

9.4. Harmology or order(s) doctrine (1st year, 1192/1993).

Note: the pagination of this course begins with 163

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We started with elementary logic. By itself, -- without thinking about the prepositions.

In the meantime, we know that logic always presupposes ‘being’, some form of ‘non-nothing’ or reality: if-then sentences invariably presuppose that the conceptual content (and the conceptual scope) is something real (even if it were an invented reality as in a fictional story). We saw that even the incongruous or unthinkable is an element of reasoning (ab absurdo reasoning occurs regularly, e.g., in mathematics).

Ontology is thus the very first basic science for any logic (even though this theory of reality was not developed before logical thinking, it is latently present in it).

The second premise of logical action is order(nings), theory.-- The term ‘harmology’ betrays the Antique Greek word ‘harmozo’: meaning to fit together, to join together. The term ‘harmonia’ is its result: interlocking, ‘harmony’!

History.-- The Milesian thinkers have left us too few texts to say anything serious about them.

But from the Paleopythagoreans (-560/-300) we have a lot more. Among other things, they introduced the term ‘cosmos’. This means “a universe that is a pleasant blend or ‘harmony’! Henceforth, harmony runs easily with all that is beautiful and exalted. For they saw the fusion, if it happened ‘correctly’, not unnatural, as the basis of all that is beautiful and exalted. Thus the whole universe or some of its parts could be seen as an ‘ornament’ (cosmos): the verb ‘kosmeo’, namely, means first of all ‘to order’, to put together in the right way.

The ancient Greek works of art of a plastic nature, the statues, the buildings, still today bear witness to the idea of ‘cosmos’ and ‘harmony’.

Note -- W. Röd, *Geschichte der Philosophie, I (Die Philosophie der Antike), 1 (Von Thales bis Demokritos)*, (History of Philosophy, I (The Philosophy of Antiquity), 1 (From Thales to Democritus)), Munich, Beck, 1976 56/71, specifies what we just indicated in general terms: the ideas “order/ harmony/ proportionality” (ontological and a.o. physical and ethical). The whole strongly musical philosophy of the Pythagoreans exudes “order.”

E.H. 164.

Note -- We now refer to 8.1. Elements of philosophy, where the term ‘stoicheiosis’, Lat. elementatio, arrangement of the elements, was briefly explained. The factors or parameter analysis is the normal reaction in the face of a given order, resp. order (organization) to be investigated.

In this connection, reference should be made to an article: P.T. van Dorp, *Aristotle on two workings of memory: Platonic reminiscences*, in: Tijdschr.v.Filos. 54 (1992) : 3 (Sept.), 457/491

In Antique Greek, at least two words exist for “remember.

a. mneme, unwearied memory (memory), in which one has remembered detached elements of the lived past;

b. anamnesis, mature recollection (memory), bringing out ordered memories.

The first type of memory is called by the author “animal,” below human; the second “an exclusively human trait.

One sees that stoicheiosis, factor analysis, springs from the second type

The author underlines that Aristotle - he was Platon’s pupil - lives here from what Platon had already brought up, namely in his dialogue *Menon*. There it is about acquiring knowledge thanks to learning and research (strongly focused on the ethical side of all that is human behavior as far as it is called typically human).

“If Menon has to give enumerations, his brain works excellently - mneme (Lat.: memoria) - (so in *Menon* 74a (1/6)). But, if he has to think, it falters - anamnesis (Lat.: reminiscencia)” (A.c., 481).

Platon in the person of Socrates wants Menon, when e.g. a definition has to be worked out, not only to learn to draw from his memory (mnème) and to enumerate but also and especially to learn personal and ordered thinking (anamnesis).

In a geometric example (finding what is the side of a square that has double the area of a given square (a.c., 484)) - the slave confronted with such a problem shows that he “has mastered the rules according to which the elements can be connected to each other” (a.c., 486). Thus the slave demonstrates to the free man Menon that he “remembers”, i.e. extracts orderly from his mind (memory), and is thus capable of independent acquisition of knowledge. Which Menon, the free Greek, does not seem to be able to do very well for the time being! Thus Platon (Socrates) wants to free Menon - and at the same time every human being - from the loose memories - inherent in the all too animalistic stage of ‘thinking’ - in order to arrive at real thinking.

E.H. 165

That involves organizing what pops up in the mind (= memory). Cfr a.c., 488. “Menon’s slave appears to live from his mind. He is able to analyse and process what he knows. His knowledge is not a collection of loose data but forms an ordered unit out of such data (,....).

His search is (...) the following of the lines that connect things with each other (...). the connecting action of the mind (...)” (A.c., 490).

To do this, one must see a kinship between more than one piece of data. -- The author of the article calls this “associative memory” (a.c., 490). We call this “identitive memory” (ED 16/18 (Identity), The mind that thinks more than “animaal” sees identities -- general (of something with itself) or partial (analogical: of something with something else). That then is the objective basis of ordering, The anamnesis or reminiscence is reflection - noble yoke - of what is really given and testable. Being according to itself (Parmenides) and not according to something else (e.g. our subjective impressions).

Conclusion: -- When Platon - and in his wake Aristotle - speaks of mind, it is abundantly clear that his anamnesis theory is direct harmology.

S. Augustine, De ordine.

During the years 386/387, S. Augustine (354/430; the greatest Church Father of the West) prepares for Christian baptism. He then writes a dialogue, *De ordine* (= On order). Subtitle “On good and evil in the order of the universe”.

Precedence with him (as with many of the Church Fathers):

a. the Paleopythagorean-Platonic concepts of order and ordering;

b. Biblical revelation on the subject.

The actual order, often experienced as disorder, has, notwithstanding everything, God as ordering omnipotence as the preeminent one. Thus, evil (ethical and also physical) is not willed by God. But He tolerates it within the totality of His world order. The “fools” (in the Biblical sense of “alienated from God”) are a part of God’s order: thus executioners, prostitutes, etc. are “provided” for in His order.

Conclusion.-- Good (very definitely) and evil (as patience) has its own place in the whole of the elements that make up God’s creation.-- Behold a first explicit harmology.

E.H. 166.

First sample.-- The human soul and ordering. (166-168)

Before embarking on the actual hermology, we would like to dwell for a moment on what happens in our psyché regarding ordering.

People e.g. who deal with mentally disturbed persons, in whatever form and especially to whatever degree, or with - what in ecclesiastical circles is called - 'possessed persons', quickly find that - what we call - 'spirit' (= intuitive reason/discursive reason/spirit (feeling of values)/will) as a capacity for order, has lapsed in such beings, into 'para.frosune', thinking outside of reality (if one wants: 'unreal' thinking).

1.-- R. Declerck/ Dr Olgan Quadens, *This is how you should be able to work*, in: Eos (Engineering for Man) 12 (1984): Nov., 119.

Human consciousness and, in particular, sleep (especially some very waking-like sleep phases (R.E.M. - sleep)) show coherence.

Note -- "R.E.M"= Rapid Eyes Movement (i.e., the rapidly rotating eyes in some sleep stages).

In doing so, what follows happens.

Out of 'noise', which coincides with the foundation of disorder, our brain system -- instrument of our mind -- creates order, -- showing itself to be a self-ordering system.

a. In terms of perceptual psychology: out of the disorderly data (loose elements of the mnèmè (EH 164) or immature memories) our brain creates order (the ordered unity (EH 165), peculiar to the anamnesis or mature memory).

b. In terms of psychology of the mind (value sensing) and the will (value choosing): from the confused value impressions in the course of the unwearied perceptions, our mind creates some ordered unit of value.

Premise: such ascertainable phenomena betray in their depth a mind as a self and what it receives organizing system.

Something that the ancient Paleopythagoreans and Platonists had long recognized and clearly stated. The stoicism method, i.e. the rational thoughtful analysis of data in such a way that the decisive factors within an observational whole are clarified both in their separate reality and in their coherence, is the 'resounding' proof of this.

Recent data including those from the psychology of perception and understanding confirm and re-establish this Antique insight.

E.H. 167.

The organizing role of sleep.

Remarkable observation.-- Ulf Nerbold, a test subject, during the first two months of his stay in space, in a state of zero gravity, showed a sharp increase in REM activity.

So says O. Quadens in the Q&A (a.c.,119). Dr. Quadens, who often worked with astronauts in the preparation phase, says:

a. biochemists, who study the chemical weft in life phenomena, view the workings of the brain one-sidedly as purely biochemical;

b. we may think of the brain as a biochemical structure within which information circulates, but there is much more : the observations that man acquires during the day are arranged and ordered in this information system during rem sleep.

2.-- Liesbeth Van Doorne, *Schizophrenia can be cured in many cases*, in: De Nieuwe Gids (Ghent) 07.12.1984.

By way of introduction.-- The classification of nervous and soul disorders is a perilous business. Only this traditional classification:

a. neurosis (ED 143/162) or nervous disease,

b. psychopathy - a transitional phenomenon probably - is a striking disturbance in behavior such that one can speak of a person as a psychopath or psychopath (e.g. kleptomania or stealing as an irresistible urge),

c. psychosis or soul disease (a state in which reason comes through only briefly).-

Behold three main types of paraphrosis or alienation from reality.

At a study day in Kortenberg - domestic and foreign experts were present - the following conclusions were reached.

1. Schizophrenia ('schizo'; I cleave, and 'frèn', mind) is defined, among other things, as "split personality". Someone e.g. who imagines himself to be Napoleon, is himself and at the same time in a crisscrossing way (if not stage actors/playwomen would also be 'schizophrenics'!) someone else.

2. Schizophrenia is also defined as "the disease in which one isolates oneself from reality." Which literally coincides with the Antique-Greek parafrosune

Behold two definitions. Anyone who deals with schizophrenics knows that too many unknown elements are at work in the patient(s) for a truly accurate and practically applicable - "operational" - definition to be drafted at this point.

E.H. 168

A brief 'phenomenology' (description of phenomena): manifestations of schizophrenia - according to Van Doorne - include delusions ("I am being irradiated when the radio plays"), hallucinations (at first sight unreal observations such as "I hear voices"), stress (overload(s) feeling). One loses contact with the environment. One's emotional life becomes blunted. There is a loss of initiative. One withdraws into one's own 'lonely' 'inner world' (which manifests itself in 'mutism' ('mutus' in Latin is 'mute'; not speaking) and deviant body motor skills, whereby the latter can be either a complete lack of physical activity or an exaggerated and frequent repetition of well-defined movements.

Young people from sixteen onwards.-- Already Van Gennep (*Rites de passage*) at the beginning of this century noted that Primitives at notable 'transitions' in life (birth, death;-- journey;-- marriage, puberty etc.m.), - in other words: all that involves a disturbing change in life, are accompanied by securing rites of all kinds.

Well, our adolescents/adolescents go through an analogous change phase from sixteen and beyond. Van Doorne: At that age, young people are faced with a lot of demands. For example, having to choose a career; building relationships. The relationship with the familiar family immediately changes - this 'changing' always happens.

All this gives rise to confused perceptions,-- to tensions in the mind. -- This manifests itself, for example, in the fact that the young person isolates himself, that he/she can no longer keep up at school. Or those who are already working can no longer cope with the demands of the working environment.

Van Doorne: "Schizophrenia is a psychosis that arises from wanting to create order in the disorder of life." -- Applied to sixteen year olds and more: one's own soul life no longer corresponds to the order around it. One then tries to create one's own, unreal order. The price one pays for this is disturbed thinking. This is how one ends up in psychosis.

Conclusion.-- One understands the Paleopythagoreans who through thinking ('philosophizing') tried to teach the young in the 'hetaireia' (thinking society) not *parafrosunè* but *sofrosunè*, healthy ordered thinking. Soul health was the main goal.

E.H. 169.

Second sample.-- Ordering science, rhetoric and philosophy. 169

Now we just immediately grasp the theme.

First, a bibl. sample.

-- Fr. Schmidt, *Ordnungslehre*, (Order theory), Munich / Basel, 1956 (esp. S. 11 (History));

-- H. van Praag, *Measuring and comparing*, Hilversum, 1968 (from 'distinguishing' to really 'ordering' addition (nevens)/ topological ordering (insertion)/ order or sequence (post-addition), counting/ weighing/ measuring, -- gradation/ interval measurement/ time measurement);

-- Hans Driesch, *Ordnungslehre*, Jena, 1912-1; 1923-2;

-- Descamps, *La science de l'ordre (Essai d'harmologie)*, (The science of order (Harmology essay)), in: *Revue Neoscholastique* 1898, 30ss.:

-- M. Foucault, *Les mots et les choses*, (Words and things), Paris, 1966;

-- J. Royce, *Principles of Logic*, New York, 1961 (ed. or.: 1912).

Up to there some works.

Logic.

J. Royce (1855/1916; Idealist thinker), says in his, work that logic is a normative - prescriptions working out - professional science. He makes every effort to show that traditional logic, even in its actualized (formalized) form, is only a part of "the science of order".

Ontology.

Schmidt, o.c., 11: "The entire metaphysics of the West - from Platon of Athens to Friedrich Nietzsche can be seen as order(s) science.

Consequence: every metaphysical system comes down to one of the many ways in which one can imagine order(s)."

Note -- With this, Schmidt confirms what S. Thomas Aquinas (1224/1274; top figure of medieval Scholasticism) says: "Sapientis est ordinare." Which, correctly translated, means "It is the sage's own to order".

Professional Studies.

Schmidt, o.c., 18.-- "All sciences do nothing but expose, through their methods, types of order(s)". Thus it also happens to the rhetor or eloquence teacher in antiquity: he tries to instill his way of order, through means of persuasion of all kinds, in his audience or interlocutor.

The separate order doctrine.

It engages in induction: each of the aforementioned products of the mind - logic (mathematics), ontology, professional science (rhetoric included) - exhibits the same but spread sense of order and arrangement. From such sampling, a general homology emerges.

E.H. 170

Third sample.-- Tropology: the metaphor. (170/173)

Preposition.-- Called 'identitive' all that is either total or overall identity or partial or analogical identity. Total identity is the reflexive (= looping) 'relation' (used here in the very improper sense) to oneself, while analogical identity is the non-reflexive 'relation' of something to something else.

The term 'identity' instead of 'relation' would make much more sense, of course : something is totally identical with itself and partially identical with something else! But a certain use of language - of a number of logicians for example - prefers to use 'relation' for 'identity'. A matter of agreement.

The logical square.

That's the traditional name.

a. Do we start with a range (gamma, differential). In particular :

Totally identical - partial identical (= analogous) - totally non-identical. Instead of "totally non-identical" it can be said "totally different".

b. Grade, we now arrange, instead of in fan form, in square configuration :

all	not all
entirely	not fully
application: all	some not
none	all not (none)
not at all	not at all (none)
application some do	all not (none)

One can see that everyday language presupposes this square.

Thus: "All students passed" - "Some students did not pass" - "Some students passed" - "All students did not pass".

Keep in mind this range drawn out to square when harmology is involved.

Tropology.

'Tropos', troop (trope), meant, in Antique Greek, 'turn'. Within a text, 'trope' meant a saying or turn of phrase. -- e.g., "That beauty there on the beach." Everyone measures that this saying does not refer to "the beauty without more", but to one instance of it, namely some beach figure. Even the simplest working-class person understands such puns almost immediately. But there is more: the tropology, applied therein, contains the key to accessing a type of being concept that makes harmology possible.

E.H. 171.

Bibl. sample :

- A. Mussche, *Dutch poetics*, Brussels, 1948, 34/75 (The image);
- H. Morier, *Dictionnaire de poétique et de rhétorique*, Paris, 1981-2, 670/742 (Métaphore), 743/793 (Métonymie), 1102/1119 (Synecdoque);
- Nic. Ruwet, trad., Roman Jakobson, *Essais de linguistique générale*, Paris, 1963 (thorough analysis of metaphor and metonymy by R. Jakobson (1896/1982), American linguist or linguist of Russian descent; founder in 1915 of the famous Linguistic Circle (Moscow), within which Russian Formalism (concerning textual science) got off the ground);
- Groupe Mu ('Mu' is a Greek letter) - (= J. Dubois e. a.), *Rhétorique générale*, Paris, 1982-2 (esp. 91/122 (Les métrasèmes: 1. La synecdoque (102/106), 2a. La métaphore (106/117), 2b. La métonymie (117/120));
- K. Bertels/ D. Nauta, *Introduction to the concept of model*, Bussum, 1969, 33/42 (Concepts related to 'model'), 36/38 (Transitive expressions).

Note -- Within a textualist streak, "a style or figure of speech that replaces one semeem (= linguistic expression) with another semeem" is called a 'metasemeem' (in FDrans 'métrasèmème'), shortened to 'metaseem' ('métrasème').

Note -- Tropes are first and foremost textual phenomena (in language and literature) but one finds them in the foreground in all human sciences and in related philosophical subjects.

Consider an example: Jacques Lacan (1901/1981; French psychoanalyst who rebranded Freud) adopted Jakobson's definitions to apply them within the psychoanalysis he practiced.

The metaphor.

We now go through the first type of trope.

A. Mussche, p.c., 40, brilliantly indicates the method of stoicheiosis (analysis). In particular: a colorless saying is a. replaced and b. especially shortened by a more colorful metaphor. A semeem is replaced by and shortened to a metaseem.

a. Colonel A. fought, in Aceh, as bravely as a lion.

Colonel A. was, in Aceh, as brave as a lion.

One sees it: analogy! And A. and a lion belong to the same (= identity) set with as common characteristic of the elements 'bravery'. A. and a lion are other points of view of bravery identical. Partial identity or analogy is "identity with reservation" (restrictive identity; modal identity; EO 128).

E.H. 172.

b.-- Colonel A., in Aceh, fought like a lion.

Colonel A., in Aceh, was like a lion.

Note the substitution of a shortening expression.

c.-- Colonel A., in Aceh, was a lion.

Note -- Note that the verb ‘to be’ (as an auxiliary verb) goes perfectly with the substitute shortening. Not surprisingly ‘to be’ is identitive.

d.-- Colonel A., the lion of Aceh.

Colonel A., that lion! Colonel A., the lion!

After a series of transformations (transformations), the metaphor is finally exposed. and one hundred percent logically justifiable.

Note -- The phrase “the lion of Aceh” is a metonymy because the place where he was brave “like a lion” shares in the metaphor (partial identity).

e.-- The lion is there.

This then is the metaphor in its shortest replacement. Of course, context is needed to grasp them.

Model Theory.

Model theory speaks in terms - in applications, of course - of “model” over an “original. The unknown or original becomes more familiar (thanks to information in the model) to the known or model.

Application: about the original, Col. A., in Aceh, the text speaks in terms of the model, lion as brave creature. In other words, the unknown Col. A., in Aceh, the original, becomes better known through the known, the model “brave lion”. Thus the metaphor.

This is how the transference works, -- in the metaphorical expression.-- Once shortened one has the actual metaphor.

Appl. model.

Literature uses metaphors constantly.-- For example, in the poem by Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900; Nihilist thinker) *Ecce homo* (Literally translated, “Behold Man”).

Bibl. sample : G. Fricke, *Volksbuch deutscher Dichtung*, (Folk book of German poetry), Berlin, 1938, 372. The background of *Ecce homo* is the scene in which Pilate, in order to arouse pity, shows the tortured (crowned with thorns) Jesus to the people present. Nietzsche as a deconstructionist likes to take tradition as a means to “cheerful science.”

E.H. 173

And now the poem.

1.-- Ja, ich weisz woher ich stamme! (Yes, I know where I'm from!)
Ungesatigt, gleich der Flamme, (Unsaturated, like the flame,)
Glühe und verzehr'ich mich. (Glow and digest me.)

2.-- Licht wird alles was ich fasse, (Light becomes all that I do,)
Kohle alles was ich lasse : (Kool all what I leave behind :)
Flamme bin ich sicherlich! (Flame I am sure!)

Nietzsche identifies himself with a flame that sets ablaze all that it burns - the great Western tradition, from Platon and Saint Paul onwards (Platonism and Christianity) - and leaves everything charred.

Heidegger will introduce the term "Destruktion" (destruction) for this and Derrida "deconstruction.

Although desire is a radical break with all that is tradition, Nietzsche animates, yes, animates, yet the literary process he employs in this little poem is primal, namely, the metaphorical analogy: he speaks of himself (original) in terms of "the flame that flares up and leaves ashes" (model).

Says Bertels/ Nauta, Introduction to the Concept of Model, 31 : "Analogy is the linchpin of the concept of model.

Access to the world, in knowing and ability, is gained by man through

- a. in the chaotic and unfamiliar to him
- b. discover similarities with the ordered and the familiar to him".

The authors point to Platon's key role: "Platon had sought to reconcile the nature of human knowledge and that of nature by

- a. all material - opm. - and all spiritual - things to be conceived
- b. as representations of higher immaterial entities (called 'ideas' by him)! Cfr o.c., 33.

To demonstrate how traditional model theory is, though, theorists say a bit further: "Paradigm" (Ancient Greek: 'paradeigma', Lat.: exemplum) stems from Greek rhetoric. The term means "inserted narrative" (to explain the current text).

In the first century B.C., an additional literary-technical meaning is added, namely 'exemplar figure' (Ancient Greek: 'eikon', Latinized 'icon', Lat.: 'imago'), the embodiment of a characteristic in a human figure (...) 'Exemplum' we also find in (...) artistic craftsmanship: 'exemplum pingere' is Latin for 'to paint a copy' (...)."

E.H. 174.

Fourth sample.-- Tropology : the metonymy. (174-175)

‘Metaphor’, moving something from somewhere to somewhere else, metaphor.

‘Metonymia’, replacing one name with another, metonymy. Let us take a model inspired by an example of Aristotle.

a.-- Eating apples partly causes health.

Eating apples is part cause of health.

The analogy here is not metaphorical (based on similarity) but metonymic, based on (causal or causal) connection.

Whereas in metaphor the notion of “collection” was the presupposition (both similar data belong to one and the same collection via the same, identically common property), in metonymy the notion of system (system) is the presupposition: the apples, the eating of them, the effect on health,-- these three form one and the same dynamic system.

b.-- Apples in part cause health (= Apples make someone healthy) Apples are healthful (= Apples are healthy).

Tropes are substitutions that involve shortening. Here: the act of eating is the middle term between the apples and the health effect. One can omit the middle term : “Apples are healthy”.

c.-- The healthy eating of apples (= The healthy eating).

The healthy apples.

Again: perfectly logically justifiable.-- Also again: the notion of ‘being’ (as an auxiliary verb) perfectly conveys the connection -- now not of similarity but of coherence.

Again, model theory.

About apples, resp. about eating them (= original), one speaks in terms of making them healthy, resp. of health (model).

