



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

Bachelor Degree Project

Domestic Unrest and External Conflict:

*Understanding the annexation of Crimea and the
Falkland Island through the diversionary war
theory*

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Abstract

The use of external conflict to guard against growing domestic unrest by mobilizing the population has been a key strategy used by leaders to solve their domestic unrest's. The aim of this paper is to understand the annexation of Crimea and Falkland Island through the lenses of diversionary war theory. The role of political, economic, social, regional and international factors in the two annexations had been considered. It is concluded that these factors have contributed the process of the two annexations and the decisions made. By comparing the two annexations cases within the scope of four aspects chosen for this study; political, economic, social, regional and international responses, through the lenses of the diversionary war theory this thesis aims to understand if the two annexations could be understood as diversionary conflicts. Each of the annexations were studied separately through the lenses of the diversionary war theory. The research have presented strong evidence that the annexations were carried out on diversionary objective to settle social unrest's. On the other side through our findings Russian annexation in Crimea could be understood as having pure political strategy since the case of NATO had been pointed out. Both cases were studied separately through the lenses of the diversionary war theory and then summarized answering the research questions.

Keywords: Annexation, Diversionary, Falkland Island, Crimea,

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1 Introduction

Annexation had always been an interesting subject in the field of International Relations. The history of annexation had been discussed and viewed by many academics that annexations might have many objectives. However, the first annexation occurred early in the 1800s. For example, in 1910 Japan carried out forced annexation by occupying Korea (See-hwan, 2015: 9-12). There are also many other annexation cases around the world that occurred under different circumstances. From 1949 many annexations have occurred in the world. Examples of such annexations are the United States occupation of the Dominican Republic, the Iraq annexation in Kuwait, and East Timor annexation by Indonesia (Fazal, 2007, 2011: 8). Last known annexation is Russia's annexation at the Crimea.

Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 had been seen as an event that marked a new chapter of geopolitical calculation. This was the first time since after the second world war that in some part of Europe a sovereign state had been annexed and forcefully occupied. The annexation of Crimea had been seen as a new geopolitical move by the Russian state of re-beginning to re-draw borders in its former USSR members (Ainis, 2015: 125). The Crimean annexation had been politicized by the Russian state pushing a controversial referendum of Crimea secession from Ukraine and re-uniting with the Russian state. Russia have been seen as being a great facilitator of the referendum in Crimea which has resulted a majority of Crimean population to vote for its secession from Ukraine and willingly integrating and joining Russia. After the controversial vote in the Crimea, Russia took military action by occupying forcefully in the Ukrainian territory. Russian action had been analyzed and understood from different angles by different scholars in the field of International Relations. One major reason that was put forward was Russia having political motives and aiming to create a new political strategy both in the regional and international level. (Wilson, 2016: 2-5).

1.1 Research Problem

The use of external conflict to divert against growing domestic unrest's by mobilizing the population has been a key strategy used by leaders to make situations stable and solve their domestic unrest's (Oakes, 2012: 15). However, academia research done on this phenomenon had mainly focused and explained annexation from the point of only having an occupation objective. Similarly, the objectives of states foreign policies outside of its national security interest has been a field that limited research had been done on (ibid). For this reason, it is worth studying the concept of how domestic unrest's can shape the foreign policy of states. This is an interesting area of research in the field of International relations on understanding on how states domestic policies could shape these states annexation decisions to be taken. The central concept and the most debated concept is if domestic unrest's can shape the foreign policy of states.

1.2 Research Objective and Research Questions

What makes states to annex sovereign states has been researched by several scholars, but most scholars understood annexations as only having the objective of occupation. Nevertheless, annexations might have different objectives.

In light of this, this study aims to compare two annexation cases by focusing what has made these states to take the decision of annexing sovereign states. Through the lenses of diversionary war theory this study aims to understand the annexations of the Falkland Islands and Crimea. Searching the name of the land i came across that the Falkland Island is given different names but through the process of writing this research the name of Falkland Island will be used.

The study will be carried out by comparing the two annexation cases from four aspects. The aspects / factors that would be focused when comparing the two cases are, political, economic, social and regional and international responses. The research question chosen for this study is –

Can diversionary war theory help us understand the annexations of the Falkland Island and Crimea?

To answer the primary research question, I will focus the following sub-questions–

- What was the role of political factors in both annexation cases?
- What was the role of economic factors in both annexation cases?
- What was the role of social factors in both annexation cases?
- What was the role of regional and international responses in both annexations?

1.3 Disposition of The Study

This research paper is divided into six chapters. Each chapter have sub-sections specifically addressing some issues.

Following the introductory chapter, is the second chapter, Theoretical framework, which outlines and explains the diversionary war theory that will be used for this study and further give a background on the concept of annexation in previous research and how annexation had been viewed and explained by different scholars in the field of International Relations.

The third chapter is the Methodology chapter which explains and justifies the method that will be used for in study which is qualitative desk study with comparative case study method. This will also explain why the method is applicable for this research paper and further explain the selection of the cases.

The fourth chapter, briefing of the annexation cases, will briefly explain the annexation cases that will be discussed in this paper. The chapter will also discuss the four factors chosen to study the annexation cases so as to get broader understanding if the two cases present any similarities and differences.

The fifth chapter, Analysis chapter presents the results found and summarized from the research paper and will analyze them and answer the primary research question

through the lenses of diversionary war theory. The conclusion chapter will summarize main findings and tie the knot by suggesting future research area.

1.4 Scope/Limitation

This study is delimited to the chosen cases and that it will not cover annexation as general subject in the field of International Relations. This study will only focus on the two chosen annexation cases for this study and investigate if the diversionary war theory can help us get a deeper understanding of Falkland Islands and Crimea annexations. Why the two annexations were carried out and on which grounds were the decisions made is not yet clear. The most debated issues were the annexations were having political objective and were not aimed to occupy those territories. It is hard to find concrete reasons behind why those states have taken the decision to annex sovereign states.

1.5 Ethical Considerations

There is no particular ethical consideration that needs to be taken into consideration since the study will be conducted as desk study. For instance, the study has no research design that requires an ethical consideration like conducting interviews. However, I came to conclude through the journey of writing this research, there is no ethical consideration that is needed to be taken into account.

2 Theoretical Overview

The theoretical chapter of the study will be divided into three sub-sections. The previous research related with annexation, defining and shedding light on how annexation is defined and finally the diversionary war theory will be discussed in this chapter. To get further understanding of the concept of annexation the diversionary war theory will be applied.

The theory will give us broader understanding of the concept of annexation and what are some of the key strategies that makes states to annex. The theory will also focus on why governments choose to engage in external conflict while having domestic instabilities. In order to give an overview of the subject of annexation previous research on the subject will also be focused before explaining the theoretical concept of the diversionary war theory.

2.1 Previous Research

Much has been researched in the field of International Relations regarding on the question why states choose diversionary war to solve their domestic problems. Some of the issues explored and researched are the conditions of how diversionary conflicts comes to possible. Some of the well-known previous researchers done on the subject is the presidential approval.

The presidential approval research focuses on the importance of public approval to presidential success (Baker Oneal, 2001: 662). Presidential popularity is related with annexation in the sense that there are some debated concepts in the academia field that a democratic leader might have a clear incentive to engage in diversionary action in order to generate a rally round the flag effect that will boost his/her popularity. Therefore, as a leader's popularity decreases the likelihood that the leader will use a diversionary conflict to boost his/her chances of political survival increases. The central concept here is the

diversionary conflict might be a case of annexation therefore presidential popularity and annexation are two related issues (Davies, 2007;2006: 134).

Simon, D.M., Ostrom, C.W. Marra (1990) have suggested three main schools of thought for presidential popularity. The first school of thought suggests that for public approval to presidential approval moves downward from the first day of office. Cronin (1980) McKuen (1983) Mueller (1970) (1973) and Simson (1976) have similar lines of arguments that presidential approval is characterized by gradual decline and erosion and this is determined by the course of the presidential terms (ibid). The second school of thought focuses and emphasizes the relation between the domestic and the international foreign policy in which presidents operate and to which presidential popularity respond (Baker Oneal, 2001: 663-664). The approach further discusses that presidents are continually assessed based on their capacity to satisfy the expectation and desires of the electorate. However public approvals rise and falls depending on how leaders meet the needs of the common good. These are like the rate of unemployment and other social related problems and the levels of international tensions (ibid). Presidential success during war and the president's success of the legislative agenda are also considered by the public approvals.

