

6.4.1. Issues in contemporary ontology (reality theory). 1986/1987
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Part I, p. 1 to 200.

-- Historical Introduction.

I.A -- The three main ontological positions in antiquity.

Introductory note.

'Ontology' or theory of reality as reality (one says, following Parmenides of Elea (-540/-475), who is considered the founder of ontology, also "theory of being(s) as being(s)"),---such is the lemma (initial idea or 'Gestalt'), with which we begin this course. It is conceived as a long analysis (review) of that initial idea.

I.A.(I). -- The nominalist ontology (1/7)

'Nominalism' we can define, briefly, as the theory of reality, which approaches all that is, from the 'onomata', nomina, names, by which we refer to things. We can call this the denotative approach. Denotation" is the act of indicating one or more things by means of a sign (think sign, speech sign, writing sign). - One compares this with the number of elements which show common characteristics and thus can be summarily indicated by means of the word that expresses those common characteristics.

In classical concept theory, this is called the extent of a concept (which has essentially a content).-- This implies that nominalism, in essence, presupposes a theory of signs (semiotics (C. Peirce), semiology (F. de Saussure)).

The protagorean ontology.

Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410), the first Protosophist, is a remarkable paragon of ancient nominalism. We try, now, to give a sketch (characteristic) of his nominalism. Not unjustly, the present "humanists" label him as their antique forerunner: the individual human being is, after all, "to metron", mensura, the measuring model (yardstick, norm) of all being.

(a).-- The denotative relationship.

None other than Hippias of Elis (.../-343), one of the most famous Sophists, puts us on the right path to understanding the true spirit of the nominalist. For Hippias, that which characterizes the true nominalist is "orthos legein," expressing oneself accurately.

This entails: expressing oneself in such a way that precisely a single fact is indicated and, immediately, that no misunderstanding is possible. Expressed in modern terms: a word (complex) is an indicative, sign, like e.g. a signpost.

H.O. 2.

Platon of Athens (-427/-347), the famous founder of the theory of ideas, in his *Hippias maior* (287 e), gives us an applicative model.

Socrates, in this dialogue, asks a pressing question, "What is beauty?" (to kalon), to force his interlocutor, Hippias, to give a universal (general) definition. This is the style of thinking of Socrates, Platon, Aristotle (the so-called Great Scientists).

Reply of Hippias: "A beautiful girl that is beautiful? One understands nominalism: every mortal, at Athens (and elsewhere), immediately understands correctly (without any possible misunderstanding) what a beautiful specimen of ideal beauty is. The ideative view of beauty in itself, generally speaking, interests the nominalist very little: he finds, easily, that such a thing is losing itself in vagueness. In other words: this is, for him, no longer an accurate use of language (orthos epein).

Still in a second way Hippias sets us on our way.-- He is, among other things, known for his mnemonics (memory practice theory).

"(1) As for names.

Thou shouldst, for example, commit the first name Chrus.ippos (Chrysippus) to memory: then think of 'chrusos' (gold) and 'hippos' (horse). Another example: think with the name Puri.lampès of 'pur' (fire) and 'lampein', (shine).

(2) The same thing as far as things are concerned.

If it is about 'courage', think of Arès (the deity of war(s)); for the art of forging, think of Hephaistos (the blacksmith of the Olympic deities) (...). (J.-P. Dumont, *Les Sophistes (Fragments et témoignages)*, Paris, 1969, 246). Hippias' systechie (pair of opposites), after all, reads "to sunolon", concretum, the denotative link between names and things (who does not think here of the title of M. Foucault (1926/1984; the famous structuralist) *Les mots et les choses* (Paris, 1966)?). According to Dumont, o.c., ibid., 'sun.olon' (the totality of more than one given) denotes both 'onoma' (name) and 'pragma' (thing) and 'nomos' (law, custom) and 'pragma' (lawsuit).

With this we are entirely in the cultural-historical sphere, in which nominalism belongs. Let us look, now, at the two main propositions.

H.O. 3.

(b).1. *The protagorean differentialism.*

'Differentialism' (also called 'variology') means the tendency to emphasize - not the identity (similarity/coherence), but - the non-identity (difference/independence) of data.

In the dialogue *Theaetetus* 166 d, *Platon* quotes Protagoras of Abdera: "In my opinion I maintain that the truth is as I have written: each individual among us is the standard ('metron') which labels existing things as existing and non-existing things as non-existing. After all, this individual here and now differs, under thousands of points of view from that individual there and later,--this, because the true reality (*note* -- the being) and the mode of appearance (*note* -- the phenomenon) of things -- from one individual to another -- come across differently.

One notes Protagoras' coherent use of language:

(a) he only comes out for his individual opinion;

(b) reality, being and appearance, comes across differently to everyone else. It is this dichotomy (complementation) "me-the others" that stands out.

Eristic

Diogenes Laërtios (third century A.D.), *Life, doctrines and theses of the famous philosophers of each school*, says: "He was the first who held the view that on all subjects there are two mutually opposed points of view."

One sees, again, the emphasis on the difference, the contrast.-- *Aristotle, Rhetoric* II:24, 1402 a 23, says: "(For Protagoras it came down to) forging the weakest argument into the strongest argument." Here the agonistics, the battle of words,-- the "dialectics," the skill of making, in response to the same theme, more than one opinion "true," comes to the fore. Protagoras does not hesitate, if need be, to use a term borrowed from Freud, to rationalize, i.e. to give irresponsible opinions at least the semblance of rationally justified propositions.

Appl. Model.

Platon, in his *Protagoras* 333 d, quotes him:: "So are good the things that are useful to men?"

Protagoras: "darn: even those things, which are not useful for people, I label as good."

Socrates: "Do you mean, Protagoras, that what you label 'useless' means, under no point of view, usefulness to men; - in other words, that it is absolutely useless? Do you also label that utter uselessness as 'good'?"

H.O. 4.

Protagoras: "Absolutely not.-- But I still know many things, which are harmful to people -- food and drink, drugs and a thousand other things. Others I know are useful. Still others I know, which are neither harmful nor useful, -- at least for people, but e.g. not for horses and such."

One establishes, with Protagoras already, what, later, with the Stoics (Stoa followers, Stoics), since Zenon of Kition (-336/-264), will become an axiological differential: usable - neither usable nor unusable (harmful) - unusable (harmful).

As an aside, didn't we see (in the Rhetoric course) that Protagoras was a utilist (usefulness-oriented thinker) or, still, a "pragmatist" (usefulness-oriented philosopher)?

In other words, Protagorean thinking deals as little as possible with the things themselves, according to their essence (recall Parmenides' term: 'cath' heauto: secundum seipsum, to consider something according to itself,--and not according to its individual impressions); he does, however, adhere, aloofly, to its usefulness. Pragmatism, in other words.

(b).2. - Protagorean phenomenism.

Phenomenon' (appearance) is what we, naively or critically, directly perceive of reality. - 'Phenomenism', i.e. that school of thought which claims that, given the limitation of our capacity to know, of total reality we can know only the phenomenal side.

The phenomenist divides reality into two areas:

(i) the phenomenal and (ii) what since I. Kant (1724/1804), the main figure of the German Aufklärung, has been called: the noumenal (from 'to noumenon', intelligibile, that which, over the phenomenal side, is the true being itself).

Note.-- One does not confuse this with "phenomenism" or "conscientism," which claims that being coincides with its appearance, in our subjective consciousness.

J.-P. Dumont, Les Sophistes, 35, cites a certain Hermias, who in his Critique of Pagan Thinkers, 9, says that "Protagoras claims that the label (naming, definition) and judge concerning things is man: on the one hand, he decides on the existence of things, so far as they are within our sense perceptions; on the other hand, he decides on the non-existence - at least in the forms, which reality takes, - of things, so far as they are beyond our sense perceptions."

H.O. 5.

One sees, indeed, the dichotomy " 'inside/outside' our sensory experiences". The ontology or theory of reality of someone like Protagoras stands or falls on this complementation.

Sensism/Sensualism.

Protagoras - to carry this dichotomy forward - does not take as a norm (standard) e.g. consciousness (as, later, the Cartesian G. Berkeley (1684/1753) did with respect to nature). He takes as a standard the perceptions of the senses. Well, one of the definitions of 'sens(ual)ism' is: "The doctrine that man knows nothing but what he experiences by sense: the whole of knowing and the thinking which follows from it consists of psychic acts, which either receive or process sensory representations.

Two inferences.

(1) *The purely empirical-sensical geometry.*

Aristotle, *Metaphysica* B: 2, 997 b 32, describes, first, his "abstract" (based on isolation from the sensory representations) geometry:

"The sense lines are not the object of the geometric's exposition. The reason is: none among the sense-perceived lines is really a straight or a curve, as defined by the geometric exposition."

Then he characterizes sensible geometry: "For example, it is not in just one geometrically defined point that a round object touches a straight line. It is as Protagoras, in his criticism of the geometrists, asserts (*note*: in more than one material point)."

Here one grasps the enormous weakness of sensism: an intellectual and rational geometry is, sensistically speaking, a nonsense. However, already in the days of Protagoras, especially under the influence of Paleopythagoreans (-550/ -300) and, even more, the Eleates (Parmenides and Zenon of Elea), a truly rational geometry existed.

(2) *The purely empirical-sensical science of religion.*

W. Jaeger, *A la naissance de la théologie (Essai sur les Presocratiques)*, (At the birth of theology (Essay on the Presocratics)), Paris, 1966, 185/203 (*Les théories sur la nature et l' origine de la religion*), ((Theories on the nature and origin of religion)), describes the Protsophist position on religion.

In Hellas, since the Paleomilesians (think of Thales of Miletos (-624/-545) and his contemporaries), a way of thinking had grown that situates "the being" (ta onta) within fuis, natura, nature: its order, its laws govern things.

H.O. 6.

Thus arose - says Jaeger - the idea of interpreting religion, with its belief in deities, forces and workings, as the product of human nature in its interaction with all of nature.

The Protosophists, following in the footsteps of the physicians and Herakleitos of Ephesus (-535/-465), thus founded a 'rational science of man', - "in this they resemble the thinkers of the Enlightenment (especially from John Locke (1632/1704)), in modern times, who follow and elaborate the path of the Sophists" (o.c.,188).

Agnosticism.

1. - *Sextos Empeirikos* (175/250), the top figure of the ancient Skeptics, in his *Against the Natural Philosophers*, 1:55v., says: "Are of the same opinion as they (Euhemeros, Diagores, Prodikos, Kritias):

(i) Theodoros the god-denier (a Kurenaic man, with very nihilistic views) and

(ii) Protagoras of Abdera, at least according to some, (...).

He writes somewhere, "Concerning the deities, I cannot say whether they exist or in what way they exist, for the obstacles, which I encounter (in this connection), are numerous.

For this reason, by a decree, which the Athenians issued against him, he was condemned. He fled and perished in a shipwreck".

The term "agnostic" means one who is sens(ual)ist and, therefore, labels as unknowable all that lies beyond the sensory phenomena, -- without denying this, however: one simply does not know.

2. Besides deity, the soul, of course, is also dismissed as unknowable: Diogenes Laertios says of Protagoras that the soul of man is nothing "pare tas aistèseis," except its sensations. In other words: Protagoras adheres to his sensism. The soul is the collection of sensory experiences.

Culturology.

The object of religion-especially soul and deity-is, therefore, unknowable. But religion itself is an essential component of human culture. This is evident in *Platon's* dialogue *Protagoras*: Protagoras notes that only man, in nature, believes in deities, erects altars, and makes statues.

H.O. 7.

In other words: he is analyzing religion from a firm or positive (professional science) standpoint, as Jaeger notes (o.c.,189).

Thus, the names "god(in)," "soul," while not transempirical (transcendental) in meaning, do take on a human-scientific denotation: they denote that which the religious man believes to exist in an "other world."

Decision.

1. *O. Willmann, Geschichte d. Idealismus, I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus)*, (History of Idealism, I (Prehistory and History of Ancient Idealism)), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 355, notes that the Eleates had already, in their own way, seen through nominalism: "In the doxa, opinion, only was, is, and will be that which men have provided with names, denoting each thing separately."

2. *Sextos Empeirikos, Pyrrhonic Hypotyposes*, I: 216, characterizes Protagoras' position as follows, among others: "Protagoras claims that man is the measure of all things, in that he labels as existing what exists, and as non-existent what does not exist. In doing so, 'yardstick' means the criterion (means of judgment) and 'things' means the actual things (...). He also states that, by him at least, only phenomena really exist (...).

He also says that the explanations of all phenomena are to be found in matter, in the sense that matter, as far as it depends on itself, can be all the things which show themselves in our representations. He also maintains that, owing to the differences between their states (conditions), people perceive sometimes this, sometimes something else: the normal man, after all, perceives the objects situated in matter in a normal way; the abnormal man, in a pathological way. It is the same with age, sleep and wake, -- with each type of condition. In this sense man grows into the measure of all things. (...).

J.-P. Dumont, Les Sophistes, 34, calls this materialism (see also o.c.,10). Indeed: logically-coherently thought through, sensism and its inherent phenomenism must culminate in a kind of materialism.

'Materialism' is called the proposition that

(i) all of reality consists of substance or

(ii) has substance as a substratum, so that every phenomenon is referred to as the working of substance. 'Spatiality' is, then, one of the essential features of what is referred to as 'substance' (matter).

H.O. 8

The conceptual realist-abstractive ontology. (8/26)

'Conceptual realism' is one type of 'realism'. Realism consists of labeling what is real as real. Conceptual realism means, therefore, that concepts, which represent reality, are also labeled as objective, true to reality.

The connotative approach, i.e. paying attention to the content - rather than the size - of a concept weighs here. The concept is, with this, understood as the mental representation, in our minds, of a given ('being').

'Connotation' is the act, by which we represent, by means of a sign (thinking sign or concept), what is of real structure in a given.

A term, in the technical-logical sense, is the name - wording, formulation -, within a given language, by which we incorporate a concept into a language. The term is, then, the speaking and writing mark, to which a feature content (connotation) is associated. Thus, the concept realist also knows his type of semiotics (semiology).

The connotation (concept content) is similar to what, in set theory, is called common property: that concept content is, in all its copies (elements, members), identical. The copies (applicative models) of the concept content (regulative model) constitute the concept scope (denotative side).

Aristotelian ontology.

Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322), for twenty years the pupil of Platon of Athens, was, among other things, the educator of Alexander the Great (-356/-323), the founder of the Hellenistic Empire. - Aristotle is one remarkable example of abstract conceptual realism. The following is a characterization of his teachings.

First of all, he is the elaborator, in grandiose style, of what Eleatism (Parmenides of Elea (-540/-475) in particular), on the theory of being(s) as being(s), started. He is also the elaborator of the logic, which Parmenides' pupil, Zenon of Elea (-490/...), through his eristic ontology, founded. The *Organon* or Aristotelian logic is evidence of this.

(a).-- *The abstractive relationship.* (8/12)

What his teacher Platon called "the noble yoke," i.e., the interval between idea and reality, Aristotle labeled as the prime example of relation.

H.O. 9.

Note.-- What Hippias of Elis called 'sun.olon' (word-cause connection), Platon 'the noble yoke' (between knowing subject and known object), Aristotle 'the relation par excellence', we, since Franz Brentano (1838/1917), with the Scholastics, by the way, call intentio(nality). Every any effort to know something has one main attraction, namely the orientation of the subject towards the object ('noësis / noëma' will Husserl say). *Cfr supra H.O 2.*

Theories.

'Theoria', speculatio, fathoming insight, is a term, which goes back to Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500), the founder of Paleopythagoreism. Aristotle's teacher, Platon, labels science as "theorètikè tou ontos," the fathoming of being. Aristotle himself divided philosophy into theoretical and practical philosophy, - classification, which became common, since then (*O. Willmann, Die wichtigsten phil. Fachausdrake in historischer Anordnung*, Kempten/München, 1909, 20f.). We are going to see how this fathoming proceeds, with Aristotle.

"The mind (nous, intellectus) is, on the one hand, so structured that it can become everything and, on the other hand, that it exposes everything,-- in this it is similar to a force -- think of light -- which, in a certain sense, turns the possibly visible colors into actually seen colors." (*Aristotle, De anima 3:5,2*).-- That exposure shows itself in abstraction, i.e., the process, in which our mind, from sensory data, forms one concept.

Appl. Model.

Do we tie in with H.O. 2 - "What is the beauty?" - to.

(1) As a nominalist, who believes that only singular instances (appl. mod.) can be 'accurately' represented in language use, Hippias answers : "The beautiful, -- that is a beautiful girl".

(2) Aristotle, convinced that even beauty can be precisely defined, does it differently: like Socrates, he proceeds inductively. Iris is beautiful, Kalliopè is not unpleasant, Arètè is beautiful. Behold three women, who evoke the same impression of beauty.

Wl. Tatarkiewicz, Geschichte der Aesthetik, (History of Aesthetics), I (Die Aesthetik der Antike), Basel / Stuttgart, 1979, 167/198 (Die Aesthetik des Aristoteles), informs us what, in summary, Aristotle understands by the universal concept of beauty (beautiful, nice).

a. Objective: like all Hellenes, he shared the conviction that, in what is beautiful, proportionality (of parts; proportion), order(s), happy union ('harmonia') - the ideas of beauty of the paleopythagoreans - must be verifiable.

H.O. 10.

b. Subjective: man, insofar as he has free time at his disposal, can, if he grasps the above-mentioned features, by looking at them or by the memory of them, suddenly experience an impression, an experience that includes a feeling of happiness.

Iris, Kalliope (one of the Muses, by the way, is called that and Muses are beautiful women), Arètè (the consort of prince Alkinoös (*Odusseia* 6/12)), once met (intentio), respond to that objective and subjective side of aesthetic experience. From these - from these concrete-singular cases (applicative models), which differ greatly from each other and are independent women - Aristotle abstracts the universal idea of 'beauty'.

Aristotle - according to Tatarkiewicz - situates beauty axiologically:

(i) 'Clean' is all that, while it can be appreciated for itself, is also praiseworthy.-- This broader - typically Greek - definition means, in addition to being beautiful, e.g. conscientious behavior, that we call 'clean'.

(ii) 'Clean' is that which is valuable and also appears pleasant. -- This term refers more to being beautiful, -- of e.g. a girl.

Decision.

Our present language uses the word 'abstract' in a nominalistic sense, to lash out at something as 'alien to life', 'vague' or. -- One noted that 'af.aireisis', abstractio, abstraction, in Aristotle, does not mean the life-foreign, but the generalized: the inductive conception.

With the nominalist, this is at most a generic name, to which nothing objective in the singular, all-too-different things answers.

Note -- Aristotelian essentialism.

J. van Rijen, Essentialism and mysticism, in: *J. van Rijen et al, Aristotle (His Significance for the World Today)*, Baarn, 1979, 9/34, reproaches, not without a great deal of misunderstanding (as a positivist), Aristotle with a dose of 'essentialism'.

P. Foulquié, L' existentialisme, Paris, 1951-6, 19/20 (*Le conceptualisme aristotelicien*) refers to Aristotle's position as "conceptualism" (this,--in a very special sense, i.e., understanding conceptualism) as a type of "conceptualist essentialism.

Like Platon, Aristotle adopts the ancient maxim "the like through the like" (similia similibus). The mind 'becomes' the phenomenon, which it, in its 'ousia' essentia, general essence, grasps.

H.O. 11.

(i) Here is meant the identitive process, i.e. based on partial identification with the known object, which Aristotle. As follows: "the soul is, in a certain sense, all being" ("anima quodammodo est omnia" will S. Thomas Aquinas (1225/ 1274), the top figure of High Scholasticism (1200/1300), echo Aristotle).

(ii) Here it is, at once, clear that the gap, which the nominalist thinks he has to think between himself as a knowing and articulating being and the things, is only partial: the abstracting mind grasps, from the concretely-singular thing, nevertheless those common properties (= ousia, essentia), which make it belong to the same class (collection) with all others, exhibiting the same properties, on test (verification) of course.

Decision:

As long as, thanks to verification, common properties are established between singular (and therefore sometimes strongly different and mutually independent) data, as long as also Aristotelian essentialism will remain a responsible opinion. Expressed with a dose of humor: as long as also there will not only be beautiful girls, but there will also be beauty as a common property!

To put it in model theory terms: as long as there are applicative models, one will be able to conclude, o.g., inductive abstraction, to a single regulatory model.

Socratic induction lies at the root of this essentialism. Ch. Lahr, *S. I., Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 591, says: "By 'induction' is meant that intellectual operation which decides from the singular to the universal. Socratic induction consists in deciding from the singular ('l individual') to the genus, the genus (in today's theory of collections: universal collection (class)), generalizing:

(iii) "Not the stone (in its full reality) is in the soul, but only its essence ('morphe', forma, translated 'form' for short)." Thus Aristotle, *De anima* 3: 8, 2.

"The cognitive faculty designs a likeness ('model'), in itself, as a representation of the circumstance, proper to things, -- not, however, as they are, in their full identity, but only according to their 'eidos', species (forma), their form of being." (O. Willmann, o.c., 549).

H.O. 12.

The creature form.

'Form' ('essence form'), a term also used in current computer science, means, in Aristotelianism, that, by which something differs from something else (including from all other data) and is independent; its 'identity', (singularity).

O. Willmann, o.c., 481, points out, correctly, the following fallacy. - "The liquid (content) takes the form of the clear glass. Here is meant: the geometrical form. Now it is true that this geometrical form can be precisely one part of the overall or being form. We saw something of that nature, H.O. 9 v.: among the objective data of the Greek concept of beauty is the 'harmonious' form of a girl, which, precisely because of this, one can label as 'beautiful'.

In other words: modernly expressed: the (creaturely) form is the total information concerning something, insofar as it is distinguishable from all other data.--Thus it comes about that, in Aristotelian language, eidos, species, creaturely form, can mean both the objective creaturely form of the given, in its full identity, and the subjective abstract concept, the connotative representation.

It is the same with ousia, essentia, essence: sometimes it means the objective event, sometimes the purely thought (subject-bound) essence, representation of that event.

This relies on the archaic-antique idea 'similia similibus' (the equal(model) by means of the equal(model)), the basic principle of all archaic-antique model theory.

(b).1. *The Aristotelian analogy system.* (12/16)

Bibliographic sample...:

-- H.-J. Hampel, *Variabilität und Disziplinierung des Denkens*, (Variability and discipline of thought), Munich / Basel, 1967, 17/19 (*Die klassische Logik als engeres Untersuchungsfeld*); ((Classical logic as a narrower field of investigation)), 45/49 (*Vorläufige Darstellung der Logik*); (Preliminary presentation of the logi),

-- G. Jacobi, *Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtsschreibung*, (Logisticians' claims on logic and its historiography), Stuttgart, 1962. Introduction.

"As the core of the classical (i.e. traditional) theory of thought, based on Aristotle's logic, we see the requirement of univocity. It was developed in response to the assignment of signs, but it was elevated to the assignment of all being without more." (Hampel, o.c.,45).

One-unambiguousness' or even, in purer English, 'addition' (assignment) involves adding, assigning, to just one data (sign, being) also just one data (sign, being). Hampel, who is not exactly an Aristotelian, recognizes that akribeia, accuracy, is the pre-eminent characteristic of the Aristotelian type of logic (the Analyticals).-- Now let us see how precisely this akribeia works.

HO. 13.

"Logic begins by clarifying the concept of 'logical'. This means 'folgerecht' (consistently reasoning through).-- Behind 'logical' there is, either overtly or disguised, a subject-specific 'deductive' deduction.

Behind 'inferring' there are - as its subject-free, objective foundation - identities between data" G. Jacobi, o.c.,10).-- From the context of the entire book, it is clear that Jacobi, who possesses a thorough knowledge of traditional thought, could just as easily have written analogies.

Analogy leather.

Who is not familiar with the formula "partim idem partim diversum" - part identical part non-identical as left by the Scholastics as a definition of the concept of analogy? So that Jacobi, as he, incidentally, explicitly states, by "identities" actually means partial identities.

Applicable model.

One is familiar with the famous dictum (saying) of the founder of modern 'rationalist' philosophy, R. Descartes (1596/1650): 'cogito; ergo sum' (I think; therefore I am (exist)). As D. Vernant, *Introduction à la philosophie de la logique*, (Introduction to the philosophy of logic), Bruxelles, 1986, 177s., says: "Conducted according to traditional logic, one could see in it an enthymeme (an unspoken syllogism). (...). 'All that thinks, is (exists). Well, I think. So I exist'".

Jacobi also speaks explicitly in this sense. But, again, as a traditional logician thoroughly different from e.g. Vernant. The latter assumes that the first preposition (VZ 1) must be categorical, i.e. a statement based on verified facts. Jacobi explicitly denies this. "The purely hypothetical formulation of the syllogism is, as is generally recognized, the most appropriate in the logical field. It formulates the prepositions (premises) in the grammatical form of conditional sentences and thus limits itself to the purely logical scope of the derivation." (o.c.,60).-

Put hypothetically, "If all that thinks is, and if, at the same time, I think, then I am (exist)."

Where, now, is the analogy situated as the basis of this Cartesian reasoning? In the fact that 'thinking' (understand: conscious life) can never 'be' (actually be, exist) without (first) 'being' (understand: existing as a thinking being).

HO. 14.

Expressed in the identitarian language of Aristotelian ontology: 'Consciousness' (in Descartes' language 'thinking') and 'being' (especially in the sense of actual existence) are not totally identical, but part-identical. But in a sense they are identical. Were it not for that type of identity, even the hypothetically formulated reasoning would be invalid.

The difference between logic and ontology.

Everyone says it, for centuries: Aristotle's logic goes hand in hand with his ontology. It is even, more than once, blamed on him; after all, one wants a pure, clean, ontology-free logic.

One forgets, however, sometimes, that logic, Aristotelianly interpreted, is ontology, insofar as it expresses itself in purely hypothetical sentences. Why is logic also ontology? Because it, too, speaks of "realities," namely hypothetical realities. A condition, set to a sentence of judgment is non-nothing, i.e. something. So as something, it falls under the laws of all being(s), the categorically expressed being and the hypothetically formulated being.

The laws of thought and of being.

H. Hempel, o.c., 17f., says that the laws of classical thought are twofold.

(1) *The identity law*

Note the wording: Laws of identity -: 'What (so) is, is (so)' (the so-called tautology);- - 'what is not (so) cannot possibly, at the same time and under the same point of view, be (so)' (the so-called law of contradiction); -- 'except for being (so) and not being (so), there is no third possibility' (the so-called law of excluded third).

(2) *The law of sufficient reason or ground.*

Although already with the Voorsocratics explicitly as the basis of all arche reasoning (the Praesocratics seek the sufficient reason or "archè" of fisis, nature, and its phenomena), it is, nevertheless, claimed (e.g., by Hampel, o.c., 18) that only G.W. Leibniz (1646/1716), the Cartesian-German rationalist, introduced this sense into logic.

The law, traditionally, expressed reads: "All that (so) is, is (so), either because it possesses in itself its sufficient (=/ individually necessary) grounds (grounds, conditions), or because it possesses them outside itself". One sees that the comparative method, understood as the method that uncovers partial identities, is at work here: one compares internally and externally a given (a 'being').

HO. 15.

(1) *First application.*

"All that is (being as being), is with itself (loopily, reflexively) totally identical and with something else part-identical." This implies that its intelligibility (what 'being' is present in it) must be sought either within that being or outside that same being.

(2) *Second application.*

The sufficient reason (ground i.e. the jointly sufficient conditions) of the postphrase of a syllogism, worthy of the name, lies in the two prepositional phrases (prephrase 1 and prephrase 2). That prephrase 1 + prephrase 2 = conclusion, can be formulated hypothetically and must be formulated (purely or purely logically) hypothetically, lies in the principle of sufficient condition(s) - understand intelligibility or comprehensibility conditions.

In other words: the whole of logic - and, immediately, the whole of ontology, insofar as logically expressed - stands or falls on the principle of sufficient 'hypothesis' (the most proper name for mere logical condition).

(3) *Third application.*

This one is an application of the previous, the second, application. All scientific hypotheses -- in the language of C.S. Peirce (1839/1914) abductions -- are merely applicative models of previous principle. They have, if well-formed, the following language form: "if ... then, immediately, the established fact is 'sensible', -- understandable; - 'reasonable', - intelligible; - non-absurd.

In other words: the reductive method, backbone of all empirical-experimental methods, has - precisely in that Aristotelian principle - its condition of possibility, i.e. its necessary hypothesis or necessary sufficient ground.

The analogy of being(de).

"Even though we pronounce, haplos, simpliciter, shorthand, the word 'be(de)', 'be(de)' betrays a multitude of meanings. Sometimes it means the accidental (to sumbekos, accidens), other times the true (to alèthes, verum), the opposite of what is false and, therefore, not (so).

Further: the multiplicity of basic concepts (kategoriai, categoriae), such as what (something) is, how (it) is (condition, state), how big (something) is, where (something) is, when (something) is, etc.; also what is possible and/or realized." (*Aristotle, Metaphys. 6:2,1*).

All these meaning variants of 'are(de)' are used 'homoiotropos', convergent, in a convergent, i.e. part-identical, manner.

H.O. 16.

Aristotle talks about the analogical use of language among other things in his '*Dialectics*' (viz. *Topics* 1:15), in his *Rhetoric* (tropology: metaphor, metonymy), in his *Metaphysics* 4: 2; 7: 4.

Appl. Model.

The notion of health: we are called "healthy

(1) that which possesses health (a healthy body e.g.),

(2) what causes them (a healthy diet),

(3) what she shows in his view (a healthy color),

(4) what is receptive to it (a healthy mindset).

In all these cases, 'healthy' means something decently different; but the essence core, a structure susceptible to variations, is the same. This is what Aristotle calls 'homoiotopia', convergence, i.e. partial identity or analogy. Well, in the example developed by Aristotle of the language 'healthy', the transcendental (comprehensive) analogy of being is at work: we say viz: "That body is healthy,--that food is healthy,--that color is healthy,--that mentality is healthy.

'Being' expresses successively possession, causation, view, receptivity. The essence of 'being' is a structure, susceptible to variations,--a 'homiotopia', a convergence, which remains identical through the variations. What Aristotle also calls 'legesthai pros hen' (speaking in such a way that a unity is pronounced in its variations).

(b).2. *Applications of the Aristotelian analogy system.* (16/26)

Connected to the problem raised by Protagoras' nominalism, we will now, briefly, analyze some applications in which analogy appears as a useful thought scheme (structure).

1. *The singular being.* (16/19)

Protagoras, Hippias - we saw - emphasize the difference (inequality, independence) of singular data (H.O. 3).

Aristotle preserves that difference, but subjects it to what the ancients called "catharsis," i.e., he presupposes it, purifies it, and elevates it on a higher plane (reminiscent, among other things, of Hegel's *Aufhebung*, lifting), within the framework of analogy.

O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id., I, 546, says that Aristotle twice improves upon his teacher Platon, in the field of the individual.

(1) "Every being possesses its own 'self'. This it carries within it, - not as a foreign fiefdom: it lives its own life, not a foreign life. (...). It is full reality". With Platon, the higher idea weighs too heavily.

H.O. 17

With him, the "self," the singular, in a given a.k.a., is sunk in creation and decay, leaving the eternal core alien, uninvolved; only the intellectually gifted beings are truly at home in the ideal world.

(2) Not only is the singular full reality, at home in this world; it is, moreover, purposeful process: to begin with the 'self', the singular essence, is only disposition ('dunamis', potentia, mere capacity); but, once it enters the nature-process by a higher power, it becomes (emerges as) realisation ('energeia', actus, actualised possibility). -- With Platon, the essence remains too much uninvolved, alien to the world-process.

The seed - and germination model.

An appl. model clarifies what was indicated in general terms a moment ago: "The seed comes from other beings, which have a greater perfection than the seed possesses; immediately it is not the seed that is first, but that which has a greater perfection.--Thus it can also be expressed: man is earlier than the seed; specifically, not man, who arises from the seed, but that man who makes the seed available." (*Aristotle, Metaph.* 120, 20).

In other words: Aristotle thinks genetically : nature, in and around us, is active in constant processes of change. The essence of things, in it, is therefore in constant development, becoming and decaying. The ousia, essence, is an evolving, genetically only, essence: Aristotelian essentialism involves dynamism. The essence is like the germ, once involved in nature, evolving. - Biology is strongly modeled; immediately Aristotle's worldview is organicist.

The singular man is, therefore,
(i) as singular, fully real and
(ii) as singular, an evolving reality.

This leads, for the scientist Aristotle, i.e. for someone who presupposes real knowledge only as knowledge of the universal (the abstract), to an aporia, a problem which is at least in appearance insoluble. "If the ideas (universal concepts) are denied as coinciding with the singular data, only singular data remain, and in a confusing multitude. How could knowledge, which produces nothing more than a confusing multiplicity, still be knowledge? We only really know something in so far as it is one and the same and general (...).

H.O. 18.

Thought content would not be there in that case, but substance derived from perception. But that is not "knowledge," unless one labels observation as "knowledge." (*Aristotle, Metaph.* 3:4,1 and 4).

One sees it: "All true science is directed towards the general (which is identical in a multiplicity). The singular 'ousia' ('substance', independent being) is, however, not something general, but rather a 'tode ti', something that is this here and now, and separate. (*Aristotle, Metaph.* 9:2,20).

Behold the aporia, the difficulty, facing the Aristotle attuned to universally valid knowing. Protagoras or Hippias (H.O. 2) reproached the universal concepts with 'vagueness', Aristotle reproached the singular data, which they defended as 'clear knowledge' (precise speaking), with a confusing multiplicity without unity, i.e. general lines, which create order.

Eduard Zeller (1814/1908), the historian, reproaches Aristotle, here, in response to this aporia, with "the basic contradiction of his system." Yet *O. Willmann, Abriss der Philosophie*, (Outline of philosophy,), Wien, 1959-5, 402, believes that Aristotle does have a solution: "The universal content of thought sought by science is situated in the singular man, namely, as a species concept."

In other words: through the common characteristics (H.O. 11), the singular man is part-identical (analogous) to his peers.- Aristotle cites, even, a humorous example: someone was called by his neighbors 'Anthropos', 'Man', -- meaning that 'man' here was proper name. Yet they gave him an adjective: 'Man, the victor of Olumpia'. Here the general concept is little distinguishable from the singular 'concept' (term, which only the Romantics tolerate), yet not totally-identical with it (*Cfr. Aristotle, Eth. Nicomach.* 7: 4).

Says Aristotle : "The sense of sight (perception) shows us a singular color. But, hand in hand with it, it also shows us the color without more. The linguist examines one singular a. - letter, which is nevertheless at the same time a without more". (*Aristotle Metaph.* 13:10,12).

In other words: the process of abstraction is simultaneous with perception. Cfr. H.O. 9/10. Incidentally, the term eidos (H.O. 11) can be used both singular and universal, in Aristotelian language: the singular is the universal in a singularized form of being (eidos). The gap, which the nominalists think between singular and universal, is, in the Aristotelian analogy system, not absolute, but relative.

H.O. 19.

That Aristotelian thinking does not minimize the individual, in the human being, is shown, among other things, by his triad of analytics/ dialectics/ rhetoric.

1. The Analytic, i.e. the core of its logic, seeks to establish the ground rules of the apodictic, scientific type of knowledge (See H.O. 13v.). Knowledge, which reveals the universal in the data of observation (theoria; H.O. 9) and this in a verified, irrefutable way, -- thus valid for all people, however individually different and mutually independent. rapport, universal dialogue is possible here.

2. Dialectics is talking about non-apodictically proven, adversarial knowledge (similar to Protagoras' eristics),--where the individual, with his individual preference, already plays a role. Yet here is still science at work.

3. Rhetoric speaks of the mainly pathetic opinions based on the individual or collective sense of value, comparable to Protagoras' pragmatic axiology (H.O. 3v.). Here too, as in Dialectics, the differences and gaps between people show up, especially between individuals, so emphasized by the Sophists. But, with Aristotle, analogy prevails: however different and contrary, people communicate within a strong common set of data.

2. Aristotelian realism. (19/26)

The Aristotelian 'sunolon' or singular-concrete fact is structured differently from the Sophist one (H.O. 19; see also 9), which involved thinking the gap between word and thing together. With Aristotle, viz., 'sunolon', the whole, consisting of more than one part, aspect, means the unity of matter and creature form.

Here, too, Aristotle corrects his teacher Platon.-- For Platon, the substance was "mè on," that which is not really being (since "being," in the real sense, means the idea, in the higher world of thought); it was also "apeiron," the void, which can take all forms.

For Aristotle, matter is that which is "dunamei on," the real being in disposition. Also, matter is forbearance, which seeks a creature form. -- It is told that when asked by Alexander the Great from where Aristotle derived his knowledge, he replied, "From things, which do not lie." In this he expresses his realism.

H.O. 20.

The four-factor theory.

It was not only his teacher Platon who tried to improve Aristotle, -- faithful to his method, starting from the opinions of his predecessors and contemporaries, in order to reestablish them, to actualize them, in his own personal way. One of its great advantages is that Aristotle builds up, in this way, a position on the question - called "status quaestionis" by the Scholastics - before taking a position on it. He has tried to summarize the whole of his predecessors - reinterpreting them - in the thesis of the four 'aitia'; 'aitiai', -- term, which, often, is represented by 'four causes'.

If 'cause' names the individually necessary and collectively sufficient reasons (grounds; H.O. 14v.) at once, then, instead of 'four causes', one should say four factors (reasons, grounds even 'hypotheses' (H.O. 15)). This, to make the jargon ready.

(1) *The substance or matter factor.*

As *O. Willmann, Abriss d. Phil.*, 338ff., explains, this factor originated with the Paleomilesians (Thales, Anaximandros and Anaximenes of Miletos), usually referred to by Aristotle as *fusikoi fusiologoi*, *Physici* (Physiologi), thinkers of nature. These started from one dominant factor, namely, the *smijge* or fluidic matter, also called primordial matter. One remembers the 'archè' principium, (primeval) principle, of which they spoke. Principle, which, in ever changing interpretations, all Greek thinkers actualized.

With Aristotle it is reduced to a very meager substance of beings. One does not forget that 'form' in his language, includes geometrical form (H.O. 12). Well, the latter refers directly to matter.

(2) *The form also being form.*

See above H.O. 11v.-- This stems, of course, both from the Paleopythagoreans, who before that spoke of 'arithmos' structure (harmony) -- to translate by 'number' is to absolutely misunderstand -- and from Socrates and Platon (understanding, idea).

(3) *The goal.*

To fully understand a 'sunolon' concretum, singular-concrete being, requires, certainly for Aristotelian teleological thought, an accurate view of purposiveness (H.O. 17). Although all the predecessors, in one way or another, assumed purposiveness (except Demokritos of Abdera (-460/-370), the Atomist (Atomician), yet Aristotle cherished a very special reverence, intellectually, for the very scientifically inclined Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428).

H.O. 21

By advancing the hypothesis (ful. reason) that the movement (change, coming into being and going out of existence) and the sense of purpose, which is clearly expressed in it, in the cosmic processes, the biological ones in the first place, is due to a common sense, "nous", intellectus, Anaxagoras gave, according to Platon, a new twist to the idea of "teleology" (sense of purpose). Aristotle expressed this even more starkly: by putting a Universe Mind first, Anaxagoras, in the midst of the first thinkers, behaved "like a sober one in the midst of drunks" (*W. Jaeger, A la Naiss. d. l. théol. , 175*).

A later Milezian, Diogenes of Apollonia (tss. -500 and -400), identifies the Universe Soul ("Air") with the Universe Mind.

(4) *The movement principle*

As already mentioned above (H.O. 17: process; gen(n)etic thinking), there is a fourth point of view, which, with Aristotle, connects.

(i) with Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465), for whom all being obeyed an ordered, continuous movement (with the reversal into the opposite or the so-called harmony of opposites), called 'logos' or 'universe-spirit' and with the just-mentioned Demokritos of Abdera, with Leukippos of Miletos, the founder of the thinking of what is, in terms of mechanically moved 'atoma', indivisible particles.

Appl. models.

These four aspects of being (explanatory hypotheses) remain unclear, until one sees Aristotle at work, in his analyses.

(1) *The artificialist model.*

One did reproach Aristotle once; but now see what it comes down to.

1. In the soul of the builder, or construction worker (still strong in one, at that time) - according to Aristotle - is the capacity (dunamis, potentia) to build e.g. a house. This is actualized (energeia, actus) as soon as he begins the praxis, in this case: the professional work (hence the term 'artificialism').

2. In the same soul, with the disposition (ability), the eidos (form of being, H.O. 11v.) e.g. of a house to be built is present, even before the execution is started. This includes logos, intellectus, mind, which designs and works purposefully. One could call it with A. Fouillée (1838/1912) an idee-force, a power idea.

H.O. 22

3. By acting on the building materials (the matter factor), the builder/engineer 'objectifies' (to use a modern term), causes, the result, the form of being brought about in matter (in this case: the house).

(2) *The biological-medical model.*

All that is alive plays a decisive role in Antique thought; so does - and emphatically so - Aristotle.

(1) In the soul of the physician lies, latent, the possibility of restoring the balance disturbed by disease. - Here we meet *Aristotle's* steering scheme of thought, more clearly for that matter, than in the artificialist scheme. In his *Polit.* 5:5, where he speaks of constitutions, which deviate (par.ek.basis, deviation) from the correct type (telos, goal), he expresses himself in terms of either 'ep.an.orthosis' (correctio, correction, improvement) or 'rhuthmosis' resumption of the correct rhythm (a term borrowed from the art of dance).

Well, the physician, starting from the correct form of being (eidos), which is and remains the goal (telus), notwithstanding all possible deviations (par.ek.baseis), commits 'rhuthmosis' (epanorhtosis), recovery.

It should be noted that this scheme (rule / deviation / rule restoration), in updated form, has been re-established since Norbert Wiener (1894/1964), the founder of today's cybernetics.

(2) The possibility, in the soul of the physician, becomes patent, as soon as he realizes the eidos (essence form) of and disease (deviation) and health making process, through his treatment.-- Thus he objectifies, analogous to the builder/constructor, but on a higher level of being (the biological), his idea of power (idée-force, in Fouillée's language).

(3) *The humane model.*

We have already touched upon it in passing (H.O. 17). Aristotle thinks, very explicitly, genesis (one pays attention to the difference 'genetic/ genesic' although both are related).

P. van Schilfgaarde, Aristotle, The Hague, 1965, 10v., mentions the high probability that Aristotle, if only through his intimate contact with the Macedonian princes, knew the mysteries of Samothrake (the kabeiroi, the cabiri). well, as in all the mysteries, about which we know, the sexual life is central. Reread, now, H.O. 17.

H.O. 23.

"(The Kabeiroi, Cabiri, the Kabires) are chthonic (i.e. subterranean) deities of fertility, worshipped with phallic rites. They are related to Demeter and Dionusos. But, also, they protected sailors. Samothrake was also an asylum (i.e. refuge devoted to the Kabires): (P. v. Schilfgaarde, o.c.,11).

(3).1. *The reproductive model.*

(i) The biological process of procreation, birth, growth and aging - one of the infinitely many applicative models of origination (genesis, fuisis) and decay (fthora), which affected the Greeks - and especially already the Paleomiles - is, with Aristotle, central. The seed and germination model (H.O. 17) was, incidentally, already mentioned. All that lives -- plant, animal, man -- exists, to begin with, in the seed (germ), viz. dunamei, in potentia, in disposition (potential, virtual),-- as, for the moment, nothing more than disposition.

As soon as the universe process involves that seed / that germ in the cycle of creation and decay (up and down), the disposition becomes energeia, actus, actualized disposition. The latent form of being (eidos) becomes patent.

One sees the proportional analogy (H.O. 15): seed/germinal state relates to mature state, as dunamis (potency) to energeia (act).

The seed maturity relation is one applicative model of the one regulative model 'potentiality/ act' This scheme will, by the way, dominate the whole Scholasticism, from the discovery of Aristotle's works.

Note.-- The energeia, the full realization state of the creature form, is, with Aristotle, also called en.tel.echeia, entelechy, literally: end.goal.state. Organicism, Aristotelianism proper, makes every process (kinesis, motus, movement) be described in terms of potentiality / act,

Add, to this, of course, what we just said about the cybernetic structure, inherent to the potentiality/actual scheme (H.O. 22). The telos, finis, purpose, plays, always, along in the process, inherent as it is to the eidos, the being-form. The essence form - so we said - is an idée-force.

(ii) Applied to human reproduction, this gives the following statement by Aristotle: to sperm echei dunamei to eidos (the sperm contains, potentially, the eidos).-- In the line of the Paleomilesians, Aristotle would also say: what is reproduced is a fuisis, nature, nature, which, once the fertilized ovum becomes mature, becomes patent. 'Nature' - in the eidetic sense, that is - is 'homo.eidès', of the same creature form (literally), identifiable, therefore, with eidos (creature form).

H.O. 24.

(3).2. The reasoning model.

The gen(n)esic or, also, generative model is, likewise, applicable to syllogistics,-- however surprising this may be. *P.v. Schilfgaard, Aristotle, 71/76 (The Closing Speech)* expounds on this.

(1) The diagram.

$B = A$; well, $C = B$; so $C = A$. So much for the regulatory model.

Appl. model (for clarification): "All true goddesses are beautiful. Well, Iris is such a real goddess. So Iris is beautiful! The middle term B (real goddess) connects the major A (beautiful) with the minor C (Iris),-- according to v. Schilfgaard. The major includes (as a larger range) the minor (application).

(2) The generative explanation.

"Aristotle calls the middle term - here: true goddess - 'aition', the ground. With the ground or 'cause' (H.O. 20) science begins. Just as, in mating, the male seed, so the 'cause' (aition) brings forth. In the syllogism is operative the living and counting: one may compare it with a living, creating pedigree" (P. v. Schilfg., o.c.,75). Very certainly, in our eyes sought after, far-fetched! But, whoever wants to understand Aristotelianism, should identify himself with his thinking,-- to empathize with it (verstehende method).

The dual aristotelian realism.

We can, only now, answer the question, H.O. 19 raised.

O. Willmann, Abriss, 400, notes a twofold "realism" (H.O. 8).

a.-- Phenomenalism (H.O. 4) volatilizes the data of our experience into representations ("representationism") of a subject. Aristotelian realism -- grown out of things, which do not lie (H.O. 19) -- gives full justice to the real data (H.O. 16) both in their singularity (see his critique of Platonism) and in their structure. This is represented by the term 'hylemorphism' (substance-form thinking).

b.-- Nominalism (H.O. 2) conceives of the four factors (H.O. 20) as mere means of thought, still just good enough to vaguely "indicate" things (denotative: H.O. 1/2). For any Aristotelian, worthy of the name, the four factors are real aspects in things.

H.O. 25.

Transhylemorphic realism.

H.O. 5/7 we saw how phenomenalist nominalism treated both the transcendent soul and the transcendent deity with agnosticism. How does it stand, on that dual point, with Aristotle? All in all not that much better.

The soul.

H.O. 21, 22, we saw how Aristotle situates in the soul (of the craftsman, of the physician e.g.) the beginning of the process, in which the understanding (eidos) present in the soul and preceding the process plays the leading part. -- But of what nature exactly is that soul itself?

P. v. Schilfgaard, Aristotle, 123/133 (The Soul), expresses the problem as follows: "life, in a strict sense, shows itself in three realms: in plants, animals, men.-- In the middle, that is, in the animals, life has its clearest form: in man it reaches its completion or entelechy. That which lies before it -- inorganic or mineral nature -- strives for life. That which lies beyond is the divine life, the perfect energeia.

Man moves, again as a middle, between animal and deity. in himself are, therefore, again three realms to be distinguished: life, soul, spirit.

- (i) His "life" connects him to the animals.
- (ii) In his "soul" man finds his clearest form.
- (iii) His "spirit" connects him to Godhead.

In sum, his soul is, therefore, (i) without his "life" barren or dead, (ii) without his "spirit" powerless.

One does not delude oneself : "A separate existence (thus also immortality) of the soul is rejected by Aristotle, in contrast to Platon". (o.c.,125). In other words: the soul, even of man, is purely an animating principle of the body, which is decisive.

Only what later Aristotle expounders, rightly, called "nous pathètikos," intellectus agens, the abstracting mind (H.O. 9/10) - calling it "mind," in v. Schilfgaard's parlance - is "separate," i.e. independent of matter (transhylemorphic).

This "spirit" is (i) collectively owned by all people and (ii) is not deity,--as Averroës of Cordoba (1126/1198) saw it.

Deity.

Equally transhylemorphic is what Aristotle calls 'god' : "It is incongruous (H.O. 14) that motion (*op.*: in itself) should arise or perish (H.O. 23): it is always (*op.*: eternal): Thus Aristotle.

H.O. 26.

On that natural philosophical fact rests his hypothesis (H.O. 15): the sufficient reason (explanation). Such a, actuality, such a movement founding (we do not say "creating," for the Biblical concept of creation Aristotle, of course, does not know) "explains" the processes omnipresent in the Fisis, Nature (process philosophy).

Himself, however, the first principle (*primum principium*) -- this is how Aristotle calls his 'deity'-- cannot be situated within those processes. "One cannot, therefore, escape putting an eternally active, yet self unmoved being first! Thus Aristotle himself.

The Aristotelian interpreters found a truly Aristotelian name for it, which gained fame : "the unmoved mover".

Note -- One compares this deity hypothesis with what we said H.O. 17 (Not the seed (understand: process) is first; rather that which makes the seed (process) available). The seed too had an explanation (a necessary and sufficient hypothesis), viz. the one who possesses it.

