecedented rate of repair and replacement in these weapons.

3. Evacuation:

a. Evacuation of casualties was rapid and very efficient. The majority of the wounded were evacuated from Battalion Aid Stations within an hour of being injured. The cover offered by hedge rows aided medical units greatly and shortened litter hauls. The litter jeep was especially useful in this campaign on the numerous farm roads in transporting patients to ambulance collecting points. Evacuation was persistently harassed by enemy snipers.

b. A Field Hospital Platoon was usually established in close proximity to the clearing station. This proved valuable in the disposition of seriously wounded cases unable physically to be transported to evacuation hospitals.

c. The following is a summary of casualties evacuated during the period of this report:

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Disease</u>	<u>Injury</u>	<u>Exhaustion</u>		<u>Total</u>
					<u>Mental</u>	<u>Physical</u>	
Division Total	390	1851	754	163	121	27	2921
Evacuated		1523	590	114	70	8	2305
Returned to Duty		328	164	54	51	19	616
*Other Units		1049	70	52	17		1188
Evacuated		1043	65	50	17	0	1175
Returned to Duty		6	5	2	0	0	13
Grand Total	390	2900	824	220	138	27	4109

*Includes enemy, civilians and other U.S. and Allied Troops.

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d. The Division Psychiatrist supervised the handling of all combat exhaustion cases. It was found possible to return 43% of these men to their original duty.

4. Burial: 9th Division dead were buried in Division plots in the Corps Cemetery located at ST. MERE EGLISE. The work was done by Corps G.R.O. Company under the supervision of the Division Quartermaster G.R.O.

5. Salvage and Captured Materiel:

a. Considerable enemy materiel was captured or overrun by this Division. Tactical demands made it impractical for organizations of the Division to adequately guard or move this materiel, however, an officer was appointed to locate and record necessary information concerning all enemy supplies and equipment within the Division sector, and daily reports were submitted to Corps and Army. Similar reports were made to relieving units and supporting salvage troops. Artillery and antiaircraft guns were disarmed at the earliest opportunity to prevent enemy stragglers from firing these pieces after our forward troops had passed. The following is a general summary of enemy supplies and equipment captured during the period of this report:


- (1) 229 vehicles actually accounted for, including trailers.
- (2) 104 guns of various types and calibers, including 4-155mm coastal guns, 2-210mm railway guns and several nobelwerfers.
- (3) Naval Arsenal at CHERBOURG with huge quantities of mines, explosives, small arms ammunition, 210mm shells, paint, foodstuffs and several thousand rifles.
- (4) General Von Schlieben's Headquarters, CHERBOURG: Huge quantities of small arms and ammunition, signal equipment and foodstuffs.
- (5) Several hospitals, in and around CHERBOURG, containing large quantities of medical supplies and equipment.
- (6) Twenty engineer dumps containing various items of engineer equipment, including concrete mixers, air compressor, power shovels, 900 sacks cement, blacksmith shop, crane, narrow gauge railway equipment, complete with locomotive and dump cars, rock quarry and stock pile of crushed rock, personnel and land mines.
- (7) Large quantities of foodstuffs, including sugar, flour, coffee and canned vegetables and fish.
- (8) 33 horses, 25 saddles and 15 sets of pack equipment.
- (9) Quantities of signal equipment, including radar station, two radio stations, two searchlights and combination lighthouse and signal tower.
- (10) Numerous launching runways for robot planes.

6. Traffic: Because of an adequate road net with numerous side roads, traffic was not a particular problem in this operation.

7. Construction and Maintenance of Roads: No new roads were constructed during this period. Maintenance consisted of replacing small bridges and culverts, filling bomb craters, removing road blocks, clearing debris and widening. The absence of mines in any quantity was a source of constant surprise and satisfaction. The following is a tabulation of work performed by the 15th Engineer Battalion during the period 10 June to 1 July 1944:

Bomb Craters Filled: 37
Roads Checked for Mines: 43 miles
Areas Checked for Mines: 3 square miles
Mines Lifted: 172
Mines Layed: Defensive Road Blocks for 60th R.C.T.
Roads Widened: 2 miles
Roads Cleared of Debris: 37 miles
Road Blocks Removed: 23
Culverts Built: 5
Bridges Built (Treadway): 5
Bridges Built (Timber): 1
Dumps Operated: 2 (Bridge Dumps)
Water Point Setups: 12
Water Put out to Troops: 647,000 gallons
Cross Country Blasting of Hoggerows to Permit Passage
Tank Destroyers: 5 miles

8. Service Troops and Trains: Service troops and trains were kept well forward because of the rapidly moving situation. This further relieved unit transportation for tactical use and eliminated traffic congestion within the Division area.


