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REPORT ON OPERATION

CONDUCTED BY

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION


UNITED STATES ARMY

NORTHERN TUNISIA

11 APRIL - 8 MAY 1943

E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION

A.P.O. # 9

Report on the Operation


conducted by

THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION, U.S.A.

in

Northern Tunisia

11 April - 8 May 1943



HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
A. P. O. # 9

10 September 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Operations.

TO : The Adjutant General, U.S.Army, Washington, D.C.

THRU : Commanding General, II Corps, APO #302

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Section II - General
Section III - Operations
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and Battle Lessons for
Training Purposes.

SECTION I - AUTHORITY

1. In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, a report on the operations conducted by the 9th Infantry Division in northern Tunisia from 11 April to 8 May is hereby submitted.

SECTION II - GENERAL

2. Preceding Operation. The last operation of the 9th Infantry Division preceding that described in this report was in southern Tunisia, near El Guettar, and terminated 8 April 1943.

3. Troops Employed for Allied Offensive in Northern Sector. The 1st and 8th British Armies, and the II U.S. Corps, all under direct command of 18th Army group, were employed in the Allied offensive in the northern sector.

a. The 1st and 8th British Armies included nine British infantry divisions, three British armored divisions, and four French infantry divisions.

b. The II U.S. Corps consisted of three infantry divisions and one armored division, and some 4000 French volunteers and native troops. A fourth infantry division was arriving when the operation ended.

c. The 9th Infantry Division consisted of the following:

ASSIGNED

39th Infantry
~~47th Infantry~~
~~60th Infantry~~
9th Signal Company
9th Medical Battalion
9th Quartermaster Company
9th Reconnaissance Troop
15th Engineer Battalion
709th Ordnance Company
Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery
Hq. & Hq. Company, 9th Infantry Division
26th F.A. Battalion
34th F.A. Battalion
60th F.A. Battalion
84th F.A. Battalion
Military Police Platoon

ATTACHED

91st Reconnaissance Squadron
434th C.A. Battalion (AA)
185th F.A. Bn. (155mm how.) (with 1 Btry. 107th C.A. (AA) attached)
62nd F.A. Battalion
36th F.A. (1 Battery 155mm guns)
Battery "H" - 67th C.A. (AA)
894th Tank Destroyer Battalion
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion (attached 26 April-4 May)
Company "C" - 751st Tank Battalion (attached 5 May-18 May)
20th Engineers (attached 8 May - 20 May)
Corps Franc d'Afrique, consisting of
 (a) 3 Infantry Battalions
 (b) 1 Marine Battalion
 (c) 4 Tabours of Goums

4. Directives. Under authority letter, HQ 18th Army Group, 26 March 1943, to Commanding General II Corps, the 9th Infantry Division was designated to move upon completion of the El Guettar battle to the Sedjenane sector in northern Tunisia, where it was to relieve the 46th British Infantry Division which, at that time, was a part of the V British Corps of the 1st British Army. The 9th Division was later again placed under control of II American Corps on 18 April.

5. Corps Objectives. II Corps was to capture the high ground east and west of Choigui and protect the left flank of British V Corps; capture the Bald and Green Hill positions, exploiting toward Mateur, and seize the high ground dominating RJ 5094. II Corps was then to (a) secure suitable positions for the attack on Bizerte, covering the left flank of 1st Army, and (b) to advance and capture Bizerte, with the cooperation of 1st Army on right flank.

6. Command. II U.S. Corps was to remain under 18th Army Group, but for these operations the actions of II U.S. Corps were to be co-ordinated by British 1st Army, which would issue necessary instructions and orders direct.

7. Commanders. During this operation II Corps was commanded by Major General Omar N. Bradley, who had replaced Lt.-Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. The 9th Infantry Division was commanded by Major General M.S. Eddy. All French troops attached to the 9th Division were commanded by General of Brigade Magnam.

8. Intelligence. Information available at the opening of this operation seemed to indicate that the enemy was weak in artillery (10-15 pieces only was the estimate) and that tanks (some two dozen were reported in reserve on the plains southwest of Tunis) would be used as mobile artillery. His morale was not high except in a few units, but he was intensively organized for defense, with key high ground protected by mine fields and good fields of fire. No strategic infantry reserves were believed to be available.

The Germans held three principal positions in the area, all astride natural approaches. They were (1) the Jefna position, of which Djebel Azzag (3877) (Green Hill), and Djebel Ajred (3872) (Bald Hill) were the main features, heavily fortified and completely dominating approaches along the main and only road from the west and the valley through which it led. (The British had assaulted these hills three times unsuccessfully.) (2) high ground commanding the head of the Sedjenane Valley approximately along grid line 33, of which Djebel Ainchouna (3281) and Djebel Dardys (3489) were the principal features; and (3) the high ground astride a secondary road to the north, of which Ac es Zapa (4295) and Djebel Touro (4397) were the principal features. Field Order #20 issued by this Headquarters (see Appendix "A") indicates the extent of the knowledge of enemy forces in our possession prior to the opening of this operation.

9. Terrain Study. A fully detailed study of the terrain over which this operation was fought is attached hereto as Appendix "B".

10. Division Objectives. The initial Division objectives were to capture the enemy position at Djebel Ajred, J3775, as the first objective,

and RJ J4983 as the second objective, and then to exploit in the direction of Mateur. The Division was also to seize the high ground dominating RJ J5094. The Corps Franc d'Afrique, attached to the Division, was to seize this latter objective.

11. Previous Operations in This Sector. The British 46th Division, which the 9th Infantry Division relieved, consisted of but two brigades, and had been holding positions generally west of the 27 grid line, and between the 73 and 83 grid lines for some weeks following a successful advance from the west.

12. Movement Into Position. The first elements of the 9th Division left the Bou Chebka area on 9 April, proceeding to Roumes Souk, and during the period 12-16 April the relief of the British 46th Division was completed. The 47th Infantry was first to go in, relieving the southern (138th) brigade of the British 46th Division generally astride the main road at 0200 hours the morning of 13 April. On 14 April, at 0400 hours, the 2nd Platoon of the 9th Reconnaissance Troop moved from their CP (which was established $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Sedjenane) to the vicinity of Bazina, Tunisia, where it relieved the British 46th Reconnaissance Squadron at 0500, with the mission of counter-reconnaissance in the vicinity of Bazina. At noon of the same date, Company "F" of the 47th Infantry was sent to occupy Djebel Tabouna; and on the night of 15-16 April the 39th Infantry relieved the northern brigade of the British 46th Division, just south of the Sedjenane Valley. The 60th Infantry, the last to arrive from the south, was held in concealed bivouac well to the rear just west of Djebel Abiod, until 19 April.

13. Plan of Attack.

a. The Division commander early decided that a frontal assault on the Green-Bald Hill position would be so costly as to be unwarranted. He therefore decided on a scheme of maneuver, whereby the bulk of the Division would be employed in a wide flanking movement through the extremely difficult terrain to the north of the main road, with the object of out-flanking the hostile positions and cutting the enemy's lines of communications to the north and northeast. It was realized from the start that such a maneuver would be hampered by the almost total lack of communication throughout the area to be traversed. However, it was anticipated that the Germans would not suspect the attempt of a maneuver of this difficulty provided that our troops could be moved into position without their presence being disclosed. Secrecy therefore, was an essential in order to preserve the element of surprise.

b. In preparation for the attack a meticulous study of the terrain was made, and dominating observation was selected for each of the intermediate objectives to be captured by each regiment each day. While each of these objectives was not always captured on the planned dates, most of them were eventually occupied, and in every case such occupation proved decisive in outflanking the German resistance encountered.

c. It was decided that on the extreme left (north) flank the French troops would move forward between the 60th Infantry on their right and the coast of the Mediterranean, through an area where it was believed the resistance would be the least. One of their main objectives was the seizure of the dominating observation afforded by Kef en Nsour.

d. The 60th Infantry, moving forward by stages under cover of darkness, commencing on the night of 19-20 April, was to initiate its attack from an area generally west of the 30 grid line and north of the Sedjenane Valley. It was assigned four intermediate objectives and one final objective to be captured within a period of five days. Its final objective completely dominated the main north-and-south road.

e. The 39th Infantry, moving forward a short distance to the area generally west of the 28 grid line and south of the Sedjenane Valley, was to attack for the capture of three intermediate objectives and one final objective in a period of five days. Its final objective likewise completely dominated the main road.

f. The 47th Infantry, moving forward to the area just west of the 32 grid line and astride the main road, would conduct a holding attack against the enemy's main position atop Green and Bald Hills. It would employ one battalion on its right (south) flank for a limited objective attack on D-day, but no serious attempt was to be made for the reduction of the German main position until the advance of the 39th and 60th Infantry had outflanked these positions to the northeast.

g. The 1st American Infantry Division would occupy the position on the right (south) flank of the 9th Division, but there would be a gap of some $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles separating the two units. To fill this gap the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was to relieve Company "P" of the 47th Infantry on Djebel Tabouna and the 9th Reconnaissance Troop in the vicinity of Bazina, and be employed with instructions to maintain contact with the 47th Infantry on the north and the 1st Infantry Division on the south. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was also instructed to reconnoiter actively and vigorously to the east in an effort to divert the attention of the Germans from the north.

h. The extreme width of the front, approximately 28 miles, posed a difficult problem for the Artillery Commander, who would be forced to scatter his units widely. As a solution the light battalions were employed in their normal roles in direct support of the three infantry regiments, the 26th with the 39th Infantry, the 84th F.A. Bn. with the 47th Infantry, and the 60th F.A. Bn. with the 60th Infantry. The medium and heavy artillery were divided into two groups, one to be employed on the south and the other on the north. But even though the units were widely separated on this front, artillery control was centralized until the pursuit phase commenced. Many of the artillery positions were inadequately protected by

infantry, however, particularly in the Sedjenane Valley. In an effort to remedy this situation, the 9th Reconnaissance Troop, the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the Division Artillery and largely employed on protective missions in the Sedjenane Valley.

i. It was anticipated that supply difficulties to the north would be insurmountable without special arrangements. The French had reported with virtually no transportation. A small number of trucks were turned over to them from the Division pool. A total of three-hundred mules was obtained for supply purposes, and for several days the 39th Infantry and 60th Infantry were forced to rely on this means of transportation almost completely.

SECTION III - OPERATIONS

14. APRIL 11:

a. II Corps troops on the move northward for re-grouping and the beginning of a new offensive.

b. The 9th Division, with the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 434th CA Battalion (AA) attached, ordered to Roumes Souk from Tebessa this date.

15. APRIL 12:

a. On this date Field Order #19, Headquarters 9th Infantry Division, was issued, directing the Division to relieve the 46th British Division in place in the Sedjenane sector. The 4th British Division was to be on our right, and the 3rd Battalion Corps Franc d'Afrique (attached to the 9th Division) in the Cape Serrat area on our left. (A copy of this Field Order is attached hereto in Appendix "A".)

b. The forward CP moved to Djebel Abiod from Bou Chebka.

16. APRIL 13:

a. The 60th RCT rejoined the 9th Division, arriving in bivouac at Bou Chebka by midnight this date, less one infantry battalion.

b. At 0200 hours this date the 47th Infantry relieved the southern (138th) brigade of the British 46th Division.

17. APRIL 14:

a. At 0400 hours this date the 2nd Platoon of the 9th Reconnaissance Troop moved to the vicinity of Bazina, Tunisia, where it relieved the British 46th Reconnaissance Squadron at 0500.

b. At noon this date Company "F" of the 47th Infantry was sent to occupy Djebel Tabouna.

c. The battalion of the 60th RCT which had remained at Maknassy area to police the battlefield, arrived at Bou Chebka by midnight this date.

d. At the same time, the detail of 100 officers and men policing the El Guettar battlefield arrived at Bou Chebka and were attached to the 60th CT for the move north.

18. APRIL 15:

a. Little activity. The 84th F.A. Battalion fired seven missions (290 rounds) with excellent effect.

b. The 39th Infantry relieved the northern brigade of the British 46th Division, just south of the Sedjenane Valley, this night.

19. APRIL 16:

a. The 60th RCT arrived at Roumes Souk 5:30 p.m. The plan was to move north on the 18-19 April.

b. The 28th Signal (Radio Intelligence) Company was attached.

20. APRIL 17:

a. 91st Reconnaissance attached to the 9th Division.

21. APRIL 18:

a. At 1800 hours II Corps assumed command of all troops within Corps boundary, relieving British V Corps of this command.

b. The 60th RCT moved from Roumes Souk to a concealed bivouac west of Djebel Abiod.

c. British Stirling, Halifax and Lancaster bombers operated at night in this area.

22. APRIL 19:

a. This night two battalions of the 60th RCT moved forward under cover of darkness so as to be in the vicinity of 1177 by daylight

of 20 April.

23. APRIL 20:

a. Continuing its move forward stage by stage the 60th RCT moved again this night beginning at 1930 hours so that by daylight 21 April two battalions would be in the vicinity of 2288 and one battalion in the vicinity of 1177.

b. 9th Division Headquarters (Forward echelon) closed its CP at 2000 hours and arrived in the new area vicinity of Sedjenane at 2230 hours.

c. Field Order #20, Headquarters 9th Infantry Division, was issued this date, and put the 1st American Division on our right for the pending operation, instead of the 4th British Division as recorded in Field Order #19. (Copies of Field Orders #19 and #20, as well as Annex #1 and Annex #2, are attached hereto in Appendix "A").