Applicable model.

Bibl. sample : Heribert Menzel (1906/...), *Die Fahne der Kameradschaft*, (The flag of comradeship), in: G. Fricke, *Volksbuch deutscher Dichtung*, Berlin, 1938, 408.-- In the following poem the coherence is emphasized. It is not a tremendously brilliant poem, but it captures the Nazi atmosphere very well.

E.H. 115.

1.-- In dieser Fahne, comrade, Sind du und ich verbunden. Wo sie uns leuchtet, Comrade, Ist Deutschland auch verbunden.	(In this banner, comrade,) (Are thou and I connected.) (Where it serves us to light, (Is Germany also connected.)
2.-- Wo immer die Fahne weht, Kamerad trifft Kameraden. Wer treu und froh zur Fahne steht, Ist in den Kreis geladen.	(Wherever the banner flies,) (Hits one comrade the other.) (Who faithfully and gladly stands by the flag,) (Is welcome in our circle.)
3.-- So ist nicht einer heimatlos Und ohne Ziel und Streben. Wer schwor, der sucht die Fahne bloß Und tritt ins helle Leben.	(So is no one without a home) (Nor without purpose and striving.) (He who swore the oath of allegiance, seeks just the banner) (And enters into the bright life.)

One may be familiar with the Nazi ideology.

A main idea: Germany: one coherence: the banner (as a symbol). Hitler and the thinking Nazis were typically Postmodern: and traditional Church Christianity (made up in the Lutheran-German term "Rome") and Modern Enlightened Rationalism continue as the thieves of the Primordial Germanic life force. That is why the archetypal Germanic and Nordic mythical life must be re-established within a Postmodern framework: the Modern sciences and techniques remain e.g., but are engaged in a revitalization religion, articulated in a peculiar way in *Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (The myth of the twentieth century), (A. Rosenberg).

Thus the terms of the poem can be understood where it says: "So is no one without a home nor without purpose and striving". The profound Postmodern cultural crisis that sees both Churches and Rationalism withering away because both no longer give life force to one whole people, the German people, necessitates resourcing. Very warlike.

So much for the ideological background. -- Now the poetics. Note the terms "In this banner, comrade, thou and I are bound together. Where that banner serves us as light, Germany is also united: Not the resemblance of metaphor but the coherence of metonymy makes the flag as an allusion, as a 'fetish' (power-laden object), that makes one, connects,-- learnedly expressed: "makes into one dynamic system", dominates the logic (applied logic) of this Nazi poem. The Primitive or Primitivist cohesion of all with all within a people, revitalizes all.

Fifth sample.-- Tropology: the synecdoche. 176

‘Sun.ek.dechomai’ means, in Antique Greek, “I master at the same time”. -- “I grasp or understand at the same time”. -- ‘Sun.ek.dochè’ means “to use a term in a more comprehensive sense”. So e.g.: to use a singular in a summary way to denote a plural.

K.A. Krüger, *Deutsche Literaturkunde* (in Charakterbildern und Abrissen), Danzig, 1910, 155, puts it as follows:

1. either a collection is exchanged with one of its elements (“des Einzelne” as the element);

2. or a system is swapped with one of its parts -- subsystems -- such that, in mentioning one, the other becomes co-meaning (co-meaning). Hence, the proposer translates the synecdoche by ‘Mitbezeichnung’ (co-meaning).

Model theoretic. About the co-meaning (original) one speaks in terms of the signified (named) (model) which provides information about the co-meaning.

Tropological. By speaking in this way one drops the co-meaning in the text - shortening - , for one mentions it only sideways.

Note.-- “Using a term in a - by scope or range - more comprehensive meaning” we said. It can also be the other way around: “using a more encompassing term in a less encompassing meaning.”

Appl. model.

Situation: an inspector observes that a couple of teachers are late. -- He may say, “Well, those are teachers” (co-meaning the pair, i.e., a subset).

Situation: all teachers teach. -- The inspector may say: “One teacher,-- that teaches”. Seemingly, he says “just one teacher” (singular); in fact, he says, co-meaning (co-meaning), “all teachers” (the whole collection). Do we call this latter “the inverse synecdoche”

The metaphorical synecdoche.

“Apple’ (sentence 2) stands for (and means also) ‘apples’ (understand: “all apples”). All apples not explicitly mentioned (= complementation, dichotomy) are indeed, by analogy (similarity analogy) counted in the one apple.

The metonymic synecdoche.-- A priest says that he is a “soul caregiver. Here ‘soul’ stands for ‘human being’: Through a part he means the whole. Again: complementation (part/ rest of the whole).

E.H. 177.

Sixth sample.-- the term "his(the)" restrictively. (177/179)

Return for a moment to the pure ontology but hermeneutical.

The mathematician and logician G. Frege (1848/1925) and the Language-positivist B. Russell (1872/1970) argued that the terms "being" and "being" - especially in the exact sciences - are totally unusable for reasons of their multiplicity.

The "many-sided" use of the auxiliary verb "to be".

A. The descriptive meaning.

a. Existence (testability).

"God is" (= God involves, 'implies', is part-identical with 'being'),-- here in the sense of "actually existing". "God actually exists".

b. essence (testability).-

b.1. Total identity.-- "Gretel is, now, Gretel". "Gretel has as a mode of being, in the reflexive sense, 'Gretel'".

b.2. Partial identity.-- Analogy.-- "Jan is a boy" ("Jan belongs to the collection 'boys'").-- "The store,-- that is his threshold" (the threshold, as an important part, can be equated with the whole house).

B. The value meaning.

"Being honest is good" (has the beingness of 'good').

Take wants the synecdoche.

a. Metaphorical synecdoche.

"And teacher,-- that's (in a sense, -- with reservations) all teachers.

Reverse synecdoche.-- "All teachers,--that is (in a sense, viz, as a copy of it) this teacher here and utility:

b. Metonymic synecdoche.

"The beard is there". Everyone understands this: the (conspicuous) part is mentioned to denote the (co-meaning) rest of the whole that is the man in question, - better: "co-meaning". In his terms, "The beard, -- that is (in a sense) the whole man".

Reverse synecdoche.-- "The man in question,--that is (in a sense) his beard (for the reason of his characteristic beard)".

Conclusion.

The term "to be" (as a verb) means, indeed, very much.

a. Testability (existence / essence);

b. collection/system (which includes, 'implies', connection, i.e. similarity and coherence).

So apart from testability (findability), 'being' also means connection (= relationship, relation).

We know why: because 'being' is identitive (expressing general and partial identity).-- One has caught it by now: 'being' involves reservation (modality) and is used restrictively.

E.H. 178.

The answer in Aristotelian terms.

We refer to EO 90 (Aristotle on the subject). Being' is not a property - sèmeion, kentrek - of something but of 'everything'. -- We expressed this a moment ago with the term "restrictive language use of 'being'".

Examples of incorrect language.

1. A mariologist at the time spent an entire class "proving" that Our Lady, Mary, the mother of Jesus, was a. a being and b, therefore a, true (insightful) and good (valuable),

These terms are EO 90 (Transcendental); 111 (Transcendental) - 'transcendental' or all-encompassing and thus applicable to everything.

To pronounce them of Mary, for example, is tantamount to redundancy: basically, one learns nothing about Mary.

2. Martin Heidegger, the existential ontologist, at the time "dabbled", as it were, with the term "Sein" (word part of e.g. "Dasein" which actually, in his parlance, designates "being human"). He reproached the West "from Platon to Nietzsche" for having "forgotten being" (Seinsvergessenheit).

In the highly idiosyncratic meaning that Heidegger attaches to the term "Sein," this is possible. But, whether being "according to itself" (Parmenides), as it is in itself, independent of idiosyncratic, straightforward, or preferred interpretations (Ch. S. Peirce), will emerge from that centuries-long "oblivion" when one applies Heidegger's restrictionless use of language in this regard, is another matter.

In this sense, Frege and Russell are certainly right.

Between dictionaries and life...

"Gapes an abyss". -- "Being" in a dictionary conveys the meanings of "being" without the concrete situations. In other words: without the caveat. Recall the concrete examples just above concerning 'to be' (as an auxiliary verb) and you will see that 'to be' is meaningfully used outside dictionary summaries.

As an aside, an expression from mathematics or logistics (specialties of Frege and Russell), once ripped from the frame of an argument and placed in a dictionary, also loses its unambiguity (without the rest of the 'system' such an 'excerpt' does not mean much and one does not learn much (a form of redundancy)), What, mutatis mutandis (in an analogous way) applies of 'being', thus also applies of all terms of exact, artificial languages.

E. H. 179

Note -- Dr. Simo Knuutila/ Prof, Jaakko Hintikka, ed., *The Logic of Being* (Historical Studies), Dordrecht, 1985, addresses our issue.

Antiquity (e.g. Aristotle's doctrine of categories), the Middle Ages (e.g. Scholastic theories of predication (saying) and Thomas Aquinas' theory of analogy), Modern times (e.g. Imm. Kant, who claimed that "actual existence is not a predicate or a saying in a sentence").

Frege and Russell are typical representatives of modern Rationalism.-- Well, the neo-rhetoric of Chaïm Perelman (1912/1984; professor of logic, ethics (moral philosophy) and metaphysics at ULB (Université Libre de Bruxelles) until 1978) postulates that, apart from the exact type of reason (rationality), prevalent in professional sciences, there is a non-exact but valid type of reason (rationality).

In particular: natural, everyday reason possesses its own exactness. It differs from the exactitude of mathematics and logistics. But it enables people, even the most developed ones in the most sophisticated discussions, to understand each other perfectly and non-multiplyingly. Observe, by the way, the paradoxical fact that in order to make intelligible and define the correct, "exact" meaning of mathematical and logistical expressions, a professor who teaches, or a textbook of mathematics or logistics ... uses the everyday language that everyone uses as a framework for language.

Conclusion -- Either pure or combined with artificial languages the vernacular or natural language is useful.

Versatile/uniform/restrictive.

Traditionally, people have used those terms - at least "multivalent" and "univalent" - to explain the problem of the linguistic accuracy of "being.

- a. 'Being' is not simply polynomial, for there is unity in it (testability, relation).
- b. 'Being' is also not univocal in the stricter sense, for it contains multiplicity.
- c. Traditionally, then, one says, "Being is analogous" (partially similar or identical, partially dissimilar or non-identical).

This amounts to the restrictive use of language for the term 'being': even when it is not explicit, 'being' is used with reservation or modality. This is evident from the context (the system).

E.H. 180

Seventh sample.-- traditional logic and relational theory. (180/184)

Before we address that topic, let's review what makes the profound difference between traditional logic and computational logic or logistics.

Bibl. sample : R. Caratini, *La philosophie, II* (Thèmes), Paris, Seghers, 1984, 43s.

1. The author says:

a. the system of traditional syllogistics is only one type of 'calculus' (Lat.: chalk,-- chalk, arithmetic) or logistics;

b. that system is "poor" in the sense that it is useless for the purpose of discovering new judgments.

2. The author claims: logistics is "more honorable" because its system provides the means to combine "any type of judgment" in such a way that one arrives at logically valid afterthoughts.

Reason: by 'calculating' with 'realities' indicated by signs - this ontological basis is still there, if not the logician calculates in the void - the operations acquire an automatic character.

Answer.

The "logistic honorific" comes down not to "an automatic deduction" (because traditional logic does that too) but to a computational automatism.

That logistics is something different from traditional logic is already evident from the classification types (because they differ). For example, "the logic of relations". A logic, in the traditional sense, of relations does not exist. Why not? Because logic refers only to derivation and not to relations, unless - note the caveat - these directly give rise to derivation (entailment or implication in the form of conditional sentences).

More to the point, traditional logic encompasses more than what a Caratini and thought-leaders understand.

We did see:

ED 33 (where not only deduction but also reduction (in the forms of induction and hypothesis) are mentioned);

ED 26 (where it is shown how already Platon, knows induction and hypothesis) - that the logic so traditional does not merely accept reductive reasoning but places it at the center? With Platon, philosophical thinking only really begins when one is reasoning reductively - analytically - and thus envisions new judgments. How then can the logician claim that "his system" is more comprehensive? Because he does not know traditional logic sufficiently!

E.H. 181.

A fallacy.

If Caratini cannot grasp traditional logic correctly, it is because he commits a methodological error: he reasons about traditional logic from the preconceptions of logistics and not from the preconceptions proper to traditional logic. This is called “externalism”: looking at something and analyzing it, not from its own presuppositions - meaning - but from the presuppositions foreign to it - meaning - . We prefer to stick to the internalist method: to understand traditional logic from its - to use Platon’s words - own “hypotheses”.

In the same way, one should not judge logistics on the basis of the presuppositions of traditional logic! One only understands logistics - meaning - if one sticks to one’s own assumptions -- Cfr. ED 71 (Cavaillès).

We know by now that any ‘set’ (sample) of hypotheses (postulates, axiomata) is limited by the fact that it is an inductive sample from all possible postulates. This is true both for logistics and for traditional logic.

This implies that its real value only becomes apparent in a pragmatic way : “By the fruits one knows the tree”.

‘Automatic’ reasoning.

The inferences within traditional logic are as automatic as those of logistics. Reason: they do not depend on subjective impressions (idiosyncratic/straightforward/for-choice) but on objective identities, as G. Jacoby explained, at the time. Thus the overall identity of something with itself (something automatically includes itself). Thus the partial or analogous identity of something with something else (something automatically involves something else under some point of view).

The “immediate” distractions.

Bibl. sample : Ch. Lahr, *Logique*, 511/ 514.-- “La déduction immédiate”.

The author means that the formal syllogism seems superfluous, as it were. Platonically speaking, this puts us in full stoicheiosis (analysis).

A.-- Exchange.

In a sentence, the subject alternates with the predicate. Which is also called “conversion.

Appl. model.-- “Every girl, normally speaking, likes to be beautiful”. Converse sentence : “Among other things, is like to be beautiful every girl, normally”. -- Basis: the theory of collection.

E.H. 182.

For: “every girl, normally” is a private or subset of “all that likes to be beautiful”. The grammatical inversion with modalization (restriction: “among others”) sets up the logical - immediate - deduction. So e.g. “Some beings who like to be beautiful are girls, normally”. ‘Some’ replaces the restrictive “among others”.

Appl. model.

“Stamen make up the flower.” -- The term “mead” creates a restrictive judgment. Partly’ implies that the stamens are part of the whole or system of the flower. In other words, ‘part’ introduces a complement or dichotomy: besides the stamens, there is the rest of the flower. Pure system theory!” -- Conversion. -- “The (whole) flower is made up, among other things, (subset, yes, part- or subsystem-indicating term) by the stamens.”

Conclusion.

The Platonic stoicheiosis or factor analysis stands or falls with the concepts of “all” (collection) and/or “whole” (system) or still “similarity and/or coherence” (= connection). The premise of deduction is precisely that stoicheiosis basis.

B.-- Opposition.

Also called ‘opposition’.-- The stakes here are either quantity or quality or the two together within a judgment.-- Reread EH 170: the logical square. In particular: “all/ whole” - “not all/ not whole” - “all not/ not whole”

Appl. model.

From the whole of the oppositional deductions, we take only the contradictory sentences.

- A. Every flower blooms in its time. Is contradictory with:
O. Some flowers do not bloom in her time”
- I. Some flowers bloom in its time. Is contradictory with:
E. No flower blooms in its time”.

So much for the collection theory examples.

Appl. model.-

Now for the systemic examples.

- A. A (= synecdoche for “all” or “every”) flower contains stamens.
Is contradictory with “O. Some flowers contain no stamens
- I. Some flowers contain stamens.
Is contradictory with “E. No flower contains stamens”.

The letters A, O, E, I.-- A refers to all (all do). O beats not all. I beats not all. E denotes all not (none). -- So one can infer; “If A, then e.g. O or I” (but in no case E).

E.H. 183.

Now for the strictly systemic oppositional deductions.

A. The (entire) flower includes the stamens.

Is contradictory with: "The part of the flower encompassing the stamens does not encompass stamens" (= O : not-wholly-not).

I. A portion of the flower includes stamens.

Is contradictory to : "(Whole) flower does not include stamens"
(= E :not at all).

In the form of the system learning logical square :

A. all / whole	O. some / part not
I. some / part do	E. all / none

But that is the premise of every Platonic stoicheiosis!

Which implies that "class logic" does form part of traditional logic (whether Platonic or non-Platonic in conception).

Relational derivations.

According to logicians, traditional logic "has no regard for relations" (but only for 'substances'); cfr EO 81: 'thing'. The mere fact that traditional logic (and ontology) invariably connects 'substance' with 'relation' should prompt great caution. - Yet there is much more.

a. The stoicheiosis is the artery of traditional thought. Proving it, after all that has gone before, is no longer necessary.

b. Examples include.

1. the categories, which are invariably pairs of elements involved in each other, (pairs of opposites or systechies),

2. the systechies, which have been commonplace since the Paleopythagoreans and ... which are pairs of elements involved in each other.

Further applicative models are the tropes: the elements within a trope are invariably related to each other. Thus e.g. the beard and the man for whom the beard is characteristic!

The relationship "greater than / less than".

G. Jacoby, o.c., 53/55 (Relationslogistik).-- The relation "greater than" includes as an applicative model e.g. " $3 > 2$ ".

Mathematical or logistic: "x greater of y" includes as an element " $3 > 2$ ".

Syllogistic.

Sent. 1: The relation " $x > y$ " is rewritable in reverse order (conversion) as " $y < x$ ".

Sent. 2: Well, " $3 > 2$ ":

Concl. : So " $2 < 3!$ " -- So one bears in mind that the traditional syllogism cannot act as a preposition in such mathematical or logistic reasoning.

E.H. 184,

Explanation.

a. Within traditional logic, forms like “ $3 > 2$ ” are concepts (compound concepts that express a relation). With concepts correct, that logic works.

b. Note the accompanying meta-language. A prof who displays that expression in class will say “three is greater than two” or still “three is greater than two.” So claiming that the judgment structure “subject/ (auxiliary verb)/proverb” is not appropriate for e.g. mathematical language does not appear to hold true.

It can also be done as follows “The (quantitative) relationship (ratio) between three and two is one of “greater than”

Model-theoretically, it is also overwhelmingly a judgmental structure: one speaks, after all, of ‘3’ in terms of “greater than two”. ‘3’ is original and “greater than two” is model, which provides information about ‘3’ (in this case: mathematical information). Reread ED 19vv., and ye see that what is said here illustrates what was discussed there.

That mathematics contains judgments is obvious, by the way, from the enormous role played by the mathematical equation : = , > , < . In natural meta-language: is equal to, is greater than, is less than.

G. Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche*, 54, cites.-

1. The mathematical theorem “if point A lies between B and C, then it also lies between C and B”.

Logical.

“The extremes of an interval (spacing) are interchangeable. For example, B and C are interchangeable with C and B”.

2. The expression of logistics “If there is a father, then there is e.g. a son or a daughter”.

Sent. 1. Father and son or daughter are terms within an opposition pair such that, if there is a father, there is also, e.g., a son or a daughter.

Sent. 2. Well, there is a father.

Concl.: So there is a son or a daughter.

Seen with the eyes of traditional logic, the logistic hypothetical sentence, supported by a mutual relation (‘correlation’), covers a real syllogism. Which once again demonstrates the ubiquity of the concluding sentence ... if one takes the trouble to think about it.

The latter examples, by the way, rely on the notion of “system” : the gap B / C is one; the correlation “father / son and / or daughter” is another.

Conclusion.

As long as relations exhibit identities, total or partial, until such time they are the domain of traditional logic that is concerned with those very identities.

E.H. 185

Eighth sample.-- The comparative method. (184/187)

It seems that the only truly general method, at least as regards order, is the confrontational (= comparative) method. It is already incorporated in the theoria, the deeper consideration of things.

'Method'

'Methodos' in Antique Greek is "way to be followed" (method of approach, way of approach). The 'way' ('hodos') that leads to the stated goal, i.e., to describe in such a way that when deepened, the given becomes comprehensible ('true').-- All this is object of methodology or method doctrine.

A famous application.

J. Champollion (1790/1832; French Egyptologist dissected the stone of Rosette, which was discovered in 1799. By comparing the Egyptian text, on that stone, with the Greek text on it, he deciphered -- 1822 -- for the first time the Antique Egyptian hieroglyphs.-- This is a spectacular application of the confrontational method.

A day-to-day application.

How often do we measure something? But what is measuring except comparing a given fact with an (agreed upon) measure or measurement model? One then speaks of the measured (original) in terms of the measure (or measurement model).

Note.-- This shows that every judgment rests on an (unspoken) comparison (ED 19vv.).

The parole of Max Müller (1823/1900).

This religious scholar put it as follows: "The comparative spirit is the truly scientific spirit of our age, nay of all ages". --what am I saying? Of all epochs.

Confronting data with each other is the true scientific method of detecting order and arrangement.-- If more than one data is compared, then order(s) -- relations, relationships -- are evident.

Bibl. sample :

Regarding the comparative method.

H. van Praag, *Measuring and comparing*, Hilversum, 1968 (contents: quantity/quality; addition (= one-single relation), topological arrangement and sequence; counting, measuring and weighing; gradation, interval measurement and time measurement);

-- I.M. Bochenski, *Philosophical Methods in Modern Science*, Utr./Antw., 1961, 149/155 (The Methods of Mill);

E. H. 186.

-- H. Pinard de la Boullaye, S.J., *L' étude comparée des religions* (The comparative study of religions), Essai critique), II (Ses méthodes), Paris, 1929-3, 40/87 (La méthode comparative);

-- L. Davillé, *La comparaison et la méthode comparative (en particulier dans les études historiques)*, (Comparison and comparative method (especially in historical studies),), in: *Revue de synthèse historique* xxvii (1913): 4/33; xxvii (1914): 201/229.