So also the whole world- and universe-process, of which the seed (partial process) is but one applicative model: also the whole as such (of processes) needs a total explanation, -- in order to be comprehensible (H.O. 15). -- Precisely because of that total explanation(s) Aristotle calls his predecessor - also natural philosopher - Anaxagoras (H.O. 21) "the only sober one among drunks": Aristotle too puts the 'working' (influence, founding power) of his Universal Mind -- not in the causing, but -- in the purpose-directing working, i.e.: just like the world-spirit of Anaxagoras, that of Aristotle is a steering-teleological 'being'. Not a creator, in the causative sense.

It is therefore difficult to understand how, after centuries of Patristicism, the Middle Ages clergy suddenly take such a high view of the *actus purus*, the Unmoved Mover, which differs greatly from the Biblical and Patristic deity. It is true that this Unmoved Mover fits into the Natural Philosophical Realism, which the Scholastics held,--just like Aristotle.

H.O. 27.

I. A. (III). -- *The concept-realist-idealist ontology.*

P. Foulquié, *L'existentialisme*, Paris, 1951-2 (*L'essentialisme théologique*), says that Platon of Athens (-427/-347) and, especially S. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430) are the two great representatives of conceptual realism, in its ideative form.

Foulquié says that the form of being, ideatively understood, is either "quelque chose de divin" (something divine) or "Dieu lui-même" (God himself). This, if correctly understood, is true. But it is not so simple now either.

Which is, now, the truth core of Foulquié 's thesis? None other than *M. Eliade, The myth of the eternal return*, Hilversum, 1964, 12, introduces us to this:

"When one considers the general behavior of archaic man, one is struck by the fact that:

- (1) the objects of the "outer world" do not possess a self-contained, inner value,
- (2) Nor, for that matter, if human actions, in their proper sense, have such value.

(1) an object, (2) an action acquire a value - and, precisely because of this, become 'real' because they, in some way, participate in a reality, which transcends (*op.*: transcends) them."

Steller provides an appl. model.

1. Among a neutral multitude of possible stones to choose and venerate, e.g., precisely this particular stone becomes 'sacred' and, at once, is "completely imbued with his" (o.c., *ibid.*), in that it possesses 'mana' (understand: extra- or supernatural power), - 'mana' attached, e.g., to its well-defined, 'conspicuous' form (geometrically understood), to the fact that it recalls a mythical event and so on.

2. Eating and drinking, for example, is, of course, first of all, as for us moderns, also for the archaic man a "natural", unobtrusive routine. But the primitive or ancient man, who still thinks archaically, eats and drinks according to a higher model, which is described, for example, in a myth of the ancestors. By imitating the ancestor, he takes part in his eating and drinking ritual. Therefore, his eating and drinking is an act that makes a higher, more 'real' reality visibly present.

The merely 'profane' feeding of oneself becomes 'mana', 'higher reality' - in short: 'reality' - is there when an archetype, an extra- and/or supernatural model, is made visible today. We know that this term 'arche.tupos' is also used by Platon.

H.O. 28.

A little further on, o.c.,38, Eliade says: "One could say (...) that this 'primitive' ontology has a Platonic structure. Platon could, in that case, be regarded as the philosopher par excellence of the 'primitive' attitude of mind; -- i.e. as the thinker, who succeeded in giving a philosophical account of the modes of existence and behavior of archaic mankind.

Of course, this does not detract from the 'originality' of his philosophical genius; for the great merit of Platon remains in his attempt to justify theoretically this vision of archaic humanity,--this, using the dialectical means, which the spirituality of his time made available to him."

Note.-- Higher (H.O 22) we saw that Aristotle, most probably thanks to his contact with the Macedonian family of princes, knew the genetic doctrine of the Kabires. In any case: his philosophy is not conceivable without something of that nature,--which v. Schilfgaard righty pointed out.

Are we listening to a connoisseur of world renown like Eliade. "The rites of marriage, too, possess a divine archetype: human marriage is the image (*note*: again, a typically Platonic term) of the divine marriage,--especially of the union of 'heaven' and 'earth' (...).

1. Dido celebrates her marriage to Aeneas in the midst of a violent storm (Virgil (-70/-19), Aeneid (-30/-19) 4:160): their unification coincides with that of the elements.

2. In Greece, the marriage rites mimicked the example of Zeus as he united, in secret, with Hera (Pausanias (+/- +150) 2:36, 2).

3. Diodoros of Sicily (-90/-20) 5:72, 4, assures us that hierogamy (*op.*: sacred lived marriage) was imitated by the inhabitants of the island.

In other words: the ceremonial sexual union found its justification there in a primal - event, which had taken place "in that time" (*note*: "in illo tempore").

It is important to bring to light the cosmogonic (*note* : concerning the origin of the universe) structure of all these marriage rites: here it is not only a matter of imitating a pre-image, namely the hierogamy between 'Heaven' and 'Earth'; above all (it is about the result of this hierogamy, namely the creation of the cosmos" (O.c., 26/29).

H.O. 29.

One sees, now, what truth core Foulquié's assertion regarding "theological" (understand: among other things, "sacredly" justifiable) essentialism.

Platonic "forms of being".

H. von Glasenapp, The non-Christian religions, Antw./Utrecht, 1967, 225, mentions : "Very remarkable is a kind of platonic idea, which, among the Eskimos (as well as among many Indians, Samoyeds and Finns) is found: every living being, yes, even every object possesses a superterrestrial shadow, an incorporeal image"

M. Eliade, o.c.,16, confirms this : "Thus, the world, which surrounds us (...) - the mountains, which man climbs, the populated and cultivated lands, the navigable streams, the cities, the sanctuaries - has an extraterrestrial archetype, which is either conceived as a 'ground plan', as a 'form' - or is seen as a 'double' without more, standing alone on a higher, cosmic plane"

So much for the world, as far as man has ordered it, against savage, disorderly "archetypes," representing disorder ("chaos").

With this we stand before the immediate archaic precursors of the higher Platonic ideas or forms of being.

Platon and the myths.

E. De Strycker, S.J., Concise History of Antique Philosophy, Antw., 1967, 91, writes that Platon was aware of radical impoverishment when he converted his religious experience of ideation into rational language.

(1) He tried to counteract this impoverishment by dramatization, i.e. in dialogues representatives of points of view, as living ideas, appear.

(2) "A second means (...) is to engage 'myths'" (O.c.,91). Thus the myth of the soul-span, of beholding the upper heavenly landscape (see what just Eliade said, on this),-- in the dialogue *Faidros*; similarly the myth of the cavemen (State 7); similarly the end-time myths (eschatology) (*Gorgias, Faidon, State 10*).

Even in this second method of teaching, Platon betrays that he was not without adherence to the emerging one-sided rationalism (Xenophanes of Colophon (-580/-490),-- the Eleates (Parmenides, - especially Zenon),-- also and not in the least Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465), the "dialectician"),-- up to and including Protosofistics (H.O. 1vv.: Protagoras)).

H.O. 30.

Says Eliade, o.c., 16: "Platon's ideal state also has its heavenly archetype (*State* 592 b; // 500 e). The Platonic forms are not astral in nature, but their mythical sphere is, nevertheless, on the supernatural plane (*Faidros* 247; 250).

Explanation: 'astral' can either mean 'high level of rarefied, fine, primordial materiality' (H.O. 20: smug, fluidic kind of matter) or, especially in Platonic and Post-Platonic thought climates, 'astro.theological' (Platon, through his reflections on the deities (and its workings in the cosmos), which he situated in the 'astra', stellae, stars (= celestial bodies), instituted a new religion, which found very many adherents in Late Antiquity).

Given the context, the meaning, which Eliade means, must be "highly subtle" ("subtle" is the same as primal, in Church parlance).

As an aside, the Paleopythagoreans (-550/-300) thought their 'arithmoi' (H.O. 20), their tone structures (souls, too), finely materialized (see Second Year course). They were, therefore, still much closer to archaic humanity.

Theology.

1. Foulquié speaks of 'theological' essentialism. Rightly so: the primitive (more precisely: the archaic) 'theology' (1/ *theologia muthike*, mythical theology (*theologia fabulosa*), 2/ as well as its 'official' variant, within archaic cultures, '*theologia politikè*', *theologia civilis*, 'political theology' (but without the leftist ideology, which that term, in recent years, received, of course)), as expounded above, especially on the basis of Eliade, is essentially a precursor of Platonism.

2. But Foulquié means, above all, the now established, since Greek antiquity prevailing "divinity" (to put it in Dutch).

"The terms "theologos, *theologia*, *theologein*, *theologikos*" were formed in the philosophical language of Platon and Aristotle. Platon was the first to use the word "theology" (*theologia*), knowledge of God. Of course, he was, at once, the inventor of the term "theology. In *The State* he introduces the term (...). (W. Jaeger, *A la naiss. d. I, theology*, Paris, 1966, 10s.).

In other words, a certain terminology has already been introduced, only by the founder par excellence of the ideative theory of concepts, which makes it clear that Foulquié (again) is right. To which we shall return later, when we try to define the strictly theological aspect of ideative philosophy.

HO. 31.

Primitivology.

1. - H. v. Glasenapp, o.c., 216, says that the Stoic Poseidonios of Apameia (-135/-50), whose works are virtually all lost, analyzed the nature of primitive peoples in broader context.

2. O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 696, says the following in this regard:

(1) already Platon and Aristotle pointed the way to the analysis of primordial traditions, common to all peoples;

(2) the Stoics (since their founder Zenon of Kition (-336/-264)), on the basis of the idea of "world citizenship" (cosmopolitan thinking), continue this, in their very religious way;

(3) The later Platonists of the type Ploutarchos of Chaironeia (+45/+125), who was a priest at Delfoi (Delphi), continued, likewise, those analyses.

Note.-- O. Willmann, o.c., 593f., says that Ploutarchos, again, began to realize that Pythagoreanism and Platonism were related (H.O. 20): both Paleopythagoreanism and Platonism are universally instituted.

They looked beyond the narrow Hellenic world, also, with regard, to other cultures, which, of course, in their eyes, rationally speaking, were 'backward' ('Barbaroi'). The Macedonian and, later, the Roman Empire, with their mixing, on a large scale, of 'barbarian' peoples, religions, mores, etc., broadened the view of later thinkers. People took ideas from them and, conversely, "barbarians" studied Greek wisdom (Egyptians, Jews, Syrians, Romans, Etruscans, etc.). A "commons of religious-philosophical insights" grew (O.Willmann, *ibid.*).

Three notable types of these were, over time,

(i) the Jewish-Hellenistic mysticism of Philon the Jew (-25/-50), already on the way to Theosophy (see below),

(ii) Roman social science philosophy (O. Willmann, o.c., 629/651 (*Römische Theologie und Philosophie*),

(iii) The Neoplatonic theosophies (from Ammonios Sakkas (+175/+242), the teacher of Plotinos of Lukopolis (203/269), the top figure of Neoplatonic-theosophical metaphysics, among others, of Origenes of Alexandria (+254), the first Christian thinker of great stature.

Decision.

Anything but Poseidonios, the great man of primitivology, Paleopythagoreanism, already, took "foreign" cultures to heart; it founded a very long tradition, which included Platon, the object of these pages. The Pythagorean-Platonic ideas served as the basis of the ecumenical idea, i.e. the Mediterranean cultures.

H.O. 32.

The platonic ontology.

W. Brugger S.J., hrsg., *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Freiburg, 1961-8, 415, labels Aristotelianism as immanent idealism: it situates Platonic ideas in the processes of nature. We have tried, as correctly as possible, to describe this.

Platonism, however, labels, there, o.c., 414, as transcendent idealism: this type of thought, after all, situates ideas above (sic: 'über')

The processes of nature

Our thesis will improve on this, somewhat: the Platonic ideas situate themselves, at least essentially, like the Aristotelian forms of being ('forms'), in the phenomena of nature. The opposition 'in / above' is too simplifying.

(a).-- *The ideational link.*

We already saw it: center of Platonic theory of understanding is "the noble yoke" (kalon zugon), literally: the beautiful and solid means of connecting two extremes of an interval (intermediate space).

Knowing and the known are connected according to the law of similia similibus, the equal through the equal, mutually modeled (cfr. H.O. 8v.).

With Aristotle this was the same, but purely abstract (H.O. 12).

The Late Antique Neoplatonic Theosophists (+200/+525), with Plotinos at their head, had one great concern: to overcome the so-called contradiction -- which they felt was very real --,-- to such an extent, even, that O. Willmann, o.c., 690f., writes:

"One could even argue that they deserve both the name 'neo-aristotics' and the name 'neo-platonics' with which they are usually labeled (Cfr. *E. Erdmann, Outline of the history of philosophy.*, I: 126)."

In other words: within the Neoplatonic synthesis (comprehensive system of thought), the Neoplatonic theosophists also included a natural philosopher like Aristotle, as an integrating component. This means that purebred Platonists have nothing against learning "from things, which do not lie" (H.O. 19.24) - the watchword of Aristotelian secularizing (earth-centered) realism.

In other words, Aristotle is a one-sided designation of Platonism. Since Platon, like Aristotle (H.O. 20), drew up a serious problem-stand (problem description), before thinking himself, we have considered it natural, in rein Platonic spirit (not according to the merely historical Platon), to sketch first the abstractionism of the pupil, as a part of Platonism.

H.O. 33.

By way of introduction.

1. Whitehead (1861/1947), the famous mathematical philosopher, once said that "all Western philosophy was one set of footnotes on Platon." Perhaps *Russell* (1872/1970), with whom *Whitehead* wrote *Principia mathematica* (1910/1913), influenced that statement:

"Until about my fortieth year, I tasted the satisfaction which Platon says mathematics can provide: it was an eternal, timeless world,--a world with the possibility of a certain perfection. From this I received, no doubt, something analogous to religious satisfaction". Thus *Russell*, for the BBC, answered the question of whether mathematical and/or philosophical pursuits had provided him, *Russell*, with a kind of substitute for religious feeling (*R. Beerling, Bertrand Russell, in R. Beerling et al, R. Eucken, H. Bergson, B. Russell (Philosophical Writings)*, Hasselt, 1963,292).

2. *Einstein* (1879/1955), the father of the atomic bomb, claimed that "all physicality was metaphysical") -- so much in the sense of Aristotle, incidentally (nature as something divine; H.O. 25v.), he said, once: "If there is such a thing as a religious feeling, in me, it is the unlimited admiration for the structure of the universe, as our science reveals it to us." (*M. Paty, A.Einstein, in: D. Huisman, ed., Dict. d. phil., Paris, 1984, 836*). - We will see - a little further - how Platonic this statement can be interpreted, i.e. H.O. 53; the beautiful as that which inspires admiration.

3. *L. Cohen, Third World Epistemology*, in: *G. Curry/A. Musgrave, ed., Popper and the Human Sciences*, Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster, 1985, mentions that *K. Popper* (1902/1994) the infamous epistemologist, divides reality into three 'worlds':

(1) the physical world, (2) the world of states of consciousness, and (3) "the third world of objective knowledge" (o.c.,2).

He compares, by way of explanation, of course - *Popper* is no real Platonist, - his "third world" with Platon's "theory of forms," among other things.

So far, by way of introduction, three-four thinkers who either explicitly mention Platon or express something Platonic. Although enormously criticized, Platon remains, until the full twentieth century, to have exposed something irreplaceable,--which one would never attribute to his pupil, Aristotle, for example. What, now, is that typically Platonic?

H.O. 34.

(a).1. Brief outline of the ideational relationship. (34/37)

We rely on the Seventh Letter.-- This letter, although not directly from Platon's hand, nevertheless - according to those in the know, today - reflects Platon's teaching very accurately. *Platon, Der Siebente Brief an die Verwandten und Freunde des Dion zu Syrakus*, Verlag G.H. Calw, 1948, 36ff., describes the ideative act as follows.

First, the text summarizes: "Every given fact exhibits, to begin with, three points of view, thanks to which - by virtue of an eternal order of the universe - its complete, spiritual knowledge is gradually brought about.-- the fourth is that complete, spiritual knowledge itself. As the fifth, its object is to be put first: it allows itself, after all, only to be known thanks to the depth of the mind and it is the true archetype ('primal image') of the given. The first of the aforementioned points of view is the designation ('name'), -- the second the - in some language expressed - conceptualization (definition). -- the third point of view is the applicative model ('image'), which is perceptible by the senses of the body.-- the fourth is, as stated above, the full spiritual knowledge: --

So much for the structure, peculiar to the genesis (H.O. 17: gen(n)etic) of the full-fledged knowledge of mind, called 'ideation'.

Then Platon elaborates an applicative model of full-fledged mental knowledge,-- appl. mod., which "models" all possible applications. What the text says of what is round (circle, circuit, circle), that is equally applicable to "a rectilinear geometrical figure and drawing", "the understanding of the good (value), as well as of the beautiful (*opm.*: on that further) and the lawful", "all that possesses body, whether artificially or naturally arising", "fire, water and all such elements", "every creature from the general animal world", "every individual realization of the human soul", "all causes and effects" (o.c.,37).

The ideation of what is 'round.

1. " 'circular object' "

(circle, circle,-- 'kuklos'), e.g., is a fact which - distinguishable from all other data - carries that very name" - 'names' had, in archaic-antique cultures, a very great importance: one thinks of the prohibition of naming, in the *Old Testament* e.g.. The 'name' (designation, -- was, to begin with, a magical value: with someone's name one could, after all, know his essence(s) - at least on a purely occult level. The magician(s) took care to always possess a completely secret name.

H.O. 35.

Note.- The 1.Herakliteans (H.O. 21) had developed a 'method' starting from the use of language to penetrate to the true being, viz. the etymological one. 'Etumos' means, viz, said of a linguistic phenomenon (a message, a rumor, a term), 'true', real. Etumologia', veriloquium, means original and, therefore, truthful sense of a linguistic fact!

The Herakliteans claimed, therefore, that it sufficed to take the 'etumon', the essence, of a term as a starting point,--this, in order to get straight to the essence of the matter itself (H.O. 2) (H.O. 9: theoria).

The premise (axiom) was: every thing possesses, within human language, a name, which belongs to it, by nature. That name, now, is the original or primordial word, which 'the ancients' (the ancestors, the first people), who were closer to the deities and, at once, had a more profound insight than later humanity, had given to the thing. unfortunately: in the course of human history (cultural-historical pessimism), that primordial word has been distorted again and again.

2. - Platon's analysis.

A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 63, says in this regard as follows.

Platon addresses this etymological problem in the *Kratulos* (titled after a student of Herakleitos).

(1) That earlier humanity would have consisted only of "wise men," who were, all of them, close to the deities, seems suspect to Platen.

(2) Even if that hypothesis (H.O. 15) turned out to be completely correct, it still depends on the full-fledged knowledge of being, which was laid down in the primal words: the 'ancients' could not give the right name without first having real knowledge of the given itself. From existing names, after all, could, impossibly, the first name givers / name givers not involve their / her knowledge.

(3) Supposing - purely hypothetically - that the first naming arose directly by divine illumination (inspiration e.g.),--how then to explain that the same words designate non-the same (H.O. 14) things? Some, after all, among the thinkers of Hellas, say that the essence of things is incessant motion (H.O. 21: *Herakleitos*); others that it is pure immobility ('stasis') (Parmenides of Elea (-540/...)).

H.O. 36.

Decision.-- Platon applies, here, the indirect method:

(a) lemma (the hypothesis proposed by the Herakliteans:

(b) analysis (the falsifications, refutations).

2. Orphanage provision.

"The second point of view concerning what is round would be the linguistically expressed concept definition. This consists of nouns and sayings (verbal part). Applied here :"(Is round) that which, starting from its extremities (lines), is everywhere equally far from a central point". Thus approximately, a definition of being could be articulated, which represents what is round (round, circle, circle(loop)), as a name (O.c.,36).

Note.-- It is clear that Platon here applies - somewhat - the nominalist method (H.O. 1: denotative approach) : he begins with two linguistic approaches.

3. Applique model ("image").

"The third point of view is the embodied applicative model ('image'). Such a thing is within the reach of our external senses. E.g. A round line, depicted by a draughtsman/drawing lady or an (art) turner.-- Unfortunately: such a thing is susceptible to (idle) weakening or (active) destruction. To such fates -- perishing into nothingness, being destroyed -- the regulative model (archetype, archetype or idea) "what is round" - - that with which all 'masters' are committed -- is not subject. The regulatory model, after all, is something else; it differs from it altogether".

Note.-- One sees that Platon, here, once again employs the nominalistic method, as a method of approach (H.O. 2: instead of the beautiful (reg. mod.) Hippias gives a beautiful girl (applic. mod.) as an approach). - Topical: contemplative teaching!

4. Scientific Insight.

Platon typifies the full degree of ability as follows; "The fourth point of view is (1) scientific knowledge, (2) the process of grasping by the rationally thinking mind, (3) the objectively true representation of the subject (theme) presented. This act, in its entire coherence, should be regarded as a single act. This act, after all, does not exist (1) in external language sounds (name, definition), (2) nor in geometrical forms (*note*: H.O. 12), which are only susceptible to external perception. This act takes place within the soul (inner).-- Precisely because such scientific knowledge is situated within the soul, it differs, of course, from the three first points of view (name, linguistic definition,-- applicative model). It differs, however, equally from the regulative model (idea) "what is round" in itself.

H.O. 37.

However, among all these points of knowledge, the inner intellectual may, concerning kinship and likeness, is closest to the fifth point of view (the idea)." (o.c.,37).

In other words: in contrast to modern 'idealism' - one thinks e.g. of a R. Descartes (1526/1650) and what idealisms (up to and including that of J.G. Fichte (1762/1814) e.g.) originated from his way of thinking - 'interiority' with Platon is not identical with 'mediatatively conceived interiority': with Cartesian conceived idealists, interiority is 'mediatically conceived'.) sprang from his thinking - is 'inwardness', with Platon, not identical with 'mediatistically conceived inwardness': with the Cartesian conceived idealists, inwardness is, first of all, from the outside world closed subjective view; as *O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id*, I, 439, says, with Platon, the soul is directly (immediatistically) connected with the objectively existing, real outer world, namely, by the noble twosome ('xu.zeuxis'; H.O. 8; 32). In other words: by intentionality, i.e. the inner being directed towards objective reality (realism).

The 'catharsis' of nominalism.

H.O. 16 (also H.O. 22: Steering scheme of thought) already taught us the archaic-antique term 'purification' We take, here, the word 'catharsis', *lustratio* (purificatio), purification, in the sense, by *W.B. Kristensen, Collected contributions to knowledge of the ancient religions*, Amsterdam, 1947, 231/290 (*Circle and totality* (1938)), extensively, with historical evidence.

See here how, in the schema itself, the structure (arrangement), of the dialectical method, typical of true Platonism, reflects the conscious nominalism purge.

1 -- *The nominalist side.*

1.A. *the name (term;* H.O. 8);

1.B. *The nominal definition*

(different from the "real" definition, of course);

1.C. *The applicative model* (as a pictorial teaching).

2 -- *The conceptual realist side.*

2.a. *Subjective:*

the *theoria* (*speculatio*; *contemplatio*; H.O. 9;19), i.e., the thorough-going insight;

2.b. *objective:*

the idea itself.-- Behold the true scope of the five moments (viewpoints) of the "dialectical method," as Platon himself outlines them. The ideative moment is in the *theoria* of the idea, viz. points of view four and five.

H.O. 38.

(a).2. Brief outline of an updating of the dialectical method. (38/46)

Pre-emphasis.

The enumeration of 'all possible' applicative models, higher (H.O. 34: e.g. 'body', 'animal', 'individual human soul', clearly shows that there is at least an empirical, if not experimental substrate at the root of the 'dialectical' method.

Which *O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 441, explicitly affirms : "To the extent that the 'fainomena' (phenomenal data), i.e. the 'visible' things:

(1) are not merely flawed representations of the (obviously transcendent) ideas,
(2) yet these same (now, of course, immanent) ideas are present in the phenomena themselves and work themselves out in them, to the same extent the phenomenal data possess an essential truth content and, precisely because of this, cover an informational value - "message" one might also say, in communication language - for the human mind.

This informative value increases as our minds penetrate deeper into the phenomena.-
- This insight, incidentally, underlies the scheme of studies (in the *Polteia*). The student:

(1) contacts the sensory world-the phenomenal data.
(2) He seeks to feel at home, according to his soul, in the applicative models ('Abbilder') of what is clean, resp. good (value), as seen in the musical works of art.
(3) Then his soul - o.g. mathematics - goes through the turning (*peri.agogè*, *meta.strofè*) from what is given in this temporal world, to what is in the transcendental world.
(4) Finally, his soul - thanks to the actual 'dialectic' (*op.*: *idea-sight*) - rises to the level of noesis, ideation, itself."

So much for Willmann's text.

We will now actualize this o.g. *Willmann, Abriss*, 366, -- where this excellent Platonist attacks J. Locke (1632/1704), the founder of the Anglo-Saxon Enlightenment (Enlightenment), nominalist in the style of William of Ockham (1300/1350), the conceptualist. Locke claimed that a goldsmith knows better what gold is than the philosopher". -- We will now elaborate this better than Willmann's sketch.

The ideation of what gold is.

As outlined above (H.O. 37), we divide the dialectical method into its nominal and its conceptual real sides.

H.O. 39.

(A).1.-- *The linguistic side.*

(1).-- *The name 'gold'* -- By that name a Platonist(s) situates all that is gold', in the prevailing usage of language.

(2).-- *The description ("definition").*

Open a slightly elaborate dictionary - or, what is much better, a scientific study - and inquire into what 'one' (the prevailing language, the prevailing scientific understanding) describes as 'all that is gold'. In the Platonic dialogues, the chapter of (usually Socratic) definitions answers this. Here is what one finds, briefly, approximately, now.

a.-- 'All that is gold' is

(i) Metal,

(ii) yellow-colored, sparkling, very malleable (malleable), virtually unchanging, soluble among other things in mercury and the like;

(iii) having as its chemical symbol Au (from the Latin 'aurum'), having as its atomic number 79, having a well-defined mass and 18 known isotopes, having as its melting point 1,063° C. (internet. thermometr. norm) and as its boiling point around 9,600° C..

b.-- It goes without saying that a detailed scientific description will provide a great deal more information - platonic: idea, partial ideas.

(A).2.-- *The contemplative ('phenomenal') side.*

'All that is gold', in fact, is never together, in one enormous lump or mass e.g.. 'All that is gold' is apart, in a multitude of 'parts'. Whoever, therefore, shows one specimen of 'gold' - as a 'beholding' contact (teaching is only one aspect of it) - approaches "All that is gold", along precisely one part of the whole. Thereby, fundamentally, the nominalist remains - think of "A beautiful girl, - that is 'All that is beautiful' (H.O. 2;36)" - even if he multiplies the samples, stands. The actual, full induction or generalization he does not pursue. He is counting, as it were, on the fact that people will somehow 'complete' the rest,--in order to 'form' a 'representation' of 'all that is gold'.

One may compare with Aristotelian abstraction (H.O. 9v.). The abstraction runs into a true essence which tries to capture accurately the general form of being, -- of e.g. 'all that is gold'. Cfr. higher H.O. 10/12 (Ar. essentialism).

(B).-- *The ideational side.* (39/46)

To begin with, all that we said about Aristotelian abstraction applies equally to platonic ideation. to platonic ideation is to go beyond mere abstraction.

H.O. 40.

One difficult definition of idea.

1. *O. Willmann, G. d. Id*, I, 433, says that Xenokrates of Chalkedon, leader of the Academy, after Speusippos, from -338 to -314, defined the idea as follows: aitia, a factor, paradeigmatikè, which performs tone image function (i.e. exemplary or archetypical), ton kata fusin aei sun.estoton, concerning the data, which, o.g.v. their nature (fusus), always (aei) maintain their unity (i.e. constitute one single system (system) (in virtue of a nature given factor)). Shorter: that which, in the midst of a multitude of data, which (and in so far as they) show a coherence, ensures precisely that coherence, as its pre-given regulative model (paradeigma).

2. This implies that we are with the idea, in the system of analogy (partial identity data) - H.O. 12/16.

The grammatical analogy.

E.W. Beth, De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van Parmenides tot Bolzano, (The philosophy of mathematics from Parmenides to Bolzano), Antw./Nijm., 1944, 36v., draws, with great reason, attention to the one in the many, i.e. that which (the factor, which), in the midst of a (sometimes at first sight confused) multiplicity, gives to a set of data their coherence, - 'unity' said the Antiques and the Scholastics -- with Platon.

Beth summarizes this in the Platonic term stoicheiosis, "elementatio" (the breaking down into stoicheia, elements, of a collection), of which the dialogue *Theaitetos* (Theaetetus) gives us one sample.

"When someone - be it a deity or a godlike and godlike man - observed this, according to an Egyptian myth (H.O. 29), calling him Theuth (= Thot, Thoth) - observed, that 'all that is sound was infinitely diverse (= many), he was the first to recognize that - in that infinity - the vowels were not one but many and, again, that there were other sounds, which, though not vowels, nevertheless possessed a certain sound value and that of these sounds also a number existed. He further distinguished a third kind of letters, which we now call consonants.

Thereupon he divided (classification act) the

(i) consonants, until he distinguished each one separately,

(ii) similarly, the vowels and

(iii) the semi-vowels, until, of these also, he knew the number. Each separately and all together was called (naming act) stoicheia, letters. But Theuth recognized that none of us could learn one of them from separately, without all the others (*op.*: divisional or complementary act), (*op.*: noësis, ideatio).

H.O. 41.

He considered and realized that it was a connection which made them all "one". On the basis of that connection he assigned to them, therefore, a single science, which he called speechology -- grammar.

So much for the Platonic myth concerning the deity Thoth, whose function included causing (Funktionsgottheit (Usener)) intellectual labor (Veroorzakerstype (Söderblom)).

One may already see that the "connection which makes all that is sound one" is the idea 'sound' (better: 'all that is sound'). The idea is that factor (aitia), which makes analogy 'meaningful' (justifiable, explicable).

In other words: the necessary and, at once, sufficient condition of the analogy (which includes more than one type, -- about which more later), which as a fact must first be verified of course (the empirical, indeed, experimental pedestal: H.O. 38).

Note.-- For its logical structure, see H.O. 15 (// 25).

For Platon, too, the 'being(s)' is analogous, i.e. it is composed (stoicheiosis) of 'being', which, among themselves, are part-identical (analogous). What he says of the letters (vowels, semi-vowels, consonants) of an alphabet (language system) is only one of the infinitely many applicative models of the transcendental or being analogy.

Compare, by the way, Aristotle's analysis of language (H.O. 16). Not only in present structuralism, also in Platonism and Aristotelianism the linguistic applicative model of the transcendental analogy (= relation system) is always somewhere in front, as paradigm, textbook example, at least,--not as absolute model.

In other words: both thinkers do not lapse into linguisticism, like the structuralists. Put even more sharply: wanting to analyze the whole of reality - being(s) - in terms of linguistic phenomena and models is irresponsible: for 'being(s)' there is no other model than 'being(s)' itself.

They -- Aristotle and Platon -- are and remain ontologists. 'Language' is just one type of 'being(s)': nothing more.

The three main types of analogy.

(1) When the myth speaks of "all sounds (collectively)," there is summative analogue: in virtue of similarity especially ("all that is sound") makes that expression the sum (totality) of all (possible) sounds.

H.O. 42

What is called the 'range', (comprehension scope) of an idea is expressed in this way.

(2).1. - When the myth speaks of 'each sound separately', there is distributive (spreading) analogy: the same general (universal) idea is expressed in all the (possible) copies (elements). The typical coherence (unity-in-the-many), which is the subject of this, is that of (creature) similarity.

With this, Thoth classifies - privately - into subclasses (vowels, semi-vowels, consonants) or subsets. *Ch. Lahr, S.J., Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 493, n.1; 499, calls this type of analogy 'logical set' ('general idea') and, as a textbook example, he gives 'omnis homo', all men (// all sounds).

(2).2. - When the myth speaks of 'the link that makes all sounds one', a Platonist understands this not only in the distributive sense but also in the collective sense. For "one (specimen) of it cannot be 'learned' (meaning: intelligently understood) without all the others (meaning: of the totality)". We would now call this a characteristic of what one understands by 'system'.

Ch. Lahr, *ibid.*, calls this type of analogy (partial identity) "physical" collection ("collective idea"), giving, as a paradigm, "totus homo," the whole human(s) (// the whole realm of sounds).

Note.-- We will return to this further, -- but, said in passing, summative analogy answers to synecdoche, distributive analogy to metaphor and collective to metonymy (tropological analogy types).

Note.-- As already explicitly treated above (H.O. 14): the identitive approach is nothing other than the comparative method expressed in language forms: by comparing sounds, Thoth discovers partial identities (analogies). Even more: thanks to in - and outward comparison (H.O. 14: application), one extends these partial identities with a type still.-- That will now be of immediate application.

The Platonic ideative act.

M. Scheler (1874/1928), the great axiologist, in *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, (The position of man in the cosmos), Darmstadt, 1930, 60, speaks of the "Act der 'Ideierung'" (the act of ideation).

H.O. 43.

(1) This is, according to him, thoroughly distinguishable from what he calls 'technical Intelligenz' (professional scientific-technical approach): "Here - to stay with our examples - is a sound(s) system, a golden object(s) system : how did it come into being e.g.?"

(2) However, one can also take a different approach: "Here is a system of sounds, a system of gold objects: how must the universe be possible for something like sounds (system of sounds), gold (system of gold objects), etc. to be absolutely ('überhaupt', says Scheler) possible? Those who use such question form thereby employ the principle of sufficient reason or ground (H.O. 15, in the form of the Kantian possibility condition ("How is something at all, without more, possible?"). Peirce would speak of Abduction. Platon speaks of lemma, - on a universe scale.

Now we return to H.O. 39 (at the bottom). We now have an accurate representation (reg. mod.) of idea.-- Now apply.

A.-- 1. That 'gold' (better : all that is gold) spread over all possible gold, in the universe, is a species name (H.O. 11), i.e. an essence (ousia), is immediately open. Distributive analogy of specimens!

A.-- 2. That 'gold' (all that is gold) is, also, a collective idea (Lahr) is evident from what *O. Willmann, Abriss*, 366, says in refutation of Locke:

(a) there are the very many times verified (empirically / experimentally) traits (common properties) - yellow, smiley etc. -;

(b) for the nominalist Locke, these traits are a loose bundle of determinable properties; for the Platonist Willmann, however, this is different: since all the conscious traits of knowledge are, always, invariably, verifiable in all gold (copies), there must be a necessary and sufficient reason or ground, which makes that coherence (partial identity analogy: and this is collective analogy) meaningful, understandable, explainable. That exactly is the idea 'all that is gold': it makes the separate properties into a structured system of properties. That structure, in, behind, above the properties, is the idea.

B.-- There is, however, another type of collective idea. The schelerian type, viz.: what causes that, spread across the universe, invariably just that coherent structure, to be present, in infinitely many copies, -- was (past) and will be (future),-- here, there, yonder and, also, wherever the copies are?

H.O. 44.

What causes these diachronic and synchronic actual modes of being, which are the endless copies? -- The idea 'all that is sound, resp. gold' is the causal agent - 'Urheberin' to speak with Söderblom, religious historian.

It is, therefore, not surprising that *O. Willmann, G. d. Id.*, i, 398, says that - among other things, according to Aristotle - Platon characterizes the idea as "gesamtname," collective, both distributive (class) and collective (system, system). The idea expresses, after all, and causes, at once, the collectivity of "all that ...is".

In other words: what will later be called, especially in mid-century scholasticism, "essentia" (H.O. 11) and "existentia" (factuality), that is already, in unison, summed up by Platon in what the idea is and in what it causes.

The seal model. (44/46).

As for Aristotle (H.O. 17), so for Platon, perhaps, a single main model applies. O. Willmann, o.c., 294, speaking of Paleopythagorean idealism, says what follows.

(1) The structure ('arithmos') is, first of all, the general, universal (distributive analogy of copies).

(2) But that general (type) is, at once, within the Paleopythagorean mode of thought, the exemplary (exemplary),---such that what under some point of view deviates from the type (pattern, essence),-- e.g., on account of a defect--also counts as an irregular specimen (H.O. 37: cleansing;-- 22: steering scheme) : the idea is, also in Platonism, a structure (creature-structure) which operates cybernetically.

Willmann gives, of these, two applicative models, which are both Paleopythagorean and Platonic:

a. The "all that is square" masters (sends) as a basic type or forms as a stamp "All that is quadrangular.

b. The chord of a key genus controls (directs) - as a seal, sfragis, all the melodies within that chord: itself, however, it does not resonate, while the melodies expire (*note:* among the Antiques, after all, there was no polyphonic (polyphonic) performance).

Thus the chord is the true representative ('Repräsentant') of the law, which both acts in the phenomena, as a regulating factor, and nevertheless rises above the same phenomena (i.e. melodies).

H.O. 45.

Note.-- We face, with this, a new type of analogy (partial identity), namely, the exemplar-cybernetic analogy.

(1) It is abundantly clear that paragon, 'paradeigma', (Lat.: paradigm), and copy of that paragon, as model-identical, are analogous (part-identical).

(2) But it is equally clear that regular and irregular (deviant) specimens, both, are contained in the same basic structure, i.e. rule (paragon, goal) / deviation (irregularity)/ repair (re-arrangement), i.e. the cybernetic structure. But what is contained in the same structure is, ipso facto, part-identical (analogous).

It should be noted, in passing, that Erich Przywara (1889/1972), the Polish-German Jesuit, makes the 'in/above' analogy, in all his works, central (cfr. *G. Copers, The analogy of Erich Przywara*, Brussels, 1952). O. Willmann, *ibid.*, continues, however.

(3) The structure is not only general (distributive, present in all specimens) and / or tone-regulating (regulative) (in / above all specimens active-goal-directing (H.O. 17: dynamics; 20: teleolog.)); it is also generative (H.O. 17: gen(n)etic, H.O. 23: reproductive model): already Orphism (a Prepythagorean movement, in which the immortal soul, - as well as a mortification morality were central, from the VII-th century B.C.) thought -- according to Willmann -- the cosmic seal as a womb.

Cfr O. Willmann, *o.c.*, 41f, where it is said among other things that already the mythical theology (H.O. 30) called the deities connected with the element water (all that is water) as 'sphragiei', sealing, i.e. powers acting as a seal (steering-general-genetic image generating power); that the same mythical theology designated a nymph cave with the name 'sphragidion' seal, i.e. microsphragis -or small-scale copy of the macrosphragis, the entire cosmos.

Now remember that 'seal' had an oval-round geometric form, with, at its center, the generative or engendering (causing) fire,--which Herakleitos of Ephesus (H.O. 21;35), in his cosmology, made central ('All that is fire') and which, in the Kabieren cult, was hierogamically (magico-sexually) 'celebrated', i.e. ritually made present.

In that perspective the idea should be understood. At least if one wants to be historically accurate. Does not Willmann, *o.c.*, 430f., say that an idea is a "zoon", "thremma", a living force and being?

H.O. 46.

Note.-- "The ancients called Herakleitos of Ephesus 'the dark one.' Not without reason. For, in true antique spirit, he considered the mystery of totality (*op.*: the harmony of opposites) more important than the rational relations of existence: 'the hidden harmony ('harmoniè afanes') is stronger than the perceptible' (*Fr.* 54).

Greek philosophy did not speak the language of religious faith. But the source of its wisdom (*note*: 'sophia' as the core of 'philo.sophia') was religious wisdom, which was the spiritual foundation of all the ancient peoples, the Greeks not excepted. And it was directed exclusively to the secret of life". (*W.B. Kristensen, Collected contribution to knowledge of ancient religions, A'm, 1947, 289*).

What the pre-eminent connoisseur of ancient religions, Kristensen, says of Herakleitos, O. Willmann claims - not without strong analogies with Kristensen, by the way - of Pythagoras and of Platon. On the subject of fire as an 'element' (idea) see Kristensen, o.c.,291/314 (*The Wealth of the Earth in Myth and Cult (1942)*).

Note . - The generative (genetic) analogy.

"As 'noèta', intellegibilia, data of knowledge and thought, the ideas are transcendent; as 'zoa', living beings, they are, at the same time, in things, immanent (H.O. 32): (O. Willmann, o.c., 432).

"As living entities (Lebensgebilde), ideas are something living, yes, origin of life. They grant, viz, the sense-perceivable data (*op.*: phenomena) share in its life, yes, make up the living in it." (Ibid.).

The generative form of "in/above" relation between what we see and touch with our senses, directly, and what we, thanks to ideation process, "see" (behold; theoria), is one type of partial identity (= analogy).

Summarizing, with *E. De Strycker, Bekn. geschied.v.d. ant. fil., 97*, we can summarize all that precedes, regarding doctrine of ideas, in three terms:

1. pareinai (= par.ousia), praesentia, the idea is present in the phenomenon it "summarizes" (HO 44);

2.1. metechein, methexis, participatio, the idea gives share to its being(s) to the phenomenon summed up in it; that 'participates' in it;

2.2. paradeigma, exemplum, the idea is present in the phenomenon summarized in it as its regulative model (archetype).

H.O. 47.

(b). *The ideation of "all that is clean.* (47/53)

Print, once again, the platonic method well in our minds:

"(I)1. *First stage:*

Apply the deepened comparative method. It includes two subphases.

(1) Nominal phase:

1. depart from the designations ("names");

2. continue with the defining descriptions;-- that as far as language is concerned.

(2) Phenomenal phase passing into beholding-perceptual contact (with one or more specimens);-- this, in order to test the previous statements concerning the so-called essence of data.

(A)2. *Second stage:*

letting everything, passion-free, come through as information; immediately, without always wanting to be passionately right, applying the true dialectical method.

(B). Only then does the light of purely spiritual perception and of the true intellectual grasping of the essence of the data illuminate us." (*Seventh Letter, Calw, 40*).

As one can see, in his letter, Platon repeats the same scheme over and over again. We will now apply this to 'all that is clean'.

Said in passing: *O. Willmann, Abriss*, 366, where he argues with John Locke about what one should mean by the term 'essence' (H.O. 38), readily admits that, in so far as the 'essence' has not yet been clarified, thanks to empirical and/or experimental verifications, that same essence 'works' as an x, a 'qualitas occulta' (a dark quality). We would now speak, in terms of electricity theory, of 'black box', 'black box' : one inserts a wire into a contact and the light comes on, even though one does not know (exactly) what is going on in that 'black' (opaque) box. "It works." So it is with the idea, among others and especially the idea 'all that is clean'. About 'what is clean', the discussions are endlessly, and endlessly. And yet! Not everything is purely subjective.

(A) *The pre-ideative phase.*

We adopt what *Wl. Tatarkiewicz, Gesch. d. Aesthetik*, I, 139/167 (*Die Aesthetik Platons*) tells us about this.

(A).1.-- *The name.*

"Whoever dances and sings cleanly (kalos), he/ she dances and songse, then at least, 'ta kala', all that is clean". Thus Platon, regarding what the ancient Greeks called choreia, the art of dancing, singing and music. The term 'ta kala', the beautiful things (bad translation), literally,-- it is there. So we can leave with its analysis.

H.O. 48,

(A).2.-- *The descriptions.*

The language, in this case, is twofold : what the ordinary, ancient Greek calls "clean" and what the intelligentsia (the intellectuals) call "clean" (defining).

The common sense.

The 'doxai', opinions, the opinions in circulation, with or without reasoned justification, apply, in Platonic analysis, of course, as well.

"In his dialogue *The Supper*, Platon says: "If there is anything worth living for, it is the living through of all that is beautiful." This dialogue is, in fact, nothing but a spirited eulogy of beauty (= all that is beautiful) as the highest value. It is indeed the first eulogy to beauty that we know, literarily speaking.-- But ... that eulogy understood beauty as the Greeks understood it, -- i.e. differently than most modern people understand it.

Consequence: where Platon praises beauty, he praises something other than what is understood today as 'beauty'.

(a) shapes, colors,-- melodies were -- for the Greeks and for Platon -- only one type of 'beauty'

(b) in this concept they recorded not only physical (material) objects, but also psychic and social data, namely characters, constitutions, ethical properties, truths' (Tatarkiewicz, 140).

In other words : Tatarkiewicz himself, well without wanting to, underlines the enormous importance of starting with the terms and defining them, within the given language use. The ancient Greek language is not now the contemporary one!

Note - Cultural-historical method.

Cfr. First and Second Year courses. Philosophy too is situated within a language. Platon, like Protosofistics, - clearly saw that, if only because he was so widely traveled.

Note -- One compares our current common-sense language regarding clean: "That was not clean of you!" (said as a characterization of an "ugly" act, e.g., treachery). "I made a clean mass of money out of it" (said of something that purely means profit), et al. m. think of 'the clean soul of the child', 'a clean goal'.

The intelligentsia.

Tatarkiewicz, o.c., 147, summarizes: The philosophers had, until then, proposed three standards (criteria) to distinguish 'All that is beautiful' from the rest (H.O. 12: the form of being).

H.O. 49.

(1) the Sophists proposed subjective living through, insofar as there is in it a dose of pleasant experience.

In *Hippias Maior* 298 a, *Platon* says that the Protosophists claimed, "Clean is all that is pleasing to hearing and sight." Which Aristotle also writes in the name of the Protosophists.

It is, by the way, not surprising: H.O. 6 taught us that, for Protagoras, the "soul" is nothing except sensations.

(2).1. The paleopythagoreans situated, as one can infer, after H.O. 44 (seal model), all that is clean, in the structure (creature form), especially insofar as there is harmony (adjusted incorporation), cognizable by order(s), regularity, balance, symmetry, in it (H.O. 10). -

(2).2. The socratic thesis, in this regard, was that expediency (functionality, pragmatics) is criterion: to the extent that something is adapted to the role, which it is supposed to fulfill, to the same extent Socrates labels it as 'clean'. From the point of view of (subjective) effect:

(i) for the Protosophists (Gorgian type) it comes down to apate (illusory pleasant sensation);

(ii).1. for the Paleopythagoreans, it comes down to catharsis, soul purification (H.O. 16; 37): the soul remains itself, but is purified and elevated to a higher level of life;

(ii).2 for Socrates, it comes down to mimesis, imitatio, correct representation.

(A).3. -- *The applicative models (phenomena)*.

In the *Politeia dialogue*, *Platon* distinguishes three reality types.

(1) *The two phenomenal types are:*

a. the singular-concrete phenomenon, in fuis (nature), called 'image' (picture) (i.e., if one starts from the idea);

b. the man-made work of art (whether artistic or artisanal, that is);--which, seen from the idea, is an image of the image.-- Thus the ancient Greeks will distinguish natural and artistic beauty; *Platon* likewise.

(2) *The ideal type, namely the idea itself;*

which, with *Platon*, at least, leads to the idea "ta kala," "all that is clean" -- the idea, now, is something that has to do with deity (not mere humanity).

Hippias Maior treats, as phenomenal data, to test the definitions just gone over,

(1) a beautiful girl (H.O. 2; 36; 39),-- a horse, a musical instrument, a vase -- (in other dialogues: beautiful people, colorful models, -- images, melodies, plastic works),-
- all data, which we might call, in the now predominant sense, "aesthetic.

H.O. 50.

(2) but Socrates and his interlocutor Hippias also list as phenomena beautiful professional work, clean legislation, what is clean in politics and in community life, -- things, which reflect the much broader Greek concept of clean.

Thus e.g. the utili(tar)ist Hippias does not conceal the fact that, for him personally, "the most beautiful thing consists in it:

- a. acquire an asset,
- b. be in good health,
- c. gaining fame among the Hellenes,
- d. reach a high old age".

For the ethically sensitive Socrates, on the other hand, the most beautiful thing is "wisdom.

This, while other dialogues cite other examples: feminine beauty, Aphrodite's beauty,-- the beauty of thought, of scholarship,-- the beauty of "good morals," of justice,- - the beauty of the soul situated in moral excellence. - the phenomena, to test the definitions, reflect the broad, antique-Greek idea of beauty.

Note -- Concerning Socrates' definition and examples: some people's bodies are "clean with a view to speed racing", others' are "clean with a view to fighting" ('clean' here is: usable, suitable). Platon also falls, somewhat, into it: for example, a golden spoon is "cleaner with a view to use" than a wooden spoon (functional, pragmatic concept of beauty).

(B) *The ideative phase.*

This decays, logically, into two sub-phases:

- (1) The critique of existing (possibly established) definitions;
- (2) in the name of its own typically Platonic definition; expression of ideation.

1.-- a. Platon rejects the Socratic definition: there where 'All that is clean' (idea) is invariably also 'good' (value in itself), the usable-beautiful, in itself, cannot be 'good' (value in itself) either; among the 'clean' bodies, forms, colors, sounds there are those which are assessable ('clean') for their usefulness, but there are also those which, merely for the sake of themselves, are 'clean'. Socrates' definition has no place for the clean for its own sake, the clean in itself (which he nevertheless talks about); his definition is too narrow (not summative (H.O. 41)).

H.O. 51.

1.-- b. Platon rejects the Protosophist definition: if the "pleasant experience" is criterion how then explain that there are pleasant experiences, which are not compatible with the beautiful in themselves, as Platon will define it?

"What is pleasing to the eyes and ears" is not a summative (H.O. 41) definition (it includes only a part): what, in both types (visual and auditory beauty) is common property, is not discussed.