24. APRIL 21:

a. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, covering the $6\frac{1}{2}$ -mile gap between the 9th Infantry Division, and the 1st Division on its right (south), received urgent instructions from Division G-2: "You will actively and vigorously push reconnaissance tonight (21-22 April). Enemy capable of attack at any time. Little contact over entire sector all day."

b. Timed to reach its assembly area by daylight 22 April, the 60th RCT moved out after dark on foot, on the final stage of its move into position.

25. APRIL 22:

a. By daylight this date all units were in their attack positions and all plans had been perfected.

b. Command of the north sector reverted to the Commanding Officer (General of Brigade Magnan) Corps Franc d'Afrique, effective on the opening of the CP, CFA, this morning. (Corps Franc had previously been attached to 60th Infantry.)

26. APRIL 23:

a. The attack started at 0530 this date. By 1100 it was reported that all regiments had reached their D-day objectives with little opposition. Orders were issued accordingly to press on to the D-plus-1 objectives.

b. It later developed that this satisfactory report was true on the north and south flanks. It was not true in the center where the 39th Infantry had encountered heavy resistance on the dominating hill, Djebel Ainchouna. By nightfall, its leading elements were in a state of confusion and had only reach the lower slopes of the Djebel.

c. Col. J. Trimble Brown was relieved as commander of the 39th Infantry and Brigadier General Donald A. Stroh, Assistant Division Commander, assumed command until such a time as the requested replacement could be received from II Corps.

d. During the afternoon the 60th Infantry on the left, meeting increased terrain difficulties but little opposition, reached a point about mid-way between their D-day and D-plus-1 objectives.

e. The Corps Franc d'Afrique by evening of the first day was held up by resistance on Hill 107 (3493).

D+1

27. APRIL 24: On this date the Corps Franc, with the support of an additional battalion of light artillery, captured Hill 107, where enemy resistance had been encountered the previous day.

b. The 60th Infantry occupied Djebel Dardyss (3489). Progress however was slow because of the steepness of the hills and the thickness of the vegetation, which was so bad at times that the men had to crawl on hands and knees to penetrate it.

c. A German force estimated at a battalion counter-attacked the 2nd Battalion of the 60th Infantry in an effort to retake the hill. They were beaten off by rifle and machine-gun fire, and a later advance by the 60th over the ground the enemy had occupied revealed a count of 116 enemy dead in the area.

d. The 39th Infantry resumed its attack on Ainchouna and reached the summit. Here its leading battalion was seriously opposed by heavy enemy fire from the north and east. Several senior officers became casualties and it was only by the superior leadership of a junior captain (Capt. Conrad V. Anderson) that the battalion was able to retain its precarious hold on the mountain.

e. The 47th Infantry, in accordance with plan, made no advance during the day.

f. Activities on the front of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron were again limited to patrol action.

28. APRIL 25:

a. On this date the situation on the north flank indicated the possibility of a German counter-attack. This did not materialize.

b. The 60th Infantry held their position during this day, moving

up supplies and preparing an advance on 26 April.

c. The Corps Franc likewise held their positions.

d. The 39th Infantry, employing a fresh battalion and with excellent field artillery support, completed the occupation of the summit of Djebel Ainchouna, driving out strong German defense forces.

e. The 47th Infantry advanced two companies about a mile to the east without serious difficulty and seized Hills 502 and 598.

f. The fall of Ainchouna deprived the Germans of much of their observation over Sedjenane Valley. It was possible thereafter to push reconnaissance with mechanized elements well to the east in this valley.

29. APRIL 26:

a. By this date it was evident that the Corps Franc was not sufficiently powerful to continue its advance abreast of the 60th Infantry and to reach the eastern exit of the Sedjenane Valley.

b. Division G-2 reported prisoner-of-war information indicating the presence of an enemy position on Djebel Cheniti.

c. The direction of the advance of the 60th Infantry was accordingly changed toward the northeast, to assist the Corps Franc by outflanking the Ac es Zapa (4295) and Djebel Touro (4397) position from the south.

d. The 39th Infantry was to continue its enveloping movement to the east and southeast.

e. The above plan resulted in divergent attacks on the part of these two regiments with an ever-widening gap on their interior flanks. While such a gap implied a serious element of danger, it was felt that the Germans could not counter-attack through it with any degree of strength.

f. The 39th Infantry advanced two battalions to Djebel El Akrat (3480) the D-plus-1 objective of this regiment, thus resuming the step-by step advance as planned.

g. Activity in the 47th Infantry zone was limited to patrolling in the direction of Green-Bald Hills where it was ascertained that no signs of German withdrawal were yet evident. Apparently he had not yet become alarmed by the progress of our enveloping forces.

h. Col. William L. Ritter was assigned to the 39th Infantry this date as Regimental Commander.

30. APRIL 27: D+4

a. Little progress was made on 27 April except in the zone of the 39th Infantry where a battalion was successfully advanced to the Hill 382, Ridge, 3681. This resulted in the regiment's being disposed in column of battalions from east to west, with the 2nd Battalion on Hill 382, Ridge, 3681; the 3rd Battalion on Djebel El Akrat; and the 1st Battalion on Djebel Ainchouna.

b. German reaction to the advance of the 39th Infantry now became marked and the 2nd Battalion, which continued to hold this position for the next week, was constantly subjected to mortar and artillery fire.

31. APRIL 28: D+5

a. By this date supply difficulties in the zone of the 60th Infantry had become so serious that it was hoped to continue the advance to the northeast, close to the valley of the Sedjenane, along which a reasonably passable road led. Such an advance, however, neglected the capture of the dominating terrain to the east, principally that afforded by Kef en Nsour.

b. For the moment logistics triumphed over tactical operations, and the 60th Infantry was directed to move to the northeast, astride the river valley, with the Corps Franc advancing on their left.

c. The 60th was successful in occupying Kef Sahan, 3988, on this date.

d. During the afternoon the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, was moved from its position on Djebel Ainchouna by a circuitous route to the northeast and successfully occupied a position on Hill 377 (3783) preparatory to an advance the following day to Hill 406 (3882).

e. No change resulted in the disposition of the remaining elements of this regiment, nor in those of the 47th Infantry.

32. APRIL 29: D+6

a. On this date it became evident that the Germans were occupying in considerable force the dominant observation east of the zone of advance of the 60th Infantry, and that unless these observers were driven off the advance of the regiment would be impossible. Accordingly, plans were made to turn one battalion to the east against Kef en Nsour, which, it was hoped, could be reached by darkness this date. So great were the supply difficulties however, and so difficult the terrain that it sometimes required two days to progress a mile and bring up the supplies for further progress. Enemy resistance was not great but

Nature provided the greatest of impediments. The 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry, was unable to occupy Kef en Nsour for three days

b. The 39th Infantry on this date was preparing plans for a co-ordinated attack on Hill 406, which was to prove one of the turning points of the entire campaign.

c. The 47th Infantry in its zone continued patrol activity against Green and Bald Hills and succeeded in holding down the German fire from those hills with their own supporting weapons.

33. APRIL 30:

a. The attack of the 39th Infantry on Hill 406 on this date was completely successful. One battalion occupied this hill, and one pushed forward to the east as far as Spur 299 (3982) leaving one battalion on Hill 382. This area completely dominated the complicated terrain just to the south, as well as the road leading northwest toward the head of Sedjenane Valley. It was evidently in this area that the Germans had concentrated many of their supply dumps and other installation for the support of their Green-Bald Hill positions. With the dominant observation in our possession, effective shelling of these installations was possible. In a single day the 26th F.A. Battalion fired over 4,000 rounds with devastating effect. The main German defenses had now been outflanked and, the next day, their withdrawal to the northeast began.

b. Events in the 60th Infantry zone were moving satisfactorily. While the 3rd Battalion was still unable to advance against Kef En Nsour, the 1st Battalion occupied Djebel Guermach (4188) and prepared to advance one company to the east to assist the attack of the 3rd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, moving to the northeast, was abreast of the French on their left, and in a position to assist our allies in seizing the high ground at the eastern exit of the Sedjenane Valley.

c. The gap between the southern flank of the 60th Infantry and the northern flank of the 39th Infantry, because of their divergent attacks, had now been enlarged to about four miles. There were some indications that the Germans would take advantage of this gap, counter-attack through it toward the head of Sedjenane Valley, and relieve the pressure on their main positions. To meet such an eventuality, the light tank company of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was moved to the vicinity of 3086, and dismounted elements of the 9th Reconnaissance Troop, as well as the 894th and 601st Tank Destroyer Battalions, were placed in a defensive position on Djebel Mahata (3885).

d. The 47th Infantry had perfected plans and had made the necessary reconnaissance to move one battalion into the valley north of Green Hill, and to attack that hill from the north on 2 May in connection with the advance by the 39th Infantry.

34. MAY 1:

a. On this date orders were received from II Corps to suspend all further offensive action pending certain re-grouping on the remainder of the Corps front. Accordingly, plans for the attack on Green Hill were suspended and all units prepared to remain in the positions then occupied.

b. The only movement ordered on this day was that of the 9th Reconnaissance Troop from the head of the Sedjenane Valley to a zone on the south flank of the 47th Infantry, where it was to operate in conjunction with the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron in filling the gap between the 47th Infantry and the 34th Infantry Division, which had been committed on the north of the 1st Infantry Division on about 28 April.

c. The 39th Infantry was warned to hold its present position at all costs pending issuance of further instructions.

35. MAY 2:

a. On this date there were definite indications that the Germans were withdrawing in the direction of Mateur. The Corps commander directed that the 9th Division pursue vigorously to the northeast, leaving one infantry regiment to guard the approaches on the south.

b. The capture by the 60th Infantry of Ac es Zapa and Kef en Nsour caused the fall of Kef les Sba and Djebel Touro, and permitted the advance of Corps Franc d'Afrique to Djebel Cheniti.

c. The 39th Infantry was ordered to reorganize in the vicinity of its position (4680-4383) and prepare for movement.

d. A rapid advance was begun all along the line. Patrols were pushed forward and found a large amount of enemy equipment. Kef en Nsour was occupied without resistance.

36. MAY 3:

a. One battalion of the 39th was ordered to move to Hill (433813-435835); one battalion to Hill 299 (392823); and one battalion to maintain its position on Si Ahmed Ben Ali (3779). It was to patrol vigorously toward Hill 375 (389785) and be prepared to occupy it on further orders.

b. The advance all along the line continued.

c. The evening of this date the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Infantry moved by motor from 4092 in Sedjenane Valley, through the 60th Infantry to a position on the north flank at 405917.

37. MAY 4:

a. By 1100 hours this date the remainder of the 47th Infantry was assembled in the vicinity of J390921, preparing to attack to the east.

b. The Corps Franc, generally along the 53 grid line, had found the enemy in strength on Djebel Cheniti (5596), and was unable to advance.

c. The 60th Infantry assembled near the exit of the Sedjenane Valley, with the exception of one battalion which had gained a position on Dar Loubia (4892).

d. The 39th Combat Team, assembled in the area (4680-4383), was preparing to move to seize the main road junction to the east and to reconnoitre toward Mateur. The 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to this Combat Team.

e. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop and the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron were in their previous zones.

f. Company "A", 751st Medium Tank Battalion, having been attached to the Division, was moved to the vicinity of Sir Helia (4196).

g. The 185th F.A. Battalion was detached from us and returned to control of the 34th Infantry Division.

h. The artillery with the Division, less the 26th F.A. Battalion, which was attached to the 39th Infantry, had been moved as far forward as practicable toward the eastern exit of the Sedjenane Valley.

i. Having now advanced approximately 12 miles in 13 days, capturing a total of 815 prisoners together with much material and equipment, the Division had reached the last of the hills leading to Bizerte. It had captured both of its assigned objectives - the Green-Bald Hill area and the RJ at 5094.

j. The Division was now confronted with the difficult task of fighting its way out of these hills with extremely inadequate lines of communication. There was but a single road leading to the east from the Sedjenane Valley. Movements south of this road were totally impossible due to the Garet El Ichkeul. The hills north of the road as far as the seacoast were strongly held by the Germans. Progress on the road, even if it could be made under fire, was impossible for wheeled vehicles due to the fact that the bridge over the Oued Douimiss, on the 54 grid line, had been blown. In other words the Division was confronted with the necessity of advancing across an isthmus less than eight miles wide, with but a single road on the extreme south flank. Of the German positions confronting us, that on Cheniti appeared to be the most formidable. The Germans here adopted their usual tactics of holding strongly the exits of all bottlenecks.

38. MAY 5:

a. It was apparent that efforts must be made to fight for elbow room, to drive the Germans from Cheniti and the hills to the north, and to construct a new road to the northeast, along which artillery could be displaced and supplies moved as the attack progressed. It was fully recognized that a frontal assault on Cheniti would probably be unnecessarily costly, whereas an advance north of that hill might result in outflanking it and making its subsequent capture relatively easy.

b. Accordingly the 47th Infantry was directed to attack on this date for the capture of the line: Hill 131 (5898); Hill 158 (5999); Hill 125 (5700).

c. The attack of the 47th Infantry was begun early on this date, but by dark had made insufficient progress to warrant a direct attack on Cheniti.

d. The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, relieved elements of the Corps Franc west of Cheniti on the night of 5-6 May, and thoroughly reconnoitered approaches from the hill and position areas for supporting weapons.