The third school of thought agrees and accepts the relationship between the public approval and environmental stimuli. It also gives further explanation on the president's capacity to overcome or challenge both domestic and international strategies through his political strategies and public relations (ibid). However, if presidents experience declines of their public approval they are expected to do whatever in their power to either minimize or reverse the public approval. Marra, Ostrom, and Simon (1990) have tried to incorporate the three schools of thought discussed but isolating the domestic and foreign influences. The central argument of the three scholars are president's approval begin to decline with the beginning of his term in office. Another point raised by these scholars is foreign policy decisions made by the president are more important than the domes-

tic ones. However, these scholars argue foreign environmental factors are considered to be important than the domestic factors within states. Davies (2002) have provided a similar explanation relating how presidential public approval can lead to annexation as a solution to the problem. Davies asserts that democratically elected leaders might choose diversionary in order to remain in power. Davies further explains the relation between diversionary conflict and the possibility of annexation case. He asserts that democratically elected leaders are expected to take an action to preserve their rule, since domestic repression is not a policy option available to them.

Another research area of the concept of diversionary has focused whether democracies or autocracies are more likely to provoke a war to divert public attention and solve domestic unrest's. There is very strong disagreement on the whole concept. Giacomo Chioza, and Hein Goemans (1988) have remarked and argued that every possible regime has been suggested to be prone to diversionary conflict. Christopher Gelpi (1990) suggested almost similar concept and sees diversionary conflict as strategy mostly used by democratic states (Oakes, 2006:16). The point of this scholars is that democratic leaders are more often to engage in diversionary conflict than autocratic leaders. A good example of such concept is discussed by Cramer (2006) and Hendrickson (2002) analyzing two cases in 1998 when president Clinton used force in both cases. Presidents Bill Clinton decision to initiate Operation Bushwhackers (OB) against Iraq 1993, and Operation Allied Force (OAF) against Yugoslavia in 1999. These scholars argue that Bill Clinton invasions of these countries were domestic political concerns rather than any strategic goals. This is because they might be voted out of office during national elections. The other argument of these scholars is that democratic leaders prefer diversionary conflict for self-preserving than using repressive tactics when domestic unrest's rise in the country (ibid).

Another line of argument raised by scholars like Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2005) are diversionary wars are mostly preferred by young democracies. Leaders who

are in their earlier stages of democracies political leaders choose to rally support and the option they mostly choose is diversionary conflict so as to show the public that there is an external threat from rival nations aiming to increase and strengthen their legitimacy. In contrast to this Ross Miller (1999), argues and concludes that autocratic leaders are more likely to choose diversionary conflict than democratic leaders. Democratic leaders might face high costs if they engage diversionary wars and especially if they lose war. By summarizing the concept if the possibility of diversionary wars is determined by the regime type is a research that some scholars could not find enough evidence. In light of this, all the discussions and the research produced by different scholars it is evident that annexation or diversionary conflict is not determined by the regime type.

2.2 Understanding Annexation

Scholars in the field of International Relations have given different definitions of what annexations stands for. Annexation is considered to be the most serious and dangerous form of illegal use of force (Leonaitė, Žalimas, 2016: 15). Annexation is defined as the use of armed force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state or in any other manner inconsistent with UN charter. Article 2 of the UN charter defines annexation as the use of armed force by a state in contravention of the UN charter constitutes Prima facie evidence of an act of aggression.

The UN resolution 1974 defined the concept of aggression which was intended to give guidance to the United Nations Security council resolution. According to the United Nations the word aggression in this context means justifications for an armed intervention or acquisition of territory by threat or use of force. Article 3 (a) of the UN aforementioned resolution aggression as invasion or attack by armed forces of a state of the territory of another state or any other military occupation (Leonaitė, Žalimas, 2016: 15). Therefore, annexation is unlawful in the international law. Annexation produces no legal effect with respect to de jure sovereignty over the territory (Costello, 2016: 354).

Another central point of annexation in the international law all states have an obligation under general international law not to recognize the lawfulness of acquisition of such territory or any claim to sovereignty over it (ibid).

A good example and international event of annexation carried out unlawfully is the Indonesian state invasion during its 1975 annexation in East Timor. The operation of the Indonesian annexation in the East Timor was carried out by armed forces of Indonesian military (Monk, 2001: 182).

2.3 Diversionary War Theory

The concept of diversionary war theory lies in the center of how domestic unrest's can lead to an external conflict. The diversionary war theory argues that leaders who have domestic troubles like political, social and economic and not having solutions for these domestic problems might choose diversionary war as a strategy to divert the public tension. The sociological understanding of the diversionary war theory rests upon two issues. These are the out-group and the in-group mechanism of sociology (Kanat, 2014: 16).

The central concept of the sociological point of view here is a conflict or war from the outside always unites the in-group members. Simmel and Coser (2016) both sociologists argued that the best and last opportunity for a state leader facing internal domestic troubles who is on the verge to lose legitimacy and capacity to rule is only to provoke and divert the internal domestic problems by creating an external threat. This makes easier for leaders to mobilize population and create rally round the flag effect (ibid).

It is often argued that political leaders facing domestic turmoil and discontent are more inclined to provoke conflict abroad in order to secure their position (Haynes, 2017; 2015: 337). As explained earlier domestic unrest's might be in higher tensions and become direct threats to the state legitimacy, capacity and existence. In the face of such threat leaders might choose diversionary conflict as the immediate solution to 1) divert

the public attention from the social, political and economic instabilities ; 2) Mobilize the population by raising nationalist issues and thus create rally round the flag effect; 3) Leaders also try to shift the blame of the population suffering socially, economically, and politically to an external scapegoat; 4) trying to increase the governments capacity and competence of leadership specially on its foreign policy (Oakes, 2006: 433). Therefore, leaders might get public support through their actions of the diversionary conflict. Sociologists consider two key issues in this case and these are the rally round the flag effect and the in-group and the out-group creation of leaders.

2.4 In-group and Out-group

Tim Keller and Richard Foster (2009) have explained to the physiological point of leaders and how this affects leaders taking either using force or not using force when the degree of domestic troubles is high (Foster, Keller, 2010: 423). The central argument in line with this, is whether using diversionary conflict can be employed to cultivate public support from the population. Not all leaders choose diversionary conflict in an effort to mobilize the population and increase their legitimacy to divert the public from the domestic problems.

Researchers in the field of political psychology strongly suggest that the in-group and the out-group is often used leaders who see this to be the best option. (ibid). In addition, these leaders who mostly use the in-group and the out-group strategy to create an external threat for them not losing their political legitimacy and also known to have strong nationalist bent who prefer scapegoating strategies (ibid). Researchers who studied this concept have predicted and suggested that the in-group bias as an important predictor of this profile.

In-group bias view has political, social and ethnic relation as their center stage that holds the group together. Leaders known to have such strong in-group bias view the world as “us” versus “them”. Such leaders also remain highly vigilant regarding to their

clearly-defined-group and are very quick to respond to perceived foreign threats with forceful strategies (ibid). political psychologists have defined the concept of in-group bias as the degree to which leaders consider nationality to represent the exclusive distinguishing characteristic of in-group and out-group membership. Therefore, such leaders also believe that all decisions made both international and domestic are aimed at enhancing the well-being of their citizens (Foster, Keller, 2010: 424).

2.5 Rally Round the Flag Effect (RRTF)

Rally round the flag theory derives from the early psychological literature on in-group and out-group dynamics (Coser 1956). The theory contends that politically and socially relevant groups become more unified and cohesive when engaged in conflict with an outside group. Applied to the realm of international politics, it holds that conflicts and crises should produce a rally round the flag in which a country's population becomes increasingly patriotic and supportive of the political leadership, thus securing the leader's hold on power (Haynes, 2017; 2015: 341). Political leaders facing discontent within their coalition or the broader population may then be tempted to manufacture crisis in order to reap domestic political benefits. Conflict will only increase a groups cohesion, however, under specific conditions. Most importantly, the external enemy must be a salient threat to the entire in-group.