2.-- a. Platon, especially in his later years of life, integrates the Paleopythagorean definition:

(i) the universe, the being, when analyzed ideatively, exhibit structure (arithmos, interlocking of a number of (arithmetically) parts (geometrically),-- this, in a harmonious way);

(ii) but the Paleopythagoreans thought this structure either coarse (physical) or, especially, fine (H.O. 30: astral). In any case material and proved, therefore, a lower level of thought than the immaterial level of ideas, with Platon; therefore Platon deepens the structure to both the coarse and fine material and, especially, the immaterial: the essence forms, material and immaterial, of the being show structure (H. O. 44: seal model).O. 44: seal model), which is both general (summative analogy of being) and exemplary (exemplary-cybernetic analogy of being) and, above all, generative (generative analogy of being).

"Platon **(1)** did not dispute that the average man could find beautiful bodies beautiful; but he held that there were things more beautiful than that : clean thoughts and deeds; the spiritually beautiful was his preference;

(2) this level of beauty is, however, not yet the highest : this is situated in the idea, which is only 'the beautiful in itself ' ('all that is beautiful'):

(2).a. if a person wants to realize something beautiful, he/she can only do this by means of the tonal 'all that is beautiful' (the in itself beautiful);

(2).b. if bodies and souls are beautiful, then only in so far as they approximate (H.O. 38: in/above), resp. approximate, the idea 'all that is beautiful': that type of beauty (arises and) perishes; only the idea 'all that is beautiful' is eternal; more so: "If thou, ever, beholdest that idea, then gold and ostentation, as well as the most beautiful boys and youths, shall appear to thee as nothing." Thus Platon's own words". Cfr. Wl. Tatariewicz, o.c., 146.

H.O. 52.

One sees it, signs again: the idea "all that is clean" is regulatory model:

(1) it is rule, present in all applications (= applicative models; -- according to the distributive structure);

(2).1. it is rule, in and above all applications as a paragon, -- which becomes apparent when one confronts the rule with its deviations (irregular applications).

(2).2. But the idea is -- as a function goddess and causal agent (Urheberin, in Söderblom's language) -- calculating power, which lays itself down in all applications (appl. mod.) and, even, in all divergent applications, as the source,-- the origin, the 'archè' the principle. In other words: the idea is seal, sphragis, sphragidion, in the mythic-antique sense. Cfr. H.O. 44v.. Understood, as just said, idea = seal = regulative model.

Note.-- All Platonic ideas are somewhere divine. But the idea 'All that is beautiful' is it in a special sense: one reads e.g. *Th. Zielinski, La religion de la Grèce antique*, (The religion of ancient Greece,), Paris, 1926, on it: pp. 49/70 explain to you how deity reveals itself in and at the same time above beauty (*Révélation de dieu dans la beauté*), (Revelation of God in the beauty).

Zielinski quotes, in this regard, the rather arid scientific Aristotle: "If, one day, by chance, we met a human being with the appearance that sculptors give to deities, it is absolutely certain that we would all be prepared to bow before such a person in reverence and to prepare a service for him/her, as if he/she were a higher being: thus Aristotle. Beauty - in the broad, ancient Greek sense - is only anagogic, i.e. understandable through an upward movement, a sense of elevation. This appears, pre-eminently, in the absolute beauty, of which Platon speaks.

2.--b. Platon integrates subjective experience, interpreted by Protosofistics purely utilitistically-hedonistically. 'beauty' without its experience is virtually meaningless: it is one type of noble yoke (intentionality; H.O. 8; 32; 37;-- as well as 9/10).

If, with Aristotle, the experience of beauty was an experience of happiness, with Platon it is equally so, but with an emphasis on wonder that grows into admiration.

Which certainly does not exclude Aristotle; on the contrary see his reaction towards an image of deity. In this Platon is again typically antique-Hellenic (Wl. Tetarkiewicz, o.c., 140; 143).

H.O. 53.

As Taterkiewicz, o.c.,143, says: "For Platon something was considered 'beautiful' insofar as it aroused admiration; -- consequently wisdom, moral high ground, famous deeds, sound legislation are also 'beautiful'. One must not exclude such things from the realm of 'beauty' by narrowing this concept to 'the formal beauty'." Cfr H.O. 33 (*Einstein*).

But beware: if Platon puts the subjective experience as an attribute par excellence, he differs thoroughly from the Sophists:

- (1) What is clean is not limited to the sense;
- (2) Experiencing beauty is more than mere subjective projection: an objective property of reality prompts admiration;
- (3) admiration is a firm, innate sense of beauty (and not simply a fleeting moment of enjoyment, as for the Sophists);
- (4) that sense of beauty is an instance of noble yoke (mutual model), through which the admirer penetrates to the essence of (beautiful) things: thus it comes about that true sense of beauty, in the Platonic sense, distinguishes sham beauty from real beauty (whereas, for the Sophist, beauty is always some form of appearance).

Note.-- *The eros (life-loving love drive) as a sense of beauty.*

Ever since the Orphics (H.O. 45) and, in their wake, the Paleopythagoreans, the 'eros' has played a leading role. Also with Platon. He speaks of it with striking eloquence. Thus e.g. in *The Supper (Sumposion)*. The object of the eros is 'to kalokagathon' (all that is clean and good).

It is even worked out as part of the theory of works of art: what is absorbed in beauty wants to objectify it, to capture it in a material object, to represent it. Thus, for example, in a work of art.

Note.-- In the *Ion dialogue* Platon speaks of inspiration (the mantic side), among other things, in the poet: this is a seer, who, thanks to a divine (psychic) gift, proceeds under inspiration. The inspiration, however, of which Platon speaks, is a form of mania, furor, rapture.

Because Platon considers the (i) supposition - speculative degree - and (ii) contemplation - contemplative degree (HO 9; 19; 35; 37) - of the idea to be a matter of nous, mind or spirit, (the noölogical side of the theory of ideas), Platon estimates inspiration to be rather minor.

H.O. 54.

(c).-- *The sacred realism.*

Religion (H.O. 5/7 (*emp.- sens. religion-science.*); 25v. (*transhyl. real.*) revolves, conveniently, around two main facts: the soul and the deity.

Let us see, just for a moment, what those two, with Platon, are.

1.-- *The soul.*

One text: "One should ... live as people who are convinced of those ancient sacred traditions which, as everyone knows, reveal to us that we have an immortal soul,--that this soul, with respect to its way of life, will meet a judge and, in case of crimes, will have to face the greatest punishments, after it has, in time, left the body.

That is why one should consider being the victim of great crimes (*note:* in the context Platon was talking about Sicilian political life, with its gross crimes) and iniquities as a smaller 'evil' than actively committing them.-- But such a thing is a doctrine, which the man who does not possess the gold of the soul and whose desire is only directed to money and the acquisition of possessions, does not hear". Compare this position of Platon and with Protagoras (the soul a bundle of sensations) and with Aristotle (the soul is mortal)! (Cfr VII-the Br., Calw, 24f.).

2.-- *The deity.*

(1) The adjective 'theios', divinus, divine, is opposed to 'human', 'mortal', 'visible'. It transcends (transcends) the latter.

(2).1. In the full sense of the word, only ideas (most the idea of "the good") are "divine" (H.O. 52).

(2).2. What is not idea - the soul, the deities of popular religion - is "divine" insofar as it is related to ideas (a kind of "participation" (H.O. 46)).

Foremost, with Platon, are the astral deities (H.O. 30), who consisted of very subtle matter and, like souls, 'sent' this celestial matter. Platon's deities are ethically flawless (hence his criticism of the 'immoralities' of folk myth). The world- or universe-soul is, for Platon, a kind of deity, encompassing all that is visible (mortal and immortal). Perhaps the Demiürg (= universe order maker) is just that world soul.

(3) Did Platon know the supreme being, as the Bible (Yahweh, Trinity), among others, knows it? Apparently not. Consequence: to interpret his ideas as God's ideas, as e.g. with S. Augustine (HO 27), is not correct. In pagan environment only Albinos of Smurna (+100/+175) will identify the ideas with God's thoughts.

H.O. 55.

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H.O. 56.

I.A.(IV) *The ontology of Albinos of Smurna* (+100/+175). (56/62)

Foulquié, L'existentialisme, Paris, 1951-2, 10/17, uses the term "theological essentialism (H.O. 27): 'The essences (*note*: forms of being, ideas) are 'something divine' (H.O. 54), even 'God himself' ".

E. De Strycker, S. J., Beknopte geschied. v/d. ant. wijsb., 114, says that the ideas as god's thoughts only appeared with Albinos. This Platonist is, therefore, a very important turning point in the history of the doctrine of ideas. Therefore, a somewhat more detailed look at his philosophy.

I.-- Situation.

We are, since +/- -320, fully into Hellenistic-Roman philosophy,--and into what is called "middle Platonism," which anticipates Neoplatonism.

1. His teacher Gaios (100/150) gives as the meaning of life 'theiosis', deificatio, deification (becoming equal to a 'deity'), -- a purpose in life already found among the Orphics, Paleopythagoreans, Platonists, even Aristotelians. These thinkers do not confront themselves with e.g. famous fellow men, but with one or another deity. Thus Gaios derives - from this sense of life - the sense of the ethical high life (H.O. 54: the gold of the soul).

2. At Athens, Gaios, has Albinos as a pupil. Later, the latter himself teaches at Smurna (Smyrna),--where he, in turn, has the famous physician Galenos of Pergamon (129/199) as a pupil.

His works: *On the Disembodied Properties, Prologue to Platon (nature, arrangement, order of Plat. dialogues)*, especially *Didaskelikos* (Epitome, i.e. summary;--a systematic survey of Platonism, but with a great deal of Aristotelian and some Stoic teaching (H.O. 32)).

II.1 Teachings.

Albinos divides philosophy into three branches.

a. *Dialectics/logic*, in which he talks about the universals (= general concepts), the categories (= basic or main concepts) - according to him they are innate - and the syllogisms, in the Aristotelian sense.

b.1. *Theoretical philosophy, encompassing* -- as with Aristotle -- mathematics, physical (natural phil.) and theology.-- Like Aristotle, roughly (H.O. 26), but in a loftier sense, Albinos posits an unchanging ('unmoved') nous, intellectus, mind, spirit, which 'thinks' itself.

H.O. 57.

'God' - that very exalted spirit viz. - is, at least as far as his deepest being(s) are concerned, unknown and unknowable.--thus he is transcendent (= exalted, transcending the phenomenal, yes, all that is even transphenomenal).

But that "God" is approachable. this, in threefold ways:

a. by reasoning, on the basis of proportionality ('analogia', here in the narrower sense): one says that he is, e.g., beautiful, like what we, all around us, see of beauty, but -- proportionally speaking -- much, yes, boundlessly more exalted.-- Later one calls this cataphatic (affirmative) theology.

b. by reasoning, on the basis of negation ('aphairesis', not to be confused with e.g. the Aristotelian 'abstraction' (H.O. 10))-- one says that 'God' is not like all the beautiful things we see around us; to that extent he is transcendent or elevated, transcending everything.-- Later on this is called apophatic ('negative') theology.-- One also reverses the order: first deny, then affirm, -- in reasoning.

c. d.m.v. - not a reasoning, but - an identitive experience, the 'huper.oche', transcendence (transcendence), namely of the two previous, merely reasoning acts.

"The deity (...) allows itself to be approached only in the mystical unification. This is, however, no real, understand: by reasoning acquired, knowledge, for the reason of its non-reasoning nature". Thus Albinos himself. Cfr. *G. des Places, S. I., La religion grecque (Dieux, cultes, rites et sentiment religieux dans la Grèce antique)*, Paris, 169, 303; 317; 336.

Later this is called mystical theology. - Later, Pseudo-Dionysios the Areopagite (between +400 and +500), a patristic thinker and mystic with enormous influence, both on Eastern and Western Christian thought, will brilliantly describe the affirming, the denying, and the transcending methods (*F. Cayré, A.A., Patrologie et histoire de la theologie*, (Patrology and history of theology), t. ii, Paris, 1945-3,97).

b.2. Practical philosophy, encompassing ethics, economics and politics. In ethics, the meaning of life is 'telos', finis, goal of life, theiosis, deification thanks to moral high ground. An essential condition of this is 'metrio.patheia', passion-moderation: our desires (passions) are not eradicated, but assumed, purified and, thanks to deification, raised to a higher, loftier level (H.O. 16: catharsis, purification; see also 37 and 22). 'Sublimation', Freudian.

H.O. 58.

II.2.-- Ideology.

Previous, strong Aristotelian subject scheme covers a true Platonism.

1. Starting point are the singular-concrete phenomena and their names. In, but at the same time above these phenomena is the Idea of them. Insofar as that Idea is in the experiential data itself, it is called 'eidos', form of being (H.O. 12;48); paragon (archetype), however, and origin of those data is that 'eidos' and is thus called 'idea', higher, divine form of being.

2. These ideas, now, experienced in visible things, are nothing but the ideas thought by God, which, collectively, make up the structure (plan) of the universe (nature). In other words: what Platon called 'kosmos noëtos', mundus intelligibilis, the knowing and thinking or ideal world, which comprises the totality of ideas -- with as its highest idea, the Good (which coincides with the Beautiful (H.O. 53))-- , is, by Albinos, situated in God.

III.-- 1.-- Deepening previous teachings.

Rereading, once again, H.O. 34; 47 (Plat. method).-- The starting point is the noble yoke (H.O. 8; 32; 37 (bipartite); 52 (apt.)), i.e., the basic duality (intentionality). This includes:

- (i) the duality "name/thing" (H.O. 2) and
- (ii) the duality "abstract concept/singular form of being" (H.O. 8v.; Arist.).

But, in Platonism, that duality becomes "ideative concept/ idea" (H.O. 32).

In other words: the subject is oriented toward the object,-- phenomenal, abstract and ideative.-- Apply this, now, to what Albinos teaches us, regarding ethics.

(A). - The problem mode.

Cfr. H.O. 20 (state of the issue).-- This includes the name and definitions (opinions).

1.-- The name.

'Telos', finis, purpose,-- meaning of life. I, you,--we all live and, what is more, give meaning to it. We are makers of meaning, interpreters. That shows itself in the taking.

2.-- The definition(s).

Albinos, above all, takes into account two competing positions, senses.

a. -- The stoic sense of purpose.

The Stoa, founded around -300 by the Cypriot Zenon of Kition (Citium) (-338/-254), founded a philosophy, which can be summarized as follows:

(i) A subsidiary part, viz. a logic derived from the Megarics) and a physical one (a Heraklitean (H.O. 21; 35; 45) natural philosophy).

H.O. 59.

Nature, which -- usually -- is identified with Deity -- a kind of Universe soul (H.O. 26 (world spirit v. Anax.); 54 (Plat.)) -- is identified, controls all processes, according to a common plan (the 'logoi spermatikoi'), which is present in that Nature = Godhead.

Nature consists purely of material -- fine and coarse (H.O. 30: hylic pluralism) -- bodies.-- Which, as a reality, gives a religious materialism.

It is striking, in this regard, that the natural process proceeds deterministically: there is no room for free self-determination (fatalism or fate belief).

(ii) A main part: ethics (moral philosophy).-- Here the Stoic is kunieker (cynic): strict, ascetic mortified life, the meaning of which is given as the accomplishment of duty. What is called morality of duty. As paragons count, among others, heroes (heroes of mythology).

Conclusion: The definition of ethics is: fatalistically subject to the process of nature, which proceeds inescapably, heroically-straightforwardly fulfilling his/her duty, including within the framework of the polis, which here is cosmopolis, the universe and the entire 'oikoumenè' (ecumenism, the then inhabited world), (world citizenship).

One finds another good dose of duty ethics, in the Stoic sense, in I. Kant (1724/1804), the Aufklärer.

b.-- The peripatetic (=aristotelian) sense.

(i) For the theoretical side, cfr. H.O. 20v. (teleology).

(ii) The Aristotelian starts from the essential form ('soul') of man, which, at the same time, constitutes his sense of purpose: man is a 'form' which, in the process of nature, comes into being and perishes. But to which, in virtue of the essential form, a 'telos', meaning of the arising and passing away, is attached.

That sense of existence is "eudaimonia anthropine" (beatitudo humana), human happiness (H.O. 9v.: happiness). What is called happiness morality. To live conscientiously or ethically well is, therefore, to be able to bring about his/her happiness.

In contrast to the Stoics, Aristotle conceives of this self-will in terms of the mind (nocturnal aspect). Noble lineage, health, beautiful body, long life, property, filial wealth, ties of friendship,--all this lies outside the will-free man and is incidental, second-rate.

Conclusion: The definition of ethics is: within the process of nature, as a self-acting being, build his/her happiness. In this, theoria (H.O. 9) plays a leading role. : particularly happy who can do theoria!

H.O. 60.

As *an aside*, one who advocates an analogous but Christianized ethic of happiness, in the Aristotelian sense, is S. Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274), the top figure of High Scholasticism (H.O. 26).

(B) -- *The theocentric-ideative meaning.*

Not the ideas are the center of the universe, as with Platon (H.O. 54: ideocentrism). Albinos thinks theocentrically an unknowable but approachable God is the center and the ideas are situated in him.

a.-- *The summative (universal) idea.*

Cfr. H.O. 41; 50v.-- 'All that is human' (H.O. 39 (gold); 47 (clean)) is what the Platonist seeks to define. I, thou,-- all of us (summative, universal) are, admittedly, singular beings, but -- compare with animals and plants -- we are bearers/carriers, in our essence, of a general form of being (eidos), our soul, which, as Stoics and Peripatetics see very well, is engaged in the phenomenal process of nature, -- in which we come into being and perish. At least, our body (H.O. 54), not our immortal soul.

Although thrown into the process of nature, we, as sentient beings, seeking a telos, meaning of life, design our lives ; thrown into the praxis of economics (H.O. 57) and politics (H.O. 57), I, thou,--we all design an economic and political activity somewhere (remember that the ancient Greek liked to be involved in polis life). - A small number make it to the theoretical life (H.O. 56): they learn logic, theoretical and practical learning subjects.

Summative:

a. diachronic: this is how it was, this is how it is, and this is how it will continue in the future, within our natural process;

b. Synchronic: so it is, here, at Smurna (where Albinos taught); so it is at Athens (where he was taught); so it is everywhere, in the oikoumene, the inhabited world, - also outside the Roman empire. - Everywhere, always - differing from animals and plants in that, humans act as instigators, seeking to realize a telos, meaning of their / her life. We are an idea.

b.-- *Generative aspect of the idea.*

H.O. 45.-- The Platonic theoria -- either speculative (reasoning as hypothesis presupposed; H.O. 47, x, black box) or contemplative (mystical contemplation; H.O. 9; 57) -- here, at Albinos, thrusts through to God, as the place of ideas, which we each are in his singular way.

H.O. 61.

Indeed : I, you, all of us, we are of God, caused by him (H.O. 45); from him we spring, in 'one way or another, however mysteriously. Immediately, in all of us (summative), is God's own spirit (Nous, Intellectus), with the idea, which concerns us, - which we embody in the coarse and the fine or tenuous substance. In each of us 'all that is human' is singularly, visibly made present. In us, yes, but as extending beyond us into God.--Thus we share in his mode of being, though in a merely approximate (H.O. 57: approachable) way. This is the methexis (participatio, participation; H.O. 46).

It should be noted that the strictly Biblical concept of creation (free causation) does not necessarily lie in Albinos' theocentrism; rather, it is a kind of outflow (emenatism), - a non-Biblical concept.

c.-- Exemplary (paradigmatic) aspect of the idea.

H.O. 44.-- God's idea, in us, at the same time above us, not only as a causative factor, but also as a goal-directing factor. The idea, which we, embodied, in the cosmic process of nature, are, by participation, is, at the same time, ideal and value. It is the meaning (telos) of embodied life.

Here we approach, of course, the Aristotelian teleology (H.O. 20): our form of being (eidos) is, to begin with, only potential in us; thanks to the process, which is our life, thanks, also, to our self-working cooperation in the realization of our paragon in us (eidos = idea), the idea in us grows into its ideal form.

This appears, particularly, in the metriopatheia (H.O. 57), the temperance. 'Measure' means measuring model, regulative model, ideal, so that temperance means, in ancient language, sublimation, elevation to the ideal form. This from the Paleopythagoreans (H.O. 20: arithmos = metron).

This involves steering structure: our drive to make a profit (economic passion), our drive to acquire political power (H.O. 57) bring us to deviations from our "true" (ideal) form of being, which is restored by the spirit in us (nocturnal aspect), which grasps the idea as its paragon (H.O. 45).

Note.-- One will, perhaps, ask the question: where is the collective aspect of the idea (H.O. 42; 43)?

H.O. 62.

The grammatical model (H.O. 42), applied a.o. in 'All that is gold' and 'All that is beautiful' (H.O. 47vvv.), Albinos, of course, also knew. One remembers that, the platonic method as such (= in itself) is dialogue (H.O. 47).

This explains why an Albinos practices eclecticism: into the Platonic world of ideas he inserts a lot of Aristotelian and, even, some Stoic teachings, which he picks out and inserts into his own whole (which is 'eklexis'). The system of ideas is never a completely closed one, but an open one. Did we not note, H.O. 32, that the later Neoplatonic theosophists sought to 'bridge' Platon and Aristotle?

When, therefore, Albinos reasons about the purpose of life, he knows that, by nature, the idea "All that (its domain) is" in its coherence ("unity": H.O. 40) includes - by definition - and, thus, that all human beings should work (summatively), collectively, toward the realization of their being-form.

To sum up: "Become fully what you already are inchoate (beginning to be), namely God's idea concerning you. -: Become fully aware that you are, from the beginning, a divine idea and should bring it to full effect, reality!".

Behold the ethical imperative or, rather, the exemplar or regulative model (H.O. 46), which summarizes the Albinian ethical definition.

Behold the deification ethic. By elaborating on the idea, which one, from God, is, one becomes deified. theiosis, deificatio.

III.-- 2.-- *Virtue (and) ethics.*

The 'virtue', if need be in the plural: 'virtues' is, still current: *Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (A Study in Moral Theory)* London, 1981, is biting criticism of the enlightenment, in W.-Europe, since the end of the Middle Ages. MacIntyre posits that only a return to Aristotle's teleology and the concept of virtue, which derives its meaning from it (Is "virtuous" in the ethical sphere, all that is suitable, washed up, useful, in view of (H.O. 50) the common life purpose of all men), can resolve our ethical crisis, since the Enlightenment.

According to Albinos, now, the deification, the goal, is accomplished by the virtues, i.e. those qualities, in the ethical field, which make me, you, all of us, fit for and equal to the ethical ideal, the idea of God in us.

More so, they form one system, at least in its perfect phase. H.O. 43 (a structured system of properties).

H.O. 63.

I.A.(V). - *The ontology of S. Augustine of Tagaste.* (354/430).

P. Foulquié, L'existentialisme, 14/17 (*L'essentialisme augustinien*).-- Indeed, like his Middle Platonic predecessor Albinos of Smurna, S. Augustine, perhaps the greatest Church leader of the world Church, is a radical essentialist.

1. This, notwithstanding the fact that, with him, God is the living God of the Bible, who is tri-personal (trinitarian) and, being self-conscious, acts actively in all creation. We are, with this, very far from the Ideocentrism (H.O. 54; 60) of Platon and, even, from the rather vague theocentrism of Albinos (H.O. 57).

2. Augustine is, further, essentialist, notwithstanding the fact that the Second Person of the Trinity, the son or "logos" (universe wisdom, - from the prologue of John's Gospel), became human from the Holy Virgin Mary, a woman, and, like all the great founders of religion, had history and made it himself.

3. Augustine's essentialism goes, thirdly, also hand in hand with his extremely lively personality, which, in contrast to the antique-Hellenic essentialisms that have been overflowing so far, does not for once display a unilateral rationalistic tendency. "In his doctrine of the 'existential' coherence of all human faculties (note: reason, yes, but also freedom of will and above all of mind) - the 'ratio' is not separated from S. Augustine - faculties which are interwoven in the focus of our attention to get to know something, he can be considered the forerunner of Blaise Pascal (1623/1662) as well as of the recent philosophy of life and existentialism". (*M. Muller/ A, Helder, Herders kleines philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Basel, 1958, 23).

In other words, if we summarize the three points mentioned above (triune God, Second Person incarnate,-- Augustine's personality), we are faced, in his way of thinking, with a personalistic essentialism,--which Foulquié has very clearly established. To identify essentialism, therefore, with "lifeless chosism" (*op.*: la chose, the thing, which is not alive), as most existentialist and vitalist thinkers did, does not, at least for S. Augustine, apply at all.

But beware: at the very heart of this personalism lies Augustinian essentialism itself: the knowledge of the human person, according to his nature and his mission in life (*telos*; H.O. 58), is only possible - according to Foulquié, *o.c.*, 17 if, in doing so, one starts from the idea of the creator.

H.O. 64.

The so-called Romantic craving.

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Idealismus*, II (*Der Idealismus der Kirchenvater und der Realismus der Scholastiker*), 239, cites W. Menzel, *Die christliche Symbolik*, I: 491:

"Augustine introduced into the Church of the West a typically Romantic trait, namely, the mystical longing (atmosphere of desire) in which, in deepest humility, one looks up to the infinite,--a trait on which all the poetry and holiness of the Middle Ages rests.

I.-- Situation.

Patristic thought (33/800) is, merely, the Biblical reworking of the basic pattern of Pagan thought, which, in Hellas and the Hellenized East, prevailed.

(1) ***Pythagores, Platon*** e.g. define 'wisdom' (general education) as "the insight (theoria) into cosmic, human and divine things, through to the necessary and sufficient reasons ('grounds') thereof." 'Wisdom' was, in their view, essential, an attribute, which belonged exclusively to the deities, respectively to one or another deity.,- Man, as a fallible being (Pythagorean, Platonic fallibilism), was only capable of the pursuit ('desire' translated our Dutch-speaking ancestors) of that divine wisdom of which, incidentally, the core is made up of 'fèmai', divine pronouncements ('revelations'), 'teletai', initiation ceremonies (recordings in 'mysteries' (H.O. 22)) and 'manteia', oracular or divine communications (H.O. 54).-- What our Dutch ancestors recorded in the term 'wijs-begeerte',-- (longing for wisdom), i.e. human (thus fallible) striving for, in principle at least, insights, peculiar to God.

(2) ***Neo-Platonism*** (-50/600),

a set of essentially related, but sharply different systems of thought, of which that of Plotinos of Lukopolis (203/269) is the most famous, designates the Pythagorean-Platonic 'sophia' (wisdom) as 'theo-sophia', theosophy.

'Theosophy' means

(1) presupposing a general-human predisposition to direct contact with the deity (goddess, god, -- daimon (divine spirit),-- Supreme Being; H.O. 57)),

(2) such that 'wisdom' (as just described) becomes possible, workable. Cfr H.O. 31 (theosophies).

H.O. 65.

It was, after all, since archaic times, the belief that, in the universe, besides darkness (lightless beings and energies), there is also light (light-filled reality, beings and energies). Cfr. H.O. 29, where Eliade et al. speak of it in terms of order and disorder ('chaos').

Illuminati / Light Metaphysics.

1. In Paleopythagoreism, especially and very clearly already in Platonism, an ontology, a doctrine concerning reality (H.O. 1), thus arises, which considers precisely that order, that light as the true, i.e., nondeceptive reality.

Especially the process of knowing, of proceeding rationally, which is the theme of every noölogy (doctrine concerning the nous, intellectus, mind, resp. reason (H.O. 9 (Ar.); 53 (Pl.); 56 (Alb.)), stands or falls with the light of the mind understood as mind/reason).

In Neoplatonism, the idea circulates that all being arises from the First Being, called Primal Light; in the dualistic systems of thought (e.g., the Gnostic systems), there is Light and Darkness, two primal origins of realities.

2. The Patristics adopted this. But particularly S. Augustine is known for his enlightenment theory and light ontology. In the Catholic Middle Ages, it is especially S. Bonaventura (1217/ 1274), who is a light ontologist, as well as S. Albertus the Great (Albertus Magnus: 1193/1280), the teacher of the top figure of High Scholasticism, Thomas Aquinas (H.O. 60). More naturalistic (optics) is the illumina doctrine of Robert Grosseteste (1175/1253).

An analogy is the basis of all enlightenment doctrine: just as in sensory experience, as a whole, natural light (optical) plays a decisive role, so too in the coming about of intellectual-reasonable knowledge (nocturnal): the eternal ideas, in God's Spirit, come through, in our fallible-sensitive mental life, only thanks to a "spiritual (incorporeal), inner light," which, within biblical revelation, is either the light of the nature-given mind (lumen naturale) or the light of the o.g.v. supernatural grace granted insight (lumen superna-turale) or, also, both somewhere in one. - Cfr. H.O. 16: analogy (= partial identity).

Wisdom Literature,

'Sophiology' (wisdom teaching) is the content of the so-called Wisdom Books of the Old and New Testaments (sapiential texts).

H.O. 66.

Apart from texts, which deal explicitly or indirectly with 'Wisdom', in both Testaments, are

a.1. Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes (= Qohelet), Ecclesiasticus (= Jesus ben Sirach), Wisdom, -- in their entirety,

a.2. Tobit, Baruch,-- in part, and

b. Psalms, Song of Songs,-- improperly, counted among the sapiential books.

According to Jeremias 18:18, the "word" is characteristic of the prophet; the "law" of the "priest" and the "counsel(ing)" of the "sage" (*G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testamentes, I (Die Theol. d. geschichtl. Ueberlieferungen Israels)*, Munich, 1961, 428).

Essentially, one can distinguish four types of Biblical "wisdom.

a the ordinary, profane and/or sacred experiential knowledge of universe and life, insofar as laws (order) are discoverable in them (o.c.,415);

b. the sacred, to Yahweh, resp. Trinity, insights:

b.1. God is referred to, invariably, in the Bible, as the wisdom par excellence (*Isaiah 28:29*);

b.2. God can, in charismatic-exceptional form, communicate his wisdom to his "elect": e.g., Solomon is a man "inspired by God's wisdom" (*1 Kings 3:28;5:9*);

c. apart from these two concepts, there is a third: a kind of personified, "hypostasized," figure, from God, exalted above creation, the great educator of nations, spreading God's wisdom over all creation (o.c., 439);

d. in the Book of Daniel (2:31vv.) appears a type of wisdom, which is apocalyptic: it is strongly related to the theosophies (H.O. 64) (v. Rad, o.c., 450; *Theologie der prophetischen Überlieferungen Israëls*), (Theology of the Prophetic Traditions of Israel), Munich, 1961, 314/328 (*Daniel und die Apokalyptik*); apocalypticism, apart from being end-time thinking (eschatology), includes all peoples (Israel loses its prime role), also does not shun paranormal and occult experiences (esotericism). - The wisdom texts were, by S. Augustine, very particularly thought out.

Theürgie.

Theosophy, whether Pagan or Biblical, can never be completely separated from Magic and Manticism (i.e., controlling occult (paranormal) energies, beings, either as a means of work (magic) or as a means of knowing (manticism)). It happens, even, that "theosophia" and "theourgia" are synonymous.

E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley / Los Angeles, 1966, 283/311 (*Theurgy*), says that an Ioulianos ho theourgos, Julianus de Theürg, is the founder of Neoplatonic theurgy (parapsychology, occultism).

H.O. 67.

The idea "Christian philosophy".

Now that we know, approximately, in what climate initial Christianity learned to philosophize (rhetoric, professional science, ontology, theology,--literature), we pause, very briefly, to consider the idea of "Christian philosophizing.

(i) *E. Bréhier* (1876/1952), in his monumental work *Histoire de la philosophie* (1926/1932), claims that Christianity, after the Neoplatonists, does represent a "vexing mental revolution" but cannot handle "real philosophy.

One feels, through this twofold statement, modern rationalism at work. Philosophizing' is, for the Enlightened, secularized thinking, - which is then still mostly, wrongly, asserted of the Heathen thinkers, (that this is perfect falsehood appears, abundantly, from H.O. 25 (Ar.); 54 (P1.); 57 (Alb.)).

(ii) *Cl. Tresmontant* (1925/997), in *Essai sur la pensée hébraïque*, (Essay on Hebrew thought,), Paris, 1953;-- *Idées maîtresses de la métaphysique chrétienne*, (Main ideas of the Christian metaphysics,), Paris, 1962;-- *La métaphysique du christianisme et la naissance de la philosophie chrétienne*, (The metaphysics of Christianity and the birth of Christian philosophy,), Paris, 1961, asserting, against Bréhier, that the Bible, though not a book of rhetoric, professional science, philosophy, theology, nevertheless contains a more or less explicitly articulated or, even, covered assumed ontology.

From the Jahwist text (-900/-800) to the First Vatican Council (1870), there is, for the unprejudiced, one coherent ontology at work: transcendental (all-encompassing) being, the particular types of being, such as e.g. unity/multitude,-- Godhead/ finite being (created being), immutable/changeable being (history,-- sacred or sacred history), time (beginning of creation)/space, matter/spirit (soul, angel/ devil, God), body/ disembodied being (resurrected body e.g.), human/animal/plant, thinking, volition and acting, etc.,-- all of this has a sometimes very precisely defined status (essence).

Saint Klemens of Alexindreia (145/215), the first Christian philosopher.

Familiar with;

(1) the 'enkuklia mathèmata' (general education: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, - musicology (Paleopyth.);-- grammar, rhetoric, dialectics (Protosof.),

(2) the Hellenic philosophy of the time (science, ontology, theology), he was, at the same time, a Christian, who wanted to elevate his Christianity to - what in those days, quite often, was called - 'gnosis', knowledge, insight.

H.O. 68.

He travels, from Greece, to S. Italy, then to the East, to meet Christian masters of thought. In Egypt he encounters the man who has given him "a pure treasure of insight."

Basis of his Christian philosophy is a deliberate epistemology (theory of knowledge).

(1) Christ, in His deepest being, as the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, is the logos (rather often translated by the word,-- better: universe wisdom (cf. H.O. 66: personified, reaching beyond the totality of creation)): as such, Jesus, as the light of spirits (intellectual activities), is present everywhere in the world, in an invisible way -- in Old and New Testaments, in the Pagan thinkers.

(2) The relation between, on the one hand, natural knowledge (H.O. 65: lumen nat.) and, on the other hand, supernatural or faith knowledge (H.O 65:1. supernat.) he tries to make clear by means of logic (the Aristotelian and the Stoic).

Bréhier cannot, after all, claim that such is not real thinking, "philosophizing"! Klemens has, in a lapidary way, summarized his position: "Just as the subjects of general education (enkuklia mathemata) form a unity in the service of their sovereign, philosophy, so philosophy in its turn cooperates in the acquisition of (note: Christianly conceived) 'sophia' (wisdom, i.e., philosophically grounded theology)". (Stromata (= Mixtures), 1).

This epistemological structure - for that is its proper scope - has become decisive for the whole of patristics, Augustine included. The Church Fathers (bishops, priests, laymen, men and... sometimes women) are believers, but mostly with a highly Hellenized culture of thought.

Like Klemens of Alexandria, they speak, about points of faith and morals, in terms of pagan philosophy and literature and, conversely, they speak, about the Hellenistic, Hellenistic (= late Hellenistic) literary and general - cultural points, in terms of the Biblical language. A single well-defined and thought-out model theory (speaking in terms of the known (= model) about something unknown), supported by the equally thought-out analogy between paganism and Christianity (H.O. 12/14; 41v.).

H.O 69.

Overview of patristic philosophy.

It is situated between 33 and 800.

(1) *Early Patristic* (33/325).

Two figures count: the already mentioned Clemens of Alexandria and, in his wake, Origenes of Alexandria (185/251), who develops the first Christian system of thought.

(2) *High Patristics* (325/450).

Two main figures: in the Greek East, St. Gregory of Nussa (335/394), whom we note, in passing, for his methodical doubt, and St. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430), in the Western Church.

(3) *Late Patristic* (450/ 800).

We note, likewise, two remarkable figures: in the East, the already named Pseudo-Dionusios, the Areopagite (tss. 400 and 500; H.O. 57), and, in the West, Boëthius of Rome (480/525), who, along with S. Augustine, is the great medieval "auctoritas" (authoritative thinker).

The shifting, carried out by the Church Fathers, in Greek thought.

(1) Were invariably rejected:

(a) any form of skepticism (not methodical doubt) (H.O. 4: phenomenalism is the more correct name for skepticism); for, the skeptic (= skepticist) refuses, systematically, to assume anything beyond the phenomena, as far as sensistically conceived perception (H.O. 5) grasps them;

(b) any form of epicureanism.

Epikouros of Samos (-341/-271) founded a system of thought that

(a) a Demokriteic-Atomistic physical (a materialism, that is (H.O. 7)),

(b) concatenated a Kurenaic pleasure ethic (hedonism or fil. v/h mere lust as the norm of action).

One does not need to know much about biblical ethics and Christianity, classically speaking, to quickly see that this twofold rejection is more than obvious.

(2) *Was little appreciated:*

Aristotelianism (H.O. 25v.: for Aristotle, as for Epikouros, incidentally, the human soul was mortal and the concept of God was too naturalistic (deity as a mere integral part the total nature).

(3) *Enjoyed a high esteem all religious philosophies:*

a. the stoa (H.O. 58v.; materialism, though recognizing coarse and tenuous substance, was, of course, rejected; it is Kunic ethics, which is valued);

b. Platonism (H.O. 32/62),--which will become very clear further on;

c. before all else, the theosophies (H.O. 64), for the reason that theosophy essentially, **(1)** presupposes God-contact (ideative) and **(2)** God-sighting (H.O. 57: mystical theology).

H.O. 70.

The Teachings of S. Augustine.

We are not, of course, going to expound the whole doctrine now. The doctrine of ideas (Platon), the placement of ideas in God (Albinos), we will assume as known (even if this giant thinker brought a lot of news to the matter).

We do, however, emphasize the new moments, which he introduced into idealist philosophy and theology. Idealism, after all, is a living organism (H.O. 45: *cybernetic; generative*), evolving, from thinker to thinker.

a.-- *Augustinian idealism as a victory over skepticism and antique materialism.*

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, II, 279, summarizes this as follows.

(a) *The refutation of academic skepticism.*

The Skepticist phase of the Platonic Academy stands or falls with, especially, two thinkers:

1. *Arkesilaos of Pitane* (in Mysia, Kl.-Az.; -315/-240),

someone, who left no writings, but who, apparently, advocated a strong dose of genuine Skepticism, behind a Socratic-Platonic facade.

2. *Karneades of kurènè* (Cyrene; -214/-129),

Whose teachings can be characterized as follows: "In the cosmos the unpredictable reigns. In it man lives and dies, who, in turn, is an unpredictable being:-- Against this, Augustine puts forward the reflective method. See a little further.

(b) *The refutation of ancient materialism.*

The form of ancient materialism, with which our holy church teacher, for many years, wrestled, is Manichaeism.-- Mani (in Greek: Manès; 216/270) is the founder of a dualistic religious-philosophical system of thought (H.O. 65) which, even, today, still finds adherents.-- Against this, Augustine sets forth the doctrine concerning ideas.

Stances of Augustine.

(1) Knowing man does not merely include our subjective representations concerning the data. It is through the noble yoke (H.O. 8; 32; 37; 52), which Augustine also designates, on occasion, with the professional term 'intentio', -in contact with reality itself. More than that: in that concrete-singular reality our knowing, at least the abstract-ideative (H.O. 10; 18; 25;-- 32) knowing, gives out on the ideal 'reality'. This twofold truth concerning our knowing misses antique Skepticism.

(2) The concrete-singular phenomenon, at least for us humans, with our bodily senses (our body, for Augustine, is an intermediate between the soul and the surrounding real bodies), is, first of all, bodies, i.e., matter, in geometrical form (H.O. 12).

H.O. 71.

But, in it, the substance, viz. the primal substance (H.O. 20;30;51;59), with its laws, prevails.

We will give a sample of Manichaeism, as we get to know it, among other things, through Augustine's works.-- The Manichaeans grasp all that God is (the idea 'God' itself), and all that is good (value), i.e. the idea itself 'goodness' (value in itself) - not only the 'goods' in which goodness is embodied - as - what they, at least, label 'light'. But ... this 'light' they understand in the purely material sense of the word!

Thus, incidentally, for them, all that is evil is, likewise, something material. Thus, e.g., they interpret the term "kingdom of God" (God's Realm) to mean a material sphere of light (the realm of light), something like the material sun, which we see rising in the morning, at the bilge, and descending in the evening, in the west, with its sphere of light (in the optical sense; H.O. 65; R. Grosseteste).

By the way: the material sun of our solar system is, for them, like a "corollary" (emanatio) of the divine sphere of light.

Augustine scornfully remarks, "They made no distinction of beings between the (transcendent) Light which is God, and the (material) light, which he created" (Contra Faust., 22: 8). In a similar sense, even, the Holy Trinity was conceived.

This materialism, coarse and fine, contained, likewise, a Catharsis - idea in the same style.

Augustine's response.

1. There exist, what the Skeptics deny, objective bodies, of matter (gross and rarefied in nature).

2. But these bodies and the substance present in them are only conceivable (H.O. 43: sufficient reason), i.e., in Augustine's language, have a ratio, a sufficient reason, only if they are the realization (concrete-singular copy) of the idea 'all that is body, resp. substance'.

In other words: the ideal reality is, again, as with the criticism of Skepticism, decisive.

Which O. Willmann, *ibid.*, summarizes lapidary as follows: "The truth, in actual things themselves, is:

(1) not our representation and, yet, it is Knowable and Thinkable (intellegibilis, ideal),

(2) not corporeal and, yet, it is real". It is both above our mere representations (representationism) and above materiality (materialism).-- These two -- representationism, materialism -- we shall yet meet.

H.O. 72.

B.-- *The reflective foundation of Augustinian ontology.*

P. Ricoeur (1913/2005), *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d'herméneutique)*, (The conflict of interpretations (Essays in hermeneutics)), Paris, 1969, 233 (238; 322), talks about the "philosophie réflexive" (reflective thinking). Central, in it, is the cogito, I think. Cfr. H.O. 13. According to Ricoeur, there is a whole tradition : the Socratic cogito ('Take care of your soul'; H.O. 54), the Augustinian cogito ("The inner man, at the intersection of the 'external' (bodily; H.O. 70: intermediate) things and the 'higher' (understand: ideal) truths"); -- the modern cogito of Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Nabert, Husserl,-- not forgetting the cogito of Maine de Biran and others.

(*Note* -- Why do we say 'reflexive' and not 'reflective'? To distinguish from 're.flexive' in the sense of 'loopy' in the general sense; -- the reflection of the self on itself is only one case of 'loopiness').-- We dwell, now, on the Augustinian texts in this regard.

Soliloquy 2:1, "-- 'Ye who strive for self-knowledge (*op.* : reflexive knowledge), do ye realize that ye exist?!-- 'Yes, I realize that!-- 'How do ye come to that realization?!-- 'I do not know that!-- 'Do ye perceive yourselves as singular (singular) or plural?!-- 'I do not know that!-- 'Do ye realize that ye move of your own strength and ability?!-- 'I do not know that. - 'Do you realize that at this moment, you are thinking?!-- "Yes, I realize that".

De Trinitate 10:14.-- "Whether the life force is situated in the air (Anaximenes of Miletos (-588/-524) or in the fire (H.O. 45),-- to such a thing men may well doubt. But who would want to doubt that he lives, remembers (= is aware of), realizes, wants, thinks, knows, and judges? For, while he is doubting, he is living, he remembers (is aware of himself) that he is doubting; he realizes that he is doubting; he desires to arrive at certainty; he is pondering; he realizes that he knows nothing; he comes to the conclusion (judgment) that he may not assume anything prematurely (= uncritically)."

De vera religione 73.-- "For all those who recognize from themselves that they are in doubt, it is true that they recognize something which represents truth and, immediately, that they have, in this respect, certainty. Consequence: for all, who doubt that truth exists, it is true that they possess, ipso facto (= immediately), something true, about which they do not doubt.

H.O. 73

But something that is true cannot be true other than by the truth itself."

De civitate Dei (On the State of God) 19:18.

In the previous text there was talk of skepticism (H.O. 70) : "A doubt of that type abhors the state of God (*op.*: the church) as without sufficient reason (H.O. 14v.). This is because of the fact that, concerning the data grasped by our mind (man,-- cf. mental) and our reason (ratio), there is a knowledge that

(1) admittedly limited (H.O. 64: fallibilism) is (...),

(2) yet that is absolutely certain, while, because of this, the senses of our soul incarnated in the body (H.O. 70: an intermediate term) - our soul serves it - are credible." So much for Augustine's reflective-critical method.

In particular: more than the brute (i.e. unexplained) fact this 'intentional' method does not give. Something, which P. Ricoeur (in the above-mentioned work) rightly points out: "he comes to the conclusion (= judgment) that he may assume nothing prematurely (i.e. without 'ratio' sufficient reason)".

C.-- *The complete, human cogito.*

Self-knowledge, in the case of the Paleopythagoreans (for whom it extended to past lives,--think of the 'anamnesis') and of Socrates (for whom it was especially ethical) something which Ricoeur, in the text quoted from him, does not make clear -- is more than merely reflective -- critical certainty of the fact that I exist. The above-mentioned schools of thought involve, at once, a conception of man.

With S. Augustine it is, for us who live (and think) in an Enlightenment-Rationalist atmosphere, of a very decisive nature. What a.o. M. Scheler (1874/1928) has very well reflected in his axiology.

The Augustinian text itself.

The civ. Dei 11:26.-- "We exist; we know our existence (being); we love ('love') our existence and knowing. Established as we are in this triplicity, no untrue insight, even if it seems true, can make us uncertain. The reason is: we do not grasp this trinity as we grasp the things outside us, namely, through the senses of our body".

This text - according to O. Willmann, o.c.,252 - provides us with Augustine's basic intuition, which goes hand in hand with the reflective basic certainty.

H.O. 74.

The facts of consciousness i.e. that which, with the certainty of the fact that each one of us, as I (= subject) exists, is grasped, when analyzed thoroughly -- is summarized by S. Augustine in the ternarium (trinity) 'esse, nosse, velle', i.e. being (understand : factual existence), knowing (consciousness, awareness), 'wanting' understand, in the language of the time...: to be absorbed in, to love (soulfully if need be).

Sometimes there is a variant: memoria, intelligentia, amor (remembering (= being conscious, aware of oneself as actually existing; insight; 'love', (= love driftly going up).

Note.-- With Max Scheler's axiological phenomenology we return, further in this course, to this. Here an ancient Christian thinker like Augustine provides us with the foundation.

The thorough distinction vs. Descartes' cogito.

O. Willmann, o.c., 252, notes:

(1) Augustine applies, here, the noble yoke (H.O. 8; 32; 37; 52; 70): our knowing, but also our loving - both, and knowing process and loving process - issue from an objective, from that knowing and loving, as acts, independent real. In other words: introspection - to use a purely psychological term, but which, at the same time, can also be used ontologically - is, at the same time, intentionally directed) towards something objective).

Descartes, on the other hand, is illusionist (one infers from the purely inner, purely subjective representation (representationism, mediatism) that there must be "such a thing as an objective fact"); Descartes' "idées claires et distinctes" (clear and distinct representations,--never translate by the Platonic or Platonizing "ideas," please, for these are something very different) are, to him, in mind, but are only nominalistic-denotative (H.O. 1).

(2) Augustine involves in self-knowledge, "consciousness" (awareness), knowing, but also value-feeling and value-striving (velle = wanting). The human mind, in its full act, is more than mere cognitive act. It is also and always, and very thoroughly, mind. Descartes, on the other hand, interprets "consciousness" to be one-sidedly rationalistic.

Decision.-- The reflective method grasps both the fact and the essence form, - at least the essence form of the psychic principal acts, peculiar to that which actually exists and also realizes this, as self-conscious 'being'.

Note -- O. Willmann, o.c., 267, notes that Augustine's Trinity idea reflects the same triad (memoria, intellectus, voluntas).

H.O. 75.

D.-- Historiology, ideational understanding.

1. As Augustine, greatest merit counts the transcendence of -- what is called, in professional terms -- the nature-bound, "cyclic" (= circuitous) idea of history, peculiar to (pagan) Antiquity and its replacement by a (Biblical) "linear" (rectilinear) scheme of history. Universal or planetary history, in its basic outlines, is set forth in *Augustine's De civitate Dei (The State of God)*.

For S. Augustine, all history is also sacred or salvific history. Insofar as human activity, which is at the heart of all history, is not involved in this sacred and salvific history, it is as good as useless.

2. The after-effects.

As with many other doctrines, so with regard to his philosophy of history (= historiology): either one preserves or elaborates it (*Bossuet* (1627/1704;-- *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (Discourse on universal history), (1681)) or one preserves some basic scheme, but secularizes it.

Apart from J. G. Fichte (1762/1814), the founder - so to speak - of what *Fr. Borkenau, Karl Marx (Auswahl und Einleitung)*, ((Selection and introduction),), Frankf.a.M./ Hamburg, 1956, 35, called "das Marxsche Fünf-Akte-Schema" (the Marxian five-act scheme), and Fr. W. Hegel (1775/1854), whom one, usually, mentions in this connection (with his scheme "self - his/ self-loss (Entfremdung)/ self-recovery), is there -- which may be surprising to some: Karl Marx (1818/1883).

Borkenau outlines Fichte's scheme as follows:

I (innocent stage),

II (Fall),

III (continued Fall),

IV (ethical repentance (reversal), with which salvation accompanies),

V (fresh innocence, but on higher ground). In Fichte's case, this is an ethical history scheme.