39. MAY 6:

a. The attack of the 47th Infantry was resumed on this date, and by noon of this day had made sufficient progress to warrant a direct assault on Cheniti.

b. The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, assaulted the northwest slopes of Cheniti with the bayonet shortly after noon this date, the men following artillery concentrations at one hundred yards or less. The attack was completely successful, and by evening Hill 168 (5497) and the saddle between that hill and Hill 207 (5596) were in our possession.

40. MAY 7:

a. Early on this date the 47th Infantry continued its advance to the east against weak opposition and was soon in possession of its objective.

b. The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry, completed the capture of Cheniti, and moved to the eastern edge of that ridge.

c. The 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry, moved east along the southern slopes of Cheniti and took position on Hill 114, which was reached without opposition.

d. The capture of Chenibi permitted the repair of the crossing over the Oued Douimiss. Prior to noon, Company "A" 751st Tank Battalion (M), and the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion passed this crossing, moved east and thence north under orders to reconnoiter the hills to the north and to overcome any opposition found therein.

e. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop moved east along the road to Bizerte, removing a mine-field at the road junction at 5796, and continued its reconnaissance to the east.

f. By mid-afternoon all indications pointed to the fact that the Germans not only had withdrawn on the Division front but had also evacuated Bizerte.

g. The mechanized force (Company "A", 751st Tank Battalion (M), and the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion) was ordered into town. They entered Bizerte at 1550. They encountered street sniping and were subjected to artillery fire from enemy positions across the channel to the southwest. They accordingly withdrew early on the night of 7 May to the vicinity of the airport.

h. Just before dark the 47th Infantry was directed to assemble and to move at once to the high ground northwest of Bizert. This move was completed shortly after midnight 7-8 May.

i. At the same hour, one battalion Corps Franc, which had been relieved by the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry and were assembled in reserve, was ordered into position on the left (east) flank of the 47th Infantry. The purpose being to extend to the French the courtesy of being the first to enter Bizerte.

j. The 39th Infantry Combat Team was attached to the 1st Armored Division for operations east of Mateur on this date.

41. MAY 8:

a. By daylight this date the French forces were along the northern exits of Bizerte.

b. The 60th Infantry was moved to the east and occupied the high ground generally along the 61 grid line.

c. On the afternoon of this date reports from II Corps indicated that a large force of Germans had been trapped on the peninsula southeast of Bizerte. Since this force was being attacked from the east, it was surmised that they might make a desperate attempt to escape across the channel into Bizerte. To meet such an eventuality, a provisional force consisting of the 47th Infantry, the Corps Franc, the 84th Field Artillery Battalion; Company "A" 751st Tank Battalion (M); and the 894th T.D. Battalion, was organized to defend the channel and the Mediterranean coast line east of Wadi Meragia.

e. The channel and the coast line in the vicinity of Bizerte was strongly defended with automatic weapons, artillery, and tank destroyer weapons. No attempt at crossing materialized.

42. MAY 9:

a. On this date, and for several more days, the 9th Reconnaissance Troop and infantry patrols thoroughly scoured the country northwest of Bizerte and brought in a few scattered prisoners discovered in that area.

b. The Sedjenane-Bizerte campaign was at an end.

SECTION IV -- RESULTS OF OPERATION

1. In this operation the 9th Division had successfully taken its assigned objectives with a minimum loss of life.

2. The 9th Division had demonstrated that it was able to take advantage of the lessons learned at El Guettar. It had substituted sweat for blood. It had maneuvered the Germans out of one position after another. The wide envelopment to the north undoubtedly came as a complete surprise to the enemy. With one exception when co-ordinated attacks became necessary, as at Ain-Chouna on 25 April, and Cheniti on 6 May, commanders were given ample time to make detailed plans and reconnaissance.

3. Finally, the infantry had learned the important lesson of following artillery concentration closely as was exemplified in the capture of Cheniti the last remaining German defensive position west of Bizerte.

SECTION V -- SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

1. ORDNANCE:

a. Units Serviced. Units serviced by the 9th Division Ordnance during this operation included the ten major units of the Division, and 8 attached units, including Tank Destroyer Battalions, Anti-aircraft Battalions, and the Corps Franc d'Afrique.

b. Vehicles Serviced. Vehicles serviced during this operation included all types of GI vehicles, plus French and English civil and military vehicles.

c. Maintenance. The odd jobs continued to roll in as before and were attended to as promptly as possible. Supports were welded on saddles for mule litter-carrying; a two and one-half ton truck radiator was rebuilt to fit a three-quarter-ton ambulance; sterilizers and an operating spotlight for the surgeon were made.

d. Supply. During this operation, a total of 800 truck tires and tubes were furnished.

e. Repair. A total of 257 major repair jobs (jobs requiring more than one and one-half hours) were done. Examples of this work are the replacement of the clutch on three-quarter-ton ambulance; the replacement of the suspension assembly in a half-track; and the replacement of the tracks on a light tank. An average of 80 guns were repaired per day.

f. Artillery Weapons. The number of artillery pieces in the Division was as follows:

	36	105mm howitzers
	12	155mm howitzers
	4	155mm guns (attached)
	12	75mm pack-howitzers
	18	105mm self-propelled howitzers (attached)
TOTAL	82	

g. Artillery Repair. There were a total of 18 major repair jobs done on artillery pieces.

h. Artillery Ammunition Expended. The artillery expended a total of 6,500 rounds of 155mm ammunition, and 40,500 rounds of 105mm ammunition.

i. Infantry Ammunition Expended. Infantry ammunition expenditure was as follows:

375,400 rounds	rifle ammunition
595,000 rounds	MG ammunition (.30 Cal. and .50 Cal.)
16,112 shells	mortar
248,000 rounds	Cal..45, automatic and sub-MG ammunition
7,300 -	hand grenades

j. Biggest days. The biggest days for expenditure of ammunition were as follows:

Mortars	23 April	4193 shells
105mm howitzers	29 April	6492 rounds
155mm howitzers	27 April	1029 rounds
Cal. .45	30 April	32,000 rounds
Hand grenades	30 April	3429 grenades

2. Quartermaster.

a. Point of Supply. During this operation, the 9th Division Quartermaster drew his supplies from the II Corps supply at Tabarka.

b. Rations. Rations furnished were as follows:

<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>Compo.</u>
494,673	443,555	38,915	19,114	3,822

c. Gas and Oil. Gas and oil furnished was as follows:

<u>V-80</u>	<u>V-87</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Diesel</u>
292,336 Gals.	5,415 Gals.	5,135 Gals.	580 Gals.

d. Lubricants furnished were as follows:

<u>Grease</u>	<u>Hypoid</u>
3,118 lbs.	745 Gals.

e. Forage. Forage furnished for the mules attached to the Medical detachments and to the Corps Franc d'Afrique was as follows:

<u>Hay</u>	<u>Barley</u>
22,977 lbs. ^{11 1/2 Tons}	85,416 lbs. ^{13 Tons}

f. PX Supplies. A total of 210,300 items of PX supply were issued.

g. British Rations. A total of 2,573 British "B" rations were issued.

3. Reconnaissance Troop.

a. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop during this operation was employed primarily on missions of patrolling and of filling gaps between attacking units for the purpose of protection against counter-attack.

b. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop operated effectively through mined areas, removing mine fields, and, after overcoming several obstacles, was able to move into Bizerte.

4. Military Police.

a. In this operation prisoner-of-war stations were established at Djebel Abiod, Sedjenane, Melaab el Koura, and Bizerte.

b. Four German prisoners of war were processed at Djebel Abiod before the battle began, and the total prisoners processed during the entire operation were:

German 446
Italian 1071

TOTAL - 1517

5. Graves Registration.

a. The first cemetery established for use by the 9th Division was the Tebarku Military Cemetery. Seven bodies were buried here.

b. The principal cemetery used for this operation was the "Regal Cemetery" at Sedjenane. A total of 92 were buried here. An additional 23 were buried just outside this cemetery, and were moved inside as the cemetery was expanded.

6. Automotive.

a. During this operation the Automotive Section, in conjunction with the Ordnance Company, did the work of both heavy and medium maintenance, as well as the light maintenance for which it is primarily equipped.

b. Servicing units, back of the lines, learned camouflage so well that not one vehicle was lost or damaged due to artillery fire or bombing.

c. Of the number of vehicles lost in this operation 50% were lost by mines; 20% by enemy fire; 20% by drivers' carelessness; 3% by blackout driving; and two percent to enemy aircraft fire.

7. Signal Operations.

a. Installations. Probably the most unusual feature of this operation was the extremely long wire lines, and the greatly extended frontage involved. For example, there was one case where there was a 32-mile circuit laid to Combat Team on the north and a 26-mile circuit laid to a Combat Team on the south. This is in the face of the fact that the usual distances to be expected are from 5 to 15 miles. Such extended distances, however, were characteristic of this particular operation. At times there were 1200 miles of wire on the ground.

b. Messages. In the most intense days of the battle, there were only four tactical messages sent in writing, while switchboard plugs were blowing from the heat. It had been the usual policy to divide the message load (via teletype, telegraph, telephone, etc.), but the possibility of instantly transmitting verbal instructions and reports side-tracked the other methods.

c. Obstacles. In one case, a butterfly bomb landed directly

on fifteen lines and cut them all. In 10 minutes, no less than 8 wire teams were untangling the mess, and, meanwhile, communications went on uninterrupted because a double set of wires had been installed at the beginning, as is the usual policy whenever possible.

d. Radio. Radio conditions were very strange at times because of the great lead content of the mountains. Large and usually very powerful sets were all but inoperative due to such mineral content.

e. Pigeon Service. There was a regular daily delivery of four birds from Corps, but they were not regularly used. One test message from Division to Corps, a distance of approximately 22 miles, took only 30 minutes from the time the message was released until an acknowledgement was received back via teletype.

f. Messenger Service. Messenger service was the exception and was used only to transmit overlays and maps.

g. Casualties. During this operation, the Signal Company lost 8 killed in action, and 4 wounded in action (1 officer, three enlisted men).

8. Artillery. A detailed artillery Report of Operations is attached hereto as Appendix "C".

9. Engineers.

a. The activity of the 15th Engineer Battalion in this operation was considerably in excess of that at El Guettar.

b. The lack of roads in this sector, the difficulty in maintaining adequate supply routes, and routes along which artillery could advance, made the frequent employment of the Engineers on road-building missions necessary.

c. The fact that the enemy demolished numerous bridges in their withdrawal made the construction of bridges, by-passes, and fords another important mission of the Engineers.

d. Near the close of the operation, the 15th Engineer Battalion was attached to the 20th Engineer Regiment, and was employed in mine sweeping, street clearance, and dock construction in and around Bizerte.

e. During the period 15 April - 8 May, the 15th Engineer Battalion accomplished the following:

Roads maintained and repaired:	125 miles
Fords constructed:	17
Bridges built:	2
Craters filled:	5

Roads constructed (new): 70 miles (70% of the new roads were two-strip, with the remainder constructed with passing strips for two-way traffic).

10. Medical Operations.

a. Terrain. The terrain over which the 9th Infantry Division operated in this engagement was featured by steep mountain ranges, heavy and thick underbrush, very little overhead cover, and almost complete absence of roads. The non-availability of roads or paths created a definite problem to our normal supply and evacuation lines. Vehicles were of no value in the forward areas; therefore, most of the medical property and supplies were hand-carried in the forward areas. Throughout this operation, the Engineers were busily engaged in developing trails to be utilized in bringing up supplies and aiding in the evacuation of the wounded.

b. Evacuation. The extremely heavy underbrush and the blackness of the nights impeded night evacuation by litter bearers. Mules were utilized to carry casualties in both the 39th and 60th Infantry areas. It was found necessary to improvise litter-carrying devices on the regular mule saddle, as no cacolets were available. The method found most expedient was that of utilizing two mules in tandem with Signal Corps lance poles fastened to the front and rear mule on the sides of the saddles. This method made it possible to fasten the litter, and at times a blanket, between the two mules. It was found that if a casualty was transported on a single mule that the ride was more rough, and the chances of injuring a patient were greater than with the method of using two mules in tandem. Single mules with a casualty on their back invariably attempted to lie down and roll over in order to relieve the extra weight on their backs. It was found necessary to have at least one medical department man with every two mules in the "casualty convoy" to prevent accidents to the casualties. In addition to the mule litter carry, there were many areas in which the casualties had to be hand-litter carried.