M. S. EDDY,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.



**AREA TAKEN by the 9th INFANTRY DIVISION
IN THE COTENTIN PENINSULA FRANCE**
12 June to 1 July 1944
 colors & dates show successive advances

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PRESENT CAMPAIGN

1. Effect of hedgerow terrain on infantry tactics: In effect, hedgerows subdivide the terrain into small rectangular compartments which favor the defense and necessitate their reduction individually by the attacker. Each compartment thus constitutes a problem in itself. On approaching such a compartment, the scouts must be particularly watchful, especially on the corners, where the enemy is frequently found commanding approaches from adjacent compartments. Fire from automatic weapons, light mortars and rifle grenades, directed at the corners and along the hedgerows themselves, whether or not an enemy was known to be present therein, was found to be frequently effective. The entire operation resolved itself into a species of jungle or Indian fighting, in which the individual soldier or small groups of soldiers play a dominant part. Success comes to the offensive force which employs the maximum initiative by individuals and small groups.

2. 4.2 inch chemical mortars in close support of infantry: An effective weapon which was found to be most useful when employed in the same manner as the 81mm mortar, employing observers with assault companies and liaison with the battalion commander.

3. Tank destroyers and self-propelled artillery as assault guns in attack on automatic weapons and fortified localities: The tank destroyers should remain in rear of the assault battalion areas. When a suitable target is found, the platoon leader or gun commander should go forward and reconnoiter gun positions and route thereto, before bringing the gun forward. When the target is reduced, the tank destroyer should withdraw to a position in rear of the infantry until a new target is found. Under no circumstances should the guns advance until the infantry has proceeded and located targets. A very effective weapon when thus properly employed.

4. Developments in the attack of fortified positions: Best results were obtained when air bombardment took place when the assaulting troops were not more than 1000 yards from the target, and when they moved in rapidly thereto as soon as the bombardment was over. Since even this limited advance required valuable time, it was found best to cover the target with light artillery fire until the attackers had advanced to a point not more than 400 yards from the target, at which time the heavy artillery concentration could be delivered, followed immediately by a rapid advance of the infantry. When such tactics were employed, success invariably followed. If, on the other hand, air bombardment took place at too great a distance from the attacking troops, it was found habitually that the defenders had an opportunity to recover and to man their positions before the attackers could arrive. In the final assault, tank destroyers and 57mm guns, if they could be spared from their primary role, were found most useful in firing at the apertures of strong points to cover the advance of demolition parties.

5. Employment of infantry and artillery with close air support:
Largely covered in paragraph 4, above.

6. Additional notes:

a. Antitank guns: Towed 57mm guns were virtually useless in the close country encountered. Such weapons assigned to the antitank companies certainly, and probably those assigned to battalions, should be on some type of self-propelled mount. The present gun cannot be placed in position sufficiently promptly, except along roads.

b. Infantry cannon: The present 105mm howitzer is too heavy a weapon for accompanying use by the infantry, nor does it have the requisite mobility. The towed 75mm howitzer (pack), which can be towed, transported in a truck, packed on mules, or carried by hand for short distances, is best adapted for use as an infantry accompanying weapon, and should be adopted.

TACTICAL STUDY OF THE TERRAIN

1. AREA COVERED.

a. The area covered is the southern COTENTIN PENINSULA, roughly bounded on the north by the 08 grid line, and on the south by the line LESSAY (1876) - CARENTAN (4084). The map used is FRANCE, 1/25,000.

2. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA.

a. DRAINAGE SYSTEM.

(1) East: The eastern portion of the area under consideration is chopped up by a criss-cross of rivers and streams, as well as drainage ditches and canals. The lowland west of CARENTAN, and the valleys of the DOUVE and MERDERET RIVERS are inundated and provide major obstacles to cross-country movement. The DOUVE is 80 feet wide at CARENTAN, and 30 feet wide at ETIENVILLE (2793). The MERDERET forks northwest and northeast south of FRESVILLE (3200). From VALOGNES (2408) to the fork, the MERDERET is fed by many tributaries, each forming small valleys.

(2) West: The principal streams flow west-east, except for a stretch in which the DOUVE flows north-south, and forms, in effect, the eastern boundary of the objective. The southwestern tributary (unnamed) of the DOUVE creates a wide and partially inundated valley about seven miles long, which, by joining the main DOUVE valley cuts the peninsula from coast-to-coast. Another important river is the SEYE, which flows from west to east just north of the division objective - roughly paralleling the 01 and 02 grid lines - until it meets the DOUVE at approximately (1602). The SEYE has one major tributary, flowing south from BRICQUEBEC (1205). The DOUVE is joined at (1998) by the BABUET, which, by connecting with an unnamed river, parallels the 97 grid line to the sea. At LESSAY, the AY RIVER creates an inundated area in from the sea which narrows the gap through which entrance to the peninsula from the south could be effected. The only rivers wider than 20 feet are the DOUVE, the MERDERET, and the AY.

b. RIDGE SYSTEMS.

While the entire area is relatively low, there are three principal ridge systems in the area under consideration, each a part of the main, ill-defined ridge system of the peninsula, which extends from ST. VAAST to the west coast, and thence south to LESSAY. The ridge systems with which this study is primarily concerned are:

- (1) The jagged hill mass north of the SEYE RIVER and west of BRICQUEBEC.
- (2) The ridge described as the Division objective, i.e., the high ground centering at 0898, west of ST. SAUVEUR.
- (3) The high ground to the south of (2), surrounding the town of LA HAYE DU PUIITS, and including Hills 120 and 131.