Borkenau, o.c.,34, outlines the Marxist economic scheme as follows:

I (paradise- innocent, but subject to nature social "harmony

II (the "Fall," the introduction of privatizing property,--with the aftermath : social inequality, state, religion, family and family),

III (continued economic "sin" : capitalism),

IV (redemptive cover : the revolution of the proletarians),

V (the 'Zukunftstaat', a new, 'paradisiacal' and innocent 'communist' state, in which primal communism (= phase I), on a higher level, purified, emerges). Cfr. H.O. 16 (catharsis),-- 37; 57. A truly 'tough' scheme of thought!

H.O. 76.

Augustinian thought schemata.

O. Willmann, hits the Augustinian nail on the head, when he quotes Augustine's words: "The systems of society - meaning Church and State - of this world (1) are not accidental constructions, but (2) they arose from a law, from the work in the nature of being (synchronic structure) and in the course of development (diachronic structure) and only known by God and founded by his free decision: "non temere et quasi fortuito (= not without deliberation and as it were by chance) (...), sed pro rerum ordine ac temporum occulto nobis, notissimo sibi (= Deo) (= but by virtue of a hidden order,-- hidden from us, but most known to God,-- order, which governs both the (structures of society) and the periods of time)."

Augustine calls God, thereby, with the specialist terms 'dominus' (lord), moderator (leader). Not the temporal order - according to Augustine -- governs and leads God, but the other way around: He - and He alone - programs them.-- Up to there the idealistic foundation: Church and State, as all that is, (H.O. 40: All that is sound; 44 (All that ...is); 47 (All that is beautiful); 60 (All that is human)), are ideas of God, at work in the phenomena (= history).

First thought outline.

O. Willmann, o.c.,306/308, exemplifies the ideal-cybernetic scheme (H.O. 45; 70) 'All that is Roman'. Preliminary summary: Roma antiqua (ancient, original Rome), Roma pagana (decayed-pagan Rome), Roma Christiana (Christianized Rome).

(1) *The "originary" Rome.*

In his analysis of Roman culture, Augustine makes a phenomenal observation: Rome (Roman humanity) was the place of "virtue" (H.O. 62). He reviews the results: not without God's permission (i.e., without responding to the original idea of God, which ancient Rome embodied), the city of Rome became the centerpiece of a world empire, the Imperium Romanum, which controlled the then inhabited world (oikoumene, oecumene) and subjected it to the Pax Romana, the peace established by the Roman state system.

What our idealistic thinker, who is Augustine, indicates by this is that the ontological core of the "people of the Romans" was a divine idea, -- the "ratio," i.e., the idea as sufficient reason of the phenomena established (H.O. 43; 71). In still other words, the origin is the God idea; insofar as the actual Romans were ethically sound, they are originary.

H.O. 77.

(2) *The fallen / decayed Rome.*

Alaric I (370/410), prince of the West Goths, took, in 410, the city of Rome. The shock was great: some were upside down, others saw a punishment in it, because of the deities, because of Christianity (as apostasy from the ancient Roman religion). Augustine writes, thereupon, a text of encouragement and refutation the *Civitate Dei* (*The State of God*), his main work. "The Roman state regarded its law and its peace as inviolable, - as what transcends every human piece of history. This self-aggrandizement became its downfall. It wanted to regulate everything, to control everything. Yet, in doing so, he rejected God. The 'order' and 'justice' that he founded ultimately amount to a ridiculous imitation, to a degeneration of an ominous nature of a natural and Christian order". (Fr. Ferrier, *Saint Augustin*, in: *D. Huisman, dir., Dict.d. phil.*, Paris, 1984, 141).

Indeed throughout his life Augustine was confronted with pagan Rome. Note: the claim that he would have said that the virtues of the pagans were polished vices, is based on an untruth. The "origin-fidelity" of Rome - above - proves this. Yet, for him, as for every Christian of that period, Rome was the symbol of "the blood spatter of martyrs" (during the barbaric persecutions).

Indeed: a twofold other idea was side by side with the divine one, at work:

(1) The idea 'All that is vice' (to which we shall return);

(2) The idea "All that is demonic," that Rome - says O. Willmann, *ibid.* - sprang from sin and galvanized in figures like Cain, the fratricide of Book Genesis.

Note.-- The powerful impression, which emanated from this twofold idea, can be felt, not only in *De civitate Dei* (in which it is the fundamental theme), but also in his *Confessions* and in his anti-Manichean writings (H.O. 70).

Explanation.

Reread H.O. 21/22 (artificialist, medical model): also man, a fortiori (in Augustinian perspective) the demons (Satan at the head),---they too design a representation (form of being), which they, in themselves and in their environment, work out. The ethical vice, the demonic inspiration, they establish, both, as an antigodly power, evil.

H.O. 78.

(3) *Christianized Rome.*

The observable phenomena, apart from showing a flawless, "origin-faithful" Rome and a dilapidated Rome, pointed to a new, history-making idea, God's supernatural grace that both restored the deviation of the dilapidated Rome (H.O. 44v.) and raised the core healthy idea-faithfulness of the origin-faithful Rome to a higher level (H.O. 16; 75).

Gratia supponit, sanat et elevat naturam: grace -- understand: the divine idea, which as the supernatural takes root in nature -- presupposes, purifies and elevates nature. This is how Scholastic theology will express it -- traditionally.-.

Since the day Emperor Constantine I the Great (°288) issued the Edict of Milan in 313, Christians enjoyed religious freedom in the empire. Although, on the basis of an archaic-natural moral maturity peculiar to the Romans, the Christian who was Augustine could feel at home in the earthly state of Rome - which, from time to time, shines through in *De civitate Dei* -, the phenomena experienced -- the facts of a growing number of converts, of a growing influence on the cultural life of the faithful -- seemed to indicate that, instead of hostility, a peaceful co-existence of Church and State was among the possibilities. Even the utopia arose, among some, that a unity 'Church/State' would one day become a reality. This aspect, too, is not missed in *De civitate Dei*.

According to O. Willmann, o.c., 308, later, Middle Ages Christianity - the Scholastics included - tended to overestimate the secular elaborability of the moment of grace.

Decision.-- O. Willmann, o.c., 306, writes: Just as Augustine attributed to Greek philosophy the merit of having prepared it for Christian truth, so too he recognized that the natural-given virtue and strength of the Roman people was, in some way, directed to the fullness of time (= the Biblical description of Christianity)

This means that the analogy - here a type of collective analogy (H.O. 42) - is the basis of an understanding - called pax, peace, in Augustine's parlance - between pagan and Christian views of life. instead of emphasizing the difference (H.O. 3: differentialism) - there was more than reason to do so -, Augustine holds love-pathos (H.O. 73v.) to underline the similarity.

H.O. 79.

Second Thought Outline.

We still have it in our memory: *rerum et temporum ordo occultus nobis, notissimus Deo* (an arrangement of things and times, hidden from us, known to God of all).

We shall, now, go over a second ideal order of a diachronic nature. The idea "All that is man (Church, State)" proceeds, according to Augustinus, in five stages.

1. *The first humanity.*

She knew a "unity" of "Church" (religion) and "State" (social order), o.k. virtue (H.O. 76).

2. *The dyarchy.*

Sin (praxis of vice) is the 'ratio' (sufficient reason) and idea of a 'civitas terrena' (a secular, earthly society, resp. 'state' but God's restorative idea, his grace, founded the 'civitas coelestis', the 'heavenly' community of God-fearing people.

Note.-- 'Dy.archie' (duo + archè: two controlling authorities) is one of the technical terms to designate a situation, in which, apart from the State, the members of a society know themselves to be included in a Church, for example.-- This phase corresponds to the Biblical idea of 'Fall'.

3. *Heritage and legacy.*

Both heavenly and earthly mankind reproduce, but with transmission to the offspring of God-fear and God-fear.

Note -- Augustine seizes upon Biblical figures, who are both founders and symbolizers: Abel and Seth are God-friends (De Civ. D. 15: 1; 15: 17); Cain, already cited, is God-fearing (Ibid. 15:5; // Genesis 4:17).

4. *The increasing struggle between good and evil.*

God has, apparently -- for the phenomena as well as of mythical as well as of scientific history show them at work -- thought the idea 'all that is struggle between good and evil' together with the ideas 'All that is good' and 'All that is evil'.

That is the 'ratio' (explanation, sufficient reason) of the fact that no understanding is possible, at least to some extent, between God-friend and God-fear, respectively God-hostile.

The growth, in the course of history of vice led to the divine judgment (God's judgment). Augustine, for example, sees this idea of "restoration" (H.O. 45) at work in the Flood. As lord of history (H.O. 76), God has structured his ideas cybernetically: with every deviation there is, as it were, a restorative movement (even if on the basis of immanent sanction, i.e. the fact that an act, in its consequences (results), is judged).

H.O. 80.

Mankind, resurrected after a God-like flood, develops the same dyarchy: figures like Cham and Japheth are Biblical thought models of vice; Shem is a figure, who embodies virtue.

This ends in an allusion:

a. the state of God (*civitas caelestis*) enters a new phase with the calling of Abraham (the foundation of the people of God, Israel, -- with priests, prophets sages, apocalyptists (H.O. 66),-- with Moses (Mosaic revelation),-- with the Judges, the Kings etc.);

b. the secular State develops into gigantic empires, world empires, such as the Assyrian and the Egyptian, -- not to mention the Roman (cfr Daniel; H.O. 66). Apocalyptically expressed: both systems, the God-fearing and the God-fearing, come to an end and top confrontation. Which will lead to a countermovement on God's part.

5. The Christian end time phase.

The First and Second Comings of Christ herald the final judgment. In the midst of that final battle, Augustine knows himself situated.

Reread, now, H.O. 75, the Five-Act Scheme: the analogy, in the sense of thorough similarity, stands out. Even Marxism contains "sacred history."

Note.-- Enlightenment-influenced people marvel that a great thinker like Augustine so easily ("uncritically") incorporates the "myths" of Biblical sacred history into his idealistic thinking.

1. Reread, now, H.O. 29 (Plat. myths).

2. One does not forget that, through the surface structures (the phenomena), Augustine seeks the depth structures (= ideas), as 'rationes', necessary and sufficient reasons ('explanations'). Well, in more than one case, the myth, instead of a surface - insight, offers a depth structure, an idea.

Note that the Antiquities and Biblical writers also knew the distinction 'myth'/'phenomenon'. Does not S. Peter (*2 Peter 1:16*) say that he did not follow 'complicated myths' (perhaps the mythical speculations of the Gnostics were meant), but as an eyewitness of Christ's glorification (transfiguration) established the facts. Myth', by the way, can be understood both melioratively (in a favorable sense) and pejoratively (in a critical sense).

If a man like Platon came to the conclusion that some ideas are only truthfully discussed in a mythical story, then this is, for us, a warning.

H.O. 81.

E. Sociology, ideationally speaking -- The Augustinian method.

First, a summary overview of the method. After the few applicative models (refutation v. antique Skepticism and Materialism; reflective meth.; the complete - human consciousness (cogito); philosophy of history), normally, for the reader(s) of the present text, the method should be clearer. -- We summarize them, therefore, briefly.

(1). The essence core is "the noble yoke" (H.O. 70v.).

However, in contrast to e.g. Platon, Augustine, to the opposition pair of 'sensory contemplation (perception)'/ 'rational thought' (this, when man himself is an eyewitness (historia, eyewitness knowledge (already Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-425) makes this distinction)), adds the opposition pair of 'faith'/ 'contemplation' (seeing) (knowledge, past the person and credibility of, one or more eyewitnesses), i.d., in Herodotean language, historia, knowledge of faith. Needless to say, Augustine, with this, in epistemology, which is essentially the analysis of the noble yoke, introduces Biblical faith as justifiable (i.e., as amenable to 'ratio' (sufficient reason)). Cfr H.O. 67v: Christian Thought.

(2) The idea of "order(s)".

H.O. 76; 79, already, taught us how thorough this idea is. But then we emphasized, with Augustine, the diachrony. In this "sociological" (society-analytical) chapter it is rather the synchrony which shows order(s).

1. *D. Nauta, Logic and Model*, Bussum, 1970, 175, defines 'system' as "a collection with a structure". And 'structure' is, there, defined as "the whole network (= totality, aggregate) of relations (relations) - we, as Aristotelians (H.O. 13v.), say ideational identities (H.O. 41) - of a system (= system)".

2. For Augustine, apart from friendship and marriage, *civitas dei* (state of God) and *civitas terrena* (earthly, 'secular' state) are two types of society (social systems) (-- H.O. 47: *qualitas occulta*, black box, x) or social essences (essences: 'essential, essential, the structure of a set of properties). or still: order(s) types.

Augustine, De civ. D., 19:13, defines - the formula is famous - order as "arrangement, which assigns to equal and unequal data ('things') each its due place.

H.O. 82.

Note.-- The idea 'law(moderation)' is a type of order(ning): "The eternal law(moderation) - lex aeterna - is such that only 'lawful' ('just') is an order of things, in which all being is as ordered as possible." (De lib. arb.,1:6).

Note -- H.O. 51v. (Palopyth. moment in Platon's idea of 'beauty') taught us, already, that that which commands admiration (= clean), exhibits order.

Augustine's idea of beauty is also harmologically sound: "is clean all that exhibits the required proportion (proportio)." The fitting together of the parts together with that which generates their mutual coherence -- according to O. Willmann, o.c., 303 -- is, therein, under understood. In other words: the system concept -- to put it topically -- is decisive. Fundamentally: every idealism is a systems theory.

It is claimed that **(1)** any idealism and **(2)** the Augustinian nature is alien. Everything would take place - as far as Augustine is concerned - between God and the individual soul (understanding this then introspectively (H.O. 72)). But just listen to De civ. Dei 22:24:

"Who, after all, could represent the picturesqueness of nature with mere words? (...). Take, for example, the splendor of the heavens, the earth and the sea; the wonderful radiance of the light; the splendor of the sun, the moon, the heavenly bodies,--of the green of our forests, --of the fragrances and colors of our flowers; the charming variety of the colorful world of birds and animals (...); the impressive spectacle which the sea presents to us, when it seems to be giving in to the world....); the impressive spectacle which the sea offers us, as it were, when it covers itself in ever new garments, with endless new colors,-- now green in all shades, then purple or blue.

O. Willmann, o.c., 317, adds: as if Augustine wanted to brace himself against any overvaluation of culture, he designs, in this text, a nature, in which the beautiful - that which commands admiration and worship (H.O. 33 (Einstein) and 53) - is nothing but the ideas, insofar as immanent (H.O. 32) to nature.

Indeed, Augustine himself elucidates what we have just said: "Look at the heavens, the earth and the sea, -- with all that shines in them or above them, with all that moves and swims in the depths all beings exhibit creature forms (H.O. 12), because they possess 'numeri', structures. Take away from them these forms of being, and they are nothing!"

H.O. 83,

It is claimed, further, that Augustinianism in particular is a Gott-und-die-seele (God-and-the-soul), Christianity (a Christianity, which knows only the God-Soul relationship).

But we look, now, briefly, at Augustine's sociology. The individual, as he sees him/her, is indeed conceived personalistically (H.O. 63), as a free, self-determining person. But Augustinian personalism is essentially 'solidarism'. The single person, however autonomous (self-determined), is not conceived of as 'anarchic'. Reread, now first, H.O. 34, 47 (Plat. dialectic). The ideation of 'all that is social' can, in virtue of Platon's method, be set forth.

I.-- *The names and definitions.*

'Civitas', 'state' (understand : society, society, with or without authority thought) is the name.

M.T. Cicero (-106/-43) the great Roman orator, defined "society" as follows: "(1) a multitude of people, (2) interconnected, (3) thanks to understanding based on a legal order and welfare, which, both, are common."

One sees that all the components of the idea of "system" (in the sociological sense, that is) are present:

- (1) set (elements, with common property(s),
- (2) but this according to the collective analogy (H.O. 42 (// 61;78) or 'structure'.

Cicero was a politician,-- consequence: his language (H.O. 48) reflects his individual commitment (telos; H.O. 20; 45; 59; 61). Augustine was first and foremost a pastoralist. Listen to his individual definition: society is the name for "all that pertains to a multitude of people, who are connected (translate: solidary) by some form of understanding (concordia)".

Just to present, all at once, an applicative model of understanding that comes from Augustine himself, see here: "the whole life of man rests on faith (H.O. 81) and fidelity: friendship, marriage, society.

Supposedly, if the premise is that one believes only what is strictly proven (apodictic), then this implies the collapse of all human society (De utilitate credendi 12:26). If, in doing so, one knows that, for Augustinus, to believe, essentially, is to want to assume what one's fellow man communicates, then one measures the scope of Augustine's term "understanding" (concordia). Immediately, also, his exegesis (interpretation) of Cicero's 'pagan' definition.

H.O. 84,

H.O. 74 taught us the fully - human cogito ((self)consciousness), which includes a third aspect, which Augustine calls 'wanting', resp. 'loving'. Here we are, of these, faced with one application. Perhaps the Dutch 'may' is a better translation: "I may her" (says someone), in the sense of the Augustinian 'want', 'love'. One who believes, resp. is faithful, loves, 'may' fellow man. That affective climate typifies both Augustine's life and his thinking. Not the dry reasoning!

Humanities Method.

W. Dilthey (1833/1911) introduced the idea of 'Geisteswissenschaft', ('Humanities'). This is human science, but on the basis of mutual 'understanding' ('Verstehen').

Well, listen to the following Augustinian description. "There are three kinds of believable things.-

1.1. The things which are believed, yet without being 'understood'. Thus "All that is history", i.e. knowledge, which has, as its object, human actions passing in time.

1.2. The things, which are believed and immediately 'understood'. Thus the 'rationes', the explanations, of man,--either of structures (*note*: numeri, a number of (number) elements, provided with a unity (coherence (H.O. 82)) or of all possible domains of knowing.

2. What is first believed and only later, in time, "understood" are the divine "things" (*note*: Augustine means the divine "rationes" (= ideas)). 'Understand' can, only, those who are pure in heart (H.O. 16: catharsis) (observing the precepts, which we were given, with a view to conscientious living, leads to that purity)." (Qaest. oct. 48 (De credibilibus)).

It is the coherence of points 1.1. and 1.2. which strikes us: 1.1. is talking about purely 'believed' (misunderstood) 'history'; 1.2. about the motives (motivations), resp. motives (unconscious motives), 'rationes' (sufficient reasons for action) of that same 'history' (= collection of 'All that is human, reasoned (led by 'rationes') action').

Also with Dilthey both layers can be found: the description of the view (behavior); but once understood, she gives the 'rationes', the motives resp. incentives, hidden behind that view (behavior). In Augustinian terms: first "believe" in the behavior, then, by analyzing the "rationes," "understand" what is at work in that behavior (moving forces in the soul).

H.O. 85.

In other words: the noble yoke (H.O. 8), insofar as the object included in it is human action, with its explanation ('rationes'), becomes the humanities 'noble yoke', The mental content of knowledge and thought, in the knowing mind, is the representation of the mental content of knowledge and thought, in the known mind, in action (history) at work. Did not a Platonist in the full XVIII -th century, say: "factum (*op.*: the historical fact,-- that which comes about through human action) est verum (*op.*: 'true'; -- in the Platonic-Augustinian sense, i.e., the knowing and thinking content, in the 'factum' itself, as 'ratio', reason, of it, at work)?"

In other words: a historical (understand: human) fact is intellegible (H.O. 12: *similia similibus*), understandable; because and in the knowing subject and in the known subject (object?) an intellegible, knowing and thinking content, aspect is at work. Cf. H.O. 32.

Or, as Vico, the forerunner of the Diltheyan humanities method, still said, "What man finds himself (factum), that he knows (*note*: among his fellow men) best."

Cfr. *K. Vorländer, History of Philosophy, Utr./Antw.*, 1971, 3, 187vv. (where proposer says that Vico, in that way, founded the humanities).

Vico admired two ancient thinkers:

(1). C. Tacitus (55/119), the Roman historian, who, behind the appearance (behavior) of e.g. the Roman emperors, exposed the soul, with its motives, above all;

(2). Platon of Athens (7427/-347) who, according to Vico, gave to the pure facts of history (man as he, factually, is), an ideal, divine background of ideas.

Cfr J. Chaix-Ruy, Vie de J.B. Vico, Paris, 1943, 58s.-- It is as if we hear Augustine, centuries before Vico, asserting, in somewhat different words, of course, the same thing. -- 'spiritual science' is one form of 'concordia' (H.O. 83). It is understanding, worked out into historical method.-- It is 'civitas', fellow citizenship of humanity, Diachronic. We now resume the thread of our exposition.

Platon, H.O. 47, after the names, resp. the definitions, which reflect the use of language, turns to "point 3" (H.O. 34), to reality, intended in names and definitions.

H.O. 86.

II.- *The phenomena (= facts)*

Three sub-phenomena, belonging to one total phenomenon, 'civitas' (society), cite, we, briefly.

(1) *The partial phenomenon of "people" (populus),*

Augustine knew, from his own observation (H.O. 81), many "peoples," Note we, briefly, his definition:

- a. a multitude (= collection) of people,
- b. having as a common characteristic "reasonableness" (ratio),
- c. among whom there is understanding regarding valuation of property, to which it holds (res).

(2) *The partial phenomenon of "church (world church)" (ecclesia).*

Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, knew the Church, indeed the World Church, from his own experience. He characterizes it - not like our present-day sociologists of religion, but - as a pastoral institution: "The Church is and 'familia' (family, relatives), resp. 'domus', house (home, heimat) and 'civitas' (society):

a. the smallest form of cohabitation - that of husband and wife - is her allusion (En. in Psalm. 138:2);

b. the grandest form of society - all humanity - is its (God's) assigned field of action." (O. Willmann, o.c., 311). Of course, the (world) church is also a type of understanding. 'pax' (peace) is what Augustine regularly calls such a thing. also called 'socialis vita' (*De civ. D.* 19:5). Even those who do not know Latin understand this term.

Social life

Listen: "the heavenly state (= form of society), while in transit on earth, recruits members of peoples ('citizens'; singular) and nations (private),-- gathers, on its pilgrimage, fellow pilgrims from all languages. In doing so, he leaves untouched the differences regarding morals, legislations, institutions. None of these he eliminates or destroys. On the contrary, he preserves and affirms everything that - here as elsewhere - serves one and the same purpose, namely peace on earth. At least in so far as this does not run directly counter to religion, which seeks to sharpen the worship of the one, true God." (*The Civ. D.* 19:17).--

(3) *The partial phenomenon of "roman empire (the Roman empire).*

The world counterpart of the World Church is "a 'civitas', which represents not in a state (political system), but the system of (all) states and generations responsible for earthly well-being." (O. Willmann, o.c., 309).

H.O. 87.

Two characterizing texts orphaned, here, cited.

a. *The legal order(s)*. -- (H.O. 83; Cicero's def.).

Augustine in De civ. D. 18:22, he interprets the fact (phenomenon) 'Roman Empire' as "the one (unique), ecumenical (involving the then world, as far as inhabited) political system ('Staatswesen' translates O. Willmann, o.c., 315), characterized by legislation such that Pax Romana, the peace established by the Empire (by force of war, admittedly), becomes possible through that unified legislation." Under 'peace', here, understand understanding on the basis of one legislation.

b. *The imperium romanum as a god idea*.

Already H.O. 76 we bumped into this.-- O. Willmann, o.c., 314, summarizes Augustine's view of church and (Roman) state as follows: "The same divine plan lies at the origin (H.O. 43: vol. reason; ratio) of both 'realms' (church and state)". H.O. 76 taught us that the hidden order(s), syn- and dia-chronic, governs creation. This receives, here, a repetition.

For Augustine, a thinker saturated with Biblical reminiscences (accumulated thoughts), the Roman Empire is "Babylon," both in the historical sense (the city, capital of Chaldea, on the Euphrates,-- once the most populous and the richest city of the ancient world) and in the "mythical-Biblical" sense (the culture turned away from the one, true God).

Listen to Augustine himself: "Blessed the people whose lord is God. Unhappy, however, the people who turned away from God.-- Yet: even this type of people possesses a peace (H.O. 86 (peace on earth)), which is not reprehensible. (...). That such a people, during this earthly life, possesses peace, is also of importance to us (God-believers): as long as both "societies" ("States") - Church and State - exist in one, we enjoy the benefits proper to the peace of Babylon. (De civ. D. 19:26).

To put it topically, secular peace, on earth, is a "good" (value) to be valued by the Church. However supernaturally directed, Augustine knows himself to be situated in the phenomenal world. Even a purely phenomenal (basically deceptive) peace, for example, is and remains, true to the Platonic way of thinking, a reality. A 'world flight' is, at least for the time being, not in the cards!

***The authority phenomenon (authority structures)*.**

Members of an ancient 'empire' knew what 'authority' was, from their own experience (H.O. 81).-- peace, i.e. understanding, o.g. order(s), involves authority. Authority is not presupposed as an absolute 'good' in itself (= the authoritarian hypothesis).--

H.O. 88.

(a).-- *The principle of subsidiarity.*

Better - in Augustinian language - true 'subsidiarity idea', because, for our thinker, subsidiarity (client-centered, helping action) is a 'ratio', a sufficient reason, situated in God's plan of the universe itself. In the Bible, for example, aren't angels (beings who carry out divine missions) characterized as "helpers"? Doesn't God, biblically speaking, know Himself to be the educator -- in reverence for the autonomy of His creature? -- "Peace with all men is founded, here, by the commandment 'harm no one, rather, be valuable'" (O. Willmann, o.c., 310).

(b).-- *The authority, a "subsidiary" matter.*

That our interpretation is correct is proven by the following text from Augustine: "In the house of the righteous (*note*: understand: God-fearing) it is so that those in authority also behave as if they were at the service of those who, superficially speaking, should obey. The reason is: those who exercise authority do not do so out of lordliness (*note*: authoritarian type), but because they feel obliged to act in a loving and caring way. (The Civ. D. 2:14).-- This speaking can, difficultly, be misinterpreted.

The ethical foundation.

J. Burnaby, *St. Augustine of Hippo and Augustinian Ethics*, in: J. Macquarrie, ed., *A Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, London, 1967, 22/24, characterizes Augustinian ethics as God-following. "Since all love has as its corollary that the one who loves resembles what he loves, love of God should elevate the soul to the most perfect likeness to God." (A.c., 23). This, of course, is agape, caritas, the high, duty-conscious, self-sacrificing form of Old- and especially, New Testament "love" Not without reason does Augustine refer, regularly, to *1 John*: "No one (...) can doubt that Augustine, as a proclaimer, knew what 'agape', caritas love as fellow humanity, involves. (Ibid.).

It is clear that the idea of peace, so central to Augustinian idealism, stands or falls with that type of "wanting" "loving" (H.O. 73v.; 84).-- A theme, said in passing, that one finds, with the Catholic Scheler, about whom further.

Immediately we face the idea of Albinos: H.O. 62 taught us that virtue ethics can also be deification ethics.

H.O. 89,

Peacemaking seems to be the main virtue emphasized by our thinker. The will to peace - the taste for peace - is, after all, a form of fitness for living together - in other words: social virtue. In De civ. D. 22: 24, it reads as follows: "virtue is the art (ability, suitability) of conscientious conduct and, immediately, of attaining eternal bliss". Appropriateness is the essential core of "virtue(ility). -- Peace Augustine defines as "omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis" (the undisturbed order(ning) inherent in things).

There are many types of that undisturbedness: body, plant and animal soul (reasonless soul) with spirit-gifted soul (of man), body and soul (within the unity of what lives),-- man as mortal, man without more -- the family, society,-- the 'State of God' (heavenly society),-- all these realities have their own order(s) and, thus, peace. Peace, in other words, is an ontological idea in Augustinian language: 'being' and 'order' and 'peace' are 'convergent' (identical, interchangeable). Harmology is the name of such a way of thinking. (We shall return to this).

Decision.-- Virtuous, capable of 'being', man - like all being - is to the extent that he/she develops a sense of (God-given) order and arrangement, i.e. a sense of peace. Behold the Augustinian irenism (eirènè, pax, peace), resp. pacifism.

One sees that mutual peace, in society, socialis vita, is only one type of "all that is peace (sense of (God-given) order(s))."

Peace' is, at once, a (Platonic) idea: it is summative (summing up all sub-phenomena (H.O. 41), distributive (H.O. 42: present in all specimens), collective (H.O. 42: all types are interrelated in such a way that, if one type of peace is lacking, the entire peace of the universe is disturbed),--typically Platonic: the idea 'peace' is exemplary (H.O. 44), i.e. normative (guiding); it is, as an idea of God, generative (H.O. 45), i.e. God, as causative, in, through, his idea 'peace', establishes peace. - Behold one of the strong sides of Augustinian irenism, the ethical basis of sociology in Augustine's sense. It is, in essence, not differentialist (cf. Rev 3; 78), although it does not eradicate, repress or suppress differences, e.g. in culture (cf. Rev 86), but on the contrary. It is analogy: a sense of understanding (H.O. 83;-- 12).

H.O. 90.

F.-- Augustinian conflictology.

Bibl. sample :

- R. Stagner, comp. / introd., *The-Dimensions of Human Conflict*, Detroit, 1967 (vrl. V (*The Analysis of Conflict*, by Ross Stagner himself,-- o.c.,131/165, is revealing);
- R. Denker, *Aggression (Kant, Darwin, Freud, Lorenz)*, Amsterdam, 1967;
- Y. Michaud, *La violence*, Paris, 1986;
- R. Girard, *La violence et le sacré*, (Violence and the sacred), Paris 1972.

R. Stagner tries to define: 'Conflict' (clash) is a situation, in which at least two human beings pursue goals (H.O. 20), which they determine cannot be achieved by all involved (o.c.1136). It is sufficient that at least one of those involved ('parties') believes (even if this opinion is unfounded) that the goal is unattainable because, for too few attainable data, there are too many candidates (parties). Desire conflict, in Freudian parlance. What R. Girard, o.c. 249/281, emphasizes: one and the same woman (the mother) is 'desired' both by the father and by the son! Too little object for too much desire! Behold the first conflict of stature with which mankind - at least, in Freudian perspective - is confronted.

An "Analysis of Conflict" also provides us with *H. J. Robinson, Renascent Rationalism*, Toronto, 1975, 171:

1. at least two antagonists,
2. in a common situation,
3. with mutually exclusive objectives,
4. such that they realize this, at least vaguely, (consciousness) and
5. at least partially mastered.

It would be surprising if idealism, essentially an irenic philosophy, possessed no idea concerning "conflict. Let us examine this with Augustine.

1.-- The surface structure.

H.O. 80 taught us that idealism, essentially, first analyzes phenomena (surface structures).

One applicative model.

J. Burnaby, St. Augustine of Hippo, 23, typifies Augustine's inner conflict (that too is possible) between his sense of the ideal and his sexual desire.

Conflictologically, the same life ("existence") is the stake of more than one pursuit (idealistic, libidinal). -- Ethically it is as follows.

(1) People, as they are in fact (= phenomenal) (HO 85: Tacitian), prefer lower values ('goods'), - downward.

H.O. 91

(2) Humans, such as they are, reach, in that downward movement; a low point, namely, the addiction to sexual desire (-- what we, now, in Freudian, would call 'libido', sexual drive. Or, in the language of the 'sexual revolution' (late fifties) 'sex').

2.-- The depth structure.

Augustine, Tract. 1, in Johannem, exclaims to the Christians, called "dearest brothers (and sisters)," "Thou seest the earth. Therefore there is an 'earth' (*op.*: idea) in the divine creative power. Thou seest the heavens. Therefore there is a 'heaven' (*op.*: *idea*) in that creative faculty".

In other words: nothing of what is phenomenon - in or around us - or a high, divine idea, a working concept (H.O. 21), is hidden in, behind, above that phenomenon. - If Augustine were, now, a strict logical idealist, he would, likewise, have to exclaim to his "dearest brothers and sisters," "Thou seest the sex sense. Therefore there is 'sex sense' (the divine idea, in above) H.O. 45) the ascertainable, permeable phenomenon."

This is consistent theocentric idealism. In the depths of the phenomenon, a divine 'design' (here: 'gender sense') is at work. -- even in its deviated forms, which one might designate 'caricatures' (H.O. 44: cybern.).

Notes.-- "Christian Realism" (H.O. 8: Conceptual Realism), begun in Russia by G. Skovoroda (1722/1794), with Vl. Solovyef (1853/1900) as its top figure, has found, among other things, in Nikolai Gogol (1809/1852), an artist's interpreter.

L. Kobilinski-Ellis, *Die Macht des Weinens und Lachens (Zur Seelengeschichte Nikolaus Gogols)*, (The Power of Weeping and Laughter (On the History of the Soul of Nikolaus Gogol)), in: R. von Walter, *Uebertr. Nikolaus Gogol, Betrachtungen über die gottliche Liturgie*, (Reflections on the Divine Liturgy), Freib.i.Br., 1938, 80/100, explains to us the tragic laughter for the reason of the caricature of the divine idea. "The contemplation (H.O. 9 (theoria); 60 (contempl. type of 'theoria')) of the idea ('Urbild') of being edits the beatitude (H.O. 89) and the seriousness, the celebration proper.

The encounter with the fortunate phenomena ('abbild'), insofar as the idea, the 'principium aeternum' (the eternal principle of the phenomenon) in God), was not yet lost, awakens the happy, cleansing laughter,-- this, because the final return to the idea is still hoped for.

H.O. 92.

Only in the realm of the caricatures (*note*: the failed, deviant phenomena),--at least there, where a return to the 'true face' (archetype; H.O. 36) and the exemplary perfection of the fallen creatures (H.O. 77) is no longer thought possible ('Zerrbild'), there resounds the demonic, the laughter that hurts all being, which, for the one who experiences that kind of laughter, is an end in itself."

Leo Kobilinski-Ellis means, in Gogol's works, the fact that Gogol - equal in this to Augustine on the one hand, was an anagogical - towards higher ideas, ideals and values - being, but, on the other hand, especially in his works, could only portray the caricatures ('Zerrbilder') of them. - So too did Augustine, in his earlier years: he had an eventful 'sex life' behind him. This ignominious failure he was, apparently, unable to cope with properly.

Return, now, to the thread of the exposition.

J. Burnaby, *ibid.*, says: "Instead of upholding the value of the sex life in itself, as implanted by the creator, Augustine, on the basis of his individual experience of the sex sense as an uncontrollable urge, was led to describe the sex sense - at least in its fallen (*op.* : original sinful) state, as it, in fact, constitutes our fate - as 'an evil'. According to him, this 'evil' could only be transformed into 'a good' in so far as it was not an end in itself, - i.e. in so far as it involved lust, - but a means of reproduction."

So much for Burnaby, who, however, holds Augustine in the highest esteem.-- In other words, Augustine, against the thoroughness of his own system of thought ("Even the caricature, though distorted, still contains within it the archetype, the divine design") -- reread his "gracious" assessment of "Rome" (H.O. 76) -- projected his own frustration as an individual with sexual ideals into his theory of sexuality.

This leads Burnaby, *ibid.*, to say, "Augustine's theory of the transmission of original sin through the sex drive, -- sex drive, which, for him, represents the typical form of 'lust' (in traditional language: 'the carnal lusts')."

Note: S. Paul contrasts 'the carnal lusts' with the 'divine spirit (= life force)', -- that Augustinian theory, viz, has, on an important part of traditional Christian ethics, exerted the most disastrous influence."

H.O. 93.

2.-- *The depth structure conflictual.*

We dwelt on an applicative model (along with its projection into Augustine's thinking), namely Augustine's failed sexual life. "Strong was his desire to embody the sacred (*op.*: the idea). Yet the mirror of his soul remained turned downward, toward the underworld of caricature! (L. Kobilinski - Ellis, o.c.,93).

What Kobilinski-Ellis says of Gogol can be said - analogously (H.O. 13v.) - of Augustine. - Yet the difference (H.O. 3; 78; 89) is great: where Gogol lapses into laughter-at-not-weeping (without idealizing the demonic (false idealism), like e.g. Lord Byron (1788/1824), Edgar Poe (1809/1849, the "Poetes maudits" (in France), the "Decadents" (in Russia), Giosue Carducci (1835/1907)), there Augustine, fundamentally, grieves all his life. But with the sadness of repentance, which brings joy.

Recall H.O. 76 (the divine ordering of syn- and diachronic phenomena). In other words: God's plan of the universe, especially his plan, which concerns humanity and its stages of evolution, is the depth, behind the surface.-- Someone, like Augustine who has lived the conflict so intensely, within himself (H.O. 81), knows it, as it were, "from his own beholding" must, normally, have thought deeply about the essence (idea) of "all that is conflict" (H.O. 39: // All that is gold, sound, beautiful).

This lemma (conjecture) is, indeed, confirmed. "The world plan (...) also determines the antitheses and struggles, which alternate the course of the world,--like the antitheses in speech. This is how history gets started: in the conflict of opposites. (O. Willmann, o.c., 314).

"The brilliance of this world resembles a song (Carmen) of great stature, tuned by a mysterious composer (modulator), who leads us to the everlasting beholding of God's glory." (Epis. 138 ad Marc.).

Behold the Paleopythagorean Augustine: one would say "Only beauty!" -- But "the brilliance of this world" includes dissonance: "By virtue of (not eloquent words, but) eloquent facts, the harmony (pulchritudo) of this world is joined together (componitur) from the antithesis of non-matching things (as materials)." (De civ. D. 11:18). In other words, conflicts are "materials" from which history is made.

H.O. 94.

Reread, now, H.O. 75/80 (historiology): two thought schemata (origins faithful/fallen (decayed)/ Christianized Rome; dyarchy (struggle between good and evil)) illustrate what Augustine, just now, asserted merely generally ("theoretically").

All we have to do, now, is ideatively situate conflict as such ("all that is conflict").

The "diabolic" (devilish) moment.

We mentioned, very briefly, the surface structure of the demonic aspect, H.O. 77, with the term "All that is demonic.

I. Note.-- Here, as well as H.O. 77, we used this term in the religious scientific sense, viz. as the representation of the harmony of opposites, - about which, probably as the first thinker, Herakleitos of Ephesus (-535/-465) the founder of what, since absolute 'German' idealism (Fichte, Schelling,-- Hegel, - and its 'reversal', Marxism), has been called 'dialectics'. This is that mode of thinking and reasoning which, systematically, departs from thesis (an assertion) and antithesis (opposing assertion) in order to 'reconcile' both in an 'Aufgehoben', i.e. lifting and elevating to a higher level 'synthesis' (encompassing assertion).

Note -- One can compare this -- but without minimizing the profound distinction -- with what we already noted H.O. 16; 37; 57; 75; 78; 84, (catharsis).

2. Augustine, indeed, uses the term 'contrariorum oppositio', the opposition of non-conforming data. It is precisely from this that "history" constructs its "pulchritudo," its harmonious beauty.

Note.-- That 'pulchritudo', literally: beauty, should not be translated by 'beauty', but by 'harmony', resp. 'harmonious hero of beauty', appears from the whole of Augustinian philosophy, which - according to O. Willmann, who knew it thoroughly (he was a Pythagorean, resp. an Augustinian) - was strongly Pythagorean (O. Willmann, o.c. 258; -- especially 279ff., where Willmann, of this, provides the formal irrefutable proofs).

Decision.

'History' is 'carmen' (song,-- a Paleopythagorean term), 'pulchritudo' (harmony),-- but composed, -- synthesis of opposites. Such is Augustine's individual (H.O. 90vv.: inner. confl.) and fellow human (H.O. 75/80: hist.) determination.-- But such is but the surface.

H.O. 95.

The Platonic nature of "All that is demonic (harmony of opposites).

Before, further, addressing this theme, we emphasize that the identification of the conflictual in history is purely Platonic.

Proof.-- E. De Strycker, Concise History of Antique Philosophy, Antw., 1967, 97, says, in consequence, what follows.

(1). *The phenomena* (H.O. 36 (= appl. mod.); 39 ('image'); 49), which are summarized by the term 'genesis', becoming (perishing is co-understanding), are singularly (individually) situated in time and space (dia - and synchronically).

But there is, according to Platon, more: the phenomena are always changing, carry "contradictions" (sic) within them: the curve is only partly curved (it contains, in the material realization, also straightness; cfr. Protagoras' geometry criticism (H.O. 5); the white, once applied to a wall, is at least partly unwhite (colored) - who among us does not experience that a "pure" white wall is short-lived? - The beautiful (pulchritudo; H.O. 93v.), once embodied, e.g., in a carpet, is, at least in part, also ugly ("Beautiful songs don't last long," says our folksy man); the living, once realized in a biological body is also dead (didn't Heidegger say that we, as actual human beings, are 'Sein zum Tode' (being doomed to death)?

"In itself - says P. De Strycker, echoing Platon - what 'becomes' does not possess any regularity (H.O. 44) and it does not even come under the laws of logic. At this level (*note*: point), the doctrine of Herakleitos of Ephesus (H.O. 94) applies, and well, in the radical form, which Platon, in his youth (H.O. 35), had heard from the mouth of Kratulos." (o.c.,97).

(2). *The ideas*, on the other hand, denoted by such terms as 'ousia', essence (H.O. 11; 44: *essentia*), -- 'to on' (being),-- 'hè alètheia' (the truth), are what they are, perfect and pure. They do not 'lie' (one might say): they do not strike at its opposite.

It is, without question, clear that Augustine recognizes this purely Platonic teaching as his own. But with a strong Pythagorean moment. That this is so is shown by the terms 'imago' (image, representation), applied and to angels and to men (i.e. creatures gifted with reason and reason) and 'vestigum', (foot) track, applied to all other creatures (which are infrarenal). "All that is created" is worm-eaten' ("demonic," susceptible to the opposite).

H.O. 96.

Update.

J. Derrida (1930/2004), one of the four "differentialists" (H.O. 3; 78; 89; 93), with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze develops, within modern Rationalism, analogous ideas. "Everything that has meaning or significance contains an essential ambiguity (*note* : duality), an internal cleavage, which allows for both loss of meaning, and construction of meaning." (A. Burms / Chr. De Landtsheer, *deconstructionism*, in: *Streven* 1986: 8 (May), 701).

Also: "The concrete plays a deconstructive role vis-à-vis the general" (a.c.,705). In other words, the grammarian Derrida's so-called deconstructionism, although Derrida - like the other three differentialists - takes an anti-platonic stance, is a purely Platonic affair: read what Derrida and his disciples write, and remember that the idea, once embodied in the phenomena (the concrete) or articulated in a language context (the linguistic), becomes susceptible to meaning breakdown.

But the 'essential ambiguity', inner duality) is not in the idea - it is pure, undefiled, not - contradictory - but in its realization either in earthly phenomena or in earthly formulations. See H.O. 34;-- 37 (closest to (subsume: but not identical with)); 47 (Only then does the light go on etc.)).

Even more: Willmann, however a real idealist, notes that the idea is and remains - mostly - an x, *qualitas occulta* (compare H.O. 47) a 'black by'. Exactly what, in Derrida's critique of ideas, is always assumed (and forgotten)! The Platonic-Augustinian idea (Augustine likes to use 'ratio') is so amenable to the construction, in Rationalist context, by being x, *qualitas occulta*, *ordo occultus*.

Its hiddenness in the phenomena and in the words (names) hides, from the non-Platonist, the fact that it is situable above the phenomena and the names, as an inexhaustible source (H.O. 45: generative) of phenomena and names.

Bibl. sample : Fr. Laruelle, *Les philosophies de la différence (Introduction critique)*, (Philosophies of difference (Critical introduction)), Paris, 1986,

2.-- The depth structure: satanic.

M. Müller/A. Halder, *Herders kleines philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Basel, 1959, 24, says that, for Augustine, *civitas terrena* (earthly society, "state") is identical with *civitas diaboli* (society of the devil). This, because this type of society consists of beings, who "seek themselves".

H.O. 97.

Against this, Augustine sets the love of God, which characterizes "heavenly" society. This love of God (and what is of God, including and especially God's ideas as the ground and norm of life in this world) counts to him as "the virtue without more" (H.O. 89).

(1). - *Humanity, - according to the God Idea.*

Re-read H.O. 60v. (Alb.). - For Augustine, in existential terms, this would read as follows: me, you,-- every human being, as an individual (distributive),-- all of us (summative), yes, we collectively (collective),-- we are the god idea 'human' (All that is human). We are this, in our deepest essence,

(a) *Steering* (= normative), because, thanks to that idea and its light, which it sheds on our lives, we see the norm of our behavior;

(b) *Generative* (here: creationist, because the Bible says we are created); for, in each of us, the idea of God is at work as a life force. This is similar to A. Fouilleé's idea-force.

Note.-- Concerning this generative moment (= aspect), see here what O. Willmann writes:

"(1) Where Platon situates the world of ideas higher than the bundle of all life forces, the world soul (H.O. 54; 60 : ideocentrism),

(2) there Augustine follows the Gospel which thinks 'spirit' and 'life' very much in one: the ideas are not only life-giving, but they are themselves life (*op.*: subj. : in God)" (o.c., 290). Cfr. H.O .45.

Compare this collection and system doctrine with, e.g., H.O. 15v. (Arist. analogy); 40 / 42 (Pl. analogy): 44/46 (seal model).

(2) - *Humanity, - according to Satan's idea.*

This would read, in Augustine's mind, roughly as follows.

(a) I, thou,-- each individually, each for himself (distributively),-- all of us (summatively, but as a vaguely descriptive "species name" (H.O. 2v.)),-- yes, all of us collectively (collectively, but individualistically, antagonistically (H.O. 3)

"I - the others," "We are individuals who differ from one another, and this thoroughly. We are all equal in selfishness and self-love; we may imitate one another, but in self-love. Thus we build up an antagonistic relationship: we understand each other very well in our selfish striving.

HO. 98.

For Augustine, this type of humanity is a caricature of the God idea man (H.O. 91v.). See also H.O. 93 (the underworld of caricatures).-- See also H.O. 77: man, demon, Satan (the devil),-- they design, as free beings, a representation, an "idea," which they make true in praxis.

For Augustine, its essential core is: selfishness,--actually expressed "assertiveness" (Nietzsche, Adler). Which, for him, is vice, unfitness for the purpose set by God.

a. Those who live in this way harbor a steering idea that is un-, yes, antigodly. Quirky.

b. He who lives in this way is generated by his own life force (the deflection of the divine life force in our depths),--yes, as inspired, he is moved by demonic-Satanic life forces.

Explanation.

(1) The ancient theosophies (H.O. 64; 66 (apocal.; theurgy): 69 (Patr.), the thinking climate both of the Patristics and of Augustine, identified the Pythagorean 'structures' (H.O. 44) with the Platonic ideas and situated them in deity (pantheistic-monistic; monotheistic (Biblical); polytheistic). But, in addition to this common trait, they also posited intermediate beings between deity and earthly humanity with whom, incidentally, they sought contact in order to rescue philosophy (rhetoric, professional science, theology) from the Skeptic impasse. Yes, S. Augustine thinks in parallel terms.

"From the grandiose intuition of the book of Job (Old Testament), according to which the morning stars with its joyous chorus and the sons of God with their unison cheers (*Job 38: 7*) surrounded God when he laid the cornerstone of the universe, Augustine draws the cooption to glimpse into the mystery of 'the becoming' (*op.*: the act of creation).

a. The divine ideas of creation are, of course, "of all eternity.

b. But, thanks to a divine information - act, they penetrate into the minds of the pure angels. The emergence of the conceptions (ideas) of the realities to be created in the minds of the angels is the first degree of externalization of the divine creative conceptions outside God's spirit. This establishes a kind of ideal creation, in the mind of the pure Angels, which precedes its realization in creation itself - not in time, but ideally." (O. Willmann, o.c. 293f.).

H.O. 99.

This implies, e.g., that "All that is man" was designed both by God and by His angels, though in profoundly different ways, of course. In our innermost self - according to Willmann, o.c., 295 - every single human being "has been pre-imagined in God and, in the beginning, has been seen by angels.

But this implies at once that, since the Fall (H.O. 79), we have been 'watched', i.e. designed, both by 'pure' (i.e. God-fearing) and by 'unclean' (i.e. God-hating) spirits. What we, H.O. 79, saw as 'struggle between good and evil', in one of its generative aspects.

Note.-- Max Scheler, already mentioned several times in his *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, Darmstadt, 1930, 83, speaks of the demonic, which he characterizes as the blind urge opposed to "all spiritual ideas and values."

The Bible situates everything demonic, everything Satanic, in the sphere of the (great) animal. Scheler also mentions, in an analogous connection, "the eternal Faust, the 'bestia cupidissima rerum novarum' (the animal which is very keen on something new (than the established one) - which indulges its blind urge; o.c.,65). 'Blind' in the sense that the light of higher ideas was obscured.

By the way: someone once defined 'Satanism' as "the view that elevates the denial of all values to some 'value'" (*J. Grooten / G. Steenbergen, Philosophical lexicon*, Antwerp/ Amsterdam, 1958, 250). In Nietzsche's language, this would be called nihilism, i.e., the denial of all higher ideas, ideals, and values.

That Augustine was serious about the doctrine that, in addition to human freedom, which was fundamental to him, our actual behavior (our everyone included) is also - not only - determined by extra-natural and, above all, supernatural factors, is clear from his fight against Pelagianism.

Pelagius (360/422), a Breton heretic, claimed that humans

- (1) is not invalidated by original sin (H.O. 79: original sin; 92) and
- (2) by his own strength (life force) can save himself for all eternity.

Against this, Augustine presented Church doctrine:

(1) original sin thoroughly afflicts man (after centuries still a source of the worst misunderstandings and systems of error,-- according to Willmann, o.c., 276); God's work of grace, in the depths of actual man, is necessity.