In the 47th Infantry area, a railroad track was located approximately in the center of the area. By removing the tires from two one-half-ton trucks and placing the trucks on the rails, it was found that the collecting company could efficiently evacuate two battalions by this method. The vehicles were placed on the railroad track attached back to back by a small iron bar. In traveling west on the track, the lead vehicle furnished the power for the "casualty train." On the return trip, the other vehicle furnished the power. The gauge of the track accommodated the truck rims nicely. The rails were broken in several places by shell fire, but were readily repaired with wood and sand bags by collecting company personnel. Twelve litter casualties could be carried comfortably on the two trucks. This "casualty train" rode more easily than an ambulance on the road.

c. Litter Bearers. During one coordinated attack, it was found necessary to supplement the collecting companies which were

evacuating the 39th and 60th Infantry Regiments with approximately 100 extra litter bearers each. In order to do this the Division Artillery Band and all surplus or non-essential personnel in staff sections were employed as litter-bearers.

d. Rest Camp. During the early preparation for the battle, when activity was limited to patrolling, the collecting company in the 47th Infantry area established a rest camp for front-line troops. Approximately 75 men were transported each night to this camp where they were provided with a full night's rest, a hot shower bath, and the facilities to write home. They were kept for a period of 24 hours and returned.

e. Collecting Company. The main function of the collecting companies during the battle was the preparation of casualties for their evacuation to the rear. The administration of blood plasma, morphine, sulfanilimide powder to wounds, hot drinks, the control or arresting of hemorrhages, readjustment of splints, and the treatment of shock were the principal medical activities performed in these units.

f. Clearing Company. Exhaustion cases were held during this operation in the clearing station. Treatment of these cases consisted of heavy sedation for a period of two to three days. On the fourth or fifth day, it was found that most of the exhaustion cases could be utilized within the Division area either as litter-bearers or truck-drivers. This "occupational therapy" proved to be an efficient method of building the morale and helping the individuals to regain self-confidence. Approximately 80 to 90 percent of all exhaustion cases were returned to some type of duty within the Division area.


g. Personnel Losses.

UNIT*	W.I.A.	K.I.A.	M.I.A.	INJURED	EXH'T.	DISEASE	RET. DUTY
	Shell	GSW			STATES		FRM. CLRNG. ST.
39th Infantry	112	30	38	4	54	89	118
47th Infantry	43	36	28	2	62	22	104
60th Infantry	164	60	40	1	65	125	147
9th Div. Arty.					1		1
26th F.A. Bn.	2		1	5	6		10
34th F.A. Bn.			1		13	1	15
60th F.A. Bn.	2		1		2		2
84th F.A. Bn.					4		1
15th Engr. Bn.	4	1	1		4		11
9th Med. Bn.	2				4		5
Special Troops	1		2		5	3	15
TOTAL FOR DIV.	330	127	108	12	220	240	429

SECTION VI - SUMMARY

The 9th Infantry Division had entered its first engagement with the enemy, the Battle of El Guettar, greatly handicapped in not having had time for sufficient reconnaissance and in not having all of the units of the Division under Division control. Going through this battle, however, they had learned lesson after lesson, learning them the hard way.

At Sedjenane and all the way to Bizerte, they demonstrated conclusively that they could profit by their former mistakes and take full advantage of the lessons which they had learned. This they did. Time after time they maneuvered the Germans out of strong positions. They continually seized points of observation held by the enemy and, having deprived him of this, continued to drive him back. They followed artillery concentrations closely, with devastating results to the enemy. The individual soldier had proved that he was capable. Commanders of all echelons had proved the same. The 9th Division had definitely become a capable combat unit.



M.S. EDDY
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding

A P P E N D I X "A"

Field Orders

██████████

AUTH: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials:
Date: 12 April 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
12 April 1943

F O #19

(F O #18 dated 12 April 1943 is superseded by this F O.)

MAPS: TUNISIA 1/50,000; Sheets, 4, 5, 10, 11, 17 & 18.

1. a. (1) Enemy. The enemy has recently suffered severe defeats in the TAMERA and SEDJENANE areas and has been forced to fall back on his old defensive positions on the reverse slopes of DJ AZAG J3877 (GREEN HILL) and DJ EL AJRED J3874 (BALD HILL). The GREEN HILL - BALD HILL position is well prepared and naturally strong.

(2) The enemy trs in the area are approx equivalent in strength to three full inf bns. They are made up as follows:

1 and 3 Cos A.30 on GREEN HILL

2 Cos A.30 on BALD HILL

The remnants of T.3 and T.4 are in the area 3873-3872 SOUTH of BALD HILL

The remnants of II Barenthin are probably in the area 3778 NORTH of GREEN HILL

The remnants of III Barenthin are probably allotted in support of the whole sector, while WITZIG's Corps Para Engr Bn XI is responsible for the engineering works of the whole sector.

WITZIG's Bn is also responsible for the patrolling along and to the North of the R. SEDJENANE VALLEY.

b. (1) The 4th British Div is on our right. The bdry between Div will be all inclusive 9th U S Div: RJ J2156 - Pt 436 J2356 - BEL MATBEG J2858 Pt 586 J3762.

(2) 3 Bn Corps Franc D'Afrique in CAPE SERRAT Area on our left and is atchd to this Div.

2. This Div will relieve the 46th British Div in place in the SEDJENANE sector.

3. a. The 47th Inf will relieve the 138th Brigade in place night 12-13 April and will place vic DJ TAMBOUNA one rifle Co reinf with 1 MG Sect and 1 Mort Sect. Trucks for movement will report to RJ H6242 at 1500 Hours 12 April. IP for movement forward - RJ at H7443. Head of Column passes 1730; tail clears 1930.

(2) 3rd Bn Corps Franc D'Afrique is atchd to the 39th Inf.

c. Artillery.

- (1) 84th F A Bn direct support 47th Inf.
- (2) 26th F A Bn direct support 39th Inf.
- (3) 34th F A Bn general support.
- (4) 434th CA Bn (AA) will provide AA protection for field arty gun positions, the road from DJ ABIOD to SEDJENANE, and the Div CP.
- (5) 894th TD Bn will provide one Co in direct support 47th Inf, one Co in direct support 39th Inf, and the Bn less 2 Cos in general support of the Div Sector. The Rcn Co will cover the area between the 39th Inf and the 3rd Bn Corps Franc D'Afrique.

d. 15th Engr Bn will repair and maintain all roads in the Div area.

e. The 9th Rcn Tr will cover the area between the 47th Inf positions and DJ TAMBOUNA, and push vigorous rcn forward.

x. (1) Vigorous and active patrolling will be carried out by all front line units.

(2) Bdry between 39th Inf and 47th Inf as follows: J280793, RJ J223787, RJ J181787.all.

(3) The CG, 9th Inf Div Arty will coordinate anti-tank and anti-aircraft defenses within the Div sector.

4. Adm O No 14.

5. a. See index 1-A6.

b. Div CP opens at J090723 at 141800.

c. Radio silence except for emergency use.

EDDY
Comdg

SUNDIN

G-3

DISTRUBUTION:

- | | | |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. G-3 File | 11. Div Surgeon | 21. 9th Rcn Tr |
| 2. V Corps | 12. Hq Comdt | 22. 9th Sig Co |
| 3. CG | 13. Prov Marsh | 23. 9th QM Co |
| 4. Asst CG | 14. Adj Gen | 24. 709th Ord Co |
| 5. C/S | 15. Div Arty (5) | 25. Hq Co 9th Inf Div |
| 6. G-1 | 16. 39th Inf | 26. 894th TD Bn |
| 7. G-2 | 17. 47th Inf | 27. 434th CA Bn(AA) |
| 8. G-4 | 18. 60th Inf | 28. North Irish Horse |
| 9. Div Engr | 19. 15th Engr Bn | 29. 228 Fd Coy |
| 10. Div Sig O | 20. 9th Med Bn | |

Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials :
Date : 20 April 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
20 April 1943

F O #20

MAPS: TUNISIA 1/50,000 Sheets 4, 5, 10, 11, 17, 18.

1. a. (1) Enemy forces opposing this Division are of Division MANNTEUFEL, and are of total combined strength approximating four or five battalions. Units identified are as follows:

✓ BARENTHIN REGIMENT, consisting of 3 Bns the third of which is in reserve and probably furnishing personnel to the two in the line. Regiment is below strength, is well equipped with machine guns, AT-guns and some mortars.

AFRIKA 30, ✓ defending the key position BALD HILL-GREEN HILL. Battalion has three companies, severely hit in battle of SEDJENANE. Defensive position well organized.

MARSCH BN 21, which suffered heavily at TAMERA. Equipment includes heavy machine guns and heavy mortars.

2nd BN, 756 MT. REGT, ✓ consisting of three companies, defending SEDJENANE RIVER valley. Companies down to 80-90 men each.

MARSCH BN, strength undetermined.

CORPS PARA ENGS BN L (WITZIG) ✓. Responsible for engineering in sector, and has been patrolling in north. Effective strength 120 men. Uses Arab-German parties for mine laying behind the lines.

VON KOEHNAN, a group of commando-saboteurs which has been operating in the north.

In extreme north is a small force of Italians of 10th BERSAGLIERI, and there may be another Italian unit in the center of our sector.

(2) There is no confirmation of report that Germans have reinforced extreme north.

(3) Enemy is weak in Arty, having an estimated 10-15 pieces. Tanks probably will be used as mobile artillery.

(4) German tanks believed in reserve on plains southwest of TUNIS, to be used when needed. 24 tanks reported behind J6243.

[REDACTED]

(5) Morale of enemy is not high except in certain units, notably 2nd Bn BARENTHIN.

(6) Key high ground is intensively organized for defense, with mine fields, good fields of fire, and dominant observation. Reserves are purely local, with no strategic infantry reserves believed available.

b. The 1st Inf Div is on our right with the mission of making the main effort of II Corps to adv up the Dr BED valley, J55, and capture the high ground EAST and WEST of CHOUGHI, J76.

2. This Div will attack on D-day with two missions, as follows:

a. Capture the enemy position at DJ AJRED, J3775, as the first objective, and RJ J4983 as second objective, and then exploit in the direction of MATEUR.

b. Seize the high ground dominating the RJ J5094.

3. a. The Corps Franc d'Afrique will seize the high ground dominating the RJ at J5094. See overlay.

(1) Command of the NORTH sector (see overlay) will revert to the CO, Corps Franc d'Afrique effective upon opening of the CP, C.F.A. during Am 22 April.

b. 39th Inf - See overlay.

c. 47th Inf - See overlay. Be prepared to resist enemy counter attack from the EAST astride route #7.

d. 60th Inf - See overlay.

e. Div Arty - See Arty Annex.

f. 15th Engr Bn -

(1) Co A in zone of 39th Inf supporting Inf and Arty.

(2) Co B -

(a) 1 Plat in zone of 47th Inf supporting Inf and Arty.

(b) Co B less one Plat in Div Res to be used where required.

(3) Co C in zone of 60th Inf supporting Inf and Arty.

(4) One water unit in each Inf Regt zone and one with rear elements of Div under control of Engr S-4 assisted by Water Supervisor and wtr Rcn Gp of Engr H/S Co.

g. 9th Rcn Tr - See overlay. Maintain contact with 1st Inf Div.

h. 91st Rcn Sqdn - See overlay. Maintain contact between 39th Inf & 60th Inf.

x. (1) Artillery will have priority on roads.

(2) Prior to launching of attack, units will hold present positions at all costs. Positions will be developed and improved with wire and mines. Vigorous patrolling will be maintained.

(3) As the days objectives are taken, each position will be organized for defense preparatory to launching of new attack. TD and AT guns will be pushed forward and dug in.

(4) All units will comply strictly with existing instructions on Signal Security.

(5) All officers and men will be instructed that in event of capture it is imperative for them to preserve complete silence on all matters pertaining to the attack.

4. See Adm O #15.

5. a. See Index 1-A-7.

b. Div CP opens at J200759 at 202200.

c. Axis of Signal Communication - See overlay.

d. (1) Radio silence to be maintained by units on move to assembly areas. To be broken only when contact is established or H plus 4 hours, which ever is first. Radio traffic will be transmitted to Hq of units under radio silence by "F" method on Div Command Channels. Each msg so transmitted will be sent twice.

(2) Commercial circuits will not be used except on authority of Corps Signal Officer.

EDDY
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

SUNDIN
G-3

ANNEX #1 - March Table
ANNEX #2 - Artillery Annex
ANNEX #3 - Overlay.

MAP: TUNISIA 1:200,000

(GAFSA SHEET #17
EL AYACHA SHEET #18)

TO ACCOMPANY FO #16 (CORRECTED)
COPY




27 MARCH 1943

OFFICIAL:

Sundin
SUNDIN
G-3

EDDY
COM'DG

French



Direction of Attack
Objective

Mortars and Small groups
on high ground - dispositions
unknown

Strength Unknown



Hq 9th Inf Div
A P O #9
1610 19 April 1943

ANNEX 1 to F O #20
MOVEMENT ORDER

MAPS: 1:50,000, TUNISIA, Sheets 5 & 6.

ROAD MOVEMENTS

Night of April	Unit	Location by Daylight	Route	Remarks
19-20	Co C 15th Engr Bn	20 April N of SEDJENANE	DJ ABIOD-TAMARA	Head passes DJ ABIOD 1930. Tail clears DJ ABIOD 1941. Clear RJ at 1277 by 2035.
19-20	2 Bns 60th Inf	20 April Vicinity 1177	DJ ABIOD-RJ at 1277	Shuttle - head 1st shuttle pass DJ ABIOD at 1945 Tail clears DJ ABIOD at 2022 Tail clears RJ at 1277 at 2166 Head of second shuttle will not pass DJ ABIOD prior to 2115.
19-20	60th F A	20 April Vicinity 2577	DJ ABIOD - SEDJENANE	Head passes DJ ABIOD at 2025. Tail clears DJ ABIOD at 2111.
20-21	2 Bns 60th Inf	21 April Vicinity 22 88	Foot Trs: RJ at 129771-Trail Junction at 184821 and 231845. Motors: RJ at 1277- SED- JENANE-RJ at 231845.	Movement to commence at 1930. Movement of foot troops and motors be coordinated under direction CO 60th Inf. Motor column will clear SEDJENANE by 2045.
20-21	60th Inf less 2 Bns	21 April Vicinity 1177	1 Bn DJ ABIOD-RJ at 1277. 60th Inf less 3 Bns-DJ ABIOD-SEDJENANE- Vicinity 2288	Shuttle. Movement will begin at 1930. Tail will clear RJ at 094721 by 0030 21 April.
20-21	26th F A Bn	21 April Vicinity 2380	Via SEDJENANE	Head will not enter Route No 7 until point of entry has been cleared by motor elements of 2 Bns 60 th Inf.