In general, the highest elevations of the three ridge systems or hill masses are from 120 to 140 meters, with some high points reaching a maximum of 150 meters in (1), 145 meters in (2), and 131 meters in (3).

In the east there is no pronounced ridge system, but the rivers, principally the MERDERET and its tributaries, segregate masses of elevated ground which in the main does not reach in excess of 30 meters except just north of the line MONTEBOURG (3105) - VALOGNES (2408), where two points reach 119 meters each.

c. ROUTES.

Due to the marshy nature of much of the area, making it difficult for vehicles to leave the roads, the COTENTIN PENINSULA is reported as the weakest point, from a military point of view, in the road system of northwest FRANCE. However, there is a network of secondary and third class roads which have been developed, and while not entirely to be depended upon for accommodating heavier types of mechanized equipment, should afford adequate routes of communication for an infantry division in dry weather (while perhaps restricting enemy armor). In the "bocage" country, which includes much of the area under consideration, roads generally have embankments three or four feet high at each side, surmounted by thick hedges. The principal routes within and leading to the tentative Division sector are:

(1) CARENTAN - MONTEBOURG - VALOGNES - CHERGOURG. A first class road, 20 feet or wider.

(2) "BEACH ROAD", paralleling the landing beach, about 3000 yards inland. A wide, secondary road which leaves the main road (1) just north of CARENTAN and at FONTENAY-SUR-MER (353055) and (350075) makes junction with roads joining the main road at MONTEBOURG. This road is connected with the landing beach by at least six good roads.

(3) LESSAY - LA HAYE DU PUIITS - ST. SAUVEUR - VALOGNES. A first class road crossed by the CARTERET- CARENTAN road at LA HAYE DU PUIITS, and making junction with good secondary route to CHERBOURG via BRICQUEBEC at ST. SAUVEUR. This is the main approach to our area from the south, and LA HAYE DU PUIITS is seen to be a key point on the road system, a junction of roads leading north, south, east, and west.

(4) CARTERET - LA HAYE DU PUIITS - CARENTAN. A secondary road, 10 to 20 feet wide, except for a narrower short stretch from ST. JORES eastward, cutting across the peninsula at the base. From CARTERET the road continues north parallel to the coast, joining the beach at DIELETTE (9714).

(5) CARTERET - BRICQUEBEC - VALOGNES. A good secondary road,

(6) ST. SAUVEUR - PORTBAIL (0789). A good secondary road, which crosses the CARTERET - LA HAYE DU PUIITS road midway between those points. This road roughly parallels a possible defense line back of the probably-inundated extension of the DOUVE Valley.

(7) PERIERS - ST. JORES - VALOGNES. A good secondary road. To be noted that ST. JORES is junction point of north-south and east-west roads and a key point in road system. PERIERS is of importance as a junction of three roads leading into the peninsula.

(8) There is a net work of roads shown on map FRANCE 1/25,000 as paved and three to six meters wide; shown on MICHELIN road map (1938) as being below secondary rating but regularly re-metalled; but which are not shown on the maps and overlays accompanying the terrain studies prepared by higher headquarters. These roads connect the more important north-south roads described above, and some are of tactical significance. One connects the main highways (1) and (3) between STE. MERE EGLISE (350964) and ST. SAUVEUR, via ETIENVILLE. Another cuts across the center of the area via STE. MERE EGLISE - GOURBESVILLE (2798) - STE. COLOMBE (202985) - ST. JACQUES (135985). Paralleling it on the north is a road FRESVILLE - LE HAM (280014) - COLOMBY (225022) - BRICQUEBEC. Maintenance of all but priority roads has been poor since 1939 and some of the roads may present difficulties, particularly on the worn edges.

(9) Railroads. There is but one double-track, standard gauge railroad line traversing the peninsula from CHERBOURG to CARENTAN, via VALOGNES, and thence eastward to CAEN. A single-track line leaves the main line north of BRICQUEBEC and joins another line near LA HAYE DU PUIITS, the cross line linking CARTERET and CARENTAN. The north-south line continues south from LA HAYE DU PUIITS to LESSAY, PERLIERS, and beyond.

d. BEACHES.

The landing beach is that at the southeast corner of the peninsula, from LA MADELEINE (4695) to GRAND HAMEAU DES DUNES (4203). This is a Beach 49 in ISIS REPORT OF FRANCE, VOL. 2, "NORMANDY WEST OF THE SEINE". The beach consists of four miles of firm, level sand 700 yards wide. Landing of infantry can be carried out at any state of the tide. If the strip of soft sand at high water were bridged, the beach suitable for M/T. Infantry could move inland everywhere along this beach. For further details, attention is invited to ISIS report.

e. GENERAL NATURE OF THE TERRAIN.

