

POLICY BRIEF

From fragility to resilience

Governance responses to climate–security risks

Berlin, September 2026 · On the road to COP31, Antalya

KEY MESSAGES

1. Climate and security risks now interact in ways that single-hazard institutions are not designed to manage. Early warnings exist, but clear authority to act, pre-arranged finance and multi-hazard resilience standards too often do not.
2. National planning shows the pattern. References to climate, peace and security rose from 30 percent of first-generation NDCs to 41 percent of third-generation submissions, and reach 70 percent among fragility-affected Parties, but the content stays diagnostic. Of 63 fragility-affected Parties, only 30 had submitted by the end of 2025.
3. Ukraine shows the compound case in practice: generation capacity fell from over 37 GW before the war to under 14 GW by end-2024, attacks continued through the 2025 to 2026 winter, and decentralisation is driven by security rather than sustainability.
4. The financing architecture reflects the same gap. Pre-arranged financing hit a record USD 9.4 billion in 2024, yet low-income and fragility-affected countries each received under 7 percent of it. In Europe, 80 percent of civil protection wildfire funding has gone to response rather than prevention.
5. Existing institutions can do this work. What they lack is operational rules: which body acts when a warning comes in, what releases the funding, and how resilience requirements are enforced.
6. The COP31 Action Agenda sets out ten priority themes. Climate, peace and security is not among them, so the agenda has to be carried through the tracks on cities, food and health.

Climate hazards rarely occur in isolation. Drought, flooding, extreme heat, wildfire, ecosystem loss and resource scarcity increasingly interact with armed conflict, displacement, energy disruption and institutional fragility. These interactions generate compound risks: shocks that arrive simultaneously or in sequence, reinforce one another, and exceed the mandates of institutions designed to manage hazards separately.

Forecasting and risk assessment have come a long way. What follows a warning has not. In most systems, no institution is formally responsible for acting on a warning; funding still requires a fresh decision once the warning arrives; and infrastructure standards address either climate risk or security risk, rarely both.

The OECD's latest fragility assessment counts 61 contexts in high or extreme fragility, 24 of them in armed conflict. About a quarter of the world's population lives in them, along with 72 percent of the world's extreme poor.¹

None of this is confined to fragile states. The gap between a warning and someone acting on it turns up in well-resourced systems too. Europe's 2026 wildfire season was fought by countries with functioning budgets and standing civil protection arrangements;² the EU has strengthened its resilience framework in recognition that energy, water and transport systems face climate, security and other interconnected risks;³ and climate, peace and security now appears in developed country NDCs.⁴ In fragile settings, the same institutional failure is more likely to cost lives and prolong recovery, which is why the evidence below draws on both.

Climate-security governance fails when early warnings are not paired with legally assigned authority, objective triggers, pre-authorised finance, and multi-hazard infrastructure duties.

DEFINITION

In this brief, anticipatory governance means institutional arrangements that assign decision authority, establish pre-agreed triggers, and release finance before compound climate-security risks escalate into humanitarian, economic or infrastructure crises.

On this definition, a governance response is operational only when it specifies who decides, on what evidence, by when, and using which pre-authorised resources. The sections below apply that test to four areas: national planning, decision authority, finance, and critical infrastructure resilience.




Figure 1. The operational chain. Each assessment section below identifies where the chain breaks.

Where governance falls short

National planning: recognition without responsibility

References to climate-related peace and security have increased across all three generations of NDCs, from 30 percent in the first round and 34 percent in the second to 41 percent in the third. Among fragility-affected Parties the figure reaches 70 percent, and the theme now appears in developed and developing country submissions alike.⁴ Measured against the operational test, however, the chain breaks at the second link, because the risk is recorded without naming the authority responsible for acting on it.