In light of this, there was earlier work by Kenneth Waltz (1967) and Richard Neustadt (1960) which have noted and explained the presidential popularity and international events, Rally round the flag effect concept was first introduced by Mueller (1970) (1973) by explaining rally round the flag effect to its relation on presidential popularity (Baker, W.D. Oneal, 2001: 664). Mueller argues an international incident must satisfy three criteria to be considered as a rally event: These are:

- It must be international in nature,
- it must involve the United States and the president directly,

- it must be specific and sharply focused.

Mueller central arguments are the public will support the president by fearing to lose the chances of the president's success if they oppose him. One further concept explained by Mueller is that only international events can unite the population and give presidents the opportunity to become masterful among the population and creating rally round the flag effect (Baker, W.D. Oneal, 2001: 664-667).

On the other side as Jack Levy (1988) explains that the cohesion of the in-group will be increased only if there already exists some minimal level of internal cohesion and only if it is generally perceived that the external threat menaces the group as a whole and not just some part of it (Haynes, 2017; 2015: 342). The central concept of Rally round the flag theory which is very important is the choice leaders should make before the act of diversionary is decided. Therefore, leaders have to select targets that constitute a clearly and recognizable out-group. According to this logic leaders who opt diversionary conflict as way of preserving their political future and power should target those states with which one has a history of conflict or ongoing dispute, as targeting a friendlier state would be less likely to generate a strong rally effect (Haynes, 2017; 2015: 341).

3 Methodology

The methodological chapter will discuss and justify the method that is applicable for this study. I will begin presenting the cases selected and why these cases are selected for this study and why these cases are relevant. I will further discuss the choice of method and its applicability to this study. Furthermore, the materials used will be discussed and finally the chosen aspects for this study and how they will be operationalized will be presented.

3.1 Selection of Cases

Events of annexations have been unusual events in the field of International Relations and has only been experienced for several times since after the end of second world war (Fazal, 2007;2001: 13-14). The concept of annexation is central and heart in the field of International Relations. Countries that existed on the world map in 1816, nearly half of them do not exist today (Fazal, 2007;2011: 13). Some scholars defined the concept of states disappearing from the world map as death of states. The definition of state death consistent with Weber's definition is that a state as having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a territory (Fazal, 2007;2011: 25). However, there are many causes of these state deaths and annexation is one of them. In particular the annexation cases chosen for these studies seem to be carried out within the same strategy and motive. One central concept with annexation that many scholars have argued is annexation happens when leaders are facing domestic unrest's. Therefore, in order to divert the public attention leaders, choose diversionary conflict which is annexation in this case or might even be other forms of external conflict (Oakes, 2012: 433).

In light of this the chosen cases of annexations have similarities and are chosen for the following reasons that, the two annexations cases had occurred in two different time frames, both Russia and Argentina were experiencing domestic instabilities when the annexations were carried out, the structure of this leadership was the same. Argentina

was an autocratic regime and same to Putin long stay in power and lastly the Leaders of both states (Russia Argentina) gave similar reasons for their annexations arguing the territories annexed were owned by them (ibid).

3.2 Choice of Method. Comparative Case Study

The comparative case study method will be used for this study. Comparing the two annexation cases the comparative case study is applicable to my research. The comparative method has many advantages and gives broader concept of the study. The comparative method is one of the most widely used methods in political research and is frequently used to study a wide range of political phenomena. (Vannoni, M. 2015; 2014, 14). Comparative methods are useful for the purpose to which there are put. However, comparative methods can be used in three main ways, to apply to existing theory to new cases, to develop new theory or hypothesis and lastly to test theory. In light of this, the comparative methods strength is that it broadens our intellectual horizons (Halperin, Sandra Heath, Oliver: 202-203).

As argued by Rihoux Ragin (2009) comparative case study bears and functions as concept of formation. The method is also applicable and used in different ways. One of the ways the method is used in scientific research is to map or structure to the degree to which diversities of theories are being applied or replicated (Halperin, Sandra Heath, Oliver: 204). I choose the comparative case study because this will give further and broader understanding of the chosen annexation cases for this study.

The comparative case study is also applicable and used mainly for the purpose of understanding differences and similarities between case studies. There are many comparative case studies in the field, in this case this will be using the case study which is the most widely used method in the field of scientific research. The case study is very advantageous in many ways. It provides interesting and meaningful concepts of the cases analyzed (Halperin, Sandra Heath, Oliver 2012: 200-206). In addition to that a

good comparative cases studies engage wider academic concepts so as to provide reliable scientific research. I therefore choose the comparative case study since this is more relevant and applicable method to the annexation cases chosen for this study which is to be compared. The method will also give broader discussions in relation to my chosen variables.

3.3 Data

This study relies on secondary sources. I found it relatively easy getting to detailed materials that gave me good understanding of the concept of annexation especially my two chosen cases. The reason I chosen academic literature as my empirical materials is because of the reliability of the chosen sources. This study will depend solely on secondary sources. Examples of the areas of focus are historical recapitulations, political analysis and literature related to description of cases all these will be used for this as outline for the empirical materials chosen.

Through my journey of searching I found a wide range of literature. But I have sorted out and only considered the most important and relevant literature that can be applied in this thesis. Most of the literature found and collected are relevant and applicable and can thus help me deeply understand the annexation cases chosen and answer my research questions.

To provide reliability and avoid risk of biasness for my research I decided to investigate and find as much literature as possible in order to study and understand each of the cases focused in this thesis.

3.4 Method Of Analysis

The diversionary war theory will in this case be applied to the task of understanding if the annexations were caused by the domestic instabilities of the countries that have carried out the annexations or if the annexations were made on other political grounds. The

focus here will be the context in which governments could decide an annexation to be carried out and further outline which are the factors that have facilitated for annexations to happen.

There are four aspects chosen for the analysis of this paper. The four aspects will be providing us to understand what has made these annexations to be carried out. In other words, the chosen aspects will be guiding us understand what has influenced the annexations to occur. Our focus which is in the beginning that if domestic unrest's in Argentina and Russia have initiated the annexations. Based on the diversion war theory, there are four aspects chosen for this research. The chosen aspects for this study are political, economic, social and lastly the regional and international responses after the annexations had been carried out. Main focus here will if domestic unrest's in the form of political, social and economic instabilities of the countries that annexed have initiated these annexations to happen. The central concept here is if these domestic unrest's like social, economic and political instabilities have forced these leaders to take the decision of external conflict to divert the public attention. Some leaders see external conflict as way of getting public support and making the image of the regime look good.

The last aspect here is the regional and international responses which this research will consider. This aspect will shed light on how the local and the international responses were after the annexations have occurred or on the other side if any regional or international factor have contributed the two annexation cases. To bring into discussion, to annex a sovereign state is an international event that would have both regional and international impact. To further analyze the two annexation cases and give wider perspective of the research the stages on how the annexations started and through the stages they have gone will also be discussed and viewed from different angles.

To apply for the chosen diversionary war theory chosen for this study the four aspects chosen will be operationalized in a way that can answer the primary research question chosen for this study. For example, to the political, the study will focus on which political

grounds were the decisions of the annexations made. The economic and social factors which are both interrelated factors in this case will be representing and give explanation on how economic weakness and social unrest's impacted/ influenced the government exercise of power and legitimacy to exercise its governmental authority, so as to make domestic unrest's stable.

The last chosen aspect which is the regional and international responses chosen will present on how the annexations have influenced the regional and international political tensions or if any regional or international factor have contributed the two annexation cases. This will also give the broader picture of the consequences of these international events. For example, the case of Russia being economically sanctioned by the United nations and the international community condemning the act as unlawful.

Taking into consideration our main research question and the four sub-questions selected and the four aspects selected for this study through the lenses of the diversionary war theory is relevant and can answer the research questions.

4 Briefing of The Annexation Cases

This chapter will present brief discussions of the Argentinian annexation of Falkland Island and Russian annexation in the Crimea each looking at the political, economic and social dimensions of the two nations that carried out the annexations during the periods of annexations. In order to further shed light, the two annexation cases the local and international responses will be as well discussed. Finally, the differences and similarities of the annexation cases will as well be discussed. Before the annexation is explained a brief background of the territorial history of Falkland Island will be given.

