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(23036) To: I. Operation Reports - European Campaign - Eq 9th Inf Div Aug 44
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WAR DEPARTMENT

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

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HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

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
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REPORT OF OPERATION

OP 5
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Headquarters Ninth Infantry Division

ARO No 9

309-03

1-31 AUGUST 1946
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BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Ninth Div. G.O. 120
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*Revised
10/11/46
10/17/46*

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:

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H. J. ...
DOWNLOADING COMMITTEE 10/11/46
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COPY NO 1

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REPORT OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

Name of Accused: **Joseph A. ...**

D. The Commanding General, 1st Army, 1st AFM, 1st Army, 24 June 50.

1. The accused is charged with the murder of one ...

SYNOPSIS OF THE RECORD AND OF THE OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

Name: **Joseph A. ...** Grade: **Private First Class**

Place of Birth: **Paris, France** Date of Birth: **2 May 1922**

Age: **28**
 Length of Service: **7**
 Character of Service: **Satisfactory**
 Previous Punishment: **None**

Character of the Offense: **Murder**
 Degree of Guilt: **Yes**

Character of Offense	Aggravated		Aggravated		Total
	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Murder	Yes	10 Yes	15 Yes	10 No	Total
Aggravated by ...	Yes	10 Yes			Total
Aggravated by ...	Yes	10 Yes	15 Yes		Total

CHARGES

Violation of A.W. No.	Kind of Offense	Place	Findings	Character of Offense
92	Murder		NS	NS but G of AW 92, manslaughter

2. **WARRANT** for the Prosecution. On the night of 2 March 1944 accused, deceased and several other soldiers returned from a pass. Accused and deceased had a few words as to which of the two was going to ride in the cab of the truck in ... When they arrived at their unit area at ... France, at about 2000 hours accused, deceased and a few others entered the barracks and stood around the stove. A scuffle between the accused and the deceased resulted in deceased knocking the accused to the floor and standing over him. One of the other soldiers led the deceased a short distance away and then helped accused to his feet. Accused then left the building. Deceased and two others stood around the stove talking and in about fifteen minutes (H 26) accused returned with a carbine held behind his back. He called the deceased by name and when the latter answered he pulled the carbine from behind his back and pointed it at the group. One of the other soldiers tried to grab the carbine but missed it (H 14, 15). Accused stepped back a few paces and fired (H 14-15, 25).

INSTRUCTIONS

Use Form No. 100, Revised to Meet Needs of Criminal Cases
Commenced after the passage of the Act

The following instructions are to be read by counsel for the accused and by the court, with the assistance of the clerk, before the trial of a case. They are to be read in the presence of the jury, and the court should see that they are read in full.

1. STATEMENT. Describe the facts of the case by filing in blank spaces (see enclosed proforma) such notes as the court may require. Each of such notes should be numbered, and the number of such notes should be indicated in the margin of the proforma. The notes should be filed in the court room, and the court should see that they are filed in full.

2. VERDICT. The verdict should be in writing, and should be signed by the jury. It should be in the form of "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of the crime of _____, and we recommend that he be sentenced to _____."

3. RECOMMENDATION. The recommendation should be in writing, and should be signed by the jury. It should be in the form of "We, the jury, recommend that the defendant be sentenced to _____."

4. OPINION. Give in this paragraph a brief, factual summary of the evidence, with appropriate citations to the record, as "R. 11." First summarize the evidence for the prosecution, and then the evidence for the defense, or state that the defense offered no case. Evidence not mentioned should be mentioned briefly. A mere reference to it will usually suffice. Avoid in any event imprecisions and immaterial evidence not necessarily necessary to prove (or disprove) the case. Citations of evidence should be given, however, for the evidence for the defense and for, even though it pertains only to matters of extension.

Do not discuss the sufficiency of the evidence in this paragraph.

5. OPINION. This is the paragraph for discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence, errors and irregularities in procedure and their effect upon the substantial rights of the accused, with the meaning of the 14th Article of War, and other relevant matters of law and fact concerning the case. State in particular the reasons for the recommendations to be made in the paragraph following, including specifically the reasons why any findings of the court are held not "manifestly mistaken" (see paragraph 6 above).

The purpose of this paragraph is to recommend a sentence, a fine, or other relief.

The DISCUSSION proper should conclude with a formal subparagraph to the following effect, modified as required by the facts of the particular case:

"It is my opinion that (with the exceptions above noted) the record of trial is fairly sufficient to support the findings of the court, and the sentence, and is free of any error injuriously affecting the substantial rights of the accused."

State in a separate subparagraph, following the formal OPINION, whether you consider the sentence suggested by the court to be appropriate, excessive, or inadequate. If you do not consider it appropriate, state the reasons for your opinion.

6. RECOMMENDATION. In this paragraph should be stated, in brief summary form, the action which you recommend that the commanding general should take. It should normally begin with words to the effect:

"For the reasons above stated it is recommended that . . ."

and conclude with a subparagraph to the effect:

"A copy of herein enclosed is forwarded, this recommendation is placed."

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d. The 47th Infantry, ~~then~~ passing through ~~the~~ of the 8th Infantry, attacked at 0900 with the 1st Battalion to capture the intermediate objective in the vicinity of 403386. No opposition was encountered; and by 1100, the battalion was on the objective. The 1st and 2nd Battalions then continued the attack toward objective "I", coming under mortar and artillery fire from small arms, self-propelled guns, and tanks, until the objective was taken. After 2000, no further advance was made.

d. The 60th Infantry (less 2nd Battalion) moved into position northwest of PERCY on the right of 2nd Battalion, which reverted to Regimental control, and at 1000 advanced with 2nd and 3rd Battalions abreast to capture its initial objective. Little resistance was met initially; and at 1600, the 2nd Battalion had reached the center of objective "A". This Battalion then proceeded toward the main road to its front, where it met stiff resistance, and advanced to the line, 434368 - 438370. The 3rd Battalion, meanwhile, met increased resistance as it approached its objective and advanced only as far as the reverse slopes of objective "A", where positions were organized for the night.

e. The 39th Infantry, remaining in its assembly areas in Division reserve, sent the 1st Battalion with attachments to the vicinity of 425385 to protect the left flank.

3. 3 August 1944

a. Division CP: to 2200, 395449; after 2200, 418370.

b. The attack to successive intermediate objectives was resumed. The 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry jumped off at 0550 from a line of departure in the zone of the 4th Division to which it had been moved during the night. This attack was supported by artillery and the fire of the 1st and 2nd Battalions from their previous positions. By 0910, having encountered no enemy or fire, the battalion was on the objective. The attack was then continued by the 1st and 2nd Battalions which pushed without opposition to objectives "M", "N", and "O". During this advance, numerous anti-personnel mines, teller mines, and road blocks were encountered.

c. The 60th Infantry continued its attack at 0630 and made rapid progress until it met organized resistance along the line of the railroad north of objective "D". At this point, orders were issued to develop the attack toward the woods to the southeast and to continue on to objectives "D" and "E". However, a fresh attack launched at 1800 met with little success and positions for the night were organized along the line ISIRY (487325) - LA BOURGERRIE (474318).

d. The 39th Infantry, still in reserve, moved to new assembly areas as the advance progressed to the southeast.

4. 4 August 1944

a. Division CP: 418370.

b. At 0800, the 47th Infantry resumed the attack toward its successive objectives. Its plan of maneuver called for the 2nd Battalion to advance on hills 273 (478295) and 280 (482291) on objective "P", and for the 3rd Battalion to attack objective "Q" from a position on the right in the zone of the adjacent division. The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, was to mop up on objective "O" and send a patrol to hill 273. The attack jumped off as planned. The 2nd Battalion, preceded by the patrol from the 1st Battalion, encountered only scattered small arms fire as it moved to its first objective, but met extremely determined resistance as it attempted to advance on hill 280. Heavy artillery concentrations fell on Companies E and F and it was only after fierce fighting, during which heavy casualties were taken and one tank was knocked out by antitank rockets, that the

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
A. P. O #9

1 September 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Operations

TO : The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

THRU : Commanding General, VII Corps, A. P. O. #307.

- SECTION I - Authority
- SECTION II - Introduction
- SECTION III - Report of Operations
- SECTION IV - Division Artillery Report
- SECTION V - Supply and Evacuation
- SECTION VI - Annexes:
 - #1 - Field Orders
 - #2 - G-2 Report
 - #3 - G-1 Report
 - #4 - Lessons Learned

SECTION I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C-3), AR 345-105, this report of operations of the 9th Infantry Division from 1-31 August 1944 is submitted.

SECTION II - Introduction

1. Command. During the operations covered by this report, the 9th Infantry Division was a part of VII Corps of the FIRST ARMY. The commanders were:
 - a. First Army - to 1 August, Lieutenant General OMAR M. BRADLEY,
- after 1 August, Lieutenant General COURTNEY B. HODGES.
 - b. VII Corps - Major General JOSEPH L. COLLINS.
 - c. 9th Infantry Division - to 19 August, Major General MANTON S. EDDY,
- after 19 August, Major General LOUIS A. CRAIG.
2. Composition of the 9th Infantry Division. During this period the Division was composed of the following units:

a. Organic:

- 39th Infantry
- 47th Infantry
- 60th Infantry
- Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 9th Division Artillery
- 26th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How)
- 34th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How)
- 60th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How)
- 8th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How)
- 9th Reconnaissance Troop
- 9th Signal Company
- 9th Medical Battalion
- 709th Ordnance Company
- 9th Quartermaster Company
- Headquarters and Headquarters Company 9th Infantry Division

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b. Attached:

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- 8th Combat Team (Reinforced) (10 - 11 Aug)
- 690th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How) (2 Aug -)
- 951st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How) (6 - 20 Aug, 25 Aug -)
- 183rd Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How) (6 - 11 Aug)
- 18th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How) (20 - 24 Aug)
- 987th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm gun SP) (2 - 6 Aug)
- Battery A 981st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm gun) (6 - 20 Aug, 26 Aug -)
- 376th AAA AW Battalion (M)
- 4th Cavalry Group (21 - 23 Aug)
- Companies C and D 87th Chemical Battalion
- Provisional Ranger Group (13 - 14 Aug)
- Provision Ranger Group Headquarters
- 2nd Ranger Battalion
- 5th Ranger Battalion
- 18th Field Artillery Battalion
- 196th Field Artillery Battalion
- 746th Tank Battalion (M) (- 11 Aug, 18 Aug -)
- Company C 745th Tank Battalion (M) (17 - 18 Aug)
- 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) (16 - 25 Aug)
- 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) (- 18 Aug, 25 Aug -)

c. Maps. The following maps were used: FRANCE 1/50,000, Sheets 5E/4, 6E/3 & 4, 5E/6, 6E/5, 6E/6, 5F/2, 6F/1, 6F/2. FRANCE 1/25,000, Sheets 34/12 SW, 34/12 NW, 34/14 SW, 31/12 SE, 31/12 NE, 31/14 SE. FRANCE 1/50,000, Sheets 7G/1, 7G/2, 7G/3, 7G/4, 7G/5, 7G/6. FRANCE 1/25,000, Sheets 37/10 NE & SE, 40/10 NW & SW, 40/8 SW & NW, 37/8 SE, 37/8 NE. FRANCE 1/100,000, Sheets 7G, 8G, 9G, 10G, 15, 16, 19, 20.

SECTION III - Report of Operations

1. 1 August 1944

a. Division CP: 405610.

b. On 1 August, the Commanding General VII Corps issued orders for an attack to the southeast to envelop the enemy's left flank and exploit the breakthrough of his defenses south of VILLEDIEU-LES-POBLES. In preparation for this attack, the Division moved to new assembly areas in the vicinity of MAUFERTUIS (4445). The 39th and 47th Infantry were closed in their areas by late afternoon, and other elements of the Division were moving throughout the day and night. Meanwhile, the 60th Combat Team (Reinforced), which had been moved to its new area the previous day, was ordered to send its 2nd Battalion to the 8th Infantry. Committed to relieve the 2nd Battalion 8th Infantry, this battalion occupied a portion of the line west of PERCY (40412).

2. 2 August 1944

a. Division CP: 395449.

b. On 2 August, the Division attacked to seize the high ground and road centers in the vicinity of GATHENO (5623) - PERIER-EN-BEAUFICE (5420) - LES-MONS-D'ERON (5717).

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c. The 47th Infantry, after passing through elements of the 8th Infantry, attacked at 0900 with the 1st Battalion to capture the intermediate objective in the vicinity of 403386. No opposition was encountered; and by 1100, the battalion was on the objective. The 1st and 2nd Battalions then continued the attack toward objective "I", coming under mortar and artillery fire from small arms, self-propelled guns, and tanks, until the objective was taken. After 2000, no further advance was made.

d. The 60th Infantry (less 2nd Battalion) moved into position northwest of PERCY on the right of 2nd Battalion, which reverted to Regimental control, and at 1000 advanced with 2nd and 3rd Battalions abreast to capture its initial objective. Little resistance was met initially; and at 1600, the 2nd Battalion had reached the center of objective "A". This Battalion then proceeded toward the main road to its front, where it met stiff resistance, and advanced to the line, 434368 - 438370. The 3rd Battalion, meanwhile, met increased resistance as it approached its objective and advanced only as far as the reverse slopes of objective "A", where positions were organized for the night.

e. The 39th Infantry, remaining in its assembly areas in Division reserve, sent the 1st Battalion with attachments to the vicinity of 425385 to protect the left flank.

3. 3 August 1944

a. Division CP: to 2200, 395449; after 2200, 418370.

b. The attack to successive intermediate objectives was resumed. The 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry jumped off at 0550 from a line of departure in the zone of the 4th Division to which it had been moved during the night. This attack was supported by artillery and the fire of the 1st and 2nd Battalions from their previous positions. By 0910, having encountered no enemy or fire, the battalion was on the objective. The attack was then continued by the 1st and 2nd Battalions which pushed without opposition to objectives "M", "N", and "O". During this advance, numerous anti-personnel mines, teller mines, and road blocks were encountered.

c. The 60th Infantry continued its attack at 0630 and made rapid progress until it met organized resistance along the line of the railroad north of objective "D". At this point, orders were issued to develop the attack toward the woods to the southeast and to continue on to objectives "D" and "E". However, a fresh attack launched at 1800 met with little success and positions for the night were organized along the line ISIGNY (487325) - LA BOURGERRIE (477318).

d. The 39th Infantry, still in reserve, moved to new assembly areas as the advance progressed to the southeast.

4. 4 August 1944

a. Division CP: 418370.

b. At 0800, the 47th Infantry resumed the attack toward its successive objectives. Its plan of maneuver called for the 2nd Battalion to advance on hills 273 (478295) and 280 (482291) on objective "P", and for the 3rd Battalion to attack objective "Q" from a position on the right in the zone of the adjacent division. The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, was to mop up on objective "O" and send a patrol to hill 273. The attack jumped off as planned. The 2nd Battalion, preceded by the patrol from the 1st Battalion, encountered only scattered small arms fire as it moved to its first objective, but met extremely determined resistance as it attempted to advance on hill 280. Heavy artillery concentrations fell on Companies E and F and it was only after fierce fighting, during which heavy casualties were taken and one tank was knocked out by antitank rockets, that the

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hill was finally taken. The 3rd Battalion took its objective in the face of stiff resistance and established contact with the 2nd Battalion.

c. The 60th Infantry attacked at 0630 with the 1st and 2nd Battalions against objectives "D" and "E". Initially, enemy resistance was light and good progress was made to the first objective. At 1200, the battalions crossed the main east-west highway; but as the attack progressed into the woods, resistance increased and the attack slowed down. Final positions were organized along the line 500292 - 509297. The 3rd Battalion, in reserve, was moved to a position south of LA VISSIERE (495294) to protect the right flank.

d. The 39th Infantry remained in Division reserve. At 1130, the 1st Battalion was moved by marching to an area south of the road below the railroad in the center of the Division zone (vicinity of 481304). The remainder of the regiment prepared to move by motor. This move did not materialize, however, inasmuch as the 39th Combat Team with attached TD's and tanks was ordered to move at 1900 to JUVIGNY-LEBERRE (528141) by way of VILLEDIEU-LES-POBLES (388325), BRECEY (423200), LA CHATEAU CHAUVET (438137), and REFFUVEILLE (458134), for attachment, on arrival at BRECEY, to the 1st Infantry Division. At 1900, the combat team was reported moving as ordered.

5. 5 August 1944

a. Division CP: to 1330, 418370; after 1330, 464313.

b. The 47th Infantry attacked at 0830 with the object of taking objective "R" with the 3rd Battalion advancing from LA GAST (493275), while the 1st Battalion moved south and advanced on the objective from the right flank. However, the enemy continued to stubbornly contest the advance with light infantry action and extensive use of mines, and the 3rd Battalion moved very slowly. As a result, the objective of the 1st Battalion was changed to hill 280 (503243). By late evening, both objectives were taken and strong positions organized for the night.

c. The 60th Infantry attacked at 0800 with the 1st and 3rd Battalions against objective "E". Only occasional artillery and mortar fire was encountered and rapid gains were made to objective "E" and on to "F". As the attack continued from objective "F", it met strong resistance from a well defined line of defense. A coordinated attack was launched with the 1st Battalion assaulting the town of CHAMP DU BOUT (543269) against enemy self-propelled artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. The battalion took the town but was immediately counterattacked with Mark 5 tanks and forced to withdraw. The 3rd Battalion, ordered to swing around to the left to assist the 1st Battalion, succeeded in doing so against moderate opposition and established contact with the 1st Battalion at 2230. The 2nd Battalion was moved up in rear of the 1st, and defensive positions were organized pending a renewal of the assault on the town.

d. The 39th Infantry remained attached to the 1st Infantry Division.

6. 6 August 1944

a. Division CP: 464313.

b. Operations to seize assigned objectives were continued. The 39th Combat Team (attached to the 1st Infantry Division), having made limited gains against stiff opposition on 5 August, was ordered to continue its attack to the north to secure the high ground and road center in the vicinity of GATIERO (5623). It was to revert to Division control as soon as the ST POIS - CHERENCE LS ROUSSEL road (4922 - 5317) was clear of the enemy. This attack was made by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions at 0730, and slow progress was made in the face of tanks and heavy small arms fire. At 1200, the Combat Team came under Division control and was given a new objective to the east. (See Amendment #2 to Annex #1 of Field Order #15). The advance continued in this direction from hedgerow to hedgerow until

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at the end of the day a line was reached well up on the western slope of the objective. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion on the right (south) flank disengaged from the enemy and advanced north to cover the right rear of the regiment. In this day's action, attached tanks knocked out two Mark IV's and two Mark V's.

c. The 47th Infantry launched an attack with the 3rd Battalion, strongly supported by artillery and fire from the 1st and 2nd Battalions, against objective "S", and at 1055 reached the line, 511252 - 515255. At 1200, the 1st Battalion, having sent a patrol to LA MODERIE (5123) without meeting opposition, moved toward objective "T". At 1300, the 2nd Battalion moved to LA TULLIERE (5025) and then followed the 1st Battalion toward "T". The 1st Battalion made good progress, reaching the vicinity of 5123. The 3rd Battalion, meanwhile, against stiffer resistance, withdrew from the line at which it was held up, to permit the firing of a second artillery preparation, and renewed its attack. However, this met with little success, and positions were organized for the night along the line, 511247 - 515248 - 517250. The 2nd Battalion was to the right rear of the 3rd along the line, 500252 - 505252 - 512258.

d. The 60th Infantry attacked at 0900. The 2nd Battalion passed through the 1st and moved through CHAMP DU BOUT (5426) toward objective "H"; and the 3rd Battalion, in the vicinity of LES BUTTES (5227), attacked south-east. The 2nd Battalion met little resistance and made good progress to a point near LA RENARDIERE (5424) where enemy resistance stiffened and the battalion halted to reorganize. The 3rd Battalion met stiff resistance from the start and made slow progress to a point near L'AUBIDIER (5423) where it halted. The 1st Battalion was then moved into position between the 2nd and 3rd at 1600, and a renewal of the attack with the support of this battalion and a heavy artillery preparation succeeded in breaking the resistance and the assault battalions advanced to the line, 539240 - 552242.

7. 7 August 1944

a. Division CP: 464313.


b. During the night and early morning hours, an enemy attack with infantry and armor developed from the east and passed by way of LE MESNIL TOVE (5216) behind the rear elements of the 39th Infantry. This attack proved to be a component of an attempt by the enemy to drive a wedge between our forces by way of SOURDEVAL-AVRANCHES, MORTAIN-AVRANCHES. At 0700, the local penetration became heavily engaged with the 82nd Armored Reconnaissance Squadron at CHERENCE LE ROUSSEL (5317) and was eventually neutralized. Meanwhile, the attack of the 39th Infantry against its previously assigned objectives to the northeast scheduled for 0800 was withheld on account of the enemy situation in its rear. At 1200, the 2nd Battalion 8th Infantry moved up to protect the rear of the 39th Infantry, and the Regiment was able to engage the enemy to the north. Here, strong pressure was felt along the entire front, with the enemy attempting a penetration between the 1st and 3rd Battalions. This continued throughout the day; but despite heavy artillery fire, the lines held firm. At 2200, the 39th Infantry was attached to the 4th Infantry Division in order to facilitate any likely employment in the 4th Division sector.

c. In view of the situation which confronted the 39th Infantry during early morning, the 47th Infantry (scheduled to attack 1000) was ordered to begin its attack at the earliest possible hour. Its attack jumped off at 0930 against objective "H". Steady progress was made against light resistance; and by 1500, the 2nd Battalion was on hill 250 (525223), the 1st Battalion on hill 280 (523-230), and the 3rd Battalion on hill 330 (525240). At 1545, the regiment was given a new objective to the east, on which the 1st Battalion advanced as far as hill 250 (526223) and the 2nd to positions astride the road at LE VELLENIERE (5421). The 3rd Battalion was ordered to remain on its position in Division reserve.

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d. The 60th Infantry attacked to the south at 0600 toward its previously assigned objective. Its battalions met heavy resistance initially until the east-west road to GATHEMO (5623) was crossed, after which the enemy became disorganized and rapid gains were made to the regimental objective which was occupied at 1530. At 1630, the high ground in the vicinity of BEAUMONCEL (5423), LE CASSEL (5423), and LA HARDONNIERE (5422) was assigned as a new objective, and the regiment was ordered to hold along a line defending from the east. By 2400, all battalions were in position on the new objective.

8. 8 August 1944

a. Division CP: to 1130, 464313; after 1130, 506260.

b. On 8 August, the attack was continued to eliminate the enemy resistance within the Division zone of action. (See Field Order #16). The attack of the 47th Infantry got under way at 1100 with the 1st and 2nd Battalions attacking to the southeast toward the Regimental objective. The attack was supported by four battalions of artillery on the area directly to the front of the line of departure. Strong resistance continued, however, and the 1st Battalion, on the left, was stopped on the line of departure by intense machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire from the front, left flank, and left rear. The fire from the left flank and rear appeared to come from the 60th Infantry, but efforts to clarify this situation met with little success. When it was realized that progress could not be made, Company B was withdrawn and ordered to proceed by way of LA MAZIERE (5222) to the high ground to the northeast to discover the source of this fire. Setting out on this mission, the company came under fire at two different points enroute and in the vicinity of LA HARDONNIERE (5422) met a force of the enemy. An engagement immediately took place, following which heavy mortar fire was brought down on the company, forcing it to dig in on its position for the night. The 2nd Battalion, meanwhile, was able to move forward and establish contact with the left flank of the 39th Infantry. The 1st Battalion could not advance, and after dark, Company A was moved north to the vicinity of 539229 with the object of securing a position from which it could join in an attack with Company B the following morning. The 3rd Battalion remained at its previous location in Division reserve.

c. At 1030, the 60th Infantry resumed its operation to clean out the resistance which remained on its objective and organize defensive positions to the east. The 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced to the east against scattered enemy resistance and secured favorable positions, while the 2nd Battalion moved east and south under heavy mortar and machine gun fire from the high ground to the south and secured a defensive position on the right (south) flank.


d. The 39th Infantry remained attached to the 4th Division.

9. 9 August 1944

a. Division CP: to 0900, 506260; after 0900, 475217.

b. The enemy continued his stubborn resistance, defending strongly from the Fidge line overlooking the 39th Infantry positions and from the high ground between the 47th and 60th Infantry. From these areas the enemy had excellent observation of our front lines.

c. The 2nd Battalion 39th Infantry delivered an attack to the east and secured the northern portion of the regimental objective. At 2200, it repelled a counterattack by an enemy force estimated to be two companies employing track vehicles. The 3rd Battalion held its previous positions, as did the 1st Battalion protecting the right flank. Effective at 1200, the regiment reverted to Division control.



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d. A coordinated attack by the 47th and 60th Infantry was planned to eliminate the pocket of resistance which held out on the high ground between their flanks. The 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry worked down to the south and attacked toward LA HARDONNIERE (543225), where it met strong resistance. An attempt by Company F to outflank this resistance met with some success and the company was able to advance 300 yards. Company E was then moved east along the north flank to relieve enemy pressure against Company F, but further attempts by the battalion to advance were repelled by heavy automatic-weapons fire. The 1st and 2nd Battalions remained in position.

e. The 47th Infantry attacked with the 1st Battalion on the left to drive the enemy from his dominating position on the left flank (in conjunction with the 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry), and with the 2nd Battalion on the right to take the town of PERRIERS EN BEAUFICE (5420) and cut the road running north-east from there to GATHEMO (5623). None of these objectives, however, was accomplished. Heavy and accurate fire from the enemy-held high ground prevented Companies A and B from establishing themselves on their line of departure, and very little progress was made on the left flank. The 2nd Battalion was able to advance slightly but was held up by flanking fire from the hill to its left which the attack on the left failed to clear as planned. Company E on the right, however, advancing along the low ground, established contact with the 39th Infantry and pushed to a point southwest of PERRIERS EN BEAUFICE at 545205.

10. 10 August 1944

a. Division CP: 472207.


b. The enemy still held out on the high ground between the flanks of the 47th and 60th Infantry. It was planned to clear this out by moving the 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry (in Division reserve) down the #4 road and attacking south and east through the lower end of the 60th Infantry sector to seize the high ground in the vicinity of 548217. The 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry was to support the attack from the position it held on the 60th Infantry south flank. Accordingly, at 0730 the 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry moved out and at 1150 reached a point at 546228 where it encountered heavy enemy fire from the front and left flank. The resistance from the flank, however, was overcome by maneuvering Company I on the left to LA LEVEIRIE (5522), and Companies K and L were able to push forward, although against fairly heavy resistance, to the objective, which they reached at approximately 1850.

c. The 2nd Battalion 47th Infantry was given the mission of taking PERRIERS EN BEAUFICE (5420) and the high ground to the east. Jumping off at 1210, the battalion moved forward unopposed about 500 yards and then was stopped by mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. Despite heavy fighting, and the eventual reduction of the fire against its left flank as the 3rd Battalion moved south, it was unable to advance further the rest of the day. The 1st Battalion 47th Infantry was moved to the vicinity of 541218 to close the gap between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions.

d. In the 60th Infantry sector, the 2nd Battalion, when cleared by the 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry, moved to the east and secured defensive positions adjacent to the 3rd Battalion 60th Infantry. In the 39th Infantry, positions previously held were consolidated and vigorous patrolling was conducted between units and to the flanks.

e. Effective at 2230 the 8th Infantry, whose positions protected our right (south) flank, was attached to the Division.

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11. 11 August 1944

a. Division CP: 472207.

b. The 47th Infantry prepared to renew the attack on FERRIERS EN BEAUFICE (5420) with the 2nd Battalion. Meanwhile, however, patrols which the 2nd and 3rd Battalions sent out at daylight reported the enemy had withdrawn; and at 0900 the 2nd Battalion moved into the town and to the high ground to the north, encountering only scattered light resistance. Patrols were sent forward as far as the streamline east of BEAUFICE and north along the BEAUFICE-GATHEMO road, and contact was made with the 109th Infantry and elements of the 113th Cavalry. The 1st Battalion was then moved to the vicinity of 555196 where it took up defensive positions south of the 2nd Battalion. While moving to this position, the battalion came under automatic weapons and mortar fire from several different localities to the east. The 3rd Battalion remained on the position it had secured the previous day. At 1500, the 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry, on the left (north) flank of the 47th Infantry, was attached to the regiment.

c. The enemy withdrawal had been effected all along the Division front. Companies A and B 39th Infantry moved forward approximately 700 yards and occupied the nose of the ridge line to their front. Company C took up a position on the right and patrolled toward LES FORGES (5517), drawing machine gun fire. The 1st and 3rd Battalions 60th Infantry, their front having been crossed by the 109th Infantry, were moved during the afternoon to secondary defensive positions behind the 39th Infantry.

d. The 746th Tank Battalion and the 183rd Field Artillery Battalion were relieved from attachment.

12. 12 August 1944

a. Division CP: 472207.


b. The enemy's withdrawal during the previous night and the advance of the 109th Infantry across the 47th and 60th Infantry sector left the 9th front relatively inactive. Patrols sent forward at daylight by the 39th Infantry encountered no enemy; and the regiment proceeding in column of battalions along the ridge to its front, occupied the high ground in the vicinity of LES VERGERS (5618), LA GOUETIERE (5617), and BLAIE (5617). The 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry in the vicinity of IE ROUSSEL (5317) was relieved by the 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry; and the 60th Combat Team was moved to the new division assembly area in the vicinity of LA GRILLARDIERE (6773). It closed in its area by midnight. The 2nd Battalion 47th Infantry was moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of 525-215; and the 1st Battalion, to the vicinity of 555195. One rifle platoon from the 1st Battalion and an antitank platoon relieved elements of the 9th Reconnaissance Troop holding a road block at FERRIERS EN BEAUFICE (5420).

13. 13 August 1944

a. Division CP: to 1245, 472207; after 1245, 677730.

b. The progressive move to the new Division assembly area continued. Units moved throughout the day over the 50-mile route as road clearances became available; and by late evening, all of the Division except the 39th Infantry and its attachments had arrived in the new area. Here, preparations were immediately begun for the employment of the Division in a new attack to the northeast by VII Corps to cut off and destroy the enemy forces withdrawing to the east. For the purpose of this operation, the 60th Combat Team was ordered attached to the 3rd Armored Division, and a Provisional Ranger Group, consisting of the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions and the 18th and 196th Field Artillery Battalions, were attached to the Division.

c. The Provisional Ranger Group was assigned the mission of holding the southeast flank of the MAYENNE bridgehead. At the time of its attachment to the



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Division, the 2nd Ranger Battalion had already taken up positions east of MAYENNE (8171), while the 5th Ranger Battalion was enroute from BUAIS (5596).

d. On orders from the 3rd Armored Division, the 60th Infantry at 1000 sent the 3rd Battalion to seize and guard the road center at PRE-EN-PAILL (1287) and in the afternoon began a shuttle movement of the remainder of the Combat Team to an assembly area in the vicinity of LA CROULIERE (0987).

