

**9.6. Elements of philosophical rhetoric (E.WR.).**  
**Third year of philosophy) 1995/1996**  
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*Contents: see p. 32*

Ever since the ancient Greek Protosofistics, a philosophical movement between -450 and -350, incorporated rhetoric, in its then form, into philosophy, a course in “Rhetoric” in the context of philosophy has been “normal. Yet today’s rhetoric is a very recent fact. From what? Because under the influence of a certain form of modern rationalism as well as a result of the failure to update traditional rhetoric, the subject of ‘rhetoric’ disappeared especially last century.

***The lemma.***

‘Lemma’ means ‘provisional definition’. As a lemma of rhetoric, the term “linguistic competence” can apply. One is familiar with the expression “to be well tale”.

One can also introduce the term ‘rapport’. Thus, that ‘rhetoric’ means ‘theory of language’ or ‘theory of understanding’.

***The “elements”.***

‘Element’ means both ‘part’ or ‘member’ and ‘premise’ (in the latter sense it coincides with ‘premise’). “Elements of rhetoric” thus means “the parts or instances that must be put in front if the term ‘rhetoric’ is to be understood.”

This implies that one would have to bring up **a.** the whole of rhetoric, **b.** all rhetoric, and **c.** the whole of all rhetoric in order to be encyclopedically complete. Which nobody can do. Which, for another, is also not necessary for our purpose here.

Therefore, the chapters will bear the name “sample,” i.e., “grasp” in the totality of rhetoric, in the totality of all rhetoric, and in the totality of all rhetoric.

*As an aside*, this is one application of the inductive (= generalizing or generalizing) method.

***Philosophical is ontological.***

The essential distinction between ordinary knowing, scientific knowing on the one hand, and philosophical knowing on the other, lies in the ontological character of all true philosophizing. ‘Ontology’ means ‘theory of reality’. It brings up reality as reality. In antique Greek language “bring up being(s) as being(s)”.

This can be done in two ways.

**a.** Reality is given (phenomenon, all that shows itself).

**b.** ‘Actual’ is also all that responds to the statements contained in the data.

Hegel, the German thinker, introduced this second meaning of “real(ish)” very clearly. It corresponds to the dichotomy “task (= given + problem)/solution” already used by ancient mathematicians. Is real (understand: true to reality) that solution which answers both the given and the requested or problem.

***Applied.***

**a.** Rhetoric, at least since the ancient Sophists, is a given and therefore “real” in the phenomenal sense.

**b.** The rhetoric of the ancient Sophists already answered a need (=problem): it was an element of education for “sound” citizenship. Those who were “well-talented” could “assert themselves” in the “agora”, the public assembly, or at the court or simply in any discussion. For some sophists, who had already been uprooted, “rhetoric” became synonymous with “asserting oneself through thick and thin, up to the unscrupulous but ‘expert’”.

Today, more and more marketing specialists (sales experts) are discovering the real value of ancient rhetoric: already in ancient times it had the character of “selling the goods” (first of all in the sense of “convincing the fellow man”, “persuading the fellow man”).

***Current “illiteracy.”***

To illustrate the current usefulness of rhetorical education the following.

**1.-- M. Tores** (Washington), *90 millions d’Américains à demi illettrés*, (90 million Americans are semi-literate), in: *Journal de Genève/ Gazette de Lausanne* 13.09.1993.

“The alarming news has been echoed throughout the American press: nearly half of adults in the U.S. - some 90 million - read and write so poorly that it constitutes a true handicap for their work.”

Congress ordered a study in 1988 on the subject. “Adult Literacy in the USA” cost \$14,000,000. 26,000 adults were vetted as a sample.

The results confirm the fears expressed many times by teachers and hiring managers: 90,000,000 adults can barely fill out the Social Security form. They cannot write a letter to notify the bank of an error in the bill. They cannot calculate the difference in price between two products. They cannot calculate the difference between the regular and the solvent price.

They cannot decipher the tables of train departure times. Forty million adults cannot locate an intersection on a city map. Only 20% of them can use a press article to calculate the average cost of raising a child. - So much for some data.

*As an aside*, all education reforms notwithstanding, many educationists have the impression that things will not look that much better with us over time!

2.-- *F. Mansour, Ces universitaires qui ne savent pas écrire*, (Academics who can't write), in: *Journal de Genève/ Gazette de Lausanne* 05.09.1994.

The Faculty of Letters, in Switzerland, introduces a hitherto unheard of certificate: “*Techniques de communication écrite*”, (Written Communication Technique). Goal: to fill the gaps in “qualified sectors”!

To believe that the schools (in Switzerland), including the higher ones, teach the language skills that are required today is unreal. “In general, students have enormous difficulties in organizing the paragraphs of a text and drafting a text.

Stellar Of The Article. -- “Is a license at a university enough to demonstrate language proficiency (in French)? The answer is clearly: no!

**a.** Some pros: “Most students struggle with enormous problems getting a treatise drafted.

**b.** Too many people cannot handle the techniques of text reading and text drafting - required by their profession. Hence the new certificate. It is issued to all those who, as professionals or as graduates, learn to draft a text: a bulletin, a sheet, a communication, an article, a file.

Up to there two samples. Now for the explanations.

**1.--** *Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism* (1978), which we will not discuss further here, dissects one factor, narcissism or self-importance.

**2.--** The more recent “irrationalism”.-- What can be called “anti-intellectualism” (the aversion to all things rational), already began with the Sturm-und-Drang and part of Romanticism (1790+).

Genius cult, individualism,--precedence of feelings (within the Sturm-und-Drang this went to a kind of premature nihilism (reduction of traditional and especially modern-rational values)) gave rise to a kind of underestimation, yes, contempt concerning all that is rational.

**3.--** The older positivism, headed by A. Comte (1798/1857), has been characterized by an underestimation of all that is language,--even in scientific work.

**4.--** The ‘Counterculture’ (Anti-culture), since the Beatnik’s (1950+) and the Hippies and Yippies (1962+), in the USA and also with us, was thoroughly anti-intellectualist: ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ were considered the killing factors within the established, ‘rationalist’ society.

Add to this the manuals, instead of “updating” the old rhetoric, i.e. adapting it to the developing actuality, remained stuck in outdated representations. So much so that the tem “hollow rhetoric” became common.

Up to there some elements at work in the decline of traditional rhetoric.

### ***The revival.***

A work like *S. IJsselinck/ G. Vervaecke, Renaissance of Rhetoric*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1994, outlines the recent rise. Importance of rhetoric for man today, rhetoric in visual communication, theory of signs (de Saussure) in ancient rhetoric, tropology (metaphor/ metonymy/ synecdoche) in rhetorical language etc. are discussed. This multifarious theme shows the many parts or aspects of the one rhetoric.

Among the factors, let us mention what *Brigitte Hernandez, Voyage en librairies*, in: *Le Point* 1167 (28/01/1995), teaches us.-- During 1993, the amount of the book market, in France, in terms of publishing, distribution through bookstores, was 22 billion French francs (+- x 6.25 BFr). Some 40,000 titles (17,000 new books, reprints) were published. 9.6 million copies were sold.-- In other words, people are reading! Much more than ever before.

### ***Other elements.***

Works such as *Ch. Perelman/ L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’ argumentation* (Treaty of the argumentation), (1958) or *St. Toulmin, The Uses of Argumentation* (1958) set in motion a real revival almost, at least actualization of ancient rhetoric.

After all, one can also define “rhetoric” as “the skill of making an argument. Hence, every textbook of rhetoric contains an argumentative essay.