A British author, Mary Cawkell, asserts the first man who discovered the island is John Davis whose ship “desire” have lost sight when caught in storm and unexpectedly reached the island. After the 1982 annexation of the island by the Argentina government the British government made the same claim (Gustafson, 1988: 3-4).

4.1 Case 1-Argentina Annexation in the Falkland Island

During his inaugural speech Galtieri himself acknowledged that the time for words and promises is gone and Galtieri was quoted-

“I also know that words have lost their force and power to persuade and this is time for firmness and action”

Given its collapsing political base the Junta has to do something -The question was what? (Oakes, 2012: 79).

4.2 Territorial Background of Falkland Islands

Falkland Island or Las Malvinas as Spanish speakers call it is small island in the south Atlantic with a population of around 1, 700. Britain rules the island and Argentina claims (Reisman, 1983: 287). Argentina seized the island in April 982, but after two months Britain retook the island. Authors have introduced many arguments concerning the Falk-

land Islands in order to understand one nation's legal title to them (Gustafson, 1988: 3). The history of the Island had begun with the log, entries, diaries, and autobiographies of the early European explorers in the region (ibid). The authors have developed interest of making evaluation of who discovered the island after the beginning of nations unbroken claim to the Islands (ibid).

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4.3 The process of the Annexation

The process of the annexations of both cases will be briefly discussed in order to shed light what strategies were being followed by these states before taking the annexation.

Argentina launched an invasion of the Falk Island expecting to end a long-standing dispute of sovereignty over the ownership of the Falk Island against the British government (Oakes, 2006: 441). The events of the Argentinian military annexation can be traced back a meeting of the military government several months earlier. The move had been organized by the military generals with the president in a secret meeting with the absence of the foreign minister (ibid).

After the government meeting, there was immediate action and on April 2 1982 thousands of Argentine marine forces landed on the British Falk Island claiming the island for Argentina (Oakes, 2006: 431). The Argentinian marine forces met very little resistance from small number of British armies from the sparsely inhabited island (ibid).

But the annexation of the Falk island taken by Argentina was seen to be a costly mistake, both politically and lives lost during the two and half month conflict (Watkins, 1983: 650). Argentina political calculations were Argentina lacked strategic importance for the British government and Argentina never really thought Britain will not fight back.

Few hours after the annexation the British prime minister made a personal view that takeover of the Island would be a great national humiliation and would also mean the fall of her government (Watkins, 1983: 650-653).

The first session of the House of Commons strongly condemned the annexation of Argentina and called for immediate action. The US was trying to solve the conflict through diplomatic means but the efforts failed after the Argentina and Britain could not agree. Finally, the British government retook the Island despite of the ongoing diplomatic trials (Watkins, 1983: 651). But that could not bring an end of the dispute. Despite the United Nations and United states diplomatic trials to find a final agreement between the two states, the diplomatic trials ended unsuccessfully and both of the two states insisted that the Falkland Island belongs to them (ibid).

4.4 Political

April 2, 1982 thousands of Argentinians marine forces have landed on the Falkland Island which was under British rule. There was very little resistance from the British army in the Island since this was unexpected invasion for the British government (Oakes, 2012: 75-76).

Shortly after the invasion had been carried out and Falkland Island came under total control of the Argentinian state, the president Leopoldo Galtieri walked on the balcony at Casa Rosado to loudly announce this unexpected victory of his nation. There was larger crowd of the population that gathered to celebrate the good news. But the most interesting issue is days before there were larger crows that gathered the same place to demand the end of military rule and were asking accountability for the masses of victims who lost their life's during the dirty wars in Argentina (Oakes, 2012: 75). Dirty war in Argentina was not a real but an illegal militarization of state repression. This was a war made by the Argentinian state against its citizens (Finchelstein, 2014: 4).

Argentina's invasion in the Falkland Island was most political analysts agreed that

it was a strategy the regime seem to be saving their political future in the country. The action of annexation by the Argentinian state was not only viewed as being diversionary conflict rather self-preserving tactics for the regime.

During the 1982 annexation of the Argentinian government in the Falk Island the regime had been facing strong political opposition from the other political organizations demanding immediate transition to democracy and compensation of the victims of the dirty war (Oakes, 2012: 78). Therefore, since president Galtieri and his government were facing high pressure from the opposition they were forced to take action and choose the best decision from the policy menu. Not only opposition political parties were pressuring the Junta on reforms towards to democracy but also the catholic church which was very important religious organization had also adopted a policy of accommodation toward the Junta. The church distanced itself from the government by publicly reaffirming its commitment to democracy and joined the labor movements against their campaign (ibid).

President Galtieri had been facing public discontent since coming to power. There was an increase from the different levels of the societies that were openly expressing their dissatisfaction with the military rule (Oakes, 2012: 79). Groups that previously backed the Junta had joined opposition groups, these included religious leaders, businessmen. The junta's strong opposition group were not only demanding economic reforms rather were asking the regime step down and Argentina be democratized. There was increasing demands of reforms from the political opposition groups, different levels of the society and it was not possible for the Junta regime ignore the increasing domestic pressure. President Galtieri himself acknowledged time for words is gone and is time for action and firmness. But no one could understand which government decision will be picked from the government policy menu.

Argentina decision to annex in the Falk Island could be understood as being Argentina grand strategy of achieving regional dominance and balancing power (Oakes, 2006: 442). Before the annexation of the Falk Island there was already dispute between

Chile and Argentina over three small islands located near the Beagle channel. However, the political calculation of the Argentinian state was if Argentina is not granted the sovereignty of the islands Chile will have full control of the Island. This will also allow the Chilean state controlling the Antarctic peninsula that would allow control the shipping route over Cape Horn and could control to waters very close to Argentina's key naval base (Oakes, 2006: 442-443). The Argentinian state have also seen that if Chile successfully gains all these water points this could affirm Chiles position as a major power in the south Atlantic (ibid).

Historians have identified three major political strategy calculations of the Junta during its annexation in the Falkland Island. These are, Argentina believed if it could regain the Falk Island it might strengthen its bargaining position in the Beagle channel dispute with Chile. Second, there was mediation between Chile and Argentina mediated by the Vatican which the outcome had favored Chile and this has disappointed the Argentinian state. So, the annexation of the Falk Island was to show their tough stance on the Falk Island and demonstrated their readiness to use force to achieve their objectives the Vatican would offer concessions to the Argentinian state over the Beagle Island. If the Vatican could not reverse his decision the Falk Island could compensate the loss of the Beagle Island (Oakes, 2006: 442-445). Finally, the other political calculation was Argentina feared that Chile and the United Kingdom would form an alliance against Argentina. So, the regime saw as important move to annex the Falk Island before the alliance is formed by the two rival nations (ibid).

Finally, the political calculation could be understood as being both domestic or regional political move and Argentina shaping its foreign policy goal of the dispute between Britain and Argentina. For the regional political calculation could be best understood on the dispute between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel.

4.5 Economic

When president Galtieri assumed office, he inherited an economic situation in the country which was on the edge to collapse. Over a short period of time more than 40 banks and major investment firms had been declared bankruptcy and shut down. There was a trial from the government side of reversing and finding solutions for the economic crises but that was not successful (Oakes, 2012: 78). Only between June and July 1981 the peso fell from 4,200 to 7,800 pesos to the dollar (ibid).

The public outcry against the regimes poor handling of the economy had tremendously increased. Union leaders for the labor organization have led high profile strikes openly criticizing the governments steps on reforming the economy. Business organizations and the local as well joined the opposition of the Junta regime (ibid). There was increasing unemployment, souring inflation and government revenue have diminished. The ability of the state to cover its expenses was in crisis since the government collection of tax was in a very low level (Oakes, 2012: 83). The government was not able to meet the demands of the public like the health sector, and education. President Galtieri himself begged the public and ask for patience promising the public economic improvements. At the end of 1975 Argentina external dept. was four billion and in 1982 it was forty billion U.S dollars.

These serious economic crises have escalated the domestic unrest's in the country forcing the regime of taking an action. President Galtieri and his government had no immediate option to solve all these domestic unrest's that escalated nationwide. The option of choosing repression to calm the situation was not in the mind of the Junta regime because the option of public repression would have proved too costly (Oakes, 2012: 85). This best explains why the Junta regime have chosen to annex the Falkland Island. Two reasons why the Junta have chosen the invasion of the Island is this would have not been too costly and many Argentinian citizens would see the retake of the Falkland Island as bigger historic victory. The state has also seen the annexation of

the Falkland Island as a political survival and self-preserving option than diversionary conflict and causing rally round the flag effect (ibid).