- (2) Thus, the self-aggrandizement (H.O. 77) is without sufficient reason.

H.O. 100.

Still under a second point of view, Augustine's stance is apparent.

1. The man of diabolical society even draws, selfishly, utility from what God laid in creation. 'Religion' is, for him, not value in itself, but means to selfish ends.

2. The root, however, of all evil in such society, is the turning away from God and the turning toward the demons, in the form of "religion. At length *Augustine* tries to make this true, in his *De civitate Dei* (2-7), in a thorough critique of Roman religion.

Immediately he is at odds with the cult of the deified (one thinks of the later Emperors of Rome, who, in the Eastern manner, allowed themselves to be worshipped as gods).

3. He subjects pagan philosophy, in this context, to an equally thorough criticism: it simply does not see the demonic-satanic, at least not thoroughly enough. The state philosophy of the Romans, for example, at least in part, colors the harsh reality with the colors of clean talk. Apparently also philosophical thinking - which is not surprising with Theosophists - is trapped in the religious system, which among other things underlies the state that the Romans founded (political theology; H.O. 30).

In this context, we must nonetheless quote a text of his: "Once justice (understand: Godliness) is out of the land, what are large political systems ('regna') unless large-scale mafias ('latrocinia')? After all: in turn, mafias are what unless political systems but on a small scale?" Doesn't it seem that even today such a thing contains truth? Can it be actualized?

Note.-- In Augustine's days, at least in a number of centers, theurgy (H.O. 66) reigned supreme. It is, therefore, natural that he should, in his works, expound his ideas on occultism.

Bibl. st.: J. Feldmann, *Occult Phenomena*, Brussels, 1936-1, The Hague, 1949-2, 299 (*demonic hypothesis*); 207; 297, e.g. offer a first information on the subject.

G.-- *Augustinian social criticism.*

We now have a sufficient background to understand Augustine's social critique.

1.-- *The distinction between the opposition pair 'church/state', and the opposition pair 'good/evil'.*

One does not think that Augustine did not subject his own Church to criticism, however attached he was to it:

H.O. 101.

"The struggle between God's kingdom and secular kingdom (understand, first of all, the two types of society) takes, for the thinker Augustine, the form of the opposition between Church and State." (O. Willmann, o.c., 307). For example, in ancient Rome, in which he situated himself.

Yet the same Willmann, o.c., 313, points out that the complete identity between the two ideas (understand: history-making designs) was, by Augustine, denied. And it does so in the following sense.

A.-- (a) The actual, realized Church, on earth, during its pilgrimage toward the Parousia (Second Coming of Christ), is often, merely, a caricature (H.O. 91v.), a distorted idea of God. In *De civ. D.* 18/49, he says, following Jesus' words (*Matt. 13:47; // 1 Cor. 15:28*), that both the good and the rejected (evil) live unshifted within the "net" of the Church. Only the separation, on the basis of a final judgment (= last or end-time separation), will separate the two types.

A.-- (b) *Appl. mod.*-- Although Augustine -- like, incidentally, Socrates and the Great Socraticians, Platon and Aristotle, each in his own way -- gave primacy to the *theoria* (H.O. 9; 19; 35; 37; 53; 59; 60 (*speculari/ contemplari*); 91), both in the sense of mere reasoning - speculative activity and in the sense of direct contemplative life, this nevertheless prevented him from worldliness. H.O. 88, speaking of the duty of subsidiarity, to be situated in Augustine's overall sociology (reason-attitude sociology: H.O. 89), taught us the reason.

Hence his criticism of the *de facto* worldliness of certain Christians, who shirk an active role in this secular world (*De civ. D.* 19:19).

B.-- (a) Actual pagan society exhibits, apparently, "righteous" (God-fearing people) in its fold. Thus *De civ. D.* 10:25. By the way: H.O. 76 (origin faithful Rome) e.g. already opened our eye to that reality.

Decision: Devil's community and state do not coincide completely. There is only partial identity,--as heavenly community and church (realized, earthly Church) are, likewise, partial identities (H.O. 13).

B.-- (b) *Appl. mod.*-- The ancient Romans, e.g., held to the virtue of "probitas," righteousness (among other things, in the form of reasonableness). This formed the basis of their secular state community (*Epist.* 138: 3 (17) ad Marc).

H.O. 102.

2.-- *The social critique.*

Yet even in actual secular society, good and evil live together unshifted. Yes, the main impression Augustine made was very unfavorable.

(a) H.O. 92 taught us that he had experienced, in his own life, yes, within his own soul, the impotence of man to realize the idea of God, in its higher (anagogical) character. Which gave him a pessimistic basic mood.

(b) H.O. 95 teaches the us that, already Platonism in itself, given its own high feeling of the ideal, judged the phenomena with a very strict standard: all material achievements are, naturally, partial, yes, defective 'caricatures' of the high idea contained in them. The actual, the evil (especially), is, in contrast to many modern naturalistic and nihilistic thinkers and writers/writers, not idealized (H.O. 93: false 'idealism'),--which, often, leads to, everything being justified.

Appl. mod.-- See here, sparsely held, some samples.

2.a.-- *The pride (self-righteousness 'narcissism').*

Selfishness, in all its forms, governs the secular man (H.O. 97). Our ancestors called this 'pride'. Also as a state community the actual culture shows pride: he means ruling, called imperialism. In De civ. D. Praef., Augustine criticizes, unmasks, this type of state: such a state conquers completely, but is itself governed by lordliness. which, in his eyes, is the slavery of sin.

2.b.-- *The mask (the "appearance") of virtue.*

(H.O. 62 (virtue eth.), in the sense of state-citizen "fitness" (to control peoples), is only one applicative model of vice: other vices also cloak themselves in that same mask: for example, where loose morals (H.O. 91: slave lust, as a downward way of life) and other evils are suppressed (possibly by the state), solely for external values. The 'heartfelt', morally serious, character is lacking in this case. Such a thing is, in Augustine's eyes, pride (better: narcissism, self-importance and pomposity,--which, to him, is rather vice. (The Civ.D. 19:25). The inauthenticity is laid on finger.

2.c.-- *Imperialism and capitalism.*

Behind the mask (H.O. 63; 66v.) of Roman rule of law and "pax" (peace) are forms of injustice.--

H.O. 103.

1. Look at the facts: the Roman state (community) revels in the proceeds of war. In such a structure (H.O. 44) the possessing class can afford to accumulate more and more wealth and, at once, to lay the foundations of a life full of pleasures (reminiscent of La Dolce Vita;--it should be noted that, already, *Platon*, in *the Seventh Letter*, mentions -- exasperated -- the analogous conditions in Sicily).

2. Look at the facts: whoever does not accept such forms of 'happiness' (purpose of life; cf. H.O. 59) as the true one, he/she is branded an enemy of the state. To such language the advocates of the absolutely free right of ownership (as a use of 'acquired' property) should turn a deaf ear. Not only that: whoever speaks such language must be banished; as an exile ('dissident') he/she must be exterminated from the community of the living, like weeds (De civ. D. 2:20). In other words: as now, as then: the mere use of language by dissidents is perceived as community hostility.

Decision.-- Starting from the pure, unclouded idea of God, church, state, Augustine establishes, "from the things, which do not lie" (H.O. 19; 24; 32), - what our present-day sociologists would call "the facts," that the (phenomenal, earthly) reality does not correspond to the higher reality, which is the idea.

Immediately it should be referred, briefly, to the problem, touched upon by *M. Scheler, Die Stellung d. M.i.K.* o.w.: "Powerful (*note* : life-giving) is, originally, the lower (H.O. 91; 93 (Gogol)) but powerless is the highest". (o.c.,77).

The great, Western (strongly Platonizing) tradition, on the subject, says it the other way around: mind (understand: intellect, reason) and idea (H.O. 45: generat.) possess an original (understand: generative) power (o.c.,74).

The Scheler, of the second (non-Catholic) period, sees the power, which spirit and idea can have, solely and exclusively, bubbling up from the urge to live (the vitalist Scheler), which he, explicitly (o.c.,70;-- 66; 79; 81), relates to Freud's libido. Scheler too, in his soul, had experienced this impotence of mind and idea.

However, he does state that the lower life drive, in the course of the cosmic process,

- (1) assumed,
- (2) purified (including by spirit and idea),
- (3) should be elevated to a higher level. sublimation is called (H.O. 16).

H.O. 104.

Note -- H.O. 56/103 outline, in two times (Alb.v.Sm./ S.Aug.), the genesis of the theocentric doctrine of ideas, as Christianity, on a Biblical basis, built it up, especially in the person of S. Augustine.

I.a.(iv).-- *The ontology v. Albinos v. Smurna (56/62).*

Situation (62).-- Leather (56/62).

a.: Dialectics (56);

b.1.: Theoret. fil. (mathematics, physical, theology; 56v.;-- affirmative, negative, and mystical theol. (57);

b.2: Prakt. fil. (57v.: telos).-- Theory of ideas (58).-- Deepening (58/62): stoic, Aristotelian, theocentric senses (ibid.);-- virtue(s) ethics (62).

I.a.(v).-- *The ontology v. Augustine v. Tagaste (63/103).*

Introduction. Life phil., 'existentialist', personalist essentialism (63v.).

I.-- Situation.-- (64/69).-- Wisdom, resp. Theosophy (64).-- Illuminati doctrine / Light metaphysics (Sophiology: 65v.), theurgy (66);-- Christian fil. (Klemens v. Al.; 67/69; survey d. Patrist. fil.: 69).

II.-- Learn.-- (70/103).-- Aug. enriches previous idealism.

A. Aug. Idealism Overcomes and Skepticism and Materialism (70v.).

B. Aug. idealism rests on the reflective method (72/73).-- This reflective method is, with Aug., and intellectual -- rational and affective (axiology) (73v.).

C. Augustinian idealism founds historiology as it will stand for centuries (75/80).

Thought Outline:

1 (origin faithful, fallen (lapsed), Christianized Rome (76/78)); thought scheme

2 (five-act schedule (79/80)).

Note: surface, depth structures (80).

D. Aug. idealism founds a specifically idealist-Christian mind-society (81/89).

The Aug. Method (belief and perception knowledge (81); order.: idea (81/83: systems sociology).

(I) Names and definitions (concordia; understanding, 83v.; humanities. method (84v.; Vico (85)).

(II) phenomena (86/89).-- people, (world) church, rom. empire (86v) authority (87v); ethical basis (virtue; 88/89).

E. Aug. idealism founds its own conflictology (90/100).

(1) surface structure (90v.).

(2) depth str. (91/100) (Gogol: caricature; 91v.);-- pure conflict theory (93/96); satania (96/100).

F. Aug. idealism founds its own social critique (100/103).

H.O. 105.

1.b. *The foundation of a full-fledged ontology by the scholastics.* (105/128)

Introduction.-

1. Patristics (33/800) did not leave to the medieval Scholastics (800/1450) an ontology worthy of the name. She stood, after all, for two types of full-fledged ontology:

a. Aristotelian "first philosophy" (the Aristotelian name for ontology) was (neo)-platonism, Patristic in its own right, too foreign (H.O. 69) to be adopted, without difficulty, as Church doctrine;

b. *The Neoplatonic* (especially that of Plotinos (H.O. 64) was too "monistic" (i.e., it offered too little room for the one, exalted ("transcendent") God of the Bible).

2. So what did the Scholastics have at their disposal?

a. *Aristotelian logic*,--at least, in the early Middle Ages, part of it (On Categories (= basic concepts), On Judgment),-- together with second-hand expositions on Aristotelian logic (Porphyrios of Turos (233/305; pupil of Plotinos); Boëthius of Rome (480/525; called "the last Roman and the first Scholastic"; also Neoplatonic); Marcianus Capella (410/439), Neoplatonic).

b. *The (neo)-platonic insights* -- ('philosophemen'), insofar as the Church Fathers (H.O. 69), especially, of course, Augustine, had mastered and Christianized them (HO 67v.).

3. ***The stakes*** -- The construction of a fully-fledged Christian ontology begins, in the XIth century, with the discussion of universals: we could, today, say 'the discussion of essentialism' (H.O. 10/12),--a question still highly topical today. This discussion is 'ontological' in that it questions whether and to what extent our general (either abstract or ideative) concepts ('Universalialia' in Middle Ages Latin) are the representation of reality (Chap. 1).

In the XIth e. was:

(a) the theory of concepts, peculiar to Aristotelian logic, the starting point and

(b) Platon's theory of ideas the final point. -- Now one understands why we, H.O. 1/104, elaborated so extensively on the ancient views on the subject.

4. ***The elaboration.***-- It continues with the distinction or, rather, antithesis pair of 'essentia / existentia' (being mode / actual existence) which appears as the main conceptual pair in S. Anselmus of Aosta (1033/1109; bishop of Canterbury), with his 'ontological' God proof, among others.

H.O. 106.

A second step, in that full elaboration, springs from the discovery of Aristotle's complete works (including the full-fledged *Organon* (= Logic)).

A third step, in, the same direction, is the reading of Islamic-Arab philosophy (theology),-- so e.g. the philosophy of the mystic (H.O. 57; 60; 64; 69) or Sufi (Sufism exists, today, still) Al-Farabi (870/950), who made the Aristotelian logic known in the in the midst of Islam; he pointed out the distinction 'essence / existence'; further of Avicenna (= Ibn Sina (980/1037)), in the East, and, in the West (Spain), Averroës (Ibn Rosjd of Cordoba (1126/1198)).

Note.-- It is said, sometimes still, that medieval Church philosophy was "narrow" (non-pluralistic): look at "the facts, which do not lie" (H.O. 19). After all, in addition to Islamic, the Scholastics also assimilated Jewish philosophy and, even, to some extent Byzantine! For example, Moses Maimonides of Cordoba (1135/ 1204; a Jewish Aristotelian) exerted great influence on the Scholastics.

5. S. Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274), the "angelic teacher" (Doctor angelicus), became, in common parlance, the expounder of the first, strongly Aristotelian, Christianly sound ontology. -- the neoscholastic (1850/ present).

One does not think, now, that Church thought remained unmoved by the development of modern and present mentality. There is the Spanish Scholasticism (1450/1640), the Modern Scholasticism (XVII th e.), the Scholasticism of the Enlightenment Era (the XVIII th e.),--until when the neo-scholasticism gets off the ground.

Pope Pius IX (1792/1878 (pope: 1846/1878)), in a letter to the then Archbishop of Munich, said : "The fact that the Scholastic type of philosophizing has been abandoned, we consider to be impudent." *Pope Leo XIII* (1810/1903 (Pope: 1878/1903) had, in 1879, in his *Encyclical Aeterni Patris*, Scholasticism announced as official Church philosophy.

The historical reason for this dual Papal action was that, around 1800, the Scholastic Church seemed dead and extinct. People blamed her:

1. the inclusion of theology in philosophizing itself (H.O. 67v.),
2. its not simple logical requirements and techniques (although current logistics far exceed them),
3. her unfamiliarity with modern philosophy and professional science.

H.O. 107.

Note --

1. Since 1900 every four years (normally) International Congresses of Philosophy have been held;-- in 1937 the foundation took place of The International Institute of Philosophy, which provides an annual bibliography.

2. On 13.09.1948, in Amsterdam, the "International Federation of Philosophical Societies" was founded. At that time there were about sixty national or international societies (eleven international), mainly European. The Central Committee for 1948/1953 included thirty personalities. Among its European members there were four Thomists and one Augustinian.

Conclusion: solid progress has been made since the low point of 1800.

(A) The concept of "middle ages.

In the very broad sense of the term, "Middle Ages" means a type of culture, which, after the collapse of the ancient cultures, emerged from Ireland to Japan.

1. None other than the philologist *Gianbatista Vico* (H.O. 85), in his famous work *Scienza Nuova* (1725),v, claims that Europe, after the People's Movements and the Fall of the Roman Empire, is resuming the threefold cycle of culture - hieratic (deity following), heroic (hero following) and human (human following) stage - , which Antiquity had gone through. This, without overall loss of the previous cycle.

The Middle Ages, in this view, are an original update of the previous cultural cycle. This includes a favorable judgment.

2. With this stance, Western Europe recovers from the contemptuous appreciation, which - as the first - the Renaissanceists (better: humanists) introduced, in the XV- th e., to brand (a) a "barbaric" period, (b) in which the "classical" (Greek-Latin) culture was "interrupted".

Note.-- One overlooks the two previous pages to see what enormous degree of either ignorance (which is certainly, in part, correct) or unwillingness was condensed into that narrowing term.

Bibl. sample.: *W. Jaeger, Humanisme et théologie*, Paris, 1956, 16/19.

M. Luther (1483/1546), the founder of Protestantism, shared the humanist scorn,-- this, although he hardly knew the works of Thomas Aquinas, for example! -- The nadir was reached by the enlighteners (especially the Encyclopedists), who usually only parroted both the Humanists and the Protestants.-- Even the XIX -th century historiography hardly overcame that prejudice.

H.O. 108.

3. The turnaround, initiated by Vico, continues with Romanticism (end XVIII - the / first part XIXth e.).

XX-st' century historiography, especially the last two decades, has initiated the radical revision of the Humanist bias.

Bibl. sample : A. Verrycken/D. van den Auweele, *Jacques Le Goff and the 'Nouvelle Histoire'*, in: *Our Alma Mater* 37 (1983): 1, 21/36...,

Even a magazine like *Paris-Match* (13.05.1983) exclaimed: "A new intoxication is rampant in France: the history of the Middle Ages. The preconception of (the Middle Ages as) 'obscurantist Europe' (note: the Enlighteners systematically spread that buzzword) is fading. The same Middle Ages, this time as 'a continent in full transformation', impose themselves". This, n.a. v. P. Barret / J.-N. Burgand, *Si je t'oublie, Jérusalem* (If I forget you, Jerusalem), book on the First Crusade (1095)).

Opm.-- H.F. Davis, *Thomas Aquinas and medieval theology*, in: R.C.Zaehner, dir., *Thus man seeks his God*, Rotterdam, 1960, 110, n.1 (citing F.B. Artz, *The Mind of the Middle Ages*, New York, 1953, ix and x), says: "Just as one might call the science (Albert the Great (1200/1280), Roger Bacon (1210/1292) especially) of the thirteenth century the forerunner of modern experimental science, so the humanism of the twelfth century (note: Johan of Salisbury was top figure) was that of the Renaissance." - Yet even the Renaissance humanists - according to the proposer - simply did not know that thirteenth century humanism!

Note.-- The first international congress of medieval philosophy (Leuven/Brussels, 1958) had as its main theme "*Man and his destiny according to the medieval thinkers*".

Was examined the pejorative meaning of the word "scholastic," as

- (1) that thinking,
- (2) which, logically rigorous reasoning, assumes revealed truths (dogmata), which can never or, indeed, should never be examined for their truth value,
- (3) and, thereby, precludes any trial-and-error testing.

Result: the actual scholasticism was different. Perhaps the Late Scholastic (the lapsed form) was something like that (in the XIVth / XVth e.).

Bibl. sample.; C. Verhaak, *Meaning of the study of medieval philosophy*, in: *Tijdschr. v. Fil.* (Leuven: Philosophical Society, 25.02.1962).

H.O. 109.

(B) *The true scholasticism.*

One can outline the historically verifiable idea "Scholasticism" as follows.

a.-- "*Schola*",

The ancient Greek 'Scholè' means 'leisure activities' (including studying). 'Scholastikos' is someone who is engaged in (occasional, studying) leisure activities. The term 'school' comes from there.

H.-I. Marrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité, Paris, 1948, 435/447, points to the emergence, after 300, of the first Christian schools, viz. the monastic (monastery-bound); dra, following troubled times (the fall of the Roman Empire), the episcopal (episcopal) schools emerge; in the VIth e. the network of presbyteral (priest-bound) schools, on the outlying parishes, comes into being. Main purpose: to form monks or clergy.

As in so many areas, the medieval school system is based on the antique Christian system. With one big difference: Christian Antiquity never knew the systematic, regular school form. This is how, among other things, the modern people's school came into being. Thus always Marrou.-- Immediately we are light years away from 'The obscurantist Middle Ages'!!!

b.-- "*Sic et non*".

Thorough research shows that "Scholasticism" boils down to the following.

1.-- Hermeneutic method.

"Hermeneutics" means, here, "textual interpretation. Well, in the medieval schools of philosophy and theology, one started systematically from a given text. Assignment (requested): commentary (text explanation, interpretation)

2.-- The teacher/lecturer was Latin-speaking.

3.-- He / she applied a fixed hermeneutical method - the 'methodus scholestica' (scholastic method) - also called 'sic-et-non' method. 'sic et non' confesses 'for' (yes so) and 'against' (no):

Note.-- Reread, now, H.O. 3 (the 'Dissoi logoi; "twofold statements" of Protosofistics):-- Its founder is the famous Petrus Abailardus (Abaelardus; 1079/1142), - - infamous for his relationship with Heloise. He was absorbed in disputatio, redoubt (eristics). He knew, of the overall Middle Ages introduction to philosophy (resp. theology), only the trivium (artes sermonicales, linguistic skills: grammar, dialectics (dialectica), rhetoric). The work of Abailardus has as its content a set of Patristic texts, preferably reflecting different, if not contradictory, opinions.

H.O. 110.

There is an introduction , whose method will influence Alexander of Hales (1186/1245; Augustinian) and Thomas Aquinas. Furthermore, *Sic et non*, the work of *Abelardus*, contains 158 groups of texts (theological questions about essence of faith, sacraments, (charity) love).

Notes.-

Fr. Masson, Pierre Abélard, in: *D.Huisman, dir., Dict. des phil.*, Paris, 1984, 8, says: "What did one, then, understand by 'dialectics'? It seems to be a very important part of logic,--at times it is logic without more. On the one hand, it is 'science of distinction,' in the sense that it serves to distinguish true from false; on the other hand, it is 'science of vocabulary,' in the sense that it is oriented more toward the 'voces,' words, than toward the 'res,' realities.

H.O. Taylor, penetrating into the Middle Ages mentality, has been able to describe them as responding to the following threefold characteristic: grammar, logic, metalogic".

Note.-- The term 'metalogica' dates from a work by John of Salisbury (H.O. 108; the medieval humanist) metalogicus (literally : what exceeds ordinary logic), i.e. a semiotics (H.O. 1), which analyzes the axiomata (postulates) of logic, in terms of sign theory.

Value Judgment.

O. Willmann, II, 329f., characterizes, critically, the sic-et non - method as follows.

(a) The subject matter, in the disputatio, redetwist, is not structurally, i.e. starting from basic insights (structures), but problem-solving, i.e. starting from 'quaesti-ones', summarizing themes, divided into 'articuli', articles, set out.

(b).1. Advantage: all perspectives, i.e., the plurality, are discussed; not infrequently, historical information comes through.

(b).2. Disadvantage: the learning content, with its coherence (structure), is spread out, torn apart, into separate issues,--"a defect, which, however, also the famous Euclidian method, in geometry, exhibits in like manner" (O.Willmann, o.c., 330).

Further: hermeneutically, there is the disadvantage that the commentary, one-sidedly focused on pros and cons of a position (quaestio, articulus), sometimes does not fully reflect the historically correct opinion of the cited 'auctor' ('auctoritas').

H.O. 111.

The 'Sophistic' slant, which is undeniable, was however, in Church style, neutralized by the fact that, at the end of the discussion (better: eristic), an authoritative statement followed.

R. Barthes, L'aventure sémiologique, Paris, 1985, 112/114, characterizes sic et non as 'un dialogue agressif' (an aggressive dialogue), which had nothing Platonic about it (H.O. 34 (full spiritual knowledge); esp. 47 (without always wanting to be passionately right)), a.o. concerning the relation 'master / pupil'. -- It was a quarrel between the two, a battle of Aristotelian syllogisms. Once a week the professors debated among themselves, in the presence of the students; the students debated after the exams.

Decision.-- The 'disputatio' is the 'dialectic in actu' (the dialectic exercised with act). Barthes, in this context, perhaps, out of prejudice (he does not 'like' (H.O. 73v.) the Middle Ages Scholastics), uses the term 'neurotic': to prove to the opponent, through syllogisms, that he contradicts himself (H.O. 90: inner conflict), until he realizes this and, emotionally, succumbs to it, must, surely, have belonged to the offshoots of Abelardus' sic-et-non method.

What explains that both the mystics (about whom more later) and especially the church authorities had serious objections to the method. How far we are from the Platonic 'dialectic' explained above!

Applicative model. -- Take the structure (hermeneutic structure, that is), as e.g. S. Thomas Aquinas, *Questio XLVI*, art. ii, "Whether the fact that the universe had a beginning in time is, yes or no, an article of faith," demonstrates it.

A. Doxographic section (doxa = opinion), -- which, is in fact a problem state ('status quaestionis' (H.O. 20),).

A.1: - Counter-Model. -- "It seems that the fact that the world, in time, had a beginning is not a point of faith, but a conclusion deducible from reasoning (rationalist position)."

A.2: - Model.-- "But on the other hand, articles of faith are not rationally provable" (= the official-Church position).

H.O. 112.

Of course, within headings A.1. and A.2. up to, say, eight texts can be cited, in support.

B. *Critical stance.*-- "Respondeo dicendum quod ..." (I answer by saying that) is the standard introduction. Here, e.g., "that the universe has not always existed rests solely on faith ('sola fide' -- a language that has become famous).

B.1. - "The reason for that is ..." (then follows the argument for the model).

B.2. - "Returning to the first point (of the counter-model) it must, therefore, be said that..." (follow the refutations).

Note.-- *There is a* certain aesthetic aspect to it though: counter-model/ model -- model/ counter-model. A 'harmonic' (Pythagorean-Platonic structure).

Note -- The sic-et-non method can, under certain point of view, be compared with the proliferation principle of Paul Feyerabend (1924/1994), one of the current epistemologists, who advocates a multiplicity of mutually contradictory, resp. opposing theories, especially in the field of professional sciences. The Abelardian method, which has become a method accepted and applied by quasi-all Scholastics (S. Thomas is the most balanced), has, in fact, made proliferation possible.-- In our applicative model: rationalism and fideism.

c. - *Four main traits.*

C.S.S. Peirce (1839/1914), the famous American epistemologist-semiotician, noted, sometime last century, the four epistemological traits that stood out to him.

1. The Scholastics never questioned the fundamental truths.-- This, because, according to Peirce, even in methodical doubt (H.O. 13; 72), every person abandons well-defined presuppositions, never abandons them,-- even if he/she does not want to have known this.

It is, moreover, known that, for example, S. Thomas, in order to specify the strictly scientific status of theology, compares its method with that of, for example, astronomy. Just as the astronomer, for example, presents mathematics as proven (without having to repeat all the mathematical propositions), so the theologian, respectively the Christian philosopher, presents the dogmata (propositions of faith) as established (in the manner of supra-rational certainties),--this, without having to "prove" them.

Which is a rational position : one recognizes one's starting points.

H.O. 113.

Note -- Reread, now, H.O. 14: "Logic -- the Abelardian-Scholastic method is essentially 'logic' -- is ontology (theory of reality), yet expressed in merely conditional sentences."

Here: "If the dogmata, the presuppositions of Christianity, are true, it follows that ..." (then follows the whole theology, resp. the whole Christian philosophy (H.O. 67vv.).

As Peirce saw very well: the Scholastic was religious-scientific. But she knew and acknowledged it. That is rational without more. Axiomatic-conscious.

2. Scholasticism relied on **(a)** the testimony of great scholars and **(b)** the all-encompassing ("Catholic") church community, as its final ground.

In other words: the individual had validity, but the group, as touchstone (criterion), widened the basis of verification. -- One can compare this with Thomas Kuhn's 'the normal science': in the Medieval Church milieu, one, though flexible paradigm, though flexible paradigm (pattern of scientific practice) has grown up, which, once founded by Abelardus, could be applied by thousands of (less) gifted people,--until it had served its purpose in the XIVth century.

Of course, behind Peirce's emphasis on all-encompassing interpretive community lies what he himself called (using a very metaphorical term) 'logical socialism' (logical collectivism). Josiah Royce (1855/1916), following in Peirce's footsteps, spoke of 'interpreting community'. - H.O. 83 (sociology of understanding) could lead us, here, to speak of Christian logical solidarity.

3. The types of proofs, in scholasticism, were manifold.-- This already follows from H.O. 112 (wildness).-- But there is more:

- (1) from natural (to be situated for every religious faith), general - human reason ('ex ratione'),
 - (2) from faith ("ex fide"),
 - (3) from the authority of great thinkers of all kinds ('ex auctoritate'),
 - (4) from what is probable ('probabile'),
- Behold four types of reasoning.

Not to mention the dichotomy 'deduction' ('syllogism' called) / induction, -- pair of opposites, which originates from *Aristotle (Prior. anal., 2; 23)*,-- generally adopted. Remember, in doing so, that both syllogism and 'induction' cover a plural of types (*A. Mansion, L' induction chez Albert le Grand*), in: *Revue Néo-scholastique* 1906 (mai-août).

H.O. 114.

4.-- The Scholastics harbored the mysteries of the faith as not provable/explainable by natural reason; but they undertook, nevertheless, to explain all that is created (H.O. 39; 47; 60).

From 1868, Peirce emphasizes, emphatically, that true scientific attitudes do not accept 'completely unexplained' data. In this sense, Scholasticism, through its "rationalism" (for it is one form of rational thought), is moving nicely toward that type of modern scientism.

Unfortunately, from that run-up, dynamism disappeared;--think of the death of that scholastic "rationality" (H.O. 71: Augustinian prototype) around 1800 (H.O. 106). It is as if, in the XIVth e., Church rationalism suffered from malakia, dullness-of-thinking, thought fatigue. Until this brought with it the "death of scholasticism" (end of XVIII th e.).

Of course, as a purely professional science, a Peirce can 'rationalize' further than e.g. a church-bound, Bible-bound movement (the heavenly society; H.O. 95: demonism), which fights with other, 'deeper' problems than secular professional science. The reduction of meaning (downfall, after rise, so typical of the demonic structure) is much stronger than in the purely secular field (H.O. 96: Derrida). In this sense, the Scholastic had it much, much harder.

(C) *The true scholasticism.*

So far the method, called 'schools'.-- Now more substantive. The scholastic natural science.-- O. Willmann, II, 621/623, in order to characterize Aristotelian natural science, at its best, cites Justus von Liebig (1803/1873), the founder of agricultural chemistry (among other things, discoverer of chloroform).

"Anyone who has familiarized himself, to some extent, with nature, knows that every singular phenomenon of nature, every singular process in nature, taken in isolation (*op.*: as a one-off case, specimen), encompasses the general law, resp. all the laws, thanks to which it comes into being, entirely within itself.

Consequence.-- The starting point of the true method is not, as *Francis Bacon or Verulam* (1561/1626; *Novum organum* (1620: the empiricist, she advocates from a multitude of specimens induce.

The true method assumes, in fact, a single case. Once this first instance is declared, all analogous cases are, ipso facto, declared: our method is the Aristotelian method, but updated with great skill and experience.

H.O. 115.

We examine the singular, and indeed each singular given. From the first we pass to the second, as soon as we have understood, from the first, the essential (H.O. 11v.: form of being; 47 ('It works': x)). In other words: we do not conclude (*note* Bacon's empiricist style) from the singular, which we know, to the general, which we do not know. On the contrary: in the course of the investigation (analysis) to which we subject a multitude of singular cases, we find that which is common to them all. (...)

Bacon's method amounts to a set of cases (specimens). But each singular case in itself remains unexplained (according to its essence), i.e. a kind of zero case. But thousands of zero numbers - in whatever sequence - brought together do not yet make up a real number. Thus one sees that Bacon's whole process of induction amounts to manipulating back and forth (each in itself according to its essence) uncomprehended sensory experiences. (...).

An empirical (*note*: understood in Bacon's sense) nature-exploration, in the running sense of that term, does not exist at all: an experiment, not preceded by a theory, i.e., an idea, relates to (true) nature-exploration, as the rattling of a child's rattle relates to (true) music. The experiment is merely an aid to the thought process, -- similar in this to arithmetic. The thought process must, in all cases and necessarily, precede it, if the experiment is to have any scope at all."

What does this long citation mean?

(1) That, since Aristotle, and, even, since Platon (H.O. 38: experimental foundation), the intelligentsia has known in principle what empirical, experimental professional science is.

(2) That mere empiricism (H.O. 5v.), by eliminating in principle the essential form (form, idea) (which, basically, Bacon also does, although with much more sense of induction than the Antiques and the Middle Ages), cannot account for the generality (concept, idea), the lawfulness (= general properties), as it emerges from induction. Something, that Aristotelianism (abstractive) and Platonism (ideative) can,

The reason for this we, H.O. 43, have set out (properties as a structured system of properties).

H.O. 116.

The question of the realization of induction.

It is certain that Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (H.O. 21; 26), who, with Aristotle, was held in very high esteem, shows a tentative beginning of experimental method.

This is evident from the thorough study of *D.Gershenson / D. Greenberg, Anaxagoras and the Birth of Scientific Method*, New York, 1964, vrl. 38/46 (*Specific Physical Theories*). "The fact that Anaxagoras illustrated his scientific lessons with demonstrations is, in itself, significant. It shows that, in his day, it was not uncommon to supplement direct observation with active experimentation." (O.c., 42).

A. Mansion, *L'induction chez Albert le Grand*, Louvain, 1906, 39, summarizes what the XIII-d' century High Scholastics made of it.

(1) The professional term 'inductio', induction, generalization, has a floating meaning in that period.

(2) The one thing, which, in all descriptions, invariably, recurs is "Inductio est a singularis in universalis progressio" (Induction is the reasoning progressing from singular to universal realities).

(3) Apart from the prepositional (pre-scientific, vernacular) induction, which is general-human (and has its undeniable value), the XIII-d' century thinkers rarely come to a real application of their theory, if it even exists, on the subject.

A. Mansion, o.c., 32, gets, in the whole work of Albert the Great (1200/ 1280), who dominated the whole "natural scientific" knowledge of his time, to barely two, today, in full professional science, somewhat, defensible applications. One is about the fact that, somewhere in the back of the mind, biological bodies have the principle of their movements (we would now include the brain and nervous system); the other about the simultaneity of lunar phases and ebb and flow. And: between very solid reasoning, following very precise observations (which proves that Albert understood the scope of it), sometimes "absurdities" (at least for our current natural science understanding).

In regard to theory of induction, John Duns Scotus (1266/1308; doctor subtilis) is still the most advanced, yet he too still -- like Albert and Thomas Aquinas -- confuses summative induction and truly experimental induction, which relies on analysis of understood specimens. Cfr o.c., 11 s..

H.O. 117.

Decision.-H.O. 106 (bottom), 108 (trial-and-error testing) pointed out to us that, because of the modern mentality, until now, the Scholastic Church has been blamed for

(1) is unfamiliar with modern professional science and

(2) excludes even trial-and-error methods. We now know why. There is a ground of truth in these reproaches. Although a sound theoretical understanding, yes, a general-human praxis was there, to a certain and undeniable degree, the Scholastics never reached the modern, massive application of it.

The run-up to modern science.

(1) *Early Scholastic* (1000/1200)

The School of Chartres had a natural philosophy thrust, in conjunction with natural science theories.

(2) *Highscholasticism* (1200/1300).

It was discussed, above, in the top figures, characteristic of the Aristotelian streak (Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus).

Particularly naturalistic, however, minded was Roger Bacon (1210/ 1292): he sharply criticized the "theological" method; pushed for a summary overview of the secular ("profane") professional sciences (which he was, only, partially, able to carry out).

He was empirically (experimentally) minded and worked with a pragmatic (result-oriented) idea of truth; -- he situated all of this within an illuminati doctrine (H.O. 65).

Curious: mathematics seemed to him to be the foundation of a scientific education.

(3) *Late Scholastic* (1300/1500).

The nominalist streak, especially active in Paris and at Oxford, was partially detached from the prevailing Aristotelianism (as a position of authority) and practiced independent observation (detached from Aristotle's book wisdom). Even the quantitative aspect emerged (though without measurements).

Figures: John Buridan (1300/1358), logician and physicalist (with, along Albert of Saxony (= Albert of Helmstedt (1306/1390)), influence on Leonardo da Vinci (1452/1519), Galileo Galilei (1564/1642), founder of modern exact natural science); -- Nicholas of Oresme (1323/1382), a.o. known as economist, anticipated Copernicus (1473/1543; the earth moves daily), R. Descartes (1596/1650; coordinate geometry), G. Galilei (discovery of the law of falling bodies).-- One sees: modern professional science (physics especially) did not fall from the sky.

H.O. 118.

(D) *The true scholasticism.*

Scholarly and dialectical, to some extent naturalistic, -- yes, but very strongly mystical.

1. *Interest in 'mystical' phenomena.*

Since R.C. Zaehner, *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane*, Oxford, 1957, and so many other works (e.g. Gerda Walther, *Phänomenologie der Mystik* (1955)), a wave of interest in 'mystical' phenomena has swept over the Enlightenment-Rationalist West. To begin with, mystical phenomena are both an ancient and planetary fact. No culture has its mystics, mysticae.

2. *A concise description.*

'Mustikos', mystic, mystical, comes from the ancient Greek word 'mueint close the eyes and / or lips.

a. It means, first of all, 'Everything connected with the mysteries (H.O. 22 (Mysteries of Samothrace); 64): In this very limited, cultural-historical sense, it concerns a viewing in small-scale communities, often strongly ritualistic and/or magical (H.O. 66: theurgy) based, i.e. attending, with understanding (if need be, mantically (H.O. 66)), a sacred event, which is often connected with after-life.

b. Here - and in a philosophical context it is mostly so (except in the Theosophies (H.O. 64), where the magical-ritual aspect must, at times, have been very important) - 'mystical' is understood in a much broader, indeed, sometimes so 'diluted' sense that the word does not mean much anymore, unless 'mysterious', 'emotionally-secretive' etc..

Yet (e.g., in Scholasticism) it is a real, more than imagined phenomenon. The divine, respectively the personally appearing deity are known and experienced, in addition to the rational way (H.O. 57), in a supra-rational, 'mystical' way. 'Godhead' can, in this context, be understood or interpreted in a polytheistic, mono- or pantheistic way. Hence polytheistic, monotheistic and pantheistic mystics. One already feels the ambiguity,-- not to say vagueness!

Note.-- As e.g. the above mentioned G. Walther, a mystical student of Husserl, says, mysticism is, almost inevitably, intertwined with paranormal ('occult') phenomena, resp. giftedness. Hence the problems from that angle.

Final sum.-- Mysticism and magic, respectively paranormal phenomena, constitute, collectively, a very delicate and -- frankly -- very difficult field.

H.O. 119.

'*Mysticism*', -- One of the meanings of this word is: 'spurious', suspicious, perverse mysticism.

'Heterodox (= rationalist) mysticism'

This professional term means that there is

(a) does have survival (supra-rational aspect),

(b) but that, at the same time or afterwards, rational, often 'bold' interpretations, explanations, are inserted into those experiences - merely proceeding from natural reason ('rationalization').

To be honest: whether a mysticism is 'heterodox' (unchurchy) is often very difficult to determine with absolute certainty. The language of mysticism (as well as of magic -- and paranormality) is of a different type than everyday and, most certainly of a well-defined type of 'scientific' (often 'scientistic') language.

Note -- H.O. 9 (theoria), vrl. 60 (speculari/ contemplari) taught us the ancient - Greek word 'theoria', which can mean both contemplation and (modernly conceived) 'theory'. Which proves that and rationalize and contemplate, easily, run together.

Note.-- Concerning magic, very particular, and related, in the Middle Ages, reference should be made to *J.-A. Rony, La magie*, Paris, 1950, from pp. 54 onwards. Islamic and Jewish (Kabbalistic) mystics and magics have penetrated, sometimes very deeply, into our West, -- living on to our days. Cfr. H.O. 106.

Applicative model.-- O. Willmann, II, 559f., says, on this subject, the following. "The God-seeking 'contemplation' (theoria) delves, by nature, preferably, eagerly, into the thought "God exists". against this divine 'being' pales, for mysticism, created ('creaturely') being;-- yea, the latter threatens, to elude it, altogether.

(a) The mystic(s) can, now, hold on to the knowledge that, if, for him/her, this world (this earthly reality) fades away, then also the world, in which the redemption (*note*: by Jesus Christ) took place and the church (by him) was founded, 'becomes a nothing'. In that case he has a firm hold on the law (*note*: the established ethical values) and on history (*note*: daily events).

(b) But he / she may also evade or minimize that conclusion. In that case, he / she is in danger of falling into monism (*op.*: living one, unique, super- and extraterrestrial world).

H.O. 120.

After all, the following thought then comes to full effect in him/her: "what is not God, is not there at all". Once this thought has taken root, it even displaces the memory of the law (*note*: the established moral codex)."

Appl. mod.: one of the top thinkers of highscholasticism, Master Eckhart (1260/1327), the founder of 'speculative' (understand: rationalizing) mysticism, in the West, - incidentally strongly Neoplatonizing (H.O. 32), came to say the following: "All creatures are 'purum nihil', pure nothing;-- God imposes no external act." By the latter, Eckhart means that the purely internal acts are sufficient, ethically speaking.

In other words, "the law" obliges one to perform physical, fellow human acts (H.O. 88; 101: duty of subsidiarity). - If one pulls such statements out of their context (i.e., the language of the mystics/mystics, which is far from pure rational speech), then one can, of course, annoy fellow believers. Or tempt one to carry out such statements literally (the inner life as a value in itself, with the otherworldliness inherent in such a cult of the inner). Understandable that the Church authorities, in this, have been concerned.

As an aside, Eckhart was condemned -- on the basis of such statements -- not as "heretical," but merely as one who spread "bad sounding doctrines" that sound "reckless" and "suspicious of heresy."-- Behold a model of heterodox mysticism.

General Decision.

O. Willmann, II, 322ff., outlines the proper ecclesiastical nature of Scholasticism as follows.

(1) Just as the Patristics, so also the Scholastics (cf. H.O. 70: Ak. Sceps.): the Patristics defended the abstract-ideal (know- and think-contents) as ecclesial and in the knowing mind (subject) and in the known data, -- this, against the Sceptics, who conceive nominalistically, our know- and think-contents, in principle, as denotative approaches, without ground in the things themselves (H.O. 1v.).

Nominalism also reigned supreme, in certain dialectical circles (H.O. 110): the *sic et non* became a juggling with mere names, at most concepts, understood as mere products of the human mind, to which no objective reality corresponded.

The ecclesiastical scholastics were, therefore, realists (abstractively (H.O. 8vv.) and/or ideatively (H.O. 27vv.),--at least in principle (not all our contents of knowledge and thought are, ipso facto, realistically, of course) and insofar as verification is present.

H.O. 121.

(2) Unlike the Patristics, the Scholastics had less or even nothing to do with ancient materialism (H.O. 70). But all the more with (heterodox) mysticism. This tended to reduce the sensory phenomena to a rather "unreal" reality. This becomes, rather, a pure reflection of either ideas (ideocentrism; H.O. 54; 60) or deity (H.O. 60; 120), without much 'being' ('reality') of its own.

Here, of course, especially the misunderstood Platonism, resp. Neoplatonism is the cause of such an "unrealism" concerning the material and created world surrounding us.

The Church's scholastics have, always, radically defended the own, essentially real, character both of all that is created, and of "all that is material. It was precisely in this that the (HO 19; 24) realism of Aristotle appeared as the desired solution.

What O. Willmann, o.c.,323, has it said: scholasticism is a realism - at least the real, ecclesiastical scholasticism. And this is in the sense of Aristotelianism.

a. She ascribes true reality to the sensory data (against mystical volatilizations).

b. It denotes at the same time, the cognitive and intellectual intelligibility as a representation of reality, -- more, therefore, than a mere product of human ingenuity (against the nominalism of the dialecticians).

(E) *The true scholasticism.*

Scholastic and dialectical, somewhat naturalistic, mystical, -- but all these aspects, preferably, orderly put together (harmony), -- such is the image, so far, that Scholasticism arouses.-- Scholasticism possesses, further, authority.

1.-- We touched on, with Peirce, H.O. 113, that great scholars and the comprehensive church community were decisive,--though not zone der more.-- There was, after all, the principle of subsidiarity (H.O. 88), which Augustine, among others, had advocated.

2.-- The firmest foundation and measure of authority is articulated, among others, by the "princeps scholasticorum" (the top figure among the scholastics), Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274), so far the Vatican's thinker.

H.O. 122.

Werner Jaeger, *Humanisme et théologie*, Paris, 1956, 112, cites the following text:

"(Whatever may be the case of the things discussed), - we need not worry much: for the study of philosophy does not serve to know what men's opinions are, but rather it comes to know what the truth concerning the data is." (*Expositio in libros Aristotelis de coelo et mundo*, Romae, 1886 (editio Leonina), lib. I, lect. 22, n. 8 (p.91)).

Note.-- This is the straightforward application of the noble yoke (H.O. 8v.): the more nominalistic, the more authoritarian; the more conceptually realistic, the more subsidiary-prone!

Et. Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Âge (des origines patristiques à la fin du XIVe siècle), (Philosophy in the Middle Ages (from patristic origins to the end of the 14th century)), Paris, 1944-2, 761, says what follows.

It is precisely the Middle Ages which first practiced a philosophy which freed itself from the grip of any authority.-- This does not mean that Scholasticism had no sense of authority. This does not mean that the Scholastics had no sense of authority; it only says that the individual and / or the (small) group worked itself free from an authoritarian grip, - always on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, together with 'the noble yoke'.

P.L. Landsberg, Die Welt des Mittelalters und wir (Ein geschichtsphilosophischer Versuch über den Sinn eines Zeitalters), (The World of the Middle Ages and Us (A Historical-Philosophical Attempt on the Meaning of an Age)), Bonn, 1925-3, 9, typifies the authority system of the church as follows: "It belongs precisely to the peculiar nature of the Middle Ages that, outside the church, there were only heresies,--which, against the impressive, positive system of the world church (H.O. 66), stormed in vain and, at once, played only a secondary role (...).

In the Middle Ages, because of the power of the Church, as the reception system - at the time - of "All that was positive," only the positive movement could continue. Examples of Middle Ages positive movements, which flowed into the ocean of the Church, are the Franciscan movement (*note*: S. Francis v. Assisi (1182/1226; during early highscholasticism; founded, in 1209, his order), the various crusading movements (the First Crusade: 1096/1099; the Last (eighth): 1270, again Highscholasticism), the mystical movement (S. Bernard of Clairvaux (1091/1153) founded the Middle Ages mysticism)." Behold three mutually complementary testimonies of people, who, in a serious way, inserted themselves into the Middle Ages.

H.O. 123.

3.-- The relationship Augustinianism / Thomism.

1. Willem van Moerbeke and others, in the course of the XIIIth century, translated Aristotle both from Arabic and from Greek. This provoked the Aristotelian controversy. The Church authorities quietly let it go, despite the fact that Augustinianism had been the established doctrine until then. This proves that real renewal or revitalization was considered possible. This implies openness on the part of the same Church authorities. Cfr H.O. 69.

2. On that background, the comparison between Augustinianism and Thomism becomes interesting. *P. Monnot, Philosophie scolastique*, in: *G. Jacquemet, dir., Dict. prat. d. connaissances religieuses*, IVe suppl. (1932), Paris, 1932, 984s., summarizes it as follows.

1. There are

(a) the concordists (there is thorough agreement between the two ways of thinking,--a strong current among the specialists),

(b) the differentialists (there is irreconcilable difference, indeed antagonism (H.O. 3; 96v.)),

(c) the identitives (there is analogy, i.e. partial agreement, partial opposition) (H.O. 12/16; 98)).

2. *Etienne Gilson, L'idée de philosophie chez S. Augustin et S. Thomas d'Aquin*, in: *La vie intellectuelle* 1930 (Juill./ août), 46.

(a) *Summary.*

1. Both thinkers - as believing Christians - thoroughly agree among themselves.

2.1. As an articulation, thoughtful form of both faiths, both philosophies (including as theology) are thoroughly congruent.

2.2. S. Thomas Aquinas was, clearly, convinced that his - individual - system (H.O. 81v.) was not the same as the individual system of his illustrious predecessor in rationally processing existential (H.O. 63) faith, i.e. simply lived through, but not reflectively (H.O. 72) clarified faith, i.e. religiously existing.

Excerpt. (123/125) For an explanation of the duality of opposites 'existence / reflection', one is referred, first of all, to *A. de Waelhens, Existence et signification*, Louvain/ Paris, 1958, 74/103 (*Signification de la phénoménologie*), where the author speaks of 'la philosophie nouvelle' (H. Bergson (1859/1941; around 1910 one begins to label 'All that is Bergsonism' as 'new philosophy'). This philosophy is 'new' (if, in the philosophical field, such a thing is possible to a high degree) in that it starts from the unconsidered ('existential') life, in order, while living, to think through its meaning and situation.

H.O. 124.

In addition to Bergsonian spiritualistic vitalism, de Waelhens sees G.F.W. Hegel (1770/1831) K. Marx (1818/1883), -- both founders of what has been called "modern dialectics"-- S. Kierkegaard (1813/1855), the founder of existential thought,-- Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900), the nihilist. According to the proposer, these thinkers and the currents awakened by them -- each in his own way -- would be applicative models of the idea, 'All that is already living, already existing, thinks on that same life, resp. exist.