14. 14 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 0930, 677730; from 0930 to 1930, 963794; after 1930, 960768.

b. At 0800, the 60th Combat Team (attached to the 3rd Armored Division) completed its move to the vicinity of LA CROULIERE and at 1400 received orders to relieve elements of the 3rd Armored Division at ST PATRICE-DU-DESERT (0597) and JOUE-DU-BOIS (1001). By 2200, these objectives were taken over, and the 60th Combat Team (less 3rd Battalion) reverted to Division control.

c. The mission of the 9th Division was to advance to the north in conjunction with the 3rd Armored Division, making its main effort on the right. In preparation for this operation, the 39th Infantry, starting at 0600 from the old area near LE ROUSSEL (5317), and the 47th Infantry, from LA GRILLARDIERE area (6773), moved to new assembly areas in the vicinity of JAVRON (0283). From here, at 1620, the 39th Infantry moved by motor to an area southeast of COUPTRAIN (0590) from where it advanced with two battalions abreast and seized without opposition its assigned objective on the ridge line south of ST PATRICE-DU-DESERT (0596). Later in the afternoon, the 47th Infantry moved from its assembly area and advanced on the right of the 39th Infantry to the high ground south of the stream in the vicinity of ORGERES-LA-ROCHE (1098).

d. The Provisional Ranger Group, holding the southeast flank of the MAYENNE bridgehead, was relieved from attachment at 1800.

15. 15 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 0810, 960768; after 0810, 080931.

b. The Division continued its advance to the north. The 39th Infantry, with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions abreast, advanced without meeting resistance until about 1800, when they received light small arms fire from the front and the direction of BEAUVAIN (0504) and cannon fire from tanks on their right front. This did not delay the advance, however, and the 2nd Battalion reached positions across the streamline west of BEAUVAIN, while the 3rd Battalion reached a line 027055-033056, some 1500 meters beyond. The 1st Battalion was held as a motorized reserve in the vicinity of 0302.

c. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions 47th Infantry, preceded by strong motorized patrols, advanced to the north against scattered light resistance, the 2nd Battalion reaching the line 083053-091056, with the 3rd Battalion on the reverse slope 500 meters to the rear. At 1300, the 1st Battalion was committed to take BEAUVAIN. It moved by truck as far as 075015, and at 1740 hours contacted the enemy east of the town. The enemy was driven back and positions to the north and east of BEAUVAIN were secured for the night.

d. The 60th Combat Team (less 3rd Battalion) was moved from the positions it held in the zone of the 3rd Armored Division and regrouped in Division reserve in the vicinity of 0800 and 1099. During the afternoon and evening, the 60th Infantry sent combat patrols along the roads running north

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and northeast out of JOUE-DU-BOIS as far as CHAMP-DE-LA-PIERRE (1204). They discovered a roadblock at 108016, but encountered none of the enemy.

16. 16 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 1045, 080931, after 1045, 034015.

b. At 0730, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions 39th Infantry resumed the attack to the north and advanced without opposition until about 1900. Thereafter, scattered resistance was encountered in the form of small arms, mortar, tank and self-propelled gun fire; and at 2200, the advance was suspended for the night, with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions occupying a 2000-meter front north of LE BOIS JEAN (0313). The 1st Battalion, in reserve, moved by motor behind the assault battalions to hill 250 (0111).

c. At 0800, the 1st Battalion 47th Infantry moved into BEAUVAIN (0504) without opposition and advanced in a northeasterly direction toward objective "B" (0605), which it reached at 1130. At 1730, the battalion was moved by motor to a point south of FAVEROLLES (0510) from where it proceeded on foot to objective "D" (0613). The 2nd Battalion, preceded by tanks and reconnaissance elements of the 3rd Armored Division, moved out at 0800 from the vicinity of LA CHAUX (0804) and proceeded toward objective "B" (0708). Resistance was met just south of ANNEBECQ (0707), but this was quickly overcome and the battalion moved through the town. Beyond ANNEBECQ, fairly heavy resistance was met, and the battalion succeeded in advancing only as far as the line, 083102-076102, on the southern edge of objective "C". At 1030, the 3rd Battalion moved by motor by way of BEAUVAIN to the vicinity of 055008. At this point, the battalion detrucked, and armored elements passed through to lead the advance to the north. In the vicinity of FAVEROLLES, the enemy was encountered; and a heavy fight developed with tanks, self-propelled guns, and infantry weapons. During this action, one of our self-propelled guns was lost, but the enemy was driven off, and the battalion advanced beyond the town to positions generally abreast of the 1st Battalion on objective "B".

d. The 60th Infantry was ordered to send a reinforced battalion on reconnaissance northeast to CHAMP-DE-LA-PIERRE (1204) and thence northwest to BOIS DU MONT (1015) to determine the enemy's presence and strength. At 0730, the 1st Battalion, supported by tank destroyers, set out on this mission. The battalion destroyed one enemy tank and its crew, took 10 prisoners, and returned to the vicinity of objective "A" (0704). At 1000, the 2nd Battalion moved to a new assembly area on objective "A", and from this locality the 1st and 2nd Battalions conducted patrolling to the north and west. At 1800 the regiment moved to another assembly area just north of objective "B" (0506), and strong road blocks were set up at ANNEBECQ and on the principal east-west road at 077058. The 3rd Battalion remained attached to the 3rd Armored Division.

e. Effective at 0800 on 16 August, the 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the Division.

17. 17 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 1715, 034015; after 1715, 041072.

b. The attack continued against the enemy's delaying forces. Jumping off at 0800, the 39th Infantry advanced slowly against scattered resistance from small arms, mortars, tanks, and long range heavy artillery, and by nightfall had secured positions on the southern edge of their final objective. These positions extended generally from a point about 1000 meters south of BRIOUZE (0014) to the outskirts of ST. HILAIRE-LE-BRIOUZE (0415).

c. The 47th Infantry also attacked at 0800, with the 1st and 3rd Battalions to take successively the two final regimental objectives. Both battalions advanced rapidly with little opposition until they reached the railroad running across their front, at which point fairly heavy small arms and mortar fire was received from the high ground to the north. Attempts to overcome the resistance with artillery fire and an envelopment by Companies ~~1 and 2~~ were successful, and

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it was not until 2000 when the regiment received the support of a company of tanks from the 745th Tank Battalion that the attack was able to move forward. The 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced to positions across the ERICUZE - FROMENTAL road (0014-0816), with flanks refused to cover the road; and the 2nd Battalion, which had followed closely behind the 3rd, took up positions to the rear of the 3rd Battalion. In this action, the final objective on the left (west) flank was taken, and the 1st Battalion knocked out one tank with mortar fire.

d. The 60th Infantry (less 3rd Battalion) remained in reserve near ANNEBECQ (0707) with road blocks at ANNEBECQ and on the IA FERTE-MACE - RANES road (0102-1207). At 2100, orders were received to motorize one battalion and send it to RANES (1207) for attachment to the 3rd Armored Division; at 2200, the 2nd Battalion was sent on this mission.

e. The 746th Tank Battalion was re-attached to the Division at 1800.

18. 18 August 1944.

a. Division CP: Q41072.

b. Indications were that the enemy had pulled out of the area on the Division's front; and with the passage of armored elements of the British Second Army across the front, contact with the enemy was completely broken.

c. During the night, the 39th Infantry sent a patrol to ST HILAIRE (0415), and no enemy troops were found. It also sent its Reconnaissance Platoon to ERICUZE (0014) to contact the British, contact being made at 0948 hours. At 1235, the regiment was ordered to withdraw to assembly areas south of the ERICUZE - FROMENTAL road (0014 - 0816), leaving patrols and road blocks to cover its front.

d. The 47th Infantry consolidated the positions held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions, and sent the 3rd Battalion to the final objective at the northeastern limit of the regimental sector. The 3rd Battalion reached this objective without contacting the enemy and pushed patrols out to the front and flanks. In the afternoon, the regiment was withdrawn to assembly areas south of the main road, and patrols and roadblocks were left to cover the front as in the 39th Infantry sector.

e. The 1st Battalion 60th Infantry remained in position near ANNEBECQ (0707). At 2145, it sent a motorized patrol of company strength to the vicinity of the woods at 096043 to clean out about 50 of the enemy reported there by a French civilian. This company, reaching the area after dark, took up a position from which it prepared to clean out the woods at daylight the next morning.

f. At 1200, the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion was relieved from attachment to the Division; and upon the withdrawal of the infantry to their assembly areas, the attached companies of the 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion reverted to unit control.

19. 19 - 20 August 1944.

a. Division CP: Q41072.

b. During this period, units rested in their assembly areas, maintaining vehicles and equipment.

c. On August 19th, Major General HAMPDEN S. EDDY relinquished command of the 9th Infantry Division to take command of the XII Corps. In his place, Major General LOUIS A. CRAIG assumed command of the Division.

d. On August 20th, the Division received orders to move to an area between SEES (4428) and VERNEUIL (0038) with a mission of covering the roads between these two towns exclusive to protect the left flank of the Army and prevent any movement of the enemy to the south. This line was approximately 30 miles

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long and was the boundary between the Second British and First United States Army. The remainder of the Corps was to follow later to an area between CHATEAUNEUF (2118) and COURVILLE-SUR-SURE (2003) south of DREUX (3235) and west of a line DREUX - CHARTRES (3802) preparatory to continuing the attack. At 1600, a warning order was issued to all units, billeting and reconnaissance parties were sent out; and at 2100, Field Order #20 was issued for the move to the new area.

e. On order from Corps, the 9th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the 4th Cavalry Group (reinforced) which established a reconnaissance screen between SEES and VERNEUIL. Upon arrival of the Division in the new area in the vicinity of MORTAGNE (6916), the 4th Cavalry Group was to become attached.

f. Effective August 20th, the 10th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the Division; and the following units were detached: the 951st Field Artillery Battalion, Battery A 981st Field Artillery Battalion, and Battery B 13th Field Artillery Observation Battalion.

20. 21 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 1630, Q11072; after 1630, 712182.

b. At 1030, units began moving to the new area in the vicinity of MORTAGNE (6916). The required number of trucks had not arrived, however; and it was necessary to move the 39th and 47th Infantry without their 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions; and in the case of the 60th Infantry, the 1st and part of the 2nd Battalion had to be left in the old area awaiting transportation. All other units were able to move and, with the exception of the 746th Tank Battalion, were closed in their new areas by 2100. Meanwhile, enough trucks had arrived to permit the remaining elements of the 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry to move at 1915.

c. The 39th Infantry was assigned the left (west) half of the Division sector; and the 60th Infantry, the right (east). Upon arrival in their areas, they established road blocks and a system of motor patrolling across the front. The 47th Infantry, in reserve, moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of 732230.

d. The 4th Cavalry Group, with the 9th Reconnaissance Troop attached, continued its screening operations across the Division front between SEES (4428) and VERNEUIL (0038). It contacted small enemy groups at 705309 and 724364, inflicting casualties and taking two prisoners. The attachment of the 4th Cavalry Group to the Division became effective at 1630.

21. 22 August 1944.

a. Division CP: 712182.

b. During the night (21-22 August), the 746th Tank Battalion and the remainder of the 2nd Battalion 60th Infantry closed in their new area. At 0630, and elements of the 39th, 47th, and 60th Infantry which still remained in the old area started the move to the MORTAGNE area, all units closing in by 1310. Defensive measures were strengthened and patrolling operations continued.

c. The 4th Cavalry Group, pushing its patrols as far as the RILE River and the LAIGES (7842) - VERNEUIL (0038) road, made a thorough reconnaissance of the roads and wooded areas to the front. The roads were found to be extensively blocked and mined, but very few of the enemy were encountered. One patrol which went up the road toward STE GAUBURGE (6838) during the night was fired on from a defended road block about 1 kilometer south of the town; and at 1255, the Cavalry reported 65 enemy dug in at the crossroad at 869379. These enemy groups withdrew, and no others were discovered by either motorized or dismounted patrols. At 1630 hours, contact was made with the British 11th Armored Division; and throughout the rest of the day, elements of the British Second Army passed by our front.

d. At 2230, orders were received from the Corps Commander to send one

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battalion from the reserve regiment as early as practicable after daybreak to the vicinity of VERNEUIL with the mission of guarding the approaches to the city from the west and northwest. Later in the day, the rest of the regiment was to be moved to this locality. The 47th Infantry was alerted for this mission, and a staff officer was sent to XIX Corps command post in the vicinity of LE ROUSSETTE (1340) to arrange for the relief of XIX Corps troops in the VERNEUIL area.

22. 23 August 1944.

a. Division CP: 712182.

b. At 0630, the 1st Battalion 47th Infantry (reinforced) set out for VERNEUIL (0038) where it was to receive final instructions for its mission of defending that locality. The instructions which were finally received by the Division called for the battalion to proceed to GAUVILLE (9840) - about 2000 meters northwest of VERNEUIL - and there make dispositions for blocking the roads leading to VERNEUIL. As soon as the battalion had unloaded at GAUVILLE, the trucks were to be sent back immediately to bring up the remainder of the 47th Combat Team. Accordingly, at 0700 a liaison officer carried these orders to the 47th Infantry; and by evening, all of its elements had taken up their defensive positions.

c. At 1350, orders were received to move the Division to the vicinity of LA FERTE-VIDAIE (9724) as transportation became available. At 1600, the 39th Combat Team began moving; and at 1745 the 47th Infantry was ordered to move the 3rd Battalion to the new area and be prepared to move the remainder of the Combat team the following day.

d. The 4th Cavalry Group, which was relieved from attachment to the Division at 1430, maintained contact with the British Second Army until it went out of action at 2000 hours.

23. 24 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 1100, 712182, after 1100, 010220.

b. The movement of the 39th Combat Team and the 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry continued during the night; and at 0800, the remaining units of the Division started to move to the LA FERTE-VIDAIE area. (See Field Order #21). The march was uneventful and by 1815 the last elements had closed in their assembly areas.

c. Effective at 2400, the 18th Field Artillery Battalion was detached.

24. 25 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 2125, 010220; after 2125, 968126.

b. At 0200, orders were received to alert one combat team and other elements of the Division for movement sometime after 1000 to a new division assembly area near ARPAGON (9513). Alert orders were immediately sent out to the 60th Infantry, the Division Artillery, and Special Troops; and preparations were begun for the march. Later during the morning, road clearances were secured; and it was learned that the Division would not move until 1230.

c. The march was made as planned (See Field Order #22) and included the following units: the 60th Combat Team, Special Troops (less 15th Engineer Battalion), Division Artillery Headquarters, the 26th and 34th Field Artillery Battalions, Battery A 376th AAA Battalion, Battery A 981st Field Artillery Battalion, the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less Companies A and B), and the

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746th Tank Battalion. The 60th Combat Team closed in its area at 2130; followed shortly thereafter by Division and Division Artillery Headquarters; but most of the other units were on the road or still closing in at 2400 hours.

d. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop, on arrival in the new area, contacted the 4th Infantry Division on the left and the 3rd Armored Division on the right and sent patrols as far as the SEINE River.

24. ~~24~~ The following additional attachments were made on August 25th: the 951st Field Artillery Battalion, Battery A 981st Field Artillery Battalion, Battery B 13th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, and the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (relieving the 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion, released from attachment August 25th).

25. 26 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 2110, 968126; after 2110, 170038.

b. During the night, elements of the Division which had moved continued to close in their assembly areas, and beginning at 0600 the 39th and 47th Combat Teams and other remaining units moved by motor to the ARPAJON area.

c. Shortly after midnight, the Division was informed that it would attach one battalion to the 3rd Armored Division; and to arrange for the details of this attachment, a liaison officer was sent to Headquarters 3rd Armored Division. It was also learned that the 3rd Armored Division was to cross the SEINE River at TILLY (1507) and that the battalion of infantry which was to be attached would clear the wooded area near EPINAY SOUS - SENART (1623) so that bridges could be put across in that vicinity. The 3rd Armored would then precede the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions in the attack to the northeast by VII Corps. The 47th Infantry was notified that it would provide the battalion called for; and in preparation for the crossing of the river, the 60th Combat Team was ordered to send an Engineer party to reconnoiter routes to the river and river crossings.

d. The 39th and 47th Combat Teams arrived in their new assembly areas around 1400; and upon arrival, the 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry was attached to the 3rd Armored Division. Meanwhile, the 60th Combat Team had been alerted since 1230 to move on one hour's notice; further reconnaissance was made of routes and bridges; and plans were drawn up for the crossing of the river early the next morning. At 1430 the alert of the 60th Combat Team was lifted and the Division ordered to move to forward assembly areas close to the SEINE. This move was made by truck. The 39th and 60th Combat Teams assembled in the vicinity of MEUN (2505) and the 47th Combat Team in the vicinity of TILLY (1507), the 39th and 47th closing in by 2400 and the 60th by 0200 the morning of the 27th.

e. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop was assembled near TILLY and notified that it would cross the SEINE at 0600 to screen the crossing of the Division at TILLY and MEUN and cover its advance to the northeast.

26. 27 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 1750, 170038; after 1750, 381151.

b. On August 27th, the Division crossed the SEINE River. (See Field Order #21.) The crossing was uneventful, the 39th Combat Team (on the right) clearing at 0742 and the 47th Combat Team (on the left) at 0855. The 60th Combat Team, in reserve with the mission of following the 39th and protecting the right flank of the Division, completed its crossing at 1215. The Reconnaissance Troop preceded the infantry at a distance of three to five miles and maintained contact with elements of the 4th Cavalry Group operating across our front.

c. The combat teams marched on their objectives without opposition. The 3rd Armored Division, advancing in three columns across the Corps zone of

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action against antitank and machine gun fire, had already advanced 20 to 25 kilometers to LESIGNY (2329), FORET DE LA LECHELLE (3121) and the vicinity of PEZAROHES (5126); and the only enemy encountered were small isolated groups which either withdrew on contact or were taken prisoner. Of these, 223 were captured by the 47th Infantry in the woods north of EVRY LES CHATEAUX (2418). By 1800 the forward battalions had reached the day's objective, the line, TOURNAN-EN-BRIE (3427) - ROZAY-EN-BRIE (4820).

27. 28 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 1755, 381151; after 1755, 540324.

b. By this time, the 3rd Armored Division had reached the line, vicinity of 4051 - MEAUX (4450) - LA FERTE SOUS JOUARRE (6248); and the 4th Cavalry Group was mopping up pockets of resistance south of the MARNE River. The 9th Infantry Division continued its advance on previously assigned objectives and crossed the MARNE to the line, PIERRELEVEE (5644) - ST GERMAN (6439) - REBAIS (7037).

c. The 39th Combat Team marched at 0830 and reached its objective without opposition, all elements closing on the objective by 1800. The 60th Combat Team, marching at 0800, passed through the 47th and reached its objective, also without opposition, at 1630. To speed up its advance, infantry were sent forward on tanks and tank-destroyers. The 47th Combat Team (less 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry) reverted to Division reserve. Shortly after daybreak, a small enemy force attempted to infiltrate into its area; and in the brief skirmish which developed, 1 officer and 17 men were taken prisoner. During the rest of the morning, the 47th Infantry cleaned out the wooded area on the left of its position; and at 1530 the combat team was moved by shuttling to a new assembly area just south of the MARNE River.

28. 29 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 1730, 540324; after 1730, 710620.

b. The objective for August 29th was the line, CHEZY-EN-ORNOIS (6868) - CHATEAU THIERRY (8358), while the 3rd Armored Division was to seize and hold the heights north of the AISNE River.

c. The march to the day's objective was uneventful. Starting at 0800, the 39th and 60th Combat Teams each moved by motor in two columns and reached their objective without opposition. The 47th Combat Team remained in Division reserve and at 1030 moved by shuttling behind the 60th and assembled in the wooded area south of BELLEAU (7563). The advance was covered by the 9th Reconnaissance Troop which reconnoitered roads and bridges, removed road blocks, and maintained a line of observation in front of the Division objective. During the morning, the 1st Platoon picked up 20 prisoners.

d. Around 1900, the Division was notified that the next day's objective would be the line of the AISNE River and an additional objective, the high ground north of the river, to be occupied by one combat team. The objective across the river was designated as the area, CERNY-EN-LAONNOIS (0601) - MOULINS (0699) - CHIVY (0400); areas south of the river were to be selected by the Division.


29. 30 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 1600, 710620; after 1600, 918905.

b. By this date, the 3rd Armored Division had reached and consolidated positions just north of the AISNE River, and the 4th Cavalry Group had approached to about 4 kilometers south of LAON (0215). The 9th Infantry Division was to continue the advance to its assigned objectives along the line of the AISNE. (See

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Amendment #1 to Field Order #26).



c. The 60th Combat Team was given the mission of taking the objective north of the river. This was taken without opposition. The combat team moved out at 0800 on trucks and by 1215 was on the objective. Defensive positions were prepared with roadblocks supported by tanks and tank destroyers. This combat team was prepared to reinforce the 3rd Armored Division on order from the Commanding General VII Corps.

d. The 39th and 47th Combat Teams were assigned march objectives along the south bank of the AISNE River. These objectives were also reached without opposition, the movement being made by shuttling. Some prisoners were taken - the 39th Infantry reporting 41, and the 47th Infantry, 11.

e. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop patrolled between the left flank of the 60th Combat Team and CONDE SUR AISNE (9197), and with one platoon maintained contact between the 60th Combat Team and elements of the 3rd Armored Division to the north. At 1855, the troop was instructed to reconnoiter crossings over the AISNE Canal, and the AILLETE, DE FAYAUX, and DE LA MEETE Rivers. This reconnaissance was made with the assistance of a party from the Engineers.

30. 31 August 1944.

a. Division CP: to 1605, 918905; after 1605, 406174.

b. The enemy continued to withdraw to the north and east while offering increased resistance to our advance with tanks and scattered forces of infantry. In continuation of the attack to the east by VII Corps, the Division was given the mission of marching at 0630 on 31 August to secure the line, ROZOY (4030) - RURIIGNY (4526) - HAUTEVILLE (5215) - RETHEL (5606).

c. The 39th Combat Team marched to the vicinity of LOGNY (4820) and patrolled the line from MADIMONT (4525) to HAUTEVILLE (5215). The Combat Team moved by shuttling with the 1st Battalion motorized as advance guard, preceded by tanks, and reached the objective at 1010.

d. The 60th Combat Team marched to the vicinity of ROZOY (4029) and patrolled the line from ROZOY to RURIIGNY (4526). The Combat Team, moving with the 2nd Battalion as advance guard, encountered a defended road block near ROZOY. The column deployed; and the 1st and 2nd Battalions, in action against small arms and mortar fire, soon reduced the resistance, following which defensive positions were taken up around the perimeter of the town.


e. The 47th Combat Team remained in its previous positions awaiting orders and road clearances. At 1200, it moved by motor to an assembly area in the vicinity of DIZY-LE-GROS (3221) in Division reserve. The regimental reconnaissance platoon reconnoitered bridges to the north and east.


f. The 9th Reconnaissance Troop operating ahead of the Combat Team, established a line of observation from RURIIGNY (5040) to SIGNY-L'ABBAYE (6127) and from HAUTEVILLE (5215) to RETHEL (5606).

SECTION IV - Division Artillery Report

1. 1 August 1944.

The entire Division Artillery moved to an assembly area in vicinity of 379474, closing in area at 1930. The 60th Field Artillery Battalion displaced at 2200 to vicinity 375425; the 84th Field Artillery Battalion moved at 2345 to 370405. Division Artillery Headquarters was alerted in the evening to displace forward to 379448 at 0530 in the morning, with the 34th Field Artillery moving into position





at 365415 at 0530 and the 26th Field Artillery Battalion to 385415 at 0500; all battalions to be prepared to support the attack of the Infantry to the southeast at 1000 tomorrow. The 60th Field Artillery in direct support of the 60th Infantry and the 84th Field Artillery in direct support of the 47th Infantry.

2. 2 August 1944.


The 690th Field Artillery Battalion (105 How's) and the 987th Field Artillery Battalion (155 SP Guns) are attached to this headquarters as of 0100. The 690th Field Artillery will reinforce the 60th Field Artillery fires, and our 26th Field Artillery will reinforce the 84th Field Artillery. The 34th and 987th Field Artillery Battalions to act in general support. The Infantry attacked at 1000; the 60th Infantry on the left and the 47th on the right with the 39th in reserve. They advanced south passing through the forward elements of the 4th Division, 8th Infantry, 1st and 2nd Battalions in general vicinity of 40-40. The bombing scheduled for the morning has been cancelled. The Infantry, tactically supported by Artillery (organic battalions, plus 690th, 987th, 899th Tank Destroyer, and 376th AAA), advanced steadily meeting little resistance. The 60th Infantry out the VILLE DIEU DES POELES - PONT FARCY Road at 435365, 1600; the 47th Infantry cut the same road about 1900 at 420355. There was very heavy resistance consisting of small arms, mortar and artillery fire at these points, causing heavy casualties. The Infantry organized positions to hold for the night. The 60th and 84th Field Artillery Battalions displaced forward in the evening with the 26th and 690th taking over their fires. Close support missions were fired for the 60th Infantry consisting of one concentration of four battalions on some tanks. Counter-battery fired by us was only of one mission due to visibility and inability of Sound to locate hostile batteries. The 28th Division on our left flank withdrew approximately 1000 yards due to heavy artillery and mortar fire. Contact maintained between Infantry units by 125th Cavalry. We're maintaining liaison with the 28th Division on our left. The 4th Division on our right keeping liaison with this headquarters. The 125th Cavalry also holding liaison with this Headquarters. The enemy seems to be fighting a delaying action, creating as many casualties as possible and withdrawing only when forced to do so.

3. 3 August 1944.

The 47th and 60th Infantry Regiments commenced attack at 0530, continuing advance to southeast. A series of preparations were fired by our artillery in support of the 47th's attack. Very little resistance was met until the afternoon when the enemy was contacted and continued to use delaying tactics. The Boche are leaving large numbers of booby traps and mines. Crossroads, entrances to fields and road junctions are particularly being mined. A message from Corps Artillery indicates the enemy's use of a new type fuze on Teller Mines. All battalions and attached units were notified. Our Artillery fired approximately 1200 rounds of ammunition on numerous small strongpoints and on one counter-battery mission. Battalions displaced forward during the day and night. Division Artillery Command Post displaced at 2000 to 417370. The advance of our front lines was approximately 8,000 yards for the day. The Infantry dug in for the night on Objective "N" and just short of "D". Heavy rain throughout afternoon and evening made operations difficult. Colonel C. L. Adams, Battalion Commander, 60th Field Artillery Battalion; Major Rex A. Hochdoerfer, S-3, 60th Field Artillery Battalion, and driver of 1/4 ton vehicle hit a mine while on reconnaissance in vicinity of 415363 at 1400. Major Hochdoerfer was killed, the driver seriously wounded and Colonel Adams evacuated but not believed to be too seriously injured.

4. 4 August 1944.

The 60th and 47th Infantry Regiments continued their attack to the southeast at 0800. Slight enemy resistance was met consisting mainly of mines, booby traps and light infantry. The 26th Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the 39th Combat Team attached to the 1st Division, moved to vicinity of 513415 to continue attack on Division Objective from southwest. They left this Division area at 1800. All battalions displaced forward during the day. Enemy artillery was extremely



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light for the period. Our artillery fired numerous close-support missions plus four counter-battery missions. 941 rounds of ammunition were expended.

5. 5 August 1944.

The 17th and 60th Infantry still attacking to the southeast with enemy resistance increasing up to mid-afternoon when it became severe. There was considerable enemy artillery active, also heavy mortar fire laid down by the enemy. The Infantry advanced approximately 5,000 yards for the period. All our artillery battalions displaced forward during the day. This Headquarters moved to a new Command Post area at 46334h, closing in position at 1200. Seven counter-battery missions were fired, also 70 close-support missions. One tank was destroyed by our artillery fire. The artillery assisted in repelling a counter-attack directed on the 60th Infantry at CHAMPS DU BOUF, 543269, time 2100. Reports were of heavy enemy casualties.

6. 6 August 1944.

The attack continued at 0800. Resistance was considerably heavier than of previous days. Reports from prisoners of war indicated that the 84th Infantry Division has relieved the troops in our zone last night. Prisoners also stated that our extremely heavy harassing and interdicting fire during the night had caused considerable casualties among their relieving and relieved troops. Harassing for the night was approximately 2,150 rounds fired on roads and trails in front of our zone of action. Counter-battery and enemy artillery activity was comparatively lighter throughout the day. Their firing consisted of an occasional batter concentration and individual guns searching thru the forward lines and artillery positions. The 987th Field Artillery Battalion (155 SP Guns) was relieved from attachment at 1200 hours. The 951st Field Artillery Battalion (155 How's); 183rd Field Artillery Battalion (155 How's); Battery "A" 981st Field Artillery (155 Guns) and "B" Battery 13th Field Artillery Observation Battalion were attached and occupied position during the night. Enemy Infantry infiltrated behind the lines between the 9th and 28th Division during the night which situation was restored early after daylight the next morning. Company "A" 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion knocked out and pulled back into our lines two Mark IV's and two Mark V tanks. Several concentrations were fired on tanks; one tank confirmed to have been destroyed.

7. 7 August 1944.

At 0010, an 899th Tank Destroyer Observer fired on 5 enemy tanks at 559247. The 951st was assigned mission - Battalion 9 volleys. Forward Observer reported results very effective and Germans screaming after fire lifted. We were warned early in the morning by higher headquarters to be on alert for an armored counter-attack, possible from MORTAIN to the west between MORTAIN and ST MICHEL DE MONTGOIE. Corps Artillery requested interdiction on the VIRE - MORTAIN highway. The 34th was assigned to interdict at 586166 with 50 rounds until daylight we were asked to fire defensive fires by the 26th Field Artillery Battalion in the vicinity of LE MESNIL TOYE, 527165, to repel an armored thrust going to the west. These fires were delivered and a few minutes later, cease fire was received - unsafe to fire. Later, the 26th reported enemy tanks of unknown number and infantry 200 yards east of LE MESNIL TOYE. At 0555, the 26th Field Artillery Battalion Commanding Officer reported 60 enemy vehicles, including tanks at 513165 and that he was firing at 527167 but did not need any additional fire. During the early morning, a radio relay station was established at the 34th Field Artillery Battalion to relay to the 26th who had been cut off from its Combat Team Regiment (39th Infantry) by enemy forces. The 26th requested fire on prepared defensive fires, concentrations "M" and "O", and again reported unsafe to fire. At 0700, two light guns fired on our Command Post area, landing within a few yards of the kitchen truck and wounding 3 cooks and two men from the Antiaircraft. Four of them were evacuated; one of the cooks seriously injured. Numerous direct support missions were fired during the day and also counter-battery. Tanks were reported

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consistently throughout the day, in groups of 1 to 3, punching and feeling at the front lines. The 39th Combat Team was detached from the 1st Division at noon. The 26th Field Artillery moved out of their position, several miles to the north-west, going around behind the enemy penetration, in position at 479198. Considerable enemy activity was observed to the east and southeast, consisting of armor, track vehicles, motorized infantry and foot troops throughout the day. Air observation reports indicate that troops are concentrating in vicinity of GEIHAMC (565237) (28th Division Sector). All units, including the 28th Division, have been warned to expect a counter-attack from that vicinity. An attempt was made to bomb enemy strongpoints in the 47th zone of action, PERIERS ER BEAUFICE (549237), but due to visibility, bombers could not see red smoke, which was used to mark targets. Fighter-bombers reported by radio that they would then attack an enemy armored column on the MORTAIN - VIRE Road. Before midnight, the 39th Combat Team was attached to the 4th Infantry Division Artillery. However, we will continue to give support requested by the 26th Field Artillery Battalion. Reports from higher headquarters indicate that the German armored penetration had been completely surrounded and annihilated by elements of the 1st, 4th, 30th Infantry Division, and 2nd Armored Division. The situation is well in hand with front lines restored. 26th Field Artillery Battalion was attacked during the day by 6 Me-109's firing rockets, machine guns, and dropping bombs, no casualties resulting in the 26th, most of rockets hitting neighboring infantry. Battery "A", 376th Antiaircraft, 326th Antiaircraft Battalion, attached to 26th knocked down two of the 6 planes (confirmed).