A certain Neo-Sophisticianism, since Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900) especially, places rhetoric at the center to such an extent that even scientific texts are examined for their linguistic competence and that philosophy is simply reduced to a form of “literature” and “rhetoric.

Thinkers such as J. Derrida (1930/.... ) drive this through to and including a ‘dismantling’ (‘déconstruction’) of the claims of sciences and especially philosophy to objective, universally valid truth. Rhetoric thus becomes the all-encompassing insight.

More recent criticism of science also contributes to the demystification of the claims of science. One reads e.g. A. Chalmers, *What is science called? (On the Nature and Status of Science and Its Methods)*, Boom/ Amsterdam, 1981-1; 1984-3 (// *What is This Thing Called Science?*, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1976). Induction is central.

Popper’s falsificationism (what is falsifiable can contain objective truth), Lakatos’ research programs, Kuhn’s “paradigms (i.e. valid models of scientific work, -- valid in the eyes of ... evolving research communities), Feyerabend’s anarchism on knowledge of truth are equally critical of the high claims of “science” “dismantling! Such that one gets the impression that scientific speech too is only rhetoric and not actually strictly objective knowledge: the argumentation is more than the objective facts.

However, this does not prevent “science” from undergoing a stormy development in the meantime: “In 1959, J. T. Thykouner published an *alphabetical catalog* of all the sciences then in existence: he had found 1150 of them. But now there are certainly several dozen more”. (I. Gérardin, *Bionics (Link between biologist and engineer)*, World Academy (// *La bionique* (1968)), 7). The active scientists foragers especially - seem to have their ‘arguments’ to ‘believe’ in the sense of science anyway!

**Conclusion:** What was abolished last century, rises again from its ashes! Rhetoric is flourishing as never before.

**Sample 1.-- The thesis (thesis) of a text.** (06/08)

We cross the line “in the midst of texts”! Soon there will be time and place for theory.

We first read a text on its ‘proposition’ or ‘thesis’ (Lat.: *propositio*), i.e. the judgment that can creatively summarize the whole text. But first the text.

**A.-- *Bibl. st.:*** *H. Bierhoff/ S.J. Prais, Schooling as Preparation for Life and Work in Switzerland and Britain, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1995.*

See here how *L. Lema, A quoi est due la réussite des écoliers helvétiques?*, (What is the reason for the success of Swiss schoolchildren?), in: *Journal de Genève/ Gazette de Lausanne* 07.03.1995, summarizing.

**1.-- The fact**

Some 75 mathematical questions were presented to thirteen-year-old students (11n.) as part of an international test experiment.

Result: the Swiss schoolchildren achieved an average that only the best British schoolchildren. achieved. By the way: all other countries scored less than the Swiss children.

For example: to the question “Which natural number answers  $5/8$ ?” 56/100 Swiss schoolchildren answered correctly, while the British schoolchildren managed only 13/100. To which a question arises, of course.

**2.-- The statement (elements).**

British researchers checked. Here are some of the factors.

(1) The British bumped into the Swiss educational tradition.

*J.J.Rousseau* (1712/1178; *Emile* (1762)) and *J.H. Pestalozzi* (1746/1827), in whose wake *J. Piaget* (1896/1980), -- the latter known for his works on measure and development of abilities of the child, mastered the school system.

Although the whole of Europe, indeed the whole planet, has been under the influence of these educators, Switzerland is indisputably the country where their ideas were worked out in the best conditions.

**(2) Further clarifications.**

These are the following.

**(2)a1.-- The educational environment.**

The school handbook stands out. The teacher sticks to it. It can be taken home where it is also available for parents to peruse.

The handbook donates a structure to the school labor of the children.

In contrast: in Britain, there is a “doctrinal opposition” to anything that even smacks of a method from which the teacher does not deviate.

(2) a2.-- *The leadership.*-- In Switzerland, there is no tension between superintendents, principals, and teachers. This creates a better common climate. This favors the learning process.

(2)b.-- *The foundations.*-- The basic model.

(2)b1.-- *Basic science.*

The Swiss model puts basic competencies at the center, which make up the pedestal. The students must acquire them together. Indeed: greater emphasis is placed on elementary skills: only when these are acquired by all the students does the whole class go one step further. All must be able to keep up.

In Great Britain, however, the students are more “left to their own devices”: the focus is on the strictly individual development of each student. This works out well for some of the students. But in classes of twenty or thirty pupils such individual education is very difficult if one wants to take into account the skill and ignorance of each pupil.

(2)b2.-- *Group work in horseshoe form.*

Swiss classes work with groups. Yet the benches are usually placed in a horseshoe shape, centered around the teacher, who thus remains even physically central.-- And individual and group come into their own.

British elementary school focus on group work. The benches are arranged so that a good half of the pupils sit with their backs to the teacher! The teacher spends the day going from one group to another, leaving too little time to keep track of each pupil individually.

(3).-- *Tradition.*-- In Switzerland, classes are more traditional. They aim at progress but together,-- with all the children who have to go along. Immediately they level off the level differences between “good” and “less good” children.

So much for the Swiss report.-- What is a report? That is one type of text. It states the main points, as faithfully as possible (i.e., it is a description) If it is a summary report. It goes into detail, if it is a detailed report. Being able to “cover” is a skill of a rhetorical nature.

**Report and Thesis.**

A good report summarizes, whether the report is detailed or concise. That summary hinges on stating the thesis. By what means? Because the thesis or thesis itself is already the summary of the text!

Note how two types of texts are present in the report.

**1.- A story.**

What is a story? A story is a description or representation of an event. Here it is the fact (the international trial with the surprising result).

*As an aside*, a story consists of at least two basic elements, the foreshadowing and the sequel.

For example, “When Daisy arrived, the lady became very tired”. The fact that Daisy arrives is already a piece of the story in itself. One expresses that piece by saying, “Daisy arrives”. But this is only the run-up (pre-note) to a real story. The real story begins with e.g.: “When Daisy arrived, the lady became very tired”. Where the preface (sentences 1) is foreshadowing and the afterword (concl.) is the sequel. Only then does one have a (core of a) real story.

**2.-- A reasoning.**

That reasoning is contained in what we called “the statement” above.

A reasoning is always the continuation of a fact or fact (Given) or phenomenon, i.e. something that shows itself. But then in such a way that the fact (Given, phenomenon) raises a question. That question is called “the demanded” (asked).

Well, a reasoning responds to the demanded (one also says “the sought”), insofar as that demanded or problem asks for an explanation, statement, clarification, etc.

So that the Swiss report includes both story (description) and reasoning.

As a result, the report is a treatise. A treatise is a text that contains more than descriptions, more than stories, more than reports.

Descriptions, respectively stories and reports are subordinate elements. A treatise argues, i.e. tries to convince. Of what is it trying to convince? Of a thesis or proposition.

In the above case, the thesis is: due to their own model (tradition, atmosphere, leadership, basic skills, horseshoe shape etc.), Swiss schools achieve better results than e.g. British ones.

Pay attention to how tradition, atmosphere (school handbook), leadership, basic skills, horseshoe shape, etc. are represented descriptively and narratively, respectively.



**Sample 2.-- The essence of description.** (09/10)

Let's start with a mini-example.

“As a gateway to the region of the globe that is experiencing the strongest economic growth, Hong Kong is at the heart of the economic vortex that will transform not only China but Asia and the entire economy of the planet,-even if that role of gateway means a frenzied price in terms of rents and commercial leases.” So says the economic magazine *Fortune*. (*Journal de Genève/ Gazette de Lausanne* 29. 10. 1994).