There are many scholars in the academic field that have discussed and suggested that there is a relationship between economic performance and war. A poor conflict can cause or be a signal of internal conflict (James 1988). To examine the relationship between war and economic performance scholars have focused two major issues. These are how economic performances affects the decisions made by leaders. Good economic performance makes a leader believing his competence of showing him the probability of winning a war. The second is if a leader or a state experiences economic disaster and domestic unrest's showing him that he is incompetent and he will need to go to war (Gent, 2009: 16). President Galtieri annexation of the Falkland Island in 1982 while facing serious economic challenges is good example of how economic performance whether negative or positive could affect a leader's decision to go to war.

4.6 Social

Before the invasion of the Falk Island there was already higher frustrations and different forms of violence both direct and indirect causing more fear and uncertainty in the country. In the 1976 government response to the Guerilla threat that threatened the state had dragged the country into more violence's causing more social instabilities (Arquilla, 2001: 747). During the guerilla war the government military response was massive campaign of illegal abductions and torture this was called the dirty war of Argentina. More than 7840 people are known to be kidnapped and tortured at detention centers. Although many believe that the number of people was more than 30,000 people in between 1976 and 1983 (ibid).

The economic declines in Argentina had caused more social problems. There was higher inflationary crisis and this recession has caused both the lack of employment and real wages in the country to drop dramatically (MacDonald, 2009: 120). The lack of

the government ability to meet the public demands had caused more frustrations in the country causing more social problems. The decline of all sectors like education, health was in crisis and the government expenses were not enough to meet all these demands from the public (Oakes, 2012: 83). However, the state was in dilemma on which state decision could be most possible to solve its domestic unrests.

State terror in the country created a culture of fear causing more social unrests. The social unrests have led to more public criticism to the regime. Some of the social unrests were demonstrations from labor organizations. This was the first time the regime experienced open criticism from the public (Arquilla, 2001: 749). There were larger demonstrations from the labor organization which the government responded with the imprisonment of the leader of the general labor confederation leader Saul Ubaldini (ibid). Union leaders and opposition political organizations have also initiated a series of foreign trips to obtain and bring international support for Argentina domestic crisis (ibid).

4.7 Regional and International Responses

The Argentinian juntas attempt to impose a resolution of the sovereignty dispute by the use of force failed (Gustafson, 1988: 177).

Argentinian invasion in the Island had caused Britain to spend more than 1,19 billion currencies. After Argentina annexation Britain acted very quick and retook the Island. The United States government did not go nearly as far the south Atlantic committee in trying to change Britain's official position but did supported the negotiations between Britain and Argentina to begin (ibid). in order to settle the dispute over the Island the United nations have drafted a resolution to solve over the political tension between the two states over the sovereignty question. Britain did not welcome the UN resolution move and the British government have questioned the resolution and called the resolution as ill-timed and ill-considered. Britain argument argued the resolution could not be possible when the Falk Island war dead were still mourned (Gustafson, 1988: 179).

British prime minister Thatcher asked president Reagan to abstain in the UN resolution move (ibid). Britain stand of opposing the UN resolution of settling the sovereign dispute over negotiations over Britain win of the war in the Island and Argentina losing the war (Gustafson, 1988: 179-181). The relationship between Britain and US have been strained a year later of the US government supporting the same move and have resumed arm sales to Argentina (ibid). The United states aided Britain in Argentina first force invasion of the Island but later turned to be neutral and called for negotiations between the two states (ibid).

4.8 Case 2-Russian Annexation in Crimea

Russian annexation in the Crimea and the military subsequent of Russian in eastern Ukraine had been surprising and troubling to many in the west (Hopf, 2016: 247). This section of the thesis will explain how best we can understand on the political, social and economic aspect of the Russian annexation in the Crimea.

4.9 Territorial Background of Crimea

Crimea has over centuries attracted the most diverse population due to its sub-Mediterranean climate and easy accessibility from the black sea to the south and became home for different ethnic and religious groups. (Hilpold, 2015: 239). If a legal title is to be attributed to Crimea on the basis of historic title the outcome will depend on the period chosen for this period. The Greeks, Germany, Romans, Gothics, Huns, Armenians have all colonized the peninsula but the Tatars ethnic group remained to be the indigenous people. (Hilpold, 2015: 239-240).

October 1921 a Crimean Autonomous Soviet, Socialist Republic was created (ASSR). This ASSR was then integrated with the Socialist Federation of the Soviet Republics. During the world war II, conflict indigenous people in Crimea accused of supporting the Nazis were deported. Many of them were deported to Uzbekistan. But the situation of

Crimea returned to normal after world war II when Soviet Union started disintegrating (Hilpold, 2015: 241). For instance, internal politics of Russia added more complexity to the issue of Crimea when in 1954 Nikita Khrushchev attributed Crimea to Ukraine which no body has expected.

The Crimean population were asking for autonomous state which Ukraine granted them in 1991. But the minority Russians have opposed this move which many have seen was not favoring them. The political tension of the region started when in 1992 the Russian state adopted the Duma resolution claiming the giving of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was illegal and Crimea is still part of Russia (Hilpold, 2015: 243). However, the Crimea created a question of who has the right to what and who will decide which could not open the opportunities for dialogue of the state's due to the political climate in the region. This has led to Russian state claim after annexing Crimea in 2014 insisting people have the right to decide and Russia has to defend minority Russians in Crimea (ibid).

4.10 The process of the Annexation

The process of annexation in Crimea dates back for quite some time. There were political tensions between Russia and Ukraine. The tensions between the two neighboring countries included to the status related to Crimea, the division of the Soviet black sea fleet between the two neighboring countries (Bebler, 2015: 39). The annexation of part of Ukrainian territory-namely the Crimean Peninsula was both unexpected by the international and academic community (Leonaitė, Žalimas, 2016:11). But others believed the process of annexation is seen in 2014 but is an annexation caused by the long existed political tension between the two states.

Since 1991 Russia had been in undercover manner supported, controlled, and often restrained the actions of Russian separatists in Crimea and had also maintained strong military agency in the region (ibid). Therefore, the annexation of Crimea was not unex-

pected as many have explained was slow going process from the Russian side. In 2008 the foreign ministry of Ukraine accused the Russian state mass distribution of Russian passport as real problem and threat to the Ukrainian sovereignty. Before the ministers statement Russia had already declared policy of possible military intervention to protect Russian citizens (Bebler, 2015:40). In August 2009 Anti-Ukrainian demonstrations broke in Crimea calling Russia to act in the same way it acted southern Ossetia and Abkhazia during the Russian-Georgia war. The Russian military action was well planned on the military side but not on the political side.

As the clashes between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protests have increased, the political tensions between the two countries was as well increasing. On 27 February 2014 masked armed individuals seized and locked government buildings in Crimea (ibid). Soon the Russian state drafted amendment to the constitutional law on admitting on new subjects to the Russian federation. The draft specifically justified the incorporation of parts of Ukraine into the Russian federation on the grounds of alleged Ukrainian discrimination of national minorities (Kuzio, 2015: 152.158). The three-week operation of Russia completely taking over the Crimea has been facilitated by three factors. The Russian marines who were already legally stationed in Sevastopol, the short distances to the most of the important strategic location in Crimea, and the lastly the airport that allowed for the quick insertion of air transported troops and finally reaching their targets (Gillich, 2015: 13).

Immediately after the takeover Crimea, Russia security personnel have shut all Ukrainian television news, imposed very blockade on the land border, and closed the Simferopol flights from Ukraine subjecting the Crimea population on one side of information with intense propaganda campaign like during the Cold War (Bebler, 2015:42). There was quick referendum which Russia pushed back and the Crimean authorities claimed 96.77 percent have voted for its separation from Ukraine and re-uniting with Russia but the credibility of the referendum was questioned by the international community and seen as

illegal transfer of power. The Ukrainian state have rejected to recognize the legality of the referendum and its outcome on constitutional grounds. This opinion was shared by the council of Europe's Venice Commission and by a number of EU and NATO member states (Bebler, 2015:43)

4.11 Political

Russian annexation in the Crimea had been understood and given explanations from different angles. Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 could not be a separate case rather a case that can be explained in the context of Russia facing the pressure of a serious of secession's which has been within the Russian territory and Russia had also already intervened (Wilson, 2016: 2). Before Russian annexation of the Crimea, Ukraine had already been fully cooperating and engaging deals with the European political, social and economic integration in the eastern blocks and going out fully from the grip of Russia (Kenarov, 2015: 442).