8. 8 August 1944.

9th Division continues attack toward southeast with the 28th Division on the left and the 39th Combat Team (attached to the 4th Division) on the right moving north and east. Resistance remains quite severe with the enemy laying down heavy mortar barrages. The enemy continued his light attacks with armor, apparently feeling out positions. Our Infantry made slight gains during the days operations. Division Artillery fired 11 counter-battery missions, 17 tank concentrations and 94 close-support missions. The 39th Infantry was counter-attacked several times; all attacks being repelled by combined fires of the 4th Division Artillery and 9th Division Artillery. Our Command Post displaced forward to new location in vicinity of 506263, closing in at 1500. The enemy "Luftwaffe" has been making harassing bombing attacks in friendly territory, generally around artillery positions, during the past few nights. No casualties have been reported.

9. 9 August 1944.

The enemy attacked our sector with a considerable number of bombers (estimated 20 to 25) dropping many personnel and a few demolition bombs. Areas of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion and 183rd Field Artillery Battalion were hit causing only one casualty in the 8th. Our Command Post displaced again, moving south on our flank to 413217, west of LE POIS, closing in about 1130. Our Infantry continues its attack improving positions and making slight advances; the enemy still laying down heavy mortar barrages (120mm). The 39th Combat Team was relieved from attachment with the 4th Division at 1200. Tactical reconnaissance reports tanks and armored vehicles moving west at 165185 at 1552. The enemy made a sharp counter-attack against the 39th Infantry at 2000; strength of which was estimated at one battalion. The attack was repulsed after heavy artillery concentrations fired immediately in front of our forward elements. 15 prisoners stated that artillery had cut battalion to pieces, killing battalion commander and causing many casualties; also stated that the extremely heavy nightly harassing fires have caused serious damage to enemy forces. Harassing fires are being placed nightly consisting of from 800 to 2000 rounds on trails, road junctions, crossings and likely troop concentration areas and strongpoints. Advancing infantry has found evidences of destruction and casualties resulting from this fire.

10. 10 August 1944.

The Infantry continued to improve positions against very desperate resistance. Pressure from mortars was relieved on infantry for a few hours after firing on suspected mortar positions. Forward Observer #2, 26th Field Artillery Battalion reports many enemy dead, 12 to 15 machine guns and several mortars knocked out after artillery fire on counter-attack against the 39th Infantry of

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yesterday. The enemy continues to probe at our front lines with armor and still used some tanks as roving artillery. The 899th Tank Destroyer knocked out one tank and artillery fire hit and burned one tank (both confirmed). Enemy artillery fire against our front lines increased in intensity just before dark. Division Artillery fired 17 concentrations on suspected mortar positions, 7 counter-battery missions, one concentration on tanks and two on Nebelwerfers. Reports from Forward Observers indicate that the enemy is using, against us, for the first time, rocket shells containing a highly inflammable mixture, possibly filled with flame-thrower type fluid. Huge blasts of flame follow their detonation causing large fires and casualties to those nearby. Additional information lacking at this time. The enemy continues his nightly bombing raids on rear and artillery areas using bombers in considerable strength. Bombers are coming in at tree-top level, below minimum elevation of 90mm guns and below safe operational level for night-fighters. 40mm antiaircraft guns and 50 caliber machine guns firing at night have little chance of hitting the planes since they cannot be seen and also give away our positions tempting the bombers to bomb area from which fire comes. Enemy has been found to be tunneling "loopholes" thru hedgerows in which they can observe our movements and fire on advancing infantry while they are protected by hedgerow. Enemy putting up smoke screens consistently believed to be screening mortar and rocket positions.

11. 11 August 1944.

Enemy planes were very active over this Division area in the early part of the morning dropping many personnel (Butterfly) bombs and heavier bombs. An estimated number of from 25 to 100 bombers from various sources. Areas were well saturated, however, no casualties were reported by Division. The 690th and 26th Field Artillery Battalions were hit, no casualties resulting. Fragments found indicate that the Germans are employing an HE artillery shell with fins attached. The infantry continues to advance, improving positions in view of occupying final objective, against very light opposition and sporadic artillery fire. In some cases, prisoners are being taken without resistance. Our artillery activity was light consisting of 12 counter-battery missions, 2 concentrations on tanks, 2 smoke missions, one mission on an enemy observation post and 39 close-support missions, expending 1722 rounds. Enemy planes strafed in the vicinity of the 60th Field Artillery Battalion in the evening. The 183rd Field Artillery Battalion was detached at noon. Observers reported that C-47's were dropping supplies on a hill in enemy territory immediately in front of our lines, apparently destined for area east of MORTAIN in which a battalion of the 30th Division was reported surrounded. A Division Artillery concentration of time and percussion fire was placed on enemy infantry pillaging these supplies.

12. 12 August 1944.

The infantry continued to advance occupying final objectives with slight opposition. The 28th Division passed by in front of our zone of action pinching out all but the 39th Infantry. The 60th Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the 60th Combat Team was ordered to move immediately to the vicinity of MAYENNE, crossing the initial Point at approximately 2000 hours. Reconnaissance parties for the remainder of Division Artillery and attached units were sent to the same area to reconnoiter assembly areas.

13. 13 August 1944.

The 8th and 26th Field Artillery Battalions were attached to the 47th and 39th Infantry Combat Teams respectively for movement to MAYENNE zone as Combat Teams. Headquarters 9th Division Artillery plus 34th Field Artillery Battalion, 376th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, (both less A, B, & C Companies), 690th Field Artillery Battalion, 951st Field Artillery Battalion, "A" Battery 981st Field Artillery Battalion, and "B" Battery 13th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, moved at 1230 toward MAYENNE, closing in assembly area at 2100 hours.

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14. 14 August 1944.

The 60th, 47th, and 39th Combat Teams were moved northeast going into position in vicinity of LE REBAY. Headquarters Division Artillery plus attached units moved to same area behind the infantry, then prepared to displace forward the next morning, behind the infantry which had been advancing meeting no opposition and taking a considerable number of prisoners.

15. 15 August 1944.

The infantry continues attack, contacting enemy and advancing rapidly meeting slight resistance. All battalions occupied positions to support the attack. Our Command Post moved early in the morning to vicinity of COUTERNES (081931) pulling into position and ready to operate at 0800. The 34th and 60th Field Artillery Battalions were attached to the 84th Field Artillery Battalion. The 690th and 951st Field Artillery Battalions to the 26th Field Artillery Battalion. Our infantry continued to move meeting stronger opposition - enemy employing strictly withdrawal tactics. There was from light to no enemy artillery activity for the day. In the afternoon all artillery battalions reverted to Division Artillery control. Communications became difficult to maintain due to fast advances. Tanks constantly reported in front of the infantry assisting enemy in their withdrawal. The 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached and given mission to protect our right flank and rear. The 34th Field Artillery Battalion found an enemy 105 Howitzer Battery intact, with mules, in area occupied by their Command Post. Extremely heavy interdictory and harassing fires were fired during the night.

16. 16 August 1944.

Enemy resistance continues to be a withdrawal with slightly greater resistance. Very little enemy artillery encountered. Our Command Post displaced to 03990035 with second echelon closing in at 1600. The 3rd Armored Div on our right continued to advance in our zone causing clearances for our artillery fires to be extremely difficult, with long delays. The 34th Field Artillery Battalion found a German 150 SP Howitzer in their area (112992) in good shape with radio in operating condition. The gun described as being an infantry heavy weapon on Mark II chassis. The 899th Tank Destroyer knocked out one enemy tank and destroyed another behind our lines. One M-10 Tank Destroyer was knocked out by an enemy tank.

17. 17 August 1944.

The infantry continues its advance with resistance becoming very stiff and classified as defensive. Numerous targets of all descriptions were available. The 84th Field Artillery Battalion knocked out one tank (confirmed). Very heavy fires were laid down in front of advancing infantry. Clearance for fire on targets of opportunity were very difficult due to 3rd Armored on the right in our zone of action and the British zone on our immediate front. Four counter-batter missions, 7 tank concentrations and 101 close-support missions were fired expending 5829 rounds. This Command Post displaced to 042073; second echelon closing in at 1825. Despite continuous and very heavy firing on enemy infantry positions, our infantry stopped for the night approximately 1000 yards short of their final objective. There was much heavier artillery fire than usual from tanks, field pieces and Nebelwerfers during the day. Lt. Col. H. Fuller, Survey Officer; Sergeant J. Williams, and Private First Class C. O. Patterson, Headquarters Battery Division Artillery were killed by a heavy enemy shell while surveying in forward area. Considerable destruction of enemy equipment and materiel has been reported from forward areas with many casualties having been inflicted by our artillery fire. Streams of fighter-bombers attacked retreating enemy columns from 0500 until dark. Numerous fires from burning vehicles and tanks were observed in the target area. Harassing fire for the night was confined to a strip approximately 3000 yards wide and 1000 yards deep across our front. British occupied town of BRIGUZE (010145), 1000 yards northwest of 39th Infantry.

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18. 18 August 1944.

Our infantry advances to occupy final objective. The area in front of the infantry was reported by forward observers as being devastated by yesterday's artillery fire. Numerous vehicles and enemy dead reported along the roads in town of ST-HILAIRE DE BRICQZE. Town reported as destroyed. One half-track captured with red cross on it containing 3 SS men, machine guns, mines, and hand grenades, confirming many reports of enemy violating the use of red cross. At noon the 3rd Armored contacted the British. Division Artillery was instructed to do no firing - front being passed by the British. Battalions were instructed to start maintenance and clean-up; however, remain laid and ready to answer calls for fire from the British or 3rd Armored. 899th Tank Destroyer detached for maintenance.

19. 19 August 1944.

No activity. Division cleaning equipment and materiel and resting up.

20. 20 August 1944.

The 951st Field Artillery Battalion, "A" Battery 981st Field Artillery Battalion, and "B" Battery 13th Field Observation Battalion, were detached from this Headquarters as of 1800. Division alerted to move the following day. At 2200, the 18th Field Artillery Battalion (105 How) was attached.

21. 21 August 1944.

Division moved to new defensive area north of MORTAGNE to hold a line from SEES to VERNEUIL. This Headquarters plus 34th, 690th Field Artillery Battalions 376th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion moved in the afternoon. Our serial left assembly area at LA GRAIS, at 1430 and arrived at 7139h, north of MORTAGNE, at 1730. The 26th, 60th, and 84th Field Artillery Battalions moved as Combat Teams with the 39th and 60th Infantries moving into defensive positions on a 35 mile front. The enemy reported very light on our front with road blocks and tanks at various points to defend the left flank for movement to the SEINE. Reconnaissance elements report log road blocks, mines, and Antitank defenses with the enemy appearing stronger on right than left. Still holding out in town of VERNEUIL.

22. 22 August 1944.

Artillery occupied positions, established communications, prepared to support the infantry in case of attack. No contacts with enemy were made and no firing was done by artillery due to Cavalry patrols along our entire front. Battalions were not allowed to register. 690th Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to reinforce the 60th Field Artillery Battalion; the 18th Field Artillery Battalion reinforced 26th Field Artillery Battalion on arrival. 34th Field Artillery Battalion, less 1 Battery, on general support in 60th Infantry zone of action, and "C" Battery, plus provisional Battery consisting of 6 tanks, (105 How tubes) were assigned to give general support in 39th Infantry zone of action. Zone of action of the Division is from SEES (435285) to VERNEUIL (000380) exclusive.

23. 23 August 1944.

The 47th Combat Team, plus attachments, took up positions vicinity VERNEUIL (000380) to protect right flank of position. 34th Field Artillery Battalion moved to reinforce 84th Field Artillery Battalion in this position. All other Battalions were taken out of action and went into bivouac in their present positions. 18th Field Artillery Battalion arrived and went into position for general support, later going into bivouac in their present position. Division Artillery less 84th and 34th Field Artillery Battalions were alerted to move to assembly areas in vicinity of LA FERTE VIDALE (970240) on 24 August. No contact with enemy.

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24. 24 August 1944.

Headquarters 9th Division Artillery displaced to 010220 closing in at 1100. 18th Field Artillery Battalion was detached at 1800 and will remain in their present area. Plans are being made for movement of 25 August to vicinity of ARPAJON (960135). 951st Field Artillery Battalion (155 How), "A" Battery 981st Field Artillery Battalion (155 Gun) and "A" Battery 13th Field Artillery Observation Battalion attached at 1600.

25. 25 August 1944.

This Headquarters, plus 34th Field Artillery Battalion, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, less combat team attachments, 376th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion less combat team attachments, 26th and 60th Field Artillery Battalions under combat team control, displaced to ARPAJON (04-13) closing at 2400. Command Post displaced from old area at 1530 arriving at new area at 2100 (960135).

26. 26 August 1944.

Headquarters Division Artillery displaced from old area at 1730 and moved to new area 170038, arriving at 2200. Preparations are being made for attack at 270600 to northeast.

27. 27 August 1944.

Infantry jumped off at 0600. The 39th on the right crossing pontoon bridge over SEINE at MELUN (26-06) followed by the 60th Infantry. The 47th Infantry crossed near TILLY (north of MELUN). They advanced to objectives vicinity CHAUMES EN BRIE (40-20), closing about 1800 hours and covering approximately a distance of 20 miles. Artillery assignments were as follows: The 26th Field Artillery in direct support of the 39th Infantry; the 84th Field Artillery in direct support of the 47th Infantry. The 60th Field Artillery reinforcing the 26th Field Artillery, the 690th Field Artillery reinforcing the 84th Field Artillery. The 34th Field Artillery, 951st Field Artillery, "A" Battery 981st Field Artillery, and "A" Battery 13th Field Artillery Observation in general support. All artillery except 26th and 60th crossed at TILLY bridge on the SEINE; 26th and 60th crossing at MELUN. No resistance was met and no ammunition expended. Division Artillery displaced to 377154, closing at 1830.

28. 28 August 1944.


The Infantry resumed its march to northeast arriving on objective in vicinity of COULOMBIERS (59-34) at 1600. Slight resistance met from small groups in isolated areas with very little delay. Enemy disorganized and apparently wondering what it is all about. Artillery assignments - no change. No ammunition expended. Headquarters Division Artillery closed in area (541326) at 1700.

29. 29 August 1944.

Infantry continued march at 0600. Objective in vicinity of CHATEAU-THIERRY (83-59). Artillery assignments - no change. Command Post displaced at 1500 to MARIIGNY EN ONKOIS (707611) arriving at new position 1700. Infantry obtained objective by 1400 hours. No resistance met. A few prisoners being taken that were by-passed. No ammunition fired by Division Artillery.

30. 30 August 1944.

Infantry jumped off at 0800 to northeast with objective across the AINES River 08-00. 60th Infantry was motorized with Division Artillery furnishing 47 trucks for the move. Infantry reached objective approximately 1800. Artillery assignment as follows: 60th Field Artillery attached to 60th Infantry; 34th Field Artillery reinforcing 60th Field Artillery; 26th Field Artillery plus 84th



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Field Artillery direct support of 39th Infantry plus 47th Infantry; 690th Field Artillery reinforcing 84th Field Artillery Battalion; 951st Field Artillery plus "A" Battery 981st Field Artillery in general support. No contact made. No ammunition fired. Division Artillery Command Post displaced to 918908, closing at 1800.

31. 31 August 1944.

Division changed direction to east, marching to objective to ROZRY SUR SERRE (4029) closing on objective at approximately 1600. Missions of artillery - no change. Contact was made with 60th Infantry on road block near objective - opposition was overcome with short delay. Artillery fired 13 close-support missions - 413 rounds expended. Command Post displaced to HANCOCKE (4016) closing in at 1700. Preparations are being made to proceed to the north on 1 September with objective MONS (3113):

MISCELLANEOUS -

a. Ammunition:

	105 How	155 How	155 Gun
Expenditures for period	24621	8899	1795

b. Vehicles:

The 60th Field Artillery lost 1/4 ton C&R due to mines.

c. Casualties:

	Officers Wounded	Enlisted Men Wounded	Officers Killed	Enlisted Men Killed
Hq Btry Div Arty	0	1	1	4
26th FA Bn	0	6	0	0
34th FA Bn	0	0	0	0
60th FA Bn	4	2	1	2
84th FA Bn	3	2	0	0
TOTAL	7	11	2	6

SECTION V - Supply

1. During the month of August, the rapid advances of this Division by motor marches extended the supply lines to a serious degree. Round trips of 400 miles to obtain supplies were not uncommon and it became necessary to supplement Quarter-master transportation with trucks from the units. In spite of the almost constant movement, the Supply Services performed their duties with remarkable efficiency. As a typical example of the hauling problem, the Signal Supply during the last ten days of the month traveled an average of 160 miles round trip for supplies. During the second ten days this average increased to 250 miles round trip and for the last ten days of the month the average round trip was 450 miles. The normal allowance of 35 miles of Signal wire per day was exceeded by 100%. Every effort was made to use commercial telephone circuits and abandoned power lines; nevertheless it was still necessary to lay 2200 miles of W110 wire and 268 miles of W130. Six (6) 2 1/2 ton truck loads of batteries were used during the month. Unit distribution of rations to the Infantry Regiments was maintained until extended supply lines made it impossible to continue this policy.

2. Rations were consumed on the following basis:

Type	B	43.3%
	C	14.7%
	D	1.9%
	K	1.4%
	U	0.1%
	10-in-1	38.6%

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3. Gasoline consumption averaged approximately 6.2 gallons per gasoline consuming vehicle per day. This average exceeded the average of July by 88%.

4. Ammunition expended for the period was 1221.6 tons which is less than 50% of the amount expended during July. Units of fire for the principle weapons amounted to the following:

<u>Small Arms</u>	
Carbine	.62
M1903	.44
M1	1.86
MG 30 cal.	2.7
MG 50 cal.	.04
Thompson, Sub MG	1.8
Rocket	.61
<u>Mortar</u>	
60mm	1.48
81mm	2.55
<u>105mm MG</u>	
	5.4
<u>Artillery</u>	
105mm	4.64
155mm	5.35

5. Replacement of spare parts and major items shortages were more critical than they have been in the past. Shortages of Watch, wrist; Binocular; Launcher grenade, M7; Projector, hand, M9; Rifle, auto, Br, M1918A2; and Mount, truck, M48; were the most critical major item shortages.

6. Replacement of salvage automotive spare parts and major assemblies became very serious. A very small percent of the salvaged spare parts, and practically no major assemblies were replaced by the depot. The 709th Ordnance Company exhausted its stock of GMC Engines, Transmissions, Transfer Cases, Axle Assemblies, Manifolds, GFW Wheels, Radiators, and Engines. All of these items were turned in to the Ordnance depot for salvage replacement, but no replacement could be promised. The lack of replacement of salvaged 600 x 16 tires for GFW became serious. This Division had 105 on back order.

7. Ordnance Maintenance: Listed below is a breakdown of work performed by the 709th Ordnance L H Company during the month of August 1944, as contrasted with the month of July 1944:

Major jobs completed	55 (34 were replacements of Maj. Assy's)
Minor jobs completed	557
<u>Previous month</u>	
Major jobs completed	41 (17 were replacements of Maj. Assy's)
Minor jobs completed	335

8. The above figures indicate that there was a definite increase in the amount of 3rd Echelon maintenance performed, despite the fact that the unit Motor Officers were reluctant to release vehicles for 3rd Echelon Maintenance because of the fast moving situation. Inspections throughout the Divisional units revealed that though 1st and 2nd Echelon Maintenance was good, several vehicles requiring 3rd Echelon maintenance were being withheld from Ordnance repair pending a static situation.

9. The 709th Ordnance L H Company performed six (6) engine replacements for the month of August.

10. Eighty-six (86) vehicles, including twenty-one (21) trailers were lost during the period. Fifty-six percent (56%) of these vehicles were 1/2 ton trucks.

11. Replacement vehicles were received promptly, but they were in very poor

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RESTRICTED
23 JUL 1945

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 Divisional & Co. TAG
 SECRET 28 JUL 1945

condition. Most all of the replacements were received minus windshields, rear seats, rear view mirrors, tops, tools, and other accessories. Transmissions had low oil levels; wheel bearings were loose and improperly packed. There was poor lubrication in general. One (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ ton Lx4, and one (1) $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6 truck, both replacements, required engine replacements after having been driven less than 500 miles. Towards the latter part of the month, the condition of the replacement vehicles became steadily worse.

12. An inspection of all small arms in the Division was made by the Small Arms Section of the 709th Ordnance L Company and the 126th Ordnance MI Company during the month.

EVACUATION

1. The combat activities of this Division during the month of August 1944 were characterized by rapid movements, the Division having advanced from MANTIGNY to DIEZIEUX GROIS, approximately 403 miles. During the month, the average distance from the Clearing Station to an Evacuation Hospital was thirty-five (35) miles. Supply depots were much further to the rear and caused some difficulty in maintaining an adequate supply level.

2. During this phase of activities, a total of 1809 Divisional troops wounded in action were treated. Four hundred and forty-eight (448) units of blood plasma were used.

3. Total casualties treated during the month of August 1944:

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Disease</u>	<u>Injury</u>	<u>Exhaustion</u>	
					<u>Mental</u>	<u>Physical</u>
Division Total	376	1809	1170	370	278	2
Evacuated		1616	835	300	219	0
Returned to Duty		193	335	70	59	2
Other Units		316	62	68	18	0
Evacuated		316	62	68	18	0
Grand Total	376	2125	1232	438	298	2

BURIAL

American dead were buried in 9th Division plots in the Corps Cemeteries located at GORRON and SOLEIS.

CAPTURED MATERIEL

1. Enemy captured materiel included:

- a. 24 - Mark V Tanks
- 35 - Mark IV Tanks

b. 212 - Vehicles

c. 34 - Guns (20mm or larger)

d. 7 - Ammunition dumps, one of which contained 15,000 tons of ammunition and 30 tons of ammonal. In addition to these dumps 2100 assorted cases of ammunition were captured in various places.

TRAFFIC

To expedite motor marches the traffic section computed march tables for Division and attached units. See inclosure. Close liaison was maintained with the Corps traffic section to insure road clearances.

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SECRET 23 JUL 1945

CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE

1. The absence of extensive enemy mining and increasing number of excellent roads lightened the work of the engineers to some extent. However, the increasing number of bridges being destroyed by the enemy in his retreat required continuous engineer reconnaissance to the front to determine the most practical routes of advance and supply. This reconnaissance was kept well forward and consequently, cooperation between reconnaissance units (to include engineers, division reconnaissance troop, and attached reconnaissance units) was vitally necessary.

2. In the early phases of the recent rapid advance, the "passing on" of bridge reconnaissance information by members of the Division staff was not efficient. Consequently, repetition of work between engineer reconnaissance units and Divisional reconnaissance troop was the common rule and cooperation between these reconnaissance units and the Division Staff was not at its best. This problem was finally overcome by having all reconnaissance information reported to one staff section, G-3, who then disseminated it to all interested sections and units.

3. The most efficient and strongest means of rapid bridging available to engineers was the steel Treadway bridge. Due to the rapid advance this bridge was exceedingly scarce and as a result was utilized only on main roads. Timber bridging requires considerable time for construction; and consequently did not fit into the picture of a rapid advance. Logically then, main supply routes of advance for heavy vehicles should, insofar as possible, follow the main roads.

4. The following is a tabulation of the work performed by the 15th Engineers Battalion during the month of August:

Roads constructed: 10 1/2 miles
Corderouy road constructed: 1/2 mile
Roads widened: 4 miles
General road repairs: 34 miles
Roads swept for mines: 28 miles
Areas swept for mines: 5 sq. miles
Mines laid: 2,720
Lines lifted: 389 enemy, 2,720 friendly.
Road blocks removed: 15
Bomb craters filled: 26
Bridges built (Steel Treadway) 2
Bridges built (Timber) 7
Bridges reinforced and repaired: 4
Fords constructed: 2
Air landing strips constructed: 3
Cross country blasting of hedgerows to permit passage of
Tank Destroyers: 6 miles.
Water point setups: 20
Water distributed to troops: 1,260,215 gallons
Defensive positions occupied: 4
Offensive missions: 3

Louis A. Graig
LOUIS A. GRAIG,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

SECRET 23 JUL 1945

CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE

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- Roads constructed: 10 1/2 miles
- Cordoroy road constructed: 1/2 mile
- Roads widened: 4 miles
- General road repairs: 3 1/2 miles
- Roads swept for mines: 28 miles
- Areas swept for mines: 5 sq. miles
- Mines laid: 2,720
- Mines lifted: 389 enemy, 2,720 friendly.
- Road blocks removed: 15
- Bomb craters filled: 26
- Bridges built (Steel Treadway) 2
- Bridges built (Timber) 7
- Bridges reinforced and repaired: 4
- Fords constructed: 2
- Air landing strips constructed: 3
- Cross country blasting of hedgerows to permit passage of Tank Destroyers: 6 miles.
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Louis A. Grady
LOUIS A. GRADY,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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13 JUL 1945

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13 JUL 1945

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Auth: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials: [initials]
Date: 1 August 1944
Hq 9th Inf Div, APO 9

FO #11

Maps: FRANCE 1/50,000

1. a. No contact with the enemy.
b. VII Corps regroup to continue the attack.
2. 9th Inf Div (less 60th Inf, 1 Plat Co C 15th Engrs, Co C 9th Mbd Bn) with 746th Tk Bn, 376th AAA Bn, Co C 87th Cml Bn, and 899th TD Bn (less 1 Co) Atchd will move on 1 & 2 August 1944 to an assembly area as shown on overlay, preparatory to a drive to the southeast to cut off retreat of enemy in front of XIX Corps.
3. See Annex No. 1, March Table (atcd)

33 INF 132

33 INF 132

39th Inf will be furnished 96 trucks for the movement. Trucks when unloaded will return to present bivouac area to shuttle 39th Inf.
Any CP to be reported.
Hit CPs to be reported.

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G-3

Annex #1, March Table, and Overlay Atchd.

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13 JUL 1945

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Declassify on: E.O. 13526
 SECRET
 MARCH TABLE 23 JUL 1945

70

to accompany FO #11

Organization	IP	Time Length	Route	Remarks
3rd Comdr 36th Tn Bn (with Co C 36th Tn Bn & 1 Btry 36th AAA Bn Atchd) Lt Col Adams	DANBY 397557	34 mins	B	Road passes IP at 1230. Rear march unit Tn Co moves at 10 mph.
3rd CT (less 8th Bn with Co C 899th Tn Bn & Co D 87th Cml Bn Atchd) Col Smythe	QUIBOU 416581	2 hrs 28 mins	B	Road passes IP at 1400.
3rd Arm Tr - Capt King	QUIBOU 416581	10 mins	B	Road passes IP at 1636.
1st Bn Bn (less 2 Bns) Lt Col Schornstrom	QUIBOU 416581	18 mins	B	Road passes IP at 1654.
3rd Bn 74th Inf (less 1st & 6th Lt Col plus 899th Tn Bn Adams' Cos and 376th AAA Bn (less 1 Btry) Capt Howell	QUIBOU 385583	2 hrs 12 mins	A	Road passes IP at 1500.
3rd Bn 74th Inf Lt Col Spindler	QUIBOU 385583	37 mins	A	Road passes IP at 1740, march at 122 mph.
3rd Tn Bn (less 1 Co) Lt Col Humphreys	QUIBOU 385583	24 mins	A	Road passes IP at 1805, march at 10 mph.
89th CT (less 26th Tn Bn with Co A 899th Tn Bn) Lt Col Fano	QUIBOU 417581	2 hrs 20 mins	B	Road passes IP on return of trucks from 17th Inf to present bivouac area.
Special Trs (with 9th Bn Bn (less 3 Cos) Lt Col Pickett	QUIBOU 416581	2 hrs 20 mins	B	Move by infiltration on order of Serial Comdr to move AM 2 August and to clear present area by 1000.

Guides: Each Serial Comdr will post guides, plus a suitable number of staff officers at critical points to control traffic.

Speed: March unit leading vehicles will not exceed 25 mph on open highways and 15 mph through town.
 Distances: 3 min between serials, 3 min between march units, 75 yards between vehicles.


1. 1st Bn Bn (less 2 Bns)
 Lt Col Schornstrom
 2. 3rd Bn 74th Inf (less 1st & 6th)
 Lt Col plus 899th Tn Bn
 Adams' Cos and 376th AAA
 Bn (less 1 Btry)
 Capt Howell
 3. 3rd Bn 74th Inf
 Lt Col Spindler
 4. 3rd Tn Bn (less 1 Co)
 Lt Col Humphreys
 5. 89th CT (less 26th Tn Bn
 with Co A 899th Tn Bn)
 Lt Col Fano
 6. Special Trs (with 9th Bn
 Bn (less 3 Cos)
 Lt Col Pickett

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 23 JUL 1945

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
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13 JUL 1954



OPERATIONS OVERLAY
 TO ACCOMPANY FORM
 1 AUGUST 44
 60th INF DIV
 MAP: FRANCE
 SCALE: 1:50,000
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13 JUL 1954

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83 JUL 1948

SECRET
1st, 667th Inf Div
2 August 1944

Hq 9th Inf Div APO 9
020300 Aug 1944

FO #15

Maps: FRAMES 1/25,000; Sheets 34/12 SE, 34/12 NW, 34/11 SW, 31/12 SE, 31/12 NE
31/11 SE.

1. a. The enemy line is not well defined, and the enemy's organization is so confused as a result of the Allied breakthrough that no accurate estimate of enemy strength in any one sector is possible. The 4th Div has identified the "Fuehrer" Regt of 2nd SS Pz Div "Das Reich" and elements of the 557 Regt (363 Inf Div). To the east of these units are 2nd French Inf Bn and 2 Bns of the 116 Pz Div. None of these units have offered such a harassing or delaying action. Generally, resistance has been limited to no E. Enemy pockets of resistance can be expected anywhere.
- b. VII Corps atks within its zone to seize objectives shown on overlay.
- c. The Ninth Air Force will bomb objective A at 1000 2 August.

2. This Div:

- Atchd: 746th Tk Bn (M)
899th TD Bn
Co C & D 87th Cml Bn
690th FA Bn (105mm How)
987th FA Bn (155mm Gun SP)
376th AAA AW Bn (M)

will atk on 2 Aug and seize objective shown on overlay.
Formations, bdrys, and objectives: See overlay.
Time of atk: 1000.