This is a description and not a story, even though it contains a future forecast (describing the opinion of a number of observers). It can be called a report to some extent, although this is not the explicit intention. After all, the description can take the form of a report. Here in the sense that the description ‘beats’ facts!

**From definition (essence) to description.**

Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Logique*, in: *Cours de philosophie*, I (*Psychologie Logique*), Paris, 1933-27, 497, says that an essence determination or definition is the representation of the whole and only of the whole phenomenon or given.

In other words: there is a one-sentence relationship between (the properties or essence of) the given and its representation.

This means that the (good) definition is actually a description, i.e. the correct one - an unequivocal) representation of (the essential characteristics of) the whole given and only of the whole given. It is about a description of the essence form (understand: that which makes the given distinguishable from the whole rest of reality) that is kept as short as possible.

**As an aside**, ontological is essence AND existence (how real is the given?) AND essence (how is the given real?) of the given.

Thus, what is called “describing” amounts to an expanded or amplifying definition.-  
- This means literally filling the creature form with conditions.

C. Ansotte, *Traité pratique de rédaction et d' élocution*, (Practical treaty of writing and elocution), Dour, 1910, 61, sees two aspects or “elements”:

- a. the totality of the data (understand: not a mutilated form of the phenomenon) and
- b. Circumscribed. See what a description is.

***The (creature) characteristics.***

Note that the term “property” is used by us in the Platonic sense.-- As *G.J. Warnock, Qualities*, in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1967, 18, 914/916, says: the term “poiotès,” Lat.: qualitas, property or trait, means all that makes something distinct from the rest of reality.

***Consequently:***

- a. relations are ‘properties (which the current logistics e.g. will not say);
- b. value traits are “properties”.

For example, “Hong Kong is in the vortex” expresses a relation (to the rest of Asia and the planet). But, since that relationship is a characteristic (essence trait) or ‘property’ of Hong Kong, it serves as a descriptive element. E.g., “A frenzied price” indicates a value judgment. In which a characteristic, typical for Hong Kong, is expressed. What fits into a (creature) description.

*As an aside*, how can a value judgment be tolerated in a description? After all, a pure description postpones all own value judgments. It is clear - here - that the little article merely describes the value judgment of others without making a value judgment of its own. So that the value element is tolerable in a pure description.

***Description is not an explanation.***

This is where what E. Husserl (1959/1938; founder of intentional phenomenology) called “phenomenological reduction” comes in handy.

After all, in the description, the given (GG) is the requested or sought (GV)! Demanded is to render the given clean, pure, creature-like, ‘objective’.

We call the theme (subject of the description) pure conception according to its objective meaning “sense”, as distinct from “sense foundation”.

This is done by eliminating all that is not pure data or phenomenon. To reduce (‘reduce’) the representation to the pure phenomenon, That is ‘phenomenological reduction’.

This amounts to pure perception. Without explanations or value judgments, which are foundations, for they introduce something that is not present in the pure given. Thus a theory about the theme, a tradition around the given is eliminated. Also the descriptive self with its subjective reactions are eliminated in the pure description. Even the question of whether the given exists outside the consciousness of the descriptive can be banished.

**Sample 3.-- The essence of stories.** (11/12)

Do we start with a model again.

“A McLaren conductor afforded the opulence of driving a copy of the world’s most expensive - en route to an exhibition - into a crumple. His McLaren F-1, costing the small sum of 634,000 pounds sterling, skidded within a roundabout - an ordinary cattle car’s equal - and ended the ride against a pole.

“There was maybe a little bit of fuel oil on the road” explained a spokesman for the automaker. “The conductor is a bit impressed and embarrassed but he is not hurt. A reprimand will be incurred but he will not be discarded.

The repairs will take a week and should cost about 10,000 pounds sterling. The price of a car -- a decent car -- that the common man drives.-- The McLaren F-1 reached 372 km/h during the course of the test drives (...). Only three hundred copies will be put into circulation”. (*Reuter*). *Journal de Genève/ Gazette de Lausanne* 20.10.1994).

This can count as a kind of story, viz. The anecdote (from the ancient Greek ‘an.ek.doton’, unpublished). This is the short but pithy, cutting, sometimes witty (as here),-- in any case appealing form of telling.

**Note.--** Elsewhere we dwelt on what has been called for some years now: narratology, narrativism, narratiek, -- dietetics,-- Dutch: verhaalkunde, ‘storyology’.-- Just one remark on the subject.

*C.A. van Peursen, Narrative and Reality (A Deictic Ontology)*, Kampen/ Kapellen, 1992, characterizes (‘describes: ‘defines’, ‘typifies’) the most bedeviled question of current storytelling as follows:

**a.** an event is only an ‘event’ - understand: a coherent whole for thinking beings with the structure “omen (VT) / sequel (VV)” - when it is narrated;

**b.** a story only acquires a “structure” - understand: a single, unambiguous reference to what it is telling - in that it reflects an event somewhere.

Some exaggerating narrativists hereby claim that the reality of an event, before it is “structured” in a story, i.e., ascribed the essential form of an event, is just one big chaos or disorder, without structure (certainly not the structure that the narrative puts in it as a form of sense-making).

***The story.***

First of all: narration is description. This means that what we said about the description is also true of the story. It is a one-sentence account of a given (phenomenon) such that the requested (GV) is in turn the given (GG).

*B. Vouilloux, Le tableau, (The picture), in: Poétique 65, 11s.,* says that every theme (given, phenomenon) is amenable to two perspectives:

- a. it is represented in its synchronic form of being;
- b. it is presented in its diachronic form of being. The former is a mere description; the latter a narrative. So that we can define: the story is the representation of the diachronic form of being of a phenomenon.

We saw it already: the primal couple “omen / sequel” is the basic structure of all events. Even when the narrator reverses the sentence structure: “When Daisy arrived, the lady became very tired” means - according to the order in the objective event itself - exactly the same as “The lady became very tired when Daisy arrived”. Only as a figure of speech (as a saying) does both mean different things.

This means that - what thinkers have called since prehistoric times - “time” plays a decisive role both in the objective phenomenon and in the objective representation. Hence the term “slide” (through the course of) in the term “diachrony”.

***Narrative platitudes.***

A “platitude” is a point of view (view) that recurs again and again, thereby proving its usefulness.

***Application.***

The storytelling platitude par excellence is the answer to the question “what happened?” The term “what” points to essence. The term “is” points to existence. What was the event really like? Essence. How real was the happening? Existence.-- Always that ontological ground systechy (systechy = couple).

Second-order commonplaces specify the basic pairing. Thus: “Where did it happen?” (place). Similarly, “When did it happen?” (time). And most importantly, “How precisely did it happen?” (circumstantial essence).

**Note.--** The “chain”: “pre-knot” (Gr.: ekthesis; Lat.: expositio),-- knot (Gr.: desis), i.e. tension beginning,-- cover (Gr.: peripeteia) or peripetion, denouement (Gr.: lysis), remains a compound commonplace.

**Sample 4.-- the court story.** (13/14)

Stories, in turn, give “reality. But - not in the circumstantial but in the ontological sense of the word ‘reality’ - reality is plural:

**a.** pure really;

**b.** imagined real. A dream event, a utopian event: they are in the strictly ontological sense ‘realities: for they are not nothing!