INDICATOR	THIRD-GENERATION NDCs
CLIMATE, PEACE AND SECURITY	Referenced by 41 percent of Parties, up from 30 and 34 percent in the first two rounds; 70 percent among fragility-affected Parties.
EARLY WARNING	Referenced by 66 percent; climate information services by 70 percent; disaster risk management by 76 percent.
NAP ALIGNMENT	Over 80 percent reference National Adaptation Plans or equivalent planning processes.
LOSS AND DAMAGE	Explicitly referenced by around 80 percent of developing country NDCs; 42 percent include a dedicated section.
SUBMISSION BY FRAGILITY-AFFECTED PARTIES	Only 30 of 63 had submitted by 31 December 2025.

Table 1. Third-generation NDC indicators. Source: UNDP NDC Insights Series, Final Issue, January 2026.

Three submissions show what substantive treatment looks like. Iraq places climate security among five pillars guiding its priority sectors, links upstream dam construction and weak transboundary cooperation to local disputes, and reports at least 90 documented climate and environmental conflicts since 1967, largely tied to water scarcity. Somalia includes dedicated sections on climate-related security risks and on conflict sensitivity. Ukraine sets out how warfare has raised emissions, disrupted data collection and reshaped the baseline for climate action.⁴

These percentages cover only the countries that have submitted. Of 63 Parties identified as affected by fragility and conflict, only 30 had submitted a third-generation NDC by 31 December 2025.⁴ Analysis of the previous cycle points the same way, finding that high climate vulnerability combined with political instability predicts late or absent submission.⁵ This creates a material representational gap: third-generation NDC evidence is least available in many of the contexts where climate-related fragility and conflict risks are most acute.

The 2026 submissions have deferred the question rather than closed it. Over 60 Parties postponed their pledges from COP30 to 2026, and the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee recorded 149 NDCs by July 2026,⁶ but no published analysis has yet coded the 2026 cohort for climate, peace and security content. Whether the 41 percent figure rises or falls as the remaining fragility-affected Parties report is the single most useful thing an assessment before COP31 could establish.

Decision authority: warning without a decision rule

Two-thirds of third-generation NDCs reference early warning systems and 70 percent reference climate information services.⁴ The published analysis records no equivalent specification of the step that follows: which body holds decision authority when a hazard crosses a border, on what timeline it must act, and which funds are released without a fresh appropriation. In terms of the operational test, the signal exists and the response is described, but the authority and timeline that should connect them are missing.

Finance: the money is not arranged before the crisis

Pre-arranged financing refers to funding approved in advance and released when predefined trigger conditions are met. It reached a record USD 9.4 billion in 2024, driven largely by contingent loans, and payouts more than doubled to USD 879 million. The distribution is the problem: in 2024, low-income countries and fragile and conflict-affected situations each received less than 7 percent of the total, and development partner support stood at roughly 1.2 percent of total crisis financing.⁷ Analysis of OECD data found that 24 of the most fragile and conflict-affected countries received around USD 8.4 billion in climate funding against costed adaptation needs of some USD 35 billion a year, as stated in their own NDCs and NAPs.⁸ A High-Level Panel convened by the Centre for Disaster Protection has called for a tenfold increase in the pre-arranged share of crisis finance by 2035, from about 2 percent to 20 percent, with priority for least developed countries and small island developing states.⁹

Critical systems: the compound case is already running

Ukraine is the clearest working example of climate and security pressures on one system. Generation capacity fell from more than 37 GW before the war to under 14 GW by the end of 2024, with damage to energy infrastructure through 2024 estimated at over USD 20 billion in joint assessments by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the EU and the UN.¹⁰ Through the 2025 to 2026 winter, attacks were sustained and systematic, extending to district heating in the coldest winter since 2010,¹¹ and in June 2026 a night of strikes left approximately 140,000 Kyiv residents without electricity.¹² Assessments at the end of that winter found repair capacity constrained and equipment reserves insufficient for rapid restoration.¹³

The main governance lesson lies in Ukraine's response. Because large plants are easy targets, the state has prioritised decentralised generation and rooftop solar with storage. As the IEA notes, decentralisation elsewhere is driven by sustainability; in Ukraine the driver is energy security.¹⁴ In operational practice the two agendas have already converged, well ahead of policy design.