Regarding foundations:

-- E.W. Beth, *The Philosophy of Mathematics* (From Parmenides to Bolzano), Antw / Nijmegen, 1944, 30 (Stoicheiosis), 34/42 (Stoicheiosis), 42/51 (Idea numbers);-- 63vv. (Stoicheiosis with Aritotle i.v. “mathesis universalis”, 103 (Mathesis universalis with Descartes); 123 (Mathesis universalis = scientia generalis either ars iudicandi (logical) or ars inveniendi (heuristic) with Leibniz); 141 (Mathesis universalis (= scientia generalis) fiercely contested by Kant, but reinstated by the German Idealists -- Fichte, Schelling, Hegel -- yet rejecting the mathematical paragon);

-- M. Foucault, *Les mots et les choses (Une archéologie des sciences humaines)*, (Words and Things (An Archaeology of the Humanities),), Paris, 1966, 66s. (Descartes' order(s) doctrine);

-- G. Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtschreibung*, (Logisticians' claims on logic and its historiography),. Stuttgart, 1962 (10Off.: *Characteristica universalis* (Galenos of Pergamon (129/199), Reymon Lull (= Raymundus Lullus (1235/1315; *Ars generalis*), Francois Viète (= Vieta (1540/1603; introduction of letter arithmetic i.p.v. numerical arithmetic), turning Lull's ‘ “general science” into “general mathematics (understand: order theory)” and transforming Lull's combinatorics into “characteristica universalis” (a general algebra));

-- O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus III* (Der Idealismus der Neuzeit), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 46/ 69 (Einfluss des Pythagoreismus auf Mathematik und Astronomie), esp. o.c., 46ff. (Analysis).

From all this it is clear that with the regularity of a clock thinkers have sought a theory of order, mathematical or otherwise, as the basis of relativity and thus of comparison.

Two axiomata.

They can, with R.A. Koch, *Die Uraxiome in ihrer Bedeutung für die philosophischen Grunddisziplinen*, (The uraxioms in their significance for the basic philosophical disciplines), in: *Tijdschr.v.Filos.* 31 (1969): 4 (Dec.); 749/766, as follows.

a. There is a universe (note: total reality) with all its parts. All that is called “being” is either a part of the universe or that universe itself.

E.H. 187.

b. There is a universe with all its parts valid. All that is called ‘being’ has validity (‘applies’) either as part of the universe or as that universe itself.

As one can see, Koch articulates the propositions dichotomously a. descriptively and b. value-wise (values ‘apply’, i.e. make themselves feel as ‘good’). If we thus order, invariably such an axiomatics will be at work. Even if we do not consciously realize this.

Unity Theory.

Rereading EO 112 (Unity).- All that exhibits similarity (collection theorem: common properties) and coherence (system theorem: collective or joint properties) is one in the ontological sense.

Those who compare see “unity-in-the-many.” To compare is to see not only unity but also multiplicity: metaphorical multiplicity (difference), metonymic multiplicity (= gap).

Note -- Bibl. st: H. Jens, *Order out of disorder* (Ilya Prigogine, Belgian Nobel laureate in chemistry 1977), in: Strive 1978: March, 527v.;

Fr. Boenders, *Prigogine and Wildiers on Teilhard de Chardin*, in: Streven 1982: July, 930/941.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881/1955) is the then controversial Jesuit paleontologist.

Boenders writes : “Ilya Prigogine : (...) Our time is indeed characterized - and this will become even more evident at the end of this century - by a search for unity in diversity.

One of those who best understood the necessity of this search for unity beyond the realm of science was precisely Teilhard (...).” - From this one sees that the Antique concern to see both multiplicity and unity is still relevant today.

A definition.

L. Davillé, *La comparaison* (1913), 23, says:

- 1.** Instead of dealing with individual cases, when it comes to dealing with phenomena or objects,
- 2.** the comparative method seeks to highlight wholes (‘ensembles’) -- either similar or complementary.

The author sees that there is similarity (collection) and coherence (system) at work, where he speaks of similar and complementary totalities.

Note -- one does not confuse ‘compare’ with ‘equate’, which is to emphasize similarities. Comparison refers to both difference/gap and similarity/coherence.

E.H. 188.

Ninth sample.-- Number and number. (188)

The ancient Greek thinkers possessed a number of “mathematical” (better: unitary) fundamental concepts or categories (EO 80). These are fundamental to our harmology.

So e.g. ‘stoicheion’ (element), ‘monas’ (singular unit, ‘monad’). So also ‘arithmos’, arrangement, configuration (‘number’),-- category par excellence in Paleopythagorean middens. So further ‘plèthos’, collection (‘crowd’) and ‘sustèma’, collection, system.

For example, Thales of Miletus (-624/-545; first Greek thinker) defined number as follows: “The first definition of number is attributed to Thales who defined it as “a collection of units” (“monadon sustema”),-- a definition almost identical with Euclid’s, namely “the multitude made up of units” (...). Eudoxus defined a number as a ‘determinate multitude’ (‘plèthos horismenon’)” (Th.L. Heath, *A Manual of Greek Mathematics*, Oxford, 1931-1, New York, 1963-2, 38).

Translated: “The first determination of the essence of ‘number’ is attributed to Thales. He defined ‘number’ as “a set of units”, -- a definition almost identical to that of Eukleides, namely “a collection consisting of units”. (...). Eudoxos of Knidos (-406/-355; mathematician and astronomer) defined ‘number’ as “a well-defined set”.

‘Unity’.

‘Unity’ has, in our language usage, a micro meaning (the unit whose multiplicity constitutes a number, represented in a number (‘number’ is original, ‘number’ is model)) and a macro meaning (the similarity and/or coherence in a multiplicity).

The Antique Greek term ‘monas’, unity, is defined twofold. Unity exists for any collection or system. ‘Arithmos’ (union of units), usually translated by ‘number’ (arithmology), is then at least two units (the monas or unit is not a ‘number’). So that the monas, monad exists for every number starting from the ‘two’ and yet returns in every number as a constituent or ‘stoicheion’.

Cfr O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus*, I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 272 (in connection with the Paleopythagorean number and space mathematics).

Note -- Counting and especially adding units is an indispensable element of summative induction (ED 42).

E.H. 189

Tenth sample. -- Cartesian theory of order. (189/192)

For the reason of the enormous impact Descartes (1596/1650), the father of typical Modern thought, had until today, a word about his way of arranging the data.

Bibl. sample :

-- A. Koyré, *Entretiens sur Descartes*, in: *Introduction à lecture de Platon*, (Introduction to reading Plato), Paris, 1962;

-- C. Forest, o.p”, *Le cartésianisme et l’orientation de la science moderne*, (Cartesianism and the orientation of modern science), Liège, 1938;

-- Al. Astruc, *Le roman de Descartes*, Paris, 1989.

In addition to the experimental method (think Galileo), which he saw as one application of his main method, Descartes saw in the mathematics of his day the pre-eminent example in terms of method.

“Thinking, for Descartes, is thinking forward and not backward. Thought-images - in his Modern way of speaking he calls them “idées” (which differs thoroughly from Platon’s ideas) - always go first. He deduces from them the reality around him and in him. And not the other way around. “Thinking is first theory and then application of theory”.

The reason for this intellectual revolution in its Cartesian way: what our minds grasp first of all are not the things themselves -- the given -- but our inner grasping conceptions in our consciousness. Typically ‘Nominalist’, of course.-- Cfr A. Koyré, *Entretiens*, (Interviews), 216.

‘Ready’

Des idées claires! Too before - he and quite a few contemporaries felt - thinking was “dark” (the “dark Middle Ages”).

“Is ‘ready’, for Descartes, i.e. radically governed by the mind, only what reason, without any contribution from imagination or senses, grasps. Which means practically: is ‘ready’ all that is mathematical or, at least, can be made mathematical! (A. Koyré, o.c., 217).

Cartesian mechanism.

All being is a kind of mechanism. Example : the machine or the apparatus of those days (e.g. the clock). -- “The whole man -- not only his body -- becomes a problem of mechanics. “A culture, a people, a century -- according to Hippolyte Taine (1828/1893; Positivist thinker) -- are ‘definitions’ that come to fruition. Man is a (geometric) proposition - un théorème - in full advance”. (G. Forest, *Le cartésianisme*, 10).-- The mind reasons like a thinking machine; the body functions like a device.

E. H. 190

The whole cosmos functions as one big device.-- That's the infamous mechanism à la Descartes.

Mathematics, as he interprets it, and device, as he interprets it, go hand in hand. This is the dual symbol of order and arrangement, as Descartes interprets them.

The comparative method.

Bibl. sample : E. Lenoble, *René Descartes*, in: J. Bricout, dir., *Dictionnaire pratique des connaissances religieuses*, II, Paris, 1925, 778ss..

See here how Lenoble characterizes the Cartesian mode of comparison. It can be summarized in three terms: intuition + analysis and synthesis.

A definition.

R. Descartes, *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, xiv, says: "If one disregards the intuition ('contemplation' of the mind) of a separate reality, then one can say that by comparing at least two realities one acquires all knowledge." Cfr. M. Foucault, *Les mots et les choses*, 66.

1. Intuition.

Reason - la raison - grasps, to begin with, a given, within consciousness, thanks to intellectual contemplation. This contemplation comprehends globally some totality.

2.1. The "analysis".

The initial "global method" alone all too easily leads to vagueness. Inaccuracies. The same reason captures "le simple", the singular fact, in a clear way.

Consequence: the full Cartesian method involves some division of a totality, in its vagueness, into constituents ('simples').

2.2. The "synthesis".

But this is not the end of the matter: Descartes thus represents a multiplicity. Without investigated coherence. Therefore: reason proceeds to reconstitute the disparate elements (simples) into the whole.

The role of the "énumération complète".

Faced with complex (compound and even complicated) data, Descartes divides them into irreducible elements. That he, in doing so, does not forget the totality, is clear from what follows: the summative induction, which he calls "complete enumeration or addition" according to a tradition of the time, checks at the end of the analysis whether all the "simples" (separate elements) have been examined and are "ready" for the mind. This is a summary of the analysis.

Therefore, we, EH 168, went into "addition."

E.H. 191.

Only now can the recomposition of the totality begin: one by one we think all the elements together according to singular relations. Again: summative induction, the summative test to see if all the elements and all the relations have been analyzed and recomposed. At the end of synthesis.

Modern akribeia.

What the Ancient Greeks called ‘akribeia’, accuracy; becomes - from the Modern natural sciences and mathematics - ‘exactness’ i.e. akribeia with mathematical and preferably mechanical precision. One feels Galilei and Viète.

Note.-- The terms “analysis” and “synthesis”.

What the Antiques called “stoicheiosis,” i.e., factor analysis, in Modern revivalism amounts to “intuition + analysis and synthesis. On the basis of comparison.

Ch. Lahr, *Logique*, 555/556, calls this “la method générale -- ‘Analuo’ = “I lay something out in its elements”. ‘Suntithèmi’ = “I put something together” Where, evidently, ‘totality’ (see summative induction) means both collection and system.

Lahr distinguishes

a. the rational analysis and synthesis, which, internally and externally, compares mental entities - concepts, judgments - i.e., dissolves them into elements (analysis) and reassembles them (synthesis);

b. experimental analysis and synthesis, which compares and analyzes and synthesizes realities, situated outside the mind.

Appl. model. - Rational.

The term “spirit-gifted living being” (analyze and again think together); the judgment “Man is a spirit-gifted living being” dissect and again think together.

Experimental.

In experimental psychology, for example, I can check whether the term and the judgment I just gave correspond to the reality of actual people.

Note.-- The terms “analytic”/”synthetic” with Kant were discussed ED 28: there we are talking about rational and experimental judgments. Which, in passing, said, parallels the terms “aprioric/ aposterioric” (Lachelier; ED 32).

Note.-- The terms ‘analytic’/’synthetic’ with Platon refer to the conditional phrases ‘analytic’ is reductive reasoning; ‘synthetic’ is deductive reasoning. Cfr ED 26.

E.H. 192.

Mathesis universalis.

M. Foucault, *Les mots et les choses*, 66/72, emphasizes: Descartes envisaged a general theory of order. He conceived of them “as a ‘mathesis,’ understood as a universal science of measure and order” (o.c., 70). “Mathesis universalis” is therefore “comprehensive, mathematical-mechanical thought of order”.

Lullism - EH 186 - with its “ars magna” (“great power”) wanted to arrive at a “scientia generalis”, a general science, from a small number of foundations (concepts, judgements), by means of combinatorics (combining or connecting them). In his wake a whole Lull movement arose,--so much so that Leibniz, among others, was deeply impressed by Lull’s ars magna.

Viète, among others, with his letter arithmetic (instead of mere medieval number arithmetic) - instead of writing “ $3 + 5 = 8$ ” write “ $x + y = z$ ” - which becomes the basis of Modern algebra e.g., stands at the cradle of the “characteristica universalis”, the universal letter arithmetic. But this builds on the Lullist combinatorics (concatenation of terms, judgments, reasoning) and its “general science” that emerges from it. The “logistique speciosa” (which works with “species”, letters) soon becomes “logistique” without more. From which our “logistique” becomes intelligible.

In 1629, Descartes spoke favorably of the *characteristica universalis*. He proposed to arrive at an axiomatic construction of it. He wanted to express all our ‘ideas’ - idées - and their combinations in algebraic symbols in order to arrive at a mathematical total system. That was his ‘mathesis universalis’. Thus Lullism was mathematized: its general science became general mathematics and its combinatorics became algebraic letter reasoning.-- Thus G. Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche*, 101, summarizes the development.

The many in the one and vice versa.

Bibl. sample : *Le Courrier de l’Unesco (Voyage au pays des mathématiques)* 1989: (The Unesco Courier (Journey to the land of mathematics)), Nov., 11.

“The description given, as early as fifteen centuries ago, by the Greek thinker Proklos of Constantinople (410/485) says: ‘The mathematical mind exposes the one in the many, -- the undivided in the divisive, the unlimited (‘infinite’) in the finite.’

E. Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, (Philosophy of Arithmetic), The Hague, 1970 (1891), still begins with “multiplicity/ unity” and, in that context, with “number.

E.H. 193.

Eleventh sample.-- Inward and outward comparison. (193/196)

Bibl. sample : L. Davillé, *La comparaison et la méthode comparative* (The comparison and the comparative method), 1913, 1914. The author distinguishes two points of view that dichotomize (= complement).

1. Internal factors analysis.

A given - e.g. an ant - can be 'compared' internally: the whole and its parts - e.g. the biological system of the ant with its parts and functions - are compared with each other so that the relations are exposed.

2. External factors analysis.

This same fact can undergo an external "comparison": the ant, for example, is examined insofar as it is situated within a totality. Thus the totality of "all that is ant" (the collection of ants),-- metaphorically and thus the totality of the ant's nest and its environment (the system in which the ant finds itself),-- metonymically.

If one wants: first the hypo- or subsystem (internal equation) after which the (hyper- or super-) system, in which the hypostatic system is situated (external equation).-- Models will clarify this.

Appl. model : the Augustinian social critique.

S. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430) is the greatest Church Father of the Western Patristics (33/800). Like many of his contemporaries, he had great regard for the fact that Rome - as a world empire - had founded a kind of legal order - *ius romanum* (Roman law) - which was the basis of the *pax romana*, the Roman peace of nations.

But Augustine, after a life of what we would now call "a playboy," had become and Platonist and Christian.

A Platonic

- (1) identifies "phenomena" (visible and tangible facts),
- (2) but illuminated by the 'idea' belonging to those phenomena. One can, for the time being, define the idea as the ideal which, in the phenomena, is more or less realized.

Application.

Thus, he proceeded from the premise that the idea of "peace" exists - in a higher, divine (Christianly trinitarian) order - which enlightens us and allows us to judge actual "peace" called facts for their "real value."

Here is what he writes: "The order and justice founded by the Roman state amount - in the end - to a caricature (literally: 'a laughable imitation'),-- to a degenerate form, unholy in nature, of a natural and Christian order." (Fr. Ferrier, S. Augustin in: D. Huisman, dir., *Dict, des philosophes*, Paris, 1984, 141).

E.H. 194

In other words: the foreground, i.e. the visible and tangible facts, - “phenomena” (phenomena) - are, within a Christian-Platonic view, set against the background, i.e. the idea (= the ideal). This dichotomy “foreground/background” typifies Platonism.

The pax romana internal and external comparison.

For S. Augustine, the mask of the actual Roman legal order conceals forms of injustice and violence.

1 -- Internal Equation.

Within the Roman empire, centered mainly in and around the “eternal city of Rome, a possessing class accumulates more and more wealth, -- the basis of a “dolce vita,” a life of enjoyment and intrigue.

2 -- External comparison.

The Roman state and community reveled in war profits, results of imperialist wars to the outside world. Wasn't the name of a conquered territory, at the time, “provincia” (winged region)?

There is more.

Both correlative comparisons - understand: comparison-based analyses - go hand-in-hand.

1. The possessing class, proponent of the premise that property is “absolute property,” i.e., “ius utendi et abutendi” the “right” to use and . abuse, must stop its ears to all those - Platonic: parafrasunè, looking beside reality - who denounce such abuses.

2. Those who do not accept such a caricature of the idea of “peace” -- and, above all, still say this, in hope, out loud -- must be exterminated like “a weed,” -- banished from the community and sent into exile. For they stir up something that the capitalist class considered “happiness.”

Thus wrote S. Augustine in his main work *De civitate Dei*, On the State of God, 2/20. This clarifies what Davillé means by inward and outward comparison, inward and outward stoicheiosis.

Appl. model: the Grossian principle.

“Das Grosse'sche Prinzip”.

Bibl. sample :

-- E. Grosse, *Die Anfänge der Kunst*, (The beginnings of art,), Freiburg i, Breisgau, 189.

-- id., *Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirthschaft*, (The forms of the family and the forms of the economy,), Freib. i.Br., 1896.

E.H. 195,

The premise of this non-Marxist writer reads, “Economic activity

a. is the life center of any cultural system,

b. is - in the most profound way - irresistibly the main factor of all other cultural factors.” Behold the axiom.

Notice the dichotomy: economy on the one hand, the rest of the whole culture on the other. With the connection, interaction, between the two.

Note -- Grosse explains his premise with a phrase from Ludwig Feuerbach (1804/1872), radical-left disciple of Hegel. The book by Jakob Moleschott (1822/1893), mechanistic Materialist, *Lehre der Nahrungsmittel für des Volk* (1850), is read by Feuerbach. He summarizes it, in his *Naturwissenschaften und Revolution* (1850): “If you want to improve the people, give them better food instead of going out against “sin”: der Mensch ist was er iszt (man is what he eats)”. (H. Arvon, *La philosophie allemande*, Paris, Seghers, 1970, 188).

Grosse in turn indicates this as follows: “Wenn man weisz was ein Volk iszt, so weisz man auch was es ist” (If one knows what a people eats, then one immediately knows what it is).

System Learning.

The entire culture can be referred to as a hyper- or super-system. In it, light falls on a hypo or sub-system, namely the economy (understand: production, distribution and consumption of goods and services). This sub-system dominates, to a high degree, the other sub-systems (family, art, religion, law, etc.).-- One sees the dichotomy (the economy and its complement, the rest of the whole culture).

The legal status of women.

Bibl. sample : W. Koppers, S.V.D., *Die materiell-wirtschaftliche Seite der Kulturentwicklung*, (The material-economic side of cultural development), in: *Settimana Internazionale di Etnologia Religiose (IVa Sessione (Milano 17/15.09. 1925))*, Paris, 1926, 109.

1. Internal comparison.

a. Generally speaking, in Modern Europe, since the Liberal, i.e., free market economy, the legal status of women has undergone a serious change.

For example, today (1925), she mostly has the right to vote, the right to university studies, the right to a free choice of career... These are things that were non-existent decades ago.

b. Now the statement. -- “Who would dare to deny or even deny that the Modern - namely the capitalist - development of the economy is primarily responsible for this state of affairs?”. Thus always Koppers.

Conclusion: -- Economy and womanhood are two sub-systems of the one comprehensive system ‘culture’. Once compared, they appear to be in a causal (causal) relationship: the free market economy causes, to a certain extent, a legal position which emancipates women.

2. External comparison.

Koppers continues.

a. The data are such that, at least in certain traditional (Archaic, Primitive, even Classical) cultures, an analogous, partly equal partly different, situation can be found regarding the “economy/woman” ratio.

The name for such a very special legal position, in very limited parts of the globe, peculiar to women is ‘matriarchy’ (‘mother law; ‘mother rule’). What it means: to understand such a culture one has to presuppose that the woman - embodied in a special way in well-defined women in particular - dominates it to a great extent.

So much so that, metonymically, the whole culture can be named after it, The part no the name to the whole.

b. Koppers, with the model of the legal position of women in our free market culture in mind, suggests the hypothesis that also within matriarchal cultures the economy can be held responsible for that dominant position.

Note.-- As is well known, the term “Mutterrecht” (Mother Right), was introduced in 1861, by the genius J. J. Bachofen. “Mother law orders were not to be found everywhere (as Bachofen’s hypothesis presupposed), but only among some tribes, mainly in the tropical and subtropical regions, where there always seems to be a relation between arable farming (= plant care) and mother law.” (E. Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirthschaft* (The forms of the family and the forms of the economy), (1896)).

The women take care of the fields and thus establish land ownership and, at the same time, in part, living quarters for families,--with the men having the task of hunting, warfare tasks such as protection and conquest, etc. This division of labor goes hand in hand with the law of inheritance such that house and landholdings, as the “property” of the women, are inherited by the daughters.

Note -- Reread ED 44 (the analogical or similarity induction). This is applied in the external equation.

E.H. 197.

Twelfth sample.-- Schleiermacher: divinatory/ comparative. (197/198).

We saw - EH 190 - how Cartesian general mathematics integrated the comparative method. In rein Rationalist-Enlightened context.

Let us now turn to the way in which Romanticism (in the broader sense) in its way gives the comparative method a place.

Romanticism, especially German Romanticism (think Schelling), does not put the mental entities of reason and its chaining together in a mathematical-mechanical way at the center, but “life” and that “in its (cosmic coherence)”.

The “essence” of something.

Rereading ED 46/50 (Idiographic Reasoning). There we saw that idiography focuses on the singular (unique, individual, yes, the singular).

Romanticism is first of all idiographic: the ‘essence’ of something - the local of a landscape, the uniqueness of a person(s), the irreducibility of a civilization and so on - is seen as the essence that is exposed by comparison in its radical distinction from all that is the rest of the universe. Here, then, is a dichotomy at work: a. the something in its singularity; b. the rest of being.

This gives rise to what is called “the individual understanding.”

Idiographic/ nomothetic.

Idiographic’ contains the Antique Greek word ‘idios’, all that characterizes something in its essence. ‘Nomothetic’ includes the Greek word ‘nomos’, all that is general.

This systechie comes from a founder of the humanities, namely Wilhelm Windelband (1648/1915; axiologically oriented Neo-Kantian). The natural sciences search in nature for laws that have universal validity. The humanities - especially psychology - look for uniqueness in all its correlations in everything that happens (‘historically’) in the culture that springs from the human mind.

Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1766/1834).