Thus, one distinguishes the historical narrative from the imagined or fictional narrative. With in the middle the “mixed” narrative (think of a historical novel that “depicts” the past partly in an imagined way.

Some narrativists claim that all so-called “historical” stories are in fact “mixed” stories. This is precisely because each narrator of the past brings out only samples of that past and never the whole in its absolute flawlessness.

One can also call this the ‘subjective’ element. This is because the samples reflect the mentality (presuppositions, ‘axiomata’) of the narrative.

In other words: a historical narrative is never radically ‘objective’. However, the honest narrative does try to be as objective as possible.

**Bibl. st.:** H. Crombag/ P.Van Koppen/ W. Wagenaar, *Dubious cases (The psychology of criminal evidence)*, Amsterdam/ Antwerp,1992.

W. Wagenaar, “Where logic fails and stories convince (A consideration of criminal evidence), in: *Our Alma Mater* 45 (1991): 3 (august.), 258/278.

The first work looks at 35 arguable criminal cases (in the Netherlands). Judges too easily assume that a story is simultaneously evidence! After all, every court case begins with a story that tells where, when someone (the subject) committed a criminal act. Psychologists accuse judges of interpreting the evidence from a pre-given, untested (at least insufficiently tested) story. I.p.v. working the other way around: i.e. constructing a story from the evidence. Police investigations, interrogation methods, testimonies of experts and suspects, identifications are treated too uncritically.

The “persuasive” essence of some story weighs more than the bare, most correctly tested and deduced facts.

Which brings us into the midst of mixed narratives in which those involved defend a thesis: their story becomes a plea!

***An applicative model.***

Wagenaar, a.c., 258vv.. -- The story reads as follows.

Ms. A. has been living with her “boyfriend” since she was twenty-one years old. At a certain moment she confesses that six years ago she was “attacked by her father”. Whereupon the boyfriend persuades her to report the assault.

*As an aside*, this is a snappy example of what historians call “History from below” (histoire anecdotique, Alltagsgeschichte, everyday history).

***Two types of evidence.***

**a.** The strict logical proof: from the pre-sentences (VZ), which represent the facts, as far as they are known, necessarily follow the post-sentences (NZ), which prove the (un)guilt.

**b.** The logically probable proof: from the prepositional phrases do not necessarily, but only probably, follow the postpositional phrases.

***The evidence issue.***

The judges, faced with Ms. A.’s story, are left with a problem:

**a.** the father denies (of course);

**b.** obviously there is only one witness, A.

Wagenaar situates the case in the Netherlands.

**A.--** “The statement (= story) of precisely one witness is not sufficient evidence” (rule of law in the Netherlands).

**B. --** Dutch jurisprudence does add “additional evidence” to this.

**B.1.--** The statement (= narrative) of the appointed physician who, after medical examination, determines that A is “no longer a virgin.”

Which, given her living with her boyfriend, is natural. However, that fact is consistent with the claim that her father assaulted them. The latter argues in her favor, but in a very weak way, of course.

**B.2.--** The statement (= story) of her father: he admits that he was once alone in the house with the fifteen-year-old girl (which argues in favor of A.), but only administered “a hefty ramming” to them. Which leads Wagenaar to remark “Not so nice but a ramming is not yet rape.” (a.c., 259).

In other words: logically not sufficiently probative for A. ‘s claim (that she was assaulted by her father).

Experience proves that those involved each make their ‘story’, recited in a ‘statement’ in court, into a (Subjective) plea ... to ‘persuade’ the judges (which is pure rhetoric).

**Sample 5.-- The essence of a report. (15/16)**

The Van Dale says: "Report is the same as 'rapport: this is a (usually written) communication concerning (the circumstances of) an event or of a state of) something". Such a 'definition', while telling to the average consulting dictionary, is too anecdotal, i.e. gives samples rather than the general essence.

What is 'reporting': i.e. representing or explaining something as a reporter? We reread *E.WR. 07v.*: there we see that the journalistic report includes both story, respectively description in general and reasoning (explanation, clarification etc.). Which makes the report a short discourse.

But to be clear, the requested (GV) in a report can only be the given (GG) and thus be limited to mere description. Without taking a position.

**An applicative model.**

Take the book *G. Fain, trad., Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalisme, socialisme et démocratie*, Paris, 1951-1 ;1984-2.

On the cover is a "report" (one of many kinds).

*Joseph Aloys Schumpeter* was born, in Austria, in 1883 and, in the USA, died in 1950.-- He passes as one of the best economists of our time. He was the undisputed leader of the Vienna School. Later he became a professor at Harvard University. He quickly gained international acclaim.

His famous work - *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, London, 1942 - is considered one of the basic works on modern economics. It offers an unparalleled analysis of economic phenomena as we experience them.

Can capitalism survive? Can socialism succeed? Steller answers both questions. Meanwhile, he gives a premonition of how our economy will develop in tomorrow's world.

So much for the "enkomion," the laudatory text, on the cover.

**The platitudes.**

Reread We.

1. Schumpeter is situated in space and time (*E.WR. 12*).
2. His specialty and the degree of expertise in it.
3. His famous work. 2 and 3 make up the "circumstantial essence" both of himself and of his main work.

In other words: the cover story here amounts to a story (with the necessary descriptions). But that story is also a plea (*E.WR. 14*).

**Typology** (species theory).

There is the brief or short report (e.g. the characteristic of something) and the detailed or comprehensive report. Toward the object at hand, one distinguishes the case report (the phenomenon without a text) and the text report (the phenomenon is a text).

**The report**

(the clean report or the also interpretive report) is one type of report that appears +- 1880 (as a report in a daily newspaper).

*As an aside*, on TV and in magazines there are very often, lately especially, text and image reports that, under the appearance of being reproduced, are in fact an advocacy. This is called “one form of opinion” (influencing opinion). Which is actually not fair.

**The digest** from Emperor Augustus (-63/+14) to Emperor Justinian (482/565), the most famous court decisions were collected under the title “digesta” - is either an excerpt or a text reduced to smaller size.

The periodical that publishes such is also called “digest” (think Reader’s Digest).

**The talk** is either a lecture introducing a discussion or debate or a summary of a lecture. The term can also simply mean “report.

Typical of the referral in the latter sense are

- a. the concise summary of an article,
- b. with all source citations....

**The text contraction.**

Especially in France, a new type of report occurs (in entrance exams):

- a. Contraction (text contraction);
- b. Synthesis (multiple text contraction).

**An applicative model.**

“Duration: three hours. – *Given: Ropger Callois, L’esprit des sects* (The spirit of the sects).

Asked : summary in four hundred words,-- with exposure of main idea and line of thought, -- with declaration at end of copy of number of words used. -- Sometimes the number of words per line are mentioned in the margin of the copy.

Penalty: an excess of 10% is allowed. Above 440, points will be deducted per 10 words too many”.

In France, when more than one text is presented instead of just one, this is called “synthèse” (multiple text contraction).

Apparently in this method of questioning lies the will to nip useless flood of words in the bud.



**Sample 6. -- The essence of discourse.** (17)

The 'being' or also the 'essence form' (i.e. existence + essence) of something is that by which that something becomes distinguishable from the rest of reality.

So what is the essence of 'discourse: after we have briefly considered description, resp. narration, and report as basic elements of discourse?

**1.--** *E. Fleerackers, S.J., De verhandeling*, (The Treatise), Antwerp, 1944-13, defines, "The treatise is the reasoned development (amplification) of an (abstract) theme." Why do we put the term "abstract" in parentheses? Because a treatise can just as easily address a non-abstract theme!