J.Ed. Erdmann (1805/1892), Hegelian historian of philosophy, cited by O. Willmann, II, 550, says : "The philosophy of a period is "ihr Selbst-verständnis" (literally: the period, insofar as it understands itself), it merely formulates 'All that within this period lived unconsciously, worked instinctively'; it puts into words the mystery of this period." What the Waelhens, earlier, understands in the individual sense, is here preserved from the collective of thinking minds - always within the same epoch. The 'living', resp. 'existing', within the same epoch, comes to full consciousness, thanks to reflection, in his philosophizing.

One refers to this view as "histor(ic)ism. The reason is given by the same Erdmann, *ibid.*: "The rise and fall (H.O. 94) of a system carries with it a world-historical necessity: a system of thought, after all, is determined in its rise by the nature of the epoch which it brings to full awareness of itself; because the epoch in question is superseded by a subsequent epoch, it is, in turn, determined in its fall by the nature of its epochal bond.

One cannot express it more beautifully: history, understood as a sequence of time periods, determines the essence and course of thought. That is pure Hegelianism. If we now apply these two insights to Augustine and Thomas, we have, perhaps, one of the most important reasons ('rationes'; H.O. 76;79), by which the two thinkers differ to a certain extent. Even though they belong to one and the same Christian movement.

In idealistic terms this means that the truth, in the course of time, is approached, interpreted, expressed differently now and then. One reads H.O. 95 (phenomena as historical achievements, resp. expressions (realized in material signs) of one or more ideas).

H.O. 125.

In anticipation of what will be explained in greater detail later on (universalia ante rem (the ideas in God), universalia in re (the idea realized in the phenomena), universalia post rem (the idea realized in our concepts)), we can say, with O. Willmann, II, 552, that in so far as truth is worked out in the progress of history, it is a product of time; in so far as it represents a content situated outside of time and, therefore, transcending history, it is a radiation of eternity (understand: God's ideas).

The philosophical systems are "universalia post rem" (insights drawn from things themselves), but what we, thanks to those systems, try to grasp, with our minds (reason, reason), are "universalia in re" (the insight embodied in things themselves) and, in the last instance, "universalia ante rem" (insights for things themselves, ideas of God).

Thus we do justice to the historical (human) aspect (the phenomena, the names; H.O. 34; 47)), without neglecting the ideational aspect (ibid.).

However, with the terms 'universalia' (concepts), 'res' (phenomena) and 'post', 'in', 'ante'(after, in, before), we find ourselves in full scholastic ontology, -- which, apparently, is not as unhistorical as it is sometimes claimed to be. - So much for the digression.

(b)1. The teaching points common to Augustine and Thomas (cf. E. Gilson) are:

(i) God, as exalted ("transcendent") Creator of all finite (created) being, is infinitely different from all creatures;

(ii) God, in the same perspective, is such that the creature is essentially dependent on his Creator.

(b)2. The teaching points that differ from Augustine to Thomas are:

(i) Theological:

a. the proof of the existence of God is worked out differently,

b. God, as "first cause" (understand: as the cause for all possible finite (created) causal processes and deeds) is expressed differently;

(ii) Anthropology (philosophy of man):

a. the doctrine of illumination (H.O. 65; 117), peculiar to both, is elaborated differently;

b. the theory of knowledge is different in both (**1.** the abstraction, core of Thomas's epistemology, is not present in Augustine's teaching; the 'intellectus agens, (the abstracting aspect of our mind) associated **2.**with that abstraction, is, likewise, not present in Augustine's teaching;-- methodological: the method, by which the distinct types of reality are rationally approached, are different.

H.O. 126

Conclusion. -- Between Augustine (354/430) and Thomas (1225/1274) lie approximately nine centuries. The world Church has, in that enormous interval, evolved fiercely. Both giants of Catholic thought reflect historical evolution.

Steadfast, however, is the dual footing of the existence clarification of faith :

a. the noble yoke (H.O. 8v.; 122), through which each person, individually, is confronted with objective reality, in a personal way;

b. solidarism (H.O. 83; 113), which, ultimately, refers back to the paleomilesians (Thales v. Mil. (-624/-545) and successors) and the paleopythagoreans (Puthagoras v. Sam. (6580/-500) and his school), who, both of them, concerning thinking, advocated the hetaireia, the thinking fellow - being, resp. the thinking fellowship (as a delineated group).

On these two bases rests the ancient idea of "philosophia perennis" ("eternal philosophy"), formulated by *Agostino Steuco* (Steuchus Eugubinus), in his *De perenni philosophia* (1557).

4.-- The failure of the Church.

Anyone who traces the history of the medieval Church - especially if this is done "critically" - will encounter authoritarian traits with clock-like regularity. - The explanation, after all we have said, regarding idealism, can be brief. Read H.O. 90vv. (conflictual idealism). It is clear that the idea of authority, as it is in God and, through creation and, also, directly (enlightenment), comes through in our thinking, once it is realized in the phenomenal world (H.O. 95), can degenerate into authoritarianism. We call 'authoritarian' 'that which authority, on grounds other than the principle of subsidiarity, wishes to impose on subjects: Cfr. H.O. 88. See also H.O. 102 (social critique: narcissism; mask), but apply to authority structure. See also H.O. 101; 120 (shirking).

Note.-- In the Middle Ages, the World Church was massive and massively authoritative. This increased the temptation to authoritarianism, of course. Yet we will find, from the Renaissance on, that Western intellectual life becomes like two soccer teams without a referee. One lapses into the other end.

H.O. 127.

(F) *The true scholasticism.*

School-dialectical, with a dose of natural scientific interest, mystical (mysticism), 'authoritarian' (with strong dose of subsiditarianism),-- such is the picture, which characterizes the Scholastic.-- But can its ontology, briefly, be outlined?

A. -- *The noble yoke.*

The immortal pedestal is and remains the relation "knowing, wanting, appreciating subject / known, wanted, appreciated object" (H.O. 8 + H.O. 73 (voll. cogito)).

As we noted, gradually) that basic relation was understood both nominally (dialectic; H.O. 110: metalogical) and abstractively (H.O. 115: Ar. method; 125) and, above all, ideatively (H.O. 121; 125) - post, in, ante.

Note.-- The term "intentio" ("intentionalis"), in the wake of S. Augustine (H.O. 70), is more common.

B.I. -- *Being, syn- and diachronic.*

As already stated (H.O. 105), synchronically 'being' becomes *essentia* (mode) and *existentia* (fact). Diachronically it becomes *potentia* (disposition, being possible) and *actus* (being realized; H.O. 17 (seed, germ model); 23), potential and actual being.

The natural-philosophical-natural-scientific tendencies of Scholasticism will involve the opposition pair 'potentiality / act' becoming commonplace in language usage. -- sometimes ad nauseam.

B.II. - *Deity as pure actuality.*

The dynamic-genetic couple of "potentiality/act" just mentioned does, however, render great service in theology. In order to distinguish divine being from transcendental (all-encompassing) being and from finite, created being, the Scholastic says that:

(i) 'All that is finite (created)', also subject to arising and passing away (H.O. 95: phenomena) and, thus, is a potential and actual, simultaneously,

(ii) that Godhead, however, is merely actual being. God is pure 'act' (understand: realized divine nature).-- One sees that pairs of opposites (systechies, in the language of the Paleopythagoreans) can be particularly useful, as models of analogy (H.O. 13). The terms are inclusive among themselves, not exclusive.

B.III. - *The transcendental.*

"Res (given), ens (be(de)), verum (true, i.e. in accordance with reason and reason), bonum (valuable, 'good'), aliquid (be(de)), insofar as distinguished from the rest (something), unum (one, i.e. be(de), insofar as undivided in itself); - for those who know ancient thought, these concepts are of Platon, Aristotle, Augustine.

H.O. 128.

B. IV.-- *The Conceptual Realism.*

Either abstractly (H.O. 8vv.) or ideatively (H.O. 27vv.) essentialism involves a brilliant model theory.

1. S. Augustine had:

- (1) the exemplary (tonal) Divine thought (as a system of ideas),
- (2) the ideal essence ('essence') of created data,
- (3) the two previous depicting (reflecting) human thought, in a light-filled (light-metaphysical) way, inclusively thought, (O. Willmann, II, 288f.).

The Scholastics (at least the conceptual realists) did something analogous: the 'intellectuals' (= universals) are the ideas of God (making up one system), 'ante multiplicitem' (for each created, finite multiplicity, distribution); the 'naturalia' (the essential forms in the data itself) make up the nature (here: being, nature) of the data, 'in multiplicitate' (in the multiplicity itself); the 'logic' (the ideas in our mind (intellect, reason), are the representation of the previous two, 'post multiplicitem', after the multiplicity of the data (naturalia), which we can, thanks to analogy, reduce to unity (reflection, on a finite plane, of God's one system of ideas). Cfr O. Willmann, o.c, 357.

2. (a) Between God and the created His ideas circulate (communication, interaction), as models.

(b) Between the created and our minds, God's ideas are in circulation (communication, interaction).

(c) Between our minds and our actions, these same ideas are in circulation (communication, interaction,-- between our theoretical and our practical behavior). At least in principle. For, once phenomenal, deviations are possible,--actually, as conflictology (H.O. 90vv.) teaches us.

Preconstitutively they are God's ideas, constitutively they are the forms of beings (naturalia) in nature, informatively they are our conceptions, deontically-technically they are our designs (models of thought and action).-- An encompassing communication resp. interaction based on models (mutual images), called "essences", behold what is his(de), for the Augustinian, resp. the Scholasticus.-- At the same time, this is truth doctrine.

Preconstitutive truth, i.e. God's ideas, to which the essence of things corresponds; constitutive truth, i.e. the essence of things, insofar as it corresponds to God's ideas or to the designs of finite beings. Informational truth: insofar as our conceptions are verifiable in things. Practical truth: our actions as responding to "essences" (norms),

H.O. 129.

(G) Chronological diagram.

The "auctoritates" (H.O. 111), which were preferred, were, briefly stated, the following.

1. (Neo)Platonism

1.1. The pagan philosophers Plotinos v. Lukopolis (203/269), the ontologist; Proklos v. Konstantinopolis (410/485), nicknamed "the Scholasticist";-- along the Jewish the Islamic fil. to, likewise, influences.

1.2. Ps. Dionusios the Areopagite (480/510) and S. Augustine v. Tagaste (354/430), as Christians.

2. Aristotelianism.

2.1. Boëthius v. Rome (450/525); +/- 1150: all works of Aristotle translated into Latin;

2.2. past the Jewish and Islamic Aristotelians, influences.

Note: Byzantine influence.

A. Prescholasticism (700/900). Carolingian and Ottoman Renaissances.-- Joh. Scottus Eriugena (810/877): first comprehensive theological-philosophical system.

B. Early Scholasticism (1000/1200). French Renaissance (XII th e.).-- The relation 'faith/knowledge', the universals discussion,-- the School v. Chartres (Neoplat.), mysticism, -- they form the four foreground themata.

Four figures: S. Anselmus v. Aosta (Canterbury; 1033/1109), Petrus Abelardus (1079/1142), John v. Salisbury (1110/1180), S. Bernardus v. Clairveux (1091/1-153). - Separately : the 'libri sententiarum' (collection of Biblical and Patristic extracts), the 'summae' (systematic treatises).

C. Highscholasticism (1200/1300).

The heyday of scholasticism. The great systems.-- Situation:

- a. the discovery of the whole of Aristotle (1150+);
- b. from 1200 : foundation of universities;
- c. the mendicant orders (Franciscans, Dominicans).

The major directions:

1. traditional Augustinianism (e.g. Henry v. Ghent (1217/1293)),

2. Aristotelianism (S. Albert the Great (1200/1280), his ll. S. Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274)).

3. Skotism (John Duns Scotus (1266)1308).

4. Neoplatonism (Master Eckhart (1260/1327)),

5. Natural Science (Roger Bacon (1210/1292)).

6. Denkleer (Raimundus Lullus (1235/1315)),

7. initial Nominalism (Petrus Aureolus (1250/1322)). -- One sees: the highscholasticism deserves, truly, its name.

D. Late Scholasticism (1300/1450).

Both the earlier currents (called via antiqua) and the emerging nominalism (terminism),-- the 'via moderna', continued.

H.O. 130.

But one figure dominates the field: William of Ockham (also: Occam; 1300/1350), - along with the emerging natural sciences (John of Buridan (1300/1358), Nicholas of Oresme (1323/1382), who prepared Galileo, among others.

The foundation of a full-fledged ontology by scholastics. (105/129).

Introduction,-- (105/107). Two full-fledged ontologies, the Aristotelian "first philosophy" and the Plotinian ontology, were available to the Scholastics,-- but they were pagan, non-Biblical. The Scholastics founded the first full-fledged Christian ontology, in the person v. S. Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274), -- still the foundation of Vatican thought.

(A) The concept of "middle ages" (107v.); supporters and, especially, opponents.

(B) The true, i.e., church scholasticism (109/129).

1.-- Schola (109); sic et non of Petrus Abelardus, as hermeneutic method (109/114), - dialectic (109/111), appl. mod. (S. Thomas Aquinas; 111v.), four main traits (cf. CSS Peirce; 112/114).

2.-- Scholastic natural science (114/117).-- Justus von Liebig on Aristotelian induction (114v.),-- praxis (116v.), run-up to modern inductive method (117).

3.-- Scholastic mysticism (118/121).-- Definition of 'mysticism' (magic, theurgy), 'mysticism' (heterodox, usually rationalistic, mysticism; 118v.);-- appl. mod. (Master Eckhart; 119v.).

Note.-- Scholastic realism overcomes and the nominalism of dialecticians (sic-et-non) and the world- and life-less mysticism (especially neoplatonizing) of mystics (120v.).

4.-- Scholastic authority (121/126).

1. Subsidiarism tempers "authoritarianism" (121).

2. Testimonies v. W. Jaeger, Et. Gilson, P. L. Landsberg terzake (122).

3. The relationship 'Augustinianism/ Thomism' (Aristotelianism; 123/126): three positions (concordism/ differentialism/ identivism (= analogy) (123).

Excerpt.-- Similarity and, especially, difference between the two greatest Catholic thinkers -- Augustine and Thomas -- explained on the basis of the ideas of "new philosophy (bergsonist) and "Hegelian histor(ic)ism" (123/125).

4. Authoritarian traits of the Middle Ages hierarchy (125).

5.-- Scholastic evolution (129).

Notes on this course (1/130).-- It may seem that what goes before is a "useless" detour into a modern and contemporary ontology.

1.- A systematic work is never more than a "systematization" of what has grown historically (H.O. 123/125).

It is striking that in recent years there has been astonishing ignorance, indeed contempt, among Catholics concerning their own ontological positions. One does not know, usually, anything accurate anymore about what the world Church, centuries and centuries, by solidary thinking, has formulated. If it is true (which is the Catholic working hypothesis,--in Platonic terms: 'lemma',) that God Himself guides the Church, through her authority figures, thinkers, then this is the way.

H.O. 131.

(H) *The "new" ("second", also called "Spanish") scholasticism.*

A. After 1450, starting from the Dominican Petrus Crockaert (+1516) and, especially, Franciscus de Vitoria (1485/1546), who founded the "new" Scholasticism at Salamanca, a self-critical re-foundation of the mid-century form of thought emerges. This gives rise to a series of commentaries on Thomas Aquinas.

B. At Coimbra (*cursus conimbricensium*), the Jesuits conceived the same actualization. - Main figure : Francesco Suarez, s. j. (1548/1617).

Note.-- Spain, once freed from the Moors, comes into its own and becomes a world power. Movements such as Humanism (Renaissance) and Protestant Reform barely touched Spain. As a result, the Middle Ages Catholic tradition is able to flourish there, in a modernizing way.

Suarezianism.

Pope Benedict XIV (1740/1758; art- and letter-loving pope) labeled *Suarez* a doctor *eximius* ("Outstanding teacher"). Two works are widely known: *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597) and *De legibus* (1612; his doctrine of law).

Suarez's erudition was extremely great: antiquity, Jewish and Islamic thought, Renaissance humanism were familiar to him. He is a Thomist, but in a critical-autonomous way.

Ontological suarezianism.

After Aristotle and Plotinos (H.O. 105), Suarez is the first, who writes out a full-fledged systematic (thomistic) ontology.

(1) This proponent of Baroque philosophy develops an ontology completely independent of theology.

(2) He always starts from the singular being. Although he is an abstract conceptual realist (H.O. 8; 120), he maintains that our mind possesses a well-defined intuition of singular (individual) being.

(3) He reduces the transcendentalities (H.O. 127) to three: one (harmology, in which analogy is the basis of ontology), true (theory of knowledge), "good" (valuable, axiology).

(4) Natural theology is, for Suarez, one with ontology: one understands being but, if one understands it from God.

Legal suarezianisne.

State power stems from God, but the latter first bestows it on a natural law). the bearer of state power can be, e.g., a monarch (but nothing more). that is scholastic democracy.

Suarez's influence, even in Protestant countries, was very great.

H.O. 132.

(I) *Applicative model of neoscholastic reasoning.* (132/143)

It may give the (wrong) impression that the Middle Ages modes of reasoning come across as outdated. That this is not at all so can be seen from a position of a Neoscholastic French thinker with regard to 'All that is modern reason'. We explain this as clearly as we can.

1. *Literatological (= rhetorical) introduction.*

R. Barthes, *L' aventure sémiologique*, Paris, 1905, 1375s., talks about the commonplaces ('loci communes', 'lieux communs'), usually brought up in what the antique-medieval rhetoric called 'topics' ('topos' = commonplace),

Well, one of the many commonplaces is the systechy (contradictory pair) 'thesis/hypothesis (causa). -- The object of a quaestio, point discussed, is split, systematically, into two aspects.

(a) The thesis (positio, also: propositum) is the general position on a debated subject,-- take: 'modern freedoms' -- In Platonic terms: the idea as a regulatory model.

(b) the hypothesis (Latinized 'hypothesis') or, in Latin, causa, debated subject (theme), - . in legal cases: case, which is pleaded.-- In Platonic terms: the position towards the phenomena, which, situated in time (diachronically) and space (synchronically), represent the pure idea.

Applicative model: "How, practically, to conceive the scholastic general proposition in time and space, i.e., in singular-concrete circumstances?"

Note.-- R. Barthes, who is not well disposed toward the Scholastic, gives as a (rather ridiculous) example:

(a) thesis: "Should one marry?"

(b) hypothesis: "Should Ornella marry?". First the universal, then the singular, respectively the private model,-- In Platonic terms.

Note.-- Barthes reduces this twofold platitude to a purely rhetorical case: it is, at once, abundantly clear, that it also involves a philosophical (logical) type of thinking.

Note.-- The antique Greek word 'hupo.thesis' means, among other things, 'subject of a debate'. One did not, therefore, rephrase it as 'supposition'.

Thus, e.g., in L. Méridier, ed., *Euripide*, t. I, Médée, Paris, 1947, 121, one can read: the 'hypothesis' (Fr.: argument) of the drama Mèdeia (Medea), according to Aristophanes the grammatikos reads as follows:

H.O. 133.

"Mèdeia, driven by her resentment against Jason (= the leader of the Argonauts), because he (although married to Mèdeia) had married Glaukè, the daughter of Kreon (the king of Thebes), killed (*op.* by magic and poisoning) and Glaukè with Kreon and her own children (*op.*: which she had with Jason),--this to get rid of Jason and to go and live with Aigeus (*op.*: prince at Athens).

This subject is not treated by either of the other two tragedians (*note*: Aischulos of Eleusis (-525/-456), the oldest of the antique Greek tragedy poets, and Sophocles of Kolonos (-496/-406); -- Euripides of Salamis (-480/-406)) (...)." From which it appears that 'hupo.thesis', here, means *the subject treated*,-- dramatically that is.

2. Neoscholastic applicative model.

J. Rivière, Libertés modernes, in: *J. Bricout, dir., Dict. prat. d. conn. relig.*, IV, Paris, 1926, 370/375, divides the exposition as follows:

1. general concept; the **2.** problem of Liberalism (*note*: here in the sense of "liberality"); **3.** doctrine (the thesis and the hypothesis).

The Church-Scholastic doctrine is regularly accused of "dogmatism", (doctrinal) "absolutism", etc.: we will examine to what extent this allegation corresponds to a reality.-- Because the article is already too long, we allow ourselves to give a summary (at least of the significant parts).

2.1.-- General concept of "modern freedoms",

a. By "modern freedoms" neoscholastics understands "the rights, granted to their citizens by the present states, concerning ethical (= moral, moral) and religious matters" (a.c., 370).

As applicative models are, briefly, named: freedom of thought, speech, - press freedom; freedoms of conscience as freedom of religious belief and worship;-- as an applicative model of modern state is, pre-eminently, named the USA.

b. The cultural-historical background is outlined as follows.

(1) The distinction "confessional (doctrinally fixed) state (society)/confessional (doctrineless) state (society).

a. The Antique and mid-century (Scholastic) state government - usually, since the French Revolution (1789), called "ancien regime" - is characterized by the predominance of authority, resp. those in authority (l'état despotique).

H.O. 134.

b. The Modern State, on the other hand, to the extent that it is truly modern (*note*: about which, more fully, later), of course, prides itself on pushing through freedom for everything (a.c.,370). In other words, he is "democratic. The 'sovereign people' rule.

(2) Not only is the modern state, through parliamentary institutions, with or without the older royal houses, non-authoritarian ('despotique'): it is also liberal.

a. The Ancien Régime (Antiquity, Middle Ages), as a state government, honored a system of doctrine ('doctrine') and -- in the ancient sacred tradition -- directed its praxis to that doctrine. Which, usually, in Freethinking circles, is branded as 'dogmatism'. Or as 'dark middle ages'.

b. The modern states, on the other hand, as modern states, renounce any ethical or religious (sacred) dogmatism: they are dogma-free. Their objective is, merely (reductionism), the public (general) welfare of the citizens of the state. Any life- and world-philosophical, 'educational' role is excluded, ruthlessly, in the name of liberality. in other words: the modern state is without higher values.

Summary.

(1) The Antique-Middle Ages state (society) believes in an absolute fact (the higher idea,-- Platonic). Consequence: its first task is the realization of ethical and sacred (religious) values (ideas), if necessary by 'le bras seculier' (the secular (understand: secular) arm), i.e. by the exercise of power.

(2) The Modern State, on the other hand, proceeds from the critique ('undermining') of 'all that is higher idea': no ethics, no religion (church) is accepted as guiding state authority. The modern state is, in this sense, 'a.dogmatic', secularized. 'Desecrated' is also said.

Note.--- J. Rivière, a.c.,370s., says, in the process, that XVIII - d' century rationalism, in its secularization tendency, has pushed through this modern idea of the state,--especially in the French revolution (1789+) instead of ecclesiastical 'interference', (despotism) now comes tolerance ('tolérance') i.e. every single citizen of the state determines for himself, autonomously (independently), without authoritarian intervention, anyway, his/her own ethics and religion. The Modern state is 'neutral' (ethical, sacred).

H.O. 135.

"The French Revolution finished this work of discouragement by bringing down, one by one, the states of the doctrinaire type. Since then-both for political opposition and out of conviction-'tolerance' was the general rule." (A.c., 370). Its first application was the abolition of the exclusive prerogative of the state churches.

Human rights.

The typically modern, freedom-loving state -- says the author, a.c.,371 -- tends, more and more, to take the declaration of the rights of man and the citizen (La déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, (The declaration of the rights of man and citizen), -- after the abolition of feudality (04.08.1789), on 27. 08.1769) as its "Gospel". - He was right, in 1926, because, on 10.12.1948, the United Nations, in Paris, had the International Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed. On 20.11.1959, at the same United Nations, the Declaration of the Rights of the Child came into being. Needless to say, these are topical.

2.2.-- *The liberalism issue.*

a. Steller says that, in addition to political questions, philosophical and theological questions also arise, in response to Modern freedoms, work of Liberalism. Take the freedoms of thought and conscience.

(a) Even mere internal freedom raises the question of the objective truth value of an inwardly cherished opinion.

(b) But, once this inner freedom develops into external freedom (in expression, freedom of the press, freedom of propaganda e.g.), it affects fellow men, the common good, the state and, even, the Church.

Both inner and outer freedom touches, immediately, God as the order-maker of the universe and, in particular, humanity. This is the sacred, religious side.

To sum up: freedom, yes; modern freedom, yes;-- but it is situated within the limits of objectivity fellow humanity and sacred order.

b. To this - to these questions - there are two main types of answers, which are situated in a different, different language.

(a) *Agnostic (septic, 'absolute') liberalism.*

Thesis: all opinions - as expressions of human (understand: individual) reason (rationalism) - are equivalent. Corollary: all ethical or religious (e.g., Church) opinions are valid only as individual opinions. As such they are

(a) do respect,

(b) yet confined to the individual, private sphere ("Religion is private business"), bounded by public order.

H.O. 136.

(b). *The ecclesiastical-Catholic position.*

Thesis: Not all opinions -- as to be situated within the framework of **(i)** objective truth, **(ii)** humanity, and **(iii)** sacred order -- are equivalent.

1. No true Catholic - argues the proposer - can attend to absolute Liberalism, because it means skepticism, agnosticism (only the phenomena are knowable; what reaches beyond those phenomena is unknowable).

2. Catholics, however, have been divided since the introduction, by the States, of modern freedoms: some, conservationists, Ancien-Régime supporters, criticize the fact of it as the source of all kinds of ills (e.g. Robert de La Mennais (1782/1854), priest, philosopher, who, in his first period, was a theocrat (supporter of kingship as God's will), ultra-royalist), the others (e.g. the same Lamennais, in his second period (L'Avenir)), the progressives, endorse the fact of modern freedoms as containing benefits. They may develop into liberal Catholics.

Conclusion.-- One sees it: the language of Liberalism and Ecclesiology (Scholasticism) stands or falls with the main axiom (lemma): on the one hand, (freedom to be abducted); on the other, (situated) freedom. The same word covers a thoroughly different perspective;-- consequence : some say 'freedom', others say 'no freedom unless situated)!

2.3.a. -- *The thesis of church doctrine.*

Typically Scholastic, J.Rivière reasons in two stages:

- a.** theological (the Church Magisterium (Magisterium; Popes); theologians);
- b.** philosophical (natural reason).

A. *Theological.*

A.1.-- *The Magisterium.*

The premise is, of course, that the Pope (eventually, a "council") can express an "infallible" or, at least, highly probable opinion.

Thesis: "In the name of the divine truth, which she represents, the Church has, to begin with, repeatedly, solemnly condemned modern liberties." (A.c., 372).

One can see that the outspoken premise ("Freedom is to be situated within an order") is duly echoed here. This use of language has, of course, scared off many democrats (Catholics and others).

H.O. 137.

Applicable models.

The first position dates from Pope Gregory XVI (1765/1846; pope: 1831/1846), with his Encyclical *Mirari vos* (15.08.1832). Directed against the liberal Catholic Lamennais and his thinkers, this document condemns the thesis that "any faith is sufficient for salvation" (religious indifferentism).

Thirty years later, Pius IX (1792/1878; pope:1846/1878) - not without first liberalizing - reiterated the same condemnation (Encyclical of 08.12.1864 *Quanta cura*; it was provided with a *Syllabus* (summary overview) of errors, which became infamous).

Third figure: Leo XIII (1810/1903; Pope: 1878/1903): this one ushers in a new phase. He undertakes the reunification of the Anglicans with Rome, as well as that of the Orthodox Churches; he urges Catholics to accept the French Republic, result of the Enlightenment; he founds, formally, Social Catholicism (*Rerum novarum* (1891)).

In the Encyclical *Libertas praestantissimum* (20.06.1888)

(a) he repeats the convictions of his predecessors,

(b) says that the Church does not oppose the concessions to modern freedoms that the modern situation, at times, requires. "Many are of the opinion that the Church must adapt itself to the present spirit of the times (...).

(i) This is an opinion, which commands respect, if it contains a view, which is wisely balanced. (...).

(ii) Things look, however, different, if it concerns things and systems of doctrine, which are the result of deterioration of morals and of untrue insights (...).".

J. Rivière: "One sees that the Church is not hostile to a well-understood liberalism. Yet she neither can nor will agree to sacrifice the 'rule' to the 'exception'." (A.c., 373).

A.2.-- *The theologians.*

They are the interpreters (explainers) of the papal documents. Which gives room for individual differences, of course.

B. *Philosophical.*

This is called arguing "out of reason" (natural reason, not lit by supernatural light, basis of philosophy).

B.1.-- *Philosophy of Freedom.*

Freedom, among other things, is twofold:

(i) freedom of ability ("I can kill someone"), the know-all of normal human beings (physical freedom);

(ii) freedom of may ("May I kill him?"), characteristic of the conscientious, "moral" or "ethical" man (ethical freedom = permissibility).

H.O. 138.

In other words: I may be free to do something physically, but it may be that I am not free to do it, in conscience.

The freedom of (physical) ability is limited by physical conditions (e.g.: the other is stronger than me so that I cannot kill him/her); the freedom of may (moral permissibility) is limited by a conscientious feeling of a higher order of ethical nature. Thus e.g. I may not kill my fellow-man unless in a state of lawful (morally justifiable) self-defense.

"Undoubtedly: man is made in such a way that he (may) have the physical ability to withdraw from the moral order ('son devoir'). However, if he should nevertheless do so, then this is an abuse of his own freedom (*note*: of physical ability). Such a thing cannot possibly be called a 'right' in the truly ethical sense of the word 'right' ". (A.c., 374).

'Right' - i.e. - here means 'false right', abuse of power; - as in the Anglo-Saxon maxim 'Right or wrong: my right' (('Right (in the ethical sense) or wrong (idem): my 'right' (in the merely physical sense of abuse of power.

Conclusion: where "absolute" Liberalism uses the word "freedom" rather ambiguously, Church Scholastics defines the term "freedom" very clearly, Or rather:

(i) "absolute" Liberalism does not, in essence, know any boundary between "justifiable" use of freedom and what, for some time, has been called "permissive" (allowing all possible types of acts) use of freedom. This has become abundantly clear since 1926, the date of Rivière's article. Such a confusion of concepts was quickly perceived by ecclesiastical Scholastics as one of the many possibilities inherent in "absolute" Liberalism.

(ii) 'Absolute' Liberalism wanted, first of all, through thick and thin, liberation, emancipation, 'freedom' (in the modern sense, i.e.), from the oppressive grip of a self-sustaining 'feudal' (understand: decadent-feudal) culture, dominated by higher clergy, nobility and royal houses, which came across as a useless 'upper layer' weighing heavily on the people and, more often than not, covered this situation with a false Christianity.

H.O. 139.

B.2. - Pragmatic argument.

With C.S. Peirce (1839/1914), we characterize what Rivière then argues as not "pragmatic" (i.e., goal- and result-oriented), but rather "pragmaticist" (i.e., what tests an idea for its applicability and its consequences, once it is transformed into praxis).

"From 'all that is true' flows, logically, 'all that is valuable' ('good'). Which implies that untrue learning systems are necessarily unholy." (A.c., 374). Steller adds, "Under that (effective) point of view, all truths form a coherent whole (system). - The effective results confirm what reason recognizes, namely, that the systems of learning, which are apparently among the most 'speculative' (seemingly impractical), sooner or later, have repercussions on well-being.

The Catholic 'thesis,' which confers justice solely on 'all that is true,' fulfills, in addition to the role of mere logical truth, that of a ready social safeguard." (Ibid.).

In other words, the concern of the Catholic Scholastics was not merely for a purely theoretical insight; it was, at once, for the public good,--which is what the "absolute" Liberals boasted so much about. Admittedly in an ecclesiastical, not a liberal way.

In commons-speak, "What will, effectively (viewed according to its 'effects'), 'absolute' Liberalism amount to? What impact will it have, over time, on 'the interests' of the people?"

B.3. - Dialectical (eristic) argument.

Since Zenon of Elea (-500/...), the pupil of Parmenides of Elea and the founder of logical thought, the "thou-even-as-I" argument has been in vogue.-- Of which we have, here, an application.--

(1) "Me".

The Church, patently, cannot do without both teaching system and teaching system fidelity in praxis.

(2) "Neither thou nor I.

One looks - says Riviere - at the practical behavior of the "laicized" governments under World War I (1914/1918). The modern freedoms (of the press, of the propagation of opinion and many others) were curtailed... in the name of a 'higher' good, that of 'the fatherland in need'. The high idea of 'public welfare' justified the sometimes radical curtailment of 'modern freedoms', which suddenly did not correspond to the spirit of the age.

H.O. 140.

This repressive behavior of the lay state is only justifiable, on a rational level ("absolute" Liberalism prides itself on acting "rationally"), if the same permissive lay state maintains a minimum-essential "doctrine" (concerning the "higher interests" of the people, for example). Thus 'the lay state as well as the church' cannot do without a system of doctrine. - Not to mention the liberal doctrine itself, of course.

2.3.b.-- *The hypothesis of church doctrine.*

a. - Note: Church-Scholastic doctrine, with the thesis (in commonsense language: 'theory', system of ideas), is not finished. Quite the contrary! "One would do the (Church) doctrine an injustice, if one knew only the thesis (part 1) of it, without taking into account its second aspect, the hypothesis: for the hypothesis functions, as a complement." (A.c., 374).

In other words: in terms of logics and set theory, as in those of classical logic, a totality is divided into a dichotomy ('complement-ring'), -- here : thesis and hypothesis.

b. Whereas the thesis was situated "in abstracto," in pure, "uncommitted" thinking, the hypothesis situates that same doctrine "in concreto," in praxis.-- Among other things: compassionate, -- in debate. See higher H.O. 132. Which amounts to the neoscholastic form of pluralism. The Scholasticus, by virtue of the sic-et-non method (H.O. 109vv.), knows, inherently, a pluralism of perspectives (= positions).

In this sense, methodically, in the very structure of his method, he harbors a "perspectivism" (term, which Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900) gave authority to).

"The cult of principles, even if they are not sought after by the masses, peculiar to the Church, does not prevent her from opening her eyes to the accidental 'contingent' conditions, in which their application is situated." (A.c., 374).

H.O. 95 (96) already taught us how Platon situates the high idea in the phenomenal data. The systechy 'thesis/hypothesis' is pure Platonism.

We will now examine how Rivière makes this, concerning modern freedoms, true.

The modernism issue.

J. Bricout, Modernism, in: *J. Bricout, dir., Dict. Prat. d. conn. relig.*, IV, Paris, 1926, 1052/1068, says: "Not only among Catholics did the desire arise to bring religion into conformity with modern ideas. Among the Protestants, the Jews,--even among the Islamists and Buddhists one finds analogous striving." (A.c., 1052).

H.O. 141.

In the stricter sense, i.e., as far as specifically Catholic modernism or the adaptation to modern culture is concerned, one understands by 'modernism' what modernism (aggiornamento), one will say later, occurred in Catholic circles between 1896 and 1910. It would be better to call this 'the crisis of modernism around the turn of the century:

The main figures were G. Tyrrell (1861/1909), in England, and, in France, A. Loisy (1857/1940), both of whom were condemned by Rome. - In fact, they were the tip of an iceberg, which, in Catholic circles, was growing, especially since the secularization (laicization) of Western culture.

The outburst of "progressism" following the Second Vatican Council (1962/ 1965) proves this clearly -- the Church authorities do not accuse the "modernists" (analogously also the "progressists") of modernization, but of modernizing the faith too far. Expressed in Scholastic-rhetorical terms: instead of the thesis determining the hypothesis (the insertion in praxis) (= Rome's position), at least with many modernists the hypothesis determines the thesis (what is now sometimes called "orthopraxy" (I adapt and transform this adaptation into theory)).

In the case of Century Twentieth Modernism, figures such as Fr. D. Schleiermacher (1768/1834), the founder of modern hermeneutics, and G.Fr. Hegel (1770/1831), the founder of modern dialectics,---both leaders of Liberal or Freethinking Protestantism, with Aug. Sabatier (1839/1901), the Protestant symbolist (purely symbolic interpretation of dogmata), stood as models. Which "Rome," of course, could not accept. Not only was this the way to a "Protestantization" of the Catholic faith, but also the way to a Freethinking Protestantization of it. So that Catholic Modernism, in its sharp form, amounted to Liberal Catholicism (H.O. 135).

The neoscholastic 'aggiornamento'.

Modernism, resp. Progressism and (Neo)Scholasticism count as opposites. Which, in part, is true. And yet: the 'hypothesis', which elaborates the Neoscholastic thinking of the thesis, shows that this opposition is only partial.

(i) The Church authorities, notwithstanding their firmness in principle (thesis), negotiated and concluded treaties with the laicized states (including in the form of a "concordat," i.e., an agreement between the pope and a government concerning religion, - where freedom of worship (one of the modern freedoms, of course) prevailed.

H.O. 142.

This not only in 'heterodox' (non-Catholic) societies, where the recognition of the Church represented a relative 'progress', but also in countries where Catholicism was an old tradition (France e.g.). -- where the assimilation to Protestantism and "Synagogue" (Jewish worship) could be interpreted as "retrogression".

(ii) In the laicized states there are, sometimes, still princes and heads of government (princes), who are openly listed as Catholics. Because of 'Rome', which - in the thesis - is so strictly rightist, such Catholics were never prevented from voting in favor of a constitution or ordinary legislation, which was liberal; laicizing, secularizing. Never was even one of them "taken to task" by that same Rome: Well on the contrary: together with the bishops of that country, they were induced to swear allegiance under oath to a ... liberal constitution.

(iii) Where the Church herself held public power, she defended, even, against popular passions, e.g. the Jews, and assured them, subject to some lighter obligations, freedom of worship.

Decision.-- 'Adaptation' there has, in the facts (in the phenomena,-- in Platonic language), certainly been. Not merely out of political calculation on the part of the Vatican (which does not yet include wrongdoing). "Those facts -- according to Rivière, a.c.,375) - count as an interpretation of Catholic doctrine itself".

"The Church -- says Leo XIII (Enc. Libertas) -- grants (in principle, as a thesis) only 'right' to what is truly morally valid. Yet she does not oppose the forbearance ('la tolerance'), with which, in her opinion, a government may treat some things contrary to truth and right,--this, in order to avoid a greater evil, to achieve or preserve a greater good." (A.c., 375).

This greater good - we guessed it from the text - is "to make or keep this earth livable for all". Behold an elaborate model of (neo)-scholastic philosophy. We think, with that, that this remains a valid type of thinking, also today.

H.O. 143.1.

Afterword.

A bipartisan comment can complement what comes before.

(1) *The "thetic" (theoretical, abstract-ideative aspect.*

What is striking, from a Platonizing-ideology standpoint, is that Rivière never fails to interpret Modern liberties as an idea of God (H.O. 58; 91) emerging in our Western European cultural history, which, e.g., in "absolute" Liberalism, comes through rather as a caricature (H.O. 77 (laughter imit.); 91) in our earthly world.

His first reflex of thought is still 'condemning' (H.O. 136v.), the striking Church reflex. However, he himself notes that the Church can accept a well-understood liberalism (H.O. 137) : the 'well-understood' in it is the God idea.

(2) *The 'hypothetical' (Practical, situational) aspect.*

We briefly note three ways to interpret the systechy 'thesis / hypothesis'.

(1) *The case study.*

Where theoretical ethics (moral philosophy) is the thesis, casuistry is the hypothesis. The word comes from "casus conscientiae" (concrete case of conscience). Thus, legal science is the thesis and concrete jurisprudence (jurisprudence) is the hypothesis, and medical science is the thesis and therapeutics is the hypothesis. They are complementary.

(2).1. *Situational ethics.*

Situational moralism is one type of casuistry. Under the influence of existentialism, which, in its extreme form, disavows (nominalism) any idea (concept, universale), the (extreme) situation moralist says that the moral value of an act is to be measured by the instantaneous (instantaneous) - inner-subjective and outer - situation (= the totality of circumstances), in its singleness and difference, from all other situations (differentialism: H.O. 3; 123). - So that universal ideas, ideals and values applicable to all people are non-existent.

(2).2. *Contextual ethics.*

The context (i.e., the totality of circumstances) of an act determines its conscientious character,--there is the contextualist assertion. Yet the contextualist opposes the (existentialist) situationist: in every context, singular, different from all other cases of conscience, there is more present: there is a direction, which reaches beyond it. Here a minimum of idea is present: here the thesis is not completely eaten away by the hypothesis (in Scholastic language).

H.O. 143.2.

6.-- Modern Scholasticism (131/143).

(H) the Spanish scholastics, (131): Fr. Suarez: systematic ontology;-- his idea of "popular sovereignty".

(1) Appl. model v. neoscholastic reasoning (131/143).

a. - The basis is the dichotomy 'thesis/ hypothesis (= theory/ practice; pure idea/ phenomenal manifestation of the idea), derived from rhetoric.

b. Application: how does Vatican philosophy (= neoscholastics) assess "modern freedoms" (// human rights)? -- The answer to this is two-phased.

2.1. General concept of "modern freedoms" (133/135).-- The distinction between confessional state and legislation (Ancien régime) and confessional free state and legislation (lay state) (133/134);-- secularization v/d state and legislation (134v.: Fr. Revolution).-- human rights (135).

2.2. Liberalism issue (135v.).-- The idea of "freedom" (135).-- Perspective v/h agnostic (skeptical, "absolute") liberalism (135v.): all opinions are, for the lay state, equivalent;-- Perspective v/h ecclesiastical thought (136) : not -- all opinions are, objectively considered, equivalent.

2.3.a. The thesis of church doctrine (136/140).

This is the pure church idea.

A. Theological (136v.).-- **The1.** Magisterium (magisterium): convictions -- shifts since Leo XIII (the Church not hostile to a well-understood Liberalism (136v.).--**2.** The theologians (as interpreters;137).

B. Philosophical (137/140).-- Philosophy**1.** of Freedom (see H.O. 135; Physical and Ethical Freedom (can / may); - Responsible and Permissive Freedom (138).-

2. Pragmaticist argument (= idea, once put into practice; the connection between true and good (valuable) (139).

3. Dialectical (eristic) argument: neither you (lay state) nor I (Church) can do without a teaching system that curtails modern freedoms; or: neither you, lay state, nor I, Church, are value-free (139v.);-- this is also called "argumentum ad hominem".

Note -- This was an application of H.O. 112/114 (four principalkentr.).

2.3.b. The hypothesis of church doctrine (140/143).

This is the thesis as a working hypothesis in practical-concrete life. Pluralism (= perspectivism), Neoscholastic conceived (140).-- The Modernism question : how to bring religion(s) into conformity with Modern ideas and society? (140v.).-- Current Progressivism (140), compared with Liberal Protestantism; (141).-- Neoscholastic aggiornamento. the facts (negotiations, treaties;-- freedom of action of believers; -- positive defense of freedom of/different believers (141/142)).

Afterword (143).-- Modern liberties as God idea;-- Situation - ethics;-- Contextual ethics;-- Casuistics.

H.O. 144.

II.-- *The main types of modern and contemporary rationalism* (1450/ present).-

Introduction.-- As a starting point we took *M. Milner/A. Halder, Herders Kleines philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Basel, 1959-2, 141/143, which distinguishes a general and a particular rationalism.

1. *General rationalism.*

a. Up front, we cite three famous characteristic statements.

(i) Aristotle (H.O. 8) says of man, as he conceives him, that he is "zoön logon echon" (a living being, possessing spirit ("logos"));

(ii) Thomas Aquinas (H.O. 106) says that man is 'animal rationale' (a living being who possesses 'ratio' (mind)),

(iii) G.Fr.W. Hegel (1770/1831) says that "alles Menschliche dadurch and dadurch allein menschlich ist dasz es durch das denken bewirkt wird" (everything human is human by that and by that alone it is caused by thinkin).

These ancient, medieval, and modern statements point to a steadfast tradition.

b. What, now, is the common characteristic of these three types of "rationalism"?

(i) man himself (human rationalism), the world (the universe; cosmological rationalism) and, even, the deity (theological rationalism), as well as the relations between those three spheres of reality (ontological rationalism; H.O. 128),--all of this is either mind (reason and reason) or cognitive and thought content (intelligibel, "rational"), i.e., amenable to reason-reason approach.

(ii) Very singularly, as H.O. 128 says in its Middle Ages, comprehensible (conceptual) thinking and knowing is central. In this sense, any traditional rationalism is essentialist. At least the three major types, named above. Cfr. H.O. 10/12 ("form of being"). This implies that the mind (nous, intellectus), from the sense data (phenomena of perception (aisthèsis, sensatio)), prepares a concept, resp. idea freely (= abstraction, ideation), with which reason (dianoia, ratio, the discursive aspect of the mind) can work reasoning, so that universal statements are possible. Thus, among other things, ontological statements.

Müller/ Halder note that, even in the counter-movements (irrationalisms of all kinds), Rationalism still persists as the main force. Which is not surprising: one undoes spirit but with spirit.

H.O. 145.

2. Modern/Current Rationalism.

With the late Middle Ages a new, attacking form of "rationalism" emerges, which we can characterize, with *G. and I. Schweikle, Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 29/31 (*Aufklärung*).

(1) Modern Rationalism permeates - penetrates all spheres of life. This type comes through in the course of the XVII -th and especially the XVIII -th century, but was prepared in the Transition Period before that. It is situated in Western Europe and, immediately, in the whole West, with its so-called "Western Civilization".

(2) It introduces the secularization process, peculiar to the modern world. See above H.O. 133/135.

(3) The name rationalism is given to this movement because it is supported by optimism concerning 'spirit' (reason).

a. Man, as a "rational" being, can reason logically (pure rationalism) and/or gain sensory experience (empirical rationalism).-- This "rational" (pure and/or empirical) penetration into either man himself (rational humanism) or into nature (rational natural science) or into religion (rational religious science) occurs progressively (progress belief).

b. This rational progress will make it possible to solve rationally ('Enlightened') - and no longer by the dilapidated, outdated methods of the past - all the problems facing (modern) man - economic, social, political, artistic, philosophical, theological questions (problem-solving will).

(4) The name "Aufklärung" (Enlightenment, Lumières, Enlightenment) - a term, which uses the light metaphor - comes from the pedagogy, end XVIII - the century. Education should, from now on, be education of the mind (reason).

This, in contrast to earlier centuries, especially the 'dark' (obscurantist) Middle Ages (H.O. 108). Indeed: the Enlightened mind looks down with disdain on all the earlier, prerational stages of culture (especially the irrational 'meantime' (Middle Ages)), first of all regarding education.

This educational name became, over time, the name of the entire "rational" cultural movement.

H.O. 146.

General Rationalism, also, in its way, put spirit education at the center. But secularizing Rationalism did so in - what it called 'Autonomous' (independent) fashion.

I. Kant (1724/1804), top figure of the German Aufklärung and, at the same time, Enlightenment critic, characterized this brilliantly: "Enlightenment is man's working his way out of the inferiority of which he himself is guilty. Incompetence is the inability to use one's intellect without the guidance of one's fellow man". (*Kant, in: Berliner Monatsschrift*, 1783). Cfr. H.O. 134.

'*Autonomous*', therefore, includes, as a premise, among other things, that the Church (divided into denominational Churches (Kath., Prot., Angl.,-- Orthod.)) is losing its position of authority and power (negative),-- with its Scholastic philosophy (H.O. 121/122;126),-- which includes anticlericalism.

Positively, 'autonomous' includes the idea of 'natural law', not only in the Antique-Middle Ages sense (which lies in man's God-willed 'nature'), but in the de-legitimizing sense: human nature is such that the individual is responsible ('free') for himself, among other things, toward any sacred, ecclesiastical patronage (laicization),--also such that the people (H.O. 136; 131 (Suarez) are self-powerful, responsible ('free') for themselves, among other things against any 'feudal' form of state (popular sovereignty).

The latter was articulated in the legal theories of *N. Machiavelli* (1467/1527: *Il principe*), - *J. Althusius* (1557/1636), *H. Grotius* (1583/1645: *De iure belli at pacis* (1625), *S. von Pufendorf* (1632/1694).

'*Autonomous*' includes, finally, that the empowered man works himself loose from theology and, even, from ontology ('metaphysics'), insofar as these formulate bindings, order, to which man, as an individual and as a collective, would 'lie bound'.

Hence desacralization and metaphysics crisis. In this sense, the "autonomous" education and cultural revolution exhibits a clearly nominalistic basic trait (H.O. 1/7; vrl. 5vv.),--without, therefore, always falling into radical nominalism, of course.

Not only is there laicization (replacing the clergy with the layman); there is, clearly, a tendency toward desacralization (the very being of nature, man, etc., is articulated without foundation in Deity (and its ideas),--which becomes very clear in attacking Materialism and Atheism). There is, from the start, something nihilistic' in autonomy.

H.O. 147

II.A.-- *The mid-century approaches.* (147/160)

E. Goreth, Einführung in die Philosophie der Neuzeit (I: Rationalismus / Empirismus : Aufklärung), Freiburg, 1972, 11, says that, before Rationalism, in the Modern sense, lies a long transitional period, whose "run-ups reach back deep into the middle ages."

II.A.(1). *From solidarism to liberalism.*

G. Dumézil (1898/1986), Mythe et épopée (L'idéologie des trois fonctions des peuples indo-europeens), (Myth and epic (The ideology of the three functions of the Indo-European peoples)), Paris, 1968, says that, already before Alfred the Great (1075/1100), the "prayer stand" (clergy, monasticism), the "warrior stand" (army-people (knights)) and "labor(er)s stand", made up the three-tiered - typically Indo-European - society structure. It is this last stand, which interests us, here.

O. Brunner, Bürger und Bourgeois, in: *Wort und Wahrheit VIII* (1953): Juni, 419/426, says that - different and from the typical Antique city ('poli', 'civitas') and from the Oriental city - in the XIth e., in Western Europe, between Seine and Rhine and in Northern and Central Italy (Lombardy, Tuscany), the bourgeois and the bourgeois city, arose.