Putin's military decision to annex the Crimea annexation had been seen as being a well-planned political strategy. Political analysts have explained Russian military action to invade Crimea in two different contexts although Russia was not to disclose their political objective both regional and international but rather argued insisted Crimea belongs to Russia.

Considering our diversionary war explanation on leaders with domestic problems might engage in diversionary conflict to divert the public attention. However, Putin's military action in the Crimea can be explained being a diversionary act. Putin is known to retain control of economic levers, security services and the most popular media outlets (Kuchinsky, 2014: 262). But during of his run up in the 2013-2014 in Ukrainian revolution Putin was becoming less popular especially with urban elites. More ever the number of Russians associating him with Russian problems were exceeding than those who do not (ibid).

In 2010 before the Crimean annexation decision by the Russian president Putin was facing domestic pressure from within. This was the first time since coming to power Putin experienced public critics from prominent entertainers, politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats (ibid). A comprehensive explanation on why elites in Russia were dissatisfied with Putin being in power was there were feeling insecure over their personal and financial security (Kuchinsky, 2014:267).

Not only elites and people in the upper class were dissatisfied with Putin leadership but for the first time in twelve years the number of ordinary citizens who asses that Putin specifically carries the blame for problems in Russia have reached fifty percent (50

The domestic pressure Putin was facing has increased and this time Putin had to play his political cards well. The case of Crime annexation had been the last option for Putin to settle the domestic grievances from the public. The economic issue in the country was very important for the situation and the projected natural resource revenues make it difficult to maintain the current level of public spending (Gardner, 2016: 32). Putin decision to invade and militarily annex the Crimea annexation accompanied by a wider television coverage allied Russians towards Putin and rapidly boosted his ratings. But the question many raised was if Russian president will be able to sustain this momentum (ibid).

Despite of the explanations that the Crimean annexation was caused by domestic instabilities of Russia during the period some other analysts have argued and produced other explanation of the event. The decision to annex Crimea at an opportune moment was created in 2008, soon after the Bucharest summit where NATO promised Ukraine and Georgia future membership alliance. But the operational plans for the invasion was postponed when president Yanukovich was elected as president in Ukraine (Bebler, 2015: 203). The central argument suggested on why the plans of invading Crimea had been postponed is the penetration of high governmental offices by Russian citizens and Ukraine's growing financial dependence on Russia and the expanded cooperation

between the two military-industrial complexes properly reduced the need for annexation (ibid). But the co-operation between Russia and Ukraine changed 22 February 2014 when president Yanukovich and a group of high Ukrainian officials closely connected to the Russian security services abruptly fled Ukraine fearing for their lives after they were accused of working with Russian intelligence services. There was a power vacuum that has been created due to the chaos in Kiev and this has offered Russia an ideal opportunity to carry out the plans of Crimea annexation. Russian military annexation had been well planned in terms of military strategy but less on political side (ibid).

After Russia had successfully completed its military action to invade Crimea there was a controversial referendum which the Russian state had organized. According to the Crimean authorities' 81.6 percent have voted and 96.77 percent have voted separation from Ukraine. But the official results of the vote could not be verified by impartial international observers (Bebler, 2015: 206).

Russian annexation in the Crimea has also created an international environment and a shift in the geopolitical system. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia had also included many other actors who see the move of Russia as a threat. Those included in the conflict were NATO, European Union, United Nations and USA. The Russian state position had been openly opposing Ukrainian integration into the economic and also political, "West" and in particular its possibility of NATO membership. Russian position has been well known but ignored by western leader and insisted that every European legal state freely can be a member of the European union or join as a member for NATO (Bebler, 2015-206-207).

A similar explanation had been also given the Russian annexation in Crimea was more of political strategy disagreeing that the annexation was carried out on the basis of diversionary act. Russian 2014 annexation in the Crimea diverged from the conventional approach by manipulating an ethnic Russian population for cover and using a robust security infrastructure (Mastriano, 2017: 69). Russian is historically known depending

land power to achieve its strategic military objectives in the region. This land power-centric approach of a broader Russian strategy to roll back the expansion of western influence (especially NATO and the European union in the former Soviet Bloc. However, Russian annexation in Crimea looking the political context might give as being a strategy intended gain regional and international power balance. On the other side the annexation could be understood as having a political objectivity of remaining in office by trying to answer the public grievances in the way of diverting them and engaging in diversionary conflict. However, this political strategy of Russia connects us to the political aspect which is one of the factors that the annexation cases understanding will be based on.

Finally, Russia justification in Crimea had been three reasons: Crimea as always Russian, revived language from world war II to demonize the post-Yanukovych Ukrainian government, and claimed the Crimean's were asserting their right of self-determination. All these were selective explanations of events led according to Russian state involvement in the Crimea. Russia argues this is what has fostered a Russian identity that goes beyond its borders (Biersack, O'Leary, 2014: 254).

4.12 Economic

Russian had been in the midst of serious economic crisis in the late summer of 2008. Although the Russian economic crisis could be understood in the context of the global recession its origin and progression are distinct (Mankoff, 2010: 4). A 2009 report by Citi gold and Russia school of economics that the GDP drop in 2009 exceeded the contractions of the late 1990s. Russia slipped into recession in 2013 with a backdrop of a global economic crisis and respected economists expect its economy to shrink further (Kuchinsky, 2014: 268).

The economic crisis had been increasing the public grievances due to the economic crisis (ibid). The Russian economic downturn had three components: financial crisis affecting banks, and severely heavy indebted enterprises and a global commodity crunch

(ibid). Despite Russian economic crisis its military action to invade Crimea had been another discussion and geopolitical tension. Although Russian action had been explained in the context of answering the public grievances caused by the economic decline in the country the case of Crimea annexation had been seen to be a move of Russia for economic reasons and not concerned with the domestic unrests in the country (Biersack, O'Leary, 2014: 243-249). According to the world bank information on Russian economy the growth of GDP has slowed down to an estimated 1.3 percent in the year 2013 from 3.4 percent in 2012 (world bank, 2014).

According to the research of Nilsson (2013) Russian black fleet policy paradigm can be understood as being a protector of Russian nation. The central concept that Nilsson further explains is that the black sea fleet had always been way of Russia protecting its nationals in Ukraine since at least Georgia in 2009. The black sea therefore has not been only used in 2013 but it served as symbolically and literally being present Russian nationals from Ukrainian threats (Nilsson, 2013). The question that had been discussed by academics is what Russia and Russian elites might gain joining Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian federation remain a question that is not well researched and explored. Two main gains of Russia are said to be the peninsula will give Russia an economic boost due to its tourist destination and present military facilities (Biersack, O'Leary, 2014: 257).

An additional explanation on Russian annexation in Crimean had been explained on Russia keeping the rich of energy resources in the region. Russia has been silent on its territorial claim. Although there was a denial from the Russian side that Russia had already enough energy from the region and had no interest to increase on the region energy resources (ibid). in connection to Russian annexation and access to the black sea that there was enough evidence to believe that Russia gained 36,000 square kilometers of territory surrounding Crimea and making Russia maritime neighbors with Romania and Turkey (Broad 2014). This increased maritime territory may also now shorten the path

of the south pipeline and may lead to the construction of a new pipeline branching from south stream to Crimea (Broad, 2014). Coming to the summary of this section Russian annexation is explained in the context of two issues. Russian domestic economic crisis which might lead Crimea has been an option to divert the public dissatisfaction of the economic disasters in the country. It could be understood as well Russia interest of the energy resources which might boost Russian economic weakness.

4.13 Social

The economic crisis in Russia from 2008-2014 had caused several social problems in the country.