**2.--** *S. Moss, Composition by Logic*, Belmont (California), 1966, 121/136 (*Opinion Statement*), specifies the artery of discourse, i.e. the thesis or thesis (*E. WR. 08*): "The opinion advocated (...) is the thesis which we wish to be true throughout the text" (o.c., 121).

**The arrangement** (= ordering).

The arrangement (train of thought, plan, sequence) reflects the unity in the multiplicity of the parts of a good treatise.

**1.** The thesis (Lat.: *propositio*) is touched upon in the introduction (attention-grabbing, benevolent mood e.g.), defined in the strict thesis (the thesis is explicitly stated), divided into the (main parts) in the format (enumeration of the main sections of the text).

**2.** The thesis is furnished with information in descriptions, respectively stories, and in reports, in the argument (argumentation, proof) either logically proved rigorously or made logically probable (*E.WR. 14*), in the eventual refutation by the reduction or deconstruction of each counter model (the opposite thesis) indirectly proven, in the comparison with other theses clarified.

**3.** The thesis is restated in the summary and briefly highlighted again in the conclusion (value judgment, anecdote, appeal e.g.).

**Note.--** One can, of course, arrange all these parts differently, but they are the commons that help define a discourse as its "elements," i.e., constituents of beings that make up its propositions.

**Sample 7.-- Brief typology of discourse.** (18)

A lot of layouts are possible. Here are a few.

1.-- Fleerackers, o.c., 13.

**The contemplation.**-- This term is the Old Dutch translation of the Greek ‘theoria’, lat.: *speculatio*, -literally: fathoming. A ‘*theorètikos*’, lat.: *speculator*, is an observer. A peeper or spy, a soldier on guard the ancient Romans called ‘*speculator*’. ‘*Speculation*’ meant “observing thoroughly about something”.

As an *aside*, Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500) called “*philosophia*” (general development) “*theoria*. Platon of Athens called his philosophy (with scientific claims) “*theorètikè to ontos*”, the perceptive fathoming of all that is.-- Fleerackers mentions two other types.

**The reverie.**-- This one is a contemplation but loaded with mind and sense of value.

**The plea.**-- This is also contemplation but with the intention of getting the fellow human being(s) to agree with the advocated proposition. We saw higher examples.

2.-- O. Pecqueur, *Manuel pratique de dissertation française*, (Practical manual of French essay), Namur, 1922-2, distinguishes other types.

**2. a. -- Informal discourse.**

“*Dissertation badine*”. -- To go into a theme unpretentiously and without regard to the formal requirements of a treatise is “*informal*” discourse. Many high school treatises amount to this.

**2.b.-- Formal discourse.**

Here the strict regulations of trading are consciously respected.-- Pecqueur distinguishes:

a. Literary (“*La Fontaine is the Homer of the French language*” (H. Taine) e.g. as a theme);

b. Scientific (“*Science, Industry and Poetry*” (M. Ducamp) e.g. as a subject),

c. Ethical-political (“*People ought to help each other*” (Lamennais); “*Self-love*” (La Rochefoucauld) are such thematata - actually to be called mind- or human-scientific.

**3.-- Platonic**

is the distinction between prefatory and philosophical treatises.-- A.R. Henderickx, *Justice in Platon's The state*, in: *Tijdschr. v. Philos.* 7(1945): 1/2.

Virtue (in the antique sense of “overall virtue”) is first vaguely described in a prescient ‘*sketch*’, (‘*hupografè*’),-- only to be very thoroughly philosophically dissected.

**Sample 8.-- The ancient 'chreia' (determination of being).** (19/22)

We saw that the form of being (that by which something is distinguishable from the rest of reality) can be clarified in the opposition pair or systechy “existence (the existence or non-existence of something)/ essence (the very being of that same something)” and in the circumstances. These form the basic structure of all discourse.

The ancient chreia or creature definition (*J. Fr. Marmontel* (1723/1799), *Eléments de littérature* (1787), thus defines the chreia) holds either a fact or a statement.

The eight-volume chreia (also Latinized as ‘chrie’) amounted to “a small page” in ancient secondary education (*H.I. Marrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, (History of education in antiquity), Paris, 1948, 241). It highlights the ambiguity of the theme and its approach; after all, the data (GG) is viewed from eight different angles (perspectives, samples) in the requested (GV).

**Application model.--** Here is a brief example.

**A.1.-- Given.--** “Isokrates of Athens (-436/-338; renowned rhetor or teacher of rhetoric; opponent of Platon) once said, ‘The roots of education appear bitter. The fruits, however, taste pleasant’.

**Note.--** Note in passing the tropic ‘roots’/ ‘fruits’ which stand for ‘formation’/ ‘result’. Such themata must first be stripped of their tropological character and translated into non-metaphorical or non-metonymical language.

**A.2.-- Requested.--** Development according to the eight headings of the chreia, So much for the task. Now for the development.

**B.1.-- Characterization of Isokrates.**

**As an aside,** “characteristic” or brief description of someone or something includes, traditionally, three aspects: inwardness/ outward appearance/ social influence.

Isokrates was rhetor. Leader of a rhetorical-philosophical school that rivaled the strict philosophical school (Academy) of Platon and advocated more general education (Philosophy 1) than strict scientific education (Philosophy 2). His influence was very great.

**Note.--** In antiquity, a characteristic was easily either “enkomioo,” praise speech (*E.WR. 15*) or also “psogos,” blame, branding, “criticism,” turning a pure “reflection” into either a reverie or a plea, i.e. allowing some value judgment to weigh in.

E.WR.

20.

**Note.--** A chreia can also concern a fact. The characteristic is then adaptable to the fact, of course. See one model *E.WR. 14*: The legal narrative that briefly outlines the fact.

*E.WR. 11* also provides a characterization or (brief) sketch in the first part of the story.

**B.II.-- *The rest of the chreia.*--** All the following capita or sections deal with aspects.

**II.a.-- *Paraphrase*** (description).

The ancient “paraphrasis” more often than not amounts to an abbreviated statement. In each case, it is a kind of interpretation in other words, without betraying the sense (what the utterance means in the first place) by some sense.

Here e.g.:

(1) Isokrates - in a metaphor - compares education to the structure of a plant whose roots appear bitter but whose fruits, on the contrary, turn out pleasant.

(2) By this he means that the practice (“sensitivity training”), inherent in education, is strict and causes stress, but with the result that one experiences in theory and praxis how useful this practice is.

In Hegelian-dialectical terms: the substructure of education is difficult; the superstructure is a delight.

**Note.--** The description when it comes to a fact is different: it can introduce further information so that the fact - captured in its sense (sentence summary) - is clarified.

Take as an example *E.WR. 06*, where “the fact” (the better succeeding of the Swiss children) is further described in the elements (tradition/atmosphere/leadership/ basic skills/ group work/ horseshoe arrangement etc.).

But here the description of the fact runs in tandem with the statement. Immediately she is long-winded.

**II.b.-- *Discourse*** (argumentation).

This lapses into several aspects.

**II.b.1.-- *positive argument*** (“verification”).

In ancient Greek ‘kataskeuè’. The assertion “hangs in the air” (is debatable) as long as it is not “proved. In other terms, before proof is given, an assertion is ‘unreal’ or at least ‘not actually made’, not ‘proved’-- The anecdote, further, can be used as an inductive form of proof or, to speak in the language of Karl Popper, as ‘verification’ (literally: truth-making).