This Protestant thinker and theologian was the main representative of religious Romanticism, He was opponent of Rationalism (even Fichte and Hegel he fought). Well known is his Reden über die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern (1799). In man, a presupposition is at work: in the mind comes through that man is radically dependent on the Infinite and Eternal which he discovers in himself and in the cosmos, the finite and time-bound, by ‘Anschauung’ (intuition). This is the basis of dogmas and rites.

E.H. 198.

Hermeneutics.

Schleiermacher wants to penetrate to the deeper spiritual and soul life of (himself and) his fellow man (which will later be continued by W. Dilthey). According to him, psychology proceeds in two steps.

1. The divinatory method.

There is first of all ‘unmittelbares Verstehen’ the direct understanding (comprehension, ‘understanding’), of one’s fellow man e.g.: “The divinatory - comprehend: empathize - method consists in transforming oneself, in a certain sense, into the other in order to comprehend the individual in an immediate way.”

2. The comparative method.

Then comes the “mittelbares Verstehen” the indirect understanding or comprehension. “The comparative method looks at the one that is to be ‘understood’ (‘understood’) as something general. It then finds the characteristic by comparing with others under the same general point of view.”

“Both methods must not be separated from each other.” (Kl. E. Welker, *Die grundsätzliche Beurteilung der Religionsgeschichte durch Schleiermacher*, (Schleiermacher's assessment of the history of religion), Leiden/ Köln, 1965, 29/30).

Conclusion.

The “hermeneutic” or “interpretive” spiritual scientific method as conceived by Schleiermacher thus focuses first and foremost on the uniqueness of the individual, but it apparently never does so without situating that uniqueness in a general and a communal framework. To claim that Schleiermacher’s method seeks unilaterally to see the singular and does not value the general concept (which Rationalism so emphasized) rests on a misunderstanding of his texts.

Again: internal and external comparison.

Davillé’s system returns in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics: first - divinatory - trying to probe the individual being of the fellow man by feeling (like the clairvoyant tries to penetrate to the inside), but at the same time - comparative - trying to situate that unique being in a totality.-- Which is typical for the philosophy of Romanticism.

Although thoroughly different from the Enlightenment-Rationalist view (in terms of religion alone the difference is thorough), yet in this Romantic thinking there is an analogous sense of order.

Thirteenth sample.-- Models of comparative method (199/201).

Resume ED 20 (Mathematical model). - Look at the drawing (figure with points representing 'arithmos', configuration ('number')). Suddenly, if one understands the Paleopythagorean method, one structures as that method suggests: suddenly one 'sees' the figures of the numbers (1, 4, 9, 16, 25) 'as' models (information-sharing drawings) of originals (1, 4, 9, 16, 25 as square numbers). On the basis of what? From comparing! Seeing' in the Pythagorean way is only possible thanks to confronting each other, in spirit, with the models as information concerning the originals.-- This is an introduction.

A space figure test.

Let's take a type of space-figure test (W. Vermoere) as it can be used e.g. in the third kindergarten class to test the mental maturity of five - six year olds.

a. Infrastructure.

The material used consists of a number of geometrical figures that are complicated (not just transparent) for a child of that age. They are presented to a child in such a way that it creates order out of chaos or disorder.

b. Suprastructure.

While the child is busy, look closely at him: he is exhibiting an intellectual "crisis. This is a state of "everything is still possible"; succeed or fail. With Prigogine: a fork in the road to enlarged disorder or founded order.

To begin with it understands nothing of it ("initial chaos"). But suddenly it sees through the structure, understands : the order(s). In and through these disorderly appearing figures it discovers a - for its age understandable - geometrical figure or configuration (Paleopythagorean: 'arithmos'). The teacher or test leader then says: "The child structures". We say: it orders.

The mathematical equation.

It already came in handy. But let's dwell on it for a moment. -- Anyone who has studied, say, algebra or the like, knows the enormous role that comparing quantities (how many) can play.

1.-- Numeracy.

"7+3=10". Elementary school, for example, teach arithmetic: this is often done in no other way than by means of such equivalences, expressed in - what are called - 'comparisons'. After all, only those who compare see equivalences.

E.H. 200. .

2 -- Letter math.

Viète taught us. For example, “ $x + y > \Rightarrow z$ ”. Only after comparison (of both magnitudes) can the sign $> = <$ be put. During the operations the comparison is maintained.

How fortunate do not professional scientists consider themselves when they can put such “comparisons” on paper either as a lemma (preliminary hypothesis) or as the result of research.

Bibl. sample : F. Thonnard, *Précis de philosophie (en harmonie avec les sciences)*, (Précis of philosophy (in harmony with the sciences)), Paris, 1950, 124/131 (Les sciences mathématiques).

The language and literature comparison.

Reread EH 170/176 (Metaphor, metonymy,-- synecdoche). The tropes, perennial in language and literature, stand or fall by explicit or concealed comparisons. But there is much more than that.

Speech comparison.

Our traditional speech systems comparatively order words and sentences according to juxtaposition and subordination (parataxis/ hypotaxis).

Appl. model.

“When the little blonde came running there, his mother was extremely happy”. Main or independent sentence: “His mother was extremely happy” - or dependent sentence: “When the little blonde came running there”.

Note -- The arrangement of sentences as follows: “The little blonde came running there. How extremely happy his mother was.” is paratactic phrasing. The sentence given earlier, a full sentence contains subordination or hypotactic phrasing.

Parataxis involves collection of equivalent sentences. Hypotaxis means system of connected sentences which are not equivalent, grammatically speaking. - So that again what Platon calls “all and/ or whole” (collection and/ or system) plays a decisive ordering role in our grammatical stoicheiosis.-- Which becomes clear by comparison. - That regarding sentences among themselves. External comparison

Still speech comparison.

Platon already distinguished between ‘onoma’, name, subject (original)-with all its adjectives-and ‘rhèma’, proverb (model)-with all its adverbial clauses.

Ever since Chomsky (Noam - (1928/...), American linguist) we have been talking about nominal and verbal components, preferably in mathematising art language.-- Reread ED 19/21 (Model Use).-- comparison is the condition.

E. H. 201.

Note -- The terms ‘para.cabs’, arrangement of an army before battle, army-in-strike order, preparation, and ‘hupo.cabs’, subordination, rearguard arrangement, bring us to the term ‘taxology’, the scientific study of classifying, i.e., ordering according to types (= similarities with mutually exclusive differences).

‘**Taxinomy**’ then means ‘classification science’ and ‘taxonomy’ each ‘classification system’ (but particularly the biological class system (think e.g. of Linné)).

In virtue of comparing, one arrives at an ordered system of concepts.

Literatological comparison.-- Appl. model.

A.- R. Gélinau, ed., *The Poetry of Transcendence*, La poëzie de la transcendance, Paris, Argel, vol. 1, 1984, gives the following piece.

Walt Whitman (1819/1892; American poet).-- “Not I, not any one else can travel that road for you,-- You must travel it for yourself.-- It is not far, it is within reach, - Perhaps you have been on it since you were born and did not know, - Perhaps it is everywhere on water and on land.” (o.c., 32/33).

Note -- The theme or subject (original) -- directions serving a person who has lost his way -- is further explained (model) by means of two emphases: a. “Thou art irreplaceable” and b. “The way is to be sought, if need be, everywhere.”

“The way” is the unifying element or stoicheion, but restrictively: the one addressed apparently does not know it, nor do the one addressed know it (except at one point: one goes the way alone).

Note -- By comparison, the unity in the multiplicity of poetic words becomes clearer.

J. Loise, *Les secrets de l’analyse et de synthèse dans la composition littéraire*, (The secrets of analysis and synthesis in literary composition,), Mons, 1880, 1/22, is entitled: “Le principe de l’unité dans la variété”. One cannot put it better. The author says that unity-in-the-variety is the rule both philosophically and in the field of art.

E.H. 202.

Fourteenth sample.-- Aristotelian hypothesis. (202)

Aristotle would not be Aristotle if he had not sought out elements of order.

1.-- In his *Kategoriai* (Lat.: Liber de praedicamentis) - E.O. 81v. (Categories) - he sets forth:

a. In order to organize data - being, as he calls it - we use categories - see the list of the ten basic concepts, centered around 'independence' and 'relation';

b. these categories themselves put forward ordering elements:

1. synchronous : opposition(savings); 2. Diachronic 'movement' (understand: modification, change), where both points of view are united in the opposition pair "simultaneity / succession".

2.-- In his *Metaphysics*, book Delta, he fills out this 'hypothesis' (undergirding every theory): He lists as ordering principles; relationship, quantity/quality,-- same/not same, equality/ inequality,-- whole/part, completeness, configuration, boundary,-- earlier (foreshadowing)/ later (continuation),-- opposites.

David Hume (1711/1776)

was once the top figure of Empiricist Rationalism (with a tendency toward radical Skepticism).--although certainly not Aristotelian realist but very nominalist in outlook, Hume nevertheless exhibits very similar views.

Hume studied the 'associations' (definition: if with A I think of B, then B is an association of A). The internal as well as the external experiences of all kinds show, on closer inspection, synchronically, resemblance and adjoining (In Dutch, the latter is also called 'belending', 'aanpaling'; 'contiguity', even 'contact') - we think of 'common property' (collection) and 'common property' (system) - and, diachronically, 'order' (= 'omen/ sequel').

Auguste Comte (1798/1857),

founder of French Positivism, a French-style intellectualizing form of Empiricist Rationalism, also sees "the facts" (the firmly established data) as orderable through synchronical "similarity" and diachronical "succession.

Bertrand Russell (1872/1970)

Having turned his back on Platonism, he saw ordering as governed by the same concepts of order to be put first.-- What tradition is capable of anyway!

E.H. 203.

Fifteenth sample.-- Assimilism (concordism)/ differentism (discordism). (203/206)

The comparatist(s) looks at both similarity/coherence and difference/gap. From what? Because he thinks identitively - the one-in-the-many, the same-in-the-different, the coherence-in-the-incoherence. Cfr ED 16/18 (Identity).

But there are variants.

a. The Assimilist(s) or Conkordist(s) tends to flatten differences and, or gaps in order to emphasize similarities and cohesiveness.

b. The Different(ial)ist(s) or Discordist(s) tends to flatten similarities and/or correlations to emphasize differences and gaps.

Both extreme positions compare, i.e. confront data, but accentuate,--even to the point of extremism.

Assimilism.

Do we show by means of a model what that is.

Bib st.: D. Audétat, *Lausanne capitale de la science politique (Le futur Institut international de politique comparée pourrait établir son siège à Lausanne)*, (Lausanne, capital of political science (The future International Institute of Comparative Politics could establish its headquarters in Lausanne)), in: *Journal de Genève* 14.02.1987.

The institution of which the proposer speaks exists only as a draft. Nevertheless, in the course of 1986+, it brought together researchers from more than thirty countries - university graduates - from all over the world in a provisional committee. The initiative came from the French professor Jean Blondel (European University Institute in Florence), who wanted to clarify, on a planetary scale, the political activities and the structures that lie behind them. On the basis of a comparative method.

Are we watching closely:

a. up to now, political science (scientific study of politics) has been fed by regional, yes ethnocentric and local thinking studies. Consequence: disparate fragments serve as (flawed) material for comparative political science.

b. J. Blondel: "Such studies must be elevated to a 'higher' 'supraregional' level. We realize that we ellen are part of the same world: Blondel's conception of comparatism (comparative political science) boils down to the detection of common traits, of shared traits within the planetary multiculture. He wants consensus, agreement on the scale of the whole earth.

Which the regionalists, nationalists don't appreciate.

E.H. 204.

Note -- J. Habermas (1929/...), Frankfurter Schule, second generation, favors “consensus” or concordism.

One hale for a moment his *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, I (*Handlungsrationalität und Gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung*), II (*Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft*), (Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, I (*Handlungsrationalität und Gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung*), II (*Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft*)), Frankfurt a. M., 1981.

The notion of interaction is central. Habermas admittedly situates this ‘Interaktion’ in our diverse multicultural with its discordisms.

The idea of ‘rapport’ is understood in a pragmatic way: learning to live together, to work together, puts something like a common, even joint, rapport at the forefront. Differences and disputes can be settled in a modern, rational way.

Habermas situates himself in the great German tradition of thought of Kant and Hegel e.g., but with as a corrective the Anglo-Saxon Language Analysis (which keeps logical analysis of language and understanding phenomena central). On a background of a kind of Neo-Marxist framework of thought, typical of the Frankfurt School.

One thinks of his *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne* (The philosophical discourse of modernity), (*Zwölf Vorlesungen*), Frankf.a.M., 1985.

According to Habermas, Modernity is not only “negative”(“negative Dialektik”), but also “positive”: “Let us, though, purge out the conciliatory, unifying Modern thought and action, yet at once, against any splintering Postmodernism with its discordant tendencies, carry it through.

Different(ial)ism.

We tie in with H.-J. Hempel, *Variabilität und Disziplinierung des Denkens*, (Variability and discipline of thinking), Munich/ Basel, 1967, 82/104.

The author does analysis of thinking as it actually proceeds (descriptive logic). In o.c., 82/ 104 (*Variologische Denksysteme*) he has underlined about thinking that all that is ‘varius’, distinct, different, separable, divergent. Both synchronically and diachronically.

Note.-- There are ‘differential’ sciences.-- For example, differential psychology, which emphasizes the differences, indeed disputes, between the psychés of child, adolescent, adolescent(s), adult, third age. Everyone knows that e.g. the ‘generation gap’ exists.

Variological point of view does not necessarily exclude all similarities and all correlations, but still emphasizes - sometimes excessively - the separations and differences: consider the statement “A child is whole and all different from...

E.H. 205.

Discordisms.

Bibl. sample : Fr. Laruelle, *Les philosophies de la différence (Introduction critique)*, (Philosophies of difference (Critical introduction)), Paris, 1988.

There have been, since Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900; philological thinker of Nihilism), thinkers such as M. Heidegger (1889/1976; Nazi Existentialist), Gilles Deleuze (1925/1995), Jacques Derrida (1930/2004); grammarian who practices as much as possible “la déconstruction”, the dismantling, of the great tradition) and others in their wake who invariably emphasize all that differs and all that separates. “If only difference! If only there is gap! Seen from our identitarian standpoint, this is as one-sided as the concordism just described.

Note -- Nominalisms.

Euripides of Salamis (-480/-406), the mystically inclined third great tragedian of the ancient Greeks, struggled throughout his life with the dissensual (discordant) world of thought and life of ProtoPhilosophy (-450/-350) in which pragmatic power thinking figured strongly.

He has immortally characterized nominalism in all its forms: “If ‘good’ and ‘evil’ were the same everywhere, there would no longer be any dispute among men. In fact, however, only the names that people use are the same everywhere, but what is meant by these names differs from region to region.”

The opinion that our knowing and living and acting with regard to “good” and “evil” does not go beyond the situation outlined by Euripides, has been called, since the Middle Ages Scholastics, “nominalism” (Lat.: “nomen” (plural “nomina”)).

In other words : “in itself” (according to the reality independent of our regional and subjective impressions or opinions) nothing is “good” or “evil”. These notions are introduced only with the introduction of the names, which show an insidious generality based on nothing.

This amounts to multicultural conventionalism (also: ‘culturalism’): people agree, group by group (‘conventio’ (Lat.) is ‘agreement’) to label something as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ from now on.

Conclusion.-- The Differentist(s) is easily beguiled by nominalism.

“All (collection) / whole (system)” mere names or more than names?

The premise of the comparative method is collections and systems. After all, these are data that teach us to see the unity in reality. For us, they are ontological concepts that can represent an objective reality.

E.H. 206.

Bibl. st: D. Nauta, *Logic and Model*, Bussum, De Haan, 1970, 258v, (The universalia problem and the battle of foundations),-- According to Abraham Fraenkel, a Platonist, the situation with the theory of sets is as follows.

A. Logicism.

G. Cantor (the formalizing revivalist) and logicism view collections (classes of data that exhibit common properties) as discoverable, findable, and testable realities.

B. The formalism

Formalism sees them as invented things but testable for its consistency (logical contradictionlessness)

C. Intuitionism

Intuitionism sees them as entities invented by the collection specialist.-- Intuitionism and, in a sense, also Formalism are clearly forms of nominalism.

Paradoxical sets and paradoxical systems.

Thanks to the eternally current comparative method, we all discover “paradoxical” unity-in-the-less.

Imagine two neighboring women who can't stand each other, What in fact happens? Are they pure discord without any residue of unity? No. If they see each other, they establish a bond, yes, a bond more intense than many other bonds. Because they are so primordially hostile to each other, they are as primordially attached to each other by ...hatred (not being able to stand one another).

Imagine this: a group of “Communalists” (“communalism” is “all that emphasizes group affiliation ultra-strongly”) is on fire because its opponents are pushing through a manifesto.

“Les extrêmes se touchent” ("The extremes are touching)

(All that is extremely opposite touches each other somewhere). They head for it. Where non-extremists remain calm, yes, stay calm at home, they head, emotionally charged and full of what their opponents are and do, for a counter-manifestation! Whether it is religious cleavages (Muslims/Hindus), which lead to the destruction of each other's places of worship, or whether it is political cleavages (Communists/Capitalists) which lead to party-formation-with-battle, or whether it is ideological cleavages (one reads each other's works to refute them), the result is the formation of a collection and/or system of contradictory elements. We call these “paradoxical” collections and/or systems.

E.H. 207,

Sixteenth sample.-- Relational science. (207/212)

The relation, direct object of the comparative method which is and remains the core of any harmonology, takes very different forms. We will now discuss some - preferably fundamental - types of relationship.

Josiah Royce's point of view.

In his *Principles of Logic*, 74, he says: "The actions (note: of someone or even of something) constitute a collection of 'entities', i.e. 'being' or 'data' which are governed, in any case, by the same laws as those by which classes (note: concepts) and judgments are governed. -- The so-called 'algebra of logic' can be applied to them".

Axiological or value relations.

Do we immediately take an example of 'action', namely the value judgment or 'evaluation' Immediately a number of 'connectives', connections or relations, are exposed.

1. Refusing value judgment.

"Neither one nor the other (good or value)". In logical language, "If e.g. two or more goods and/ or values, then neither of them or none of them!". The expression "neither nor" is a negation or denial (negation).

2. Exchange solution value judgment.

"If more than one good (values) then one (the one) and not the other (the other). The value judgment in question no longer refuses without more ("neither nor") but accepts one good (one value) and not the other (the other)." It is a restrictive refusal (one refuses with reservations).

3. Alternate value judgment.

"If more than one good (value), then now one (the one) then the other (the other)".

4. Preferred value judgment.

"If more than one good (value), then prefer one (the one) to the other (the other)". Note that this type of 'action' is not quite the same as the exchange solution judgment, because preferring something differs from refusing something.

5. Aggregation value judgment

"If more than one good (value), then all (goods, values)". These are day-to-day connections or 'connectives' between goods and/ or values. They express value relations or rather choice relations.

Note -- Reread E.H. 170 (logical square): the choice acts go from none over some do, some don't to all.

E.H. 208.

The viewpoint of Ch.S.S. Peirce.

Peirce goes on to be one of the founders of the relationship logistics.-- He designed, e.g., in imaginary form, “a closed system” in which each member or “element” is either a teacher or student. However, in such a way that no one can be both at the same time.

1. He labeled the job “teacher/teacher” as “colleague.
2. He labeled the relationship “teacher/student.”
3. He labeled the “student/teacher” relationship as “teacher.
4. He labeled the relationship “pupil/student” as “fellow pupil.

Note: Reread E.H. 170 (logical square). From both “teacher” over one to neither teacher! That amounts to one example of “all over some to none”. It can be argued that some ‘names’ are indigestible to a natural language, but they are “termini technici” technical term to facilitate a transition from ordinary logic to thematized logic (within which ‘names’ can become universal terms). Thus one ‘calculates’ with terms e.g. : this is then called a calculus!

Sociometrics.

Jakob Levi Moreno (1889/1974) is the founder of psychodrama (reserved for doctors). In it the ‘actors’ let the problems - psychological, also physical, social, cultural - come through in groups (hence the term ‘group psychodrama’). This can also be done through a kind of therapeutic play (Moreno tried it in Vienna). Goal : to start a process of growth.

Note. - The ancient Greeks would speak here of ‘catharsis’, Lat.: purificatio; purification. Purification process, in which one starts from all that is in fact such that, gradually, all that is ‘negative’ is eliminated (= purification in the strict sense) and all that is ‘positive’ is elevated on a higher plane (purification in the metonymic sense).

In such a growth group, Moreno pays attention first and foremost to the relations between individuals and between eventual groups within the group. On the ‘reflexive’ (loop) relations (“What do the participants think about themselves?”), on the ‘reciprocal’ (symmetrical) (“What do some think about the others and vice versa?”), the ‘transitive’ (transitive (“Would you introduce me to X?”)).

E.H. 209.

'Communication'

Human ('social') communication (and interaction, because both data are distinguishable but not separable) can be described as a process whereby a. a sender (who sends a message), b. by means of a channel and signals (thereby a code or signalling system, a language if you will) tries to make data ('data: the message) available to c. a receiver (who processes the 'data' into 'information' (all that gives insight), preferably as the sender understood it).

Bibl. sample : G. Fauconnier, *Communication* (Broad but engaging), in: *Academische Tijdingen* (Leuven) 26 (1992) :4 (Dec.), 12/15.

Moreno thus studied "communication" (for that is "communication" (with interaction, mutual incorporation)).-- Sociometry in its formalizing aspect has sometimes been accused of moving away from the singular-concrete interactions between communicants in order to become "abstract.

Yet it is immediately apparent that the relationships and relations we live through are becoming more transparent.

All 'theory' is barren and 'life' is juicy! But without theory life remains too blind, too opaque, too much 'anankè', aimless opacity, as Platon would say. Though it is true that without life every theory remains 'empty',-- too much pure 'nous' (Lat.: intellectus), transparency.

Possible symbolization.

The ones note for "relation (relationship) between a and b" 'aRb' ('R' = relation). The others note : "r xy" (read : the relation between x and y). Still others : "B(a,b)" (the relation between a and b).-- Matter of agreement.

Brief typology.

There are, of course, very many (infinitely many) types of relations. yet there are a small number that are very frequent. Therefore, a word about them.

1.-- The encompassment (implication).

On the face of it, the fact that "something involves(implies) something" is a matter of whole or total identity ("Something involves totally itself") or partial identity ("Something involves partially something else").-- That is the identitarian basis (E.D. 16/18).

Note that the negation also applies "Something implies (utterly or absolutely) not something else!

In other words: the encompassing goes from total (whole) over partial well partially not to total not (again : E.H. 170 (logical square).

E.H. 210.

“Eigen to (inherent to)”. -- View the encompassing in reverse.-- “Something encompasses - totally/ analogically (= partially)/ totally not - something (itself/ something else)”.