The level of corruption became a common almost in all governmental sectors and reached a level it prohibited sustainable development (Kuchinsky, 2014: 268). Russian elites had been shaken by events, Among the major events and social unrest's experienced in the Moscow were extremely worrying the ruling class of Russia. Attack on a mainstream of journalist, bigger riots in the capital Moscow, the murder of a young lawyer while in government custody, explosions in international airport (Kuchinsky, 2014: 268-271).

Larger riots that began earlier December 2010 until late 2013. Some of these social unrests in the country had been caused by the anger from the injury or killing of pedestrians by speeding motorcades owned by businessmen and senior politicians which then became unifying object of disgust (ibid).

4.14 Regional and international Responses

Annexation is an international event but also is a regional concern for member states. The regional and international responses aspect will be briefly discussed in order to get a good understand of the annexation cases. This aspect will give us on how the cases were similar or different considering the regional and international responses that were

experienced both in the region and international context after the annexations were fully carried out.

The Russian military move to annex Crimea and the clandestine intervention in eastern Ukraine, followed by Russian intervention in Syria conflict crisis had been seen as complete failure of NATO presence in the region and the European union (Gardner, 2016: 490). The Russian move had been seen as Russia negotiating a new post-cold war Euro Atlantic security architecture. Russia foreign policy and defense policy had been under intense pressure. This came after triple expansion of the US, EU and NATO presence in the region which Russia have considered to be not only undermining the Russian -backed regimes in the former Soviet Union (most recently Ukraine under the leadership of president Yanukovich) but also representing a potential security and defense threat (ibid). Russian annexation in Crimea had been explained in the context of Russia geopolitical calculation of expanding its influence over southern Ukraine, the northern regions of the black sea strategically planning to protect Russian energy (Gardner, 2016: 491)

What had been most interesting after Russian unexpected military force in the Ukrainian territory were the responses of the greater powers, the US, NATO members and the international community. After the annexation NATO and the European union have asserted their full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders (Gardner, 2016: 493). The US also signed Ukraine freedom support act. The plan was to allocate up to 350 million US dollars as a military aid to Ukraine.

To the side of regional countries, the Russian military move had questioned their sovereignty existence. Countries that lined up to openly criticize Russian move in the region were Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. In contrast eastern countries and members of NATO like Germany and France had been reluctant of the suggestion of some NATO members the stationing of rotating forces in the Baltic states and Poland in the aftermath of the Russian annexation in Crimea (Gardner, 2016: 495).

The actions of Russian annexation in the Crimean Peninsula had violated fundamental international legal principles entrenched in the UN Charter (1945). The declaration of the UN general assembly on the principles of international law (1970) and the Helsinki Final Act (1975) which also include the non-interference of internal affair of another state (Leonaitė, Žalimas, 2016: 21). Despite of the international community accusing Russia occupying Ukrainian territory was against the international law, there were no steps apart from economic sanctions and diplomatic trials that failed to solve the annexation event. This has been a prove and a shift in Russia's geopolitical strategy both in the region and internationally (ibid).

5 Analysis

Through the lenses of the diversionary war theory this chapter will examine each annexation case from the four chosen factors by trying to understand if diversionary war theory can help us understand the two annexation cases. The four factors introduced at the introductory chapter will be taken into consideration. These are Political, economic, social and lastly regional and international responses after the annexations. Each annexation case will be analyzed separately. The primary research question and the four sub-questions will be answered in this chapter.

5.1 Argentina Annexation in Falkland Island. Diversionary war theory

The ruling military government of Argentina was experiencing open criticism during the annexation of Falkland Island. Opposition political parties, religious leaders were all demanding democracy and end of military rule in the country. The Junta regime was in the first time facing open public criticism since coming to power. (Oakes, 2012: 78). Taking into consideration the diversionary war theory explanation in its simplest form that leaders who are facing certain domestic problems and have no immediate solutions for these problems resort to a strategy of distracting the attention of the public away from these domestic problems to provide a temporary relief (Kanat, 2014: 16). However, the distraction succeeds when the public stops focusing on domestic problems at home and instead focuses on foreign policy.

During the annexation of the Falkland Island the regime was also experiencing an opposition from groups that previously backed the Junta regime which have joined the opposition groups. Among the groups were, religious leaders and businessmen. However, the role of political factor in the annexation was more on to settle the domestic instabilities of the Junta regime and was also self-preserving for the regime.

Another finding of Argentinian annexation in the Falkland Island which could be


understood as a political regional strategy that there was already dispute between Chile and Argentina over their small island near the Beagle Channel. Historians have identified there could be three political strategies of why Argentina have annexed the Falkland Island. The relation between the two cases were explained from the point of Argentina made three major political calculations. Argentina believed if they regain the Falkland Island this was also strengthen their political bargain of the Beagle channel. Argentina was also trying to show their tough stand and how ready they want to regain the disputed Islands. However, the role of political factor in the annexation of Argentina is very clear. From the explanation given how a political factor played a central role on the initiation of the annexation was both from the diversionary aspect and the case of the regional political strategy which is a more finding factor in the case. The Argentinian regime annexation could be understood as politically motivated move but not the regimes claim of regaining a territory.

Our major focus here, if diversionary war theory can help us understand the annexation of Argentina in the Falkland Island could be understood in the economic and social aspect of the Argentinian state during the annexations. When president Galtieri assumed office the economic situation in the country was already on the edge to collapse. Economic problems also brought with them significant social problems. President Galtieri and his Junta regimes knew that there was no quick fix for these problems he encountered. The public outcry against the regime poor handling of the economy has tremendously increased. It was very for president Galtieri and his government that continued public unrest could represent a fundamental challenge to the continued legitimacy, capacity, and even the existence of the state (Oakes, 2006: 433).

The diversionary war theory considers three major factors could be caused by the domestic instabilities which can lead to leaders to choose diversionary conflict to divert the public attention. The major ones are political, social and economic aspects. In this case The Junta regime facing extreme economic problems in the country was not giving

the ruling Junta regime an option to find solutions for the problems. The question here is considering the economic and social factors what role they played in the regimes decision to annex the Falkland Island.

The Junta regime has not been in the position of meeting the public demands and public repression was also not in the mind of the Junta regime since this will be costly as well (Oakes, 2012: 85). The diversionary war theory explains this idea that leaders facing domestic problems might either choose repression or diversionary conflict to divert the popular attention but they choose the best option in order to remain in office and gather public support. However, The Junta regime facing serious economic challenges only between June and July 1981 the peso fell from 4,200 to 7,800 pesos to the dollar (ibid). There was also serious unemployment rate in the country, inflation and deeper diminish of government revenue.



courtesy of (*The policy alternatives approach* (Oakes, 2016: 436).

The policy alternatives of the diversionary theory presented on the figure gives us a good understanding on why the Junta regime have chosen to annex the Falkland Island. Therefore, the Junta annexation of the Falk Island was political calculation and grand strategy which the regime saw as being as political and self-preserving option than diversionary conflict thus creating rally round the flag effect.

In light of this all these economic problems have also brought social problems in the country causing more pressure on the ruling regime. Major crucial government departments like health, education have dramatically declined causing more frustrations from the public (MacDonald, 2009: 120). Larger demonstrations organized by the labor organizations that were criticizing the state plans of settling the economic crisis in the country. Mothers who were missing some of their children during the dirty war were demanding from the Junta an explanation. These demonstrations came to the attention of the foreign press, other governments, and non-governmental organizations. In light of this the military government was under mounting international pressure to improve its human rights record.

Despite all these alternative arguments and explanations on the Junta political, economic and social situations there is a considerable degree to which the Junta was influenced by the rising social unrest when it planned to invade the Falkland Island.

Coming to the final point in order to tie the knot by considering the research problem of this thesis that the use of external conflict to divert against growing domestic unrest by mobilizing the population has been a key strategy used by leaders to make situations stable and solve their domestic unrest's it is very clear how Argentinian state domestic instabilities have led to diversionary conflict. In addition to our primary research question, asking if diversionary war theory can help us understand the annexation of Falkland Island by the Junta regime and further understanding the role of political, economic, social and regional and international aspects the diversionary war theory can give good understanding and strong evidence that Argentinian annexation of the Falkland Island was more on diversionary act than what the state claimed. The role of the four aspects discussed were crucial and central for the annexation objectives.