Critical systems: resilience standards set in separate tracks

That convergence is not yet reflected in how standards are written. Resilience requirements are typically set separately by climate adaptation authorities and by civil protection or security regulators, so an asset can satisfy an adaptation standard and remain at a single point of failure in a security scenario. The EU's Critical Entities Resilience Directive offers a particularly relevant regional example of multi-hazard resilience governance.³

The Directive covers eleven sectors, among them energy, transport, drinking water and health. Member States must adopt a national resilience strategy, carry out risk assessments, and identify their critical entities. Its obligations reach operators only once they have been transposed into national law, and the deadlines are recent: strategies were due by January 2026 and lists of critical entities by July 2026, so practice will differ from one Member State to the next. What other regions can take from it is the method. A single risk assessment covers natural hazards, sabotage and hybrid threats together, instead of separate plans for each threat. The Directive does not, however, integrate climate and security risk as such, and it has no role in adaptation finance.

Wildfire: a working decision rule, and a budget that lagged behind it

Europe's 2026 wildfire season is the clearest current test of anticipatory governance in a system that has one. By 5 August 2026, 505,683 hectares had burned across Europe since the start of the year, against 379,392 hectares by the same date in 2025, with seven activations of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism recorded.¹⁵

The mechanism itself satisfies the operational test in a way most climate-security arrangements do not. An affected country, inside or outside the EU, requests assistance; the Emergency Response Coordination Centre receives the request, coordinates offers and deploys. Capacity is positioned before the season rather than assembled during it: for 2026 the rescEU fleet held 22 firefighting aircraft and 5 helicopters across 12 countries, with 777 firefighters from 14 countries pre-positioned in Cyprus, Greece, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal, the highest participation since pre-positioning began in 2022.² Signal, authority, trigger and response are all specified.

The finance link remains the weakest part of the chain. An external analysis of EU Civil Protection Mechanism wildfire-related spending found that approximately 80 percent of EUR 368.4 million supported reactive measures, compared with 20 percent directed to prevention.¹⁶ That figure is a journalistic assessment rather than an official EU accounting classification, and should be read as indicative. A standing decision rule attached to a budget weighted towards response moves capacity quickly once a fire is burning, but does less to reduce the conditions that let fires become disasters.

The Commission has recognised the imbalance. Its March 2026 Communication on integrated wildfire risk management, issued in line with the Preparedness Union Strategy, places explicit emphasis on prevention: ecosystem-based measures and fire-resilient landscapes, updated risk assessment guidelines for Member States, expansion of the rescEU fleet, a European firefighting hub in Cyprus, and further development of the European Forest Fire Information System for early warning and monitoring.¹⁷ It is the right direction, and it also illustrates this brief's central point. The instrument chosen to anchor the approach is a proposed Council Recommendation, which is not binding on Member States. Prevention duties that carry no legal obligation, deadline or consequence remain guidance, however well designed.

Coordination: mandates without decision powers

Fragmentation persists because mandates, funding streams and reporting lines reward it. Coordination bodies frequently lack formal decision authority or delegated budgetary powers, limiting their ability to convert shared risk assessments into timely action. Where cross-border cooperation exists it is often built on informal relationships rather than standing arrangements, and does not reliably survive changes of government or the onset of a crisis.

The COP31 window

Much of the debate at COP level still turns on whether security language belongs in climate negotiations. Parties have moved past it: they are making the link in their own submissions, and the more exposed they are, the more likely they are to do so. How that link is framed still matters. Security narratives shaped by the priorities of a few Global North states have met resistance from Global South governments, and recent analysis of the emerging nature, peace and security agenda warns that state-centric framings risk alienating key stakeholders and undermining cooperation.¹⁸ What remains is largely practical: decision-makers are not named, triggers are not agreed, funds are not committed in advance, and resilience standards are not reconciled. Most of that can be written into instruments that already exist, from adaptation planning and loss and damage arrangements to transboundary water agreements and civil protection frameworks.