This boils down to, “It is inherent in (the second) something (self/thing else) (the first) something - totally/partially/totally not - something (else) to be.

Appl. model.-- “If it rains, it implies that sprinkled things become wet” = “It is inherent or inherent in sprinkled things, if it rains, to become wet.”

Note: --This is a case of interchanging subject (original) with saying (model)-'conversion': a type of 'immediate deduction. Cfr EH 181.

The ambiguity of the encompassing.

One has reapproached the term 'to be', a.o. as an auxiliary verb, with being 'many-sided' - EH 177vv. -

However, the same could just as well be said of the encompassing.

a. Existence.-- God is (= God actually encompasses existence).

b. Essence.

b.1. Total identity.-- Gretel is now Gretel (= Gretel encompasses Gretel).

b.2. Partial identity.-- Jan is a boy (= Jan entails being a member of the set 'boys').
Being honest is good (= Being honest involves goodness).

Note.-- It is as if the concept as an auxiliary verb especially among logicians and mathematicians has been especially weakened and resurrected in the concept of embodiment, -- with precisely the same multiplicity or better “identitative” multiplicity.

Note.-- The term 'relation', especially in current usage (= among logicians and mathematicians), covers precisely the same identitive multiplicity: the reflexive or looping 'relation' is total identity and the non-reflexive relation is non-total identity. How the dime of criticism of traditional ontology can run after all!

2.1.-- The looping or reflexive relation.

Logicians express themselves as follows: “The relation of something - e.g. a - to itself”. Ontological: the total identity of something - e.g. a - with itself.

Note.-- A diurnal language use will not so easily speak of the “relation of something to itself (in the strong sense).” For such a language use, “the relation of something to itself” is a tropological language use: one uses the term 'relation' in the - for a daily language use 'improper' - sense.

E.H. 211.

Note-- Something of this is found in the ‘reciprocal’ or reflexive verbs: “I look at myself”. “I see myself standing there already”.

2.2. -- *The reciprocal or symmetrical relation.*

One does not confuse “reciprocal” with “mutual” (as in the responses to New Year’s wishes). Reciprocal relation is looping back on itself and reciprocal relation is meeting so that something responds to something while that second something responds to the first. From both sides there is relationship.

Case in point-- Surely one is familiar with the well-known term “mutual marital fraud”. Which can mean “going out from both sides”. Maybe even “by mutual consent” (then the mutuality is even stronger).

Or the well-known natural law expression: ‘work and we(d)erwork’ (= action and reaction).

Or still (in an argument, be it flapping or not) “word and response.

Reread from here EH 206, where there is talk of paradoxical sets and especially systems. There there is outgoing contradiction from both sides.

Note -- Fred. J. Buytendijk (1687/1974; Dutch physiologist and psychologist) who gained fame in Phenomenological circles for his beautiful work *The Woman*, has written about the encounter, i.e. the mutual acquaintance of more than one person which takes place at a deeper level over time.

So when in a meeting group - think of something like “Marriage Encounter” - a gesture, a word and so on gets no response, then there is no real deep encounter. Unless in a paradoxical way: when e.g. the acquaintance is accompanied by “heartfelt” dislike etc., then one “meets” each other on a “deeper” level ... in a negative way. “In the mode of failure” (to speak with e.g. Heidegger, where he talks about ‘Verfallenheit’, the falsification or failure form, of something).

Note -- It is then one case of ‘nothing’: e.g. “With these two, with true love, it is nothing”. Cfr ED 117: “nihil privativum”, robotic negation (in a marriage, after all, one expects symmetry or mutual love). Loving “one another” is not there!

2.3.-- *The transitive or transitive relation.*

Between two or more terms there is at least one intermediate term. From a over b to c.

“My friends’ friends are also my friends”. Or a more ‘subtle’ example: “She married him for the reason of his possession”. In other words: she - through him - possesses!

E.H. 212.

3.-- The clarity relationship.

One hears it in everyday language: “That is unambiguously clear” (not susceptible to more than just one interpretation)”. Or: “That is more- or rather ambiguous”. The latter: susceptible to more than just one interpretation.

The core is what in Dutch is also called ‘addition’, i.e. following a given (e.g. one or more than one interpretation) is ‘added’ to that given. Usually said of - what is called with a terminus technicus - “one-syllable relation”. This is the case when precisely one fact provokes precisely one addition (e.g. of an interpretation).

From the addition understood in this sense, one then arrives at “one-meaningful” (just one fact elicits more than one addition) and “many-meaningful” (more than just one fact elicits only one addition (e.g., just an interpretation).

Within a class: just one teacher, responsible for more than one student. Or politically: many Nazis, just one Führer!

Appl. model.

Multiculturalism makes us accustomed to one-meaningful relations! Interpreting (interpreting, making sense either by grasping the meaning or interpreting the meaning) within a multiplicity of philosophies of life and the world proceeds according to that clarity scheme.

One is reminded of the fact that King Baudouin of Belgium, for conservative-Catholic reasons, did not want to sign the law (voted by Parliament) on abortion (saying, among other things, “Am I the only Belgian who is not allowed to hold an individual opinion?”).

For days and days, Belgians (and outsiders) interpreted his refusal - one and the same fact - in more than one way, with even more than one point of view being able to help determine the interpretations: some who did not agree with him nevertheless admired his “character” (which indicates more than one interpretation within one and the same person). One can speak here of one interpretation and of many interpretations

Note.-- One can also dwell on the number of terms involved.-- For example: the dyadic (bipartite) relation includes two terms; the triadic (tripartite) three. The n-adic then includes n terms.

Appl. model.-- “I (1) give this apple (2) to my friend (3).

E.H. 213.

Seventeenth sample.-- Structure (distributive / collective). (213/216)

The concept of “structure” has been used, especially since Structuralism (de Saussure et al.),-very widely. Even the Marxists use it very much as basic concepts or categories: one thinks of the terms “Unterbau/ Oberbau” (infrastructure/ superstructure).

So what does “structure” mean? ‘Structure’ can be described as ‘network of relations’.

Bibl. st: D. Nauta, *Logic and model*, Bussum, 1970, 175vv.

Called ‘structure’ the total of relations between data.

The synecdoche.

The two basic structures - they foundation the notion of collection and the notion of system - are exposed in the synecdoche and its reversals. Cfr EH 176.

The metaphorical synecdoche.

In “A Teacher Leads by Example,” one instance of the collection of teachers is mentioned, ostensibly. In fact, the complement, the rest of the teachers, is included.

Following a copy, someone says “All teachers set a good example,” while co-meaning “this teacher here and now.”

The metonymic synecdoche.

“There appears verily the beard” also means the whole person, who is mentioned according to a striking characteristic.

Conversely “He appears there, whole and entire” means, in context of course, “the beard” (the one labeled with that predicate).

In both cases, a systechia returns.

a. Metaphorically: “one copy/all copies” or vice versa.

b. Metonymically: “one part/ all parts” or vice versa. In each case a structure is hidden.

Metaphorically: a distributive (distributive) structure.

Metonymic: a collective (joint) structure.

Note.-- We again pause to consider two Antique-Greek insights that are in part the basis of this course.

A.-- The ideas “all / whole” in Platon.

A. Guazzi, *Le concept philosophique du monde*, (The philosophical concept of the world), in: *Dialectica* 57/58, Neuchâtel (CH), 1961, 89/107, brings up the following. The author starts from the question “Is ‘cosmos’ (world, universe) with Platon an idea?”. Platon left no explicit affirmation in this regard.

E.H. 214.

Yet the answer is “yes,” for Platon’s cosmology (universe theory) is merely a “physical” (understand: natural philosophy) reissue of his “dialectic” (understand: Platon’s philosophy).

As an aside, the “idea” in Platon is anything but a concept. It is the necessary presupposition of the unity-in-the-quantity (and as such an extramental reality). All daisies, however distinct, exhibit in nature, not in our minds, in their background the same fundamental pattern. As a result, they are summarizable. The intended ‘pattern’ or ‘paragon’ is “the idea ‘daisy’ “.

Guazzo starts from Platon’s harmology.

The ideas “all (e.g., “all people”)/ whole (e.g., “the whole man”, “all humanity”))” are fundamentally - at least according to Guazzo - “equivalent” ideas. After all, they represent “all parts” (in Platon’s sense, “all elements or all parts as Platon breaks down in his dialogue *Theaitetos* 205a. One may recall, e.g., that Platon speaks of the “parts” of the soul (the great monster (night/diet/sex/possession), the lesser lion (honor), the little man (spirit)).

There is more - says Guazzo - : the one (all that comprises unity) is not conceivable without ‘parts’ (elements) and vice versa. Thus Platon himself in his *Parmenides* (passim i.e. throughout the text).

Note.-- This is confirmed, indirectly, by E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde*, (The Philosophy of Mathematics.), Antw./ Nijmeg., 1944, 29/56/ Plato), where *stoicheiosis* (Lat.: *elementatio*, literally: ‘parts analysis’) is discussed. Cfr EH 164.

Lahr, *Logique*, 493, brings us the Scholastic language.

1. The general concept (“all people”) is distinguishable from the collective concept (“all man(s)”).

2. O.c., 499: classification or typology is twofold. One can say “all the specimens” (in Middle Latin ‘*omne*’) can be classified ‘logically’“. One can say “the whole specimen” (in Middle Ages Latin ‘*totum*’) can be classified ‘physically’. So that the Middle Ages distinguished two totalities, a merely logical (collection) and a physical (system).

This means that they too, following in the footsteps of the Antique *stoicheiosis*, perfectly distinguished the two structures, the metaphorical (collection doctrine) and the metonymical (system doctrine).

This is and will remain the “foundation” of our structure theory.

E.H. 215.

B.-- *The Antique number mathematical and space mathematical concept of structure.*

That “logical” and “physical” were known long ago is evident from what follows.

A collection (also a system but different) consists of a number of elements, which may be expressible as a number (EH 188).

Eukleides of Alexandria (-323/-283), in the thirteen books of his *Elements of geometry*, treats number mathematics (‘arithmetikè’) in books 7/9. True to his axiomatic-deductive method, he begins with definitions (conceptualizations).

a. *Unity.*

“Unity - in the ancient Greek ‘monas’, monad - is that according to which every being is called one (singular)”. We could also use that as a definition of ‘element’.

b. *Number(form).*

“Number (form) - in Antique Greek ‘arithmos’, literally ‘configuration’ - is the collection - ‘plèthos’ - created by aggregation of units.”

As Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft, I (Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen)*, (History of Natural Science, I (The Foundation of a Science of Nature by the Greeks)), Freiburg, Rombach, 1971, 319, says:

a. unit (monad) is element; b. ‘number’ is at least two units (and hence collection).-
- To the collection theory side.

And now to the systemic doctrinal side.

“Arithmetic and ‘construction’ (= working out figures) went hand in hand. The (Paleo)pythagoreans did not only calculate with numbers. They also saw them as configurations (= spatial structures). And a ‘construction’ (of a spatial mathematical nature) was for them at the same time an arithmetical (understand: number mathematical) problem.” (O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.Idealismus*, I (Vorges. u. Gesch. d. ant. Id.), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 288.

In other words: in addition to the metaphorical (collection theoretic) structure, they saw in numbers the metonymical (system theoretic) structure.

Note.-- Their musicology strongly confirms this: “They did not just see numbers. They heard them, too, since they were accustomed to interpreting sounds as line relationships and as number relationships.” (Ibid.).

One thinks of the resonance of the blows of the blacksmiths of the time on the anvil (and the cosmic music that the Paleopythagoreans thought they heard). One thinks of the musical “harmony of the spheres” (in the solar system and cosmos).

E.H. 216.

The concepts of common and joint property.

A multiplicity (= elements) can be brought to unity by virtue of some 'property' ('characteristic'). If there is at least one property, there is unity.

1.-- Common feature.

It exists when more than one datum exhibits the same property. This property, insofar as common(ish), 'gathers'.

2. -- Joint property.

This is the case when, apart from a common property, at least one property makes a multitude of elements into a whole, 'dispersed'. In other words: all elements belong, by virtue of a common characteristic, to a system.

1. Distributive (distributive) property.

From the Latin 'dis.tribuere', to spread, distribute. One thinks of 'iustitia distributive', distributive justice.

Mathematical model.

The expression " $ax + ay + az$ " may be transformed into " $a(x + y + z)$ ". The term 'a' is spread over the elements " x, y, z ". 'a' is the unit in the multiplicity.

2. Collective (joint, solidarity) structure.

From the Latin 'collectivus'.

Mathematical model.

Einstein's well-known formula " $E = mc^2$ " can be broken down into, E (energy), m (mass), c (speed of light). Seen this way, with the number 2 (as a square), these are the separate elements (which, by their looseness, constitute collection). But these elements are not 'one and the same' (simply interchangeable) eons they are incorporated in the structural formula. For example, one may not move the ' 2 ' (e.g., m^2). The actual structure of energy in the universe does not correspond to such a formula with displacement of ' 2 '.

The interchangeability.

One of the key features of the distributive structure is that the elements are interchangeable or 'equal'. The 'a' from the structural formula " $ax + ay + az$ " is unitary or convertible.

E. Husserl, in one of his works, gives as an example "all that is red." A red bull, a red cloth for the bull, the red part of the coagulating blood in the bullfight, the red part of the toreador's clothing,-- they are all "red."

But the system "toreador/cloth/bull" (to be situated in the hypersystem of the arena (with the spectators)) shows unitary structure not only in terms of the red, but especially in terms of everything that makes a bullfight a whole (system).

E. H. 217.

Eighteenth sample.-- Systematology. (217/220).

The concept of a set, thanks to the “new” mathematics, is usually better known than it used to be. Systematology or systems theory much less so. Therefore, an explanation.

1954: Foundation of the Society for General Systems Research.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901/1972), Kenneth Boulding (economist-sociologist), Rapoport and others are the founders.

Bibl. sample :

-- F.E. Emery, ed., *Systems Thinking* (Selected Readings), Harmondsworth/Baltimore, 1969;

-- P. Delattre, *Systeme, structure, fonction, évolution* (Essai d'analyse épistémologique), Paris, 1971;

-- D.D. Ellis/ Fr.J. Ludwig, *Systems Philosophy*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962.

-- Particularly inspiring, ontologically speaking, is L. Apostel et al, *De eenheid van de cultuur (Naar een algemene systementheorie als instrument van de eenheid van ons kennen en handelen)*, (The unity of culture (Toward a general systems theory as an instrument of the unity of our knowing and actin), Meppel, 1972 (mathematical communication, artistic activities are systematically interpreted).

-- L. von Bertalanffy, *Robots, Men and Minds (Psychology in the Modern World)*, New York, 1967, 61, says:

a.1. the needs for organization inherent in our current complex production processes (think human-machine systems, armament research),

a.2. the work of Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*, New York, 1948-1,

b. L. von Bertalanffy himself who from 1930, sought a general systems theory, these three factors are at the origin of a general systems theory.

Note.-- It should not be thought that antiquity was not familiar with steering science (cybernetics): Aristotle, *Polit.* v:5, puts it as follows: a constitution e.g.

1. Has a ‘telos’, purpose (goal orientation),

2. but may deviate (“par.ek.basis”) from that goal and

3. can be fed back (‘rhuthmosis’, to bring back into, the right movement, or ‘ep.an.orthosis’, rectification),--as O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.Idealismus*, III, 1035 says.

By the way: Aristotle is not doing anything else but continuing a much older steering idea that was already clearly a main idea with the Paleopythagoreans and after them.

This, of course, first involves “goal-directed or dynamic systems.” It involves three “moments”: purposefulness, deviance, and recovery.

E.H. 218.

Typology.

Bibl.st.: *Logic and Model*, by D. Nauta, (173v.) distinguishes three levels concerning systems.

1.-- 'Concrete' systems.

A crystal (inorganic), a living organism (biological), a factory (human).

2.-- 'Conceptual' systems.

All that is abstract. Thus constructions of our minds (o.c., 175). Consider schemata (ED 85vv.). E.g., a diagram of concrete systems like an atom ("atomic model"): this amounts to a representation in mind and on paper of the concrete atom. Similarly, the diagram of a curriculum, a mathematical point set,--a logically or logistically constructed number system.

3.-- 'Formal' systems.

One also says "linguistic or language systems," because the term "formal" is used here in the non-traditional sense.-- For example, programming languages for computers,-- the whole of logistics (logistic calculus) or part of it.

'Formal'

What does D. Nauta understand by "formal"? Any language (= sign system, code) in which

a. of concrete realities

b.1. a comprehensible (conceptual) representation (reconstruction)

b.2. is worked out symbolically. In it, especially relations, resp. structures are represented 'syntactically' (i.e. in their mutual coherence).-- Thus one can speak of "a logistic syntax",

Formal

In traditional-ontological - language, 'formal' means "all that concerns the 'forma' creature form (essence + existence by which something is distinguishable from the rest." Thus the formal traditional logic that puts concepts, creature forms ('formae') at the center. It is unfortunate that logicians use the term 'formal' so often without realizing that they are misunderstanding a tradition. And thereby create confusion.

'Formalized'

This term represents "formal" as logical syntax. It has the advantage of not confusing the ordinary audience, not familiar with philosophy or logic, resp. logistics.-
- For further insight see I.M. Bochenski, O.P., *Philosophical Methods in Modern Science*, Utr./Antw., 1961, 51/62 (Formalism). Instead of concepts in the traditional sense, formalism processes signs, i.e. graphic (spots drawn on paper or computer screen (representing possible concepts)).

E.H. 219.

Targeted System.

One type of system is the teleological or goal-oriented system

The Antique Greek term 'archè' Lat.: principium, principle (premise), expresses the essence of a purposive system. For 'archè' means "that which governs something". If one is controlled by something, that 'element' of control must be taken into account. After all, it directs behavior.

Teleological principle.

Telos', Lat.: finis, aim, is a principle or premise such that it intends a future result already beforehand. So that the intended result already exerts its influence and as 'archè', principle of purpose (one also says 'cause of purpose'), which governs the whole course. Now one also says 'rule'. This regulating mechanism is the core of goal-oriented systems which are 'steered' to a result by their presupposition. This is the 'cybernetic' (steering) system just mentioned.

Appl. model.

A school classroom.-- This system consists of the teacher(s), the students,-- the classroom (within the encompassing system that is the school),-- the classroom infrastructure (board, chalk,-- desks,-- books, etc.).

It is governed or "directed" by a (composite) thinking goal, i.e., to form the students culturally. That goal before it is realized (outcome), determines the entire classroom activity and its course.

The school classroom is thus a goal-oriented system,--with goal, eventual deviation from the set goal, and equally eventual feedback,

Organicism. The German Historical School.

F.K. von Savigny (1779, 1861; jurist), the actual founder,-- K.F. Bekker (*Organismus der Sprache* (1827-1; 1841-2)), Jakob Grimm (1785/1863), with his brother Wilhelm founder of Germanic philology (study of language and literature of the Germanic languages),-- Leopold von Ranke (1795/1886; top figure in XIXth-century German historiography).

Instead of the 'unhistorical' (understand: especially non-traditional) thinking of Enlightened Rationalism, the Historical school places life, especially understood as a living organism, at the center (where Rationalism kept abstract concepts at the center). It espouses an 'organic' view of life and the world. One now also says 'organismic' (view of life and world).

E.H. 220.

Organicism puts first:

- a. the set governs its singular element or its private set;
- b. the system controls each component (subsystem) thereof.

Teleology.

Well, in the view of Organicism, the collection, respectively the system (the totality) is the goal. Every organic reality is such that it is governed by its totality as the goal.

Note: -- Such a purposeful organismic reality can be a people, a legal system, a language, a fairy tale, a historical movement, a culture.

Note: -- One senses the Romantic background. L. von Bertalanffy, *Robots and Minds*, 53/115, opposes -- with the German Historical school -- the purely mechanical model espoused by the Enlightenment. “*Toward a New “Natural Philosophy” (The Open System of Science)*” is his title.-- The ‘new’ scientific viewpoint -- according to von Bertalanffy -- is: the universe “as organization” as an organized whole.

Ordered complexity.

In doing so, he emphasizes the notion of organized complexity. Cfr o.c., 58. - All levels of reality show this characteristic: an atom (physical), a living being (biological), a psychosocial mass phenomenon (culturological).

The only valid premise to be able to explain this organized complexity - says always von Bertalanffy - is a truly general, all-reality doctrine of systems as he expounds o.c., 61ff.

In doing so, he repeatedly, emphasizes the distinction between mechanistic systems theory, peculiar to the cybernetics in circulation, and his own organismic systems view.

Systems theory and order theory.

von Bertalanffy says “organized complexity”.

D. Mercier, *Metaphysique generale (Ontology)* Louvain/ Paris, 1923-7, 536, says: “To order is to take data one after another and to place them according to a unifying principle.” And: “Order is placing data in such a way that each is in its place and satisfies its own purpose. Order is the proper arrangement of data according to the relations which their purpose imposes upon them.” (o.c., 539).

So is an organismic (or “functional”) system!

Nineteenth sample.-- The doctrine of signs. (221/223)

We order in more than one way. Thus we order, i.e. we see relations between data, when we interpret something as a sign which stands for something else (which refers to something else). This happens so often that we shall devote a few chapters to it.

Names.

Drawing theory, theory of signs,-- semantology, semasology,-- since de Saussure semiology and since Peirce semiotics. In all cases, we want to make a draft of a general theory of signs.

Old.

Alkmaion (= Alkmeon) of Kroton (-520/-450), an ancient Greek physician influenced by Paleopythagoreanism, says: "Only by 'tekmèria', signs, symptoms, of the hidden can we deduce that which is hidden". From symptoms, for example, even the ancient physician, yes, even the primitive healer, deduces the hidden nature of, say, an ailment.

This, to show that Antique-Greek thinkers made the referential value of signs an object of investigation very early on.

Ontological.

One sometimes hears it said, "Signs are not realities. However, they do denote 'realities'". In everyday language this may be correct, since the everyday language sometimes denotes 'reality' very narrowly (and certainly not ontologically).

Ontologically, a sign is a reality since the sign provides information regarding that to which it refers. How can something completely unreal provide information? Even if a sign is purely imaginary, insofar as it is really sign and thus has referential value, it is something real. This is to say 'non-nothing' 'something'.

Embrace.

One can define the sign in terms of implication.

1. Reflexively.-- "A implies A" amounts to "A refers to A". This is then the purely loopy sign of something totally identical with itself.

2.1. "An element of a set involves the set itself in which it takes place" amounts to "An element of a set refers to the set of which it is a member" and is sign of it.