Jean Gimpel, La révolution industrielle du Moyen Âge, Paris, 1975, says that the "great" Industrial Revolution, which is claimed to have originated both in England and in the XVIIIth century, in fact got off the ground already in the Middle Ages and, no doubt, in Western Europe.

"From the XIth to the XIIIth centuries, Western Europe experienced a period of intense technological activity. It is, immediately, one of the - in terms of inventions - most fruitful periods of history. This period should, in fact, have been called 'the first industrial revolution', were it not for the fact that the English industrial revolution of the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries is already referred to by that name." Thus Gimpel. What *J. Rosmorduc, De Thales à Einstein (Histoire de la physique et de la chimie)*, Paris / Montréal, 1979, 19s. (also: 31), endorses.

A new style of thinking emerges, immediately.

W. Sombart (1863/1941), Der moderne Kapitalismus, Munich, 1902/1908, already saw the change of mentality, in that economic-social phenomenon. In his description of the economic development of the European peoples, from the Middle Ages to the present, Sombart distinguishes four stages:

H.O. 148.

- (1) Segregated economy,
- (2) craft (handiwork),
- (3) Progressive capitalism,
- (4) Fading capitalism.

Sombart emphasizes the psychology of the transition from the artisan to the capitalist:

a. the craftsman works to acquire what is strictly necessary; profiteering does not occur to him at all;

b. but, in the Middle Ages, the figure of "the capitalist merchant" or (as L.B. Alberti painted him), draws itself. In the new economic phase, already flourishing in the Italian and German cities, at the end of the Middle Ages, the capitalist merchant is the central figure. Well, this type of economy will define modern culture. Immediately, maximum profit becomes the "spirit" of modern life.

J. Van Houtte, Economic History, 1938, 103, writes: "During the Middle Ages, socio-economic thought (...) had, for the most part, a collective (cf. H.O. 83: solidarism) character (...). Representatives, on the other hand, of a fairly advanced industrial capitalism, such as the Flemish and Italian drapers, thought, already, much more egocentric and individual (...). This turnaround (...) was precipitated by the breakthrough of Renaissance and Humanism".

Th. Suranyi-Unger, Wirtschaftsphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts., Stuttgart, 1967, 27, characterizes the turnaround as follows: "Apart from the important role played by mercantile capitalism, Renaissance culture is based on the principle of handicraft production, taken over from the Medieval Ages and now absolutized. From this grew the bourgeois spirit of the "homo faber" (the craftsman): "What I know how to make, thanks to the skill of my hands and the insight of my mind, I can master" (...).

(i) Principle of Performance, **(ii)** Striving to Ascend, **(iii)** Individualistic Co-ordinationism change the stagnant nature of the medieval economy. Trading houses and guilds of considerable importance, with their money economy, line the globe as far as is known.

The peasants, incensed by the paragon of the free urban bourgeoisie, covet greater independence."

Conclusion.-- As many a historian notes, economic-social development helps shape thinking.

H.O. 149.

II.A.(2).-- *The terminism of William of Ockham* (1295/1350).

E. Coreth, Einf., I, 11, says that, among the incursions of Modern Rationalism also belongs nominalism (H.O. 1/7), as it, under the name of 'via moderna (H.O. 129), emerges especially at the end of Middle Ages philosophy, in its decline.

1.-- *The name "nominalism"*.

R. Poirier, Préface, in: *J. Largeault, Enquête sur le nominalisme*, Paris / Louvain, 1971, v/vi, gives us - semasiologically (i.e., content-wise) - the conceptual content of the term 'nominalism'.

(a) *Epistemological*.

'Nominalism' means, first of all, a theory of knowledge. Our concepts (resp. ideas) are not the representation of the 'essence' (being-form) of actual things, but only names, signs, 'terms' (termini), which are only a product of our minds and, for the time being, mean nothing but a reference (denotative,-- with vague connotation) to actual data. In our reasonings about reality, the 'terms' (termini) take the place of actual data ("They stand for things"),-- nothing more.

It should be noted that Occam 's nominalism is called 'terminism', because he uses the word 'terminus' (mv.: termini) so often.-- For example, when I say 'the beauty; then this remains, for just about most people, vague (connotative, according to conceptual content), but the term 'the beauty' refers (denotative, according to conceptual scope, i.e. the things, which are indicated by that 'term') to 'all that is beautiful',-- e.g. this beautiful girl (H.O. 2).

(b) *Ontological*.

But, as already in the case of Protagoras of Abdera (H.O. 1; 3/7), the great Sophist and humanist, also in that of William of Occam: a whole theory of reality (ontology) accompanies, with that theory of knowledge. Poirier enumerates some of its main features: the primacy of the singular and its direct knowing, the primacy of experience (observation, trial-and-error),--the elimination of 'useless' entities, such as e.g. abstract concepts and ideas, the elimination of mediators (intermediaries) between God and man,--the underlining of the radical exaltation ('transcendence'; H.O. 57) of God,-- in God Himself the coincidence of mind (reason / reason) and will (voluntarism),-- a well-understood right to 'free' inquiry on the basis of individual experience,-- individualism in the economic (H.O. 148) and political spheres,-- the autonomy (H.O. 146) of the power of the layman.-- In other words : emerging liberalism.

H.O. 150.

(c) *Cultural History.*

Poirier adds, to this, that all such representations, though without a strict-logical connection between them, are nevertheless the expression (projection) of an attitude to life which most certainly exhibits a connection. -- This entails that Occam's attitude to life, centered around his terminism, is the expression of a zeitgeist (H.O. 123 / 125: new philosophy; historicism).

A. Weber, Hist. d. l. philos. européenne, Paris, 1914-8, 234, says: "William of Ockham was, in himself, so convinced that he meant well by the Church. However, his nominalism - like all philosophy - is fundamentally the mirror in which the main concern of his time is reflected: namely, to shake off the yoke of Christian Rome, the great concern of 'all that was in the power of the laity': the states and the nations, intellectual education, the arts and sciences, philosophy.

Indeed, as soon as nominalism reappeared, we saw the first development of national life and modern languages, which were opposed to the unity that Rome, heir to the tradition of the Roman emperors, had imposed on Europe.

Nominalism, under the mask of deep attachment to the Church and of extreme piety, covered, in fact, a crowd of tendencies hostile to Catholicism."

Decision.-- Occam did not elaborate a system, but a theory of knowledge. But this theory of knowledge was the summary, the conglomeration, of the relations of time. Hence its enormous importance.

2 -- Occam's conceptualism.

As a term from Middle Ages philosophy, this means what follows. Our concepts (Lat.: conceptus) are a kind of 'reality', i.e. in our mind (not outside it) there exists, e.g. of a number of beautiful girls, singularly existing, a general representation (conceptus), according to which we decide whether a given girl is beautiful or not. General concepts, i.e., do not exist as Platonic ideas, per se (H.O. 42/46: ideation).

H.O. 151.

Nor are they mere words ("names"). In this sense, conceptualism differs from pure nominalism, of course.

The noble yoke (H.O. 8), core of all conceptual realism (abstractive or ideational), falls away, actually: the universal concepts ('universalia'):

(i) are not the representation - one-another - of actual beings or of aspects of actual beings (the *similia similibus*, core of the noble yoke, falls away) - that would be conceptual realism -;

(ii) no: the universal notions 'signify' only, i.e. stand, as signs, in the place of actual data,-- within thought (signs of thought) and within language (signs of language: speaking and writing). -- The theory of signs, semiotics (Peirce), semiology (de Saussure) prevails.

Nominalist-terminist concept of science.

What objective value does our knowledge (daily) and our science (including philosophy, as well as theological science), possess then? "In order for science to mean reality, it is not necessary that the 'extrema propositionis' (the main components of a 'proposition' or sentence of judgment, statement), namely the subject and/or the saying, be realities ('realia'). It suffices that the subject and the predicate are 'supponant pro realibus', substitutes of realities". (J. Largeault, o.c., 35; *Occam's* words themselves from his *Sent. I, dist. 30, q. 1, x*). In other words, the terms refer (denotatively) to real, singular data, as its substitutes.

Critique.-- *Ch. Lahr, Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 670, notes, critically: the refutation of conceptualism lies in the consideration that, if our notions have no representation value, then, immediately, they also have no signifying value. After all, by themselves, our representations have no reality value, until they are tested - on the conceptual content (connotative) - against the real data.

There must, in other words, be something truly universal in the actual data that corresponds to the universal in our minds (one-another, the noble yoke). Otherwise, our world of concepts is a purely psychic reality without objective value.

Note.-- *P. Foulquie, L'existentialisme*, Paris, 1951-6, 18/26, talks about "conceptualist essentialism" (using Aristotle, Thomas v. Aquinas, Modern professional science (Francis Bacon, Descartes), traditional lay morality as examples). In that sense, this seems rather shunned.

H.O. 152.

Criticism.

a. R. Jolivet, *Les sources de l'idealisme*, Paris, 1936, 24/30 (*L'epirisme occamien*), notes that Ockham introduces - what he calls by a French term - 'chosism'. 'Chose' means, here, a thing existing in itself, singular in nature. 'Actual' in Occam's parlance invariably means 'thing existing in itself (singular)'. It is this narrow ontological notion of 'reale' (thing existing in itself) that makes it impossible for Occam to think of anything other than that, which nonetheless actually exists.

Thus a form of differentialism arises (H.O. 31: the 'realia', the (singularly) existing 'things', differ among themselves to such an extent that they are not susceptible of any substantial similarity. The whole of reality thus becomes a "cloud of dust of separated real things, whose connection remains incomprehensible" (o.c.,29),--"a cloud of dust of phenomena, a discontinuous universe of coexisting things" (o.c., 32).

In other words: analogy disappears (H.O. 12vv.)-- Even the singular (individual) thing is only, in Occam's view, a set of properties and phenomena, which, synchronically and diachronically, show a more or less loose coherence: it is our thought-sign that constitutes the 'unity' of it, in the first place (o.c., 27). Its unity and coherence lie in the 'signifying' (provided with a think-sign) subject,--not so much in the object itself.

b. R. Jolivet, o.c., 30/35 (*La science du singulier*), (The science of the singular), reproaches Ockham with subjectivism ("immanence philosophy," where the term "immanence" denotes the subject's interiority).

Ockham recognizes two types of characters:

a. the natural signs (e.g., the resounding of laughter indicates laughter itself; billowing plume of smoke betrays fire);

b. the arbitrary signs (thus the words, to which we connect the things meant by them, 'signified' (provided with a language sign)).

Well, the universal is only a sign, which designates something, radially different from that sign, in a grossly summarizing way.

The object of our knowing, of our science, is, in the first instance, not the things (les choses) existing in themselves, but those mental data themselves, within our consciousness. The mental, not the data existing outside our consciousness, behold what we know. Modern subjectivism is born.

H.O. 153.

Note.-- Reference is made to *F. Cromphout, Narcissism as a social phenomenon*, in: *Streven* 1982: Oct., 29/36 (on *Chr. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism*, London, 1980, - 'narcissism' being, here, understood as imaginary dream of omnipotence (in a more or less Freudian sense)); *Leo Loewenthal, Goethe and the false subjectivity*, in: *Streven* 1982: dec., 250/259 (here referring to the introverted cult).

That philosophical subjectivism can still be topical is proven by *Herman De Coninck, Uren van bewondering: (Hours of admiration)*, *Leo Apostel*, in: *Humo* Nr 2247 (29.09.1981, 50/53. Leo Apostel (1925/1995) was the internationally known epistemologist. Here is what Leo Apostel says in the interview:

"No: I didn't come to philosophy through friends.-- Philosophy,-- that's almost religious; that's the desire for the unity of everything.-- Once God had fallen away, I had to have something in its place. I am, in fact, still working on that.-- At the time I had a period when I thought: if God doesn't exist, does the world exist,-- do I exist? Isn't it all a dream?

Vida es sueno. (Life is a dream). When you really realize that existentially, it's a horrible experience,--especially for a boy in a not too cultured environment. What saved me, I believe, is that I dared to say it.--I still saw the table in front of me, but I was no longer convinced that it was real. Had I said that out loud, people would probably have collocated with me. That disappeared after a while.--

But from that, still, an intense interest through epistemology and logic has remained: can I prove that this table really exists? That has never been, for me, an academic (*note: purely theoretical*) problem. - God turns out not to be there: but, then, the world must be able to be explained in some other way! And religious ethics, then, does fall away: but, then, you must be able to find precepts somewhere else! -

Besides: you do not, after all, have immediate access to extreme reality. In the history of literature you can still find examples of loss of the sense of reality: I can see you; but, maybe, you're only set,--it's all unreal. When you're very tired, you often have this: it all seems like cardboard.

H.O. 154.

Then you really have to convince yourself: no, there is a real world and I even know a bit of it. that doctrine of knowledge is, therefore, really the result of my need to get to the world and, finally, to get to people. I seldom wonder where this need for philosophy comes from; on the contrary, I wonder how a person can live without it. -

But the peculiarity of such a philosophical life is, of course, that you get so lost in the technicity (*note*: thorough deepening) of your subject that you still haven't solved the basic questions from your adolescence even at age fifty-eight. In epistemology I have, at least, tried, but in metaphysics very little. But I do keep asking the same questions,--very stubbornly".

1. So much for this poignant, honest testimony from someone who confesses to being an outspoken rationalist. From an Occam onwards, the whole of typical 'modern' philosophy will show this very inwardly subjective characteristic To use Father Ch. Lahr's terms: the Rationalist knows the world only mediately, indirectly, i.e., through the intermediate term which makes up his subjective permeations (trains of thought, for example) ("mediatism"), whereas the Conceptualist (abstract or ideative), through the noble yoke, believes he knows the world immediately, without that intermediate term ("immediatism").

2. It is also noteworthy that Leo Apostle connects the sense of unreality (mediatism), at least to some extent, with the absence of God. Especially the idealistic tradition (e.g. Augustine) saw it this way: the data are "real"; insofar as they sprout from God, are grounded in Him (the mystical side). As a counter model: once God is absent, the world seems unreal. Just reread Apostle's text on this. Cfr. H.O. 27; 95/96; 119v. (mysticism); 131 (natural theology). The death of God establishes the "great void. The attacking 'autonomy' (H.O. 146) involves something like 'the death of God'.

3. Curious also: the deeper contact ('encounter') with one's fellow man suffers, too, from the unrealism of autonomous subjectivity. What a difference with the rapport of an Augustine (H.O. 84: Verstehen; 83 (understanding: concordia)). - The whole ontology (theory of reality) shifts!

H.O. 155.

Concerning the sociological side of modern subjectivism see: *A.G. Zijderveld, Institutionalization (A study on the methodological dilemma of the social sciences)*, Hilversum/ Antwerp, 1966,--in which nominalism approaches the social data from the individual, while conceptualism approaches the same social phenomena from comprehensive structures (cf. H.O. 82v.).

Fr. Hsu, Clan, Caste and Club, New York, 1963, demonstrates such a thing, on a global scale.-- Incidentally, Liberal sociology set out to create a non-authoritarian society, which would be "bound" only by "human rights" (H.O. 135), derived from natural law (H.O. 146), understood as "autonomous" law.

Result: the social contract ("le contrat social"), such that the state serves only to assure the self-development of the autonomous subject, in its "modern," "bourgeois" freedoms. The autonomous subjects unite to form a state in that individual-subjective sense.-- All this, from nominalism, becomes intelligible. Nominalism is the theory of knowledge of subjects entrenched in themselves. So much for this comment on nominalistic fellow-humanism,-- touched on briefly in Apostle's text.

The delineation of the sciences.

A. Boulenger, Le Moyen Âge (De Clément V à la Réforme (The Middle Ages (From Clement V to the Reformation), (1305/1517)), Lyon/ Paris, 1936-4, 343/346 (L'ecole occamiste), outlines the so-called demarcation - or delimitation - problem, at Ockham, as follows.

(A) *Ontology*

1. 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate' (The being should not be multiplied without sufficient reason) is the great economy - or economy - principle. Already Petrus Aureoli (1250/1322), a Franciscan, had introduced this principle, equally nominalistic.

Practical: all 'essentialist' entities (Platonic ideas e.g.) are superfluous, because 'unreal' (H.O. 152: chosism). Their elimination is a 'saving'.

2.a. 'Actual', fully, are the singular data. 'Actual', as products of our minds, are the thinking, language signs (speaking and writing signs), by which we speak of the singular things.

2.b. **The** basis of knowing is the will to take on real things, i.e. 'faith'. This implies voluntarism : all knowing is more than pure insight; it is, at once, wanting to see typical of an autonomous subject.

H.O. 156.

(B) Professional Studies.

a. In the spirit of Oxford, from which Ockham came (R.Bacon (H.O. 117; 129)), he declared the experimental (experimental) method to be the only one that could lead to apodictic certainty.

b. Traditional Scholastic ontology, insofar as it makes use of "superfluous" entities, such as the general concepts (ideas), in the view that this represents a rationally justifiable behavior, is meaningless.

Appl. mod.: God (his existence and his being properties ('attributes'));- the soul (its existence, its being property 'immortality');- freedom (its existence and its being properties),- all this is rationally (understand: experimentally) unprovable in the apodictic sense; one arrives, only, at arguments for and against (i.e. probabilities),- nothing more.

One compares these main points - God, soul (freedom) - with what, a Protagoras of Abdera (H.O. 6: agnosticism) and what an Aristotle of Stageira (H.O. 25v.) claim about them. Only Platonism (H.O. 54) considers natural reason capable of grasping God and soul.

Fideism.- As just said, faith (wanting to see) - voluntarist understanding - 'saves' data such as God and soul (freedom): a 'metaphysics' (ontology) stands or falls with the freely willed conviction that God, soul (freedom) are real data. The freely willing subject is decisive. In which modern autonomy comes through, of course.

(C) Ethics.

a. The soul is, essentially, free-willed subject.

b. The distinction between good (conscientious) and evil (unscrupulous) does not rest on a distinction in the essence, the essentiality, itself of what we call 'good' and 'evil' respectively: only a free will act of God as autonomous subject par excellence establishes that distinction. "To such an extent, even, that, supposing God changes his value judgment concerning good and evil, what is (hitherto) holy and just ('hot') turns into (unholy and) unjust." Behold the formulation in Ockham's language itself!

The thesis of the conceptual realists is: not even God, however omnipotent, can change the nature of good and evil. The property of 'good' and 'evil', after all, is something objective, inherent in the very structure (order) of reality.- One sees to what the doctrine of the autonomous subject can lead.

H.O. 157.

(D) Biblical theology.

'Knowing', (especially science) and 'supernatural' theology (not to be confused with the 'rational' or 'scientific' of above,-- part of the ontology) are, in Ockham's mentality, strictly separated. Instead of the 'vain', earthly science of (natural) theology: that the Church adheres to the Bible and her own Magisterium, supported by Biblical faith (not to be confused with the natural 'faith' of above, the act of will of a free subject in relation to insights of all kinds)! Here - in this sphere of revelation - God and soul (freedom) belong: when the Bible and the Magisterium (Magisterium) tell us that God and soul (freedom) exist, then this insight is guaranteed.

Decision.-- Ockham's conceptualism (terminism, "nominalism") represents a true revolution.

(A) P. Baumgärtner, Uebers. / Einl., Briefwechsel zwischen Abaelard und Heloise (mit der Leidensgeschichte Abaelards), (Correspondence between Abaelard and Heloise (with the story of Abaelard's suffering)), Leipzig, 1894, 10ff., says that the Sic-et-non method (H.O. 109vv.) was a "dialectic" (eristics), which Abelardus wanted to apply both to philosophy and also to the whole of theology. He wanted "to demonstrate the rationality (Vernünftigkeit) of existing dogmata in a rational way". (o.c.,12). Which is what the entire scholasticism, in its theology, in one way or another, was striving for. In this sense, Scholasticism is a kind of rationalism: Cfr. H.O. 144; general rationalism.

Abelardus' method was, even then, a rational revolution:

a. Patristics and Voorscholasticism (HO 69; 129) held as an axiom: "Credo ut intellegam" (I believe in order that I may see;-- first believe, then see);

b. Abaelardus and a part of the Scholastics held as a premise: "First doubt, then see; first see: then believe." The starting point of all knowledge is (methodical) doubt (H.O. 72 (reflective meth.); 114: Scholastic rationality). Once this basic certainty is established, the rational deepening begins: believing something without seeing it beforehand (i.e., justifying it on rational grounds) is, for people like Abelard and a part of the scholastics, nonsensical and beneath the "dignity" of the right-thinking person.

(B) From this understanding one better understands Ockham's reaction against the (exaggerated) rationalization of Scholasticism.

H.O. 158.

The after-effects of Occam's nominalism.

No better book to learn to see the enormous after-effects of Occam than *R. Van Zandt, The Metaphysical Foundations of American History*, 's - Gravenhage, 1959, especially 124/ 156 (*Realism versus Nominalism*).

a. Nominalism is the foundation of empiricism (H.O. 145),-- from which materialism (H.O. 146) and positivism (the philosophy, which reduces philosophy to (the results of) the positive or professional sciences) spring; -- the nominalism -- says always Van Zandt --, which includes secularism (H.O. 146), modern professional science (H.O. 156: exp. w.), Protestantism (H.O. 141: liberal, Pr.), individualism (H.O. 134; 146), industrial society (H.O. 147), and technology (ibid.); -- nominalism, which nurtures factualism (emphasis on facts rather than insights) and anti-intellectualism,-- this nominalism is, as Poirier (H.O. 149), who is a nominalist, clearly says, a whole view of life and the world, in one with a whole cultural-historical epoch (the modern age).

b.1. Nominalism founded by Occam, undermines Scholasticism and founds the whole of modern thought, Van Zandt quotes J. Feibleman : "There was a tidal wave of nominalism

1/ Descartes was a nominalist.

2. Locke and all that springs from him of thinkers -- Berkeley, Hartley, Hume and, even (the Commonsensist) Reid --, -- they are nominalists.

3/ Leibniz was an extreme nominalist. Kant was a nominalist. Hegel was a nominalist with realistic nostalgia. -- So that, to put it in one word, "all modern philosophy" was nominalist.

The nominalist Weltanschauung grew into - what I venture to call - the true flesh and blood of the average modern mentality." (*J. Feibleman, An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy*, 171; o.c., 125f.).

People like Dewey, Cohen, Randall, Burt, Dampier, Carré,---they all subscribe to Feibleman's observation. Yes, to the extent that no one was discussing nominalism (only recently did it come up again), it was tacitly accepted as obvious basic philosophy.

b.2. Nominalism - says always Van Zandt - is par excellence, an Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Occam came from Oxford. English and American thought is, through and through, nominalistic.

H.O. 159.

3.-- *The eventful life of William of Occam.*

The man, from whose philosophy all of modern thought is a series of footnotes, was a staunch supporter of S. Francis of Assisi (1182/1226), the founder of the Friars Minor. The return to a fresh, original Christianity was, therefore, very familiar to him. The Church was to him a "heavenly society,"-- great, holy, purified from every worldly blemish. So much so that, in time, William felt that the Pope of Rome should not interfere with the secular affairs of the European states.

Franciscan, yes,-- but also fierce temperament. At Oxford, where he was studying, he was excluded at a certain moment "because of dialectical audacity" (H.O. 109: sic et non). For the sake of well-defined theological propositions, he will never be able to become a "doctor" (teacher) and will therefore only remain an inceptor (literally "beginner"). His nominalist followers will make it an honorary title: 'venerabilis inceptor' (Venerable novice).

Excluded at Oxford, he finds, in France, a refuge. There he puts himself at the head of a group of Franciscans, who, as monks, want to return to the strict poverty prescribed by the Rule of S. Francis (introduced in 1209). This commitment brings him into conflict with Pope John XXII (1245/1334).

The Popes at Avignon.

To understand properly, one should know that -- from 1309 to 1376 -- the Popes reside in Avignon. Pope Clemens V settles there, under the influence of the French monarch Philip IV, the Magnificent (1268/1314).

As a result of a Council at Avignon, which had as its point of discussion the teachings of the Dominican priest Master Eckhart (1260/1327; H.O. 120), whose statements sometimes sounded heterodox, a new conflict arose. William, as a Franciscan, thought he had to take a stand against the Dominicans, who supported Eckhart at the Council. But, precisely because of this, he again found himself at odds with Pope John XXII, the Franciscans' ally. William is expelled by both camps.

In the conflicts between Philip the Handsome and Louis IV of Bavaria (1286/1347; emperor from 1314 to 1347), on the one hand, and the Pope, on the other, William, of course, took the side of both princes.

H.O. 160.

Louis IV of Bavaria introduced, indeed, a new idea of authority: the sovereign (the emperor) bases his authority on popular authority (H.O. 131; 146: later education), Autonomous (H.O. 156) conceived, i.e. radically independent of papal authority.

Of course, this provokes radical intransigence from John XXII at Avignon. But Louis surrounds himself with enemies of the Pope, heretics of all kinds. More than that, he questions the Pope's straightforwardness (William of Ockham also wanted to have the Pope deposed as heretical),--yes, he wanted to question the idea (the very principle) of "papal power.

William was denounced to the Pope and called to Avignon in 1324. He stayed there the four years, which his trial lasted. In 1326, 51 theses of William were censured.-- In 1328, he flees to Louis of Bavaria. He is excommunicated. He is also condemned by the University of Paris in 1339, 1340. In 1346 he is also condemned by Pope Klemens VI (at Avignon:1342/1352).-- After the death of Louis, in 1347, he again sought contact with the official Church. However, his premature death prevented reconciliation.

The name of the rose.

Umberto Eco (1932/2016), semiologist at the Univ. of Bologna, has published, in 1980, in Milan, *Il Nome della Rosa*. Dutch translation: *The name of the rose*,, Amsterdam, 1985 (with U. Eco, *Postscript to The name of the rose*,, A'm, 1984-3), tenth edition. End 1986: this novel, readable in a variety of ways, has been translated into no less than twenty-four languages!

Between Liguria and Provence, in 1327, while John XXII and Louis of Bavaria were at loggerheads, in a Benedictine abbey, there was "a great and heavenly massacre" (o.c., 53): one monk after another was found dead. William of Baskerville (think William of Ockham) and his pupil Adso set out to decipher, through the signs and traces, this massacre.

Jean-Jacques Annaud (1943/...) filmed the novel. It runs for weeks. At Geneva it was introduced, "Laughter always constitutes, a danger to power; it kills the respect and fear of the powerful." People like Jacques Le Goff (H.O. 108) helped depict the Medieval Ages extremely faithfully. The fading Medieval Ages, of course.

H.O. 161.

II. B.-- *The philosophy of transition* (1450/1640).

H.O. 123 (new fil. historicism); 150 (culture historicism) taught us that the autonomous subject appears only either as an expression of the spirit of the time or as situated in that same spirit of the time.-- Which points to the very limited scope of the individual as the center.

1450/1640 - one does not, now, discuss too much about the dating - is, generally, considered a transitional time.

1. We saw, above, that this same 'transition' had been underway for some time, when 1450 dawned. Medieval economy (H.O. 147v.), Medieval politics (H.O. 159v.), Medieval terminism (H.O. 149/160),-- these three 'factors' (elements) belong, already, to the 'new age(s) spirit'. This is like the system, which includes the elements.

2. We will, later, briefly discuss new factors (elements.), but we already summarize them now:

a. extra-intellectual 'factors' (increasing individualism; -- development of the national state, the voyages of discovery (America);-- the printing press);

b. intellectual 'factors' (Humanism (Renaissance), Reform and Counter Reform,-- Modern natural science). - However old, in some sub-elements (e.g., the Renaissance reestablishes Antique humanism), yet these 'factors' (elements) are new and belong, thus, to a whole ('system'), called 'new'.

Since Jakob Burckhardt (1818/1897), especially, every intellectual has opened their eyes to that newness. But e.g. the Renaissance scholars themselves see themselves as "new": they are resolutely opposed to the "middle ages" (H.O. 107). In other words: however unnoticed - people like Michel Foucault (1916/1984) place great (too great?) emphasis on that unnoticed, that unconscious, the Renaissance humanists knew themselves to be innovators. So the transition was not so unconscious.

Notes.-- M. Foucault is known for his studies on la coupure épistémologique (the epistemological cut), i.e., the transition from one interpretation to another. Together with (though distinct from it)

(i) the Epistemological School of G. Bachelard (1884/1962), the dialectician, and G. Canguilhem (1904/1995), the historian of science, and

(ii) the 'New Historiography' (Nouvelle Histoire) (H.O. 108), Foucault renewed historiography (at least thorough historiography). (J. Rajchman, Michel Foucault (Le liberté de savoir), Paris, 1987,68).

H.O. 162.

His "archeology," the science of the origin of transitions in history) emphasizes the fact that, somewhere in the structure itself, deep in the soul life, the way of expressing oneself and things changes,-- but in an unconscious way. Just as Aristotle, at the time, said that, in the individual doctor, medicine is at work, so too, analogously to Foucault: in the individual language, peculiar to the transition, the (new) language of the zeitgeist is speaking differently, in new ways. (Cfr. J. Rajchman, o.c., 19ss.: *'langage sans discours'*).

J. J. Lacan (1901/1981), the structural psychoanalyst of the thirties, already defends a thesis concerning the clinical case of a woman whose writings, written under the inspiration of inner voices, were published by P. Eluard (1895/1952), the Surrealist, under the title of *'poesie involontaire'*. In other words: entirely in the sense of the Surrealists, who, as Freudians, investigated 'the unconscious', the woman in question had involuntarily committed 'poetry'.

As an aside: the Muses, in pagan antiquity,-- the sacred writers, in the Bible,-- they inspired or wrote (consciously or unconsciously) texts, as inspirations or under inspiration. That phenomenon is, in occultist midst, well known. Not to mention the mystics (H.O. 116), of course. Medial writing' is what they call it.

Lacan designates this, structurally, as "automatic language use;-- in his view, the "proof" that Freud's unconscious "est structuré comme un langage" (is structured like a language system).

Something like this, of course, also fits into the frame of mind of a Foucault (at least in his first period). As long as it is unconscious and language(system), -- Saussurian. If only the autonomous subject emerges from it "as foam" (i.e. perfectly controlled, 'aliased', by the structured of 'the' language, which, in the seemingly-autonomous subject, 'speaks' ('Die Sprache spricht' also says M. Heidegger, the fundamental ontologist))!

But there is another interpretation both of inspired speech (writing) and of transitional experience.

H.O. 163.1.

In the theological interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of ideas (H.O. 56/62 (Alb.v.Sm.); 63/103 (S. Aug.), the idea is a summarizing content of knowledge and thought, which, spread over a (in principle unlimited) number of individuals (phenomena), which, among themselves, constitute one system (coherence), emerges from the other - call it, with the depth psychologists, "unconscious" - world, accessible, deep in the soul.

By the way: someone like S. Augustine (and, with him, the Theosophists) knows this depth psychic aspect very well! Just read H.O. 98vv. Well:

(1) Suarez, after Augustine and Thomas, the great ontologist, denotes popular sovereignty, in the evidently modern sense, as "emanating from God (from an idea of God corresponding to it)" (H.O. 131);-

(2) modern freedoms are accepted, by a Rivière, as, in their essence, valid for scholasticism (H.O. 137; 143). - insofar as "well-understood". Someone like Albinos of Smurna or S. Augustine of Tagaste could have called popular sovereignty and modern freedoms - equally - ideas of God! Without, therefore, ignoring the downsides. On the contrary: just reread H.O. 93/96 (vrl. 95: the idea embodied in our earthly world).- God's contents of knowledge and thought, now, come through - not so much as noisy 'revelations' by others than ourselves, but - as wordily formulated 'language' in our subconscious. According to some exegetes e.g., it is quite possible that the ordained writers of the Bible never consciously knew that they were writing (thinking) under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

Well, according to that model we can interpret the transition and the language, in which it expresses itself,... platonic, with the advantage that the conflictology (critical separation of the image of the idea from the caricature of the idea (H.O. 77 (ludicrous imitation); 91; 93; 98) is contained in the very structure of the idea, insofar as it is achievable. One need not, in other words, naively-idealize in 'all that is modern', to see in it an idea of God,--amidst many contradictions and failures e.g.. All this is sound doctrine of ideas.

A Foucault, at all costs, wants to "contest"! Very well, that is his right. But not only his historical nominalism (dixit Rajchman) is 'critical'. Also historical idealism (H.O. 75/80), as e.g. S. Augustine founded it, can be 'critical', without nominalism.

163. 2.

Comparison.

1. Foucault's archaeology is similar to the doctrine of change or metabletics.

In 1956, J.H. van den Berg, *Metabletica or doctrine of change*, Nijkerk, 1957- 41 makes a new form of historiography public. The subtitle reads : Principles of a historical psychology.-- Reference is made to *S. Parabirsing, De metabletical method (An analysis of the teachings of J.H. van den Berg)*, Meppel.

Van den Berg's book, likewise, points to "The Unconscious as Evidence of a Different Society" (o.c.,173/201).

Note.-- A book like *J. Claes, Psychology, a double birth (1590 and 1850: beacons for a modern consciousness)*, Antw./Amsterd., 1980 can be read as an application of the metabletic method,

2. The historical epistemology of *Thomas S.Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions*, Meppel, 1976-2, which is a comparative study of

(1) "normal" science, i.e., the pattern of behavior of scientists, once a paragon pioneer has prepared a new paradigm (model of scientific praxis), and

(2) The "scientific revolution".

Both books are more than mere psychology or epistemology they situate their object in the broad framework of the overall culture, in which they examine at a given moment a series of simultaneous phenomena for their deeper coherence. Which resembles Foucault's method.

Note.-- *J. Ortega y Gasset, Das Wesen geschichtlicher krisen*, (The nature of historical crises), Berlin/ Stuttgart, 1943, is a book dealing with the period 1550/1650. - It assumes - life-philosophically (vitalistically) - that our mind responds to prerational, 'vital' needs (o.c.19) of life.

Well, here's how Ortega speaks "In the XIVth century, man weakens under his social role: everything is association, guild, rank. Everyone wears, even in their clothing, the 'uniform' of their office. Everything is conventional, prescribed, invariable form : everything is ritual, infinitely complicated.

Knowing, for example, is there fixed in such an entangled form, laden with distinctions, classifications, arguments, that there is no means of discovering, in such a dense forest, the system of clear and simple ideas, which (...) orient man, in his existence." (o.c.,57).-- Such is the crisis of the age.

H.O. 164.

II.B. (A).-- *The non-intellectual factors.* (164/185)

It is clear, after what we said about economic and political development, in the Late Middle Ages (H.O. 161), that non-intellectual factors (modes of behavior) influence, at least partly influence, thinking. We go over the more recent non-intellectual factors, very briefly.

(A).1. *Emerging individualism.*

With *G. Legrand, Vocabulaire Bordas de la philosophie*, Paris, 1986-2, 176, we can characterize "individualism" as the name for a set of learning systems or, simply, mentalities, which share as a common trait the emphasis on the value (dignity) and role of the individual ("individual").

Applicable models may include:

a. democracy, from the antique Hellenic polis (city-state) to the civil rights (H.O. 134), which, in the French revolution (1798+), were pushed through (representing a pinnacle of "individualism");

b. economic individualism (H.O. 148),--especially from the XVIIIth century onwards (according to Karl Marx "it seeks to extend to the maximum the icy waters of selfish calculation"); it merges with the idea of "capitalism" (i.e. that economic system, which posits as the basis of society the individual ("private") possession of the productive goods (land, enterprises,-- money and "value" capitals));--

historically speaking, capitalism, as individual property, only comes to its full potential when machinism (H.O. 147: the first ind. rev.) gives rise to big industry and, therefore, requires maximum investment (which includes "capital").

We would like to underline one additional feature. Already at the time of ancient Greek philosophy (-450/-350), differentialism (H.O. 3), i.e. the tendency (if need be, the ideology) to emphasize the differences, the mutual independence ('autonomy forms'), comes along with individualism.

What develops into agonistics i.e. mutual exchanges of power (think of the economic competition, think of the political 'elbow movements,' - to outdo one the other (first 'difference/ independence'), eliminate (second 'differentiation'), subjugate (third 'differentiation')). Instead of seeing in one's fellow man 'ich-noch-einmal' (A. Schopenhauer), one sees in it a 'nicht-ich' (H.O. 97: antagonisms of all kinds).

H.O. 165.

The Modern autonomous subject (H.O. 156) indulges in it: the performance society is, immediately born. Those who do not 'perform', perish, in that agonistic (power-measuring ideology). One thinks, for a moment, of the fourth-worlders, who, typically, remain below the required level of performance (they 'differ'): our individualistic society, insofar as individualistic, of course, does not, for that matter, know what to do with such 'laggards' ('difference makers'). To perform, to measure up, to surpass, to 'advance', to surpass etc. is the law.

Ethical individualism is another variant of general individualism: it bears, often, the name hedonism (lustful ethics). It is also called "eudemonism" (but this gives rise to misunderstandings (H.O. 59: happiness morality or eudemonism)). Happiness, after all, is not the same as pleasure, enjoyment.

Note.-- It is, at once, clear that "anarchism" intertwines with individualism.

According to G. Legrand, o.c., 16s., 'anarchism' is that school of thought which sets 'anarchy' as an ideal. By 'anarchy' one understands the individual, in his 'free' (= unhindered) self-development, in such a way that no pressure (obstacle), situated outside the individual, is exerted. So e.g. legislations, state governments, yes, any government ('authoritarian order'), -- they are forms of pressure, obstacles.

However, there are:

- (i) (singular) purely individualistic anarchisms (M. Stirner (1806/1856): and
- (ii) (private) particularist, 'socialist' anarchisms (M. Bakunin (1814/ 1976)).

Thus one understands the profound aversion of Church-Scholastic solidarism (H.O. 83; 147;-- 165: "absolute" Liberalism, permissive), -- like that of a Karl Marx, to Individualism, which can call into question any sense of community.

(A).2. *The development of the national state.* (165/170)

The national state constitutes, in a sense, the antithesis of individualism (liberalism, anarchism).

We try, first, to make ready some basic concepts.

(1) *State.*

One is called "state" first of all, a community/society, which (and) is founded on law and (and) is "sovereign" (i.e. not subject to other states or groups).

H.O. 166.

The second meaning: 'state' is the government, with all that it encompasses, that runs the 'state' as a sovereign community of law;--"the common or public good" is its major point of view;--what is called "the political class," are the people, who either hold or are closely associated with that governing power.

A. Hitler (1889/1945), in *Mein Kampf*: "The highest aim of the racist state must be to watch over the preservation of the representatives of the original race, who establish civilization and, at once, constitute the beauty and the moral value of a higher type of man."

J. Stalin (1879/1953), in *The Principles of Leninism*: "The state, in the hands of the ruling class, is a machine, aimed at crushing the Class opponents (...). The proletarian state is a machine, aimed at crushing the bourgeoisie'. -- One sees that Hitlerism and Stalinism consider the government to be a key position (hence their etatism, about which later).

National State.

A sovereign community of law and/or government, insofar as defined by a territory, which is describable by the ideas 'homeland' or 'nation' ('people'), is a national state. One thinks of the 'state of Oklahoma' in the USA (United States). Or one thinks of our Belgian state, which encompasses more than one language area.

One sees that the national state, in the course of cultural history, has conquered what belonged to the family (clan) or tribe. This increase in scale is characteristic.

P.J. Bouman, *Textbook of Economic History*, Amsterdam, 1947, 74, says: "In the late Middle Ages the modern, centralized state emerged: Burgundy, France, England. (...) The Modern State subjected all interests to the maintenance of its independence. It recognized no higher power above it, not even the Church (H.O. 160).

The doctrine of state sovereignty (H.O. 146) implied a recognition of the right of the strongest (...). -- H. Védérine, *Les philosophies de la Renaissance*, Paris, 1971, 86, says: "The Middle Ages had lived on two myths, which the facts had never allowed to become reality: the unity of the empire had to be matched by the unity of Christendom". (H.O. 150). 'National' is in between local and international.

H.O. 167.

Etatism (philosophy of understanding).

In addition to the liberal conception of the state (H.O. 133/135), Modern society has the etatist type.

With *D. Julia, Dict. de la philosophie*, Paris, 1964, 92 (Etatisme), we define 'understanding' as follows: the system of society that wishes to maximize governmental powers. The Liberal counter model is 'privatization'.

1. *Economic etatism.*

The understanding can include all cultural domains (one thinks of the Hitlerian or Stalinist model of government). But especially the economy falls within the wishes of the understanders.

P.J. Bouman, o.c.,74, writes: "In the Late Middle Ages the Modern, centralized state emerged (...): this fact also became of great significance for economic history. (...) Wherever, in the New History, powerfully governed and strictly centralized states arose, one saw these states also include economic life in their power politics. The pursuit of state economic organization is called mercantilism.

2. *Mercantilism.*

In France, under Louis XI (1461/1483) later under Colbert (1619/1683), minister to Louis XIV (Colbertism);-- in England, under Henry VII (1485/1509);-- in Germany, after 1648, where it is called Chamberalism, what will later be called etatist dirigisme or protectionism emerges.

For two centuries, Mercantilism will dominate the economies.-- Today, meanwhile, updated economic etatism prevails in the Communist countries. Thus in the Soviet Union. The Soviets see the realization of the Communist ideal (the future state) in two stages.

a. the present stage, during which Soviet man is still engaged in the "purgatory" of the "socialist" state; at this stage there is absolutely no equality or freedom among Soviet citizens; on the contrary: at most, Soviet man is supposed to be engaged in the state purposes, whose expression is the Communist Party (not a class dominating the other classes, as in the Bourgeois states);-- economic dirigisme is therefore the rule;

b. Only then can the "communist" society, on the basis of the present complete self-denial of the working communal beings, who are the Soviet citizens, come about: only then will everyone be free and equal to the others.

H.O. 168.

In doing so, one can see that today's dirigisme is a typically modern product, getting off the ground, in the Late Middle Ages : the Soviet system is indeed rooted in our tradition (*Bib. stitchpr.: K Malfliet, Behind the Mask of Justice (The Individual as Roleplayer)*), in: *Our Alma Mater* 37 (1983) 2, 137/153,-- esp. 142v.).

Of course there is evolution:

a. earlier Mercantilism had two main features:

(i) fill the treasury to the maximum with precious metals (no paper money was yet in circulation);

(ii) the favorable balance of trade (i.e., the ratio of imports to exports such that the balance of payments includes increases in the treasury);

b. current state policy - dirigiste or not - except for the high role of precious metals (although good still applies), still has the treasury as its center of gravity. In other words: what the late middle ages founded, still today, persists.

What etatism, today, favors is the planned economy, which bundles all economic efforts of an individual ("private") nature (macroeconomics),--which does not prevent economic Liberalism, within that planned economy, which is state, from unfolding. One sees this in the USA.

Machiavellianism.

Bib. stitchpr.: E. Faul, Der moderne Machiavellismus, Köln / Berlin, 1961.

This book deals with the time of Nicolo Machiavelli (1469/1527) and the solution, which Machiavelli found to the problems of his time. Further, the development of state utilitarianism (the view, typically Machiavellian, that what is useful to the state is at the same time good), after Machiavelli: Walter Raleigh (1552/1618), English statesman,-- Oliver Cromwell (1599/1658), English statesman, -- Denis Diderot (1713/ 1784), the inspirer of the Encyclopédie (Enlightener),-- *J.-J. Rousseau* (1712/1778), known for his *Contrat social* (1762). - After this historical overview, Faul defines Machiavellianism (= realpolitik): the rational aggregation of

a. state policy,

b. economy and

c. (not the least) military necessity.

One sees that Machiavellianism is one form of etatism. The governmental power, sovereignly availing itself of all means! In doing so, it is shown that the national wars of freedom, especially the French Revolution, are the stakes of today's Realpolitik or Machiavellianism. Faul also discusses the Machiavellian elements in social ideologies: K. Marx and Marxism, Fr. Nietzsche and Nietzschean nihilism, *G. Sorel* (1847/1922: theorist of Syndicalism, known for his *Réflexions sur la violence* (1906)).

H.O. 169.

Bibl. stitchpr.: A. Glucksman, *Le discours de la guerre*, (The discourse of war,), Paris, 1979, 93s., puts on the same line N. Machiavelli, Karl von Clausewitz (1780/1831), Prussian general and polemologist, who ran up with Machiavelli, Vl. Lenin ((1870/1924), the Bolshevik, who, as a Russian emigrant at Berne, in 1915, immerses himself in the reading of von Clausewitz, whose theory he will apply in the construction of the Soviet state.

"Macchiavelli - so Glucksman writes, o.c. 93- : at the age of forty-three, excluded from the political life of Florence. Inconsolable. During fifteen years of enforced non-activity he writes the first political treatise, the first book on strategy (*note*: strategy is the skill of leading a battle under all its aspects) and the first modern history. Three paths, which, definitively, describe the only object of passion from which Europe suffers: political action".

B.-H. Lévy, *La barbarie à visage humain*, (Barbarity with a human face,), Paris, 1977, 71, reproaches Francis Bacon (H.O. 114v.), the designer of causal induction (the study of the link 'cause/ effect'), with his new, 'Modern' notion of 'causality': the moments, which make up time (omen/continue), as conceived by the techno-capitalist bourgeoisie (H.O. 148: the capitalist merchant), are structured by professional science).

B.-H. Lévy accuses Bacon, precisely because of this, of helping to construct the Modern concept of history, namely as the history of political (state) power.

Note: *Les nouveaux philosophes* (The Neo-Philosophers).

Both, Glucksman and Lévy, belong to the 'New Philosophers', who, since June 1976 (B.-H. Lévy, in: *Nouvelles Littéraires*), in France, they represent a new tendency: they are disappointed in the Révolte of May 1968 and align themselves with the language and language-use critique of Poststructuralism (R.Barthes (1915/1980; the famous semiologist), M. Foucault (H.O. 161v.), J.Lacan (H.O. 162)),--among others regarding an apolitical stance.-- They are related to the Princeton-gnosis, a group of Anglo-Saxon or Asian physicalists, astronomers, biologists, physicians, known by that name since 1968.

H.O. 170.

Both tendencies criticize the established systems of government, whether humanist-capitalist or materialist-Marxist, in the same way: they can be interpreted as products of Enlightened Rationalism (especially from the XVIIIth century), which have never kept their word. This is due, in part, to the anthropocentric (human-centered, in the secular sense) character of the systems of thought on which they are based.

These systems of thought tended, gradually, to surrender man, whom they put at the center, to those powers, which find its worst form in the introduction of the omnipotence of the modern state,--this, in the place of the omnipotence of God.

Conclusion: both the New Philosophers and the Gnosis-of-Princeton-thinkers pose the problem of etatism.

For more information:

-- S.Bouscasse/ D. Bourgeois, *Faut-il brûler les Nouveaux Philosophes? (Le dossier du procès)*, (Should the New Philosophers be burned? (The trial file)), Paris, 1978;

-- G. Schiwy, *Les Nouveaux Philosophes*, Paris, 1979 (vert. v. *Die Kulturrevolution und 'Neue Philosophen'*, Hamburg, 1978);

-- R. Ruyer, *La Gnose de Princeton*, Paris, 1974.

Note.-- That there are, between Machiavelli and Marxism, close links is also shown in *E.Mead Earle et al, Makers of Modern Strategy (Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler)*, Princeton, P.U.P.,1944, 25:

"Like Fr. Engels (1820/1895; Marx's collaborator), Lenin had read, commented on, and pondered von Clausewitz.-- Speaking of Clausewitz's infamous statement "War is politics continued by other (op.: violent) means," Lenin said, "Marxists have always interpreted this axiom as the theoretical justification of the meaning of every war" (*V.I. Lenin, Works* (English Translation), New York, 1929, XVIII, 224).

Lenin was, further, convinced that there is a close connection between, on the one hand, the structure of the state and the system of government and, on the other, the military organization and the policy of war.

From Marx and Engels, among others, Lenin acquired the eye for "the real things proper to power politics" (o.c., 323).-- Again: Marxism and Leninism, respectively, are rooted in our tradition.

Note.-- P.Vervaeke, *Sales-actualities*, in: *De Nieuwe Gids* (Ghent), 09.11.1962 (as well as in a number of subsequent issues) points out the very great influence of Machiavelli on our Western sales science (marketing).

H.O. 171.

(A).3. *The voyages of discovery.* (171/180)

The term voyages of discovery brings to mind, out of habit, Christopher Columbus (1450/1506), who, on 03.08. 1492, departed and, on 12.10.1492, discovered the island of Guahani, later calling on Cuba and San Domingo.

J. de Mahieu, L'imposture de Christophe Colomb (La géographie secrète de l'Amérique), (The imposture of Christopher Columbus (The secret geography of America)), Paris, 1979, claims that the honor of having discovered America does not belong to him, but, meanwhile, preparations are being made, on both sides of the Atlantic, nevertheless, to celebrate that discovery in a grand manner in 1992.

1.-- *The discovery of America as a 'power idea'.*

Alfred Fouillée (1838/1912) founded the "Idée-force" (idea of power). It is a psychic content, of which the subject, man, is aware. In addition to knowledge and thought content, it also contains energy: it literally drives man to action.

In his *L'avenir de la métaphysique fondée sur l'expérience*, (The future of metaphysics based on experience), Paris, 1889, 273s., he gives, of the "idea-force," an applicative model.

"The faith of Chr. Columbus consisted of thoughts and feelings, not of arbitrary assertions. This faith was an idea, which governed him, a power idea, in which Columbus's will was only the inner extension of that power and his voyage of discovery the external realization.