3. a. 47th Inf

- Atchd: Co C 746th Tk Bn
Co C 87th Cml Bn
Co C 899th TD Bn

will atk initially with 1 Bn and seize successive objectives shown on overlay.

b. 60th Inf

- Atchd: Co B 746th Tk Bn
Co D 87th Cml Bn
Co B 899th TD Bn

will atk, 2 Bns abreast, and seize successive objectives shown on overlay.

c. 35th Inf

- Atchd: Co A 746th Tk Bn
Co A 899th TD Bn

will move to concealed bivouac area now occupied by the 47th Inf, as soon as 47th Inf combat elements have cleared. They will await orders in Div Res, prepared to counterattack to E or SE.

d. 9th Recon Tr will await orders in present area prepared to pass through assault Regts after seizure of objectives A and B.

e. 746th Tk Bn (less Cos A, B, & C) await orders in present area in Div Res.

f. The Div Art:

- Atchd: 690th FA Bn (105mm How)
987th FA Bn (155mm Gun SP)
899th TD Bn
376th AAA AW Bn (M)

will support the atk.

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83 JUL 1948



- (1) 60th FA Bn - direct support.
- (2) 84th FA Bn - direct support 47th Inf.
- (3) 26th FA Bn - general support and reinf 84th FA Bn.
- (4) 34th FA Bn - general support.
- (5) 690th FA Bn - general support and reinf 60th FA Bn.
- (6) 987th FA Bn - general support.
- (7) 899th TD Bn will furnish the Div with protection against armor.
 - (a) Co A atchd 39th Inf
 - (b) Co B atchd 60th Inf
 - (c) Co C atchd 47th Inf

(8) 376th AA AF Bn will furnish AA protection for Div Arty.


x. Point of Origin, Map Coordinate Code, effective 020001 Aug - 3830.

- 4. See Adm O #6.
- 5. a. See Current SOL.
- b. Div CP - 39E449.
Regtl CPs - to be reported.

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Comdg

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Annexes: Annex No. 1 - Operations Overlay.



SHEET - 1

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

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SECTION A

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SECTION B

ESTIMATED

SHEET 2

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OBJ

SECTION A

OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

AMENDMENT NRI

TO FOW 10

DATE 2 AUGUST 1974


BY [unclear]

FOR [unclear]


APPROVED BY [unclear]

DATE [unclear]

OPERATIONS OVERVIEW



OBJ



9th DIV
OBJ

OPERATIONS OVERLAY

AMENDMENT NO. 1
TO FORM
DATED 2 AUGUST 1954
SUBJECTS
SHOWING
MAP SHEET
SHEET NO. 12 SW, NW, SE, SW
DATE 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31
SCALE 1:50,000
SHOWING CHANGE IN
BOUNDARY OF DISTRICT


SECTION B

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35

b

SECTION A



SECRET

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79
A+

MAP: FRANCE
SCALE: 1:25,000

Amendment No 2
to Annex No 1
(Operations Overlay)

to FOW 15
dated 2 Aug. 1944

Showing change
of bdrys and obj

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28 JUL 1948

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#35

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SECRET
Auth: CG 9th Inf Div
Initials: *(initials)*
Date: 7 August 1944

Hq 9th Inf Div, APO 9
072350 Aug 1944

FO #16

MAPS: FRANCE 1/25,000; Sheets 3h/12 SW, 3h/11 SW, 31/12 SE, 31/12 NE, 31/11 SE

1. a. The 1051st and 1052nd Regts of the 81th Inf Div, with elements of the 184th Arty Regt in support, comprise the bulk of the enemy forces in our Div sector. At least one infantry regt and the arty of the 1st SS Pz Div "ADOLF HITLER" have been identified to the S, with indications that the entire div moved from the CAEN sector in the hope of exploiting a breakthrough to the west. This breakthrough did not materialize on 7 August, but is likely to be attempted again, using the 1st SS Pz Div, the 84th Div, supporting elements of the 116th Pz Div (the bulk of which was withdrawn) and the 2nd Pz Div, now in the general area of CHESSUCE IS ROSSELL.
- b. VII Corps continues the atk.
2. This Div (less 39th CT plus 2 plats 9th Ren-Tr atchd)
 - Atchd: 746th Tk Bn (M)
 - 899th TD Bn
 - 376th AAA AW Bn (M)
 - 183d FA Bn (155 mm How)
 - 951st FA Bn (155 mm How)
 - Btry A 931st FA Bn (155 Gun)
 - Btry B 13th Obs Bn
 - 690th FA Bn (105mm How)
 - Co C & D 87th Cml Bn

Will atk 8 Aug and seize objectives shown on overlay.
Formations, bdrys, and objectives: See overlay.
Time of atk: 1030.

3. a. 47th Inf (less 3d Bn)
 - Atchd: Co C 746th Tk Bn
 - Co D 87th Cml Bn
 - Co B 899th TD Bn

Will atk on 8 Aug and seize obj shown on overlay. Upon seizure of its obj will organize and defend to the E and SE.

- b. 3d Bn 47th Inf - will remain in present posns in Div Res.
- c. 60th Inf
 - Atchd: Co B 746th Tk Bn
 - Co D 87th Cml Bn
 - Co B 899th TD Bn

Will atk on 8 Aug and seize objective shown on overlay. Upon seizure of obj will organize and defend to the E.

- d. 39th CT plus 2 plats 9th Ren Tr atchd - Atchd 4th Inf Div off at once, VCG, VII Corps.
- e. 9th Ren Tr (less 2 plats) will await orders in present posns.
- f. 746th Tk Bn (less Cos A, B & C) await orders in present posns in Div Res.

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23 JUL 1945

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 SECRET
 23 JUL 1945

- g. The Div Arty
 Atchd: 690th FA Bn (105mm How)
 951st FA Bn (155mm How)
 183rd FA Bn (155mm How)
 Btry A 981st FA Bn (155 Gun)
 Btry B 13th Obs Bn
 899th TD Bn
 376th AAA AW Bn (M)

Will support the atk.

- (1) 60th FA Bn - direct support 60th Inf
- (2) 84th FA Bn - direct support 47th Inf
- (3) 26th FA Bn - atchd to 39th Inf
- (4) 34th FA Bn - general support and reinf 84th FA Bn
- (5) 690th FA Bn - general support
- (6) 183d FA Bn - general support and reinf 60th FA Bn
- (7) 951st FA Bn - general support
- (8) Btry A 981st FA Bn atchd 951st FA Bn
- (9) Btry B 13 Obs Bn - general support
- (10) 899th TD Bn will furnish the div with protection against armor.
 - (a) Co A atchd 39th Inf
 - (b) Co B atchd 60th Inf
 - (c) Co C atchd 47th Inf
- (11) 376th AAA AW Bn will furnish AA protection for Div Arty.

4. Sec Adm O #9 - to be issued.

5. a. Sec current SOI.

b. Div CP - 464313
 Regtl CPs - to be reported

EDDY
 Comdg


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Annexes: Annex-No. 1, Operations Overlay

DISTRIBUTION:


CG VII Corps (2 copies)	G-3	87th Cml Bn
Asst to Div Comdr	G-4 - G-1 (in turn)	4th Inf Div
CG	Div Sig O	28th Inf Div
C/S	Div Eng	
CG Div Arty (12 copies)	Div Surg	
39th Inf	Div QM & Div Ord (in turn)	
47th Inf	AG file	
60th Inf	Provost Marshall	
9th Ren Tr	746th Tk Bn	

- 2 -
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 23 JUL 1945



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28 JUL 1945



Changes in Objectives
& BOUNDRIES EFFECTIVE 091600 Aug 30

9th INF DIV
Amendment No. 1
TO FO# 16
dated 7 Aug 44

Map: France
Scale: 1-25,000

OFFICIAL:
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comdg

SECRET
28 JUL 1945

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53 107 1042

SECRET
Date: 28 JUL 1945

SECRET
Initials: [Signature]
Date: 11 Aug 1944

Hq 9th Inf Div, APO 9
111930 Aug 1944

FO #17

Maps: FRANCE 1/25,000; Sheets 54/12 SW, 54/14 SW, 51/12 SE, 51/12 NE, 51/14 SE.

1. a. The enemy in our sector comprising the 1051st and 1052nd Regts of the 84th Div, and elements of the 215th Pa Div, has pulled back to the E. Contact is not definitely established, but indications are that the withdrawal is not extensive, although it is doubtful that any firm defense position has been organized in front of the divisions to be its objectives. Enemy losses have been severe, particularly to the 1051st Regt, which may have been withdrawn completely.

b. VII Corps continues the atk.

2. This Div

- Atchd: 899th TD Bn
- 376th AAA AW Bn (M)
- 951st FA Bn (155mm How)
- Btry A 981st FA Bn (155mm Gun)
- Btry B 13th Obs Bn
- 690th FA Bn (105mm How)
- Cos C & D 87th Cml Bn

Will continue the atk and seize objectives shown on overlay.

3. a. 39th Inf

- Atchd: Co D 87th Cml Bn
- Co B 899th TD Bn
- 9th Ren Tr (less 1 plat)

Will seize, occupy and defend, successively, objectives 1, 2 and 3 shown on overlay.

b. 47th Inf

- Atchd: 2nd Bn 60th Inf
- Co C 87th Cml Bn
- Co C 899th TD Bn
- One plat 9th Ren Tr

Will seize, occupy and defend objectives shown on overlay.

c. 60th Inf (less 2nd Bn) will organize and defend objectives shown on overlay.


d. The Div Arty

- Atchd: 690th FA Bn (105mm How)
- 951st FA Bn (155mm How)
- Btry A 981st FA Bn (155mm Gun)
- Btry B 13th Obs Bn
- 899th TD Bn
- 376th AAA AW Bn (M)

Will support the atk

- (1) 84th FA Bn - direct support 47th Inf
- (2) 26th FA Bn - direct support 39th Inf

RESTRICTED
Date: 28 JUL 1945



- (3) 60th FA Bn - general support
- (4) 34th FA Bn - general support and reinf 84th FA Bn
- (5) 690th FA Bn - general support
- (6) 951st FA Bn - general support and reinf 26th FA Bn
- (7) Btry A 981st FA Bn atchd 951st FA Bn
- (8) Btry B 13th Cbs Bn - general support
- (9) 899th TD Bn will furnish the div with protection against armor.
 - (a) Co A atchd 39th Inf
 - (b) Co B general support
 - (c) Co C atchd 47th Inf
- (10) 376th AAA AW Bn will furnish AA protection for Div Arty.

4. See Adm O #9

5. a. See current SOI.

- b. Div CP - 472207
Regtl CPs - to be reported

EDDY
Comdg

OFFICIALS:

Fail
EALL
G-3

Annexes: Annex 1 - Operations Overlay

DI TRIPVICH:

CG VII Corps (2 copies)

Asst to Div Comdr

CG

C/S

CG Div Arty (11 copies)

39th Inf

47th Inf

60th Inf

9th Recon Tr



G-3

G-4 & G-1 (in turn)

Div Sig O

Div Engr

Div Surg
Div Sig & Div Ord O (in turn)
IG Mills
Provost Marshall
87th Cal Bn
28th Inf Div
36th Inf Div



SECRET
Auth: CG 24th Inf Div
Initials: [Signature]
Date: 13 Aug 1944
24th Inf Div, APC 9
32300 Aug 1944

FO #18

Maps: FRANCE 1/50,000; Sheets 70/1, 70/2, 70/3, 70/4, 70/5, 70/6.

1. a. Contact in this sector has been slight as the enemy has been withdrawing. Elements of the 703 Inf Div and 5th Pz Div have been identified.

- b. VII Corps continues atk to LZ.

2. This Div (less 60th Inf CT Reinf)

Atchd: 899th TD Bn

376th AAA AW Bn (1)

951st FA Bn (155mm How)

Btry A 981st FA Bn (155mm Gun)

Btry B 13th Cbs Bn

690th FA Bn (105mm How)

Co C & D 87th Cal Bn

Will assemble in areas shown on atchd overlay.

3. a. 39th Inf CT

Atchd: Co D 87th Cal Bn

Co A 899th TD Bn

9th Recon Tr

1 Co Ambrs (less 1 platoon)

Will assemble by bus and separate units, in area shown on overlay; prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.

Time of departure and route: See March Table to be issued.

- b. 47th Inf CT

Atchd: Co C 37th Cal Bn

Co C 899th TD Bn

Will assemble by bus and separate units, in area shown on overlay; prepared to move on thirty (30) minutes notice.

Time of departure and route: See March Table to be issued.

- c. 60th Inf CT (reinf) atchd to 3d and Div 13100.

- d. The Div Arty (less 26th, 30th & 48th FA Bns)

Atchd: 690th FA Bn (105mm How)

251st FA Bn (155mm How)

Btry A 981st FA Bn (155mm Gun)

Btry B 13th Cbs Bn

899th FA Bn (less Cos L, M, O)

376th AAA AW Bn (1)

Will await further orders in present posns.

4. See Adm O #10.

5. a. See current SOI.


- b. Div CP will establish HQ at 96750.

Regtl CPs - to be reported.

EDDY
Comdg

OFFICIALS: *Fail*
EALL
G-3

Annexes: Operations Overlay.



SECRET
23 JUL 1945

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58

52


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42

SECRET
23 JUL 1945

43

RESTRICTED



OBJECTIVE

OBJECTIVE

OBJECTIVE

TFY 3

FIRST
SECOND
THIRD

XX
39

5810

3 26

2 1

2 26

7 60

6 3

1 60 88

7 0 3

15

47 M
INF

TFZ 3

39 M
INF

3 39

OPERATIONS OVERLAY
TO ACCOMPANY FOR 10
14 AUGUST 44
9th INF DIV
MAP: FRANCE
SHEETS: 76/12, 34, 586
SCALE 1:50000

RESTRICTED

OFFICIAL

BODY
COMDG

File
FILE

47

SECTION B

RESTRICTED

Org & Co	IP	Time length	Route	Remarks
47th Inf, Co B 899th TD, Co C 87th Cal Bn - Col Smythe	St Poils 49722h	2 hrs 30 min	B	Head crosses IP 0800
Div Hq (less first elements), 9th Sig Co - Lt. Col. Brill	St Poils 49722h	42 min	B	Head crosses IP 1048
709th Ord Co - Lt. Col. Childs	St Poils 49722h	7 min	B	Head crosses IP 1138
4th Engr Bn less 3 companies - Lt. Col. Schermerhorn	St Poils 49722h	6 min	B	Head crosses IP 1153
9th Med Bn less Cos A, B, & C & one platoon Co D - Lt. Col. Kaufman	Le Mesnil Gilbert 49818h	4 min	A	Head crosses IP 11 plus 4 hrs
9th QM Co - Lt. Col. Hinkley	St Poils 49722h	19 min	B	Head crosses IP at 1207
Bq Div Arty, 690th FA Bn, 34th FA Bn, 951st FA Bn, Btry A 901st FA Bn, 376th AAA Bn less 4 Btrys, 899th TD Bn less 3 Btrys, Btry B 13th Obs Bn - Gen Howell	Le Mesnil Gilbert 49818h	4 hrs (actually 3.02 but slow column)	A	Head crosses IP at 11 Hour (Probably 1030)
80th Inf, 26th FA Bn, Co C 15th Engr Co C 899th TD Bn, Co D 87th Cal Bn, 9th Rec Tr, Btry C 376th AAA Bn, Co C 9th Med Bn - Lt Col Bond	To be announced	3 hrs 45 min	To be announced	

- Route A:
- 49818h - IP Arty
 - 47218h
 - 49718h
 - 58018h
 - 500060
 - 525057
 - 527030
 - 538031
 - 531995
 - 558968
 - 553915

NOTE: When any unit is stationed forward of the designated IP it will fall in on the route of march at the nearest point to its bivouac area.

- Route B:
- St Poils 49722h
 - Caves 470190
 - Dreay 422199
 - 456039
 - St Hilaire Du Harcourt 470833
 - RJ 471962
 - Londivy 510920
 - Knee 572718
 - Due East to Destination

RESTRICTED

SECRET

ADV. CT 9th Inf Div

33 JUL 1945

Date: 14 August 1944

HQ 9th Inf Div, APO 9

141700 August 1944

FO #19

Laps: FRANCE 1/25,000; Sheets 37/10 NE & SE, 40/10 NW & SW, 40/8 SW & NW, 37/8 SE
37/8 NE.

1. a. No organized enemy resistance has been encountered by the VII Corps for the past 24 hrs, nor is any strongly-defended line expected in reaching the div objective. Elements of the 91st Div, 243 Div, 353 Div, 363 Div, 275 Div, 2nd Pz Div, 331 Div, Pz Lehr, 77 Div, 708 Div, 1st SS Div, 2 Pz Div, 9 Pz Div and 13 Pz Div have been identified on the Corps front. Pressure being exercised throughout the entire front makes likely the presence of scattered elements of the withdrawing Germans through the FALLISE gap. A counterattack from the NE by previously withdrawn forces is a possibility as the objective is neared, as is also an attempt on the enemy to force his way out from the W.

b. VII Corps continues the atk to the N & NE.

2. This Div (less 60th Inf CT Reinf)

Atchd: 899th TD Bn
376th M.L. M Bn (1)
951st FA Bn (155mm How)
Btry A 981st F. Bn (155mm Gun)
Btry B 13th Obs Bn
690th PL Bn (105mm How)
Cos C & D 87th Cnl Bn

On order will atk to the N, occupy, organize and defend objectives shown on overlay. Will be prepared to assist the 3d Armd Div in reaching PRODMTEL.

Formations, bdrys, and zones of action: See overlay.

3. a. 39th Inf CT

Atchd: Co D 87th Cnl Bn
Co A 899th TD Bn
Co 15th Engr Bn (less 1 plab)

On order, will move from present area by route indicated. Will occupy that portion of the 60th Inf objective shown on the overlay and await further orders.

b. 47th Inf CT

Atchd: Co C 87th Cnl Bn
Co C 899th TD Bn
Co B 15th Engr Bn (loss 1 plab)

On order, will move from present area by route indicated. Will occupy that portion of the 60th Inf objective shown on the overlay and await further orders.

c. 60th Inf CT (Reinf) atchd to 3rd Armd Div. Reverts to control 9th Inf Div upon reaching line shown on overlay. Upon relief by the 39th & 47th Inf will assemble behind objective in area shown on overlay.

d. 9th Ren Tr await orders in present area.

e. The Div Arty

Atchd: 690th FA Bn
950th FA Bn
Btry A 981st F. Bn
Btry B 13th Obs Bn
899th TD Bn
376th M.L. M Bn (1)

Will support the adv.

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33 JUL 1945

RESTRICTED
3 7 19
SECRET
23 JUL 1945

- (1) 26th FA Bn atchd 39th Inf
- (2) 60th FA Bn atchd 60th Inf
- (3) 84th FA Bn atchd 47th Inf
- (4) 34th FA Bn direct support 84th FA Bn
- (5) 951st FA Bn direct support 26th FA Bn
- (6) 690th FA Bn general support
- (7) Btry A 981st FA Bn general support
- (8) Btry B 13th Obs Bn general support
- (9) 859th TD Bn will provide the div for protection against armor.
 - (a) Co A atchd 39th Inf
 - (b) Co C atchd 47th Inf
 - (c) Co D atchd 60th Inf
- (10) 376th AAA AW Bn will provide AA protection for the Div Arty
 - (a) Btry A atchd 26th FA Bn
 - (b) Btry C atchd 60th FA Bn
 - (c) Btry D atchd 84th FA Bn

- 4. See ada O-111 - to be issued.
- 5. a. See current SOI.
- b. Div CP - 055900.
Regtl CPs - to be reported

ELDY
Comdg

OFFICIAL: *File*
FELL
G-3


Annexes: Annex 1 - Operations overlay

CG VII Corps (2 copies)
CG 9th Inf Div
Lsist to Div Comdr
C/S
CG Div Arty (12 copies)
39th Inf
47th Inf
60th Inf
9th Recon Tr
G-1 - G-4 (in turn)
G-3
Div Sig O
Div Engr
Div Surg
Div QM & Div Ord (in turn)

AC File
Provost Marshall
87th CIL Bn
1st Inf Div
3d Armd Div

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23 JUL 1945

RESTRICTED



AMENDMENT # 2
TO ANNEX NAI
FOR 19
CHANGES IN BODYS
& OBJECTIVES

CONFIRMING VERBAL ORDERS
OF THE CG.
MAP REFERENCE
SCALE 1:25,000

OFFICIAL

Neil (MND)

FBIL

G-3

BODY

COMDG

9x34

RESTRICTED

10 BR AF

SECRET

SECRET
Auth: CGM/NS
Int: 101
Date: 24 Jul 1949
Hq: 1st AF
1372000Z


Amendment No. 1
TO Annex No 2
FO 19

1. This Div continues the atk to seize, control and defend objectives within its zone as shown on map.
2. 2d AF JNE will, upon seizing OBJ H, establish the bridge at 022170. Bridges will be destroyed upon seizure of OBJ N will maintain...
3. 1st AF will be prepared to... will be prepared to... 1st AF will be prepared to...

OFFICIAL:




526
FEIL
5-3

EDDY
LOADS



SECRET
23 JUL 1949

SECRET
23 JUL 1946





SECOND BR

39 347

39




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23 JUL 1946



600) EVENTS TO
THIS DATE

27/26

11/26

AS

32

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600)


Route of 500

12/1/26

01

54

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OPERATIONS OVERLAY
 TO ACCOMPANY FORM
 14 AUGUST 44
 5th INF DIV
 MAP: FRANCE
 SHEETS: 17/10 NE, SE 34/10 NW, SW 40/8 SW, NW 37/8 SE, NE
 SCALE: 1:25,000
 EDDY
 CON

RESTRICTED

SECRET

Hq 9th Inf Div

Initials: *Q*

Date: 20 Aug 1944

RESTRICTED

Downgraded Auth. TAG

23 JUL 1945

Hq 9th Inf Div, APO 9
202100 Aug 1944

FO #20

MAPS: FRANCE 1/100,000; Sheets 7G & 6G

1. a. The enemy has succeeded in extricating the bulk of his armored formations from the pocket formed by the ORNE RIVER and a line running S of FALAISE, W of TRUN, W of CHA'BOIS, N of ARGETAN - ECOUCHE. In order to do so, however, he was forced to abandon approximately 5 or 6 Inf Divs to fight a hopeless rear-guard action. Fierce counterattacks by the enemy to hold open the shoulder and later to re-open the gap were repulsed. 3 Armd Divs were caught and split while attempting to pass thru the last remaining route of escape at TRUN and CHA'BOIS. What remains of the German Seventh Army is now re-grouping in the vic of VIPOUSSIERS (Q4964) with the armor preparing to move to the SW to cover the withdrawal of his Inf Divs across the SEINE RIVER. Formations which were not engaged in the fighting inside the pocket or were among the early departures have been dispatched to the E to form a protective screen between GAGE and DREUX.

Units identified along this line include elements of the 9 Pz Div, 116 Pz Div, Pz Lehr Div, and 331 Inf Div. The line LAIGLE-VERNEUIL-DREUX is reported to be held by scattered groups of Inf, Tks, and SP guns. Elements of the 708 Div have been identified in the vic of LAIGLE; elements of 6 Para Div vic VERNEUIL; and elements of 17 GAF Inf of DREUX.

- b. (1) VII Corps regroups to continue the atk.

(2) One troop 4th Cav Ren Grp, with 5th Ren Tr atchd, will reconnoiter line SEES - VERNEUIL (both exclusive) by daylight 21 Aug to determine presence of any enemy in that area.

2. This Div

Atchd: 629th TD Bn
376th AAA AW Fm (H)
690th FA Bn (100mm How)
746th Tk Bn (H)
Cos C & D 87th Cml Bn

Will move to an area between SEES (4428) and VERNEUIL (0030) to cover the roads between these 2 towns, both exclusive, to prevent any movement of the enemy to the S and to protect the left flank of the Army.

Formations, bdrys and objectives: See overlay.

3. a. 39th CT

Atchd: Co D 37th Cml Bn
Co A 629th TD Bn
Co A 15th Engr Bn (less 1 plat)
Co A 746th Tk Bn

Will move to assembly area shown on overlay. Will cover the roads within its sector to prevent any movement of the enemy to the S.

Time of departure & routes: See March Table to be issued.

b. 60th CT

Atchd: Co C 37th Cml Bn
Co B 629th TD Bn
Co C 15th Engr Bn (less 1 plat)
Co B 746th Tk Bn

Will move to assembly area shown on overlay. Will cover the roads within its sector to prevent any movement of the enemy to the S.

23 JUL 1945

56

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Downy and A. J. [Signature]

Time of departure & routes: See

- c. 47th CT
Atchd: Co C 629th TD Bn
Co C 746th Tk Bn

Will move to an assembly area shown on overlay in Div Res. Will be prepared to counterattack to the NW, N, or NE.

Time of departure & Route: See March Table to be issued.

Upon arrival in assembly area all 47th CT atchmts will revert to Div control.

- d. 9th Ren Tr - atchd to 4th Cav Ren Grp.
- e. 746th Tk Bn (less Cos A, B & C) will move to assembly area, to be designated, in Div Res. Cos A, B & C will, upon reaching new area, join their respective Tns.

- f. Div Arty
Atchd: 690th FA Bn (105mm How)
629th TD Bn
376th AAA AW Bn

Will support the Div.

- (1) 26th FA Bn atchd 39th Inf
- (2) 60th FA Bn atchd 60th Inf
- (3) 84th FA Bn atchd 47th Inf; direct support-26th FA Bn on arrival at new area.
- (4) 690th FA Bn - direct support 60th FA Bn
- (5) 34th FA Bn - general support
 - (a) Btry C reinf 26th FA Bn
 - (b) Bn (less Btry C) reinforce 60th FA Bn
- (6) 629th TD Bn will provide protection for the div against armor.
 - (a) Co A atchd 34th Inf
 - (b) Co B atchd 60th Inf
 - (c) Co C atchd 47th Inf; general support on arrival at new area.
- (7) The 376th AAA AW Bn will provide AA protection for the Div Arty.
 - (a) Btry A atchd 26th FA Bn
 - (b) Btry C atchd 60th FA Bn

4. See Adm O #13 to be issued.

- 5. a. See current SOI.
- b. Div CP to be announced.

Regl OPs to be reported.

OFFICIAL: [Signature]
FEIL
G-3

RESTRICTED
Downy and A. J. [Signature]

CRAIG
Comdg

Annexes: Annex #1 - Operations Overlay.

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Downy and A. J. [Signature]
SECRET
23 JUL 1945

RESTRICTED9th Inf Div
ATO #9
2400, 20 August 1944NANCE TABLE 21 AUGUST 1944

Northern Route: LA LARIE DE LOUGE (086129) - RJ (099128) - RANES (123077) -
"A" CARRUGES (163995) - SEES (435285) - RJ (470291) - Destination
Vic ST SCOLASSE SUR SARTHE (592240).

Organization & CO	Present Location	IP	Time Length of Column	Time of Departure H-Hour
39th CT Including 26th FA Bn A Btry, 376th AAA A Co, 15th Engr Bn A Co, 9th Med Bn D Co, 87th Gnl Bn A Co, 629th TD Bn LT COL BOND	086129	NEUF-RENE-AN ROULANS (C86129)	3 hrs	
47th CT (less 2 Bns) Including 84th FA Bn B Btry, 376th AAA 1 Pltn Engrs B Co, 9th Med Bn B Co, 629th TD Bn COL SLYTHE	077116	Same	1 hr 52 mins	H plus 3 hrs 10 mins
47th CT (2 Bns)		Same		Approx. H + 10 hrs

Units will choose their own routes to IP.
Units will post own guides.
HP's will be posted on route to control traffic.
All units will maintain liaison with the preceding unit to make sure it has cleared the IP.
Average speed 20 mph.
Interval 75 yds.
H-hour will not be before 0700.
Units will receive a minimum of 2 hours notice of the time of H-hour.

Immediately on completion of the move all attached truck companies will be released. A report will be made to G-4 at the earliest possible opportunity giving the time of release. An officer from the 47th Inf will accompany the 39th Inf convoy to bring back one (1) of the attached companies to transport 2 Bns of the 47th Inf.

5 minutes rest stops will be made at the end of the first hour after passing IP and at the end of every 2 hours thereafter.

All vehicles will stop off of the paved portion of the road at all scheduled halts.

By Command of Major General CRAIG:

NOAH M. BRINSON
Colonel G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL: *George E. Pickert*
GEORGE E. PICKERT
Lt. Col., G.S.C.
AC of S, G-4

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

MARCH TABLE - 21 AUGUST 1944

SOUTHERN ROUTE ("B") BEAUVAIN (049042) - **COUPTRAIN** - MAGNY LE DESERT
 (035001) - BJ (032994) - BJ (046964) - SAOLES
 (053948) - BJ (060353) - BJ (064926) - BJ (071924) -
 COUPERAIN (066305) - FAY-EL-BAILL (125875) - ALENCON
 (340332) - LE PLESSIS SUR SARTRE (559170) - BJ (680180)
 MONTAIGNY (700156) - ST. ANGE (816242) - DESTINATION,
 VIC. OF LAURENCE LMS CERENVEY (867291).

Organization and Cdn.	Present Location	I.P.	Time Length of column	Time of Departure
60 CT including: 60 FA Bn. C Btry, 376AAA C Co, 15 Engr Bn. C Co, 9 Med Bn. C Co, 629 TD Bn. C Co, 87 Cml. Bn. COL. CLAUDEY	049042	BEAUVAIN (049042)	3 hrs.	H HOUR
Div. arty including: Hq., Div. Arty. 34 FA Bn. 690 FA (105) Bn. H & S Btry, 376AAA H & S Co, 629 TD Bn. 18 FA (105) Bn. BRIG. GEN HOWELL	049075	Same	2 hr. 15 min	H plus 3 hr 10 min
Hq., 9 Ing Div. LT. COL. BRILL	049075	Same	17 min	H plus 5 hr 35 min
9 Sig. Co. CAPT. HANCOCK	041071	Same	15 min	H plus 6 hr 00 min
9 Ql Co. CAPT. MCCORMACK	037054	Same	13 min	H plus 6 hr 25 min
9 Med Bn (less 3 Cos.) LT. COL. LAUFMANN	047040	Same	3 min	H plus 6 hr 45 min
15 Engr. Bn. (less 3 Cos.) LT. COL. SCHERMERHORN	045047	Same	15 min	H plus 6 hr 55 min
709 Ord. Co. CAPT. ROTONSON	024053	Same	5 min	H plus 7 hr 25 min
746 Tank Bn. LT. COL. KUMPFER	COUPTRAIN	COUPTRAIN	29 min (10 MPH)	Approx 8 hrs 5 min

1. Units will choose their own routes to I.P.
2. Units will post own guides.
3. M.P.'s. will be posted on route to control traffic.
4. All units will maintain liaison with the preceding unit to make sure it has cleared the I.P.
5. Average speed 20 MPH.
6. Interval 75 yds.
7. H hour will not be before 0700. Units will receive a minimum of 2 hours notice of the time of H hour.
8. Immediately upon arrival at their destination, units will release all attached truck companies. A report will be made to G-4 at the earliest opportunity.

RESTRICTED

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- opportunity giving the same release.
9. 5 minute rest stops will be made at the end of the first hour, after passing the I.P. and at the end of every 2 hours thereafter.
 10. All vehicles will stop on the paved portion of the road at all scheduled halts.