COP31 takes place in Antalya from 9 to 20 November 2026, with Türkiye holding the presidency and Australia presiding over negotiations.¹⁹ The Global Climate Action Agenda presented at Bonn on 9 June 2026 names ten priority themes: zero waste, oceans and seas, food security, climate-resilient cities, powering climate action, youth and education, green industrialisation, clean energy transition, Rio synergy, and dynamic and resilient health systems, with finance, technology and capacity building as horizontal enablers. Climate, peace and security is not among them, and the three headline targets address electrification, waste growth and building energy intensity.²⁰

The omission matters because of what preceded it. The COP27 Presidency launched Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace; COP28 held the first Relief, Recovery and Peace Day at any COP, with a declaration endorsed by over 90 states and 40 organisations; the COP29 Presidency launched the Baku Call on Climate Action for Peace, Relief and Recovery.²¹ All three sat outside the formal negotiations, so no successor presidency was obliged to continue them. The COP31 Action Agenda does not include a dedicated climate, peace and security track.

The practical route at Antalya is to carry anticipatory governance into themes already on the agenda. Three offer direct entry points: climate-resilient cities, which covers resilient infrastructure and risk insurance; food security, which covers water and drought; and resilient health systems, which covers early warning and outbreak monitoring.

The most useful negotiated outcomes to build on come from Belém. COP30 adopted 59 voluntary indicators under the Global Goal on Adaptation, covering the eleven targets of the UAE Framework and including the reach of early warning systems and access to adaptation finance, though the package was tabled late and several Parties objected.²² The Mutirão decision calls for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035, read as tripling the Glasgow goal to about USD 120 billion, with no stated baseline.²³ The Baku Adaptation Roadmap sets a 2026 to 2028 work programme, and the NAP negotiations stalled since COP29 concluded with a decision recognising the 71 NAPs submitted.²²

Across planning, finance, infrastructure and coordination, the same gap recurs: warning systems are more developed than the legal and financial arrangements needed to act on them. The recommendations below are designed to close that gap.

Recommendations

01 Move from referencing climate-security risk to assigning responsibility for it

For: National governments and line ministries

Where an NDC or NAP identifies a climate-security risk, name the body responsible for acting on it and the trigger at which it acts. With 41 percent of Parties already referencing the linkage and over 80 percent aligning NDCs with NAPs, the drafting vehicle exists; what is missing is the assignment of authority.

02 Pre-authorise trigger-based finance, and direct it to fragile contexts

For: Finance ministries, development banks, climate funds

Agree in advance which indicators trigger disbursement, at what threshold and to whom, with simplified access for conflict-affected contexts. Raising the pre-arranged share of crisis finance toward the 20 percent proposed for 2035 would convert a political decision taken under time pressure into an administrative one taken in advance.

03 Close the submission gap for fragility-affected Parties

For: UNFCCC Secretariat, UN system, bilateral partners

Treat NDC preparation support for the fragility-affected Parties still outstanding as a climate-security priority in its own right, including simplified data requirements where conflict has disrupted statistical systems, a constraint Ukraine documents explicitly in its own submission.

04 Reconcile adaptation and civil protection standards for critical infrastructure

For: Regulators, infrastructure operators, civil protection authorities

Adopt a single multi-hazard risk assessment for energy, water and transport systems, drawing on the method of the EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive, and prioritise decentralised generation where single points of failure carry both climate and security exposure.

05 Carry anticipatory governance into the COP31 Action Agenda themes

For: Parties, presidency partners, Action Agenda coordinators

With no dedicated peace and security theme at Antalya, embed decision authority and financing triggers within the resilient cities, food security and health systems tracks, and press for fragility-sensitive reporting against the Belém indicators on early warning reach and access to adaptation finance.

06 Agree damage assessment and accountability methods in advance

For: International organisations, recovery planners, negotiators

Agree methodologies for assessing climate- and conflict-related damage, attributing responsibility and conditioning recovery finance on climate-aligned reconstruction. Recovery choices are made within months of a crisis; disputes then lock in high-carbon rebuilding.