The aspect of regional and international response as finding through our research is not a strong evidence but the case can be understood as being a diversionary conflict. But the regional and international aspect could as well be a future research on the annexation

of Argentina in the Falkland Island.

5.2 Russia annexation in Crimea. Diversionary war theory

Russian annexation in Crimea have been explained from different angles. The Russian annexation in Crimea had been carried out when the geopolitical system had been changed and was not annexation that has been expected. But our major focus here is can the diversionary war theory help us understand if the annexation was on diversionary. Through the lenses of the diversionary war theory I will try to discuss if the diversionary theory can help us understand the annexation in Crimea what was the role of political, economic, social and regional and international responses in the annexation.

Considering our diversionary war explanation on leaders with domestic problems might engage in diversionary conflict to divert the public attention. However, Putin's military action in the Crimea can be explained being a diversionary act. This is because in 2013-2014 run up was becoming less popular especially with urban elites. Not only elites but the number of the population who were associating with Russian problems have exceeded (Kuchinsky, 2014: 262).

Before the Crimean annexation Putin and his government was facing open criticism from the public. Among those were businessmen, entertainers, politicians and bureaucrats were in the first time coming with their denouncements and lack of satisfaction to Putin and his government. One major reason why elites were unhappy with Putin and his government was there were feeling insecure for their security and business due to Putin's ruling style in the country (ibid).

Not only the elites were the issue here who were showing dissatisfaction of Putin and his government. The first time in twelve years the number of ordinary citizens who asses that Putin specifically carries the blame for problems in Russia have reached fifty percent (50


Bodin (1955) suggested that the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing

it against sedition, rebellion, is to keep the subjects in amity with one another, and to this end to find an enemy whom they can make a common cause. However, Russian annexation could be understood as a political move aimed at settling domestic pressures the state was facing. And the only option the state could consider was not repression but choose the case of Crimea from the government policy menu in order to divert the popular attention. Therefore, the political factor played a significant role in the process of initiating the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Russian economic crisis was in the midst of crisis since from 2008. There were no better economic improvements in the country and during the annexation of Crimea in 2014 there were serious economic issues in the country. The GDP drop of Russia has exceeded against the contractions of 1990s. The economic crisis in Russia had caused more public grievances and the Russian was not in a position to meet these demands from the public caused by the economic crisis in the country. The major sectors affected were in the financial sectors of the country, heavily indebted enterprises, and a global commodity crunch (Biersack, O'Leary, 2014: 243-249). These economic crises in the country has brought with social problems in the country.

The rise of social unrest's in the country has shaken by Russian elites and became a worrying for the ruling class. Larger riots began in the country from 2010 continued until 2013. Attack on a mainstream of journalist, bigger riots in the capital Moscow, the murder of a young lawyer while in government custody, explosions in international airport (Kuchinsky, 2014: 268-271).

Despite of all these economic and Social problems in the country the Russian state step of annexing the Crimean had been seen and understood as way of diverting the public attention and settling these economic and social unrest's in the country. The option of oppressing the public was not the state's best policy option even though the state tried to use its authority but the Crimean annexation became as the best option for the state getting support from the public and settling these unrest's



courtesy of (*The policy alternatives approach* (Oakes, 2016: 436).

The policy alternatives of the diversionary war theory presented on the figure gives a good understanding on why the Russian state could not decide to oppress but instead Crimea annexation was the best policy the state could choose.

The Russian state behavior could best be explained as being a diversionary act. According to Keller and Foster that explained the in-group and the out-group perspective or “us” verses “them” (2009) the physiological point of leaders and how this affects leaders taking either using force or not using force when the degree of domestic troubles is high. For instance, the role of economic and social factor in the annexation of Russia is an evident that these factors have taken a bigger role in the process of the annexation and are seen to be some of the major factors that have initiated the annexation of Crimea by the Russian state.

On the other side and through the research there is another finding and explanations from some other scholars who disagree and argue that the annexation of Russia in Crimea was not diversionary but was geopolitical calculation both in the region and in the international political system by arguing that Russia was unhappy with NATO presence in the region. The central argument and the most debated subject was Russia saw as a threat

the Europeanization of former Soviet members in the region and the presence of NATO in the region.

Russia move of annexing Crimea had been explained from the angle of when the international system possess more pressure on another state this will have direct influence on the foreign policy of that state (Kenarov, 2015: 44). However, the central argument was NATO presence and the Europeanization process in the region was a political pressure for the Russian state. For instance, the other explanation brought forward was Russian annexation in the region was a geopolitical calculation of showing both in the region and international level on Russian expansionist ambition and its power in the region (Brletich, 2015: 12).

5.3 Summary of the Cases and Answering the Research Questions

Thoroughly analyzing the results found through the lenses of the diversionary war theory could help us understand partly that both annexations were carried in order to reap domestic support and divert the public tension and therefore, both annexation were diversionary acts. Through the analysis both Russia and Argentina were experiencing serious political, economic and social unrest's during the annexations. But through our research the findings of the Russian annexation might be understood as being pure political move since the case of NATO had been put more emphasis on. Answering the research question of this thesis the diversionary war theory can help us partly understand both annexations. In addition, the political, economic, social, and the regional and international factors have played a crucial role in the process and the decisions made on the annexations.

Two more findings in this research paper are the aspect of the regional and international aspects which some scholars in the academia have argued that the annexations were not diversionary but were geopolitical calculations both in the region level and international level. For example, the case of Russia annexation was aimed at balancing power in the region and in the international level because Russia was unhappy with

NATO presence and the Europeanization process in the region. On the other side the case of Argentina could be understood as being pure diversionary from the facts found but there was also dispute between Argentina and the Chile over small islands and the control over the Beagle channel in the region. Therefore, was showing their tough stand to the world and the regional states their tough stand over re-claiming their lost islands.

Finally, the diversionary war theory can help us understand that the annexation cases were diversionary conflicts but a further research could help us understand looking the annexations from the angle asking, were the Russia and Argentina annexations aimed at balancing regional and international power balance.

6 Final Conclusion

This research paper has analyzed if diversionary war theory can help us understand the annexation of Crimea and Falkland Island. Choosing the four aspects of Political, economic, social and regional and international responses we have concluded through our findings and analysis that the diversionary war theory can help us partly understand the annexations were carried out on the basis of diversionary war theory.

The research problem of this thesis raised of the use of external conflict to divert against growing domestic unrest by mobilizing the population has been a key strategy used by leaders to preserve their political future and reap domestic support through two main strategies, rally round the flag and the in-group and out-group perspective. unrest's (Oakes, 2012: 15). However, the academic research done on this phenomenon had mainly focused and explained annexation from the point of only having an occupation objective. The case briefings of the two countries that took the annexations revealed that there were domestic unrest's both in Russia and Argentina. The ruling class of both states were forced to make a decision on how best these domestic unrest's could be settle. Through the discussions and the literature, it revealed that states experiencing such social unrest's in the form of political, economy and social might either choose to oppress or take diversionary decision.

Our main focus in this thesis was to understand if the diversionary war theory can help us understand the annexations of Russia in Crimea and Argentina annexation in the Falkland Island. This thesis has chosen four aspects in order to understand the annexation cases. The four chosen aspects were political, economic, social and lastly the regional and international aspects. Through the lenses of the diversionary war theory and the analysis of the findings of this thesis it is an evident that the diversionary war theory can help us understand the annexations. In addition, the role of political, economic, social and regional and international responses played crucial role in the process and the decisions made on the annexations.

To tie the knot and bring a final word to this research through the use of the method and the findings of the empirical materials this research have answered the research questions and recommend a further research on if the annexations could be further researched if Russia and Argentina annexations could be understood by asking , were the Russian annexation in the Crimea and Argentina annexation in Falkland Island aimed at balancing regional and international power balance.

This research has focused if the diversionary war theory can help us understand the annexations of Crimea and Falkland Island. We have concluded through our findings and analysis that the diversionary war theory can partly help us understand the annexations. Researchers on the Russian annexation in Crimea had many of them strongly argued that the case of Russia was more on geopolitical calculation focusing more on the case of NATO presence in the region which the Russian state saw as a threat. However, a further research regarding on interviewing elites and policy makers in both countries that were present or have been part of the decision on the annexations could open up and give clear evidences on which ground were decisions of the annexations based.

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