By Command of Major General CRAIG:

NOAH M. BRINSON
Colonel G.S.C.
Chief of Staff


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George S. Pickett
GEORGE S. PICKETT
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AG of S. G. 4

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ANNEX NO 1 TO
 FOE IC
 20 AUGUST 68
 9th INF DIV
 MAP: REAN-4
 SHEET: 8G
 SCALE: 1:100,000
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Auth: CG 9th Inf Div

Initials: *[Signature]*

Date: 26 Aug 1944

Hq 9th Inf Div APO 9
262330 Aug 1944

FO #24

MARS: FRANCE 1/100,000; Sheet 10 G & 11 G

1. a. Same as FO #23 except add the following paragraph: The 338 Inf Div previously located North of PARIS has been identified by the 3rd Armd Div.

b. No change.

2. This Div (less 3rd Bn 47th Inf atchd 3rd Armd Div)

Atchd: 899th TD Bn
376th AAA AW Bn (M)
746th Tk Bn
690th FA Bn (105mm How)
951st FA Bn (155mm How)
Btry A 981st FA Bn (155mm Gun)
Btry A 13th PCB
Cos G & D 87th Cml Bn

Will not assemble in areas designated in FO #23, on E side of river, but will continue to march on objectives shown in Annex #1. For bdrys, zones of action, objectives, and assembly areas. See overlay.

3. a. 39th CT

Atchd: Co D 87th Cml Bn
Co A 899th TD Bn
Co C 746th Tk Bn
Co A 15th Engr Bn (less 1 plat)

Will march on assembly area shown on atchd overlay.

- b. 47th CT (Less 3rd Bn)

Atchd: Co C 87th Cml Bn
Co C 899th TD Bn
Co A 746th Tk Bn
Co B 15th Engr Bn (less 1 Plat)

Will march on assembly area shown on atchd overlay.

- c. 60th CT

Atchd: Co B 899th TD Bn
Co B 746th Tk Bn
Co C 15th Engr Bn (less 1 Plat)

Will march on assembly area shown on atchd overlay in Div Reserve.


- d. 15th Engr Bn

Co A (less 1 Plat) in support of 39th CT.
Co B (less 1 Plat) in support of 47th CT.
Co C (less 1 Plat) in support of 60th CT.

e. 9th Rcn Tr - Will reconnoiter three to five miles in front of the Inf within the zone of action. Will establish a screen five miles in front of the march objectives and maintain contact with the Third Army.

f. 746th Tk Bn (less Cos A, B, & C) will assemble, in Div Reserve, in vic of area shown on overlay.

23 JUL 1945



g. The Div Arty
 Atchd: 690th FA Bn
 951st FA Bn
 Btry A 981st FA Bn
 Btry A 13th Obs Bn
 899th TD Bn
 376th AAA AW Bn
 Will support the advance.

- (1) 26th FA Bn atchd 39th Inf
- (2) 60th FA Bn atchd 60th Inf
- (3) 84th FA Bn atchd 17th Inf
- (4) 34th FA Bn direct support 26th FA Bn
- (5) 951st FA Bn direct support 26th FA Bn
- (6) 690th FA Bn general support
- (7) Btry A 981st FA Bn general support
- (8) Btry A 13th FOB general support
- (9) 899th TD Bn will provide the Div with protection against armor.
 - (a) Co A atchd 39th Inf
 - (b) Co C atchd 57th Inf
 - (c) Co B atchd 60th Inf
- (10) 376th AAA AW Bn will provide AA protection for the Div Arty:
 - (a) Btry A atchd 26th FA Bn
 - (b) Btry C atchd 60th FA Bn
 - (c) Btry D atchd 84th FA Bn

x. (1) Flow of traffic over bridges will be continuous (no interval between march units and serials.

(2) Particular attention will be paid to movement of traffic by bounds with CTS, moving vehicles rapidly along roads between selected vehicle assembly areas.

(3) Phase lines A, B, C, & D are shown to facilitate reporting of posns.

4. See Adm O #15 to be issued.


5. a. See current SOI

b. CTS to be reported

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3 JUL 1945

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Auth: CG 9th Inf Div

Initials: *RJR*

Date: 23 Aug 1944

Hq 9th Inf Div, APO 9
232100 Aug 1944

3 JUL 1945
RJR

FO #21

Maps: FRANCE 1/100,000; Sheet 80

- 1. a. No contact.
- b. VII Corps continues to regroup.
- 2. This Div (less Cos B, C and 1st Plat Co A, 15th Engr Bn and 47th CT with Co C 629th TD Bn atchd)
 - Atchd: 629th TD Bn
 - 376th AAA AW Bn (1)
 - 746th Tk Bn (1)
 - 690th FA Bn (105mm How)
 - 18th FA Bn (105mm How)
 - Cos C and D 87th Cml Bn

Will move by Combat Teams commencing 23 Aug 1944 to assembly area shown on Annex No. 1.

3. See Annex #2, March Table (on reverse side).

4. See ADR C #14 to be issued.

5. a. See Current SOI

b. Div CP - 970240

Unit CPs to be reported

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Annexes: Annex #1 - Operations Overlay
Annex #2 - March Table

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- Div Engr

Provost Marshall
CG 746th Tk Bn
CG 87th Cml Bn

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ANNEX #2, FO #21.

Org. & CO	Present Location	IP	Route of March	Time Length of column	Time of Depart
47th CT (-1 Bn) COL SMYTHE	982482	VERNEUIL RJ 002371	N&A1 to Biv Area NE of FERTE VIDAME. Column will stay above 971250 and Highway FERTE VIDAME - BREZOLLES		0800
60th CT COL GIBNEY	835265	ST MARICE LE CHEPRENCY 867299	FERTE VIDAME RJ 94242, RJ 970245 to Biv Area East of FERTE VIDAME (Via BREZOLLES RD)	4 hrs- 30 mins	0800
Div Arty less Hqrs & CT atchd elements		MT HUCHET 845245	RJ 904218, RJ 932235 to Biv Area SW of FERTE VIDAME	1 hr- 30 mins	0800
Div Hqrs & Div Arty Hqrs COL BRILL	711207	RJ 738251	TOUROUVRE 785235 RJ 809240 RJ 815242 RJ 829252 RJ 932218 RJ 962239 RJ 970240 to Dest. 010220	35 mins	0930
Sig Co CAPT HANCOCK	711207	RJ 738251	Same	15 mins	1010
9th Recon	662279	RJ 663309	RJ 738251 Same as Div Hq to Biv Area Via 082210	05 mins	1045
Ord	RJ 673227	RJ 738251	TOUROUVRE 783235, RJ 809210, RJ 815242, RJ 866291, RJ 929260 Dest. NW LA FERTE VIDAME	09 mins	1400
QM	686183	RJ 665223	Same	13 mins	1420
Med Bn	713187	RJ 738251	Same	03 mins	1455
Eng'rs	700138	RJ 738251	Same	15 mins	1510
746th TK	730196	RJ 738251	Same as Arty	30 mins	1600

Rate of March 20 mph except Arty Bns & Trks

Arty 15 mph.

Tanks 10 mph.

Interval 75 yds.


Units will post own guides.

Units will move by organic transport or on foot.

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28 JUL 1945



20 30

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28 JUL 1945

9th INF DIV
 OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY
 FO 21, 23 AUG 44
 MAP: FRANCE
 SCALE: 1:100,000 (SHEET 80)
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 G-3
 CRAIG
 COMD

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Auth. CG 9th Inf Div
Initials: *[Signature]*
Date: 25 Aug 44

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23 JUL 1945

Hq. 9th Inf Div, APO
250900 Aug 44

FO #22

Maps: FRANCE 1/100,000; Sheets 93 & 100.

1. a. No contact.
- b. VII Corps continues to regroup.

2. This Div

Atch: 899th TD Ln
376th AAA Bn (M)
746th Tk Bn (L)
690th FA Bn (205 How)
Cos C and D 37th C-1 Bn
951st FA Bn (255 How)
Btry A 981st FA Bn (155 Gen)
Btry A 13th FOB

will move by CTS commencing 25 Aug 1944 to assembly areas shown on Annex #1 (see reverse side)

3. See Annex #2, March Table, issued.
4. See Adm. O #15 to be issued.
5. a. See current 501
- b. Unit CP's to be reported.

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Annexes: Annex #1 (over)
Annex #2 - March Table

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CG 60th Inf
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CG Div. Trty (12 copies)
CG 9th Trs
CG 9th Regt

Provost Marshall
CG 74th Div
CG 87th Div
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
Div S. O.
Div QM & Div Ord O (in turn)
Div Surg
Div Eng

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Declassify Auth: TAG
23 JUL 1945

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Annex No 1 -
 Assembly Area. 9th INF DIV
 Taken from Map France
 Scale 1:100,000
 Sheet 10G

Note: Dotted Lines
 Indicate Boundaries.
 Solid Lines Roads

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NORTH ROUTE (ROUTE "A")

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Hq 9th Inf Div
APO #9
D500 - 25 August 1944

MARCH TABLE - 25 AUGUST 1944

Organization and C. O.	Present Location	I.P.	Route of March	Time Length of Column	Time of Departure
60 CT, including 60 FA Bn; C Btry, 376 AAA; Pltn C Co, 15 Br; C Co, 9 Hed Bn; C Co, 87 Cml Bn COL GIBNEY	East of LA FERTE VIDLLE	RJ- 059183	RJ-059183 - SENOCHES - HIGNY - CHATEAUNEUF-EN- THYMERAIS - V. INTERON - RANBOUILLET - AEPJON - Dest at Vic. CORBELL	2 hr 40 min	1230
Hq, 9 Inf Div & Hq, Div Arty LT COL BRILL	010200	o	Same	25 min	1520
9th Signal Co CAPT HANCOCK	3200	Same	Same	15 min	1555
9th Cn Co CAPT MCCORMACK	3200-97240	Same 970240	Same	15 min	1610
9th Medical Bn LT COL KAUFMAN	945272	RJ- 970240	Same	03 min	1635
709 Ordnance Co CAPT ROBINSON	972271	RJ- 970240	Same	05 min	1645
26th FA Bn; Btry 4, 376 AAA LT COL STONG	000205	RJ- 059183	Same	28 min	1720
899 TD Bn (less A & B Co)		RJ- 059183	Same	25 min (15 MPH)	1800
<u>SOUTHERN ROUTE (ROUTE "B")</u>					
34 FA Bn; Btry 981 FA Bn LT COL SUNTIN	965205	RJ- 985155	RJ-939204 - RJ-937163 - RJ-985155 - RJ-010104 - RJ-070120 -	47 min	1530
746 Tank Bn LT COL HILFEN	950240	RJ- 950240	RJ-074690 - COURVILLE-SUE- BURE - CHIFFRES - ABLIS - BOURDEN - ETAMPES - BOISSY- LE-CUTE - BAULAE (025025) - RJ-015046 - RJ-021076 - VERT-LE- PETIT - VERTE-LE-GRAND - WEST to Dest vic of CORBELL	30 min	1610

By Command of Maj Gen CRAIG:

NOAH M. BINLSON
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

GEORGE R. HOFF
Major, G.S.C.,
Asst AG of S, C-1.

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Initials: RJK

Date: 26 Aug 1944

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Hq 9th Inf Div, APO 9
261900 Aug 1944

FO #23

MAPS: FRANCE 1/100,000; Sheet 10G

1. a. The enemy has disposed light forces, equipped with small arms and mortars, along the NE bank of the SEINE RIVER between PARIS and MELUN. Tanks in very limited numbers and AA guns have been used against other friendly units operating in this area. Withdrawal of major forces from the German 7th Army and some of the 15th Army continues to the N side of MONTMIRAIL being the only specified location. The only div contacted to date in the area is the 48th Inf Div reported to have 8000 men and most all of its organic equipment and armament. Recently identified units near the operational area indicate that a variety of hastily organized "KAMPFGRUPPE" are likely to be encountered. The 11th Pa Div (much reduced in strength) is reported to be to the E, possibly as distant as the ARGONNE. Only continued delaying action is indicated at present, to permit the continuation of the withdrawal toward the German border, or to give time for reorganization of withdrawn units and the organization and occupation of a defensive line, possibly along the MARNE RIVER.

b. VII Corps continues crossing the SEINE RIVER preparatory to advancing to the NE; 3d Armd Div in the lead with the mission of seizing the line MEAUX LA FERTE SOUS - JOUARRE with 1st Inf Div on the left, 9th Inf Div on the right. 4th Cav Rcn Grp will reconnoiter within the Corps zone to a line MEAUX - LA FERTE SOUS - JOUARRE.

2. This Div (less 3d Bn 47th Inf atchd 3d Armd Div)

Atchd: 899th TD Bn
376th AAA AW Bn (M)
746th Tk Bn (M)
690th FA Bn (105mm How)
Cos C & D 87th Cml Bn
951st FA Bn (155mm How)
Btry A 981st FA Bn (155mm Gun)
Btry A 13th FOB

Will move by CTs, commencing 26 Aug 1944 to assembly areas shown on Annex 1 preparatory to crossing the SEINE RIVER at daylight 27 Aug 1944. Assembly areas after crossing are also shown on Annex No. 1.

3. See Annex #2, March Table, to be issued.

4. See Adm O #15 to be issued.

5. a. See current SOI

b. CPs to be reported.

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
Annexes: Annex No. 1 - Overlay
Annex No. 2 - March Table

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Assembly Areas
After Crossing



Annex No. 1 TO FO# 23
Map: France
Scale: 1:100,000
Sheet: 10 G

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SECTION A

Y
X
Z
HL

129

47 ≡ 39

67CT(6)

39CT(6)

746TK(6)

60
CT

8P
TR3

ARTY

47 ≡ 39

SEINE RIVER

16
X
16

55
X
16

D

C


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SECTION 9



ANNEX NO 1
TO FO # 20
26 AUG 44
9th INF DIV
MAP: FRANCE
SHEETS: 10 & 11G
SCALE 1:100,000

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DATE: 23 JUL 1945

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Auth: CG 9th Inf Div

Initials: *J*

Date: 27 Aug 1944

Hq 9th Inf Div, APO 9
271500 Aug 1944

FO #25

MAPS: FRANCE 1/100,000; Sheet 11 G

1. a. The enemy continues to attempt to delay our adv in the region N of MELUN and E of the SEINE, screening the withdrawal of the 48th Div and 9th Pa Div (rein) to the E. The 48th Div and 9th Pa Div have withdrawn to the E and NE, (PROVINS and MEAUX) leaving behind small elements to protect their left flank. The enemy Hq is likewise reported to have moved to BREIMS, ENF of MEAUX. Infiltration from the N was rptd during the night of Aug 26-27, but here as elsewhere no aggressive intentions were indicated.

b. VII Corps continues atk to the NE.

2. This Div (less 3d Bn 47th Inf atcd 3d Armd Div)
Atchd: No change

Will, at 280000 Aug 1944, march on objectives shown on overlay.

Line of Departure: Present front lines.

3. a. 39th CT
Atchd: No change

Will, at 280800 1944, march on objective shown in Annex No. 1.

LD - March obj 27 Aug. Time to cross LD: 280800 Aug 1944.

- b. 47th CT (less 3d Bn)
Atchd: Co C 899th TD BR
Co A 746th Tk Bn
Co B 15th Engr Bn (less 1 plat)

When passed thru by the 60th CT will follow the 39th CT to assembly area shown on overlay.

- c. 60th CT
Atchd: Co C 87th Cml Bn
Co B 899th TD BR
Co B 746th Tk Bn
Co C 15th Engr Bn (less 1 plat)

Will pass thru the 47th CT (less 3d Bn) so as to cross the LD at 280800 Aug 1944. LD: March objective 47th Inf 27 Aug.

d. 15th Engr Bn - no change.

e. 9th Ron Tr - Ren mission no change. Establish line of observation 5 miles in front of March Objective 28 Aug.

f. 746th Tk Bn (less Cos A, B & C) in Div Res; will assemble in vic of area shown on overlay.

g. The Div Arty plus atchmts will support the Div as per SOP.

(1) 34th FA Bn direct support

(2) 951st FA Bn direct support

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x. (1) Particular attention will be paid to movement of traffic by bounds within CIs, moving vehicles rapidly along roads between selected vehicle assembly areas.

(2) Lettered phase lines will be used to facilitate reporting of posns.

4. See Adm O #16 to be issued.
5. a. See current SOI,
b. Axis of Signal Communication - See overlay.
c. CPs to be reported.

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Annexes: Annex #1 - Overlay

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23 JUL 1945	Initials: [Signature] Date: 28 Aug 1944

FO #26

MAPS: FRANCE 1/100,000; Sheets 11 G & 19

1. a. The enemy continues to attempt to delay our adv to the N and E in order to gain time, making use of the 128 Inf Regt, 48th Div; and probably elements of the 9th Pa Div. Identifications of the past 24 hours indicate the increasing use of KAMFGRUPPE of battalion size. Infiltration continues, but no aggressive intentions have been indicated, nor does this seem likely. Since the line of the SEINE-MARNE is compromised, it is believed that a retirement to the heights of the AISNE is highly probable.

b. VII Corps continues atk to the NE.

2. This Div (less 3d Bn 47th Inf atchd 3d Armd Div)
Atchd: No change.

Will, on 29-30 Aug 1944, march on successive obj shown on overlay.

3. a. 39th CT
Atchd: No change.

Will on 29 Aug 1944 march on objective for that date shown on overlay and on 30 Aug 1944 march on objective shown for that date.

LD 29 Aug - front lines at close of opns 28 Aug.
LD 30 Aug - front lines at close of opns 29 Aug.
TIME TO CROSS LD 29 AUG - 2800

- b. 47th CT (less 3d Bn)
Atchd: No change.

Will follow the 60th CT to successive daily assembly areas as shown on overlay.

- c. 60th CT
Atchd: No change.

Will on 29 Aug 1944 march on objective for that date shown on overlay, and on 30 Aug 1944 march on objective shown for that date.

LD 29 Aug - front lines at close of opns 28 Aug.
LD 30 Aug - front lines at close of opns 29 Aug.

Times to cross LD to be announced, 28 AUG - 2800

- d. 15th Engr Bn - no change.

e. 9th Ren Tr - general mission no change. Specific missions to be assigned later.

f. 746th Tk Bn (less Cos A, B & C) in Div Res; will assemble in successive areas shown on overlay.


g. Div Arty with atchmts will support the adv as per SOP.

(1) 84th FA Bn direct support 26th FA Bn

(2) 690th FA Bn direct support 60th FA Bn

i. Lettered phase lines will be used to facilitate reporting of roads.

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23 JUL 1945



4. See Adm O #17 to be issued.
5. a. See current SOI.
- b. Axis of Signal Communication - See overlay.
- c. CPs to be reported.

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Annexes: Annex #1 - Operations Overlay.

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1st Inf Div
3d Armd Div
90th Inf Div



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Auth: CG 9th Inf Div

Initials: *CE*

Date: 29 Aug 1944

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23 JUL 1945

Hq 9th Inf Div, APO 9
292330 Aug 1944

Amendment No. 1
To FO #26, dated 28 Aug 1944

- 1. a. No change.
- b. No change.
- 2. This Div (less 3d Bn 47th Inf atchd 3d Armd Div)
Atchd: No change

Will, on 30 Aug 1944; march on objectives shown on overlay.

- 3. a. 39th CT
Atchd: No change.

Will, on 30 Aug, 1944, march on objective shown on overlay.

LD - Front lines close of opns 29 Aug.
Time to cross LD: 0800.

- b. 47th CT (less 3d Bn)
Atchd: No change

Will, on 30 Aug 1944, follow the fight column of the 60th CT to march on objective shown on overlay.

- c. 60th CT
Atchd: No change

Will, on 30 Aug 1944, march on objective shown on overlay.

LD - Front lines close of opns 29 Aug.
Time to cross LD - 0700

- d. 15th Engr Bn - No change

e. 9th Ron Tr (less 1 plat) will screen and patrol between the left (west) flank 60th CT and CCNDE SUR AISNE (913973). One plat will maintain contact between 60th CT and elements of 3rd Armd Div to the N of div sector.

- f. 746th Tk Bn (less Cos A, B & C) in Div Res; will assemble in area shown on overlay.

- g. Div Arty plus atchmts (less 60th FA Bn) will support the adv as per SOP.

(1) 590th FA Bn direct support 34th FA Bn

- 4. See Adm C #19 to be issued.

- 5. a. See current SOI.

- b. Axis of Sig Com - See overlay.

- c. CPs to be reported

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(4-3)

AMENDMENTS: Amendment No. 1 to
Annex No. 1 to FO 26

RESTRICTED
Downgraded Auth TAG *Jim*
23 JUL 1945

SECRET

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3d Arm Inf Div
Established: 23 Aug 1944
Date: 23 Aug 1944

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3d Arm Inf Div APO 9
10300 Aug 1944

FO #27

MAPS: FRANCE 1/100,000; Sheets 15, 16, 19 & 20

1. a. The enemy has been withdrawing to the N and E. It is believed he will attempt to arrest our adv at the SEDAN G.F. in order to hold open one of his main lines of communication. Recent PW identifications and captured documents place four armored divisions (9 Pz, 116 Pz, 2nd Pz, 21st Pz) to the N and W of LAON, and presents the possibility of an armored atk from the NW. It is a possibility that our rapid adv may overrun withdrawing enemy elements.

b. VII Corps atks E at daylight 31 Aug 1944. The 3d Arm Div has a specific mission that will pass their columns across those of the 9th Div; movement to commence about 311000 Aug 1944. 3d Arm Div has priority on roads.

2. a. This Div (less 3d Bn 47th Inf)
Atchd: No change

Will march, at 310630 Aug 1944, by routes indicated, to areas shown on overlay to secure the line ROZAY (4030) - RUDIGNY (4526) - HAUTEVILLE (5215) - RETZEL (5606).

3. a. 39th CT
Atchd: No change

Will march by shuttling, at 310630 Aug 1944, by routes indicated, to area shown on overlay and promptly patrol the line WADIMONT (4525) to HAUTEVILLE (5215) both incl. First elements to move will be one mtd bn preceded by tanks accompanied by TDS.

b. 47th CT (less 3d Bn)
Atchd: No change

Will move under orders to be issued later.

c. 60th CT
Atchd: No change

Will march by shuttling, at 310630 Aug 1944, by routes indicated, to area shown on overlay and promptly patrol the line from ROZAY (4030) to RUDIGNY (4526) both incl. First elements to move will be one mtd bn preceded by tanks accompanied by TDS.

d. 15th Engr Bn - no change.

e. 9th Ren Tr

(1) Troop (less 1 plat) will move at daylight 31 Aug 1944 to establish a line of observation from RUDIGNY (5040) to SIEUX-L'ABBAYE (6127).

(2) One plat will move at daylight 31 Aug 1944 to establish a line of observation from HAUTEVILLE (5215) (exclusive) to RETZEL (5606) inclusive.

f. 76th Tr Bn (less Cos A, B, C & D) in Div Pos; will assemble in area shown on overlay. Company B will move at daylight to vic of SIEUX-L'ABBAYE - MILLEPE (361) and await orders of CG 9th Div.

g. Div Arty plus atchmnts will support the adv as per SOP.

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(1) 951st FA Bn & 690th FA Bn direct support of 26th FA Bn & 60th FA Bn respectively.

(2) 26th FA Bn & 60th FA Bn will follow the advanced march of the 39th CT and 60th CT respectively.

x. (1) Initial movements will be preceded by an advance guard strongly reinforced by tanks and TDs.

(2) 3d Armd Div has priority on roads.

4. See Adm O #19.

5. a. See current SOI.

b. Axis of Signal Communication - See overlay.

c. CPs to be reported.

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Comdg

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Fair/AM

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G-3

Annexes: Annex No. 1 - Operations Overlay

DISTRIBUTION:

CG VII Corps (2 copies)

CG 9th Inf Div

Asst to Div Comdr

C/S

Div Arty (12 copies)

39th Inf (2 copies)

47th Inf (2 copies)

60th Inf (2 copies)

9th Recon Tr

G-3

G-4 & G-1 (in turn)

Div Sig

Div Engr

Div Surg

Div Ord & Div QM

Provost Marshall

1st Div

3d Armd Div

90th Div

87th Cnl Bn

746th Tk Bn

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23 JUL 1945

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10
30

60

X 77
VII

60101
MTZ BN

Reg
60101

ROAD TO 60101

60101

CHY DIV
03J

60101

FORGET TO ACCOMPANY
FOR REG 60101

SECRET
JUL 1949

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SECRET

Auth: CG 9th Inf Div

Initials: *(initials)*

Date: 31 Aug 1944

RESTRICTEDHq 9th Inf Div APO 9.
312000 Aug 1944

FO #28



MAPS: FRANCE 1/100,000; Sheets 15 & 16

1. a. It is believed that the bulk of the enemy inf has been withdrawn from this sector to the E having left behind armored elements in the area to act as rear guard. It is expected that this armor will be encountered in our adv to the N, probably elements of ADOLPH HITLER, 9th Pz and 10th Pz Div. Principal road centers and river crossings will probably be mined and road blocks used on main routes.
- b. VII Corps changes direction to the N immediately. 3d Armd Div is now assembling to conform to Corps mission of marching on MONS. 1st Inf Div remains in present posns to protect the left (W) flank of the Corps.
2. This Div (less 3d Bn 47th Inf atchd 3d Armd Div)
Atchd: No change.
Will atk 010800 Sept 1944 in zones indicated on objectives shown on overlay.
3. a. 39th CT
Atchd: No change
(1) Atks within its zone, at 010800 Sept 1944, to seize objective shown on overlay to secure the road center at HIRSON (3053). ID: See overlay.
(2) One Bn 39th Inf will be retained motorized for prompt movement as Div Res, after seizing its objective.
- b. 47th CT (less 3d Bn)
Atchd: No change
Atks, within its zone at 010800 Sept 1944, to seize objective shown on overlay to secure the road center at VERVINS (2544). Particular attention will be paid to flank security in movement to objective. ID: See overlay.
- c. 60th CT
Atchd: Same plus 9th Ren Tr
Atks at 010800 Sept 1944 to seize road center at ROZOY (4030), BURNEHAMBI (4436) and AUBERTON (4643) to protect the right (E) flank of the Corps. One Bn will occupy each of the objectives. ID: Present front lines.
- d. 15th Engr Bn - No change.
- e. 9th Ren Tr - Atchd to 60th CT effective 312100 Aug 1944.
- f. 746th Tk Bn (less Cos A, B & C)
Co D, moving at 010630 Sept 1944, from ID shown on overlay, will reconnoiter to the N of objectives to line shown on overlay.
- g. The Div Arty plus atchmnts will support the adv.
(1) 34th Ft Bn direct support 34th PA Bn.
- x. See Para 3 a-(2).
4. 5. a. See current SOI
b. Axis of Signal Communication: See overlay
c. CPs to be reported.

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C-1**RESTRICTED**CRAIG
Comdg


83

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Ret Line
Co D 146
T-58

39th C



Phase Line 3

Phase Line 2

Phase Line 1

(60)

(60)

(60)

(60)

INDEX NOT
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SIC THE DIV
M. FRANCE
SHEER: 10-18
SCALE: 1:100,000

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G-3

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23 JUL 1945

FROM: 4422845 August 1944
TO: 02200 August 1944

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

Hqs 9th Inf Div.
In the field.
030015 August 1944.

No. 32.
Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD:

a. Enemy front lines: The enemy was holding along a general line south of the VILLE DIEU - LES - POELES (3832) - PONT FARCY (5343) road between 425360 and 440372.

b. Units in contact: 5 Co, 2nd Regt (Der Fuhrer) 2 SS Division
4 Co, 36th Pz Gr. Regt. 17 SS Div.

There is evidence that one regt of the 116 Pz Div is to the immediate north of the 9th Div sector, and that elements of that regiment were operating this morning in front of the 47th Inf. This Div (of two regts of infantry each of two bns) has a tank regt of undetermined size. The division was evidently committed in its entirety 2 days ago after travelling from the neighborhood of PARIS in its own vehicles. These it still possesses, and though its supply of gas is limited, it still suffices. The companies were up to strength, and the bns possessed 120mm mortars and in the heavy weapons company (4th Co) there was a platoon of possibly 4 20mm AA guns. The morale of the men appears to be somewhat low; more as a result of war weariness than because of experiences here or because of the situation. It is interesting to note that elements of the NSkk (a paramilitary transportation corps) is evidently to the rear; providing transportation of munitions and supplies. This organization was withdrawn previous to the invasion, and its appearance indicates the committing of a reserve of transport, hitherto intact.

Units, according to PWS, maintain contact with Hqs by radio.

According to a PW statement, the withdrawal was to be in a NE direction. It is significant that the men have been ordered to hold out "as long as possible" and then to withdraw; and no longer "to hold out to the last man".

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. General: - Little or no resistance was encountered by our troops until the high ground along the VILLE DIEU - LES - POELES - PONT FARCY road was reached. A considerable number of mines was reported during the period, the mines being indiscriminately placed along approaches to the high ground. Our units encountered considerable small arms and automatic fire supported by direct fire artillery, probably from SP guns, towards the close of the period.

b. Heavy artillery fire was falling intermittently on strategic crossroads coming from the east and southeast.

c. Mortar fire was considerable towards the close of the period coming generally from the south.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. MI interrogator reports that elements of DAS REICH Div. (possibly DER FUHRER Regt) were seen August 1 in the neighborhood of PERCY with 40 med. tanks and two guns possibly 150mm tractor drawn; they asked the road to VIRE. Other troops passing through asked the direction of LE CHESSAIS where the Germans had

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23 JUL 1945

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23 JUL 1945

an important hospital. The direction of German withdrawal, according to civilian sources, appears to lead to VIRE and the FOREST DE ST SEVER, the latter being an important ammunition dump which was still active two days ago. Ammunition of German and Russian types are there and are being drawn upon. This confirms reports of 76.2s, and 15.2s in this area. ~~The~~ ammunition dump is in the forest NE of L'HERITAGE, around the triangle formed by secondary roads. There were no guns in the vicinity. The personnel working in the dump is largely captured French colonial soldiers. This information came from 2 escaped Senegalese.

b. Engineers report that mines in heavily shelled areas become supersensitive and the weight of individuals may detonate teller mines.

c. Heavy charges along the edge of the road activated by trip wire were reported being used by the Germans.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Continue delaying action, gradually withdrawing in a southeasterly direction.

(2) Withdraw to a new MIR.

b. Discussion: Capability (1) is most probable. There is as yet no tangible indication that the enemy plans to abandon his tactics of delaying our advance until threatened with encirclement or physically pushed back. There is no evidence of an organized defensive position to which he can withdraw.


ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-2.

DIST: G-2, VII Corps	S-2 Divarty
G-2, 4th Div.	S-2, 746th Tk Bn.
G-2, 3rd Armd Div.	CG, 9th Div.
G-2, 1st Div.	Asst. CG, 9th Div.
G-2, 28th Div.	C/S
S-2, 399th TD Bn	PW Cags.
S-2, 39th Inf.	File (2)
S-2, 47th Inf.	
S-2, 60th Inf.	

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23 JUL 1945



G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

MAPS 9th Inf. Div.
In the field.
020800 August 1944.

No. 33
MAP 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line. While no definite enemy line had been established there was contact on the VILLEDIEU LES POELES - ST. SEVER CALVADOS ROAD, and enemy was believed to be in the FOREST DE ST. SEVER.

b. Units in contact

1st Bn, Deutschland Regt, 2 SS Div.
2nd Bn Der Fuehrer Regt, 2 SS Div.
3rd Bn, Der Fuehrer Regt, 2 SS Div.
Hq Co, 37 SS Regt, 17 SS Div.
2nd Bn, 38 SS Regt, 17 SS Div.
17 SS Ren Bn, 17 SS Div.
1st Bn, 957 Regt, 363 Div.
2nd Bn, 957 Regt, 363 Div.
1st Bn, 943 Regt, 353 Div.