(1) East and central: This consists generally of a low marshy plain, with a coastal border of low-lying meadow land now inundated. The flat river valleys are a conspicuous feature and at several places broaden to form wide expanses of pasture known as "Prairies Marecageuses". These tracts are liable to be marshy in winter and spring; some, notably the PARIRIES MARECAGEUSES DE GORGES to the west of CARENTAN, are permanently marshy. If dry, river valleys are under rich pasture with tree-lined or hedged fields. Behind Beach "Utah" the ground rises to about 60 feet, sloping on the other side to the valley of the River MERDERET. Across the valley and north of the DOUVE it rises to 90 feet. At the northern edge of the area under consideration, at the general line MONTEBOURG - VALOGNES, the ground begins to rise more sharply.

(2) West: The Pariries south of ST. SAUVEUR give place to the steep hill country east of CARTERET. Around LA HAYE DU PUIITS these hills rise steeply from plains and are clothed with fields, pasture and heathland. LA HAYE DU PUIITS itself lies in a deep valley with high hills on all sides. The hilly country is largely "bocage", with much pasture land. Fields are bordered by hedges and trees. There are more orchards and fewer woods to the south. Rivers are sluggish and meandering, some forming deep and narrow valleys. Along the west coast is the series of important high points, described in 2 b.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN.

a. AVENUES OF APPROACH AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

(1) There are six or seven roads leading from the beach, across the inundated area, to the north-south Beach road. The use of connecting roads from the beach exits to the arterial system will depend upon the amount of destruction by the withdrawing enemy. The First Army Engineer contemplates the possibility of a serious engineering problem, perhaps requiring construction of plank roads. From the beach road to the main CARENTAN - MONTEBOURG - VALOGNES Road is a series of secondary and third class roads, spaced approximately 3000 yards apart.

(2) Westward avenues of approach:

- (a) FRESVILLE-LE HAM-COLOMBY-BRICQUEBEC; thence BRICQUEBEC-CARTERET or BRICQUEBEC-PORTBAIL.
- (b) STE. MERE EGLISE-GOURBESVILLE-STE. COLOMBE-ST. JACQUES-BARNEVILLE.
- (c) STE. MERE EGLISE-ETIENVILLE-ST. SAUVEUR-PORTBAIL.

(3) In defense of Division area, our lines of communication would be restricted to those from the east. From the north, the enemy would have three main avenues of approach:

- (a) The coastal highway into CARTERET.
- (b) The series of minor roads running generally north-south, between the coastal highway and BRICQUEBEC.
- (c) The CHERBOURG-BRICQUEBEC highway, and the roads out of BRICQUEBEC (leading to CARTERET, to PORTBAIL, to ST. SAUVEUR).

If BRICQUEBEC were denied the enemy, his avenues of approach for an attack southward would be seriously restricted. For an attack northward, from the south, his routes are even more restricted - to the highway LESSAY-LA HAYE DU PUIITS-CARTERET, and possibly LA HAYE DU PUIITS-ST. SAUVEUR. In defending our area from attack from the south, our local lines of communication would be ample.

b. OBSTACLES.

(1) General: There are obstacles to movement in all directions. Major obstacles are the low flooded areas immediately behind the landing beach; in the valleys of the MERDIERET and the DOUVE, and the swamp land at the neck of the peninsula between CARENTAN and LESSAY. The "bocage" districts, with their ditches, embankments, hedges, stone walls, and orchards, present individually small but collectively important obstacles. There are fewer natural obstacles in the southwestern peninsula. The numerous streams provide obstacles of varying importance.

(2) The DOUVE River and the bridges across it. All bridges as they now exist are good, but demolition may be expected. The DOUVE is

55 feet wide at ST. SAUVEUR, and 25 feet at its junction with the SEYE. The availability of fords has not been determined.

(3) The SEYE River. The river is 20 feet wide, and probably has a drop from the bank to the water surface. Much of the SEYE flows through a steep-sided valley.

(4) Southern extension of the DOUVE. Probably inundated as far west as ST. SAUVEUR DE PIERRE PONT (1589), although there are indications that the inundation is receding eastward. A bridge crosses the inundation at this point. Hills 120 and 131 dominate the crossing.

c. CONCEALMENT AND COVER.

Cover and concealment are spotty. Orchards, woods, ditches, embankments, and brushwood can be utilized. In many places it is difficult, if not impossible to leave the roads to secure cover, due to the density of the trees lining the roads, or the hedges and embankments. On the low-lying meadowland of the south, cover and concealment are lacking.

d. OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE.

The same factors which influence concealment and cover act to obstruct observation and limit fields of fire. What appears on the map to be a good observation point, or to have a good field of fire, may actually be restricted by obstacles to vision and fire. The high ground in the west should afford observation to north, east, and south. If the enemy holds the area of the Division objective, he will have observation from Hills 120 and 131, and from the elevated ground west of ST. SAUVEUR.

4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES.