**II.b.2.-- Negative argument** (“falsification”).

This is the refutation of the counter model. Here: the assertion that what Isokrates said is false.-- In ancient Greek ‘anaskeuè’. -- Here, e.g., is room for describing, recounting, and reasoning about failed educations (e.g.: the view that schooling is a pleasure).-- The term ‘falsification’ comes from K. Popper: it literally means ‘falsification’ (not: falsification).

**Note.--** One sees that the chreia compares with the opposite (and engages in opinion polling in that context). In ancient Greek democracy, this was “a sacred rule” (one thinks of the discussions in the agora, the popular assembly).

That the chreia compares, i.e. confronts with other data (one does not confuse “compare” with “equate”), is also evident from the immediately following platitude.

The first part of the evidence revolves around the thesis. The second part highlights more of the information included.

**II.c.1.-- ‘Comparison’.**

In ancient Greek: ‘sunkrisis’, the bringing together of similar things. In other words: one type of comparison. To quote the same or similar.

A parallel is appropriate here, for example: the actress practices very hard, but she acts beautifully as a result. Or: the fruit grower spends months trimming the trees, but he brings delicious fruit to market.-- Such a thing strengthens the argument.

**II.c.2.-- Story** (anecdote).

Here is the place for an “exemplification” (citing an example).

Thus, one can “illustrate” the thesis (by citing a sample) by what follows: “Demosthenes of Athens (-384/-322; most famous orator in Hellas) initially suffered from a weak voice (in a culture without our speakers), yes, was not very dramaturgically gifted (as an actor). But he nurtured an idea of strength (“idée-force” (A. Fouillée)), namely to become a great orator. He learned to deliver speeches,--with pebbles in his mouth (he stuttered) and, on the shores of the sea, against the roaring waves.

Precisely this harsh method of (self-)education had as its “pleasant result the fact that he became a very famous orator.”

This is an application of the inductive method that generalizes from at least one specimen to all specimens.

**II.c.3.-- Testimony** (authority argument).

An authority argument stands or falls with the (sometimes very limited) expertise of the person whose opinion one is quoting.-- Here: in late antiquity, “the ancients” (who were considered closer to the deities) like Homèros and Hèsiodos were the source of “testimony” or authority argument. Among other things, regarding educational requirements.

*Opm.--* Behold the scheme -- which is not immutable in its order, of course -- of “usefulness” (“chreia” first of all means “what is useful”). This lasts to the present day!

*Afterword.--* The Romans adopted the Greek scheme.

1.-- Afthonios of Antiocheia (270/ ...), deuterosophist orator.

**A. Introduction.--** The fact or assertion is given a commendation.

**B. Middle.-**

a. Paraphrase. Rewriting in other terms.

b.1. Explanation (“a causa”, from the cause).

b.2. Explanation (“a contrario”, from the counter model).

c.1. Comparison by means of what is similar (“a simili”, from the similar: parallel).

c.2. Narrative (example, inductive sample). “Ab exemplo”,

c.3. Testimony (authority argument). “A testimonio”,

**C. End.--** “A brevi epilogo,” from a brief afterword.

The ancient rhetors made their students memorize the scheme in those terms.-- One easily recognizes the scheme we briefly outlined above.

2.-- Mnemonic formula.

**a. Introduction**

Quis? (Who acted or spoke in this way?).-

**b. Middle.**

a. Quid? (What? Paraphrase).

b.1. Cur? (By what? Why?).

b.2. Contra (Counter model).

c.1. Simile (Equal model; analogous model).

c.2. Paradigmata (examples).

c.3. Testes (Testimonies), which consisted of both ‘scripta’, written texts, and ‘facta’, facts.

**c. Conclusion.**

E.g. an exhortation or so.-- One immediately recognizes the previous scheme.

A treatise according to the chreia is called by Marmontel a “comprehensive definition” either of a saying or of a fact. Those who are well versed in the ancient scheme, subject to updating of course, will find that hard labor crowned by a pleasant result, as Isokrates said.

**Sample 9. -- The essence of reasoning. (23/25)**

Already Herodotos of Halikarnassos distinguished between the immediately given ('the visible') and the demonstrated by reasoning ('just invisible'). Perception ("empeiria", from which we derive "empirie"), i.e., the observation and noting of what shows itself, and reasoning ("logismos"), i.e., the pushing forward to what is demonstrated, are the two domains of our knowing. Or, if you will, the couple "phenomenal / transphenomenal".

In ancient rhetoric, this pair appears as follows.-- The starting point is that which the audience to which one is addressed already presupposes as a kind of "given."

**A.-- Direct evidence.**

"Pisteis a.technai". -- When an interlocutor(s) is already convinced e.g. of a legislation known by everyone, of a testimony given by someone - for everyone, in principle, audible - of the terms (text) of a written agreement, then this is called "proof without any reasoning" (= a.technos). It plays a role similar to the direct observation of a phenomenon. In other words: one does not have to prove evidences again!

**B.-- Indirect evidence.**

"Pisteis en.technai" (Lat.: probationes).-- When it is not obvious to an interlocutor(s) or to an audience and not clearly predicated, one must demonstrate it,-- if necessary from the predications ('evidences') of the interlocutor(s) or of the audience.

**Bibl. st. :** R. Barthes, *L'aventure sémiologique*, Paris, 1985, 126/136.

**Which is rhetorically evident ("obvious").**

Let us now turn to the "direct rhetorical proof". -- The ancient Greeks left us a list in this regard.

**1.-- "Eikos," which seems "obvious.**

For example, what comes across as "natural", as "traditionally established" by the whole community. Thus: children begin by honoring their parents.

This is similar to the "commons sense" (the common sense;--not to be confused with the common sense) of Cl. Buffier, *Traité des premières vérités* (Treaty of the first truths), (1717), and the Scottish commonsensists. Belong to the common sense things like "2 + 2 = 4", "red is not blue", "the existence of my own consciousness", "the clearly observed or remembered really exists", "other people, as beings who betray their inner life through their externally observable behavior, exist" et al.

Although the common mind, i.e. all that a group assumes to be a group - in common, i.e. common - (as apparent), differs from the healthy, i.e. not impaired by psychiatric disturbances (as e.g. neurosis, psychosis), yet they are partly intertwined. Hence the confusion of concepts between the two.

### **2.-- ‘Tekmerion’; the apparent sign.**

A girl who is pregnant gives “the ready sign” of having had sexual intercourse or artificial insemination. The connection between cause and effect needs no reasoning rhetorically.

### **3.-- ‘Semeion’; the designating sign, “the designation”.**

Take again the pregnant girl: whether it was natural sexual intercourse or artificial insemination is ‘indicated’ by her condition, visible to everyone, but it remains a mere indication, -- no evidence. Further research and thus strict proof (indirect proof) will be necessary if one wants to ‘convince’ the interlocutor(s) or the public of either sexual intercourse or artificial insemination, as these are not ‘obvious’.

### **Scientific reasoning.**

The Scottish thinkers, in Claude Buffier’s wake, erred: they used in strict philosophy what is valid only in rhetoric.-- The main forms of reasoning, since Platon, are the following.

#### **A.-- Deduction (“sunthesis”).**

According to the Jevons - Lukasiewicz notation, “If A, then B. Well A, therefore B”. -- If all water boils at 100° C., then this water and that water. Well, all water boils at 100° C.. So also this water and that water”. -- Logically necessary connection between prepositional phrases (VZ) and postpositional phrases (NZ).