(See atchd consolidated IPW and MI Report)

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

The enemy withdrew during the period, no infantry fire being encountered north of the railroad (600 yds N of road). The enemy made extensive use of mines, not only on roads, but in the fields and under fence-gates. Arty fire was light. Mortar and arty increased towards the end of the period. No SP fire was reported.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Weapons in one company (12th Co) of 957th Regt: 9 light MAs, 3 bazookas, 3 grenade launchers, 9 trained snipers with rifles with telescopic sights. Heavy weapons company has 4 120mm mortars.


b. PW from 17 SS Ren Bn stated ANGERS is ration depot for unit, and that rations are brought from there by truck at night.

c. PWs from Deutschland Regt stated 1st Bn had 4 Mk Vs and "several" Mark Vs in support.

d. Kampfgruppe Grill is approx. 80 men from various companies of the 36 Regt, armed only with small arms. It had assault guns from the 17 SS Div in support.

e. CO of the 957th Regt is col. FREIHERR VON GALL.

f. The 957 Regt was obliged to march from the Belgian frontier to the Seine and PWs were told that as no bridge over the Seine was left, they were to cross by ferry - east of ROUEN. The Division is to be committed piecemeal, the remainder still being on the approach march.



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23 JUL 1945

g. PWs believe that loot and plunder is encouraged among SS men, but is strictly held in check among regular army men.

h. No strong line of defense was noted between Belgian frontier and Normandy, according to PWs.

i. A civilian stated that Germans spoke of withdrawing to a line FOUGERES - LEMANS - MAYENNE - South of GENE Paver.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. The enemy can:

(1) Resume delaying action, with heaviest resistance from FOREST DE ST SEVER.

(2) Continue withdrawal.

b. Discussion: Capability (1) is considered more likely, although threat of encirclement can force rapid withdrawal. There still is no concrete indication that the enemy yet has an organized defense line up on which to fall back, and PW reports indicate his troops have been ordered to hold where and when possible. The FOREST ST SEVER offers a strong-delaying position. Small local counterattacks with armor are possible.

ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-2.

DIST: No change.

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23 JUL 1945

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23 JUL 1945

FROM: G2200 August 1944
TO: G2200 August 1944

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

Br's 9th Inf. Div.
In the field.
G22330 August 1944.

No. 34.
Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines: The enemy was holding along a line 4927 - 5029 - 5130.

b. Units in contact:

- Elements of the 1st Bn Deutschland, 2 SS Div.
- *Elements of the 2nd Bn Deutschland, 2 SS Div.
- *Elements of the 1st Bn Der Fuhrer, 2 SS Div.
- *Elements of the 2nd AA Bn, 2 SS Div.
- *Elements of the 1st Bn, 37 SS Regt, 17 SS Div.
- *Elements of the 2nd Bn, 37 SS Regt, 17 SS Div.
- *Hrs Co., 942 Regt, 353 Div.
- Elements of the 1st Bn, 943 Regt, 353 Div.
- Elements of the 1st Bn, 957 Regt, 363 Div.
- Elements of the 2nd Bn, 957 Regt, 363 Div.
- 11th Co, 957 Regt, 363 Div.
- *Elements of the 1st Bn, 983 Regt, 275 Div.

* Represent new identifications since yesterday.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. Little opposition was encountered in our advance until mid-afternoon when moderate resistance from small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and arty fire was encountered, slowing up but not stopping our progress.

b. Arty fire was light during the period, some 170mm fire being reported.

c. An estimated five tanks were active on the front, in support of infantry.

d. Mines were used extensively, particularly on crossroads.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Annex 1 to G-2 Periodic Report No. 52, 1st Army states: The following captured document shows the enemy is anxious to avoid any occurrence which might lead to the suspicion that the Germans will use gas.

3rd Para Div.

"CP, 7 July 1944

Ref: Order of 2nd Para Corps,
6 July 1944

This order (from the OKH) will be brought to the attention of all units and will be strictly observed.

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23 JUL 1945

SUBJECT: Anti-Gas Training
Prohibition of Use

"1. A recent occurrence makes it necessary to point out that it is forbidden to use anti-gas training equipment in combat. Among the equipment are sniff bottles, practice poison gas candles, sulphur candles, irritant smoke candles practice gaseous chemical warfare agents."

"2. It is emphasized that these weapons are only for training purposes in anti-gas defense and are not combat weapons. Under no circumstances may these weapons be used in combat for if they were, the enemy would have an excuse for the assertion or even an apparent proof that Germany started gas warfare."

"3. International law permits the use - and the following are frequently used - of smoke candles, smoke grenades and tear gas shells to smoke out bunkers, cellars, etc."

For the Divisional Commander
The First General Staff Officer

DISTRIBUTION:
(Down to Regiments and
all Companies)"

b. Enemy tank tactics as described by a PW are as follows:

"It is usually the custom to leave two tanks in support of a company of infantry. One tank on each flank of Inf Co echeloned 150-200 meters to rear, acting as SP artillery. The tanks withdraw when our artillery falls on infantry position and return to the infantry position as our artillery fire lifts."

c. PW taken during period - 45.
Total PW taken since August 2. - 110.

d. PW states that Germans are withdrawing to LAVAL AREA.

e. Civilians who worked in the ammo depot only a few days ago report no permanent defensive installations. Women were used for cleaning arty shells, male civilians for digging 1-meter-deep holes for ammo stacks, and dug-outs for the ammo trucks. (FORET ST SEVER).

f. Civilians in POMTEHERMONT agree that the last 400-500 German infantrymen who withdrew through that village at 0300, 4 August th, did not go east into the forest, but southeast towards LE GAST, 493275. They were accompanied by only 2 or 3 horse-drawn anti-tank guns. That information was given to 39th and 47th leading Bns and telephoned to D, v G-2.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. - No Change.

ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

DIST: No Change.

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23 JUL 1945

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FROM: 04200 August '44	23 JUL 1945
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT	
Hqs. 9th Inf. Div.	
1945	
060010 August 1944.	
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No. 35.
Map 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines - The enemy was holding along a line 515245 - 538262 CHAMP DU BOULT (543269).

b. Units in contact (or elements thereof).

2nd Bn Hq, 958 Regt, 363 Div.
2nd Bn, 958 Regt, 363 Div.
14th Co, 958 Regt, 363 Div.
1st Bn, 957 Regt, 363 Div.
5th AT Bn, 5th Pz Div.
1st Bn, 947 Regt, 243 Div.
2nd Bn, 942 Regt, 243 Div.
2nd Bn, 957 Regt, 363 Div.
14th Co, 957 Regt, 363 Div.
Hq Co, 958 Regt, 363 Div.
10th Co, Engr. Co, 156 Regt, 116 Div.

The lineup of enemy units has shown no great change in the last 24 hrs. The 363 Div, a 6-bn division, evidently extends across a wide front, from the unit to our right to the British well to the left. 5 of its bns are committed, and no further new identifications need be expected from it. No SS units were identified during the last 24 hrs and it is possible that they have been withdrawn. A Kamperuppe Grdeman (?) seems to contain remnants of Pzch. units and the 5 AT Bn of the 5th Pz Div has been identified on the 47th Inf. front. Two new identifications to the south, both capable of intervention later, are the 2nd Pz. Div and the 34 Div. The 2nd Bn of the 958 Regt seems to have suffered heavily and to have withdrawn during the night of August 4-5. Arty inflicted the heaviest losses on equipment though PWs state that the accuracy of our mortar fire was extremely deadly. The units in the FORET DE ST SEVER were initially well equipped in weapons but almost at once lost vehicles and AT guns and some transportation through air attacks. Bn CPs were in the forest itself from which arty fire was controlled.

The morale of the men of the 363 appears to be uniformly bad, due to inexperience, lack of enthusiasm on the part of the non-coms and officers. For the first time PWs report non-coms consulting with the men as to the advisability of surrender or withdrawal. The lower echelons of the enemy appear to have only the scantiest knowledge of the political situation in GERMANY, but have no hopes of a victory.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. General. - The enemy was stubbornly contesting our advance on our left flank. In the town of CHAMP DU BOULT (5426) our troops were met by an estimated two bns of inf. supported by arty, several SP guns and mortars and were forced to withdraw outside the town. The right flank was quiet at the end of the period, the only action being observed mortar fire in the late afternoon.

b. Arty estimated to be 1700m from the southeast and the light btry was active during the late afternoon and through the end of the period.

c. An estimated four tanks were reported operating in the sector during the period.

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3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. PW taken during the period 197
PW taken since August 2, 1944 - 208.
- b. Civilian states the route of withdrawal is CHAMP DU BOULT - GATHERNO -
VIGNONS - TINCHERAY - DOMFRONT.
- c. Interrogation of civilians by the XIX Corps in the PERCY area revealed
that Wehrmacht units there disarmed all foreign elements two weeks ago and has
since used them as baggage carriers, etc.

4. FREMY CAPACITIES

Continued withdrawal, delaying our advance wherever possible with light
infantry action and use of mines, appears to be the only course of action open
to the enemy in this sector.

ROBERT W. ROBB
Lt. Col., G.S.C.
AG of S, G-2

DIST: No change.

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23 JUL 1945

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UNITED STATES ARMY
Interrogation Report

Form: O41800
To : 051800

Total number of PW's: 85

48 PW's by 47th Inf.
36 PW's by 60th Inf.
1 PW by 15th Engr.

Units identified on:

60th Inf. Sector

1st Co., 942nd Inf. Regt., 353rd Div.
2nd Co., 942nd Inf. Regt., 353rd Div.
4th Co., 942nd Inf. Regt., 353rd Div.
8th Co., 922nd Inf. Regt., 243rd Div.
4th Co., 957th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
6th Co., 957th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
7th Co., 957th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
8th Co., 957th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
14th Co., 957th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
H.Q. Co., 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
8th Co., 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
5th Co., 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
14th Co., 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
10th Co., (Pioneer Co.), 156th Regt.
116th Div.

47th Inf. Sector

5th Co., 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
5th Co., 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
7th Co., 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
8th Co., 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
14th Co., 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
2nd Bn HQ, 958th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
2nd Co., 957th Inf. Regt., 363rd Div.
2nd Co., 5th AT Bn, 5th Parachute Div.

1 1 Sgt. PW of the 8th Co., 958th Inf. Regt. stated that the 363rd Div. came to relieve the E. Gren. Div. "Windhund", which had had heavy casualties according to an NCO of the "Windhund" Div, with whom the PW spoke. PW was also told that the remnants of the "Windhund" Div. were to head South to counteract our armor and they were to accomplish that with 17 assault guns, 10 Panthers, and 4 Tigers. PW saw the Tigers moving South. Another PW from the 7th Co., 958th Inf. Regt. saw 15 assault guns moving S. 2 days ago. A 3rd PW observed 3 Tigers withdrawing from LE FORET DE ST. SEVER and claims that 2 - 75mm AT guns and 3 - 50mm were abandoned on high ground in FORET DE ST. SEVER (505295) last night.

PW states that the "Windhund" Div. was on the Russian front, then committed on the CAEN front and finally shifted to this sector about 7 days ago. It has a reputation for being an unusually tough outfit and its members will avoid being captured at any cost. They wear a badge on their caps, picturing a Greyhound. Several other PW's have heard of the "Windhund" Div., but most of them have not.

1 PW, a telephone operator of the 2nd Bn. HQ., 958th Inf. Regt. heard the Bn. CO of the 2nd Bn tell the Company COs that the only way out was through the woods to the SE. He said he knows that the 2nd Bn. 958th Inf. Regt. is attached to the 353rd Div. He claims that the 1st Bn., 958th Inf. Regt. has been committed West of LE GAST (confirmed by another PW), and that the 14th Co. is attached to the Co's of the 2nd Bn. He saw an Engineer Platoon with Teller Mines coming from the South and heading toward LE GAST, but he does not know where or if the mines were planted.

The ages of the PW's of the 2nd Bn., 958th Inf. Regt. range between 19 and 38, the average age being 30. Of the total number of PW's taken (85), there were 9 Russians, 15 Poles, 1 Rumanian, 1 Serb, 4 Alsatians, 4 Czechs, and 1 Dutchman, or a total of 35 foreigners.

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Declassified Auth Code: 65200 August 1944
65200 August 1944
C-2 TACTIC REPORT 23 JUL 1945
Headquarters 363 Div.
in the field.
070130 August 1944.

No. 36.
Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines: Enemy held no definite line; there was evidence that he was in semi-organized positions on the high ground at 526229 - 537254, - 542264 - 552231 and that a line was developing to the west of the 342612 road.

b. Units in Contact in Division Sector.

2nd Bn, 106 Regt, 116 Armored Div.
1st Bn, 1051 Regt, 84 Div.
2nd Bn, 1051 Regt, 84 Div.
1st Bn, 1052 Regt, 84 Div.
2nd Bn, 1052 Regt, 84 Div.
3rd Bn, 1051 Regt, 84 Div.
4,5 Btrys, 145 Regt, 116 Div.
1st Bn, 104 Arty Regt, 84 Div.

In addition, stragglers of the 363 Div, the 353, and of other units of the 116 Div. were taken prisoner. It appears that the SS and Prcht elements were relieved Aug. 4 by the 116 Armored Div, which was withdrawing from the SW. The 116th was in its turn relieved last night by the 84 Div. which was supposed to be committed between MORTINE and MORTAIN but withdrew when the danger of encirclement became apparent. It has appeared on the Division front with two Regt - 5 Bns identified and in Arty regt. It has no organic transportation, though the Arty has prime movers. The division has never before been committed nor have the two infantry regts ever operated together. PWs describe it as an emergency division meaning that it is used to reinforce weak sectors etc. and not in an independent role. The SS units and the 116th were according to PW withdrawn to prepare a defense system 20-30 km to the NE. Stragglers of these units will undoubtedly appear during the next day or so, however.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. General. - The enemy resisted stubbornly our advance on our left flank. The resistance started at daylight when our troops jumped off and continued until the enemy line was broken through in the early afternoon when organized resistance ended and became sporadic from groups of infantry. Resistance was somewhat lighter on the right flanks, but was stubborn until again our troops forced an enemy withdrawal to the southeast. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was heavy in the right sector. At the close of the period resistance was light. We were still in contact.

b. Activity of Component Elements.

(1) Arty - The Arty. during the period was light to moderate. Fire was falling on front line troops and very little was reported in rear areas. Most of the fire was from light Arty, a few reports being received of medium caliber.

(2) SP guns - SP guns were quite active during the period being particularly heavy in the 60th Inf area and in very close support of infantry units.

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23 JUL 1945

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Declassified Auth: TAM

28 JUL 1945

(3) Tanks - An estimated 12 to 15 tanks, 80th AF 100th AF: Vs, were active along the front. They were used in close support of infantry.

(4) Mortar activity was light during the period. There were no rpts of heavy mortars active.

(5) The 60th Inf. rptd that during the morning the enemy was firing 20mm AA at our infantry troops.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Civilians report that munitions are being carried by German ambulances day and night and by requisitioned civilian carts. Roads leading from CHAMP DU BOUT to GATHEMO and to VENEGONS have been mined. Civilians were forced to dig holes every 200 yds on the margin of the roads. About 600 Inf. bearing Greyhound insignia (116th Div) passed through LA FORGE on 4 August asking the way to MORTAIN.

b. PWs captured during period - 85.
Total PWs since August 2, 1944 - 293.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

a. The enemy can:

(1) Continue strong delaying action in front of LA ROUSSEL-GATHEMO-VIRE road.

(2) Withdraw on axis GATHEMO-VENEGONS.

b. Discussion: The withdrawal of the 116th Div., and its replacement by the 61st Div. indicates the enemy's intention to delay our advance as long as possible at the lowest possible cost to him. Once the GATHEMO-VIRE road is lost to him, it is likely he will withdraw, probably to defend again in front of the road SOURDEVAL-VIRE. VENEGONS may be held as stubbornly as was CHAMP DU BOUT. A withdrawal to a line farther to the east will be dictated by the advance of adjacent units; or by the establishment of a new M.A. Prisoners have variously placed such a line at 10 to 20 kms to the east, but such an extensive withdrawal at this time is doubtful.

ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-2.

DIST: No change.

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28 JUL 1945

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23 JUL 1945

G-2 Intelligence Report

FROM: 062200 August 44k
23 JUL 1945 072355 August 44k

Hqrs 9th Inf Div.
In the field.
072355 August 1944.

No. 37.

Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

L. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines: - The enemy held a general line along the 55 eastings,

b. Units in contact:

1st Bn, 1051 Regt, 84 Div.
2nd Bn, 1051 Regt, 84 Div.
1st Bn, 1052 Regt, 84 Div.
2nd Bn, 1052 Regt, 84 Div.
2nd Co, 1st Bn Hq, 1052 Regt, 84 Div.
1st Bn, 60th Regt, 116 Armd Div.
2nd Co, 1051 Regt, 84 Div.
4th Co, 156 Regt, 116 Armd Div.
5th Co, 985 Regt, 273 Armd Div.
2nd Btry, 184 Arty Regt, 84 Div.
2nd Co, 184 Engr Bn, 84 Div.
1st Co, 675 Engr Bn, 116 Div.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. The enemy continued his delaying tactics throughout the period. Resistance was light. Fire from small arms, mortars and interdicting arty fire was still being received at the end of the period.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Civilian interrogated by 28th Div. states that he believes defense line is being established along line DOLFRONT-ALENCON-LEVAIS.

b. PW say that mines are hurriedly being laid on the inside and outside bend of curves. The German theory is that tanks and armored vehicles rounding the turns hug the side to get a good view for AT guns ahead of them, and do not watch for mines in the effort to spot enemy positions and vehicles.

c. According to a German airman who circulated within the lines of one of the Corps Divs. on the nights of August 4-5 and 5-6, he was challenged five times during this period and allowed to pass by the sentry when he stated that he did not know the password.

d. PW who have done extensive work around gasoline and ammo. depots give the following info: Dumps and depots are almost always given code names. Those for gasoline dumps begin with the letter "B" (Benzin) and those for ammo. dumps begin with the letter "M" (munitions).

e. PW states that the Flying Bomb weapon has been placed under the direct control of the Army High Command, and is at its disposal for use against enemy ground troops.

f. A railway gun has been seen on aerial photos at Chateau Du LOIR (5799).

- 1 -
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23 JUL 1945

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Downgraded Auth TAG *JA*

23 JUL 1945

g. Civilians state that they were requisitioned by Germans on 23 July to work on the GATHEMO-VENGEONS road, digging and improving individual foxholes and slit trenches along the ditches. Those they were told, were to be used by vehicle drivers to take cover when attacked by our air.

h. Some civilians with military experience and a good knowledge of the region express the opinion that the reason the Germans have been defending so resolutely VIRE and the wooded heights S and SE of FORET DU ST SEVER, was to keep open a gap through which to drive to the sea, with the armor available in the VIRE region, through SOURDEVAL and AVRANCHES.

i. The opinion of civilians is that the SEINE, although a serious obstacle, is not a natural main line of resistance for the Germans. They picture the final stand on the HINDENBURG line of the last war. A natural intermediate line of resistance is the wooded heights BILLEME - MORTAGNE - LAIGLE - BRETEUIL - CONCHES - EVREUX - VERNON.

j. PWs taken during the period - 120.
PWs taken since August 2, 1944 - 413.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can:


- (1) Attack, generally on axis SOURDEVAL-AVRANCHES.
- (2) Continue delaying action.

b. Discussion: There are strong indications of an enemy build-up, particularly to the CP of our sector. 1st SS Pz Div. "ADOLF HITLER", and 2nd Pz Div have been moved in, and PWs speak of other units being in the general area. It is likely that the enemy intends to attempt to split our forces on the axis SOURDEVAL-AVRANCHES, MORTAIN-AVRANCHES. An abortive attempt to infiltrate was made on the morning of 7 August. If indications of the build-up are reliable - and PW identifications support them - the enemy intends more than delaying action.

ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-2.

DIST: No change.

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23 JUL 1945



0-2

082200 August 1944
082200 August 1944

Paris 9th Inf Div.
in the field.
082300 August 1944.

No. 38.

Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines: - The enemy was holding along the line GATHEMO (5623) - FERRIERS BR BRAUPLICE (2054) - 5517. There was a strong point at 547218.

b. Units identified during the period.

1st Bn, 1051 Regt, 84 Div.
2nd Bn, 1051 Regt, 84 Div.
1st Bn, 1052 Regt, 84 Div.
2nd Bn, 1052 Regt, 84 Div.

c. The 1st Bn, 60th Regt (116 Armd Div). The 2nd Bn, 985 Regt (275 Div), identified yesterday were not identified today. Info. from PWs merely confirmed previous reports that the 84 Div. was originally to be committed near MORTAIN with tk support and with a holding mission, but were suddenly withdrawn 3 days ago and committed in this sector. None of these units have been identified on the sector of the Division to the left where elements of the 353 still remain. The sector to the right shows elements of the 84 Div, 2nd Pz Div and the army of the 1st SS Pz Div.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. The enemy held stubbornly to his defensive line during the period. Small arms and arty fire was moderate to heavy, the arty falling all along the front with some interdiction in rear areas. A few SP guns were reported. Mortar fire was heavy at the close of the period, estimated to be 120mm.

b. An estimated 12 to 15 tanks were reported during the period operating along the front.


3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. There is definite evidence that lives are needlessly being lost because our troops fail to heed warnings of MINES. There are two known cases when troops have been warned by civilians of the location of mines and have ignored the warnings, and shortly thereafter vehicles were destroyed and lives were lost. This info. should be disseminated to all troops. Reporting of mines and booby traps is the duty of every EM and officer.

b. A sign indicating a minefield was found to be mined for detonating a booby trap.

c. Many of the PWs from the 84 Div, having been stationed near DIEPPE, have frequently observed the flying bombs passing overhead, apparently from nearby.

d. Civilians report that about three months ago, the German authorities ordered French banks to evacuate their gold and other metallic reserves "East of a line BARBES-SOISSONS". That line, running from St. REMOND to the NE part of FRANCE and dividing FRANCE roughly in half, is known only by hear-say; the original German order has not been found.





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23 JUL 1945

e. A convoy of civilians, evacuated by German orders from DAMPIERRE to ST. MANVIEU, following the prescribed evacuation route and displaying white flags and even bed sheets on the carts, was twice machine-gunned by German planes. German planes were clearly identified by civilians. Casualties were: 15 dead, 15 wounded. Date: 8 August 1944, at ST. CHARLES DE PERCY.

f. Civilians in this region, as well as in the regions previously encountered, report that trucks going to the front with ammo. and personnel replacements, consistently display Red Cross flags. Trucks have also been seen with Red Cross flags on turrets.

g. Civilians report that wounded are in some cases being evacuated on motorcycles.

h. Total number of PWs for period - 32.
Total PWs taken since 2 August 44 - 445.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No Change.

ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-2.

DIST: No change.

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23 JUL 1945

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23 JUL 1945

FORM: 082200 August 1944

092200 August 1944

G-2

Hors 9th Inf Div.

In the field.

092230 August 1944.

No. 39.

Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines: - No change. A Particularly strongly defended area was at 550185.

b. Units in contact:

2nd Bn, 60th Mtz Regt, 116th Armd Div.
2nd Bn, 156th Mtz Regt, 116th Armd Div.
1st Bn, 1051st Inf. Regt, 84th Div.
14th Co, 1051st Inf. Regt, 84th Div.
1st Bn, 1052nd Inf. Regt, 84th Div.
12th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 84th Div.

c. There is no indication from PWs that new units have moved up. The 116th Div. appears to be opposite the 39th Inf, the 84th Div. opposite the 60th and 47th Infs. The 116th Div. is evidently part of a larger concentration of mtzd and armd forces in the vic. of MORTAIN. The 1051st and 1052nd are the west-ermost units of a line which includes elements of the 84th Div, 353rd Div, of the 958th and 959th Regts, and two Kampfgruppe. These units lack in many instances organic arty and have no organic tanks. The more efficient units have been moved to the south into the MORTAIN area.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. General: The enemy continued his active defensive tactics during the period, stubbornly resisting and aggressively patrolling, particularly during the night. The enemy had excellent observation on our front lines and fire from all types of weapons was accurate. At the close of the period our troops were in close contact along the front.

b. Arty fire during the period was light coming primarily from long range. A large gun, possibly a railway gun was reported.

c. Nebelwerfers were active during the period.

d. Enemy armor in considerable strength was reported along the front, but no concentrated armor effort was attempted.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy tanks captured or recovered during the period; 1 Mk IV, 2 Mk Vs.

b. Total enemy tks to date: 38.

Mk III - 2
Mk IV - 8
Mk V - 26
Mk VI - 2

c. Civilians report German camouflaging is excellent. They report the enemy uses complete-cut apple trees to simulate orchard pattern in camouflaging arty pieces.

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- d. 57602018 - 4 weapons btry.
- 57952019 - Possible gun btry.
- 58172074 - Poss. Lt. AA (3 gun).
- 57002040 - Military activity.
- 56642293 - 1 gun
- 56702285 - 1 gun
- 56822283 - Center of three (3) gun btry.
- 57282217 - Center of 3 possible guns.
- 57912048 - Military activity
- 57802052 - 3 gun posn.
- 56102151 - Military activity
- 56192172 - 1 possible gun.
- 56822184 - 3 guns
- 55812354 - 1 gun
- 55832340 - 1 gun
- 55652276 - Center of 3 guns
- 55602250 - 1 gun
- 55672246 - Military activity
- 56472344 - Center 1 AA gun
- 56392306 - Center of 3 guns.
- 55902254 - Center 3 Lt AA gun
- 57801805 - Infantry
- 57801830 - 2 guns
- 57941804 - Great deal of military activity around hedges.
- 58361867 - 1 gun (?)
- 67691970 - Military activity
- 57981975 - Military activity
- 56521908 - Possible arty
- 56491918 - Activity and camouflaged object
- 56611990 - Indication of 3 guns by muzzle-blast activity.
- 56861918 - 4 gun btry
- 57871944 - Military activity.
- 56341822 - Possible gun
- 56361898 - Unidentified activity
- 56761900 - Possible gun.
- 56941872 - Tracks at these three coordinates.
- 57071868 - Indicate the possibility of a SP gun pulling off rd to fire.
- 57381847 -
- 56971850 - Possible gun
- 57411853 - Possible gun
- 57091820 - Vehicles
- 57761905 - Troops on road
- 57381863 - Military activity
- 57041834 - Military activity
- 57291812 - 4 AA gun posns (unoccupied).

e. CIVILIAN RPT that the elements of the 5th Pzcht Div previously near ST. LO and TORIGNI withdrew from the vic of ST. POIS August 3 to DOMFRONT in good order.

f. The 47th Inf rpts the use of smoke screen to cover up the firing of the Nobelwerfer.

g. Total RIs for period: 7
Total RIs since August 2 - 870.

h. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

a. The enemy can:

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23 JUL 1948

(1) Fight a delaying action, maintaining successive positions as long as possible.

(2) Withdraw to straighten line in view of threat of envelopment.

(3) Counter-attack locally.

(4) Attack, to cut communications of Forces south of MORTAIN-AVRANCHES.

b. Discussion: The enemy's exercise of his capabilities in our Division sector will largely be determined by the over-all situation. He intended to attack toward AVRANCHES to drive a wedge between our forces and cut our lines of communication. This attack was nipped in the bud at heavy cost to him in armor and personnel. Meanwhile his units in our sector have suffered substantial losses while fighting defensively, and there is today no evidence of any further build-up. The recent shifting of enemy forces to mass power for an attack has at least resulted in spreading and strengthening his defense, and in the VII Corps sector, he has the strength to continue a fairly strong delaying action, taking full advantage of terrain features. The threat of envelopment on either or both flanks, however, may force a more rapid withdrawal, perhaps to the line TINGHEBERRY-DOMERONT-MAYENNE. Thus capabilities (1) and (2) are of high probability; (3) is always possible particularly during a withdrawal and (4) appears less likely.

5. IPW REPORT for period 081800 - 091800 August 1948:

- a. Total number of R/S - 18.
 - 6 by 47th Inf.
 - 12 by 60th Inf.

b. Units identified on:

47th Inf. Sector
 3rd Co, 1051st Inf Regt, 84th Div.
 14th Co, 1051st Inf. Regt, 84th Div.
 12th Co, 1052nd Inf. Regt, 84th Div.


60th Inf. Sector
 3rd Co, 154th Engr. Bn, 84th Div.
 5th Co, 1051st Inf Regt, 84th Div.
 6th Co, 1051st Inf Regt, 84th Div.
 2nd Bn Hqs, 1051st Regt, 84th Div.
 1st Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 84th Div.
 2nd Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 84th Div.

The C.O. of the 3rd Co, 164th Engr. Bn, 84th Div, told his men to hold the MIA because he (the C.O.) had heard that 3 Divs were coming to this sector to relieve them and other units. He said that the SS "Hitler jugent", another SS Div, and a "Wehrmacht" Div were mentioned.

ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-2.

DIST: No change.

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23 JUL 1948



G-2

August 1944
August 1944

Hqs 5th Inf Div.
In the field
102200 August 1944.

No. 40,
Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines: - No change. There was some indication of a withdrawal on the left flank.

b. Units in contact:

1st Bn, 105th Regt, 84th Div.
2nd Bn, 105th Regt, 84th Div.
2nd Bn, 60th Regt, 116th Armd Div.
3rd Bn, 37th SS Regt, 17th SS Div.
1st Bn, 156th Regt, 116th Armd Div.

c. According to PW reports the 105th Regt withdrew from in front of the 47-60th Sector, either to man the defenses south of GATHEMO (contacted by the 109th this afternoon) or to reorganize further east. A PW captured by the 28th Div. processed by our PW cage was from the 7th hv AT (?) Bn. His company, one of three, had 12 88s which undoubtedly accounts for the hv flank in the area between GATHEMO and SOURDEVAL. 7th hv AA Bn is probably a more exact identification, as the PW was not certain himself.

The 10th SS Pz Div was identified by the 2nd Armd Div was identified by the 2nd Armd Div at 6610.

PWs from the 105th 2nd stated that there were no reserves, and no prepared positions to the rear.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. General: Activity ranged from light in the 60th sector to heavy in the 39th sector. Towards the close of the period there was increase in arty and mortar fire from long range in the 60th and 47th sectors indicating the possibility of a withdrawal in those areas. Activity in the 39th sector had decreased somewhat although there were no apparent signs of a withdrawal. There was still close contact in the 39th sector.


b. Arty fire was light on the left flank and heavy on the right, firing primarily on routes of advance and supply.

c. Nebelwerfers were again actively firing on the 39th Inf.

d. Tks were reported, primarily in the 39th sector, firing as arty in support of infantry.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. PW from Prisoner Bn until recently stated that those units have been building fortifications for troops and vehicles across the SELME River in the vicinity of DUCLAIR and LETRE. He states that those were knocked out by our air force almost as quickly as they could build or repair them. PW knows of no defensive installations being built anywhere by disciplinary units of this type. He told of much physical cruelty imposed upon the men in these bns.