07 Establish a legal duty for anticipatory climate-security governance

For: National legislatures, governments and regulators

Adopt or amend climate, civil protection, public finance and critical infrastructure legislation to require periodic multi-hazard climate-security risk assessments; designate accountable decision-makers with coordination powers; establish trigger-based anticipatory financing; and impose resilience, continuity and reporting duties on operators of essential services. The statutory test is simple: every credible warning must have a responsible authority, a decision deadline, a financial trigger and an enforceable response measure.

RECOMMENDATION	INSTITUTIONAL HOME	INSTRUMENT	INDICATOR
01 RESPONSIBILITY	Line ministries, NDC and NAP focal points	NDC and NAP revision cycles	Share of NAPs naming a delegated trigger authority
02 FINANCE	Finance ministries, MDBs, climate funds	Contingency finance facilities, risk pools	Share of adaptation finance pre-arranged for fragile contexts
03 SUBMISSION GAP	UNFCCC Secretariat, UN system	NDC preparation support, Climate Promise	Fragility-affected Parties reporting, from 30 of 63
04 STANDARDS	Regulators, civil protection authorities	CER transposition, national resilience strategies	Sectors under a single multi-hazard assessment
05 COP31	Parties, Action Agenda coordinators	Action Agenda themes, Belém indicators	Fragility-disaggregated reporting on early warning reach
06 ACCOUNTABILITY	International organisations, recovery planners	Damage assessment methodologies	Recovery frameworks with climate-aligned conditions
07 LEGAL DUTY	National legislatures and regulators	Climate, civil protection, public finance and CER transposition law	Statutory duties naming authority, deadline, trigger and enforceable measure

Table 2. Implementation pathways.

Embedding this in law

Voluntary coordination is insufficient where delayed action can disrupt essential services or lock in high-carbon reconstruction. The operational layer of climate-security governance therefore has to be embedded in law, budgets, regulatory licences and public-investment rules rather than in declarations.

A statutory climate-security duty should contain four minimum elements: a recurring multi-hazard risk assessment; a designated public authority with defined coordination powers; objective triggers that require action within a specified timeframe; and a pre-authorised financing or regulatory mechanism. A duty without an accountable authority, deadline, trigger and consequence remains a planning aspiration rather than an enforceable governance rule.

At EU level, the more legally credible route is not to call for a new climate–security directive. The Critical Entities Resilience Directive already supplies a horizontal multi-hazard framework for the resilience of essential services, and national legislation can go beyond its baseline.³

In practice, that means building climate–security criteria into the way Member States transpose and implement the CER Directive, so that climate risk is assessed alongside other hazards and not in a separate process. The resulting duties should then be tied to adaptation planning, energy regulation, civil protection, public procurement, and cohesion and reconstruction funding. Where the EU finances infrastructure in fragile or conflict-affected contexts, a multi-hazard, conflict-sensitive assessment should be a condition of that support. Finally, the duties need to be enforceable. Attached to regulatory licences and funding conditions, they would ensure that a missing decision-maker or trigger has consequences.

At UNFCCC level, this is a matter of domestic implementation and does not require a new treaty. Legislative authority and budget control remain national. What COP31 actors can usefully supply is model legal principles, NAP guidance, fragility-sensitive criteria for adaptation finance, and reporting indicators against which national duties can be assessed.

Method and limitations

This brief assesses climate–security governance across four areas. National planning and decision authority draw on published analysis of third-generation NDCs, principally UNDP's NDC Insights Series. Finance draws on OECD data and reporting on pre-arranged crisis financing. Critical systems draw on EU critical infrastructure legislation and on IEA, World Bank and UN reporting on Ukraine. Process material comes from COP31 Presidency documents issued at Bonn in June 2026.

Four limitations follow. Each figure is the most recent published at August 2026, but vintages differ: submission counts to July 2026, NDC percentages to December 2025, financing to 2024 flows, and the OECD fragility framework largely to 2023. A reference in an NDC is a weak proxy for implementation. Fragility status follows the source datasets, which use differing thresholds and are not directly comparable. And the sections on infrastructure standards and coordination rest on qualitative assessment, since no dataset of equivalent coverage exists.

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