~~SECRET~~
Road Movements Cont'd

Night of April	Unit	Location by Daylight	Route	Remarks
20-21	34th F A Bn	21 April Vicinity 2378	Via SEDJENANE	Movement to be coordinated with that of 26th F A Bn by CG 9th Inf Div Arty.
20-21	Fwd Ech Hq 9th Inf Div & Hq 9th Inf Div Arty	21 April Vicinity 1976	Route No 7	Movement will begin at 0100 21 April.
21-22	2 Bns 60th Inf	April 22	-	Details to be announced later.
21-22	1st Bn 60th Inf	22 April Vicinity 2288	Foot Troops: RJ at 129771-Trail Junction at 231845. Motors: RJ at 1277-SED-JENANE- RJ at 231845	Details to be announced later.
21-22	185th F A Bn	22 April Vicinity 2875	Route 7	Arriving on Corps order.
21-22	62d F A Bn	April 22 Vicinity 2180	Route 7-Road North from SEDJENANE	Details to be announced later.
22-23	1 Btry 36th F A	April 23 Vicinity 2675	Route 7	Arriving on Corps order
22-23	9th Ren Tr	April 23 Vicinity 2784	Route 7-Road North from SEDJENANE-CR 229831-CR 252838	Depart at 1930

TACTICAL MOVEMENTS
Not Involving Road Space
On Page 3

[REDACTED]

Road Movements Cont'd

Night of April	Unit	Location by Daylight	Route	Remarks
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TACTICAL MOVEMENTS
Not Involving Road Space

19-20	39th Inf	20 April RHOMD-EL HAMRA-DJ EL GARSIA	-	-
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21-22	47th Inf less 1 Bn	22 April Hill 398 (2976) - Hill 319 (3075) - Hill 533 (3072) - Hill 610 (3171)	-	-
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21-22	1 Bn 47th Inf	22 April Vicinity 2971	-	-
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EDDY
Comdg

SUNDIN
G-3

ANNEX #2 to F O 20

MARCH TABLE - MAPS 1:50,000, Tunisia Night of 21 - 22 April 1943

UNIT	LOCATION BY DAYLIGHT 22 April	ROUTE	IP	REMARKS
1st & 2nd Bns, 60th Inf	Assembly Area	As selected.		Move by marching to positions clear CAPE SERRAT Road by 2130 to allow passage of 40 trucks of C.F.A.
3rd Bn, 60th Inf	Assembly Area	NORTH SEDJENANE VALLEY Road - to position.	Present Location	March both sides of roads. Motor pass through troops. Start 1930.
60th F A Bn	Vic 2587	Present Position - SEDJENANE, CAPE SERRAT Road - new position.	Present Location	Head Pass IP 2100; tail clear 2120 Clear RJ 212761 by 2140
62nd F A Bn	Vic 2582	Present Bivouac - DJ ABIOD - SEDJENANE - CAPE SERRAT Road - New Position.	Present Location	Head Pass 1930; tail clear 1955 Arrive new position area 2040.
1 Bn, C.F.A. (Corps Franc d' Afrique)	Vic 2290	TABARK - DJ ABIOD - SEDJENANE - CAPE SERRAT ROAD.	TABARKA	Head pass 1800, tail clear DJ ABIOD 1930.

S E R R A T

S E C R E T

Authority: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials :
Date : 4 May 1943

Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
2000 4 May 1943

F O #21

MAPS: TUNISIA 1:50,000 Sheets 1,2,3,5,6,7.

1.
 - a. The enemy with an estimated strength of one Bn hold the DJEBEL ECH CHENTI 562970 and DJ ARGERB EL AHMAR 536972. He is weakly supported by Arty, the observation for which is believed to be on DJ IUHKEUL 5687. Guns located near FERFYVILLE.
 - b. (1) Corps Franc d'Afrique hold a line west of OUED DOUIMISS from approximately DJ KHARRATA (5395) to DJ ZOUTINA (5097). TABOURS are operating to NORTH of this.

(2) 1st Armd Div on our right vic MATEUR.
2. This Division will attack the enemy positions on DJEBEL ECH CHENTI 562970 and DJEBEL ARGERD EL AHMAR (536972) on 5 May 1943.
3.
 - a. 47th Inf
 - (1) Move to assembly area previously reconnoitered night 4-5 May.
 - (2) To attack DJEBEL ECH CHENTI and DJEBEL ARGERD EL AHMAR at H-hour (to be announced later), 5 May and when successful exploit to the line Hill 215 (577008) and to Hill 131 (585982).
 - b. 60th Inf - One Bn 60th Inf will be alerted at 0800 hours 5 May and be prepared to move on orders this headquarters to vic 589950. AT Co 60th Inf is detached from Corps Franc d'Afrique, and will rejoin 60th Inf prior to 0800 5 May 1943.
 - c. 39th CT (601st TD Bn attached) will remain in present location prepared to move on Div order.
 - d. Corps Franc d'Afrique - When passed through by 47th Inf, to assemble in present location and patrol NORTHEAST in direction of DJEBEL SIDI AMEUR (535990). Be prepared to attack DJEBEL SIDI AMEUR.
 - e. Division Arty:
 - 60th FA Bn - Direct support of 47th Inf.
 - C Btry 36th FA - General support.
 - 62nd FA Bn - General support.

S E C R E T

f. 9th Rcn Tr at present at SIDI SALEM (475843) will, on Div order, exploit along Route #11 toward BIZERTE. Rcn Co 894th TD Bn exploit SOUTH-EAST along Route #57 toward FERRYVILLE.

g. "A" Co 751st (Med) Tank Bn will move to an area previously reconnoitered in vicinity 4896, starting movement at 0600 5 May, and be prepared to exploit the situation on Div order.

h. 9th Med Bn - One collecting company in direct support 47th Inf.

i. 15th Engr Bn - Will repair blown bridges at OUED DOUIMISS as soon as practicable.

4. See Adm O #16 (To be issued later.)

5. a. See Index IA-8.

b. Div CP at 415923.

EDDY
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

SUNDIN
G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

1 CG II. Corps
1 Asst CG 9th Inf Div
1 C of S 9th Inf Div
5 Div Arty
1 39th Inf
1 47th Inf
1 60th Inf
1 9th Rcn Tr
1 Div Engr
1 G-1
1 G-2
1 G-3 File
1 G-4
1 Div Surg
1 Div Ord O
1 Div Sig O
1 Provost Marshal

Attached Units:

1 Corps Franc d'Afrique
1 B Co 751 Tk (Med)
1 894th TD Bn
1 Rcn Co, 894th TD Bn.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

CAPE SERRA

CFA

CFA
60 (INCL)

Dj. Mraia

190

190

208

Mad

467

D+3

139

60

711

Dj. Kedd

D+2

D+3

404

Dj. Mnata

206

D+3

139

432

D+1

513

D+2

395

D+2

D+3

462

D+4

Dj. Ainchoona

39

Dj. el Akrot

47

280

Dj. Chouat

Dj. el Azzag

306

398

47

556

Dj. el Ajred

444

47

933

Kef Maksour

47

91 (INCL)

191

Dj. el Mehaehem

9th INFANTRY DIVISION NORTHERN TUNISIA OPERATIONS PLAN OF ATTACK. D-DAY 23 APR.

OPERATIONS MAP REPRODUCED FROM OVERLAY ACCOMPANYING FO # 20.

LEGEND

MAP: TUNISIA SCALE: 1:100,000

MILES 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 MILES

ELEVATIONS IN METERS

1st CLASS ROADS

2nd CLASS ROADS

STREAMS

GERMAN POSITIONS



MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH 1st DIVISION

191

A P P E N D I X "B"

T e r r a i n S t u d y f o r t h e

S e d j e n a n e - B i z e r t e C a m p a i g n

TERRAIN STUDY - SEDJENANE BIZERTE CAMPAIGN

1. Purpose and Other Limiting Considerations.

a. This study, prepared primarily to accompany the official report of the tactical operations of the 9th Infantry Division (reinforced) during the campaign which culminated in the capture of Bizerte, covers the general area north of the Beja-Mateur Road (exclusive), and east of the line: Djebel Tabouna, 26-Sedjenane, 27-Cape Serrat, 19. The maps employed are the following:

Tunisia 1/50,000; Sheets 1,2,5,6,11, and 12.
French North Africa 1/500,000, Sheets N.J.32 - S.E.

b. The mission of the command, after relieving the British 46th Division, was to capture the Djebel El Azzag-Djebel El Ajred hill mass (hereafter referred to as the Green-Bald Hill position), to seize the road junction at 5896 and 4982, and to demonstrate toward Mateur.

c. The enemy capabilities in the area were believed to be as follows:

(1) To defend the general line: Green-Bald Hill-Djebel Ainchouna-Djebel Dardyss, with covering detachments to the north and south of this position.

(2) To counterattack generally west through the valley of the Oued Sedjenane or the valley leading to the west from the Green-Bald Hill position.

(3) To withdraw to the east employing the numerous delaying positions available.

d. The decision of the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, was to contain the Green-Bald Hill position, and to maneuver the bulk of the Division around the north (east) flank of this position, with the objective of seizing Kef En Nsour and cutting the main road east of the Green-Bald Hill position.

2. General Topography of the Area.

a. Drainage System. The area is drained by two principal streams, the Oued Sedjenane and the Oued Malah, both of which flow generally from west to east. Neither stream has any importance as an obstacle, but the valleys through which they flow, particularly the valley of the Sedjenane, had an important bearing on the conduct of the campaign. Several minor streams, usually dry, proved to be more or less important. Of these, the Oued Douimiss, which flows generally from north to south along the 54 grid line, should be mentioned.

b. Ridge System. The principal ridge lines extend generally from west to east between the two principal rivers previously mentioned, and to the north and south of those rivers. However, the ridge lines are badly broken by numerous valleys which run in nearly every direction, thus causing the ridge system to be sub-divided into a large number of irregular formations. The highest point of importance in the area is Kef en Nsour, 523 meters in height. It dominates the entire area, particularly that to the northeast, east and southeast. Other heights of importance are Djebel Dardyss, 294 meters, dominating the Sedjenane Valley; Djebel Ainchouna, 513 meters, dominating both the Sedjenane and Malah Valleys; and the Green-Bald Hill position, averaging 476 meters, which dominates the main east-and-west road and railroad; Djebels Hazemat and Touro averaging 423 meters, which control the northernmost east-and-west road; and Djebel Cheniti, 207 meters, which controls the main road crossing over the Oued Doumiss.

c. Routes.

(1) Railroads. The only railroads in the area, which lead west from Mateur, was not in operating condition.

(2) Roads. One improved road, in excellent condition, runs from west to east paralleling the railroad and bisecting the Green-Bald Hill position. This road is joined at the road junction at 4982 by a similar road leading northwest from Mateur which, continuing to the north, skirts the west shore of the Garrat Achkel and then turns east toward Bizerte. An unimproved road, in poor condition, passes through the valley of the Sedjenane and joins the road previously described at the road junction at 5094. A similar road parallels it through the mountains north of the Sedjenane Valley. A significant fact is that there are no north and south roads, with the exception of that just west of Garrat Achkel and an unimportant track connecting Station de Sedjenane with Cape Serrat. Nor are there any east and west roads across the isthmus between the Garrat Achkel and the Mediterranean, with the exception of the main road to Bizerte, which skirts the northern shore of the lake.

d. General Nature of the Terrain.

West of the line of the Mateur-Bizerte road as far as the mouth of the Sedjenane, thence to the north, the terrain consists, except in isolated areas, of two jumbled masses of mountains, generally densely overgrown with extremely thick brush of the Lantenna variety, in some cases rising to a height of six or eight feet. For this reason, progress overland is extremely difficult and fatiguing. The upper reaches of the valley of the Sedjenane and Malah are flat and generally under cultivation. East of the line of the Mateur-Bizerte road as far as the mouth of the Sedjenane, thence to the north, the vegetation ceases abruptly and the low hills, which continue thence to Bizerte, are under cultivation and easily traversed overland.

3. Military Aspects of the Terrain. The area of operations may be roughly divided into three sub-areas as follows:

Sub-area A: The cape lying east of a north and south line connecting the mouth of the Sedjenane with the coast of the Mediterranean.

Sub-area B: The area west of the line of the westernmost Mateur-Bizerte Road as far as the mouth of the Sedjenane, thence to the north; and north of the railroad leading west from Mateur.