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23 JUL 1945

b. PW states that combat patrol was sent out at about 0200, consisting of about 8 men with a MG. If patrol is larger, bazookas are carried.

c. PW states they had received orders to stay out of buildings.

d. Two ambulances of 47th Inf. were shot at by two Germans with machine pistols. The ambulances stopped, and the Germans approached. Upon identifying the vehicles, they apologized to the drivers and allowed them to proceed.

e. An undated captured map shows a defense line with companies disposed at the following points: 625151 - 699139 - 694130 - 701113 - 693094 - 712088 - 714073 - 710050 - 729044 - 741007.

CP locations were given as: 84th Div CP - 727180. 275 Div CP - 750127. 363 Div CP - 641242. 554th Regt CP - 612279.

f. Divarty reports enemy using smoke to attempt to hinder adjustment of arty fire.

g. PWs taken during period - 85
PWs taken since August 2 - 555

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change.

ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AG of S, G-2.

DIST: No change.

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23 JUL 1945

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23 JUL 1945

August 1944
August 1944

G-2
ACTIVITIES REPORT

Brns 9th Inf Div.
In the field.
112300 August 1944.

No. 41
Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines. - The enemy had defensive positions across the ridge between 530198 and 530180. A small enemy group was reported at 556197. There was no other contact in the rest of the sector.

b. Units in contact.

2nd Bn, 60th Mtd Regt, 116th Armd Div.
1st, 2nd Bns, 156th Mtd Regt, 116th Armd Div.
Signal Bn, 5th Prcbt Div.
1st Bn, 1052nd Regt, 84th Div.
2nd Bn, 1052nd Regt, 84th Div.
9, 10, 12 Cos, 1052nd Regt, 84th Div.

None of these units were identified in the line later than Noon, 11 August.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. During the night the enemy broke contact withdrawing to the east. Contact was regained near the close of the period in the 39th sector.

b. Arty fire was heavy during the period in the 39th sector. A railroad gun was reported active coming from the 5817 square.

c. Rocket and Nebelwerfers were active in the 39th sector.

d. An estimated 6 tanks being used as supporting arty were reported during the period.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Civilians state that the Germans closest to our elements fire a short burst from a machine pistol to direct arty fire in the direction of a point where they see movement or hear noises.

b. Civilians state that in addition to the main road east from SOURDEVAL through TINCHBRAY, the Germans are making use of the road SOURDEVAL-LE FRESNE-PORET - GER - BEAUCHENE - LONLAY - ST. BOMER. This route is reported to be in good defilade, and partially concealed by unusually high hedges and trees.

c. The road CHERENCE-SOURDEVAL is reported by civilians to have been mined in the vicinity 516196.

d. Civilians state that tanks were being used as arty along a line between BROUAINS (5618) - BEAUFICEL (5721) - la BEC-BLEREE (5723).

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23 JUL 1945

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23 JUL 1945

e. Although the river SEE is negligible stream, its valley is the deepest we have yet encountered. It is a tank obstacle in most places according to civilians. The main highway following it can be easily cut. The secondary road running from 556190 to 561183 to 597190 is reported to be a good dirt road and being used by German tanks.

f. Civilians state there is an amao. and gas dump in the woods LES MONTES D'ERON (5717). They also state there are supply dumps in the abandoned iron mines of ROMAGNY, 2 kms SW of MORNAIN.

g. The bridge and RJ at 577190 is reported to be prepared for mining.

h. Total PWs for period - 43.
Total PWs taken since August 2 - 606 (figure in Periodic Rpt for Aug. 10 was in error and should have read - 558).

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No change.

5. IPW REPORT for period 101800 - 111800 August 19th:

a. Total number of PWs - 96
17 by 60th Inf.
71 by 47th Inf.
8 by 39th Inf.

b. Units identified on:

- | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| 60th Inf Sector | | 47th Inf Sector | |
| 1st Co, 184th Engr Bn, 6th Div. | | 3rd Co, 184th Engr Bn, 8th Div. | |
| 1st Co, 156th Mtd Inf Regt, 116th Armd Div. | | 5th Co, 60th Mtd Inf Regt, 116th Armd Div. | |
| 3rd Co, 156th Mtd Inf Regt, 116th Armd Div. | | 6th Co, 60th Mtd Inf Regt, Armd Div. | |
| 2nd Co, 5th Sig Bn, 5th Front Div. | | 1st Co, 156th Mtd Inf Regt, Div. | |
| 3rd Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | | 2nd Co, 156th Mtd Inf Regt, " | |
| 4th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | | 3rd Co, 156th Mtd Inf Regt, " | |
| 10th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | | 4th Co, 156th Mtd Inf Regt, " | |
| 12th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | | 5th Co, 156th Mtd Inf Regt, " | |
| | | 6th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | |
| | | 7th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | |
| | | 8th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | |
| | | 9th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | |
| | | 10th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | |
| | | 12th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, 8th Div. | |

- 39th Inf Sector
- 6th Co, 60th Mtd Inf Regt, 116th Armd Div.
 - 5th Co, 60th Mtd Inf Regt, 116th Armd Div.
 - 7th Co, 60th Mtd Inf Regt, 116th Armd Div.

1 PW of the 4th Co, 1052nd Inf Regt, captured by the 60th Inf. heard that the 1st Div. of the 1052nd Inf Regt was to withdraw at 2100, 10 August 19th. Although PW is a telephone operator, he was not on duty at the time the order was issued to withdraw. PW was told the withdrawal was to be made to the south. PW did not learn the extent of the withdrawal as he was on a listening post.

Another PW of the 7th Co, 60th Mtd Inf Regt (captured by the 39th Inf. at 1000, 11 Aug. vic. CHERENCE LE ROUSSEL, saw 2 Panther tks that were attached to his company withdraw to the south last night (5/3174). He overheard C.O. tell the 1st Sgt. that the company would withdraw at 2300, 10 August 19th about 3 to 4 kms to the south in order to strengthen out the line. The 60th Mtd Inf Regt had 4-5 75mm assault guns, two 88mm SP guns and about 3 Panther tks. PW saw 2 Panther tks that were out of action.

ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

DIST: No change.

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23 JUL 1945

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Declassified Auth: TAG
23 JUL 1945

G-2

FROM: 112200 August 1944
TOUL: 114300 August 1944
Hqs 9th Inf Div.
In the field:
152245 August 1944.

No. 42.
Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Resistance was coming from the woods and high ground in the vicinity of 0306, from a pocket at 050044, and from 086055. No definite defensive line was apparent.

b. Units in contact.

- 1st, 3rd Bns, 723th Regt, 708th Div.
- 1st, 3rd Bns, 743th Regt, 708th Div.
- 1st, 2nd Bns, 1708th Arty Regt, 708th Div.
- 272nd Engr. Bn, 272nd Div.
- Mixed AT Bn, GHQ
- 1st SS Engr Bn, GHQ
- 1st, 3rd Bns, 2nd SS Regt, 1st SS Div-Adolf Hitler.
- Hq Co, 304th Regt, 2nd Pz Div.
- 1st Bn, 11th Regt, 9th Pz Div.
- 130th Arty Regt, Pz Lehr Div.

According to PWS not all of the 708th Div is on this front, the remainder still being in the south. The 2nd Bn of each regt has been detached and consolidated into a Fusilier Bn. There is evidence that this unit is on the front.

Documents show that the units in contact with the 708th Div administratively were, as of August 12: 9th Pz Div, including the 9th Pz Ron Bn, the 11th Pz Gr. Regt, the Pz Lehr Div and 2 GHQ Bns.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD. *

a. Enemy activity was characterized by a withdrawal action, the withdrawal being generally to the east following the route 012058 - BEAUVAIN(0504) - RANES (1207). Early in the afternoon contact was established, and resistance was coming from small arms of infantry supported by tanks operating as mobile arty coming from three localities listed in Par 1a. Resistance throughout the period was light.

b. No arty was reported during the period.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. A low-grade enemy agent, caught behind our lines, had in his possession a Todt card. Following the usual pattern, he claimed this was proof that he was a Todt worker. The card itself was similar to the normal form, but contained the following printed paragraph which definitely proved the man was not a "Todt worker". It is desired that Todt cards be checked for the following phrase:

"Der Inhaber dieses Ausweis ist berechtigt, die Baustellen der Org. Todt, Oberbauleitung Cherbourg zu betreten. Dieser Ausweis hat nur Gultigkeit in Verbindung mit einem anti-Personalausweis u. nur fur die auf der Ruckseite angegebenen Dauer.

Oberbauleitung Cherbourg
Der SS. - Verbindungsfuhrer

(signed) I. A. MEDEL

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23 JUL 1945

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23 JUL 1948

The above paragraph is transcribed as follows: The holder of this pass is entitled to enter the offices of the Organisation Todt and the head offices at CHERBOURG. This pass is valid only in connection with an official personal pass (identity card) and only for as long as is stamped on the reverse. The firms for which this agent was allegedly working were "Saulnier-Juval" and "Firma Elektro HELM".

b. CIC, 3rd Armd Div, arrested and obtained confessions from two enemy agents in civilian clothes who had been left near FRE EN PAIL with a radio transmitter and instructed to learn unit identifications and numbers of tanks and vehicles. Other agents may be in the area.

c. Total PWs taken during period - 120.

d. PWs state that signs reading "DECKUNG" (with the silhouette of an airplane above it) and pointing to likely sheltered areas along the road, often point to areas in which tellermine have been placed, and should therefore be avoided or investigated.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can:

- (1) Continue withdrawal to the east.
- (2) Attempt semi-organized spearheads to the east in an effort to escape.
- (3) Continue to delay our closing the gap.

b. Discussion:

(1) There is evidence of disorganization of enemy forces to the west and of a general withdrawal to the ME. The main routes now open to the enemy are (1) BRIOUZE (0014) - FROMENTEL (0816) - PUTANGES (1021) and to the E, and (2) TAILLEBOIS (9726) - PUTANGES (1021). It is expected that stiff resistance will be encountered around PUTANGES (1021) that being the focal point of the road nets and the only good crossing of the ORNE River in possession of the enemy, capability (3). Capability (1) seems the most likely at the present time coupled with the growing possibility of (3) as more pressure is exercised. Capability (2) is considered probable because of the apparent lack of knowledge of the full situation and it is expected that the enemy will fight his way out if he finds it necessary.

5. IPW rpt. period 141800 - 151800 August 1944.

a. Total number of PWs: 99

- 47 PWs taken by 47th Inf.
- 31 PWs taken by 60th Inf.
- 10 PWs taken by 39th Inf.
- 4 PWs taken by 9th Div MP.
- 2 PWs taken by 81st FA.
- 2 PWs taken by 60th FA.

b. Units identified:

1st and 3rd Bns, 726th Inf Regt, 708th Div.
1st and 3rd Bns, 748th Inf Regt, 703th Div.
1708th Arty Regt, 708th Div.
272nd Enge Bn, 272nd Div.
Com. Pz. Jg Co (mixed AT), A.O.K.I. (Army)

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23 JUL 1948

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2nd Engr Co, 1st SS Div
3rd Bn, 2nd Regt, "Adolf Hitler", 1st SS Div.
1st Bn, 2nd Regt, "Adolf Hitler", 1st SS Div.
Hq Co, 2nd Armd Div (304th Pz Gr. Regt)
QM Co, 9th Armd Div.
1st Bn, 11th Regt, 9th Armd Div.


A PW from the Hq Co, 304th Pz Gr. Regt, 2nd Armd Div was an interpreter. He relates US PWs rarely give anything but name, rank and ASN and that Germans do not use pressure methods to get information. The amount of information obtained does not affect the treatment of PWs. When PW was questioned about the units facing the Germans in the US sector, he gave a complete OB which, he claims, are in regular-printed OB books. Interrogating is not done below regimental level.

ROBERT W. ROEB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-2.

DIST: G-2, VII Corps
G-2, 4th Div.
G-2, 3rd Armd Div.
G-2, 35th Div.
G-2, 30th Div.
G-2, 1st Div.
S-2, 899th TD Bn.
S-2, 39th Inf.
S-2, 47th Inf.
S-2, 60th Inf.
S-2, Divarty
CG, 9th Div.
Asst. CG, 9th Div.
C/S
G-3
PW Cage
Air O.
File (2)

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23 JUL 1945



FROM: 15200 August 1944
200 August 1944

Hqs 9th Inf Div.
In the field
162930 August 1944

No. 43.
Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line: The enemy had no defined line, resistance coming from scattered pockets.
- b. Units identified during period:

4th Training Bn, 9th Pz Div.
3rd Bn, 102nd Arty Regt, 9th Pz Div.
Rcn Bn, 1st SS Pz Div.
Hq Co, 1st Tr Regt, 1st SS Pz Div.
2nd Bn, 3rd Tk Regt, 2nd Pz Div.
1st Bn, 728th Regt, 708th Div.
3rd Bn, 728th Regt, 708th Div.
1st Bn, 1078th Arty Regt, 708th Div.
Signal Bn, 708th Div.
10th Co, 6th Para. Regt - Atchd to 1st SS Div.
3rd Co, 13th Cav. Regt. - Atchd to 1st SS Div.
678th Armd Engr. Bn.
18th Trucking Co, 8th Div.
Tartar Ln 627.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

a. Enemy resistance during the period was light, consisting of small pockets of infantry supported by tanks and AT guns.

b. Arty fire was light during the morning, none being reported after noon.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Following info from British VIII Corps Intelligence Summary #39 indicates a method the enemy is using to obtain unit identifications:

"Further Details on the Siegfried Line Service"

These postcards are issued to British PW with the promise that, completed with a fifteen-word message and addressed to an army address for onward transmission to relatives, they will be fired into our lines. Skillfully guided by the interrogator and the layout of the card, British PWs may easily address these to a friend or their unit command - falling into the trap and giving away their unit - or some unit on the British front.

Some 20 such postcards were fired over British lines night 6/7 August which were supposed to have been written by recently captured PWs. They were fired from propaganda rifle grenades."

b. The enemy is still employing ruses in combining anti-vehicular and anti-personnel mines. Two soldiers were injured when they attempted to detonate AT mines with a long rope. The convenient hole they chose for protection during the operation was booby-trapped. (From 30th Div Periodic Rpt #60).



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c. The German equivalent of "Army talks" lists the following "false" rumors current in GERMANY and among the soldiers, and seeks to deny them:

That VIENNA is being evacuated of the Viennese in order to make room for Germans wishing to avoid the bombing.

That the losses from the bombing in GERMANY have been extremely heavy (500,000 in HAMBURG). The figure is actually less than one tenth, the document declares.

That women of the "upper classes" are not drafted for war work.

It further recognizes dissatisfaction among the troops at the scarcity of front news over the radio; and complaints that foreign workers in GERMANY are able to enjoy luxuries that soldiers at the front cannot have. Likewise it seeks to modify the irritation of the soldiers over the constant praise of the home front. As to the fears of the soldiers that all good jobs will be taken after the war, the document assures them that nothing of the sort will occur.

d. Civilians in LE GRAYS 035077 and in LE POISSER, 043085 state that in the following areas are ammo and fuel dumps, as yet intact:

Woods at 092131 - 099128 - 095125 - 092131.
Woods at 072145 - 075143 - 074141 - 071480 - 009141.

e. A German critique of the SALERNO landings distributed in January 1944 had the following comment to make:

"The combat worth of Americans and English is not too highly regarded. They have an obvious dislike of close in fighting and of hand-to-hand combat. They fear the M1 M2 and also mortars and Nebelwerfers. On the other hand, they do not know the meaning of terrain difficulties. Unfavorable terrain is, as it were, their specialty; as is also the excellent use of OPs for their army. Infantry combat patrolling is weak.

The attacks in larger numbers did not occur; at most 10 or 15 used as mobile AT guns, well camouflaged. In the attack single tanks accompany the inf until it has reached its objective, which soon takes place. AT weapons on the MLR are systematically fired upon before the attack.

American attacks are in general characterized by systematic recon and preparation, as well as by the intention to save lives by the increased employment of materiel. The objective is apparently always limited in range. Speedy exploitation of tactical successes has not yet occurred, although it was often possible.

Large expenditure of ammo usually with limited success (flat trajectory) long ranges. Heavy concentration before an attack. Effect on morale greater than material damage, particularly with limited fragmentation. Concentration of batteries under the protection of air superiority. (American) tanks draw fire intentionally, shoot usually without plan at 2000 - 2500 meters. Recognized AT weapons are taken on by army. Observers in arm cars. These arm cars are easily set on fire. The bagcocka (spelled Baccocka in the original) is an effective weapon. Characteristic of the Americans and British is their speedy overcoming of obstacles, which implies a good engineering and construction set-up.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Continue withdrawal to the east opposing our advance with delaying forces of infantry and/or armor.

(2) Counterattack.

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23 JUL 1945

b. Discussion:


Capability (2) is considered unlikely except for local attempts to slow up our advances. The enemy may well be expected to fight his way out should he become trapped, but an organized attempt on the part of forces remaining in the "pocket" to break through to the east through friendly lines as long as a route of withdrawal is still available to him is considered unlikely. Capability (1) is the most logical and the least costly to the enemy.

PW statements and unit identifications indicate that enemy intentions are to continue delay as long as possible, the delay being effected by armored and infantry elements, probably the 1st SS Pz, 9th Pz and the 708th Inf Divisions.

JACK A. HOUSTON,
Major, G.S.C.,
Asst AC of S, G-2.

DIST: No change.

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23 JUL 1945



G-2 FIELD REPORT RECORDS

Hqrs 9th Inf Div.
In the field.
172330 August 1944

No. 44.
Map: 4347, 1/25,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: Although the enemy held no definite line of defense he was resisting our advance from successive scattered strongpoints.

b. Units identified during period: August 17, 1944.

- *8th Co, 5th Inf Regt, 353rd Div.
- *2nd Tro, 510th Mobile Sq, 30th Mobile Brig.
- *9th Co, 91st Regt, 353rd Div.
- 2nd Co, 17th Engr. Bn, 17th SS Div.
- 4th Co, 84th Fusilier Bn, 84th Div.
- 3rd Co, 2nd SS Regt, 1st SS Div Adolf Hitler
- Hq 2nd Bn, 33rd Tk Regt, 9th Pz Div.
- 5th Co, 1st SS Tk Regt, 1st SS Div Adolf Hitler
- 220th Engr Bn, 21st Pz Div.

c. Additional information on units:

The units identified with an asterisk are attached to the 728th Regt, 708th Div, and are probably part of the Kampfgruppe PETRI, who is C.O. of the 3rd Bn, 728th Regt. This group was formed on or about August 6 near MAYENNE to defend that locality and to it were further added 2 bns of the 1708th Arty Regt and various fragments of units which appeared after the American breakthrough on August 2-3. The Kampfgruppe PETRI, though seriously lacking in transportation, communication equipment, and supporting arty was nevertheless not as disorganized as the identifications would indicate.

The Pz from the 1st SS Div were stragglers, their units having withdrawn 2 days ago.

The PWs from the 220th Engr Bn (trucking Co) were in the ammo dump at FROMENTEL which originally served the 21st Pz Div. They stated that on the 10th of August they loaded the last supplies for that division which was then withdrawn to the north. For 3 days previous to that date all mortar ammo was returned to the dump and sent to a dump farther to the rear, as the mortars had been largely destroyed from August 10 on the dump supplied SS units, until the afternoon of August 17. PWs stated that the 21st Pz had received 3 sets of replacements since the invasion.

Documents (forwarded to Corps) indicate that the bulk of the 9th Pz (minus the 33rd Regt) was not committed; nor was the 748th Regt though elements have been identified. A corps reserve was constituted August 7 with elements of the 748th Regt, 1 company of M4 Vs, 40 M4 Tvs, and a bn of Inf. This was at once sent to the NE of MAYENNE. The 1st Security Regt was likewise withdrawn from that sector and a Russian Bn, the Volksturm Bn-527th(?) was not deemed capable of combat and was detached from the 708th at CHESTON, and presumably sent to the interior.

A PW stated that on August 15 he saw the 2nd SS Regt withdraw in good order, with the majority of its equipment, to the NE.

A PW from the 2nd Btry, 74th Light Mtd AA Bn (37mm) said that his bn belonged to the 13th AA Div, which in turn belongs to the 15th AA Corps. Other units of this division are (according to the same PW) the 87, 89, 91, 93, 112 AA Bns. All units with numbers below 100 are mtd. PW was attached to the 9th Pz Div, presumably to those elements of the division forming part of the Kampfgruppe PETRI.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. The enemy was fighting a defensive action during the period using Nebelwerfers, mortars, 20mm, tks, SP guns, small arms, machine weapons, and arty, firing from positions which indicated a lack of coordinated effort. An exception was found in the groups of infantry supported by the RESTRICTED 113
of the seemingly loose pattern of defense, it was RESTRICTED 113

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23 JUL 1945

b. Arty fire was moderate to heavy during the period, coming from an estimated mixed bn of light arty and a btry of long range heavy guns.

c. An estimated 10' tks were active along the Division front during the period.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Prisoners state that they, a group of 70 men, were wandering around in the dark, stepped on an American soldier who was asleep, partly awakened him but he was not alarmed and went back to sleep. They then proceeded into a bivouac area where they were not discovered, and no alarm was given. They left the area again without once being challenged or suspected of being about (from Encl #2, G-2 Periodic Rpt #72, VII Corps).

b. Total PW taken during the period - 43.
Total PW taken since 2 August 1944 - 1002.

c. Analysis of the "Soldbuch" of ERNST JALO-METZKI: Soldier was born on 6 January 1917 at SCHOTTENAU, County of KATOWICE, Upper SILESIA. His home address is No. 4, Heutenstrasse, RUTENAU, County KATOWICE. He was inducted as a private at KATOWICE on 17 January 1942 and his ASN is 2nd Inf Trg Bn 360 #5425. His training center was the 2nd Inf Trg Bn 360 at STRASSBURG, ALSACE and he must have moved from that place to another on or around 6 February 1942, because he received iron rations on the before-mentioned date. He was then member of the 1st Med. Co, 320th Inf Div. From the 31st of May until the 17th of June 1942 he was on furlough. This unit must have been in combat because he was wounded and received the "Verwundetn Abzeichen" (Purple Heart) which he received on 28 April 1943. Other indications that he has been in combat and made a casualty are that he has been at a collection point and got paid there on 21 February 1943 at CRACOV. From there he was transferred to a hospital at BAD DOBERAU and was there from 28 February 1943 until 2 April 1943. Also received a partial pay there on 1 April 1943. Then he received a medical furlough from 2 April until 17 April 1943 and an extended medical furlough from 29 April until 12 May 1943. After his return he was dispatched to the 8th Medical Replacement Center at DRACHENBRONN resp. LOBEN, Upper SILESIA. There is also another indication that he was located there. From here he came to the 2nd Platoon, 572nd Ambulance Bn. He had another furlough from 11 November until 27 November 1943. On 1 February 1944, he obtained a promotion to the rank of Pfc. This promotion was still at the old unit as is noted on the bottom of page. His last unit 10th Co, 2nd Pz B. Regt, received its replacements from the 7th Med. Replacement Bn, stationed at MESSACH. The earliest entry of the 2nd Pz Gr. Regt. can be found on the clothing record on the 24th of March 1944.

The following analysis of a "soldbuch" indicates the amount of information that this document contains as a aid to identification, interrogation, and military movements, and demonstrates the importance of leaving the "soldbuch" (paybook) in the PW.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Small scattered groups of enemy may be encountered as our troops continue to advance to their final objectives.

ROBERT W. ROBB,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-2.

NOTE: No change.

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23 JUL 1945

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23 JUL 1945

G-2

20500 August 1944
22200 August 1944
Hqs 9th Inf Div.
In the field.
282200 August 1944.

No. 45.

Map: GSGS 4250, 1/50,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: No contact except for scattered groups of stragglers and those infiltrating from the west and north.

b. Defensive organization. (See Annex #1).

c. Units identified on Division front:

Hqs Co, 128th Regt, 48th Div.
1st, 2nd Bns, 128th Regt, 48th Div.
11800 AA Bn.
Todd Unit Berger.
2nd Bn, 195 Security Regt
1st, 2nd Bns, 196th Security Regt.

(These last two regts are now part of the Chittan Bn of the 352nd Div)

997 hv arty Bn.

d. Additional information of units in contact.

The 128th Regt, part of the 48th Div but temporarily attached to the 352nd Div, had the mission of defending the CORBEIL bridgehead to the last man, as of the 23 of August. Attached to the regiment were the 2nd Bn of the 1st Sicherungs Regt, Alarm Bns Wolf and Chittan, 11800 AA Bn. The 3rd Bn of the 128th Regt (an Armenian Bn) was not committed. On the 26th several of these units were given the order to withdraw during the hours of darkness to the north and east, to the neighborhood of RHEIMS. All that was left in the line, therefore, were the 1st and 3rd Bns of the 128th Regiment, 11,800 Anti-aircraft Battalion, The Battalion Chittan, and the 13th and 14th Cos of the 128th Regt. All other identifications should be considered as stragglers from the PARIS region or other sectors. It is evident that a certain system was maintained in the withdrawal, since field orders were issued every day giving reg'l and bn CPs.

The units which have been in this area and which have apparently moved to the east are the following:

127, 126th Regts, 48th Div.

997th hv Arty Bn.

3rd Bn, 128th Regt

An unidentified Luftwaffe unit, possibly of reg'l size, with the insignia: A white triangle in a blue ring.

1st Bn, 1st Sicherungs Regt.

1st, 2nd Bns, 102nd Armd Arty Regt (9th Pz Div)

The objective of at least one element of the 128th Regt was CHALONS-SUR-MARNE, and there is evidence that the 997th Arty Bn (which still possesses 13 of its twelve 152mm guns) has likewise withdrawn in that direction. RHEIMS is the center of ammo. and rations. The 997th arrived in FRANCE from DENMARK 5 days ago and operated in an anti-ak role. Civilians believe LAON, RHEIMS, MAILLY-CHALONS are points in a likely defense system.

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 23 JUL 1945

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

Scattered groups of enemy were offering slight resistance during the period. There was no apparent organized defensive or delaying plan on the part of the enemy. No fire other than small arms and automatic weapons was encountered.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. PWs taken during period - 398
 Total PWs taken to date - 21401.

b. A message from General SCHIMPF to his troops, dated August 14 is translated as follows:

"3rd Frecht. Div
 CG

Div. CP, 14 August 1944

To all soldiers of the 3rd Frecht. Div.

False rumors are the same as bad orders --

Both come from rear.

I have reason to point out that, contrary to all rumors coming from the rear areas to front line troops, there is no need to worry that the division might be encircled and cut off from its supply lines. Without being able to go into details on the situation, I want to point out that all rumors of this type are false. They must be considered enemy propaganda which are intended to demoralize us paratroopers.

The American or English Army capable of encircling and capturing our div. does not yet exist. Even if the enemy should ever succeed temporarily in interrupting our supply routes, this would be no reason for a paratrooper, who is specially trained to jump into the midst of the enemy, to feel depressed.

As certainly as the war will be won is the certainty that the glorious 3rd Frecht Div will never stop fighting, and therefore will do its duty, unvanquished, until the end of the war.

He who thinks or talks otherwise, will be slapped across the mouth.

/S/ SCHIMPF:"

(Source: V Corps)

c. Arrival of transport aircraft in the forward areas indicates that personnel of four Luftwaffe Gruppen are returning to the forward areas. There appears to be no lack of pilots, but the serviceability factor of aircraft has reduced the average strength of aircraft in each Gruppe to approx. one third normal strength. It is anticipated that when the airdromes outside of the PARIS area are reconquered, the scale of enemy air activity over forward areas and defiles will increase.

(AA-officer, 1st US Army)

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

Scattered groups of enemy may be encountered by the Division in its advance. No organized resistance is anticipated.

JACK A. HOUSTON,
 Major, U.S.C.,
 Actg. AC of S, G-2.

1597: 3-C, VII Corps	S-2, 39th Inf	G-5
G-2, 1st Div.	S-2, 4th Inf	37-Cage
G-2, 2nd Armd. Div.	S-2, 7th Inf	1st G.
G-2, 90th Div.	S-2, 8th Inf	115 (2)
G-2, 14th Cav. Gp.	CG, 5th Inf	
G-2, 899th TD Bn	Asst. Ch. of Staff	
S-2, 746th Tk Bn	C/S	

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 23 JUL 1945

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FROM: 082200 August 44

23 JUL 1945

G-2 ENEMY REPORT

Hqrs 9th Inf Div.
In the field.
292200 August 1944.

No. 16.

Map: GSGS 4250, 1/50,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line: No contact.

b. Defensive organization: There was evidence that a defensive line was being formed to the north of the AISNE River.

c. Units likely to be encountered:

128th Regt, 148th Div.
130th Pz Lehr Div (Rcn Ele)
902nd Regt, Pz Lehr Div.
190 Sicherungs Regt.
195th Sicherungs Regt.
196 Sicherungs Regt.
Ele of 352nd Div.
Ele of 9th Pz Div.

and Divers Landeschutzers Battalions, AA Bns, GHQ units, all part of Kampfgruppen Chitian, Wolf, and Berger. The arm'd divs are likely to be represented by rcn, AA, and AT ele having the mission of providing arty support for inf els.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD.

Omitted.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. VII Corps states that reports give the following info on V-2 projectile:

Weight - 1.2 tons, radio controlled; has an air burst of 50ft (detonates 50-ft. above ground) and has an effective radius of 3 kms from point of detonation. V-2 is reported to be put into use some time this week.

b. Civilians believe Germans intend to hold in the vic of SOISSONS, N of the AISNE River, attempting to bar the way to LAON.

c. Civilian population on highway N 8201 to N 9105. SOISSONS-LAON is being evacuated. Troops leaving CHATEAU THIERRY had orders to withdraw to LAON. In this area the road defenses are organized for MG fire. It is not known whether the area is mined.

d. Translation of German military publication among the leaflets which were scattered (by the Allies) in NORMANDY there were several with a remarkable tendency. The enemy attempts to cast doubt on the combat efficiency of the Ger. soldiers. Evidently these leaflets were prepared before the beginning of the campaign. It is strange that the enemy command allowed them to be dropped for it is maintained in these leaflets that on the German side "men either too old or too young for combat duty are fighting who six months ago were classified limited service". In another leaflet it is declared that the German forces are composed of "irretrievable foreign els. One is tempted to inquire why the Allies did not have greater success against supposedly old or too young or physically unfit and supposedly unreliable foreign units. The further progress of the battle in NORMANDY will be the best answer to these enemy leaflets.

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e. Document found by 1st Div 23 August shows following assembly points:

- 2nd Pz Div - CLERMONT (2625)
- 21st Pz Div - CREIL (S 1886)
- 116 Pz Div - ESTREES ST. DENIS (N 3004)
- 9th Pz Div - CREPT and COMPIEGNE
- 21st Pz was to withdraw NE to LASSIGNY (N 4020) by August 30.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can (1) attempt delay of our advances along a general SW line N of the AISNE River. (2) withdraw behind the West Wall of GERMANY (3) counterattack.

b. Discussion.