- a. The inundated area back of the beach.
- b. The DOUVE and MERDERET Rivers, and their inundated valleys.
- c. The ridge on the axis 2107-1904-2400.
- d. The SEYE River.
- e. Hill 90 and 110, between which passes the ST. SAUVEUR-PORTBAIL Rd.
- f. Hills 120 and 131, key points of the enemy defense.
- g. The ridge 0498-1198 (high ground of Division objective) and the high ground to the northwest (0400). These slopes offer observation and fields of fire in all directions, isolating CARTERRET and dominating the BRICQUEBEC-CARTERRET Road. High points of the entire area are 065987 and 103980, each 140 meters.
- h. The river extending from BARNEVILLE along the southern base of the above ridge, connecting with the BABUET at 1196, and proceeding westward to the DOUVE.

i. The unnamed river branching from the DOUVE at 2392, forming a flat valley and prairies, inundated to 1539, and overlooked by Hills 120 and 131.

j. The GRIS and OLLANDE Rivers, which meet at 104900.

k. The high ground centering at 2380 and 2384, overlooking the LESSAY-LA HAYE DU PUIITS and CARENTAN-LA HAYE DU PUIITS Roads, the railroad, and the dry passage at the base of the peninsula.

l. ST. SAUVEUR and the high ground to the east. ST. SAUVEUR is center of road net.

m. The hill mass north of the SEYE River, west and north of BRICQUEBEC, Hill 120 (1405), and BRICQUEBEC itself.

n. LA HAYE DU PUIITS, key road center.

5. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN.

a. The primary objective of the Allied forces is to secure the Port of CHERBOURG. The primary effort of the enemy can be expected to be the defense of the port. Our forces, by landing in the center of the peninsular coast, and by airborne landings, can by seizing key points dominating entrance to and exit from the peninsula, cut off the enemy troops fighting defensive action in the north. The enemy must attempt to hold open these routes. It is to be expected that the eastern entrance to the peninsula, through CARENTAN, will be denied him immediately.

b. The enemy's first strong defense line probably must be the high ground in the area MONTEBOURG-VALOGNES, and behind the DOUVE and MERDERET Rivers, with the intention of holding the general line VALOGNES-ST. JORES-LESSAY, in order to defend CHERBOURG and hold open his lines of communication with the "mainland". This line is fronted by streams and marshes which provide natural defensive obstacles.

c. If CARENTAN is denied the enemy early, and a sufficiently deep beachhead quickly established, his north-south lines of communication will be immediately restricted to LESSAY-LA HAYE DU PUIITS-ST. SAUVEUR-VALOGNES, and LESSAY-LA HAYE DU PUIITS-CARTERET north. The latter he must hold at all costs, if he either to evacuate or to reinforce the peninsula.

d. An early objective of the attacker must be the crossings of the DOUVE to cut off from the south of the ridge system between the DOUVE and MERDERET, as an envelopment of VALOGNES must be via that ridge, on the left. Of key importance is ETIENVILLE, junction of the VALOGNES-ST. JORES-LESSAY and the STE. MERE ENGLISE-ST. SAUVEUR Roads.

e. The capture of VALOGNES, contemplated by D plus 2, and of ST. SAUVEUR by airborne troops, would restrict the enemy prior to D plus 4 to lines of communication west of the line CHERBOURG-BRICQUEBEC-LA HAYE DU PUIITS.

f. There are three primary routes open for the westward movement of the D plus 4 force, outlined in Par. 3 a (2). The final selection of routes must depend upon the tactical situation on D plus 4. The best route, physically, appears to be STE. MERE EGLISE-ETIENVILLE-ST. SAUVEUR, but if the enemy has not been driven from Hills 120 and 131, and the area to the south, he will be capable of interfering with movement on that road. The northernmost of the three routes, leading into BRICQUEBEC, is under observation of the high ground around BRICQUEBEC, and if that town and the hills to the east and west were still held by the enemy, its use could be denied to us.

g. If the enemy is not driven from the low hills between the MERD-ERET and DOUVE Rivers by the assault force (4th Division) he could interfere with our movement from the ridge running on the axis 2107-1904-2400, and the high ground north and west of ST. SAUVEUR. The former is hemmed in by the two centering at 2492. From there an attack could be made to the northwest along the ridge, and/or to the southwest toward ST. SAUVEUR. Elements on the LE HAM-COLOMBY road could attack the tip of the ridge from the north. Lateral communication between the two forces would be provided by the ETIENVILLE-VAL-OGNES road at the western base of the elevation (2492).

h. The high ground east of ST. SAUVEUR should be taken if the DOUVE is to be crossed there or north of STE. COLOMBE, as it offers elevation for observation across the river. The enemy has observation of the entire east side of the river, if he still holds the west side.

i. A serious problem may be that of crossing the DOUVE at any point, in the face of enemy opposition. There are four bridges on our routes - at ST. SAUVEUR, STE. COLOMBE, RUE DU PARD (170006) and L'ETANG BERTRAND. Aerial photographs indicate a number of small crossings, evidently for carts, all along the river, and it is probable that infantry could ford the river at various points, depending upon the depth of the water at the time. Rivers now relatively shallow may be fuller after the Spring rains. There must be prompt reconnaissance of river crossings.

j. West of the DOUVE a number of situations may exist on D plus 4, depending upon the success of the assault force, and the ability of the enemy to bring in reinforcements and launch counter-attacks.