2.2. "A part of a system encompasses the whole system" amounts to "A part of a system refers to the whole system" and is the sign of it.-- One feels the identitive structure!

E.H. 222.

Towards a definition.

J.H. Walgrave, *Around the problem of symbolism*, in: Tijdschr. v. Philosophy 1959: 2, 298/316, has it on Suzanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, Harvard Univ. Press, 1957-3, a work that deals with the renewed interest in symbolism (in the broadest sense of that term) in philosophy.

Walgrave defines, "(A symbol is) a concrete representation which, by its known-ness, transfers consciousness to the knowledge of something else. (A.c., 299).

Note: -- Walgrave says "concrete representation." With this one does not walk up to the sign in its most general sense. Abstract representations may just as well, by their known-ness, carry over to the knowledge of something else. What else are the tracts of logistics and mathematics but "abstract signs" which refer to something, however general and indeterminate that something may be.

We omit the term 'concrete' as well as the term 'representation' (which is still too particular). Thus: a sign is something (model) that once known provides us with information (insight) concerning something else (original).

First: the term 'something', twice, ensures that the definition is ontological and therefore as general as possible (transcendental even). Then: by introducing the terms 'model' (informing something) and 'original' (intended by the information something) we give a precise content to the term 'refer' used so far.

So: in F. de Saussure's semiology, the acoustic image (a word used) and the concept associated with it belong together. By what means? By agreement within a language and sign community, the acoustic image (e.g. the term 'donkey') refers to the concept (what we associate concerning 'donkey' with the word 'donkey' used).

Through the association of the two parts of the Saussurian sign, we receive information.

Thus: in Peirce's semiotics, there is talk of 'thinking sign' (the concept in our mind, with what goes with it),-- of 'speaking sign' (the word associated with the concept or thinking sign),-- of writing sign (the sign applied to e.g. paper).

The last two signs are language signs. The three types of sign refer to each other,-- "put on the way to each other", inform about each other.

E.H. 223.

We now refer briefly to ED 20 (Mathematical Model) where the depiction of square numbers is discussed, -- with a drawing.-- Each drawing, refers to the corresponding number. And vice versa, of course. For once sufficiently known, an 'original' serves as a 'model'.

Tropological.

1. Metaphor.

Col. A. and the lion involve a resemblance (common trait: courage, honor). Precisely because of this, Col. A 'sign' for 'lion' and vice versa.

2. -- Metonymy.

Eating apples, according to Aristotle, involves health making process. This, thanks to coherence (joint property). Precisely because of this, eating apples is 'sign' for 'health making process; And vice versa.

3. Synecdoche.

a. A teacher educates (implies: in principle, all teachers educate): a teacher is "sign" to "all" and vice versa. Metaphorical synecdoche.

b. The threshold makes the store (involves : an important part determines the whole store(value)) one part is 'sign' for "the whole". And vice versa. Metonymic synecdoche.

Conclusion.

There are apparently metaphorical, metonymical and twice synecdochical characters.

Sign and structure.

Reread EH 213.-- Call 'structure' all that is "network (totality) of relations".-- Reread EH 216 (Distributive and collective structure).

We are going to clarify this distinction through what follows.

The map and the signpost.

a. A map is a likeness sign.

Because the natural and cultural landscape is "depicted" on it. It is therefore a metaphorical sign. Based on a distributive structure: the same 'form' can be found in the landscape and in the map. In other words: that one form is spread over at least two data, landscape and map (which together form two elements of one and the same collection).

b. A signpost is a coherence sign.

For landscape and signpost make up one system (whole). The signpost is therefore a metonymic sign. Based on a collective structure: the signpost is literally incorporated (part) as a reference to a part of the landscape. Landscape and signpost together make up the same system.

Note: -- The map is an iconic sign. The signpost is an indicative (indicative, deictic) sign. Thus a certain use of language. They have heuristic or finding value.

E.H. 224.

Twentieth sample.-- Structuralism. - (224/225).

It is not the intention to provide a thorough understanding of what Structuralism is. However, it is intended to go into detail about the structural or semiological signification.

Bibl. sample :

- Ferd. de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, (General linguistics course), Paris, 1916-1, 1931-3;
- J.M. Broekman, *Structuralism* (Moscow/Prague/Paris), Amsterdam, 1973;
- O. Ducrot et al, *Qu' est-ce que le structuralisme?*, (What is structuralism?), Paris, 1968;
- Role. Barthes, *Eléments de sémiologie*, in: Communications (Recherches sémiologiques) Paris, 1964 (No 4) 114/140 (Syntagme et système).

De Saussure himself defines his “sémiologie” as follows: “Une science qui étudie la vie des signes au sein de la vie sociale” (A professional science that studies the life of signs within the framework of social life). Cfr Cours, 33.

Sign Designation.

“The linguistic sign connects not a thing and a name but a concept and an acoustic image (‘une image acoustique’).”

The entire sign includes

- a. “le signifié” (that which the acoustic sign means, i.e. the concept), it meant,
- b “le signifiant” (the acoustic sign, e.g. a word(sound)), the signifying (signifier).

Note: -- de Saussure conceives of the whole sign as something “psychic” or mental (*Cours*, 98). We leave that, of course, for his consideration.

Difference with the language of manners.

The colloquial language calls ‘sign’ the acoustic sign (le signifiant), viz. the sign audible to the ear (internal or external hearing). Thus, for example, the word ‘tree’.

Not so de Saussure, because he calls (total) ‘sign’ and the word and the concept. For example, the word ‘tree’ and the concept ‘tree’ referred to by it only together make up the concept ‘sign’ defined by de Saussure.-- Because, for him, the life of signs, within a society, takes place entirely in the psyche.

Relations : syntagmatic and ‘associative’.

Cours, 170ss. (Rapports syntagmatiques et rapports associatifs).-- Saussure’s theory of signs is essentially an applied theory of relations. Applied to direct and lateral “speech” (“speech” in the sense of “language use”).--

A.-- The syntagm.

‘Suntagma’, Antique Greek, means “all that are placed together” (so an army in battle order, a text).

E.H. 225.

de Saussure means the linear, i.e., occurring as a line of words, sequence of words-and-concepts. He calls this “the chain of linguistic usage”. A linguistic syntagm consists of at least two units (elements).

Appl. model.

Thus, e.g., “re-lire” (note that the units within “re-lire” are within the word itself); - reread); “contre tous” (against all);-- “la vie humaine” (human life); -- “Dieu est bon” (God is good); “s’ il fait beau, nous sortirons” (if the weather is nice, we go out).

A linguistic term only acquires value within such a ‘syntagma’. Nl. only from the opposition with what precedes and what follows (omen and sequel), the meaning emerges.

Note: -- The Structuralists, when speaking of the sign, say, in de Saussure’s trace, that only pairs of opposites -- an updating of the Paleopythagorean systechies -- work meaningfully. -- We are thus in full relativity theory, though within the spoken word.

Note: -- Actually, this is incorrect: both similarity and difference determine the meaning of a “unity,” but Structuralist thinking emphasizes the difference.

B.-- The association.

Note that later Structuralists, instead of ‘association’, speak of ‘paradigm’ (“paradigmatic connection”).

Now it is not the word line that is central but the meaning. Meaning-related words (acoustic images) connect - ‘association’ - among themselves in memory. Thus ‘groups’ are formed.

Appl. model.

Thus, for example, the word ‘enseignement’ (education) will unconsciously - Structuralism goes hand in hand with depth psychology which, in its way, emphasizes the unconscious and subconscious, also in speech - evoke a crowd of other words - by ‘association’ - : ‘enseigner’ (teach),-- ‘renseigner’ (inform).

Or also: ‘armement’ (armament), ‘changement’ (change). Here evidently emphasizing the ‘unit’ ‘-ement’ in associative memory.

Or still: ‘education’, ‘apprentissage’.

Either as concept content or as word sound : words evoke words.

Behold the Structural theory on ‘langue’ (language) and ‘langage’ (language use) in a nutshell.

E. H. 226.

Twenty-first sample.-- Semiotics. (226/230)

Bibl. sample :

-- Charles Morris (1901/1971), *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*, Chicago Univ. press, 1938 (the classic work);

-- I.M. Bochenski, *Philosophical Methods in Modern Science*, Utr./Antw., 1961, 45/89 (The semiotic methods).

Not that we are going to give a complete picture of Morris's theory; just the essentials.

Note: -- The Protosofistics (for the reason of its rhetoric; -450/-350),-- Platon (*Kratulos dialogue among others*), Aristotle (in systematic form), in his *Peri hermeneias* (On Judgment), the Ancient Stoics,-- the Scholastics,-- all of them were talking about semiotics or sign theory.

Three semiotic aspects.

Morris, following in the footsteps of the Wiener Kreis (Logical Positivism) and of Pragmatism, resp. Pragmaticism (Ch. Peirce), developed for the first time clearly three aspects of the sign, namely the syntactic, the semantic and the pragmatic.

1.-- Syntactic aspect.

'Syntax' here means the interrelationships within the character.

Appl. model.

Well known in clerical circles was once the often bizarre and humorous West Flemish priest Van Haecke. One of his classes was called "Faict". One day he combined the elements of that name to the following Latin phrase: "Faict ficta facit! Note the pure syntax, which very coincidentally has a meaning (= semantic value) here: the set of 'ficta' and 'facit' has the same elements as the set of 'Faict', Van Haecke just moved the letters, i.e. made them into another configuration (set of things placed). Such an activity bears the name 'combining' (combinatorics).

Note: -- One can also "combine" things other than pure letters: so concepts, judgments, reasoning.

A. The reflexive relationship.

If x, then x or x if x.

B. The non-reflexive relations.

a. Incongruity.-- "If x, then not -x", (where -x: is the negate of x).

b. Non-contradictory exchange solution.-- (Within two possibilities, 1 and 0 holds) "if 1, then not 0".

c. Sum.-- "If x + y, then either x or y or both".

d. Product.-- "If xy, then and x AND y" (both terms simultaneously or together).--

Logistics works with this.

E.H. 227.

Syntactics, regarding sign, thus talks about

- a. the elements of a sign internally (internal equation) and / or
- b. the elements of a composite sign (a multiplicity of signs) (external comparison) in their relations to one another.

Thus, one distinguishes “categorematic” and “syncategorematic” characters.

Appl. model.

1. An incomplete (syncategorematic) character is both the first name and the last name in a complete address (where the names of the street, street number, town name and town number are also syncategorematic or incomplete characters, of course). An incomplete task is only ‘sign’ when it goes together with others.

2. A complete or categorematic sign is, e.g., the name of a person without any addendum to designate someone,

2.1.-- Semantic aspect.

One can also situate the combined sign (in life) - “Sitz im Leben” - such that it takes on meaning.

Van haecke’s sentence of a moment ago “Faict ficta facit” means “Faict commits fabricated things”. This refers to - according to Van Haecke’s interpretation, of course - the actual behavior of the college.

The sentence semantically, reflects a reality outside the sign, the sentence, itself. It contains a description, indeed a value judgment.

The term “symbol” in religious studies, for example - e.g., a totem pole, an “idol,” a chant, a magic formula - refers to something outside the sign itself.

Also in the case where, according to the mentality in question, an invisible being (totem plant or totem animal, deity, magical power, life force) is present in (and at the same time above) the sign or ‘symbol’. This is then a reference to the transempirical or transrational realm.

Semantic stages.

I.M. Bochenski, o.c., 72v.-- The things, the language about the things, the language about the language about the things!

a. All beings belong to the semantic zero stage (they are not signs).

b.1. As soon as we think, speak, write in signs about beings (thinking sign/ speaking sign/writing sign), there is language about the beings. That is first (semantic) stage or object language.

b.2. One can speak - indirectly reason - about that language about things. That is then language over language or meta-language.

-- Something like this happens daily: when we say something while in our innermost being we ‘say’ “I don’t mean what I say now”!

E.H. 228.

Or better, when the inner voice of conscience says “Thou meanest not that.” Bochenski says: “(...) The famous liar, who, since Platon until the beginning of this century, has troubled all logicians (...): ‘What I am saying now is false’“. From this immediately follows a contradiction. For, if the person is telling the truth, then he is saying something false, and, if he is lying, then what he is saying is true.” (O.c., 72v.). Bochenski says that the liar’s sentence: viz, “What I am saying now is false” is not at all a judgment statement but “semantic nonsense” because the sentence contains at the same time a sentence about the sentence itself.

Conclusion.-- The mental or inner “restriction” (reservation as to what one communicates outwardly) as in the sense of the “liar” shows that the mere syntax alone without semantics leaves some statements without any real interpretation.

Note:-- The distinction between syntax and semantics also concerns depth psychologists: conscious language may contradict the language of the subconscious or unconscious part of the soul. The “subconscious or unconscious constraint” then reads as follows: “What I say consciously - rationally - is true only subject to a subconscious or unconscious correction”.

Note:-- The seducer, advertising, any (unscrupulous) rhetoric (persuasion technique) proceed analogously with such a mental restriction: “I sell you this as a fine product” (“Although my patron said it is only second-rate”). This last sentence, in parentheses, is the mental restriction. Which does not show outwardly and thus allows the outsmarting of the (naive) buyer.

Note:-- Only the testing of the explicit or conscious statement with reality can be conclusive here. But that is semantics and therefore epistemology (EO 112v. (Truth)).

Semantics, concerning sign, thus concerns the relations between the sign and the signified. Whether that signified is to be situated mentally or outside the mind and consciousness has only secondary importance.

“Morning Star/Evening Star”

G. Frege (1848/1925; German mathematician) introduced the semantic couple “Sinn (concept content)/ Bedeutung (concept scope)”-.

E. H. 229.

One then sometimes introduces the terms “morning and evening star” as two concepts (“zwei Sinne”) for one and the same scope (“eine Bedeutung”), which then gets the name “the planet Venus.” For - so they say - by the terms “morning star” and “evening star” one and the same planet Venus is “indicated”, “meant”.

Note:-- Yet it does not seem so simple. After all, the conceptual content ‘morning star’ refers to the planet Venus in a different position of observation, cosmologically speaking, than the same planet Venus as evening star. So, if one works in a traditional-logical way, one speaks of two conceptual contents for ... two conceptual dimensions. Matter of Antique-traditional akribia (‘accuracy’).

2.2.-- Pragmatic aspect.

Let us take again the example of Van Haecke: “Faict ficta facit”.

Still the “Sitz im Leben”, but now different: “What did the person Van Haecke want with this pun when he spoke like this in the presence of other persons?” Did he simply want to make them laugh with his humor at Faict’s expense, without underhanded ulterior motives? Or did he immediately want to make real criticism of, say, the behavior or even pastoral care of a colleague,--at colleagues? That too is situated outside the sentence itself.

Significa.

Lady Victoria Welby, lady-in-waiting to Queen Victoria of England (Queen 1819/1901), started the Significa research in 1896. ‘Significa’ is concerned with

a. the human means of expression

b. insofar as these can be means of understanding. Again, as in Morris’s pragmatics, between persons who use signs. One sees the sameness.

In passing: there once existed a Significal Circle (around G. Mannoury (1867/1956; mathematician (fundamental research)), author of a Handbook of Analytical Significance (2 vols. 1947-1948). The psychological and sociological as well as the culturological slant of what we use as means of expression in our dealings with fellow human beings attracted particular attention. Which is pure pragmatism.

Signal.

A sign can be used by someone as a signal to someone.

As O. Willmann, *Abriss der Phil.*, Wien, 1959-5, 59, says: Ancient Greeks (Aristotle e.g.) distinguished between “logos apofantikos” the establishing (descriptive, narrative, reporting) sense on the one hand, and, on the other, “logos sèmantikos” signal speech.

E.H. 230.

For example, a prayer, a command, a wish etc. is “semantikon ti”, something pragmatic. When someone says to a beauty, “Thou, beautiful girl” this can be mere (amazed - admiring) observation. But that phrase can also be meant flatteringly to penetrate into the intimacy e.g. of that pretty girl. This can only appear if ... the (eventual) “restrictio mentalis”, as the Romans said, is exposed.

In other words: just as in semantics, so also in pragmatics. The meta-language, inwardly, also decides the proper pragmatic scope of a sign. Or even worse: someone encounters an “ugly duckling of a woman” and says (scornfully): “Thou, pretty one”. That is then, via inner reservation noticeable, reversing the meaning as far as purely semantically intended.

Note: -- The logic of language and of language use gains from paying attention to modalities (EO 126vv.).

In addition to the logical and ontological modalities, there are the metathematical modalities, which involve their own type of reservation.

Pragmatics, regarding sign, thus talks about the relations between the sign and the interpretations that persons place in it or find in it. This, in signification or pragmatics. What rapport - good or bad - involves.

Rhetoric.

The “technè rhètorikè” the eloquent expertise, originated once in Sicily.-- Whoever knows Antique rhetoric, understand : theory of understanding, a little, sees that Morris is doing nothing but reestablishing that Antique rhetoric.

1. Syntax.

A text, a figure (e.g., a picture of a car-with-attractive-girl) are in a merged way : the parts of the text, of the advertisement, for example, are a configuration.

2.1. Semantics.

The one who speaks or advertises has a “message” (information) to communicate so that it can reach fellow human beings.

2.2. Pragmatics (significant).

The one who speaks or shows to convince (= to establish rapport), has his intentions. He / she wants a result.

These three aspects - ‘merè’ (Lat.: partes, parts) in Ancient Greek - were very well known to the Antiques. Yet it is to the credit of a Morris (with his ‘pragmatic’ approach), among others, to have taught us these ancient achievements again.

E. H. 231.

Twenty-second sample.-- psychodrama. (231)

Jacob-Levi Moreno (1889/1974) was a Romanian by birth but came to the US, where he became famous as the founder of psychodrama. His *Gruppenpsychtherapie und Psychodrama (Einleitung in die Theorie und die Praxis)*, (Group Psychotherapy and Psychodrama (Introduction to Theory and Practice), Stuttgart, 1973-2, 14, mentions a Primitive model: - It occurred among Pomo Indians (California west coast). Witness: an ethnologist. An apparently dying Indian was brought into the village. Immediately the 'sacred' man ("shaman", "medicine man", healer) appeared with his helpers.-- Here is the method.

1. Preparation

First the healer enlightened himself: the man who had brought in the "sick one" said that he had encountered a turkey cock -- something he had never seen before. Fears had overwhelmed him since then.-- The 'sacred' man withdrew.

2. Action.

He -- with his helpers -- depicted the situation that had generated the shock,-- in every possible detail. The 'sacred' man -- amidst a group of friends and neighbors -- played the role of turkey cock. Around the "sick one" he made circles like a bird flapping its wings wildly.

The difference.

He did this in such a way that the "sick man" could gradually, with the group, see that a turkey-cock was actually nothing bad,--that fear of such a thing was unfounded.-
-Result: the man improved visibly and "healed" completely.

Note: -- Such methods exist in all somewhat ordered Primitive cultures.

The structure.

1. Similarity-and-difference

play a leading role. The 'sacred' man plays, as accurately as possible but at the same time as reassuringly as possible, the traumatizing event.

2. Cohesion is active:

the 'sacred' man-and-his-helpers, on the one hand, and, on the other, the neighbors-and-friends make up two interrelated groups that help transform the unreal and thus neurotic value judgment of the shocked Indian into a real and healthful value judgment.-
- Again: similarity and coherence. Relationally speaking.

The US government asked Moreno to analyze interrelationships in groups (likes/dislikes among prisoners, among colleagues). Which gave rise to Moreno's sociometrics. Cfr EH 208. Still guiding in industrial psychology.

E.H. 232.

Twenty-third sample.-- Associative psychology (232-233)

Bibl. sample : Theodule Ribot (1839/1916), *La psychologie des sentiments*, Paris, 1917 -10, 171/182 (*Les sentiments et l' association des idées*), (The feelings and the association of the ideas).

Ribot was an experimental psychologist and thinker. His still-valuable book teaches us that the mind, understood as value capacity, also (and in its way) establishes relationships.

1.-- The fact.

We first dwell on the facts.

1.a. -- Similarity.

For a young man, if he resembles her son externally or, e.g., has the same age, a mother may - suddenly - feel a sympathy rising within her.

Thus Ribot.-- One sees it: the young man, o.g. by resemblance, refers to her son,-- is “sign-signal” for a value feeling, called ‘sympathy’. We say “refers to” but instinctively it would be better to say “runs in tandem with”.

Ribot broadens this example: “Thus there are fear reactions that are called unconsidered (‘instinctive’).-- A deeper penetrating observation, however, can reduce them to a similar explanatory ground as the case of the spontaneously sympathizing mother, where similarity was at work:-- Unconsidered we identify.

1.b. -- Coherence (‘adjacentness’).

The feeling that a lover in love originally lived through for the very person of his “mistress” (lover), he transfers to her clothes, her furniture, her home.

Other model: envy and hatred cool their anger on the inanimate objects that belong to the enemy(s), for the same reason.

Note: -- Where is the time when, during the Gulf War with Iraq, the Iraqis cooled their anger on all that was American, -- first and foremost the U.S. Embassy.

Another model: in absolute monarchies, the cult of the monarch is transferred to his throne, to the emblems (= signifiers) of his power.

Now it is not the resemblance but the coherence - the “adjoining” says Ribot or still “apposition” - that is at play: the reference has its ground in this.

Fetishism.

a. Religious belief, a ‘fetish’ means (in West Africa especially) an object ‘charged’ with magical life force. ‘Fetish belief’ then is that form of religion which attributes to it a kind of transempirical reality.

E. H. 233.

b. But psychologically and in terms of sexual psychology we call “fetishism” a “deviation” that instead of the person, physically especially, the possessions and objects belonging to the eroticizing person, feels as also and even sometimes more strongly eroticizing.

Both phenomena but each in its own way rely on coherence.

2.-- The interpretation.

Ribot, speaking of similarity cases, says: “The explanation of many of these cases is situated in an unconscious state. It is not so easy to find out. If, however, this state again penetrates consciousness,-- something in which the will plays only a very indirect role, it sheds light on the whole event.”

Associative behavior.

If a makes one think of b, then b is an ‘association’ of a. In that case there is tropological transference (ER 170v.) one reacts emotionally (appreciatively) to b because - in the case of a - one thinks of b. And well: one reacts to b as if it were a!

Says Ribot, “One knows that the association of thought contents was reduced to two basic laws, the similarity law and the adjoint law.”

One can see it: the notion of “collection” (distributive structure/ metaphorical association) and the notion of “system” (collective structure/ metonymic association) are the (secret) presupposition.

‘Transfer’.