#### **B.-- Reduction (“analysis”).**

“If X, then B. Well, B. So X.” -- ‘X’ is the lemma, the hypothesis, which one suspects is at work in the given ‘B’. As long as it is not thoroughly certain that e.g. all water boils at 100° C., then it reads, “If all water boils at 100° C., then this water and that water. Well, this water and that water boil at 100° C.. So all water boils at 100° C.”.

What the induction is: from a finite number of samples (“this water and that water”), it concludes ‘all’ samples,--without having actually performed them. This is, in passing, one form of amplifying or knowledge-expanding induction or generalization.



**Note.--** A. Of deduction there exists, since Platon, one peculiar form, viz. the proof from the incongruous or ‘absurd’. The mathematicians of Platon’s time used this all the time. From a proposition one deduces, with the introduction of information, the radical opposite of that proposition.

In rhetoric this occurs in the form of an “argumentum ad hominem”. proof against the asserted: “if thou dost so assert, it follows that which thou dost refute”.

**B.** Of the reduction there exists, since Platon, one very frequent form, namely, the (lemmatic)-analytic proof.

One stands there with a hypothesis, lemma. What does one do to be able to continue the investigation? One acts as if the lemma, the requested (GV) is already given (GG) and works with that.

Mathematical model:  $20 = y \cdot 40 + 10$ . -- On both sides, one divides by 40:  $10/40 = y40/40$ . This gives:  $10/40 = Y$ . -- Where is the lemma or ‘hypothesis’ in mathematical language ‘unknown’? In the y, which is woven into a contraction.

This is the lemmatic-analytic method, based on introducing the demand in the form of the given (the unknown  $10/40$  is given the known sign y with which one works as if it were a (known) given).

The sciences and philosophy as well as rhetoric work with such lemmas that are given the provisional form of the known (given).

### ***The eristics.***

Zenon of Elea (-540/ ...) applied Parmenides’ ontological logic. And in the form Aristotle articulates, “neither thou, nor I, prove what thou dost maintain”.

‘Thou’ stands for the one whose argumentation one tests rhetorically or scientifically. One thereby establishes that his thesis is somewhat probable, o.k. arguments. But these are not radically probative. But ‘I’ stands for the one who criticizes and who also cannot present radically convincing arguments.

Which is very common.

**Sample 10.-- Pathetics.** (26/28)

Rhetoric, if it is to be real, does not convince only with arguments (logical aspect). It also persuades with arguments of feeling and of mind (pathetic aspect).-- Let's elaborate on that for a moment.

Reread *E.WR. 06/07 (the elements that govern the Swiss school model)*. -- Being Pathetic:

**a.** the good relationship-the goal of rhetoric-between inspection, management, and teachers,

**b.** focusing children's attention on handbook, as "very important" (which covers a value judgment), and on teacher, centerpiece of horseshoe shape, as "very important" (again: which covers a value judgment)

The value judgments involving good (= valuable) rapport and textbook and teacher run like a thread throughout the school system.

The logical content of the transfer of learning from textbook and teacher to children is infused with that multi-faceted pathetic element. The "mind" of teacher and children is more than mere thinking; it includes value feeling.

That little example makes clear why the ancient rhetors summed up the task of rhetoric in "logos, pathos."

Now let's go into that "pathos," -- the word is often not even translated from the Greek.

***The ontological foundation.***

The great tradition is articulated in *K. Lee, A New Basis for Moral Philosophy*, London, 1985.

The thesis of the book is "if are, then value." It entails:

**a.** all that is somewhat 'his(de)', i.e. something (reality), is susceptible to subjective valuations;

**b.** all that is somewhat value-feeling is directed, willy-nilly, towards 'something', i.e. reality (even if that 'reality' is a fiction, a utopia e.g.).

It is precisely this sense of value that is activated in rhetoric when it attempts to persuade.

***The rhetorical axiology.***

All rhetors have sensed and thought through that value element. Thus e.g.: *Ingrid Craemer-Rügenberg, Hrsg., Pathos, Affekt, Gefühl*, (Pathos, affect, feeling), Munich, 1981 (with the fourteen references on pathetics from Aristotle to the present).

***Typology of valuations.***

It comes down to a range (differential).

1. Refusal: “no appreciation” (which is another form of appreciation)-.
2. Alternate solution: “no appreciation for this; appreciation for that”.
3. Variety: “appreciate now for this, then for that”.
4. Preference: “rather this than that”.
5. Merge: “appreciation and for this and for that”.

The list could possibly be added to!

***Bettermann's typology.***

A. D. Bettermann, *Psychologie und Psychopathologie des Wertens*, (Psychology and psychopathology of valuing), Meisenheim am-Glan, 1949.

The ‘werten’, valuation, shifts Bettermann into healthy and sick(er) value estimation.

***1.-- The naive appreciation.***

Very spread out. Children especially appreciate in this way. Without introducing distinctions, without asking questions, very confidently the naive appreciator goes into what she finds valuable. Inheritance values are especially highly regarded.

***2.-- The emphatic appreciation.***

This is the feeling-addicted or feeling-overloaded value judgment. Irrational in the eyes of rationally minded fellow men. It expresses the deeper soul of the appreciator,-- independent of the environment.-- Occasionally it goes so far that the value so valued is ‘deified’,-- placed on a throne, sensed as inviolable (taboo).

Bettermann: every true love, all true religiosity tends toward this type.

***3.-- The appraisal valuation.***

Here the valuation shifts from the obvious object to something else for the sake of which that object is valued. In this way one values one's fellow man on the basis of his social standing, on the basis of the profit that one can draw from him. Not because of him- or herself! -- Falls on the non-spontaneous. On the contrary: the deliberate stands out. Weighs here by the calculating mind.

***A parallel.--*** The same painting is worshipped by the emphatically appreciative art lover/art lover “in moderate admiration” and is “calculated” by the profit-loving art dealer (“It will probably fetch a lot”).-- Bettermann: a certain bourgeois culture is thus typified.

***4.-- The value-added valuation.***

Wert.ent.fremdung’. The appreciative is and remains aloof,-- distant from every value-in-itself. Being’ becomes ‘nothing’. Nothing to really appreciate. Nothing to really be absorbed in. Cool,-- yes, cold, she estimates.-- Bettermann Sees this appreciation already somewhat at work in the appraising appreciation.

Of this latter, value-added type, Bettermann gives three models.--

**A -- Aestheticism.**

Everything that is or seems clean is no longer enjoyed - appreciated - because it is or seems clean in itself but for the reason of its thoughtful analysis. In other words, the centre of gravity lies in the enjoying subject, not in the enjoyed object. And then only insofar as the analysing mind - reason - dominates.

**B.-- Criticism.**

The term "criticism" has been in use especially since the enlightened thinker *I. Kant* (1724/1804; a number of his works are entitled "*Kritik*"). -- Today it is used to denote rational-distance analysis, committed from a purely earthly (secular, worldly) standpoint. It was already at work in aestheticism.

This attitude to life radically undermines the basis of any surrender - think of the naive or the emphatic forms of such a surrender - to value in itself. The critical man abhors any form of "being naive," of "gloriously absorbed in." -- This basic attitude is also found in the following type.

**C. -- "Humorism.**

*Note* -- Bettermann speaks of "humorous appreciation".

We believe he uses "humor" in a sense that is not so common. In particular.

**a.** 'Humor' usually counts as innocent-good nature exposing something in its laughter provoking nature. The humorist, as a human being, can be very good-natured and forgiving.