(1) It is probable that the enemy will hold the high ground around LA HAYE DU PUIS, and that he will at least make every effort to include Hills 120 and 131 in the ground that he holds. It should be presumed that he does.

(2) The enemy may hold the high ground around BRICQUEBEC and north of the SEYE.

(3) He may hold the ridge which is the Division objective, and command the crossing at ST. SAUVEUR, which is reportedly a strong point.

(4) He may hold everything west of the DOUVE, both north and south of the SEYE and north and south of Hills 120 and 131.

ATTENTION INVITED TO ACCOMPANYING ANNEX "A"

ANNEX "A" TO TERRAIN STUDY

1. SITUATION.

a. One infantry regiment is advancing west astride the road COLOMBY-L'ETANG BERTRAND. A second regiment is on the route ORGLANDES-STE. COLOMBE.

b. The enemy is holding the high ground west of the DOUVE and south of the SEYE; the situation north of the SEYE is not known. The 82nd Airborne Division occupies the area immediately west of ST. SAUVEUR.

2. MISSION.

a. The mission of the Division is to secure the high ground west and northwest of ST. SAUVEUR, south of the SEYE.

3. AVENUES OF APPROACH.

a. The route of the 39th Infantry from the point 222002 toward BRICQUEBEC follows the axis of a ridge running SE to NW. The ridge continues northward, providing observation and covering fire for a crossing of the river as far north as the 05 grid line. Along the entire route are smaller connecting roads running to the river, and a lesser road parallels most of the river bank. At 193024, the east-west road is crossed by a road which could be used as an alternate route of approach. This route would pass through MAGNEVILLE (185015)-VGE GALLET (180020) and across the bridge at 160022 (see Grandcamp bridge, below). At 188028, the main road is joined by another road into VGE GALLET. The nature of the terrain is such that troops could deploy off the roads to approach the river at most places, moving behind the cover of hedges. The hedges, which may be entirely of vegetation, or, as in southern England, of earth topped with hawthorne, would impede the progress of vehicles, but probably openings for $\frac{1}{4}$ tons could be made.

b. The route of the 60th Infantry from ORGLANDES-STE. COLOMBE road is crossed by the COLOMBY-ST. SAUVEUR road. Like the road to the north, this NE-SW road is joined by numerous lesser roads leading to the River DOUVE. Here again, foot troops can deploy through the fields, using hedges for cover, but having to force openings for vehicles. From ST. SAUVEUR to about the 97 grid line is a small ridge (30 to 40 meters) which would provide some observation and covering fire for a river crossing between STE. COLOMBE and ST. SAUVEUR.

4. CROSSINGS.

a. BRIDGES.

(1) NEGREVILLE (185065)

Length of bridge	- - - - -	30'
Width of river	- - - - -	20'
Depth of river	- - - - -	2-3'
Banks	- - - - -	6-8'; steep earth with revetment on east bank.
Approach	- - - - -	Meadows with trees and thick hedges along road.

(2) L'ETANG BERTRAND (176033). (This is a dam and bridge).

Length of dam and bridge - - - 135'
Width of river at dam - - - 90'; at bridge - - 10'
Depth of river at dam - - - 10-12'; at bridge - - 1-2'
Banks - - - - - 6-8'; earth revetted.
Approach - - - - - Meadows and orchards.

(3) GRANDCAMP (160022)

Length of bridge - - - - - 70'
Width of river - - - - - 25'
Depth of river - - - - - 3-4'
Banks - - - - - 6-8' at 4 to 1
Approach - - - - - pasture and hedges

(4) RUE DE PAIT (170037)

Length of bridge - - - - - 55'
Width of river - - - - - 35'
Depth of river - - - - - 3-4'
Banks - - - - - 6-8' at 3 to 1
Approach - - - - - on east, 12' ditches beside
road; on west belt of trees
and orchards.
Foot bridge - - - - - 6' wide, at 172006

(5) STE. COLOMBE.

Four bridges are crossed on this road, of which details are available for three.

(a) Bridge at 199986

Length of bridge - - - - 40'
Width of river (branch) 10'
Depth of river - - - - 3-4'
Banks - - - - - 5'
Approach - - - - - Buildings and gardens.

(b) Bridge at 196983 (over dam).

Length of bridge - - - - 45'
Width of river (DOUVE) - 30'
Depth of river - - - - 4-6'
Banks - - - - - 6-8' at 4 to 1
Approach - - - - - Meadow, pasture and hedges
on east; farm buildings and
orchard on west.

Timber farm bridge - - - 8' wide and 30' long, at
197990; no approach on west.

(c) Bridge at 193984.