Tropological behavior consists of “transference. So too here. ‘Transfert’ says Ribot.-- There is “transfert par ressemblance” (similarity transfer) and there is “transfert par conti-guité” (coherence transfer).

Note: -- Ribot calls these twin ‘laws’ on soul life “descriptive rather than really explanatory.” Yet -- he adds -- they reveal “quelque chose en sus” (something more). In particular: several writers have pointed, in this context, to an often “hidden but effective influence”. “Une influence souvent latente mais efficace” he says.

We can, now that we have got to know a Freud, an Adler, a Jung and so many other depth psychologists, confidently state that Ribot, with this relational psychology, stands at the cradle of a real, wood-carving psychology of the unconscious and especially of the subconscious (based on deeper memory) soul life.-- Again: identitative basis!

E.H. 234.

Twenty-fourth sample.-- Associative psychoanalysis. (234/235)

This time we take a well-known psychoanalyst, Charels Baudouin (1893/1963). This Swiss man has many years of experience in child psychoanalysis, in Geneva. Main work: *L'âme et l'action (Prémises d'une philosophie de la psychanalyse)*, (The soul and the action (Premises of a philosophy of the psychoanalysis)), Geneva, 1969-2.

A.-- The fact.

First some data.-- In his *Etudes de psychanalyse*, this excellent connoisseur of the child's soul dwells on a certain Berthe. She came to him with a problem, namely arm neuralgia (a kind of nerve pain in the arm).

True to his method, Baudouin seeks for this "phenomenon" a "rational" explanation that is situated first and foremost in "les tendances" (the value relations) active in the conscious - but even more so in the "unconscious and subconscious" soul.

a.-- In his 'theoria' (Platonic for 'investigation'), Baudouin stumbled upon the fact that Berthe, on- and subconsciously, mimicked the whole situation of a classmate, who -- it may seem coincidental -- also bore the name 'Berthe'. Which brings us to the parable model.

b.-- What exactly was Berthe imitating? Not so much her classmate herself for her own sake, of course. But what she regarded as "the happiness of (Berthe)." Which therefore meant a value in (Berthe). (Berthe) had had an arm ailment for a time. This ailment had a great advantage: it provided (Berthe) with a lot of free time. Even more: not the free time for its own sake but what that free time caused, namely the possibility to work herself up to "an educated woman". That was the 'Eigenwert', the value coveted for oneself. It was there, through a number of disguises (poverty, a lot of free time), that her value was directed.

In other words, Berthe wanted his equal (Berthe), an educated woman!

B.-- The statement.

The "mechanism" boiled down - according to Baudouin - to this.

1. One immediately grasps - he says - the analogy reasoning ("raisonnement par analogie"). This "identified" Berthe with (Berthe). This identification went so far as to lend itself to "morbid imitation".

Behold what the psychologist calls "a soul mechanism." Its escape from conscious soul life authorizes the term "mechanism."

E.H. 235.

2. Says Boudouin: the memory of (Berthe) and her arm belong to the strictly individual sphere but the un(der)conscious mechanism by which that memory 'works' (is causative), namely by begetting the bodily symptom, the arm pain, belongs to "a primitive layer."

Note: -- With or without sufficient reason, psychoanalysts call the unconscious and subconscious layer in the soul "a primitive layer." Apparently they forget that real Primitives are very aware of things which with us, Moderns, do not penetrate to the rational domain and vice versa. It would be better to speak of "another layer".

Axiological/ logical.

An axiological factor in the soul, viz. wanting to be an educated woman (like (Berthe)), employs analogical reasoning (if that mechanism may be called reasoning) to achieve the goal. The logic here is methodically applied pragmatically (i.e. for the reason of the on- and subconsciously intended result).

So much for a similarity model. Now a coherence model. With Ribot, we can also speak of 'adjacency model'.

Bibl. sample : Ch. Baudouin, *L'âme enfantine et la psychanalyse I (Les complexes)*, (The child soul and psychoanalysis I (The complexes)), Neuchâtel/ Paris, 1950-2; II (Les cas) / III (Les méthodes), Neuchâtel/ Paris, 1951. In *Les méthodes*, 162, the author states what follows.

a. A child - he says by way of introduction - is not a miniature adult but a being in some preliminary stage of adulthood.

b. It was found - he continues - that, just because one or two parents themselves had gone through psychoanalysis, young children in particular were profoundly changed. This without the need to treat the little subject itself.

The statement.

"This is explainable - he says -, on the one hand, if one presupposes that the ailments of the child in question were not yet firmly established and, on the other hand, if one presupposes that the traumatizing () situations which had caused the problems depended substantially on the living environment, especially the family environment.

By changing this living center, one can change the whole coherence".

Conclusion.-- Like Ribot but using the postulates of Psychoanalysis as a guide, Baudouin arrives at an associative psychoanalysis that sees relations and thereby clarifies, indeed, solves problems.

E.H. 236.

Twenty-fifth sample.-- "A kind of identity". (236)

We will continue with Baudouin for a moment but now insofar as he, in his "inclusive" thinking (which is open to more than one interpretation), addresses Frances Wickes, *The Inner World of Childhood*, New York/ London/ Appleton, 1927, 17.

The facts which, relationally, in psychological or psychosomatic matters, lead to associative psychology, are - says Baudouin - 'irrécusables' (undeniable). So that is the firm 'firm' (= 'positive-scientific') basis.

Now for the rational explanations.

It is evident that the term "rational" here, in such subtle matters, is meant in the broad though real sense.

Baudouin thinks that, within depth psychologies, the Individualpsychological streak - of C.G. Jung (1875/1961) - may well recite another - yet also valid - explanation.

Wickes says that, in early childhood, between, on the one hand, the un(der)conscious soul life of a child and, on the other hand, the un(der)conscious soul life of e.g. the parents "a kind of identity" exists.

Applicable model.

Freud taught us, in the wake of a tradition that certainly leads far beyond the Ancient Greeks, that the dream is "the royal way" to penetrate the unconscious and subconscious soul life.

Note: -- Let us say "a royal road"; among several others.

A child who had known and followed Wickes lived through a conflict in a dream. A more thorough analysis revealed that the problem in question was not something that concerned the child himself but something that belonged to his father. Cfr Fr. Wickes, o.c., 26.

Another child - Wickes, o.c., 28 - lived through a feeling of insecurity (it knew itself to be unsafe somewhere). More thorough "theoria" (Platon's term for "going into something thoroughly") revealed that this feeling was merely "an intuitive perception" of ... the objectively insecure situation of his parents.

Baudouin is rather aloof with respect to such "irrational" factors. Yet he is formal: "It is certain that a child somewhere 'understands the atmospheres in his environment'" (o.c., 162).

This is then called, for example, "intuitive perception" (Wickes), "spiritual osmosis" (Benoist Hanappier) or even "mystical participation" (L. Lévy-Bruhl).

E.H. 237.

Twenty-sixth sample.-- Harmology also oppositional theory: (237-238)

Let's go back to EH 203/206 (Assimilism/differentemism): there we saw that the comparative method - if it is really comparative - also examines the differences and gaps. Let us dwell on the relations which are opposites.

The Augustinian definition.

De Civitate Dei (On the State of God).-- In it we read: "order is the placement that assigns to things - by comparison - as fitting together ('parium') and not fitting together ('disparium') data their due place." Augustine borrowed the definition from M.T. Cicero (-106/-43).

Note two things

- a. Ordering is "placing," "arranging" (combining configurations);
- b. arranging is placing matching and also non-matching data. The latter includes putting together and taking apart.

Note: -- The basic differential we saw EH 170 (207; 208; 209)

The concept of "differential".

One might say "difference configuration.

1. What the Ancient Greeks called 'dia-stema' (Lat.: intervallum), interval, is clearly the basic scheme of all comparison.

Out of it / in it
border 1

in it / out of it
border 2

In terms of "arranging": what is inside the gap is intermediate; what is outside it on either side is outside.

Note: -- Topological structure.

This scheme is apparently, even in mathematics, a basic understanding.-- Think of a coherent ball of clay.

- a. Mass as an immutable factor is not changed.
- b. It does get deformed : the geometric form is a variable factor. The kneading will show that the deformations move within extreme limits. This is the definition of interval.

2. Second characteristic.

A differential places - orders - such that a series is created, namely a series of 'values' of which one extreme is negative and the other positive. With possibly intermediate values.

Inequal /equal/different.

Convergent/ parallel/ divergent.

E. H. 238.

Aristotle uses the term *homoi tropos*, *convergens*, to name analogical data. Kard. J.H. Newman (1801/1890) used the term 'convergent' to name a form of argument.

Note: -- The induction may take a 'convergent' turn. Think, for example, of tracing one or more perpetrators of a murder. After some time of 'theoria', investigation, a number of at first sight mutually independent indications come to light (what the ancient Greek rhetoricians would have called 'semeia', vague indications,-- to be distinguished from 'tekmèria', certain signs). At some point, these 'vague' (ambiguous) indications may all or at least in its majority point in the same direction. They 'converge'. This is the convergent induction. The samples allow a 'generalization' of a certain type. Cfr ED 40/44 (Induction).

The contradiction theory.

The way is now clear for a kind of general teaching concerning the opposites. Now reread EO 114/117 (Being(the), and nothingness) for a moment. There was talk of

- a. the utter nothingness,
- b. the relative nothing (pure negativity (*nihil negativum*) and robbery (*nihil privativum*). Clearly, this is a first basis of opposites.

Now also reread, briefly, EH 207/212 (Relation Science). There was talk of axiological oppositions (logically-square orderable), oppositions within a (fictitious) school class (logically-square orderable), embodiments (logically-square orderable). Also of looping (reflexive) relations - which fall outside the sphere of opposites, like the absolute nothing, of mutual relations, of transitive (transitive) relations, of clarity relations.

All of these can also be viewed in its antithesis aspect, as shown, among others, in EH 211 (Paradoxical Mutual Relations) and EH 206 (Paradoxical Collections and Systems).

Thus, a transcendental opposition (which is not really one), a restrictive opposition (with reservation), -- as well as a group of categorical oppositions (*contraire*, *privative*, - *correlative*) can be distinguished. They are nothing other than the contradictory impact of a relation.

Conclusion. - They need no further explanation. However, it is good to briefly recall the relations in which they are situated.

E.H. 239.

Twenty-seventh sample.-- Tension theory (taseology). (239/242)

Tension theory is one application of opposites theory. In game, in conflict e.g. people come together but face each other in opposite 'camps'. Paradoxical collection, paradoxical form of system! But that is what defines 'tension'. Tensions of all kinds play an enormous role in humanity and the cosmos. Therefore a short structural analysis, i.e. an analysis of the network of relations involved in tension.

A soccer game.

Two équipes play to get hold of the ball and control it so that it ends up in the enemy goal.

Note: -- Two boys wrestling for the same ball, eventual fighting. Every rivalry -- thanks to (merciless) economic competition -- exhibits a structure that stands out. Look at two firms "fighting" over the same sales territory. Yes, two of the best students are competing for the same first place.

Structure.

All of these models point to the same original.

a. There are always at least two "camps" (opposites).

b. There is at least one same 'stake' (= the soccer, the ball, the sales territory, the first place). - The paradoxical meeting, synthesis, of the two data a and b: the camps have an opposite interest in the same stakes.

Humorously stated, "There are too many applicants for too few coveted objects. More than one camp ... for just one stake.

Note: -- In gaming, that structure is even deliberately organized. In the "struggle for life" that same structure is imposed.

Mechanical model.

Among other things, mechanics talks about forces. These can come into a tension relationship. Think of the upward force, in a mountain of fire, pushing up against, the lateral forces of the inner wall of the crater,--while it 'negates' the downward forces of gravity. The stake, sole object, here is the lava. The camps are the opposing forces,-- upward and downward and upward and sideways. With the result : tensions.

Human model.

Tension - contrast - can be a literary process.

Bibl. sample : E. Mercenier, *La prière des églises de rite byzantin, II (Les fêtes)*, (La prière des églises de rite byzantin, II (Les fêtes)), Chevetogne, 1948, 127.

E.H. 240.

The “Holy Week” has a “Holy and Great Wednesday,” from which we reflect a typical contradiction.

“While the sinner - a prostitute - was offering you, Lord, an extremely costly perfume, the disciple - Judas, the traitor - came to an agreement with the administrators. With great delight she goes out what she had purchased - for a great deal of money.

With great haste he sold the One who can be paid with no price. In Jesus she accepted the Lord. Against that Lord he took a stand. Thus she was set free while Judas, as a slave of the inheriting enemy (Satan), went on a rampage. Terrifying is Judas’ lowliness. Exalted is the repentance of the prostitute

“Grant me, Savior, who entered into death for us, that repentance and save us all.” Miserable is Judas’ fate: as he watched the prostitute kiss the feet of Jesus, he was contemplating how he would inflict the treacherous kiss on Him. She untied the hair from the knot. He tangled with his soul: instead of bestowing costly perfume, he incubated within himself a repulsive evil design.-- “Covetousness prefers what is not preferable: shield our souls, Lord, from such a thing.”

Note: -- One sees the structure: a. Jesus is the stake; b. the camps: in the foreground the (converted) prostitute and Judas who betrayed Jesus for “thirty pieces of silver” (his greed for money); in the background: what the Bible calls “the kingdom of heaven” and “the kingdom of darkness” lying in merciless conflict until when the Lord Jesus returns, at the end of time.

Mimetism (R, Girard).

In Antique Greek ‘mimesis’, Lat.: imitatio, means ‘imitation’, ‘reproduction’, ‘Mimetism’ then is the phenomenon of imitation or reproduction, as well as the theory concerning that phenomenon.

Bibl. sample : René Girard (1923/2015), French culturologist developed a theory centered on tension. His desire theory says nature desire, the fundamental desire in man is not a desire for sex or for death or killing (Freud et al.), but imitation desire. All human behavior springs from it. But both people themselves and many theorists misconstrue (repress, suppress) this imitative urge. Consequence: it remains virtually unconscious.

Freud’s lucid moment.

Freud, speaking of the “primal horde,” an imaginary “primitive” humanity, says, “My neighbor has just the same the desires as I do.

E.H. 241.

Girard quotes: "The little boy shows great interest in his father: he would like to become and be what his father is,--yes, replace him under all points of view. This attitude towards "the father" - or towards any man in general - has nothing passive or feminine about it: it is, essentially, masculine. And she is, moreover, very easily reconcilable with the Oedipus complex which she helps to prepare. -- Thus literally Freud himself.

Unification and mimetism.

Girard: "There is a very clear resemblance between 'identification' (loosely translated: "identification with someone one looks up to) - especially: identification with the father" - and the desire to imitate: both consist in choosing a paragon (...). This choice can be attached to any man (...) who then takes the place normally given to "the father" in our society, namely the place of paragon! Cfr EH. 234 (Berthe/ (Berthe)).

Note: -- *Bibl. sample* : H. Robinson, *Renascent Rationalism*, Toronto, 1975, 171.

Robinson develops a theory of conflict which approaches ours: within the same and common situation (note: similarity and coherence) - the convergent aspect - mutually exclusive value relations are at work - divergent aspect (of tendencies) - aimed at one and the same stake which gives rise to divergent imitations.--Such a thing happens between "the father" and "the son" in Freud's view.

'Complex'

Bibl. sample :

-- Ch. Baudouin, *L' âme et l' action*, (The soul and the action,), Geneva, 1969-2, 97/141 (*Esquisse d' une théorie des complexes*), (Outline of a theory of complexes).

-- J. Jakobi, *Complexe, archetype, symbole*, Neuchâtel (CH), 1961 (transl. v. Complex, Archetypus, Symbol).

We are in full depth psychology: what is called 'complex' there can be described as "tension, preferably conflicting tension between more than one tendency (= value assignment) within the soul".

Appl. model.-- A tendency in us "wants" ("desires") an object (e.g., a man-out-of-wedlock marriage), yet -- within Biblical preconceived notions (instilled by upbringing) or within other cultures -- that tendency counts as "sin. The same object of desire (value) elicits two value judgments (one hedonistic and one moral).

E.H. 242.

'Oedipus Complex'.

Girard: "The little boy becomes aware that "the father" is obstructing his access to "the mother." As a result, identification with "the father" takes on a hostile tinge and spills over into the desire to replace "the father" - even with "the mother." Identification with "the father" and desire to replace "the father" with "the mother" coincide.

For another, this identification is ambivalent from the outset (dichotomous, bivalent" (Girard, o.c., 252). - Thus Freud.

Competition.

Immediately it is clear how rivalry arises, mixed with envy. By imitating "the father" in his relationship to "the mother", yes, by repressing rivalry, "the son" unconsciously develops the Oedipus complex.

"It is 'the father' who shows 'the son' what is desirable,-- precisely because he himself desires it (i.e., 'the mother')" (O.c., 253).

Note: -- Note the structure: a. the same bet, "the mother"; b. more than one candidate, "the father" and "the son". c. because the latter mimics the former. The mimicry is the conflict-generating factor.

Note: -- Diel's psychology of justifications would mention 'vanity' here : in an early norm of vanity, "the son" wants to get it on "the father."

Human model.

Robinson - just mentioned - tends to see a real conflict at work already in the game. But analysis of the phenomena - playing and fighting - shows that there is a difference.

When two soccer teams, centered around just one ball, are playing, tension does arise. The 'desire' of one party to have the one ball (greed) is diametrically opposed to that of the other party who 'imitates' the first party.

Border Crossing.

a. When a rule of soccer is violated, the referee intervenes. That is still playing. Even if it is sometimes rock-hard and "violating the rules of the game with a dose of violence".

b. However, if some players become so brutal - i.e. use real violence, in the hand-to-hand sense - then the referee will come down on them for attacking in the stricter sense. Only then does playing become aggressive. It becomes fighting (quarrels, hitting, settlements). O.i. this is only a tension called 'conflict'.

E.H. 243.

Twenty-eighth sample.-- Conflictology. (243/245)

Conflictology or disputeology.

A dispute, resp. a conflict, stricto sensu, is a. an opposition, b. involving violence.

Again, there is a structure at work that is contradictory. It lies in the opposites themselves.

a. Assertiveness.

Since the “assertive” person (or more broadly any assertive being) denotes his environment as a field full of attacking creatures, he poses as “assertive. From the stimulus one can already infer the reaction, the assertiveness. Assertive’ is “to be so self-consciously resilient that one is ‘combative’“. So we say - instead of that strange word - combative’;

b. “Through thick and thin”.

Assertiveness’ usually includes one more characteristic, namely in asserting oneself, feeling threatened by the attacking environment to such an extent that one takes up a combative position ‘through thick and thin’. In other words: one asserts oneself ‘boundless’.

One’s own ‘identity’ - understand: the position-in-the-environment-persevering through thick and thin,--see what could be suggested as a smooth description of ‘assertiveness’.

Note: -- In Platonic-psychological terms: the lesser lion - understand: the sense of honor - pushes on at the expense of the lesser man - understand: the elementary-spiritual insights. -- In Paul Diel’s psychology, one would say: the vanity pushes through, as it were, blindly.

The structure of the “gang”.

Summarize again: ‘assertiveness’ is a. one’s own ‘identity’ (position of power in the world) b. persevering c. going against the rest.

Appl. model.

Bibl. sample : P. Sigaud, *Les autorités montent en ligne contre les gangs des jeunes*, (Authorities go online against youth gangs), in: Journal de Genève 13.07.1990.

“Americans have learned to live with the general problem of violence in all its forms: big banditry, crime syndicates, drug trafficking. But in the last few months they have come to realize that a new phenomenon is emerging (and this is because of its worrying scale), namely the ‘gangs’ of young people between fifteen and twenty years of age, who, by means of gunshots, demarcate entire city districts in which they lead an organized life”. This is how Sigaud situates the theme. Let us go into that because the structural analysis can feed on it.

E.H. 244.

Samples.

According to the most recent analyses, all 50 states - Alaska and Hawaii included - are affected by this toxic malady.

a. Los Angeles. This California city is the oldest area of action for youth gangs. Number of people involved : some 80,000. Divisible as follows: 59% Hispanic Americans, 39% Negro Americans, 2% Asians. Only 72 individual whites. The combined total of these gangs in 1989 was 554 crimes (burglaries, hold-ups, armed robberies, drug offenses, murders, extortion of all kinds).

b. Chicago. In second position.-- 15,000 youths (125 gangs). The great majority Negroes. The rest quite a few Hispanic-Americans. 1989: 72 crimes (12 more than in 1988).

c. New York. Only about forty corridors. According to a number of sociologists, this is due to the far-reaching fragmentation of the population into a multitude of ethnic groups.

d. Boston. Some forty gangs (2000 youth). 80% Blacks, 13% Portoricans. 1989 : 9 murders (three times more than in '88).

e. Washington. 1989: 434 crimes, the record.

So much for the facts. Inductively, one can come to the following conclusion : the plague is becoming common.

Statements (interpretations).

Like any fact, especially of a human nature, the phenomenon of youth passage is multifaceted.

1. -- A police officer.

"It is always the same issue: soon they will allow children who are still playing hopscotch to own a firearm. If guns and revolvers could not be bought so easily, young people would settle their disputes differently."

2.-- A psychiatrist.

Armando Morales (Prof psychiatry Univ. Calif.). This one sees it twofold.

a. The neglect regarding mental life, from which many young people suffer, works : "The gang replaces the family structure that the gangsters almost never knew."

Note: -- A nice model of the robotic nothingness (EO 117). Resulting in : being absorbed into the pacifier of the corridor.

b. "They have, moreover, the impression that there is no place for them in USA society. The corridor provides them with a place based on hatred and brutal violence".

Note: -- Again: the robotic nothingness or "a vital void".

E.H. 245.

The gang structure.

Morales: "The number of members varies from five to several hundred. But this number has little importance. Everything depends on the field of action, the objectives pursued, the personality of the leader."-- Thus Morales continues.

The youth in question are not ordinary thugs, not murderers wanted by all police stations. So what are they? They obey rites, codes, customs. For example: in Washington, members dress in black hooded sweatshirts. In Pine Bluff (Arkansas), one must have committed a burglary - approved by the leader - to become a member of the Folks. In San Antonio (Texas) the local terrorists had the nerve to hand out business cards to the police officers, after a carnival celebration, saying "All kinds of vandalism".

Note: -- This structure proves two things:

- a. a "primitive" behavioral structure cemented by an equally "primitive" co-habitation bond,
- b. a typical Modern cynicism that desecrates everything.

"The Man"

We just said: authority structure.-- "The Man" is the nickname of Rayful Edmond (25). He is now in prison in Marion, Illinois. - Between 1986 and 1989, he was the top figure in cocaine and crack (drug) trafficking throughout the District of Columbia.