Sub-area C: The area west of the westernmost Mateur-Bizerte road and south of the railroad running west from Mateur.

a. Sub-area A:

(1) In the western portion of this sub-area, lines of communication are limited to the single east and west road which skirts the northern shore of Garrat Achkel. This road crosses several dry stream beds, particularly Oued Douimiss, which constitutes a difficult bottleneck for wheeled transportation. The eastern portion of the area is well-supplied with means of communication. The road from Mateur via Ferryville affords access to the area from the south. The road from Tunis is interrupted southeast of Bizerte by the strait connecting the Goulet du Lac with the Mediterranean. Communication over this strait is limited to ferry service which was not in operation at the time of the campaign.

(2) There are no serious obstacles to cross-country movement in the area.

(3) There is practically no cover or concealment in the area except that afforded by occasional batches of trees.

(4) Observation is excellent over the entire area.

(5) Fields of fire for all weapons are excellent.

(6) The area lends itself readily to mechanized operations of an attacker advancing from the west and, after passing the isthmus near Ferryville from the south. It also lends itself readily to defense, especially just east of the Oued Douimiss, and for delaying action.

b. Sub-area B:

(1) Two principal avenues of approach and lines of communication are available in this area, both running generally east and west. These are the valley of the Sedjenane on the north, and the valley through which the railroad passes on the south. Both avenues are dominated by the high ground on both flanks, principally, in the case of the Sedjenane, by Djebel Dardyss and Djebel Ainchouna, and, in the case of the southern avenue, by the Green-Bald Hill position. These heights, strongly held by a determined enemy, constitute a serious obstacle to any advance from the west.

(2) The area abounds in natural obstacles and lends itself admirably to defense by weak forces. In addition the Germans had improved the natural strength of the positions by extensive mine-fields, and by weapons and personnel emplacements, especially in the vicinity of the Green-Bald Hill position. Road and railroad bridges had been extensively destroyed.

(3) Except in the open valleys excellent concealment and cover are available. This in general favors the defensive, since offensive operations are necessarily limited by the extreme difficulty of maintaining direction and progressing through the heavy underbrush.

(4) Observation over the flat valleys is excellent from any one of a large number of points in the mountains, thus again favoring defense of the mountains against an approach from the west. Within the mountains observation is restricted and available only to that force which holds the highest peaks. Possession of these peaks is therefore essential to either defensive or offensive operations.

(5) Fields of fire from the controlling terrain over the flat valleys are excellent, particularly when the heights are in possession of a defensive force. Thus from the general line: Green-Bald Hill - Djebel Ainchouna - Djebel Dardyss all approaches from the west can readily be taken under fire by troops defending these hill masses. Within the mountains, fields of fire are largely restricted, in some cases to a few yards, unless the underbrush is previously cleared.

c. Sub-area C:

(1) This area consists somewhat of a combination of sub-area A and B. The elevations are generally lower, underbrush and other vegetation is more sparse but not wholly lacking, and movement, while difficult, is not prohibitive. Fields of fire, observation, and communications generally favor the defensive.

4. Critical Terrain Features. The critical terrain features in the area for either combatant are as follows:

a. Djebel Dardyss, which controls the unimproved road through the Sedjenane Valley and a similar road paralleling the first on the north.

b. Djebel Ainchouna which, with Djebel Dardyss, controls approaches from the west through the Sedjenane Valley, and also to some extent, approaches via the main road and railroad through Station de Sedjenane.

c. The Green-Bald Hill position, which completely dominates approaches via the main road and railroad, and the valley through which these run.

d. The high ground dominating the valley of the Oued Malah northeast of Station de Jefna, since this valley affords an excellent area for the establishment of administrative establishments in support of the Green-Bald Hill position.

e. Kef en Nsour, which dominates most of the area, particularly the eastern reaches of the Sedjenane and Malah valleys.

f. The high ground just east of the Oued Doumiss, which controls the exits from the hill mass to the west and the crossing of the only road over the Oued Doumiss.

5. Tactical Effects of the Terrain.

a. Tactical operations leading to the capture of Bizerte fall naturally into two phases: (1) Occupation of sub-area B, and (2) debouchment from that area and advance across sub-area A.

b. German defense of sub-area B could be expected logically to be strongest where the best routes of communication were available, namely in the south on the Green-Bald Hill position. Other avenues of approach and routes of communication from the west, via the Sedjenane Valley and the road to the north, could be expected to be guarded less strongly. Any attempt to advance frontally against the Green-Bald Hill position would be certain to result in excessive losses. It would therefore appear desirable to flank this position either from the north or from the south. Flanking action from the south is undesirable since sub-area C is totally devoid of lines of communication, lacks sufficient cover and concealment, and is wholly under observation from the Green-Bald Hill position. Even if successful, flanking action from this direction would tend to drive the defenders back along their principal routes of communication instead of cutting such communications behind them. Flanking action from the north, on the other hand, would deprive the defenders of the possession of the dominating observation over the Sedjenane Valley and later over the Valley of the Malah. The direction of such flanking action would be such as to result in the capture of Kef en Nsour and the cutting of the lines of communication in rear of the Green-Bald Hill position.

c. Debouchment from the sub-area B will be retarded until the heights east of the Oued Doumiss are occupied, or until additional routes of communication can be constructed to the north, west of the stream. Until one or the other has been accomplished, displacement of artillery east of the Oued Doumiss will be impossible. Frontal assault against the heights which are nearest to the mouth of the stream will be difficult because of the depth and steepness of the valleys in that area. The terrain farther to the north lends itself better to flanking action from that direction.

#

A P P E N D I X "C"

Report on Artillery Operations

Northern Tunisia

A R T I L L E R Y R E P O R T

1. GENERAL. Just prior to the operation covered in this report, the following units were attached to the 9th Division Artillery and served with them throughout the engagement:

The 434th Coast Artillery Battalion (AA), protection of field artillery gun and C.P. positions and the road Djebel Abiod - Sedjenane; the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 9th Reconnaissance Troop, reconnaissance and anti-tank protection; the 62nd Field Artillery (Armored), self-propelled 105 howitzers, later assigned in direct support of the Corps Franc d'Afrique; "C" Battery, 36th Field Artillery, 155 rifles; the 185th Field Artillery Battalion, 155mm howitzers; and a short-base flash section from the 1st Observation Battalion. Sound was not utilized, and flash did not prove itself worth the trouble of installation, due to the nature of the terrain, defiladed enemy positions, and the difficulty of surveying in a base.

2. AMMUNITION. Ammunition dumps were established at Djebel Abiod (Corps dump with three days average combat expenditure) and at Tamara Station (Division dump with one day's combat expenditure). Combat expenditure, prescribed by II Corps, was considered to be 100 rounds per gun for 105s and 70 rounds for the 155s. Light battalions were ordered by the Commanding General, Division Artillery, to have 150 rounds "at the gunsite", while the 155 howitzer battalions and the battery of 155 rifles were to have 100 rounds. However, it later developed that it was more advantageous to the battalions to carry greater than the prescribed load, due to the difficulty of night supply over poor trails, frequent position changes, mined roads, abnormally heavy fire needs, and dawn-and-dusk road strafing by ME-109s and Focke-Wulf 190s. All units habitually carried far in excess of their minimum requirement. The 60th Field Artillery Battalion, for instance, averaged well over 4000 rounds. In one instance, 25% of our rounds were dented because of poor Cloverleaves, and unserviceable. Recommendation was made that all rounds be left in original overseas packing until arrival at dumps. Ammunition expenditures by battalions were as follows:

<u>105mm Battalion</u>	<u>Rounds</u>	
26th F.A.Bn.	11,864	
60th F.A.Bn.	9,830	
84th F.A.Bn.	4,068	
62nd F.A.Bn.	<u>6,216</u>	
TOTAL	31,978	31,978
<u>155mm Battalion</u>		
36th F.A.(C Btry)	1,795	
34th F.A.Bn.	2,600	
185th F.A.Bn.	<u>4,203</u>	
TOTAL	8,598	<u>8,598</u>
TOTAL (10% smoke)		40,576

3. OPERATION.

The whole action was a series of limited objectives, the monotonous taking of hill after briar- and brush-tight hill. The problem of supply was never more acute: mules obtained by Corps from the French were the answer to the infantry battalion's problem over the narrow, steep, and many times booby-trapped trails, and artillery CPs and forward installations found them invaluable for supply and wire laying. The RL-31 "mounted on a mule" went anywhere that a man could climb. When the Division took over the sector the English axis of supply through Beja was changed to the Djebel Abiod-Tabarka road with main source at LaCalle.

Enemy air at the beginning was active, but it dropped down to almost nothing later, and never at any time was one-half as annoying as at El Guettar. Straight stretches of road were strafed daily and sometimes bombed, apparently on a regular schedule. The largest enemy flight was 23 FW-190s over the sector on April 23. Few bombs landed near our installations, although enemy fields at Mateur and later at Bizerte were only five minutes away, and during most of the first phase enemy observation looked down our throats and could easily have requested spot missions. A contributing factor to this was probably that at no time was the air able definitely to locate battalion positions as it had done at Thala and El Guettar. The man-high brush everywhere made concealment possible; however, most batteries received counter-battery at one time or another while firing.

Our own division air OPs were used to advantage many times in adjusting the 155 rifles especially, and they also took some good obliques with the aid of an engineer cameraman. A photo mission requested and approved by Corps through the

1st Army was never flown over vicinity road junction 4389. An air mission to bomb observed gun positions and constant heavy traffic was approved three times and then flown the fourth day.

For three days after the British artillery was relieved registration was not allowed except in cases of absolute necessity. Our calibre and strength were not given away. The lights registered and did a little direct support firing in the first (old British) positions, but after the change to the battle positions no one registered until 23 April when the main attack began. The 155 rifles were kept as a hole card and were opened up later on rear supply interdiction, to duel the few 170s and to search out the 150s -- at all times controlled by Division Artillery (with a direct line to the AA) so that no firing was done in the presence of enemy air in the sector.

Harassing fires were fired nightly, and their effectiveness attested to by each new batch of prisoners. Three SOP items of interest: One, the rule that all battalions within range immediately drop a concentration on the bombed area at any time one of our own bombing missions materialized; two, that any time the observer could actually see the piece itself and not the flash, the battery would be neutralized, then a precision adjustment on each piece made and continued until destruction of the visible piece was achieved, regardless of expenditure of ammunition; and three, direct support battalions stood ready at any time to survey in by flares the positions of front line infantry battalions, and to mark objectives with smoke on call.

The estimate of opposing artillery made at the beginning proved to be correct: two batteries 105s, one battery 150s, two guns 170, eight SP 75 howitzers, and six or more 88s. In the first phase the whole battery of 150s and one battery of 105s opposed the southern forces with the self-propelleds out in front in both sectors and the 170s far back behind the south. In the second phase, the push around the north, two of the 150s appeared there (at the same time disappearing in the south). The 170s went north also although they continued to cover the whole front while the self-propelleds fell back gradually. Three 88s appeared in the south at the same time the 150s left. For two days three 88s operated in the north. The 150s and 170s then disappeared. Along at the last the self-propelled and the 88s fired an average of 75% AP or duds, although the 88s fired a lot of time fire at extreme range. No concentrations were ever fired greater than a six-gun battery, but all artillery was obviously under one command.

The setup for the jump-off on 23 April was as follows: The North Group following the Sedjenane Valley was formed consisting of the 34th F.A. Battalion, 62nd F.A. Battalion, 26th F.A. Battalion, 60th F.A. Battalion, 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one company) supporting the 39th and 60th Infantry, with the secondary mission of assisting the Corps Franc d'Afrique. Supporting units of the 434th Coast Artillery Battalion (AA) moved with units they covered, and also protected the Sedjenane-Jefna Station road and the Sedjenane River valley. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop protected the artillery by reconnaissance of the south side of the Sedjenane Valley. The 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion provided protection by reconnaissance of the north side of the river.

The South Group consisted of the 84th F.A. Battalion, the 185th F.A. Battalion, the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and "C" Battery of the 36th Field Artillery (later split into platoons with two rifles sent to the north group).

The split between the two groups was never as distinct as at first anticipated, and the Division Artillery CP did not divide according to original plan. Mutually supporting fires were common; fires of all types had to be conducted at extreme ranges much of the time because of the difficulty of displacement over roadless djebels.

Registration was permitted at H-1 on D day. A pre-arranged code naming the prominent features was provided -- Studebaker, Willys, Nash, Cadillac -- and used exclusively for locations.

Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery, had out 255 miles of wire over a 35-mile frontage for the start. On one 35-mile line only two booster coils were available, but proved effective with only occasional relay. Radoy relay, both SCR 284 and SCR 608, was established with the left flank forces. Radio communication could be maintained solely because of a borrowed SCR 193 set. Frequency modulated radio sets failed at times due to intervening terrain. In one instance when the platoon of "C" Battery of the 36th Field Artillery were divided we realigned their 608 on our channels and our plane observed their fire directly. There were also instances in radio when the forward observer of one battalion observed for another battalion by switching his set to his battalion K channel and the battalion he observed for contacted him on the observer's battalion K, thereby eliminating necessity for relay. The SCR 284 radio sets did not prove practical. Concurrence of trouble was consistent, with the vibrator unit especially. The set is not strong enough to out station and static interference at night over irregular terrain at distances of over ten to twenty miles.

During the entire operation we tried to secure booster coils from the Signal Corps for our long lines. Finding none, we used in the emergency German booster coils and found them satisfactory. Their four-conductor cable is superior to our wire because of its greater conductivity, tensile strength, and strong plastic insulation. Line route maps were very advantageous in laying future lines on forward moves. There were very few lines laid that were not used by some other unit later.