Length of bridge - - - - 50'
Width of river (branch) 30'
Depth of river - - - - 3-4'
Banks - - - - - 4-6' at 4 to 1
Approach - - - - - Meadowland; bushes on west.

Current is slow.

b. OTHER CROSSINGS

- (1) From ST. SAUVEUR to STE. COLOMBE, the map shows no crossings. There are indications that fording would be difficult.
- (2) At VGE GALLET (1802) there is a bridge.
- (3) Aerial photos indicate some small foot bridges being laid by Germans.
- (4) It is probable that river can be forded at several points, north of COLOMBE.

5. GENERAL TERRAIN NOTES (DOUVE).

a. From NEGREVILLE (1806) south along the river the land appears marshy, with a gradual rise from the river of about a 1 to 20 grade. Exceptions are:

- (1) At L'ETANG BERTRAND (1703) there is steep approach to bridge on east side, with a switchback.
- (2) At the river bend at 160023, the bank is steep on the NW side and gradual on the SE.
- (3) Above VGE GALLET, from 180022 to 1830 27, there is a stretch which appears poorly suited for troop crossing; muddy with numerous ditches.
- (4) From the dam at 176033 up the river to 188046, it appears to be marshy.
- (5) From 197000 to 193963 there is a marshy stretch, with numerous streams 6-8 feet wide. The DOUVE is wide in this area.
- (6) From 197980 to ST. SAUVEUR, the banks are sharp.

6. ROUTES AFTER CROSSING DOUVE.

a. IF ENEMY IS NOT NORTH OF SEYE.

(1) Regardless of the point of crossing the DOUVE, the 39th Infantry can proceed either to BRICQUEBEC via main road or along good secondary road paralleling the SEYE westward.

(2) No information is available as to the crossings of the SEYE, but a study of aerial photographs indicates that the river is neither too wide nor too deep to be crossed by foot troops, even if bridges are blown, and that banks are not excessively steep, at least east of the 10 grid line.

(3) The highway south from BRICQUEBEC splits at 119028, the two roads then paralleling one another at approximately a 1200 yard inter-

val to and beyond the lateral STE. COLOMBE-ST. JACQUES-BARNVILLE road. A third major road, BRICQUEBEC-BARNEVILLE, crosses the SEYE at 066019.

(4) If the bridges between STE. COLOMBE and NEHOU are not blown, or are still usable (which is likely even if demolition is attempted) the 60th Infantry can proceed astride the main road. At NEHOU (188985), good secondary roads branch from the main east-west highway, joining with other secondary roads to make a network of usable roads. Of particular importance is the road from MULAC (182998) to ST. JACQUES, which parallels the NEHOU-ST. JACQUES road.

b. IF THE ENEMY HOLD BRICQUEBEC.

(1) If BRICQUEBEC and the high ground around it are held by the enemy, the securing of Hills 80 (139032) and 120 (140048) is necessary. The roads referred to in 5 a (1) meet on Hill 80. From there several roads lead northward to Hill 120. That hill also is approached by at least one good secondary road out of L'ETANG BERTRAND.

(2) If it is necessary to fight for BRICQUEBEC, it may be decided to swing the 60th Infantry north before crossing the DOUVE. If one regiment crossed in the vicinity of L'ETANG BERTRAND and another at VGE GALLET or GRAND CAMP, the two could converge on Hill 80, one from the east and one from the south. If it is decided to attack Hill 120 from the east or northeast, the road north from L'ETANG BERTRAND, joining the VALOGNES-BRICQUEBEC road, provides lateral communication between the roads approaching the objective.

7. CONCLUSIONS.

a. It must be established promptly whether or not the enemy holds the area around BRICQUEBEC.

b. Early and thorough reconnaissance must be made to ascertain the condition of river crossings; and the availability of fords and crossings not shown on present studies. Particularly intense reconnaissance of the DOUVE 1500 yards on either side of STE. COLOMBE is required.

c. On both sides of the river, troops can deploy off the roads; there are adequate second class roads for normal vehicular transportation.

d. If BRICQUEBEC is not held, it is recommended that one regiment cross the DOUVE at 160022 or L'ETANG BERTRAND, moving westward along the road which parallels the River SEYE, of tenable; or L'ETANG BERTRAND-BRICQUEBEC road. The attack to the south to be along the two roads crossing the SEYE at 106010 and 119009. A second regiment (60th) to attack westward on the axis STE. COLOMBE-BEHOU-ST. JACQUES, utilizing, if desirable, the road 1200 yards (approx) north of the main road. The 47th Infantry can (a) occupy BRICQUEBEC, (b) be prepared to reinforce the 39th, (c) be prepared to flank the enemy by advancing southwest along the BRICQUEBEC-BARNEVILLE road.

ATTENTION INVITED TO ACCOMPANYING ANNEX "B"

ANNEX "B" TO TERRAIN STUDY

1. ROUTE, STE. MERE EGLISE TO DOUVE RIVER. (Proposed route, 60th Infantry and Divarty; see map).

a. ROADS AND BRIDGES.