**b. 1.** 'Irony' is different, though still soft. It is the oblique 'appreciation' of something that one really disapproves of but laughs at remotely. Often not without bitterness (which is lacking in humor).

**b.2.** 'Sarcasm': from the Greek 'sarkasmos', literally: biting the flesh, is the caustic form of irony. 'Sardonic' laughter is the grinning-mocking form of that.

Bettermann means by 'humor' the last two forms: the critically minded person, laughing and inviting laughter, takes distance from value. So that the term 'cynicism' would be more appropriate here.

*Note* Bettermann notes that value alienation is complete only in psychosis (soul disease). Who does not know the alienating smile of psychiatric caregivers?

**Decision.--** It is evident that a text must take into account the four types of appreciation outlined among the interlocutor or audience.

**Sample 11.-- Radiation theory.** (29/31)

The theme, although ancient, is 'in': *E. Van Elsacker/ M. Wijnants, Dossier: tinkering with your personal charisma*, in: *Elga* 56 (1992): April, 30/44, tries to give "practical tips" to update what the ancients called 'èthos'. What exactly is 'èthos'?

**Logos / pathos / èthos.**

With this triad, the goal of rhetoric was typified. Attention:

- a. 'Ethos' (not with 'è' but with 'e') in ancient Greek means 'custom', 'usage', 'morality';
- b. 'èthos', however, means "character, i.e. temperament and character", among other things, insofar as it radiates character.

In rhetoric, it is the "disposition" of the person who is trying to get a message accepted in the soul of a conversation partner(s) or an audience.

In occultism (which is essentially a form of animism (belief in soul and soul substance)), the aura of the character is called 'aura', i.e. the soul, resp. soul substance as far as it extends beyond the biological body.

**Note:** What the ancient Greek 'èthos' can be may become clear when one reads the small masterpiece by the Russian writer Nikolai Gogol (1809/1852), *The Portrait*. A painted portrait hangs in a house: whoever is confronted with it (and is sensitive to it) experiences bizarre sensations in body and soul.

A similar experience is reflected in Henri Beyle (nicknamed "Stendhal"; 1783/1842), in his *Rome, Naples et Florence* (1817-1; 1826-2). Stendhal goes on a journey in Italy, following in the footsteps of Sterne. He notes 22.01.1817: "Florence. (...). I was already in a kind of rapture at the thought of being in Florence and in the company of famous men. (...). On leaving Santa Croce I had palpitations - in Berlin this is called 'nerves'. The life had gone out of me: I could march on but with the fear of falling down.

**The stendhal syndrome.**

**Bibl. st.:** *Grazielle Magherini, Le syndrome de Stendhal (Ou voyage dans les villes d'art)*, (The syndrome of Stendhal (Or journey in the cities of art), Sogedin (Ed. Usher), 1990.

Writer cites Stendhal (o.c., 31).-- She adds:

- a. **S. Freud** (1856/1938; founder of psychoanalysis), visiting the Acropolis (Athens), experiencing "bizarre uneasiness."
- b. **Henry James** (1843/1916; brother of William James) visiting Venice and living through "a bizarre impassivity."

According to Magherini, *Laurence Sterne* (1713/1768; supporter of John Locke's enlightened rationalism), *A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy*, an account of a trip in 1765 (published in 1768), is the prototype of text that depicts travel as existential experience.

Magherini : the term 'sentimental' includes

- a. eventual strong permeations and
- b. sometimes amazing physical reactions.

This in people who travel and experience amazement and wonder of all kinds when they are absorbed in works of art, among other things.

In antique terms: a work of art - the Acropolis for Freud - possesses a 'character' which radiates and acts on soul and body. A phenomenon that is very well known in occult circles - including the New Age - and emanates, among other things, from living fellow human beings.

### ***Applicable model.***

Magherini, o.c., 67.-- Isabelle.-- A young Frenchwoman, teacher in art education, with her students on a visit to Florence.-- "really present". - Paintings, portraits of celebrities or self-portraits of artists: people who have long since died, come across to her, when admired with her students, as "really present."

### ***Discontent.***

Suddenly she is seized. Some paintings disgust her. More than that: she wants to destroy them! This urge is so strong that she is horrified at herself. Later effects: a strong and lasting excitement and dejection. Also a phobia (fear).

**Note.--** In reading Magherini, it is notable that the permeation is often

- a. 'manic' (excited) and
- b. is then "depressed" (dejected, exhausted).

### ***The echo of a star.***

**Bibl. sample :** *Joepie* 379 (21.06.1981 ).-

The actress Charlene Tilton (Lucy Ewing in Dallas series): "I have always admired Marilyn Monroe (Norma Jean Baker (1926/1962)) immensely. For a long time I even wanted my first name changed: I wanted to be called Norma Jean at all costs. I have read everything that has ever been written about Marilyn Monroe - a whole library. Or rather: devoured. The first time I saw a film in which she acted, I was beside myself: I felt that there was something that connected us. (...)"

This shows that living people exhibit an "èthos" and e.g. incite to imitation. They "radiate."

***Charismatic authority.***

C. Rogers (1902/1986) described “charismatic authority” as follows:

1. Averted to any ‘authoritarian’ (imposed from outside and above) form of authority,

2. trusts “the new man” (what that is, we leave to Rogers) thoroughly in his own individual experiences,-- so much so that he draws others along with him precisely because of this. Rogers speaks of “inspirers” to whom other, less strong or even weak personalities are drawn.

One can see that Rogers is actually drawing a “strong character-without-appearance.”-- Noteworthy is that “the new people,” however anti-authoritarian, are founding “a new obedience,” which ... sometimes takes forms from which the traditional education system, dismissed as “authoritarian,” recoils. A naive, indeed, emphatic obedience (*E.WR.27*) is then apparent.

**Note --** Magherini’s examples often involve a (strongly) erotic moment. The “new obedience” also includes this: who does not know, in this day and age, the “butterflies in the stomach” of many young girls when they hear the voice of a singer or when they see his picture or come into direct contact with him during his performances? On closer inspection it is clear that the “èthos” of the singer has a strong eroticizing effect and “seduces” into naive-emphatic fan and freak listening.

Rhetoric is the study of the enactment of conceptions, valuations and “emanations”. -- Logos, pathos, èthos. When studying a text, when composing a text oneself, one must therefore take into account that threefold aspect of spirit - in - a. text.

I. Kant.-- “Rousseau did not fundamentally want man to return to the state of nature but rather that, from the level of culture at which he now stands, he should look back to it.”

Rousseau’s premise was “Man is good by nature.” Thereby ‘nature’ is understood as “inherited nature” yet in a negative way. Man is, in fact, of himself and intentionally not evil. But he is in danger of being infected and corrupted by evil or clumsy leaders and paragons”. Kant was convinced of “das radikal Böse” (the radical evil), in culture. Rhetorically, his views are not without objection.

***Elements of philosophical rhetoric (E.WR.).***

Third year of philosophy) 1995/1996

Sample 1.-- The thesis (thesis) of a text. (06/08)

Sample 2.-- The essence of describing. (09/10)

Sample 3.-- The essence of stories. (11/12)

Sample 4.-- the court story. (13/14)

Sample 5.-- The essence of a report. (15/16)

Sample 6. -- The essence of discourse. (17)

Sample 7.-- Brief typology of discourse. (18)

Sample 8.-- The ancient 'chreia' (determination of being). (19/22)

Sample 9. -- The essence of reasoning. (23/25)

Sample 10.-- Pathetics. (26/28)

Sample 11.-- Radiation theory. (29/31)