The worst fighting of the action took place on Djebel Ainchouna (Allentown) and "Little Ainchouna" (Cadillac) starting off with a heavy group of concentrations on the point of Cadillac which left 114 German dead when the 39th Infantry arrived. The infantry battalion commander of the battalion which took the hill ran into bitter fighting and he and his executive were killed. The regimental commander and staff, with complete plans for the objectives of the week ahead, were captured just as they were moving their CP. They were later recaptured by the Americans but the plans were lost.

Bitter fighting continued until 3 May, when suspicion that the enemy had completely withdrawn an unknown distance to the east were verified, just as he had slipped quietly away from us at Thala and El Guettar.

The Commanding General II Corps ordered an aggressive follow-up at once, with the docks at Ferryville and Bizerte to be the targets as they came in range (dock order later rescinded) and the 155 rifles to be able to fire on shipping in Lac Bizerte and later in the Mediterranean. Indications that Mateur was being evacuated, even that Bizerte had been weakened, later proved true.

The battle was really over now. From this date there were no further infantry death casualties, except from mines after the fighting ceased. Two jumps were made, one last difficult bit of ground taken, and then ahead lay the broken city in the harbor, filled with time-bombs and snipers and interdiction by high-velocity and rapid-firing AA weapons from across the channel in the 1st Armored Division's sector.

All battalions were given the mission of cleaning up salvage from the battlefields, and then moved for a brief period of rest and swimming along the beach. The Tunisian campaign was over.

A N N E X

Report on Combat Experience

and

Battle Lessons for Training Purposes

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
A.P.O. #9

21 June 1943

SUBJECT: Reports on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training Purposes.

TO : Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with letter Allied Force Headquarters, 14 May 1943; Subject: Report on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training Purposes. Paragraph a is a discussion of tactical principles compiled by the Division staff. Paragraph b is a compilation of comments submitted by commanders of subordinate units. Reports of the Quartermaster, Ordnance and Medical services are attached as inclosures.

a. General Discussion of Tactical Principles.

(1) DOMINANT OBSERVATION MUST BE SEIZED

This principle has been taught for years, yet at El Guettar Hill 772 remained in German hands during the first ten days of the battle. As a result, the enemy had artillery observation and was able to fire on anything that moved. As soon as Hill 772 was captured the Germans abandoned the entire position. This may or may not have been planned ahead of time, but the fact remains that we were helpless as long as he was "looking down our throat". The principle was further borne out in the Sedjenane-Bizerte operation. During the early days while our enveloping force was getting into position, German observation again dominated us. Our envelopment turned the enemy out of the line of hills on which his O.P.'s were located and allowed us to "look down his throat". It is now known that the German withdrawal from the Green-Bald position started immediately after we occupied the two hills referred to. As a corollary it is believed that any campaign, unless it is fought in a desert or a great level plain, will end up in mountain warfare for a large portion of the force. We learned that to live we must take to the ridges and advance along them, avoiding, the natural "avenues of approach" up the valleys. Heads of valleys were always strongly defended and heavily mined--to advance along the valleys was disastrous. Taking to the ridges was tedious, strenuous business but it saved hundreds of lives and gave physical possession of the high ground. Four times this resulted in the collapse of strong positions and the German was finally driven into the open country, his resistance broken and pursuit tactics made possible. It is recommended that all infantry divisions should be trained as mountain divisions before leaving the United States. This in turn brings up the subject of equipment. It is realized that all infantry divisions cannot be organically equipped for mountain warfare, but the transport and supply situation could be met in the following manner: Establish in the corps or army echelon a pool of pack equipment, mountain howitzers, etc. for issue to divisions as they find themselves up against mountain warfare conditions. Pack animals need not be shipped to the theater since in any mountain country the pack animals will be in use by the inhabitants and can be requisitioned. Infantry cannon companies should be equipped with the mountain howitzer (75mm) as a towed load. This weapon could be transferred to mules and become a true accompanying gun wherever the infantry went. Both at El Guettar and in the Sedjenane mules were collected for transport of supplies and ammunition, in the latter operation using over 300. Much time was lost in procuring them and the only pack equipment available was borrowed from the French and British. Barrack bags, mattress covers and other improvised packs sufficed but we needed pack saddles badly.

(2) ACCURATE G-2 INFORMATION MUST BE FURNISHED THE COMMANDER TO ALLOW HIM TO MAKE A SOUND DECISION AND PLAN.

Our doctrine teaches that the commander's decision is based on four factors:

- (a) The Mission
- (b) The Terrain
- (c) The Tools (Our forces and their disposition)
- (d) The Enemy Situation

Only the fourth of the factors MUST be furnished him by his G-2 since the other three he either knows or can find out by reconnaissance. Our G-2 reported to the 1st Division which was already in contact east of El Guettar. There he found a feeling of great optimism. He was furnished an overlay showing German mortars and probable infantry positions on the slopes of Djebel Berda and a delaying position across the Gabes-Gafsa road. The opinion was that resistance would be light and no intimation was given of the presence of a strongly organized defensive position. The 1st Division confidently expected the II Corps to push through the pass in two or three days. This erroneous estimate was not the fault of the 1st Division; it was based on what they had found out. As it turned out, the Germans must have worked at least two months on their position. Emplacements and dug-outs were carved out of the rock in many places. There must or should have been secret agents within the German lines to report these preparations to Allied G-2 agencies. Also, aerial reconnaissance would have disclosed much information. The fact that there was no information of the great strength of this position had a vital bearing on the plan of attack of the II Corps. Had the true situation been known there would probably been no attempt to operate offensively along the Gabes-Gafsa road. An envelopment of the enemy south flank might have been tried. In marked contrast was the situation at Sedjenane. There we relieved the British 46th Division and were furnished maps giving all details of the German positions on Green and Bald Hills and at the head of the Sedjenane valley. As a result an enveloping maneuver was carried out avoiding all prepared positions. Each enemy position was evacuated as soon as the pressure of envelopment was felt.

(3) THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMORED FORCE AND ITS USE IN COMBINED OPERATIONS SHOULD BE RESTUDIED.

In the age old struggle of armor against armament the latter seems master at present. Tanks, even medium and probably heavies, are very vulnerable to fire of the high muzzle velocity guns (such as the German 88 and American 3 inch). Benson's force tried several times to break through the pass at El Guettar and each time was driven back by relatively few German 88's and tanks. It seems that, except in desert country, the main role of the tank will be one of exploiting a break through. The 1st Armored Division did a magnificent job east of Mateur but most of the German anti-tank resistance had already been overcome. There should undoubtedly be tank groups held in strategic reserve to exploit a break through but the full time employment of a large number of armored divisions seems wasteful in man power and material as long as the anti-tank gun holds the upper hand. Mine fields covered by the fire of anti-tank guns can hold up armor indefinitely unless tremendous losses are taken.

(4) MINES AND THE THREAT OF THEM SLOWS UP MOVEMENT MORE THAN DOES HOSTILE FIRE.

In country that the enemy has occupied, no movement is safe without prior mine reconnaissance. The German use of both teller-mines and anti-personnel mines is diabolically clever. All roads, paths, stream crossings and breaks in woods are possible mine traps. Consequently, hours of time are lost probing for mines before even small forces can advance. By night, any movement is nerve-wracking. Armored vehicles were much delayed on pursuit missions waiting mine clearance. A heavy land mine sweeper is needed to clear a path quickly by explosion. (The British have such a vehicle). The driver must be fully protected from all directions since the German often connects anti-personnel mines to detonate when tellermines are set off. These A.P. mines are usually placed high along banks beside the road. After passing through a mine field the ditches just beyond must be avoided. The German mines these ditches with A.P. mines hoping that when vehicles are fired on the men will seek shelter in the ditches to escape fire. It is better to stay in the vehicle and run for it than to seek cover in the ditches. Parties working on mine clearance must be dispersed. One party had eight men killed and eleven wounded by one A.P. mine due to bunching at a stream crossing. By equipping all officers and N.C.O.'s. with a metal cone made from rods taken from artillery ammunition containers, and giving instruction in technique of probing for mines and testing for trip wires, passage of troops through mine fields was speeded up towards the end of the campaign.

(5) THE AMERICAN ARTILLERY WAS GREATLY FEARED BY THE ENEMY AND PAID FOR ITSELF MANY TIMES OVER IN RESULTS OBTAINED.

All doctrine of the Field Artillery School proved itself in combat. The flexibility of fire was astounding. At one time a forward observer on the north flank conducted fire for a battalion of 155 howitzers located on the opposite flank. Enfilade fire was concentrated on a road that was jammed with enemy vehicles. Forward observation methods were used almost entirely. Each battalion had at least ten forward observers. Through the Fire Direction Center at Division Artillery forward observers often adjusted fire of other battalions. The use of radio and telephone relays over both infantry and artillery wire solved all communication difficulties. Some forward observer was able to do the job in every case. There was practically no unobserved fire except harassing fire at night. Often effect of fire on reverse slopes could not be accurately spotted but general surveillance was possible. Our artillery, caliber for caliber, is more powerful than the German due to a larger high explosive charge. Many prisoners spoke of the power and efficiency of our artillery fire. Several times after an artillery pounding men swarmed out of gullies to surrender. One Nazi who had served on almost every German front said that the American artillery fire was the most deadly that he had experienced. Night harassing fire was the general rule and apparently did much to break enemy morale.

(6) IN AN ATTACK OF A PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITION INFANTRY FORWARD ELEMENTS MUST FOLLOW THE ARTILLERY CONCENTRATIONS AT 100 YARDS.

This was conclusively demonstrated. In early action the infantry often allowed artillery concentrations to lift so that five hundred yards or more had to be traversed before closing with the enemy. This allowed the German to come up out of his dugouts, recover from the shock effect of the artillery concentration and man his weapons. As a result our attack was often repulsed with heavy losses. Later at Djebel Cheniti the 60th Infantry stormed the hill following the artillery at 100 yards. They took only about three casualties from our artillery and overran the position with the bayonet before the defenders had recovered and manned their guns. No casualties were suffered other than the three mentioned above. Our infantry is now sold on this procedure but they have to be shown. It is believed that all troops, including high staff officers, should advance behind artillery fire at 200 yards in the training area before going into combat. Two hundred yards is recommended rather than one hundred due to fact that normal dispersion will cause some casualties at one hundred yards. In combat these are accepted with equanimity while in training such casualties would be a serious detriment to morale.

(7) AFTER TAKING AN OBJECTIVE TROOPS MUST CONTINUE DOWN THE REVERSE SLOPE AND PREPARE FOR COUNTERATTACK OR BOMBARDMENT.

Several times infantry was slow to realize that they must not expose themselves on the skyline after reaching the top of a hill. The German always places artillery fire on positions he has vacated. In the attack on Djebel Cheniti by the 60th Infantry (described in (6) above) advance elements stood up on the skyline instead of continuing down the reverse slope and digging in. Artillery fire came down almost immediately causing many more casualties than were suffered in taking the position.

(8) INFANTRY MUST USE THEIR ORGANIC WEAPONS AND REQUEST ARTILLERY SUPPORT ONLY WHEN RESISTANCE CANNOT BE DEALT WITH LOCALLY.

Initially there was a tendency to call for artillery fire instead of using mortar and cannon company weapons. In this operation the consequences were not serious due to an abundance of artillery ammunition. In a landing operation where every round must be transported over water and landed on beaches a critical shortage of artillery ammunition may result. Also, transport to get it forward will be limited. Every round must count and the infantry will have to use their own weapons and get along with much less artillery support than they received in Tunisia.

(9) WHEN FIRED ON INFANTRY UNITS FROM THE SQUAD TO THE BATTALION MUST ADVANCE BY FIRE AND MOVEMENT, USING ENVELOPING TACTICS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

Many times units reported that they were stopped by enemy fire and upon inquiry it was found that they had received practically no casualties. All echelons must be imbued with the will to advance and deal with resistance by local envelopment. Towards the end of the campaign this was being done with gratifying results.

(10) IN A STATIC POSITION THE INITIATIVE LIES WITH THE SIDE THAT CONDUCTS THE MOST ACTIVE PATROLLING.

This division relieved the 46th British Division on the Sedjenane front. The hostile positions were separated by fairly open rolling country about six kilometers wide. Patrols from both sides roamed this ground especially at night. The British told us that we must out patrol the enemy in order to hold the initiative. In the first three days on the position three complete patrols were lost; two others ambushed with only a few survivors escaping and in one case a German combat patrol penetrated deep into the defensive area of one of our regiments, inflicted casualties and captured prisoners. As a result of being out patrolled by the German, knowledge of his movements and dispositions were denied us. The Division was mentally reduced to the defensive. Our junior leaders were quick in learning the technique of patrolling and by the time the attack started on 23 April, were pushing patrols far into the enemy position. One such patrol penetrated to a point where it was able to observe activity at Jefna Station for several hours, bringing back valuable information of German troop and supply movements. This vigorous patrolling had taken the initiative away from the enemy and our commanders and staffs were furnished with the detailed information necessary for a successful offensive.

b. Comments from subordinate unit commanders.

(1) INFANTRY TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

(a) Fire and movement continues to be the most important basic tactical maneuver in infantry combat. All infantry must realize that to remain in position after having been fired on is in effect giving the initiative to the enemy.