(1) The road from STE. MERE EGLISE (350964) to the railroad crossing (323960) is hard surface and 14 feet wide.

(2) Railroad crossing (323960): The road crosses over the railroad, which runs through a deep cut at this point. This cut could be a considerable hazard to vehicular traffic if the bridge over the railroad were blown. The cut runs some 500 yards north and south of the bridge site. About 500 yards north of the overhead crossing is a level crossing accessible by a secondary road which leaves the main road at 327961 and rejoins it at 314956 (MERDERET Bridge). An equal distance to the south is another overhead crossing - - - a secondary road which parallels the main road from STE. MERE EGLISE, finally joining it at 317957.

(3) Should the MERDERET be so inundated that crossings are restricted to main roads and bridges (which is probable), and those bridges destroyed beyond repair, an alternate route would be necessary. A suitable alternate, seinging north around the inundation, would be STE. MERE EGLISE-NEUVILLE-RJ 334996-FRESVILLE (323999)-GRAINVILLE-GOURBESVILLE. (Use of this route would affect the movement of the 39th and 47th Infantry; see par. 2 a (5).

(4) The bridge over the MERDERET (314956) is 12 feet wide and 24 feet long. It joins a 300-400 yard fill across the inundated area. It is improable that inundation will cover the road, but both bridge and fill are subject to demolition.

(5) From the end of the fill (309958) to GOURBESVILLE (283980) the road is hard surface, 12 to 14 feet wide. From GOURBESVILLE to the bridge at (282983) is 20 feet wide.

(6) The bridge (282983) is 12 feet long, with 18-foot-wide road. The stream is only about 3 feet wide and is probably 3 to 4 feet deep. From the bridge to ORGLANDES (255985) the road is hard surface, about 16 feet wide.

(7) It is possible that some short distance could be saved, and populated areas by-passed, through use of an alternate road between 295965 and ORGLANDES. This is an unpaved secondary road for approximately half the distance (to RJ 279971) and at this date its condition is not fully known.

(8) The road from ORGLANDES to STE. COLOMBE (202986), via HAUTTEVILLE BOCAGE is surfaced and 12 to 16 feet wide.

b. COVER.

(1) Roads along route are either hedge-rowed or ditched, which will restrict deployment of vehicles. Ditches and hedge-rows provide some cover for infantry and for individual vehicles.

(a) Around STE. MERE EGLISE, scattered cover.

(b) From STE. MERE EGLISE to MERDERET River, hedge-row cover.

(c) At MERDERET crossing, some vehicular cover, and hedge-row cover for infantry.

(d) In the vicinity of AMFREVILLE, hedge-rows and sparse orchards.

(e) About 500 square yards of woods west of AMFREVILLE at 280966, with orchards and hedges nearby. Accessible by road.

(f) AMFREVILLE-GOURBESVILLE-ORGLANDES-STE. COLOMBE, orchards and hedge-rows provide cover.

2. ROUTE, FRESVILLE TO DOUVE RIVER. (Proposed route, 39th Infantry and 47th Infantry; see map).

a. ROADS AND BRIDGES:

(1) The road LE VAL (330996)-RJ 307007-stream crossing (298007) is a hard surface, adequately wide road. However, at 300004 the road comes within a few feet of the edge of a deep pit. Recommended as better road is the secondary road, 307007-303010-299006. This road is satisfactory surface, and 8 to 10 feet wide.

(2) The railroad crossing at 297007 is a level grade crossing, and the road from there to bridge at 276015 is wide and surfaced.

(3) Bridge and mill west of LE HAM (at 276015): Overall length of bridge, 100 feet, road width, 20 feet. Width of stream, 50 feet upstream, 30 feet downstream. Bottom is silt on hard bottom. Current slow. Liable to flooding in wet seasons. Approaches are meadow, with hedges on western side, and buildings and mill yard on eastern side. There is good alternate bridge site 20 yards upstream. There is about 800 feet of fill to the west from the bridge.

(4) The road from LE HAM to 260015 is hard surface, 16 feet wide. It is good surface, 12 feet wide, through 254014, 253016 to 237009. It is hard surface, 12 to 14 feet wide, from there to COLOMBY. From COLOMBY to RJ 222002 it is 20 feet wide, narrowing to 16 feet the rest of the way to L'ETANG BERTRAND. (176035).

(5) If 60th Infantry had to by-pass MERDERET inundation (see Par. 1 a (3)), going through FRESVILLE, it might be necessary to in turn re-route the 39th and 47th, sending them north on the STE. MERE EGLISE-MONTEBOURG highway to RJ 321027, thence via ECAUSSEVILLE (312025)

to railroad crossing at 2970073

b. COVER.

(1) The general situation as regards cover is same as on southern route. (see Par. 1b (1).

ATTENTION INVITED TO ACCOMPANYING ANNEX "C"

A MORE DETAILED STUDY OF MERDERET VALLEY IS FOUND IN ANNEX "C"