It is believed that the enemy has a two-fold plan; First, to defend the Channel coast and the pilotless aircraft sites, and second to interdict the lowland avenue of approach to GERMANY. In order to put this plan into effect he will attempt to protect his forces engaged in the defense of the Channel from being outflanked from the E. There is evidence of a considerable movement of troops (4 arm'd divs) to the NE. It would appear likely that this force is not primarily retreating due E to the VOGES-MAGINOT line but is protecting the left flank of the Channel army, and that when it is compelled to withdraw it will do so in a northerly direction, to join forces once more with the Channel army in eastern BELGIUM, attempting to delay in the ARDENNES and making a final stand in the LIEGE GAP, the classic entry to GERMANY itself. The LORRAINE approach to GERMANY is defended by the rugged terrain, the defenses constructed there and by units recently brought from GERMANY reinforced in time by those divisions withdrawing from the S before the advancing 7th U.S. Army (capability (1))

Withdrawal behind the West Wall (capability (2)) before FLANDERS and the lowlands had proved untenable, and before the ARDENNES had been exploited would be an admission of defeat and the likelihood of an early battle of GERMANY. Capability (3) is not deemed likely although there is evidence of an arm'd concentration developing in the LAON-SOISSON-CHALONS area. Their mobility and effectiveness could best be used in a delaying role.

JACK A. HOUSTON,
Major, G.S.C.,
Actg AC of S, G-2.

DIST: w/c

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23 JUL 1945

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

302200 August 1944
312200 August 1944Hqrs 9th Inf Div.
In the field.
312200 August 1944.

No. 47.

Map: OSGS 4250, 1/50,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines: The enemy held no line at the end of the period. Light resistance from scattered infantry and tks was being encountered.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General: The enemy was attempting to impede our progress with the use of scattered infantry supported by mortars, arty. Road blocks near strategic junctions and along main routes were being encountered and there was evidence of hastily laid mines.

b. Tanks: An estimated 10 tks and a few armd cars were reported operating along the front during the period.

c. Arty fire was rptd falling sporadically in the vic of MONT CORNET (3228)

d. Mines were rptd to have been laid around rd blocks and at road junctions

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. A letter and note were left by a German soldier in the hands of a civilian, to be given to the first American who appeared. The letter was addressed to the parents of the German, in NEW YORK CITY, expressing the hope that he would see them soon again, that AMERICA would win the war; adding as an after-thought that if ENGLAND were to invade HOLLAND the war would be over even sooner.

The note accompanying the letter, and addressed to the Americans, read as follows:

"352nd Div is smashed, will be reconstructed in GERMANY or HOLLAND. In this area (near CHATEAU THIERRY) only the service elements remain.

65% - Russian conscripts
German-Americans
German-Poles.

All want to fight on the American side. 352nd Div was smashed in 3 days" (presumably in June near LESSAY).

b. The 70th Inf Div, according to documents, was originally the 165th Mobilization and Training Div. It was upgraded to its present status effective August 1, 1944. It contains the 1018th Inf Regt, 1019th Inf Regt, 1020th Inf Regt, 170th Arty Regt. 170th is presumably the auxiliary number. Its estimated strength as of August 27 was 11,500.

c. PWs processed during period: 116.

d. Civilian and PW reports indicate that considerable inf has withdrawn to SEDAN and the N with no intention of halting before NAMUR; that armd elements on the other hand are withdrawing generally BRUNHEMEL, AUBENTON, HIRSON; its rearguard mission accomplished.

e. Weather Forecast from 30 August to 3 Sept. Unsettled weather over southern FRANCE. 30-31 August, clouds broken to overcast. Cloud bases 2000 to 3000 ft. Intermittent rain becoming continuous light rain and frontal systems moving east. Clouds breaking during night. Visibility becoming poor at dawn and early morning. 1-2-3 Sept. - broken clouds in afternoon with light rain showers in northern sector and channel coast. Clouds becoming nil at night. Visibility poor in early morning.

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f. PW rpt for period 291800 - 311800: Total number of PWs - 100.

Captured by: 47th Inf - 17 690th PA - 14
 39th Inf - 39 297th Engr - 6
 4th Cav - 4 units unknown - 20

Units identified: Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 12th SS Arty Regt, 5th SS Arty Trng Div.
 2nd Bn, 901st Mtzd Inf, Pz Lehr Div. Div.
 2nd Bn, 902nd Mtzd Inf, Pz Lehr Div.
 2nd Co, 130th Ren Bn, Pz Lehr Div.
 2nd Bn, 10th Mtzd Inf, 9th Armd Div.
 1st Bn, 11th Mtzd Inf, 9th Armd Div.
 2nd Co, 85th Sig Bn, 9th Armd Div.
 Hq Co, 21st Ren Bn, 21st Armd Div.
 2nd Bn, 128th Inf, 48th Div.
 11th Co, 128th Inf, 48th Div.
 4th Btry, 11800 AA Bn, ZBV
 Hq Btry, 11800 AA Bn, ZBV
 3rd Bn, 302nd Air Force Sig Trng Regt.
 1st Alarm Bn, Supreme Comdr West
 Security Platoon, High Comdr of SOS (Nachhubtruppen)

6.

Organization Todt "Firm Hubert Iven".
 Organization Todt "Firm Armbruster".

(1) PWs from 5th Co, 901st Mtzd Inf, Pz Lehr Div, said that they had received orders on 27 August to proceed to SOISSONS in small units from a point 22 kms SW of that city. They were told that the Div was going to BELGIUM for reorganization.

(2) PWs from 1st Alarm Bn, Supreme Comdr West said that their bn was formed from stragglers and discharged hospital cases from the 77th, 91st, 243rd and 352nd Divs.

(3) 3 PWs from Security platoon, Higher Comdr SOS troops 6 (HöH Kdr D Nachschubtrp 6 Sicherungszug) said that their platoon consisted of 80 men who had formerly been Landesmilizen personnel. Most of the men were those whose honour had been declared forfeited (entlassen) for anti-nazi actions. Unit was formed 8 weeks ago under command of 2nd Lt. Fischer, a one legged veteran of RUSSIA. Was ordered to move to ROCHEFORT, BELGIUM and left 25 August, leaving 3 damaged vehicles behind. PWs had sabotaged their truck as pretext for remaining behind.

(4) 2 PWs from MG Qlbator, captured via ROZOY, grid square 4029, by 60th Inf. 1 from Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 12th SS Arty Regt, Hitler Jugend. 1 from 5th SS Arty trng and Replacement Regt. Mission was to fight delaying action. Saw 2 Mk IV tks in support. One destroyed by fire from our tks this AM. Tks were from SS Hitler Jugend and PWs were told that two additional tks were in support but did not see them. They also saw 2 50mm AT towed guns in support. PWs were commandeered for this combat team yesterday. Believe it has 200 to 300 men. Direction of withdrawal was BRUNS-HAMEL, grid square 3644.


4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can:

- (1) Withdraw to the N, attempting to slow our advance by a rear guard action.
- (2) Fight a stubborn delaying action.
- (3) Counterattack.

b. Discussion:

Withdrawal to the N is indicated by PW statements, civilian info, and documentary evidence. It is believed that he is incapable of organizing a strong defense prior to reaching the Belgian border. He will attempt to gain time by using road blocks and mines and by using a limited number of tks and AT guns. (capability 1). If he believes that he needs more time for preparation of defense to the N he may commit an increased number of tks and inf and attempt a strong delaying action, risking the possibility of being overrun or cut off (capability 2). Counterattack from armd ele is a possibility although not considered likely. It appears that very little inf is left in the area and that armor of the 10th Pz, 9th Pz and Hitler Jugend divs may be encountered.



312200 August 14h
012200 September 14h

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

Hqrs 9th Inf Div.
In the field.
012200 September 1944

No. 48.

Map: GSGS, 1/50,000, FRANCE.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front lines: - Enemy identified at SIGNY, ST. JEAN AUX BOIS, LIART; contacted at RULIGNY, AUBENTON, ORIGNY, VERDUN. Between these points the line was fluid.

b. See IPW Report (Attached).

c. Additional Information on units.

(1) The mobile units in contact with the Division during the day were in most cases elements of the 2nd SS Div, Hitler Jugend, to whom were attached for tactical and administrative purposes a variety of inf units. By far the larger part of these (SS as well as Wehrmacht) seem to have come directly from a replacement center at HIRSON, also their center of supply. Another large enemy element was the regimental combat team von FRITSCHEN, a unit of some 2,300 men with a rcn ele of 200 men, and its main body at CHARLEVILLE. The enemy stragglers which have appeared within the Division area should be accounted as remnants of a previous withdrawal to SEDAN, and not as having been committed in this sector.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General: In the Division sector the enemy offered stubborn resistance at isolated spots along the THON River to prevent or delay our crossing, and our eventual cutting of the highway from LIART to HIRSON. Mortar, Nebelwerfer, and some long range arty, in addition to small arms fire, was encountered. Isolated elements were encountered in woods by the 39th. Toward evening resistance was overcome at ORIGNY and at AUBENTON. Enemy patrolling with arm half-tracks and light tks was active at CHAULIOTT and SIGNY L'ABDAYE, where reinforcements were reported.

b. Tanks: An estimated two companies of med tks and 10 or more armd cars were active along the front during the period. Tks and armd cars worked together in run, heavier tks acting as arty from concealed posns, and half-tracks serving as troop carriers. Mortar fire observed was doubtless from half-tracks.


c. Arty: Long range arty fire was falling on AUBENTON.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Civilian and PW reports indicate that a steady stream of enemy forces from ST. QUENTIN and IAON (to the SW) has gone toward HIRSON during the last 4 days. HIRSON has been reported as the assembly area for the 1st SS and 12th SS Div, but men of the 1st SS have frequently asked the way to MONS and beyond, indicating that HIRSON will not be defended by these units. At HIRSON there appears to be a considerable supply of vehicles and AT guns, as well as of rations and equipment.

b. The Belgian equivalent of the FFI is the so-called "Armees Blanches" which is organized with a cadre of regular army personnel.

c. PWs processed during period: 40.



4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. The enemy can:

- (1) Withdraw to the N, attempting to arrest our advance.
- (2) Fight a stubborn delaying action.
- (3) Counterattack.

b. Discussion:

With the break in the HIRSON-SIGNY line of road blocks and outposts, the enemy will have difficulty in maintaining unity. Along the front he is likely therefore to operate in two groups with two distinct missions. The first group composed of elements of the 2nd SS Div Hitler Jugend with attached tanks and assorted infantry support, now in the vic of AURENTON 6643 will probably attempt to withdraw to HIRSON and continue a delaying action of limited effectiveness to the N. The advance of friendly elements on our left makes any prolonged stand at HIRSON 3853 unlikely. The second group, S of AURENTON, and of less immediate concern to the Division would have little choice but to withdraw in the direction of CHARLEVILLE along with the forward elements of the regimental combat group Von FRITSCHEN, now at SIGNY 6127. The plight of those SS units whose base of supply and replacement is at HIRSON is the most serious, and they can be counted on to withdraw to the N and E as soon as HIRSON is in our hands. It is still unlikely that a major counter offensive will be attempted.

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Actg AC of S, G-2.

DIST: n/c

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HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of AG of S, G-2
APO #9

31 August 1944.

TACTICAL STUDY OF THE TERRAIN

Maps: Reference GSGS 10G and 11G.

1. This study is an analysis of the terrain in the region MELUN-COULOMBIERS-CHALONS SUR MARNE - MEAUX - PARIS.

2. General Topography of the Area.

a. Drainage System.

(1) The SEINE River, one of two principal rivers in the area, flows to the NW through PARIS, through a wide and shallow valley. The slopes on either side of the river are frequently wooded.

(2) The YERRES River flows east to west, emptying into the SEINE. The banks are gradual and wooded. It affords no real obstacle.

(3) The MORIN River flows generally to the W/NW through the area, emptying into the MARNE River, about 4 miles SW of MEAUX. From this point, the MARNE and MORIN are joined with the SEINE by an east-west canal. The banks are fairly steep on both sides of the river.

(4) The MARNE River flows generally east to west into the SEINE. The banks are gentle. The river is about 100 yds wide, forming an obstacle to movement, to foot troops as well as vehicles.

(5) The MARNE and the SEINE Rivers are easily approached, although their widths will hinder crossing and make bridging a large-scale undertaking.

b. Ridge System.

(1) Ridge lines run generally south-east to north-west. One such line runs from MORLAIX (4313) to PARIS. This is very gradual, rising from about 80 meters at the SEINE to the ridge which is 100 to 110 meters in height.

(2) A plateau running from E/SE to W/NW reaches a height of 180 meters. The plateau falls away to the south, west, and north quite rapidly.

(3) From the SEINE the country is gently rolling, rising from about 35 meters at the river to 80 meters at the beginning of the plain to 126 meters at the MORIN River, falling away sharply to the river and rising again to 170 meters some 7 miles E/SE of MEAUX. The high ground continues to the MARNE River.

c. Routes.

(1) The road network does not lend itself to SW-NE traffic, since the highways converge at PARIS. MELUN however, is a communication center, and from that town roads lead to the NW, N, and NE. The country offers few terrain features of difficult passage, and roads are numerous in the area.

3. Military Aspects of the Terrain.

a. Roads provide axial supply lines throughout the sector, although their general direction is not that of the advance. However, sufficient secondary roads are available which allow for liberal road movement.

b. Obstacles.

(1) The SEINE and MARNE Rivers are natural obstacles in our movement to the NE. Should crossings be destroyed, it would be a bridging job of considerable size. The rivers are not fordable.

(2) The river MORIN will hinder vehicular movement, and bridging of it must be considered.

(3) The land surface generally favors movement of mechanized units, the rivers offering the only real obstacles. Unsurfaced roads would be muddy during rainy spells.

c. Observation and fields of fire.

The terrain is naturally broken into compartments by rolling hills and valleys. Observation generally is good, being restricted by forests which cover about one quarter of the area. Excellent fields of fire are afforded throughout.

d. Concealment and Cover.

(1) Concealment in the area is limited. The land rises generally towards the objective, favoring enemy observation. Cover is afforded by numerous patches of woods and two large forests, the FORET DE SAILLET and the FORET D'ARRE-INVILLIERS, although the approaches to the woods are, in most cases, open to enemy observation.

(2) Main highways are frequently lined with trees on both sides affording limited cover.

4. Critical Terrain Features.

a. The most important terrain feature in the area is a combination of the MELUN River together with the Plateau land to the N of the river. The restriction afforded by the river itself plus the observation possible from favorable terrain makes it a likely area for defense by the enemy.

b. The fields of fire and routes of withdrawal along with, in some cases, dominating terrain of the covered area, make the woods and forest definite obstacles should they be defended.

5. Tactical Effects of the Terrain.

The terrain lends itself to a delaying action from the SEINE River to the MARNE. The dominating terrain in the area is southeast of LEAUX and south of the MARNE River. The characteristic gradual rise towards the objective coupled with ample cover running roughly east and west across the area about half-way to the objective provides an excellent delaying line with covered routes of withdrawal to the most dominating ground which lies immediately south of the objective.



HEADQUARTERS NERVE-INFORMAL DIVISION
Office of AC of S, G-2
AFO #9

31 August 1944.

TACTICAL STUDY OF THE TERRAIN
(from Tactical Study of the Terrain, Hq VII Corps, dtd 17 July 1944)

Maps: GSGS 2738 Sheets 3A and B
4249 Sheets 6F and G
4250 Sheets 5F/2 and 6F/1, 6F/2, 5F/4 and 5 F/6, 6F/3, 6F/9, 5F/6, 6F/6

1. This study is an analysis of the terrain in the area ST. LO - LESSAY - AVRANCHES - DOLFRONT.

2. General Topography of the Area.

a. Drainage System.

(1) The VIRE River. This river flowing north into the BAIE DE LA SEIN near ISIGNY is a controlling terrain feature throughout its length between the towns of VIRE and ST. LO by reason of its width of 20 to 100 feet, and the steepness of its walls between STE MARIE LAUMONT (6341) and ST. LO.

(2) The TAUTE River - This presents no great problems in this area. Its tributaries tend to divide the isthmus between the VIRE and the TAUTE into roughly north-south corridors.

(3) The AY River. The east-west stretch of this river being over twenty feet wide, tends to channelize seriously the southern advance of the VIII Corps in the already narrow corridor between LESSAY and PERIERES.


(4) The SOULLE River - This joins the SIENNE River near COUTANCES. It presents no barrier because of its width, but does by reason of the steep slopes of its valley.

(5) The SIENNE River - This river flows generally north except in its middle area; between GOSSELIN (2444) and SOURDEVAL-LES-BOIS (3641) and in its upper area east of VILLEDIEU-LES-POELES. It runs between steep valley walls.

(6) The AIROU River - This river flows north near the western edge of the area for approximately the same distance that the upper portion of the SIENNE north in the west-central part. The AIROU likewise flows between steep valley walls.

(7) The SEE River - This river flows due west across the area, empty into the Channel at AVRANCHES. It is at least 20 feet wide for some 20 miles in from the coast but does not constitute the barrier which the valley walls make of the rivers previously mentioned.

(8) The SELUNE River - This river flows generally west-northwest and empties into the Channel near the mouth of the SEE. Being at most points over 200 feet wide from the vicinity of ST HILAIRE DU HARCQUET to its mouth, both because of its natural width at its mouth and because of a dam near LES DOUETS (3507) which backs up a large volume of water in a steep valley, it forms a considerable barrier except for the stretch between LES DOUETS and DUCHEY, where it is less than 60 feet wide and has flat banks.



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b. Ridge System.

(1) The high ground running north from Hill 112 (3963) northeast of MARIIGNY. This has a long north-south spur, running east of the Highway from TRIBEHOU to MARIIGNY.

(2) The east-west ridge at MARIIGNY. On the east, in the area immediately west of TORIGNI SUR VIRE and south of the tributary of the VIRE flowing by TORIGNI, there is a point where gradual banks on both sides of the VIRE facilitates a crossing of this river, provided that adjacent dominant high ground can be captured or neutralized. A southeastern spur running to the east of the north-south stretch of the SOULLE River permits an approach to PERCY along high ground.

(3) The plateau south and west of the SOULLE River. If enemy forces could be contained here during a southward advance along the high ground to PERCY, mentioned in Par (2), they could be readily prevented by our forces in PERCY from withdrawing to the south.

(4) Other important hill masses near PERCY are those (a) between the AIROU and the SIENNE Rivers, and (b) to the east and southeast of PERCY.

(5) Two further east-west ridges south of the above hill masses are those (a) between the upper reaches of the SIENNE River and the SEE and (b) between the SEE and the SELUNE Rivers.

c. Routes.

(1) Highways. The principal highways in this area are those from ST. LO to VIRE on the east, LESSAY via COUTANCES and GRANVILLE to AVRANCHES to the west, and the transverse roads between AVRANCHES and CAEN (via VILLEDIEU LES POELES). In general, a good network of roads, apart from these highways, covers this area. Most of these could be designated as one-way roads to expedite traffic circulations.

(2) Railroads - Important double track lines connect COUTANCES and AVRANCHES, and GRANVILLE and VIRE. These lines run together for several miles near FOLLIGAY 2532. Single track lines join COUTANCES with ST LO, AVRANCHES with DOMFRONT, and ST LO with VIRE and MORTAIN. Narrow gauge lines connect this last line with TESSY, PERCY, GAVRAY, GRANVILLE, and AVRANCHES.

d. General Nature of the Terrain.

See Tactical Study of the Terrain, Hqs VII Corps, 20 June 1944, on the area CARENTAN - PERIERS - GAVRAY - PERCY for general remarks applicable to this whole region as to conformation of the terrain, characteristics of roads and streams, camouflage and concealment. This study will discuss only specific terrain features of the area under consideration; this area is composed largely of hill country.

3. Military Aspects of the Terrain.

a. Roads. The roads in the area are adequate to support movement of the Corps; their number will permit an easy selection of main and alternate supply routes.

b. Railroads. It is not believed that the enemy will leave the railroads in areas in such state as to permit of their use in time.



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c. Obstacles:

(1) The east-west high ground near FARIGNY. This provides a barrier against an advance to the south, but, once taken, also provides a corridor for an advance to COUTANCES. The southwestern spur of this ridge south and west of the SIENNE River near COUTANCES would hinder to some degree a coastal advance to the south.

(2) The VIRE River and the high ground along its banks. This forms a protective east-west barrier for a north to south movement and a difficult problem to solve in the case of a west to east movement.

(3) The valley of the SOULLE River. This provides a natural barrier diagonally across the north central portion of the area.

(4) The high ground in the immediate vicinity of PERCY. This could be used by the enemy to delay an advance on PERCY east of the SOULLE.

(5) The plateau south and west of the SOULLE River. This would greatly delay troops having to fight their way across this area against enemy forces determined to make the most of its defensive possibilities.

(6) The steep scarps and river walls along the east-west stretch of the VIRE River north of STE MARIE LAUMONT (6344). This region is a definite barrier to military movement across it in any direction.

(7) The east-west ridges (a) between the upper reaches of the SIENNE and the SEE and (b) between the SEE and SELUNE. These constitute barriers to forces driving south, the southernmost being the most pronounced barrier. The SEE River, while not a barrier in itself, accentuates the defensive possibilities of (b).

(8) The SELUNE River. This forms a considerable barrier to southward movement in the area described in Par 2 a (8). However, it could also serve to protect a reorganization of forces on the high ground to the north, or to protect the southern flank of an advance to the east at this point.

(9) The headwaters and the tributaries of the VARENNE River east of MORDAIN. The steep banks of these streams form a number of minor barriers in this area.

d. Enemy Works. Enemy works located in the area to date consist chiefly of road blocks, trenches, various temporary field arty, machine-gun, and anti-aircraft installations, obstacles and inland strong points, supply dumps and vehicle bays. The principal organized areas appear to be the high ground south of the TAUTE River, and towns of ST LO, TORIGNI, LESSAY, and GRANVILLE.

4. Critical Terrain Features.

a. The high ground running north from Hill 112, (3963). Enemy forces in possession of this ridge would make impossible any advance south along the TRIBENOU - MARIGNY road.

b. The east-west high ground at FARIGNY. Possession of this area is a prerequisite to a successful push east, south, or west from the present VII Corps area.

c. The stretch of VIRE River west of TORIGNI where the banks are gradual. This, together with the adjacent ridges dominating it, constitutes a gateway for extending a successful thrust in the present VII Corps area over into the present XIX Corps area, capturing TORIGNI, and cutting off ST LO from the road.

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d. COUTANCES. The possession of this key coastal communication center by friendly troops would isolate the enemy strong points of LESSAY and PERIERS.

e. TORIGNI SUR VIRE. This is a communications center controlling the network of roads south of ST LO; its possession by us would seriously menace the enemy hold on that town.

f. The town of VILLEDIEU-LES-POELES. Forces in possession of this town could control the road net in the center of the area. It would provide a good base for further operations to the south or east.

g. The town of VIRE. This is a similar road center in the area to the east of the present VII Corps area.

h. Granville. While this is an important coastal strongpoint, it could be safely bypassed and isolated.

i. The two east-west ridges south of VILLEDIEU, mentioned in Par. 2 b (5) successively become critical terrain features as the advance reaches each in turn.

j. AVRANCHES. Possession of this town and the adjacent coastal area, particularly to the southwest, is a prerequisite to a westward land thrust into BRITANNY from the NORMANDY beachhead.

k. MORTAIN. This town being a road and rail center and also being located on commanding ground, would be extremely useful as a base for operation to the south or east from that point, or as position from which to protect the flank of a push to the east.

l. DOUFRONT. This is a key rail and road center at the southeastern corner of the area, and as such would be a desirable base for further operations, to the east or south.

5. Tactical Effect of the Terrain.

Every effort should be made to secure as a first major objective the east-west ridge at LARIGNY. Further operations to the south should follow the axes COUTANCES-AVRANCHES and LARIGNY - PERCY - VILLEDIEU - GATHEFO (5623) - MORTAIN. The western force should push as far to the west along the two southern ridges as the Corps boundary then in effect will permit. Thrusts to the east could be made via TORIGNY, VIRE or DOUFRONT, depending on how close an envelopment of enemy force on the east of the present VII Corps zone is desired.

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UNIT	KILLED			DIED OF WOUNDS			MISSING IN ACTION			WOUNDED IN ACTION			TOTALS		
	IN ACTION			OF WOUNDS			IN ACTION			IN ACTION			TOTALS		
	OFF	EM	TOT	OFF	EM	TOT	OFF	EM	TOT	OFF	EM	TOT	OFF	EM	TOT
82d Co.															
92d Sig. Co.					1	1					1	1		1	1
92d Regt. Inf.	2	2	4		1	1	2	2	4	1	5	6	3	10	13
92d M. Co.															
702nd Ord Co.										2	18	16	2	18	20
15th Med. Bn.		4	4								1	1		1	1
9th Med. Bn.															
19th Inf.	3	81	84		10	10	49	49	98	24	820	844	27	550	577
47th Inf.	4	115	119	2	12	14	1	1	2	24	434	436	31	542	573
50th Inf.	12	146	158	1	13	14	2	15	17	15	604	619	50	726	746
Div. Arty.		3	3								2	2		6	6
26th FA Bn.											4	4		4	4
14th FA Bn.															
60th FA Bn.	1	1	2							3	3	6	4	4	8
41st FA Bn.										1	1	1	1	1	1
82nd Trns.		1	1											1	1
MP Flt.											1	1		1	1
DIVISION															
TOTAL	23	351	374	3	15	18	2	17	19	90	1471	1561	118	1949	2067

NOTE: In addition to above figures, 8 officers and 158 enlisted men were dropped as injured in action.

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PRISONERS OF WAR

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DATE	OFF	NOO'S	PYTS	TOTALS
AME. 2	1	6	38	45
3	1	1	19	20
4	1	2	44	46
5	1	5	92	97
6	1	6	79	85
7	1	21	116	138
8	1	1	29	32
9	1	1	8	8
10	1	13	73	87
11	1	1	47	48
12	1	1	8	9
14	1	1	30	31
15	1	19	136	156
16	5	11	141	157
17	1	1	42	45
18	1	3	17	21
19	1	1	1	2
27	4	58	221	284
28	4	31	141	176
29	1	10	95	106
30	1	19	55	77
31	1	11	74	86
TOTALS	23	225	1508	1756

REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED AND CASUALS RETURNED TO DUTY

DATE	REPLACEMENTS			RETURNED FROM HOSPITAL		
	OFF	EM	TOTAL	OFF	EM	TOTAL
AME. 2	2	1	3	1	1	2
3	6	1	7	1	1	2
4	1	52	53	1	17	17
5	1	1	2	1	89	91
6	1	14	15	1	17	18
8	14	1431	1445	1	184	185
9	1	1	2	1	110	112
10	10	1	11	2	151	153
11	14	250	264	2	21	23
12	10	1	10	5	43	48
13	15	85	101	1	197	198
15	1	1	2	1	1	2
16	14	238	252	1	1	2
17	5	10	15	1	1	2
18	1	1	2	1	10	11
19	5	190	195	1	26	27
20	1	2	3	1	155	156
21	1	12	13	1	1	2
22	1	12	13	1	1	2
23	1	16	17	1	1	2
24	1	1	2	1	1	2
25	1	1	2	1	7	9
TOTALS	97	1315	1412	18	1089	1107

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ANNEX # Lessons Learned

Infantry

1. Infantry - Tank - Tank Destroyers. It has been found that operations can be speeded up by using tanks and tank destroyers as transport by riding infantry thereon, and good results have been obtained by this method.

2. Tanks and Tank Destroyers. To get the maximum use of tanks and tank destroyers in the attack, it has been found that they must be employed well forward with the leading infantry elements and dispersed in a formation permitting the tank destroyers to cover the advance of the tanks. In this connection, tanks are used in front of tank destroyers so that maximum value can be obtained from their forward machine guns.

3. 4.2 inch mortar. The 4.2 inch mortar proved a valuable weapon. Due to its relatively short range, it is suggested that its displacement forward be rapid and frequent so that a rapid advance of the front line will not leave it out of range. It is strongly recommended that a 4.2 mortar battalion of three companies be made an organic part of infantry divisions.

4. Hedgerow fighting. In hedgerow country the best results were obtained by using all automatic weapons and small arms to spray the hedgerows and cover every possible position of the enemy.

Artillery

1. When marking targets with colored smoke for bombing missions the A.O.P. has been used to advantage to report the density, effectiveness, and the drifting of the smoke.

2. Displacements have been expedited by sending forward with the battalion reconnaissance party a single piece which is registered in the new position prior to the displacement of the battalion.

3. The A.O.P. in contact with Liaison Officers and Forward Observers had assisted in giving these officers information of the terrain ahead of them, the forward elements of friendly troops, and location of enemy personnel and tanks.


4. A system has been adopted for the "general support" A.O.P. to work directly with tank destroyers of the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached to this Headquarters. (See Par. 5 below - extract from Division Artillery SOP)

Each Tank Destroyer has a channel which allows the Tank Destroyer to work on the Artillery Air-Ground Channel. Each company commander "listens in" on the Air-Ground net during the hours of daylight. When the A.O.P. spots a tank destroyer target he calls "Hello 99" tank at (coordinates). The company commander in this zone answers the call and notifies the platoon concerned of the target. The platoon commander checks in on the A-G net and has the 4 tank destroyers of the platoon listen in. The platoon concerned then reverses the identification panels on the tank destroyers, that are to engage the target, for identification by the A.O.P. The A.O.P. then works with the platoon commander of the tank destroyers concerned and assists the tank destroyers by keeping them informed of the movement of the target. This procedure is of great assistance in engaging tanks that are too close to the infantry for artillery fire.

The Division Artillery Air OP Detachment will be under the command of the Division Artillery Air OP Officer. It will consist of a Command Group and five (5) Air OP Sections. These will be designated as the 26th, 60th, 81th, and Division Artillery Sections.

Communications

1. Laying Wire in Hedgerow Country.



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a. During operations in hedgerow ("cocage") country, telephone lines went out many times due to improper laying of wire. Wire laid along the narrow roads was frequently torn out by trucks and tracked vehicles. To reduce the amount of line trouble, it was ordered that all lines laid in the Division must be placed on top and in back of hedges and trees.

b. Before this order was issued, breaks in lines occurred from four to six times a day. Since the new method was introduced, there have been no more than two or three cases a day on each line.

2. Improvised Antenna for SCR-300.

a. During recent operations in France replacements for the AN-130-A were scarce and a number of SCR-300 were inoperative. To remedy this situation an aerial was improvised which proved to be able to operate under similar conditions as the AN-130-A.

b. The improvised aerial was constructed by soldering to the original base of the AN-130-A a length of French transmission wire gauge #8 or #10 equal in size to the original antenna. To support the transmission wire on the base, seizing wire was wound two inches above and below the joint and then soldered.

3. Wire Communication in Fast Moving Situations.

a. With the collapse of enemy resistance to our front, the Division made daily advances varying from 15 to 75 miles. This situation was beyond the capabilities of the Division personnel and equipment to maintain continuous wire communication. Although wire communication was utilized to the utmost, command control was exercised mainly through radio facilities.

b. The Division Command Post was moved by bounds and a wire net installed each day. The location was established several hours prior to opening. Extensive road reconnaissance was carried out at the first opportunity so that when the Division Command Post was located, sufficient information was at hand to intelligently and quickly order the construction of the wire net. Every available mile of French Commercial wire and power lines was utilized. To cite one example: one day 70 miles of operating circuits was installed with only 12 miles of field wire. The net was completed in slightly less than 5 hours.

c. Experience showed that it was best to dead end circuits at each end of villages and lay field wire through the town. This eliminated the need of cutting numerous lead-ins to the buildings and the PTT exchanges. It also saved time.

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