(b) Patrols of two or three men are useless in all except specialized situations. Combat Patrols are necessary in practically every case. Sufficient force must be used in all patrols to accomplish the assigned mission without danger of being cut off or captured.

(c) All infantry companies must become proficient in night patrolling. Night attacks should not be made unless the nature of the terrain is suitable. The terrain in the surrounding mountains around Sedjenane was so dense with heavy brush that maintaining direction even by daylight was a major problem. Night patrols should be used extensively.

(d) Leadership. There is no substitute for good leadership. Unsatisfactory Officers or NCO's must be sent back or reduced the minute they are found to be lacking in initiative and ability. To have only one Officer or NCO who can lead a group of men is fatal. The loss of such a leader will come at a critical time in most instances, and the burden will then fall upon a subordinate who must be dependable.

(e) Communications. Infantry communications have been found to be a major problem. Communication difficulties within the smaller units (platoons and companies) result in a lack of information to Battalions, Regiments, etc. To supplement runners the 536 radio has proven very satisfactory and should be issued in greater quantities. In a situation where any organization is over-extended communication difficulties are to be expected. The runner system is overtaxed in rough country and the 536 radio will not only relieve this situation but will provide a more rapid system of communications.

(f) Heavy Weapons and Cannon Companies. The Infantry Cannon Company, both in the El Guettar and Sedjenane-Bizerte battles proved its value on many occasions, especially in the latter one. Due to the nature of the terrain, with its limited road net, mountainous country and heavy vegetation, suitable intermediate artillery positions from which the artillery could adequately support the infantry were hard to obtain. The self-propelled weapons of the cannon company, especially the full track ones, were able to follow the infantry in most cases sufficiently close to support the action of separate battalion when that particular battalion was attacking beyond the range of effective artillery support. Cannon Companies must employ indirect fire methods in order to prevent their remaining idle and wasting their fire power--Artillery forward observation methods can be used exclusively in directing the fire of the cannon companies.

(g) Maneuver The use of natural approaches, such as wadis, covered ravines or draws for outflanking moves often proved fatal. The enemy anticipates the use of such approaches and locates his machine guns and light mortars accordingly.

(h) Do not fire on small groups of enemy unless it is absolutely necessary. The German often uses small groups to draw fire for the purpose of determining where your automatic weapons are located.

(i) Personnel must avoid enemy equipment until same has been inspected for booby traps by an expert.

(k) The personnel of all infantry regiments must know the methods of mine detection and removal with and without detectors. Engineer personnel cannot remove mines for the advance of an entire division.

(2) ARTILLERY TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

(a) Combat experience has proven that the basic tactical training of field artillery is definitely sound.

(b) Wide dispersion of artillery pieces has made an artillery battery an unprofitable target for bombing or counterbattery.

(c) Dummy positions draw enemy fire and have been used by the 9th Division Artillery to good effect. There is a need for a small explosive charge of some type to represent muzzle blast.

(d) Night harrassing fires are very effective. Each gun on a different point during the night will give 48 points which can be bothered. PW reports prove the effectiveness of this system.

(e) Massed artillery fire will break up a tank movement.

(f) Batteries should use diamond, horseshoe or square formation to cover large fronts.

(g) Forward observation method for adjustment of fire is excellent in 90% of the cases encountered. It is easily taught, is less technical than other methods, and is very accurate.

(h) Cub planes were used more for reconnaissance and checking camouflage than for directing fire. However, there were always plenty of OPs in the Tunisian campaign. This may not always be the case. In any event, the Cub plane is invaluable.

(i) Forward observers are not liaison officers, and must seek observation.

(k) Adjustment of fire on enemy batteries tends to be short. Experience shows that if the long limit of the bracket is taken as the center, better effect is obtained.

(l) Reporting of targets must be complete and according to form in order to save unnecessary questions and delay.

(m) Long range adjustments should be made by adjusting one element at a time.

(n) Artillery fire should be placed on enemy areas immediately following bombing by our air. Personnel have a tendency to relax immediately after a bombing and are unprepared for artillery fire.

(o) Ricochet fire is tremendously effective and affords a means of shelling reverse slopes of hills.

(p) Infantry protection is required for artillery OPs. Dominating observation is necessary and the infantry must realize this. In several instances artillery observation was necessary before the infantry objective could be taken. Delay in getting this observation will result in delay in taking the objective.

(q) Communications have been generally satisfactory. Long lines require repeating coils. Captured repeating coils were used satisfactorily in the African campaign. SCR 193 is definitely superior to the SCR 284 for artillery work.

(3) TANK DESTROYER UNITS.

During the Tunisian campaign several different Tank Destroyer units were attached to this division. They were all used as a mobile force, held, pending an armored threat. In the employment of the units when an enemy advance was not considered imminent, the reconnaissance elements of the Tank Destroyer units were employed with excellent effect. The Tank Destroyer organization was found generally very satisfactory, and their communications, excellent.

(4) RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS.

(a) In an over extended situation, a division needs at least a Reconnaissance Squadron instead of a troop.

R E S T R I C T E D

(b) The Reconnaissance Troop of this division played an extremely important part in the division action. This arm is the most flexible one attached to the division and if properly used is indispensable.

(c) Special cooking facilities must be given to the Reconnaissance Troop to enable them to stay out for a period of days.

(d) The men must be given relief due to the extremely nerve-racking type of work they do. Mine removal must be part of their work and mine detectors must be supplied to the Troop.

~~(e) Reconnaissance Troops must be very careful at night in the selection of their positions and in maintaining guards. German tactics stress the capturing of patrols or outposts just before dawn. Radio operation (the click of the key and noise of the set) at night is dangerous.~~

(f) Organization of the Reconnaissance Troop at present is not as efficient as it could be. Suggestions for organization:

- 3 - Platoons, combat
- 1 - Hq. Platoon

Organization of combat platoons:

- 1 - Armored Car with SCR 506 and 510.
- 1 - $\frac{1}{4}$ ton with 50 Cal. & SCR 510
- 1 - $\frac{1}{4}$ ton without radio.
- 1 - 75mm self-propelled half track.
- 1 - 37mm self-propelled $\frac{3}{4}$ ton.
- 1 - Half track (for carrying personnel to dismount and work on foot.)

(5) ENGINEERS.

(a) Engineer Reconnaissance must push well forward to locate roads and water and Engineers must have Infantry protection at all times.

(b) The method of laying deliberate mine fields prescribed in TC 29, 1942 is too complicated for field use. The tape method prescribed in Engineer Memorandum #1, II Corps is much better.

(c) Mine removal by the Lambert drill method is superior to the method set forth in TC 14, 1943.

(d) The "walking stick" is a simple, effective way of combating mines.

(e) Rocket launchers are more suitable than 37mm guns for Engineers and do not require care, training or transportation that the 37's do.

(f) One BAR per squad is desirable, as are two .50 caliber MGs per half-track. This would increase their flexibility in combat and furnish much needed AA protection for working parties on the roads.

(g) Communications are not satisfactory. Isolated working parties could not be called in in less than 4 hours in some cases. Rapid movement is sometimes required on short notice and sets of the SCR 193 type would provide a good net.

(h) Mine detectors should be issued on the basis of one per squad with a reserve of 3 per letter company 14 per H/S Company. This number was carried by the 15th Engineer Battalion and was found to be adequate. The mine detector is very sensitive and 20% are generally being repaired.

(6) SIGNAL CORPS

(a) Signal communications in the 9th Infantry Division during the Tunisian Campaign were excellent. Telephone communications seldom failed even though the division was habitually extended. Repeaters for improving transmission over long lines were urgently needed.

(b) A system of extra, automatic, signal supplies should be devised to increase equipment as it is needed. For example; a division operating on a normal front is allowed 120 miles of wire. Upon being ordered to occupy a wider front, credit should be established immediately for extra equipment to handle the increased load. Upon completion of the mission, the credit would be cancelled, and equipment turned in.

(c) Some assistance from Corps should be available for a Signal Company which is operating on a wide front. There is no rest for the wire crews and they become worn out after night and day servicing. A pool should be formed to operate in conjunction with paragraph (b) above.

(7) COOPERATION BY SUPPORT AND OBSERVATION AVIATION.

(a) Although an air support party was attached to the Division during the campaign, the support we received was not close enough. The delay between requesting a mission and receiving only the approval or disapproval of the request was excessive. When the time required to fly the mission was added to the original delay, the result was an ineffective support. The Air Corps complained on several occasions that there were no enemy where we reported them, yet their planes flew over the indicated target two or three hours after the request was made -- Enemy troops move.

(b) Advance request for cover to intercept routine enemy reconnaissance and bomber flights were sometimes approved only after insistant request. The results were generally good once the mission was approved.

(c) It is believed that direct radio communication with the airfield would speed up the system.

(d) No observation aviation was available - Few air photos were available. Observation type aircraft should be made available for the use of every division.

(8) STAFF PROCEDURE AND COMMAND POST OPERATION.

(a) G-3 and G-2 must operate in close cooperation with tents adjoining.

(b) C.G. and C.ofS. must do the same.

(c) All members of the staff must receive information which concerns them, coming in to another section, promptly and should initial it before returning it.

(d) 24 hours a day operation requires a certain amount of time off which officers and men must take.

(e) Every section must know the exact time required to load and move and the SOP equipment which moves in each echelon under each condition.

(f) An information and Liaison Officers' tent must be used to keep all persons out of the other staff tents.

(g) The habit of calling for the chief of a section to deliver a message which a Sergeant or journal clerk could take should be stopped.

(h) All orders must go through the staff section concerned.

(9) MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Mine Warfare and Booby Traps. - Failure to recognize the fact that the enemy is a master in the art of mining and using booby traps will cost lives. Confidence in removing mines and booby traps is gained only after long and careful training. Men doing this type of work must be relieved often as they will become careless.

(b) Camouflage concealment and cover must be pushed every day - Troops will neglect them in the heat of battle and must be prompted - We are not as good as the Germans in this respect. Do not wait till the position is constructed before camouflaging.

(c) Communications in general will work - Infantry communications are not as good as artillery due to the Infantry's continual movement. Sound power telephones have proven very useful. The SCR 536 is valuable and should be issued in greater quantities. The SCR 193 is an excellent set and should be used for artillery nets. Wire allowance must be increased.

(d) At least one Battalion of AA should be an organic part of every division - Six batteries are preferable, one with each artillery Battalion and two to protect lines of communication.

(e) Several orders were issued relative to firing on aircraft. The final and most satisfactory one was found to be: "No firing except when fired on. No night firing unless direction finders were available."

(f) Security - On outposts, and on patrols, security must be paramount at all times. In front lines and as far back as support companies you must be very alert. Behind this point the danger of surprise does not appear to be as great, although in a defensive situation the situation would undoubtedly be dangerous.

(g) Combat Intelligence - Difficulty was experienced in obtaining prompt, clear, intelligence reports. PW interrogation teams furnished useful information. Intensive intelligence training is now in progress within this division.


(h) Message Center procedure was generally satisfactory. Importance of leaving a message center team with the rear position of the Headquarters, when the forward part is moving, cannot be stressed too much. Message centers must realize the importance of every message regardless of the time, day or night.


R E S T R I C T E D

(i) Troop movements - Strict traffic control is necessary in moving a division. Each unit must be given a time of movement and move at that time. Higher headquarters must not move separate troops into a division area without consulting the division concerned. When higher headquarters gives a division priority on roads it should be fact - not theory. Large troop movements take more time than is realized and cannot be executed with precision.

(10) WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

- (a) The .50 Caliber MG is an excellent all purpose weapon. good AA ground mount is needed.
- (b) 155mm Howitzer M1917 is outranged by enemy artillery - ~~is urgently needed, a battery of these would fill the gap between Division and Corps.~~
- (c) All towed vehicles need electric tail lights for black-out purposes.
- (d) Submersible type hot water heaters are needed for all units.
- (e) One 250 gallon water trailer per company or similar unit should be issued.
- (f) A sleeping bag type of roll for each man would take up no more room and would be of far greater comfort and value than blankets.
- (g) Barracks bags should be eliminated and "unit supply" replacement of clothing and equipment should be used.
- (h) Combat suits are needed for every man.
- (i) A tracer which does not glow for the first 100 yards is very desirable. This would eliminate giving away your gun position.
- (k) Artillery gun sections need more pioneer tools.
- (l) More compasses and field glasses are needed in Infantry, Field Artillery, Reconnaissance Troops and Engineers.


M. S. EDDY,
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding.



9th INFANTRY DIVISION NORTHERN TUNISIA OPERATIONS 23 APRIL-8 MAY 1943

NOTE: COMPOSITE FORCE OF
9th RCNTB, 894 & 601st TD
WAS PLACED IN DEFENSIVE
POSITION 30 APR-2 MAY

LEGEND

MAP: TUNISIA SCALE: 1:100,000

MILES 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES

ELEVATIONS IN METERS

FIRST CLASS ROADS ———
SECOND CLASS ROADS - - - -
STREAMS ~~~~~
GERMAN POSITIONS [Symbol]

CAPE SERRAT

BIZERTE

LAC DE BIZERTE

GABAET ACHKEL

FERRYVILLE

BEDJENANE

MATEUR

ROUTE OF
47th INF

OLADIBO

Dj Tabouna

PATROL ACTION
[Symbol] (23 APR-1 MAY)

59th C.T. (601st T.D. Detach) (4-7 MAY)
Attached to 1st Army Div (7 MAY)