Headquarters: his grandmother's house in a Negro neighborhood. Together with about 20 family members, he controlled 20% of the drug trade there.-- Weekly revenue: \$2,000,000.-- The gang had +/- 150 members.

From Los Angeles they received, monthly, 700 kg. of cocaine. For three years, The Man led a princely life: trips to Las Vegas, a Jaguar, a magnificent villa, opulent furniture, a \$45,000 bracelet.

To all the children of his neighborhood he handed out \$100 banknotes. To his many admirers he donated gold earrings.

The Man now says, "I was the King, the monarch. In his cell, he adds, "I had friends everywhere. As soon as I get out of prison -- in one or two, I'll open a nightclub".

Note: -- So the alternative to the gang is a nightclub, one senses the relatedness of violence and sex. Both are a domain for "assertiveness.

E. H. 246.

Twenty-ninth sample.-- Oppositionalism. 246

Bibl. sample : J. Muurlink, *Anthropology for educators and social workers* (Ideological manipulation or self-determination), Bloemendaal, 1981, 17/18 (oppositionalism).

The phenomenon is ancient. The name is new. "Oppositionalism occurs when one strongly opposes a particular term or concept and places another in opposition to it to which absolute validity is assigned." (O.c., 17).

Subject-matter model.

A model of oppositionalism is found in a number of biologists and/ or psychologists.

a. The ones absolutize the role of predisposition: already at birth, in an individual biological and/or psychological being, all or almost all life possibilities are predetermined.

b. The "oppositional" view exaggerates the role of the habitat-an individual living being, an individual psyché is, in his/her fate and life course, wholly or almost wholly "determined" by the environment in which it has its biotope.

Philosophical model.

a. The Modern Subjectivists, with R. Descartes at their head, absolutize to a very high degree the individual "thinking" ("Je pense. Donc je suis" (Descartes); "Ich denke" (Kant)) subject or I.

b. An "oppositional" view is found in Structuralism, among others. With a de Saussure at the head. Not the autonomous self but "the structure(s)" dominate thinking and acting. By 'structure' one can understand e.g. 'language' with its unconscious and subconscious rules (grammar). It can also be understood as "the economic foundation" (the whole of economic activities) (K. Marx).

If it is language that is radically determinative, then one has "linguisticism"; if it is economics, then one has "economism."

Platonism.

Besides the fact that no one has ever found a closed system in Platon's texts, there is the fact that Platon teaches methodical thinking in "restrictive judgments." Cfr ED 15 ("Under for preservation true").

a. Is absolutely "good" (valuable) - for Socrates and Platon - the good-without.

b. The rest -- and that is pretty much all being -- is good -- subject to reservation.-- So extremely many judgments. They are true or false "restrictively" ("modally"), i.e. with reservations,-- if need be with the reservation of the opposing opinion which the former 'nuances' along.

Thirtieth sample.-- dichotomy: Systechy (oppositional pair). (247/250)

“Das Kombinieren im eigentlichen Sinne (von ‘bini’ (Lat.: je zwei) hat Gleichgeordnetes zum Gegenstande” (O. Willmann, Abriss der Phil., Wien, 1959-5, 46).

‘Combine’,

‘Combine’, ‘to bring into one whole a multitude of data’ can be determined in the broad and in the strict sense. In the narrower sense - according to Willmann - ‘combining’ with ‘bini’, each time two data, is working. What fits together in the ordering process - even if it is, to a certain extent (notice the restrictive), opposite - is ‘combined’ within one whole or totality.

Note: -- The Structuralists, in a restorative way, also worked “combinatorially” (including with pairs of opposites).

The systechy.

‘Su.stoichia’, togetherness of elements. And that of two elements. Opposite-pair.-- Go into examples.

Sumerian.

Bibl. sample : S.N. Kramer, *L’histoire commence à Sumer*, Paris, 1975, 153.

The Sumerians (Sumerians) were discovered around 1872. They are an Archaic-Antique people who called themselves ‘kengir’. They settled in Sumer between - 4000 and - 3000. In cities like e.g. Ur (Ur), Lagash (Lagash), Deruk (Uruk), Eridoe (Eridu). They are the inventors of cuneiform writing.

Note: -- What is now Iraq and Iran,-is the approximate region where they lived.

Well, in the Sumerian texts one finds many typical couplings that divide a totality into two belonging opposites.

Thus e.g. “Winter/Summer: Or rather “Winter/Summer” because in the Archaic religious mentality natural phenomena are the work of deities. These deities continued as what Nathan Söderblom, the well-known historian of religion, called “Urheber” (Causers). So that (a cosmic phenomenon like) the seasons -- seen in the background -- were ‘divine’,-- yes, the visible and tangible presentiment of the causing deities.

To speak with S. Paul: those deities, causative ‘factors’ of all that is visible, are “ta stoicheia tou kosmou”, Lat.: elementa mundi, the factors (par excellence) of the cosmos.

Bibles.

“The serpent was the most outsmarting creature among all the creatures in the fields (...). She said to the woman (op.: Eve), “So that makes ‘God’ said ‘You shall not eat of all the trees in the pleasure garden (paradise).

E.H. 248.

The woman replied, "(...) But of the tree in the middle of the pleasure garden, God has said, 'In any case, you do not eat from it. Do not even touch it! Otherwise it will cost you your life'. To which the serpent replied: 'I don't believe that! Die? That in no case! But what is true is that 'God' realizes that, the day you do eat of it, your eyes will be opened and you will be like the deities, at home in good and evil.'"

Note: -- In traditional theology, this "mythical" story is considered to be the story concerning the first sin (from which, for all descendants, original sin results) or "Fall. The first sin or primal sin would thus have been a kind of cooperation with "the deities" - the elements of the cosmos (par excellence), in Paul's parlance - who are thereby characterized as "familiar with, at home in good-and-evil."

Still true, outside of any true Biblical belief in God, magics are two-faced, "at home in good-and-evil." Expressed in vernacular, the Pagan deities "don't delve so closely" when it comes to the Ten Commandments (the ethical code).

If necessary, they achieve their ends not only through the ethically irreproachable but through everything that is ethically evil. Ask the non-Western peoples about their magicians and sorceresses: they will tell you that these people "don't look so closely", in many cases. As long as the goal is achieved!

"Good-and-Evil"

A very distinctive dichotomy (systechy). It divides all behavior into good and evil. Together these 'elements' are the totality. And of the conscientious and of the unscrupulous. Of model and counter-model.

Antique Greek.

Bibl. sample : Gad Freudenthal, *The Theory of Opposites and an Ordered Universe* (Physics and Metaphysics in Anaximander), in: *Phronesis* (A Journal for Ancient Philosophy), Assen.

It is about Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/-547), the thinker or 'hetairos' of Thales of Miletos, the first thinker. Apparently he looked for order in the fusi, nature (to be understood as "all that is"). Among other things in opposites.

Conclusion.-- Very early philosophy and science were considered to be ordering activities. Indeed: with Anaximandros, the 'archè' is the basic conception of all that is, involved in coming into being and passing away,--a systechy.

E.H. 249.

The systechies of the Paleopythagoreans.

Harmony, i.e., incorporation, is the central feature - along with soul(s) power - in the system of the Pythagoreans. Another list has been preserved which claims to go back to the Paleopythagorean stoicheiosis or factor analysis.

In particular:

a. identity/non-identity,

b. orderliness/ disorderliness, form/ formlessness, firmness/ unsteadiness, mathematical: straightness/ crookedness, -- natural science: light/darkness, -- human science: masculinity/femininity, right-handedness/ left-handedness, ethical good/ evil.

Archutas of Taras (-445/-395).

This Paleopythagorean from Tarentum has in his name a text (which is contradictory).-- “If someone was able to reduce (“genes”) all species to the same premise (“archa”) and from that premise to lead and put together (“suntheinai kai sunarthmèsasthai”), then - so it seems to me - such a person is the sage par excellence, - someone who possesses all truth as a share,-- someone who takes a standpoint from which he can know god together with all things: how god viz. has put everything together with the premise of the pair of opposites and ordering (‘en tai sustoichiai kai taxei’).” (O. Willman, *Abriss der Philosophie* 14).

Note: -- In this text -- whether it is authentic or not -- the dual method of reasoning -- analysis, tracing back to a premise to be found,-- sunthesis, inferring from premises; ED 26 (Deduction/reduction); 36) -- is clearly present and is present as an orderly duality.

Platon

With Platon, the oppositional pair “tautotès/ heterotès” (identity/non-identity) is the basic system. As above.

E.g., to order concepts: the diaretic method orders from the most encompassing concepts to the less encompassing (e.g., from “living being” to “man” (one type of living being)); the synoptic method proceeds in reverse.

Platonic dialectic.

Among other things, the pairs of opposites are strongly discussed in the *Parmenides* dialogue.

Thus e.g. *Parm.* 129a/e. There it speaks of “interweaving” and “keeping apart” concepts. -- “In the greatest embarrassment one gets (...) by the demand that the ideas each exist in themselves (133b).

E.H. 250.

The ideas, after all, all appear to have their existence or being in their mutual relations. As, e.g., the ideas 'slavery' and 'dominion' encompass each other". (W. Klever, *Dialectical Thinking (On Plato, Mathematics and the Death Penalty)*, Bussum, 1981, 53).

As W. Klever underlines, G.W. Hegel (1770/1831; teacher of Marx), the innovator of the dialectic, called *Platon's Parmenides* "die heilige Schrift der Philosophie." (the holy scripture of philosophy). This apparently because of the emphasis on the "koinonia". The mutual involvement, of ideas.

In his dialogue *Sophistes* 259th, Platon says: "Only by the ideas being interwoven on the other side - 'ton eidon sumplokè' - does insight arise."

Note: -- What Anaximandros and the Paleopythagoreans said, Platon says in his own way. Specifically: ordering involves harmony of opposites.

In his *Theaitètos dialogue*, the question is "What is knowledge?"

In the spirit of the Protosophist Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410), known for his thesis "All that is, is as it happens to each one of us individually with the consequence "The (individual) human being is the measure (= premise) of all things", Theaitetos postulates that "knowledge is perception". And this is sensory perception. Cfr Theaitètos 151e.

The dialogue then turns to the implications of this proposition. If the proposition is correct, why is there still talk of errors of perception, illusion, gradations of insight, distinction between sleeping and waking?

Yet Platon agrees that that statement contains some truth. Thus *Theait.* 179c.

The difficulties, indeed even the impossibilities that result (164b) - even if one presents the thesis as favorably as possible - compel:

- a. a dissolution of it
- b. in the sense of supplementing it.

This removal is not brought about from outside but is obtained from the proposition itself (170a). This means that its validity does not disappear but comes into its own in a subsequent proposition.

In that next proposition Platon - going along with his interlocutor - claims: "By means of the senses we arrive at a knowledge which, however, is no longer that of the senses themselves." In particular: the soul, thanks to 'anamnesis', summary memory (EH 164), grasps the common and joint in the multiplicity of sensory impressions.

E. H. 251.

Thirty-first sample.-- "Including". (251)

The systechy just seen can be translated into "the complete understanding of one term of the systechy includes: a. the understanding of that term, b. including the second term."

I.e.: the separated understanding of one term, seen from its full or total understanding, is restrictive, i.e., precisely subject to (the rest, the second term).

Appl. model.

Cfr ED 14vv. (Restrictive judgment);-- 128v. (Ontological modalities).-- ED 12.-- The narrative concerning the boy who had killed his father covers a structure;

a. the narrative itself is an inductive sample;

b. the moral lesson is the generalization.

Understanding both fully involves grasping the sample (the narrative) subject to - including - the moral lesson (otherwise it is 'blind') and the moral lesson subject to - including - the sample (otherwise the moral lesson is 'empty').

So much for the doctrine of comprehension.-- Cfr also EO 131 (Probably): "under stipulation".

Now regarding the doctrine of judgment.

ED 15.-- "Christianity is a humanism" is correct subject to the fact that -- defined differently -- "Christianity is not a humanism" is also correct. The full understanding of the first sentence includes a. the understanding of that first sentence b. including the second sentence. Both are restrictive judgments. They refer to each other as complements.

Now to the theory of reasoning.

ED 33.-- Actually, the deduction can be formulated as follows: "If and only if A, then B. Well, A (or B). So B (or A)". As soon as the 'if' of the first preposition does not include "and only if", there is reduction either as explanation or as induction. What is 'reduction'? A deduction under proviso! Thus, the full understanding of an explanatory reduction or an inductive reduction includes a. its understanding b. including "the rest".

That 'rest', -- those are the other possible explanations or the other possible samples. Only if ("if and only if") those other explanations and/or those other samples have been checked, can one proceed to a real deduction.

In other words: only then is there the full understanding.

Dialectics

This is how Platon constantly proceeded : his whole stoicheiosis (anamnesis (EH 164)) stands or falls by this.-- So too, in his way Hegel (ED 66vv, : Deductio hegeliana).

E.H. 252.

Thirty-second sample.-- Dichotomy (complement, supplement) (252-253).

Ordering -- this is how we saw it in the Theaitètos dialogue -- involves a. an internal comparison (which gives an understanding) b. with an external comparison (which gives an understanding including a complement).-- Ordering is therefore “combinatorial,” i.e. essentially pairwise thinking.

Supplement.

In ancient Greek: “To plèrama:”, Lat.: complementum. Also called: “hè loipè” the rest (or: “to loipon”, what remains).-- Something is (is true, is good) subject to the rest -- including the rest. Anyone who thinks this way thinks “sumplèrotikos,” in a complementary or supplementary way.

After all, a given is split up - within a totality - into the given itself and the rest (everything else within that totality).

a. All elements separately and all elements together (collectively);

b. all parts separately and all parts together (disruptive),--see the two main variants.

A.-- Description (definition).

The essential form or essence of something is that by which it is distinguishable (discriminable) from the rest. Its description or even its strict definition attempts to express that distinctiveness.

A.1. -- The singular form of being.

Think about yourself! How will ye articulate what defines you? Mainly by pointing out all that makes you different from the rest. Cfr ED 46/50 (Idiographic reasoning). This is: by virtue of dichotomy. Thus e.g., “I am a Fleming (and not a Walloon or a Brusselian)”. “I live in Ghent (and not in Hasselt)”. “I am married and have two children” (and not unmarried and childless)”.

That mentally appended “and not “ - explicitly or not - refers to the rest. Thus thou makest thyself distinct from the rest.

Note: -- It is because of this that the singular is always also ‘concrete’ (‘concretum’, is Latin for “fused with”).

A.2. -- The private form of being.

Thus: a Negro(in) is a. a human being (universal) b. characterized by a culture and among other things a skin color (private). By enumerating the private, one contrasts the Negro(er) with the rest of humanity. In virtue of. “some have traits, some do not”. A Negro(in) is a human being (but not a white person or a Chinese person). “But not” differentiates from the rest (the complement of the set).

E.H. 253.

B.-- Description (definition).

Now take the system.

Appl. mod.

“That beautiful girl there on the beach playing in the sand! How it draws, with jet-black hair and bronzed skin, against the facial horizon bathed in the setting sun!”

a. Commonsensical.

“Common sense” (as opposed to “intimate sense”) means “common - i.e., generally distributed-sense.” Everyone with his or her common sense puts the dichotomy, in, the form of addition, consciously or rather un(der)consciously, first. This is evident from the sentence just mentioned (in which we have underlined the dichotomy). The pair of opposites “foreground/background” (one part of the landscape/the other part or the rest of the same landscape) plays here.

b. Observational psychology.

In perceptual psychology, ‘figure’ is called the (geometric) form that separates itself from a totality. But precisely because of this the ‘figure’ becomes foreground against background. Namely within the totality of the observed.

Appl. model.

Listen carefully - perception! - a beautiful song. The melody - in the form of the refrain especially - detaches itself - mainly thanks to its (perceived) repetition - from the whole. Similarly, the theme detaches itself from the whole. Foreground arises on some background!

Gestalt.

Gestalt or form psychologists will here speak of “Gestalt” (instead of “figure”).

Note: -- Which amounts, in Paleopythagorean language, to ‘arithmos’, “number.form.harmony” (a number of elements in a configuration make up a harmony).

Surface - depth.

Other form of dichotomy.

a. A fact.-- A ll. at school falls behind (area).

b. The explanation.-- Falling behind is merely “coming to the surface” of a disorder e.g. which ‘betrays’ both the total health condition and the total psychosocial situation ... in depth. Or in the background.

Note: -- When one pays attention to the language use of the Structuralists (EH 224), one notices that the pair of opposites “surface/depth” appears regularly. Thus one even speaks of “surface” and “depth structures” (the latter only becoming exposed upon thorough analysis).-- Thus one defines systems or parts thereof.

E. H.; 254.

Thirty-third sample.-- Dichotomy (human). (254-255)

'Human science' ('anthropology') includes, in addition to the representation of, the biological aspect of man, that of his psyche and also of his society and culture (psychological/ sociological/ culturological).

Yet this can be done in many ways. We dwell on two main types of anthropology. Again, one thinks in terms of a dichotomy.

Prosopopoeia (view description)/ ethopoeia (inner description).

Bibl. sample : H.I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, (History of education in antiquity), Paris, 273s.. - The author gives, in thirty-six subparts or aspects, the structure of - what was then called - the 'enkomion', Lat.: 'laudatio', eulogy.

a. First we dwell on physical appearance and environment. We would now say, "the Behavioral aspect" Object: that which is (viewed from the outside) visible and tangible, -removed.

b. Then one dwells on the inner aspect (the "soul") of the praised one. Now we would say : "the Geisteswissenschaftliche aspect". Object: what biologically,-- psychologically, sociologically, culturally goes on in the human being, -- by means of empathy and perception grasped.

Note: -- With this we find ourselves in full Antique rhetoric i.e. understanding theory. The Behaviorist attitude towards the studied fellow-man is narrow, -- keeps itself at a distance, -- wants to be "objective - scientific".

Spiritual-Scientific understanding goes to the depths of the soul: through all kinds of expressions it tries to penetrate to what is going on in the fellow man. Feeling,- empathizing with by means of a real 'encounter' (deeper acquaintance). Cfr EH 211 (Buytendijk: encounter).

Exclusivism/ inclusivism.

Cfr. EH 246 (Oppositionalism);-- 203 (Assimilism/ differentism).

a. The 'exclusivist(s)' sees all that is different, as "not-me" or as "not-to-the-group". The "other" is in this mode of interpretation, so different that there is an unbridgeable gap. The Hitlerian racist or the Serbian ethnic-purifier belong to that type.

b. The "inclusivist(s)" sees the other -- which can sometimes be painfully different -- as in principle approachable and permeable, -- as fundamentally "understandable. He/she therefore tries to keep the dialogue and the real encounter going. The gap can be bridged.

E. H. 255.

Instead of “not-I”, the “other” fellow human being becomes “I-again” (to quote A. Schopenhauer: “Nicht-Ich”/”Ich noch einmal”),-- the group that is “different” is integrated into one’s own group. The other corporeality, the other psyche, society and culture are treated with minimal benevolence. Instead of being excluded, they become objects of inclusion.

Consequence: the method changes. The fellow human being is no longer “the black box” (whose inner soul life one puts in parentheses; on which one performs stimuli to elicit ‘reactions’ (‘Reaction Psychology’ or ‘Behavioral Psychology’). Like an electrician running wires in and out to know what the black box is storing. Instead of the “stimulus-response” scheme, the insight comes that the reaction to a stimulus is actually the processing of a situation with as co-representation the soul (mind, I, personality) of the person who interprets that situation (cfr. ABC - theory ED 23) : apart from the objective situation, the subject who interprets also determines the reaction. It is precisely this subjective factor that one tries to discover - feeling, compassionately ‘Participating observation’ - through its ‘signs’ in external behavior. Behold the ‘comprehensive’ method.

Appl. model: Herodotos on the totemism of the neurs.

By way of introduction.

a. Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-425).

The founder of land and ethnology, also “the father of historiography” is known for his *Historiai* (Investigations). In them he reveals himself as a reporter (either as an eyewitness or as informed “by hearsay”). He was traditionally religious. But he was at the same time influenced by the Milesian school (Thales c.s.), which was engaged in “*historia*”, research, concerning “nature” (“natural philosophy”).

As an Ionian, he was very open -- “inclusive” -- in spirit. Which was reinforced by his democratic beliefs (“Everyone is allowed to speak”) and his highly traveled business life.-- In this sense, he was a synthesis of old and new.

b. Multiculturalism.

Herodotos, as a Lesser Asian Greek, was familiar from childhood with a multitude of cultures, some of which were very distant from his. We would now like to examine how these were more likely to be approached from the outside for him.

E.H. 163/255)

Harmology or order(s) doctrine	(163/651)
1st sample.-- The human soul and ordering.	(166/681)
2nd sample.-- Ordering science, rhetoric and philosophy.	(169)
3rd sample.-- Tropology: the metaphor.	(170/173)
4th sample.-- Tropology : the metonymy.	(174/75)
5th sample.-- Tropology: the synecdoche.	(176)
6th sample.-- the term 'his(the)' restrictively.	(177/179)
7th sample.-- traditional logic and relational theory.	(180/184)
8th sample.-- The comparative method.	(184/187)
9th sample.-- Number and number.	(188)
10th sample. -- Cartesian order theory.	(189/192)
11th sample.-- Inward and outward comparison.	(193/196)
12th sample.-- Schleiermacher: divinatory/ comparative.	(197/198).
13th sample.-- Models of comparative method	(199/201).
14th sample.-- aristotelian hypothesis.	(202)
15th sample.-- Assimilism (concordism)/ differentism (discord).	(203/ 206)
16th sample.-- Relational Science.	(207/212)
17th sample.-- Structure (distributive / collective).	(213/216)
18th sample.-- Systematology.	(217/220).
19th sample.-- Drawing Theory.	(221/223)
20th sample.-- Structuralism.	(224/225).
21st sample.-- Semiotics.	(226/230)
22nd sample.-- psychodrama.	(231)
23rd sample.-- Associative psychology	(232/233)
24th sample.-- Associative psychoanalysis.	(234/235)
25th sample.-- "A kind of identity".	(236)
26th sample.-- Harmology also oppositional theory:	(237/238)
27th sample.-- Dpanning theory (taseology).	(239/242)
28th sample.-- Litigation.	(243/245)
29th sample.-- Oppositionalism.	(246)
30th sample.-- dichotomy: Systechy (opposition pair).	(247/250)
31st sample.-- "Including".	(251)
32nd sample.-- Dichotomy (complement, supplement)	(252/253).
33rd sample.-- Dichotomy (human).	(254/255)