This idea became a visible phenomenon with every wave that pierced his ship. That idea became a visible phenomenon on the shore, where he could step ashore.-- The material trace, which his ship left in the sea, has, for the eyes of our contemporaries, disappeared (....). But the trace, in the water, of his idea, -- that trace is, still, "visible" (in the eyes of our minds). As long as there will exist, in America, a new civilization,-- as long as between America and Europe there will be communication (...), until then the idea (which drove Columbus) will never perish."

A. Fouillée is an ontologist, who, under the influence of natural science, founded an idealism, which is one of the many elaborations of idealism without more.

(1) As a model Fouillée took e.g. geometry: the geometrician puts forward a power idea, as a lemma, assumed solution (hypothesis), whose consequences, on a purely ideal plane he tests.

H.O. 172.

(2) With *Cl. Bernard* (1813/1878), the founder of the experimental method in physiology (*Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale* (1865)), Fouillée asserted that every experimental act, to which he counted the implementation of his 'idée-force', as one type of applications) is only possible in virtue of a guiding idea (= l'idée-force).

For the physiologist Bernard was, this could be e.g. the power idea of a physiological law (think of the steering stability of the internal temperature of a biological body). As long as the experiment had not confirmed (verified) the force idea, it remained 'une loi imaginée' (= a product of the imagination). With Bernard, Fouillée, the ontologist, says: "Empiricism (H.O. 114v.: idea) can serve, e.g., to accumulate facts. But to build science it is unsuitable. The experimenter, who does not realize the idea which he seeks to test, does not even understand what he, in experimental results, finds." (o.c., 79s.).

In other words: with the power idea, as conceived by Fouillée, we are faced with an authentic idealism, which is perfectly at home both in modern geometry and in modern experimental science. Immediately, this type of idealism is perfectly incorporated into psychology and complements Augustine's impetus to it (H.O. 73: the complete cogito).

But let us return to the explorers themselves: did not Fouillée, brilliantly, in an idealistic way, sketch the psychology of discovery? People, gifted with that type of psyche, have, since the beginning of Modern times, helped to elaborate our present planetary space of life, which is the expansion of the Antique oikoumene (H.O. 86: world church) which S. Augustine idealistically tried to interpret. Is, here, not a god idea, viz. 'all that is human, humanity,' at work?

2.-- The discovery of America as a modern, resp. postmodern problem of understanding.

Now reread H.O. 63v.: concordia; humanities method). S. Augustine's idealism had, for centuries, articulated the basic ideas that should prepare a "verstehen" (understanding) of what, in the time, we are discussing, was called "the savages.

Let us see, now, what modern Christians, who were, practically, all explorers and colonizers, not to mention missionaries and missionaries, have made of that Augustinian idea.

H.O. 173.

(i) Did they, with the illustrious predecessor of S. Augustine, Klemens of Alexendrea (H.O. 67v.), see Jesus as universe wisdom active,--also in the minds of Indians?

(ii) Throughout the fallen/decayed lifestyles of the 'savages' - did they, like Augustine (H.O. 76v.), also see the 'origin-bound' 'savages'?

(iii) Did they, with understanding eye, like the illustrious Church Father (H.O. 86), see the differences of cultures?

(A)-- The opinion of *Gustave Welter, Les croyances primitives et leurs survivances (Précis de paleopsychologie)*, (Primitive beliefs and their survival (Précis de paleopsychologie)), Paris, 1960. (173/177) - O.c., 20/31, summarizes this ethnologist as follows.

(a) Up to and including the Middle Ages, yes, up to the beginning of the Renaissance, one adheres to what the ancients (the antiquities) had written about "the barbarian peoples," about "the mythical creatures" (Kentaurs, Amazons, Satyrs, Kuklopen), on the edge of the inhabited world (oikoumene).

(b) With the discoveries, comes, instead of the written book of the ancients, the direct encounter.-- Welter distinguishes, fundamentally, two main types.

(1) *The missionaries.*

They started from an understanding ('humains') point of view: in that spirit

a. they carefully noted the customs of life, -- as shown in *Relations des Jésuites* (1633) concerning (sometimes now totally disappeared) Indian tribes.

Main impression: the incomprehensible morals of the 'savages' are not the result of a 'natural virtue', but of a thoroughly different interpretation of things, compared to the developed peoples.

b. Or also: they sought to penetrate into the very soul (H.O. 84) of "these alienating neophytes (students of the faith)" (o.c.,20).

(2) *The conquerors.*

The Spanish, in South America, the French and English, in North America,-- the Russian Cossacks, in Siberia,-- they limited themselves to killing the natives, -- to "conquer" their lands and women.

Welter points, at once, to the idea of "the good savage," launched by Michel Eyguem, seigneur de Montaigne (1533/1592) and by the -- naively dubbed -- stories of James Cook (1728/1779) and L.A. de Bougainville (1728/1811), as well as J.-Fr. de La Pérouse (1741/1788), discoverers of mostly Oceanic peoples,-- idea, which made people like J.-J.Rousseau (1712/1778) and J.H. Bernardin de Saint-Pierre (1737/1814), as exotic reading, world famous (valorized by Romanticism, by the way).

H.O. 174.

But this idea grew from reading reports, - not from direct acquaintance.

Welter also refers to a typical rationalist 'reading' (interpretation) : the encyclopedists (H.O. 107; 146) used the reports to attack the Church (anticlerical 'reading'). Thus *Diderot* (1713/1784; director and inspirer of the *Encyclopédie* ((1747/1766)), in his *Supplément au voyage de Bougainville*: the "nature-morality" of "the children of liberty" (H.O. 146) - this is how the enlightened mind interprets the "savages", insofar as they can be used as an argument against the Church - is a higher stage than the "prejudices" that (Church) "religion" instills in us!

H.O. 145 taught us, however, that the "rational" man regards "All that is pre-rational" with contempt! One sees that the same 'savage' is open to more than one interpretation, in the eyes of the Rationalists, who do not always think coherently, to the point.

To which Welter notes, "That is an example, which strikes, of the harm that either political passion or ideological prejudice can do to the objective investigation of truth." (o.c. 23).

Finally, Welter points to the emergence of a modern science of religion (see the text of Hiero-Analysis). His little book is, incidentally, a brilliant introduction to archaic religions, which form the basis of all non-rationalist cultures. It will take, in passing, until 1833, before our Rationalist-influenced universities tolerate a chair of religious studies: Johann Georg Müller begins, in the year of the Lord, 1837, at Basel (Switzerland), to give lectures on "the polytheistic religions," -- in the summer, before a strongly interested student audience, ... from 6 to 7 in the morning!!! How (Rationalist) "open-minded" academia was!

The second chair, always in gracious Switzerland, followed only in 1873, in Geneva! In 1883, the Institut Catholique de Paris followed,--in 1884, the Université Libre de Bruxelles. Cfr. *G. van der Leeuw, Phänomenologie der Religion*, Tübingen, 1956-2, 797.

Decision.-- Welter clearly distinguishes between more than one type of "reception" (interpretation) of "the savages."

H.O. 175.

Bibl. sample: for more on the growth of a science of religion, see:

-- P.W. Schmidt, *Origine et évolution de la religion (Les théories et les faits)*, Paris, 1931 (Neoscholastic);

-- M. Eliade, *La nostalgie des origines (Methodologie et histoire des religions)*, Paris, 1971 (previously Patristic Greek);

-- M. Meslin, *Pour une science des religions*, Paris, 1973 (humanities).

Applicative model of processing.

Lafcadio Hearn (1850/1904) *Esquisses martiniquaises*, Paris, 1924-6, 182s., gives us a sample of the difficulties, with which, in the discovered cultures, one had to deal. He stayed in La Martinique (Antilles), 15.02.1887, in Saint-Pierre, where Ash Wednesday was celebrated (carnival lasts a day longer).

There was "la vérette" (smallpox) that year, and a kind of religious procession is held, in which two processions, from opposite directions, come to each other, les Sans-Souci and les Intrépides, who, both, poet and sing carnival songs.

"But look : there is the group ('bande') of les Intrépides, who play la Bouéné. It is a dance song, but it is also a striking and exuberant dance style. The dancers, facing each other, approach each other; they squeeze each other, press against each other and separate again to embrace each other.

This is a very old dance, of African origin. It is, perhaps, the same dance, about which Father JeanBaptiste -Labat (1663/1738; Dominican, French missionary in the Antilles, from 1693,--after first having been prof of mathematics and philosophy at Nancy; in 1705 back in Europe) wrote in 1722: "This dance is contrary to honor."

Notwithstanding this, he is so much to the taste of the Creole Spaniards and is with such a force in vogue, with them, that he is the crumb of their amusements. - Even he is part of their religious life: they even dance him in their churches and their processions. Even the women of the monastery do not fail to dance this dance, on Christmas Eve, on a platform, in their choir, in front of their gate, which is open, so that the people can share in the joy that these good souls show at the birth of the Savior.

H.O. 176.

Fr. Labat is a notorious figure, but here he displays two types of interpretation:

(i) his, which, perhaps, is grounded in what we have seen H.O. 90v. (the difficulties, which Augustinianism had with sexuality) have seen,--typical of the intellectual and the missionary,--though he - graciously - labels the sisters, who dance 'improperly', in her convent, on Christmas night dancing with the term 'good souls' (remember how the thesis (H.O. 132v.) is 'softened' by the hypothesis (H.O. 140v.):

(1) Thesis: the dance is dishonorable,

(2) hypothesis : whoever dances him, nevertheless, may, nevertheless, be a "good soul"); that's scholastic, -- typical;

(ii) the type peculiar to the folk man: the Creole Spanish people testify that the other, the one, who "differs" (H.O. 3: differentialism; 123: three attitudes), can also be accepted, with understanding attitude. Most probably it became quickly clear to the Europeans, working-class people, not crammed with intellectual prejudices, that the improper, here, among the Negro Africans -(resp. Indians, Caribs), instead of being sinful and irreligious, was deeply religious (see above H.O. 22v.; 28v.; 45v. -- 53).

Talk about 'verstehen' (understanding)! It is they - and not ideologues - who founded the Central and South American type of racial and cultural mixing that our current Pope, on his trip to Brazil, praised as a model of mutual understanding.

Platonism as a model of interpretation.

The texts just cited demonstrate, overwhelmingly, that when it comes to making sense of other, different cultures - creature-like that Platonism, provided some adaptation, offers that type of ontology that provides access to discovered non-European cultures.

If Modern Rationalism has had - and still has - so much difficulty understanding non-Western cultures, it is, most certainly, largely because it has eliminated the Platonic view, nominalistic. Reread, now, just H.O. 27/30 (Plat. 'models'; 31: primitivology).

Did, on our BRT (25.06.1984), *Basil Davidson*, e.g., in the eight-part British documentary *Africa*; not, rightly, show that David Hume (1711/1776), the top figure of the Enlightenment, along with other thinkers, who claimed that Africa had no crafts, arts, sciences, were grossly wrong?

H.O. 177.

Note.-- On the communication and interaction between philosophies of "different," "other" cultures, see:

-- J. Plott / P. Mays, *Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha (A Bibliographical Guide to the Global History of Philosophy)*, Leiden, 1969 (the term 'global' means, here, 'planetary' think 'globe'),-- book, in which Western 'ethnocentrism' is duly transgressed;

-- P.T. Raju, *Eastern and Western Philosophy*, Utr./Antw., 1966,-- book, setting forth Western philosophy (the reality outside man), Chinese philosophy (man), and Indian thought (the inner being).

(B) - *The opinion of Tzvetan Todorov, la conquête de l' Amérique (la question de l'autre)*, Paris, 1982.

Bibl. stitch pr:

-- Ch. Grego/G. Groot, *The riddle of the other (Tzvetan Todorov and the discovery of America)*, in: *Streven* 1964: Oct.,42/55.

G. Welter was the type of the positive scientist (ethnologist); Todorov is the type of the Poststructuralist (H.O. 161v. (Foucault, Lacan; 169: New fil.) semiologist, who, as a differentialist, engages in history-making.

On differentialism we have already met, H.O. 123 (the difference Augustine/Thomas),-- 96 (J. Derrida), except, of course, H.O. 3, and H.O. 164 (agonistics), that deviation from identitarian (analogical) thinking.

Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900), M. Heidegger (1889/1976),-- Gilles Deleuze (1925/1995), J. Derrida (1930/2004) count as leading the way in the differentialist field. Cfr. Fr. Laruelle, *Les philosophies de la différence (Introduction critique)*, Paris, 1986.

"For the first time the encounter took place with a world, with which one had nothing in common: no language (not even a mediating third language), no sign system, no customs, no values." (A.c.,42): this is how Grego and Groot characterize the problem, arising at Columbus' footing. One feels just differential (nothing in common,- none, none, none...) and the semiological (no sign system).

Both of Todorov's interpreters situate America's discovery philosophically: "The discovery of America meant for European civilization, a confrontation with that which was radically different. In this sense, this event is more than just a historical occurrence. The conquest of America has a strong philosophical relevance (scope).

H.O. 178.

Ever since Platon, the theme of the same and the other has been one of the great stumbling blocks of philosophical thought: how is the other to be grasped as other in a consciousness which, of necessity, seeks to unify itself and the whole of its world, i.e. to reduce it to the same field, in which, at most, nuances (shades), but no radical - escaping this unity - alterity (*op.*: difference, being different) can exist?

Are we, indeed, capable of thinking the other without, immediately, applying to it the power grip of assimilation (*note*: the reduction of what is different to what is the same)? Is our thinking not, essentially, "totalitarian"? Especially the current, so-called Poststructuralist French thinking has made this theme of alterity and differentiation one of its key points.

Building on Nietzsche and in discussion with Hegel (the systematicist of the all-unifying - 'same' - gaze par excellence), one tries to find openings, which escape this 'imperialist' thinking -- ways, through which the other is neither ignored nor reduced, but is thought of and recognized as other fully." (A.c., 42v.).

A brief language analysis of the text just read shows that two opposites are thematized:

(1) not so much the difference ("differentiation"), the being different, but the radical difference is emphasized;

(2) its counterpart is called 'assimilation' (what we, H.O. 123, have called 'concordism'), viz. the cancelling out of difference, the smoothing out, the 'equalizing', but, now, in a political sense: this 'assimilation' - ironing out of difference - is labelled 'essentially totalitarian' (in the sense of 'what comprises totality' and of 'political totalitarianism') and 'imperialistic' (H.O. 102v.), as the Roman Empire, at the time, was criticized by S. Augustine.

The title of Todorov's work 'la conquete' (the conquest) -- not, e.g., 'the encounter' or 'the missionary' or 'the interpretation' or so -- reminds us of what Welter, H.O. 173, said about the conquering approach. 'Grounds and women' were the point of view,--not the customs or, even, the 'soul' of the natives, the 'savages'. If one reads with this political ulterior motive, one understands the text.

H.O. 179.

When one goes deeper into this political - a.o. étapist (H.O. 167vv.) - aspect, another (known to us since H.O. 164 (third differentiation)) moment of Todorov's differentiation thinking is exposed: Todorov's question is, above all, whether there existed, in those times of discovery, a capacity to recognize the other as other, without denoting that other in its distinction, as less, as inferior (a.c.,52).

In other words: the agonistics of the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras of Abdera (H.O. 1), as we got to know them last year (Rhetoric) - resist in such a way that one is on top -, plays, in this political differentiation, a leading role.

Applicative model.-- A few texts by Bartolomé de Las Casas (1474/1566), "the apostle of the Indians," who, around 1514, became convinced that forced labor, imposed on the Indians, was an undeniable evil, testify to what Todorov calls the equality theorem (conquerors and conquered are equal (worthy)).

(a) As man-eaters and man-sacrificers, the savages (Indians) came across as "a wild and cruel people. To this Las Casas replies, "The peoples, who offered human sacrifices to their deities, showed, in reality, at once, as misguided idolaters, what high regard they held for the excellence of the deity (...)" (A.c., 52).

According to Crego/ Groot, this entails that Las Cases "relativizes" (denotes as unrepressible) the absolute character of Christianity: he appreciates (postmodern) religious feeling and its various culturally determined expressions (a.c.,52).

It is, in itself, of course, possible that the aging Dominican, who, in his attempts to "civilize" the Indians without subjugation, failed miserably, began to think "in perspective.

For us, however, this is simply the scholastic-church method, where, in terms of rhetoric, they soften the thesis ("The savages are idolaters") by the hypothesis ("Even as idolaters, human sacrificers, they have high regard for 'all that is deity' (as do we Catholics)") (H.O. 140: neoscholastic pluralism). After all, the 'thesis/hypothesis' dichotomy is a form of accepting the other as different from one's own thesis.

H.O. 180.

(b) The savages, in their languages, were referred to as "barbarians" (showing bad language). To this, Las Casas replied, "If we assume that every language is a language, then - what we label as - the barbarian savages (Indians) will answer us, Spanish conquerors, with 'neither you nor I' (H.O. 139): 'You Spaniards, do not understand our gibberish. we Indians, do not understand your gibberish either'" (A.c.,52). Crego / Groot denote this reasoning as 'perspectivism' (H.O. 140).

Possibly, in a Las Casas, who was much travelled. But certainly not Nietzschean.-- There is a simpler interpretation: the Scholastic method "sic-et-non" (H.O. 109) (Abelardic model) ; 111 v. (Thomistic model)) had to be familiar to Las Casas as a Dominican, more or less. The whole Scholasticism was built on that method; it "hung in the walls" of every Church institution.

Decision.-- With Crego/ Groot we say, therefore, "At the end of his life, Las Casas reached a form of thinking, which did recognize the equality of the other, but no longer connected it with a thought of assimilation.

In this perspectivist vision (view), it became possible to understand the other and his culture without immediately subjecting them to a standard equal to each, undifferentiated,--which, in this case, meant the values of sixteenth 'century Spain." (A.c., 52v.).

Ontological Afterword.

'Assimilism / differentialism', -- such is the systechy (opposition), with which Todorov, Crego, Groot e. a. 'differentists' work.

We adhere, here, to analogy (H.O. 12/14; 68; 89; etc.). After all, only the analogous idea of being can account for the other as other, without logical buck-passing. Parmenides of Elea taught us to consider the idea, 'kath' heauto' (secundum seipsum; according to itself, i.e. as it is in itself)). That is ontology.

Well, to regard something that is different 'in itself' is to regard it as different. Only then does its own identity ('singularity') become exposed. The identity principle "What (so) is, is (so)" (H.O. 14; 35) applies here: "What is different is different".

Add to this the principle of subsidiarity (H.O. 88) : "Do not harm anyone (including the one who is different), rather, be valuable to him/her (including the one who is different)" and one reasons like a true Augustinian regarding foreign cultures.

H.O. 181.

(A).4. The new text diffusion. (181/185)

Laurens Janszoon, nicknamed Coster (for short: Coster;1370/1440) publishes, around 1430, Spieghel,--printed with "movable" letters;

Johann Gensfleisch, nicknamed Gutenberg (1397/1468), perfects Coster's system (movable and metal letters), about the same time; publishes the Latin Bible, in 1450.

Bibl. stitch pr. :

-- *P. Schneiders, Paper memory (Book and writing in the Western world)*, Weesp, 1985 (historical overview)...,

-- *Marshall McLuhan* (1911/1980) the -- among alternative-thinking youth, authoritative, Catholic -- cultural philosopher and mass media theorist,-- known for his *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962) and *Understanding Media* (1964).

By "medium" (Lat.: intermediate term) McLuhan means any datum that enhances the human ability (to communicate and interact with other beings) (a wheel, a machine,-
- a pair of glasses, any implement (instrument)).

Phase-wise, he distinguishes three stages:

(a) the archaic phase, in which the spoken word (the language or speech sign (H.O. 151) is the medium of choice;

(b) the writing phase, in which, in addition to the speaking sign, the writing sign (H.O. 151) appears. Around -3,300, in Lower Mesopotamia (Mesopotamia; Uruk IV b) the pictographic script is invented; around -3,100 there is, in Egypt, a beginning of hieroglyphic writing; around -2,800/2.600 the Sumerian script becomes cuneiform (kuneiform); around -2,300 the peoples, in the Indus Valley, use a script of their own, which is undeciphered;-- around -1,800 Akkadian becomes the international language of diplomacy throughout the Near East.

Around -1,550, the ideographic script of the Chinese is found on bronze vessels and oracle or mantic bones, as well as, on Crete, the Minoan script, of the type 'Linear B'; around -1,100, the first known inscriptions in the linear alphabet are peculiar to the Phoenician alphabet.

Around -800, the Greeks invent the vowelized 'modern' alphabet. Cfr *Naissance de l'écriture (Cuneiformes et hiéroglyphes)*, (Birth of writing (Cuneiforms and hieroglyphs), Paris, 1982, 42.

Well, according to McLuhan, with Coster and Gutenberg, the alphabetic script experiences an eruption in the XV- the century (about the Renaissance period) that shows itself in the massive spread of the printed word: book, newspaper, magazine.

H.O. 182.

Indeed: what we, with Gimpel (H.O. 147) have called "the first industrial revolution" finds its extension in the printing press. In a first subphase there is the printing press. But in a second sub-phase there is press printing. By 'press' one means regularly appearing newspapers with news ('message' in communication language), 'information' (in idealistic language: expressed ideas). Many people were quickly interested in this.

More so: even before 1700 there is a beginning of press science,-- witness: *Kaspar von Stieler, Zeitungslust und Nutz* (Newspaper lust and utility), (1695),--and, at German universities, in the XVIIIth century, lectures on newspaper and magazine.

Bibl. stichpr.: *J. Hemels, The owls of Minerva in communication science*, in: *Streven* 1972: dec., 259v..

Ahead, with McLuhan's books,

(c) the phase of the electronic media, in recent decades, especially television, - brings a final blow to the literary Gutenberg era, which began at the end of the Middle Ages.

According to McLuhan, the Gutenberg era was characterized by logical thinking (classification, systemic organization), hand in hand with the professional sciences, getting off the ground, in the typically Modern sense of that term, -- hand, in hand also, with modern industrial society, in which -- one forgives the literalization -- the professional idiots who, in McLuhan's eyes (and in those of many alternatives and anarchist thinkers), the professional scientists and the technocrats, are, in fact, to be situated.

Like all daring overviews, McLuhan's Division (archaic era, printing press burst, electronization phase) is also controversial. What can no longer be doubted, however, is the thesis of the anarchist that is McLuhan that "the Gutenberg products" (a term, which is not without irony) have greatly influenced our culture: thus, e.g., the philosophers now have an audience, which is much wider than ever before, in cultural history.

Theodor Geiger, The Creative Vanguard (On the Social Functions of the Intelligentsia), Rotterdam/Antwerp, 1970, 101/104 (The Press Betrays Its Calling), gives us an important insight one more time.

H.O. 183.

1. A 'fait divers': the Enlightened-Rationalist Frederick II (1712/1786) nicknamed 'the Great', of Prussia,

(a) wanted, in theory (/ /thesis, H.O. 132 vv.), every newspaper to be interesting,

(b) however, (hypothesis: H.O. 132vv.; a Cologne newspaper writer, who, by making too critical remarks about the Enlightened Monarch, had made his paper 'a little too interesting', had it whipped half to death by hired assassins.

As an aside, the Church, in the eyes of the Enlighteners, made herself hateful by her book and press censorship, e.g.. But, in rhetorical-argumentative terms, she might, in turn, remark "ye Enlighteners, neither do I" respect the press freedom so praised (H.O. 139; 180).

What is also called "argumentum ad hominem" (argument against man himself).

2. Geiger emphasizes, bitterly, the. shift of the press "from informational to propagandist-agitator press" (o.c., 102/104).

'Enlightening' is what Geiger calls them insofar as they feed readers into self-serving judgment (H.O. 134: autonomous), one of the hobbyhorses of Rationalism.

'Agitational' ('propagandistic') is what he calls them insofar as they manipulate those same readers, 'opinionating' (forcing an opinion), by all possible (fair and, also, unfair) means.

The latter - says Geiger - is, especially, the case, when it becomes mass press, i.e. after 1848. This is, according to him, especially the case with people who only hear one bell (e.g. read one daily newspaper).

Semiotic-semiological aspect.

We might come across as ugly "outdated" if we did not, very briefly, point out the sign doctrinal aspect.

S.IJsseling, Rhetoric and philosophy (What happens when one speaks?), Bilthoven, 1975, 158/168 (*Who speaks, when one speaks?*), points out three major types of interpretation, which refer both to the speaking sign and to the writing sign.

(a).1. *The philosophy of the autonomous subject* (H.O. 146; 156)

The "philosophy of subjectivity" or the "humanist" point of view - does not tolerate the namelessness (anonymity) of the author (which was tolerated in Antiquity and Middle Ages) and claims that a text (= string of signs) is the product of the creative personality.

(a).2. *The dialogic or intersubjectivity philosophy*

M.Buber (1878/1965; main work: *Ich und Du*, Frankfurt, 1923) e.g. claims that the autonomous subject only comes about in and through dialogue.

H.O. 184.

Not only do the dialogists claim that I, as an autonomous subject, always maintain mutual relations with you, as an autonomous subject;-- much more: that I only grow into an autonomous subject because you come to a (deeper) conversation with me and vice versa. This is lapidary expressed in the maxim 'Kein Ich ohne Du'.

For example, we exchange insights among ourselves; yes, but they only become insights in the exchange itself. Applied to textual science: a text is always possible only as a text which responds to another text (reacts to it, agrees with it, objects to it, etc.).

Conclusion: the individual nature of the (autonomous) subject is downplayed to such an extent that one gets the impression that only all subjects are possible at the same time (synchronously) and interacting with each other (collectively). The same with the texts.

This is a violation of the idea of "author" of a text, which, since the Transitional Period (1450/1640), has supplanted the Antique-Middle Ages.

Note -- There is something Platonic about this dialogism: "(...) From repeated conversation, precisely on this theme, just as from intimate coexistence, suddenly this idea springs up in the soul,-- as, from a spark of fire, the light kindled,-- and this, then, itself finds its way further" (*Platon, Der siebente Brief*, H. Calw, 1948, 35). Cfr H.O. 47.

(b).1. M. Foucault's *structuralist conception of "author"* (H.O. 161; 169; 177) was raised in a lecture "Qu'est-ce qu' un auteur?", for the Société Française de Philosophie, in 1969.

Like his thinking predecessor Fr. Nietzsche (1944/1900), who, as a philologist (i.e. someone, who sees everything like the classical philologists), claimed that "All that is author" is reducible to a language and sign phenomenon (H.O. 151), so does Foucault: what is called "author" is - to some extent - a mode of "speaking", a language and sign phenomenon, constructed by our modes of speaking.

In plain language: even in the texts that one composes - supposedly "creatively" - oneself, one incorporates very much that one has borrowed from others, predecessors and contemporaries.

To begin with: the mother tongue, the subject terminology, the modes of exposition etc.. Which, however, in our opinion, does not yet mean that 'the author' is a construct. The autonomous subject processes, in an individual way, what is 'from others'.

H.O. 185.1.

Analogous to this is the intertextualism of *Julia Kristeva* (1941/...) in her *Sèmeiotikè (Recherches pour une sémanalyse)*, Paris, 1969. Every text is citation, i.e. the absorption and recasting of pre-existing texts,--so much so that (instead of speaking of intersubjectivity) the term 'intertextualite' is the correct one. The so-called 'author' of a text is not the one who processes independently, but the one who is produced by the network of texts, which is the historically grown sign system (the whole of texts, 'All that is text').

M. Foucault: "It is not the thinkers, who think, but a system exists, which, as a kind of network of necessities ('nécessites'), makes possible the distinguishable singularities,--which we, then, call e.g. Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume or Condillac."

How far we are, suddenly, from the autonomous subject (H.O. 146; 156), with which the Modern period begins.

(b).2. The poststructuralist conception of the author of a text goes even further: according to Lacan (H.O. 162), even the unconscious in man is structured as a language, which, within the deeper soul, is a system of "signs" (a "text;-- transpersonal, of course) that the autonomous subject, even before it realizes it, "inscribes" (prescribes, prescribes) what it commits to texts.

Bibl. stabpr.: *G. Schiwy, Les nouveaux philosophes*, Paris, 1979, 23/48 (*Sous le signe du Post-structuralisme*).

The 'power' - which makes itself felt above all in the political use of language, by the way - of 'the language-in-our-depths' is perhaps the main theme of Poststructuralism. What the 'humanist personalist' tradition designates as a person is, in other words, only a product of a gigantic collective system (H.O. 25: abstr. verst.).

Note.-- Structuralism does heal, however, from that "collectivism": witness *Tzvetan Todorov's Mikhail Bakhtine (Le principe dialogique)*, among others, in which, within the structural system of language, the subject regains a place.

Comparable to Leo Spitzer (1887/1960), a literatologist, who pursued language structures but also individual personalities in his literary analyses (*H. Weber, La méthode de L. Spitzer*, in : *La Pensée* (Rev. du rat, mod.), Paris, 1967, oct., 175/181).

H.O. 185.2.

The main types of modern and contemporary rationalism (1450+).

Introduction (144/146).-- General Rationalism (144).-- Modern/Current Rationalism (145v.): Western, secular, pure or empirical, problem-solving, 'enlightened';-- Autonomous (146), i.e. separate from theology.

II.A. *The medieval approaches* (147/160).

(1) From Middle Ages solidarism to Modern liberalism (147v.): bourgeoisie, city,-
- 'First industr. rev.' -- capitalism;-- homo faber.

(2) The terminism v. William v. Ockham (= Occam) (149/160).

1.-- (The term "nominalism" (149v.). -- epistemological, ontological, cultural-historical

2.-- Occam's conceptualism (150/158).

a. - Our notions mean the singular realities by means of thinking, speaking, writing signs (150v.).-- Critiques (Lahr; Jolivet : differentialism (152); subjectivism (152/154; the testimony of Prof. Apostle (mediatism): "Can I prove that this table really exists?" (153).-- sociological scope (155).

b. the delimitation of the sciences (155/157) : (A) Ontology (156);-- (B) subject sciences : experimental method; the traditional Schol. metaphysics is meaningless;-- (C) ethics (the free will act of the autonomous subject);-- (D) Biblical theology.

c. The enormous after-effects (158).

3.-- Ockham's eventful life (159v.): The name of the rose.

II. B. *Transitional philosophy* (1450/1640;-- 161vv.).

Introduction (161/163.2).-- The various factors form one system of transition. Notes: Foucault: epistemological cut: Lacan: poësie involontaire (unconscious use of language) (162); idealistic interpretation;-- metabletics (v.d. Bergh, Claes), historical epistemology (Th. Kuhn).-- Ortega y Gasset's idea of "crisis" (163.2).

II.B.(A).-- *Non-intellectual factors* (164/185).

(1) Emerging individualism (164v.).-- The individual, differentialist (agonist);-- anarchism (165).

(2) Development of the national state (165/170).-- The idea of "state" (sovereign territory), national state (local, internat.) Entrenchment (etatism; 167). - Mercantilism (167v.).-- Machiavellianism (168/ 170; Realpolitik).

(3) Discovery (171/180).

1. As a Power Idea (Fouillée) (171v.);

2. As a problem of understanding (172/180). -- The "savages":

(a) G. Welter (subject law.) (173/177;-- miss. / conquerors; mod. religionsw.; Labat; Platonism as a model of interpretation (176);

(b) T. Todorov (177/180) (differentialism (radically different; 177v.)) ;-- appl. model (Las Casas (179v.)).-- Afterword : assimilism (concordism) / =/ differentialism and analogy (identitative approach) (180).

(4) New text diffusion (181/185). -- McLuhan's tripartite division;-- semiotic / semiological aspect: what is an author? (183vv.);-- subjectivist; dialogic; structuralist, poststructuralist.

H.O. 186.

II.B.(B).-- *The intellectual factors.*

Renaissance - humanism, Reform and Counter Reform,-- Modern natural science,-
- though very narrowly intertwined with non-intellectual factors, are, nevertheless, a
class apart.

By way of introduction, we are talking, briefly, about the bearers/carriers, of it, who
are given the collective name 'intelligentsia'. This word, of Russian origin
("intelligencia"), originally denoted "all that was intellectual in Russia before the
Revolution of 1917. Now it is expressible of the social class of "intellectuals" (including
the art world), peculiar to every people.

The economic basis.

*Th. Geiger, The Creative Vanguard, Rotterdam / Antwerp, 1970, 74, describes this
as follows.*

(a) The agrarian society of the middle ages, characterized as 'feudal' has only the
clergy (secular and monastic clergy) as the culture-bearing class. The Church controlled
the entire mainland and imparted a culture, essentially of a religious nature, to the rest
of the - often very poor - population.

(b) The economic revolution (H.O. 147v.) the outgrowth of, among other things, the
Crusades (H.O. 122; XII -th/XIII -th century), favored - says Geiger - the growth of
cities.

In those cities high prosperity arises,--owned by an overconfident bourgeoisie,
which, gradually, elaborates an economic network over the entire planet. - Within the
framework of this prosperous society arises, on the one hand, the national ("territorial")
state (H.O. 165vv.), on the other hand, a profane representative culture, created, mainly,
by the intelligentsia.

This culture is 'profane' and opposes the sacred culture (H.O. 174: Rat. reading),
peculiar to Pre-Rational humanity. It is 'representative' (according to Geiger), insofar as
it differs from the nameless (H.O. 183) culture of an entire society (e.g., its language),
whereas 'representative' culture requires individual achievement (e.g., a new direction
in art, an invention).

The intelligentsia.

The "intelligentsia" are the freedmen who can devote themselves to the new culture.-
- The name itself indicates the primarily rational (HO. 145: mind) activity, but does not
exclude the musically aesthetic activity (art, poetry),--quite the contrary.

H.O. 187.

For example, at the courts in Italy, one has a musical-artistic intelligentsia and, in Germany, the "scholar," at home in the bourgeoisie and teaching at the university.

In the Renaissance, in the scale of values, the aesthete was ranked highest; in the XVIIth century (Baroque period) he is pushed aside by the natural scientist; at the end of the XVIIIth century, Romanticism partially restores aesthetic and musical values; halfway through the XIXth century, however, there is Science, which once again gives (natural) science the place of honor.

One can also refer to this duality with the names "integral (=musical) and splitting thinking" (S.W. Couwenberg, *Integral and splitting thinking (two ways of thinking in bourgeois culture)*, in: *Streven* 1985, Feb., 407/417).

Note.-- A Marxist but relatively open position on the intelligentsia is taken by Antonio Gramsci (1891/1937). Gramsci sees no strict gap between intelligentsia and masses: all people 'think' and enter the 'philosophical level'. After all, they possess a world and life view such that they rationally process (naming, classifying, value judging) 'all that they live through'. This is one type of commonsense philosophy (the philosophy of common (do not confuse with common) sense).

The so-called professional sage has every interest in communicating his "high" insights and cultivating rapport with the people.

For more information: R. Devos, *Antonio Gramsci (The role of the intellectuals)*, in: *Streven* 1985, Feb., 418/430.

(B).1.-- Renaissance humanism. (187/198)

E. Coreth, I (Rat.- Emp.-Aufkl.) 14f., says that humanism, too, emanating from Italy, wants to overcome Late Scholasticism.

We first consider the concept of humanism itself.

(1) General humanism.

G.u.I. Schweikle, Hrsg., *Metzler Literaturlexikon (Stichwörter zur Weltliteratur)*, Stuttgart, 1984, 200f. tells us that - coming from the Lat. 'humanus',

(i) Human,

(ii) formed, developed -- "humanism" means concern for the "humanitas," being human -- preferably such that it is evolved humanity, where "being human" means being "person, resp. personality," i.e., individual humanity,-- however, situated in a cultural landscape and a society, appropriate to it (H.O. 164: individualism).

H.O. 188.

(2) Renaissance humanism.

According to the said dictionary, the terms 'Humanism' and 'Renaissance' are used, sometimes, as synonyms, other times, - such as *Jakob Burckhardt, Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (1860-1; 1976-10) - such that 'Humanism' is the presupposition, resp. partial aspect of the entire 'Renaissance' - This type of 'Humanism' is situated - always according to the said dictionary - between 1350 and 1600

a.-- The dating.

1. A first opinion has the Humanist movement (and the "Rinascimento") begin with Petrarch (1304/1374) -- not without, usually, naming Boccaccio (1313/ 1375) in addition -- and designate Petrarch as "the father of humanism and the first modern poet,-- of whom, according to some, Dante (1265/1321) is the precursor. -- in which case the Renaissance begins as early as the Late Middle Ages.

Notes.-- J. Claes, Psychology, a double birth (1590 and 1850: beacons for modern consciousness), Antwerp/ Amsterdam, 1980, 31/64 (Trecento: beginning gap), describes, from a psychological point of view, the ascent of Mont Ventoux (in Haute-Provence (Vaucluse: 1912 meters high)) by Petrarch in 1336 as a new, non-medieval phenomenon. The panoramic gaze (view of the natural and cultural landscape), i.e. the aspect: 'world' (object), leads to 'introspection', i.e. the aspect 'reflection' (H.O. 72vv. (subject). "Instead of simply being himself in a self-evident world (note: typical of the Middle Ages), Petrarch, from the new, distant, empty world, is thrown back on himself" (o.c.140). - One compares this view with H.O. 153v. (Leo Apostle): an analogous mediatism (reaching objective reality only through one's own inner permeations) stands out.

Bibl. stitch pr:

-- E. Cassirer (1874/1945; famous for his *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen* (1923/1929)), *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*, New York / Evanston, 1964 (*Individuum und Kosmos in der Renaissancephilosophie*, Leipzig / Berlin, 1927);

-- A. Vloemans, *The Heroic Philosophy of the Renaissance*, Zutphen, 1926.-- Unmistakably, with Petrarch, the autonomous subject (H.O. 146) arises, with its "detached view" of a reality, which -- to begin with -- comes across as "not-I," "foreign.

H.O. 189.

Note.-- Of course, one should situate people like Petrarch in the wealthy cities (H.O. 147: civil, st.; 186: high welst.) of Italy: Florence (with the court of the Medici), Ferrara, Mantua, Naples,-- Rome.

2. A second opinion takes the fall of Constantinople (1453) as its beginning.

Bibl. stitchpr.: *Francois Masai, Plathon et le Platonisme de Mistra*, Paris, 1956 (after the closure of the Platonic Academy at Athens, by the Christian Emperor Justinian 1 (482/565), in 529, Platonism (in its Neoplatonic or non-Neoplatonic form (H.O. 31)) is not dead: thus it lives on, intensely, in the city of Mistra).

The IVth Crusade (1202/1204), itself an unfortunate affair, nevertheless had one benefit: contact was established, again, between the West and Byzantine culture.

Around 1438, time of reconciliation efforts between Rome and Constantinople -- strengthens Byzantine influence: Platonic and Aristotelian intellectuals came to Italy, - - giving rise to philology (studio of language, literature, situated in its cultural-historical framework), as practiced by the Humanists.-- The fall of Constantinople, in 1453, strengthens, a second time, the Byzantine influence.

3. A third opinion has the Renaissance begin with the discovery of America (H.O. 171vv.),-- this for the reason of broadening horizons, which -- like the renewed contact with Byzantium and Antiquity -- works loose from the "narrow" Middle Ages. Reread, perhaps in that perspective, for a moment, what was said about the broadening of horizons as a result of the voyages of discovery, above.-- In 1492 Columbus discovers America.-- Summarized: 1336 (Ventoux), 1453 (fall v: Const.), 1492.

b.-- The extent, -- geographically.

M. Nauwelaerts, The University of Leuven and Humanism, in: *Our Alma Mater* 1980: 2, 104/109.

'Humanism' - says this article - is, first and foremost, the cultural movement that,
(1) departs from Italy,

(2) - from the XIVth to the XVIIth e. - mainly visited Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Central Europe. Around 1460, Humanism - one thinks of Erasmus of Rotterdam (1496/1536) - penetrated the (Southern) Netherlands (one thinks of the foundation of the University of Louvain in 1425).-- According to Nauwelaerts, Humanism was situated in the scholarly and scientific European world.

H.O. 190.

Opm.-H.O. 131 (Sp. Schol. taught us that, at least as far as Spanish Scholasticism was concerned, Spain was "hardly touched" by e.g. Humanism.

A corrective to this is, perhaps, *C. Norena, Studies in Spanish Renaissance Thought*, The Hague, 1970. Especially under Charles V (1500/1558) and, less so, under Philip II (1527/1598), Spain still lived with the rest of Europe and was a world empire.

C. Norena, Juan Luis Vives, The Hague, 1970, offers us Vives (1492/1540) as an exemplary Humanist, who tried to reconcile both tradition and modernity. In 1524 he published *Institutio* (formation) of the Christian woman.

Cfr also: *J. Ortega y Gasset* (1883/1955), *Das Wesen geschichtlicher Krisen*, (The nature of historical crises), Stuttgart/ Berlin, 1943 (on the period 1550/1650).

c.-- Characterization of humanism.

After situating them in time and space, the kentrekken.

(1)1. *W. Jaeger, Paideia (die Formung des griechischen Menschen)*, 3 Bde, Berlin, 1934/1936-1, taught us - together with *H.I. Marrou, Histoire de l' éducation dans l' antiquité*, Paris, 1948 (at least o.c., 27/309) - what was the content of the antique-Greek paideia (= 'humanism').

-- *H.I. Marrou*, o.c. 311/447, taught us what Rome made of it.

(1)2. *R.M. Brown, A Study of the Scipionic Circle*, Iowa Studies, 1934, specifies to what extent, at Rome, the scipionic circle, around -150/-130, within the framework of circle of friends and denomination, translated the Greek paideia into the Latin humanitas. 'Re-founded', 'actualized', - one could say.

Central figure: *P. Cornelius Aemilianus Africanus* (Scipio the Younger (-185/-129), conqueror of Carthage (-146));-- other figures: *Panaitios of Lindos* (-180/ -110; Middle Stoic thinker), *Polubios of Megalopolis* (-200/-125; the famous historian); *Publius Terentius Afer* (-190/-149; the comedian); *Gaius Lucilius* (-170/-103; satirical poet);-- further politicians like *Caius Laelius Sapiens* (-185/ -115) and *P. Rutilius Rufus*.

The revival is, in fact, a fusion of Hellenic paideia (philosophy and literature) and Roman-Latin culture, which is a political-military realism (*H.O.* 168: Realpolitik).-- Along the orator *M.T. Cicero* (-106/-43) and his philosophical works, especially, the Scipionic circle profoundly influenced the whole of Western European culture.

H.O. 191.

The duality of Latin humanism.

Army captains, politicians, historians, poets,-- this hodgepodge of humanists shows, simultaneously, an opposite tendency.

1. K. Vorländer, *Philosophie der Renaissance. Beginn der Naturwissenschaft*, Rowohlt, 1965, 100, notes that Machiavelli (H.O. 168v.) honored the 'virtu', the purposeful, because rational power, inherent in man,--that this made him admire ancient Rome: Rome's armies, his imperialism (H.O. 102), achieved results because they were intellectually-reasonable (they were, in this sense, the eternal model for all (national) states). One sees how the Realpolitik - after centuries (since the Scipionic humanists) - still reverberates as an ideal.

2. Erasmus, also a humanist, writes, however, his *Textbook of the Christian Monarch* (1516),--but to refute Machiavelli's Realpolitik position. This goes, rather, in the direction of Greek democracy, of course. This too was already present in the Scipionic circle.

(2) ***The 'studia humanitatis'*** (the humanistic subjects of learning).

a. The teaching subjects peculiar to the Humanism of the XVth e., as they were prevalent in bookshops, schools and universities, reflect the scipionic circle:

(a) grammar, rhetoric, poetics, --

(b) History, --

(c) moral philosophy (ethics).

One compares point (2) with H.O. 109, where, instead of poetry, dialectics were practiced.

b. The "humanists" were teachers of precisely these subjects. --- One compares the whole of it with rhetoric, as it was prevalent until last century: there is - except perhaps as regards history (and still) - identity. But, then, the term "rhetoric" is understood not only as part of the studia humanitatis, but as the whole of it. One designates the whole through the part (figure of speech).

It is clear that, in the ethical field, a Machiavelli, with his Roman pragmatism (Realpolitik), could not coexist with an Erasmus!

It is immediately clear, too, that what is called philology coincides more or less with these subjects. The humanists were essentially philologists -- not Scholastics (whom they contested in part because of their dialectic (Sic et non)),-- not natural scientists (to whom they were partly alien).

H.O. 192.

One does not think, now, that the humanists were merely teachers: they were drafters of letters and speeches (compare with the Sophists, in ancient Greece);-- they played a role as secretary, administrator, diplomat, in the Italian states.-- Furthermore, they searched, diligently, for ancient texts and published them.

Decision.-- One could refer to them as the human scientists of their time (were it not for the fact that this term, only around 1950, emerged). Or as the "Geisteswissenschaftler" (Dilthey) of the same time. *Vico* could pass as a philosopher of Humanism, with his *Scienza nuova* (1725; H.O. 85). This assertion is all the more true since the Humanists had previously been aloof from natural science.

c. *W. Jaeger, Humanisme et théologie*, Paris, 1956, 41ss., describes what the Humanists added to the Carolingian and the Ottoman, as well as the scholastic (= XIII-d' century) 'Renaissances' (H.O. 129).

(i) They revive Greek all over Europe.

(ii) They carry Platon, Platonic and Neoplatonic (H.O. 31; 64; 189), of which the Middle Ages, in part, knew less directly, in.

(iii) They introduce the Stoa (H.O. 58; 69) and - which did not agree with either Patristics or Scholastics - Epicureanism (H.O. 165: Epicureanism is one type of lustful ethics).

As an aside: Here, too, the Humanists could not reach agreement on one of the subjects (ethics): Stoa is tough duty morality, Epicureanism is pleasure morality! Both philosophies, as nominalistic, certainly do not go together with Platonism or Neoplatonism (Theosophy).

(iv) They introduced, in literary terms, Homer and the Attic tragedy (Aischulos, Sophocles, Euripides). Cfr. H.O. 108: the humanism of a Joh. of Salisbury (1110/1180) the Humanists hardly knew!

Decision.-- It is Greece in particular that comes to the fore, in this enumeration. The Scholastics, too, had incorporated an Aristotle. But the humanists were one-sidedly poetic, -- not strictly philosophical. They wanted above all imitation of antique paragons. Yet their knowledge of Greek thought was not as thorough as that of a Thomas Aquinas or the XIX-d'century (especially German) classics (after the *Aufklärung*).-- Thus always *W. Jaeger*.

Relative to the Middle Ages, there is, therefore, gain and loss.

H.O. 193.

Classic and Mannerist.

Usually the studia humanitatis are praised for their classical character,--which, then, means: ordered, controlled, balanced, -- light-hearted, optimistic.

If time periods are valid, then,

- (i) Athens - the Periklean period (Perikleës of Athens (-492/-429) - and
- (ii) Rome - the Augustan period (Emperor Augustus (-63/+14; from -31 onwards, autocrat)

Mannerism.

1. G.R. Hooke, *Die Welt als Labyrinth (Manier und Manie in der europäischen Kunst: Beiträge zur Ikonographie und Formgeschichte der europäischen Kunst von 1520 bis 1650 und der Gegenwart)*, (The World as Labyrinth (Manner and Mania in European Art: Contributions to the Iconography and History of Forms in European Art from 1520 to 1650 and the Present)), Hamburg, 1957 (vrl. o.c.,44ff.; 225ff.), teaches us, in the line of E.R. Curtius, M. Dvorak, E. Panofsky, that there is another side, the Mannerist one.

2. Applicable model.

The painter Jacopo Carucci, nicknamed Pontormo (1494/1557), belongs to the School of Florence. He is a loner, -- melancholy; he is afflicted with a "temocramento lunatico" (he loves the uncanniness of the night,-- is "capricious") and is an "uomo fantastico e solitario" (fantastic and solitary man; according to Giorgio Vasari (1511/1574)). Further: he is erotic and misogynistic (misogynistic), Da Pontormo (he was born in Pontormo) is genius, subjective, 'bizarre' (eccentric).

Hooke writes, o.c.,21 : "Man, freed from the old 'ordo' (order) - H.O. 76, seeks his own new way. Indeed: disordered, uncontrolled, unbalanced, -- dark, pessimistic, -- such are the characteristics of mannerism, which affects daily life, but also art (literature, music, plastic arts), philosophy, theology. There is something thoroughly anarchic at work, in the depths of the mannerist,--which recalls the chthonic or underworld deities, from the ancient mythologies.

3. Time periods.

The world as maze (an Umberto Eco, the semiotician, also says that the world is a maze (H.O. 160)), typical of Mannerism, comes through particularly in some periods :

- (i) alexandrian
- (ii) the silver latinity (14/138; after the Augustan era, at Rome),
- (iii) the late Renaissance/Baroque (with Gongorism, Marinism, the Préciosité e.g. (1520/1650),
- (iv) Romanticism (in its unbalanced side; 1800/ 1830; especially in the Romance countries,
- (v) 1880/1950 (surrealism, expressionism, naïveté).

HO 194.

Among the more recent ones, the author names Max Ernst (1891/1976; surrealist), Pablo Picasso (1881/1973), Salvador Dali (1904/1989), Marc Chagall (1887/1985),-- even Henri Rousseau (le Douanier; 1844/1910; naïvist).

According to the proposer, all these "Modern" artists, as "Mannerists" are not so new,-- quite the contrary.

d.-- Characterization of humanism.

One can characterize Humanism towards the past. -- but it was an actualization of that Antique past.

1. Sociologically speaking, the citizen (H.O. 147; 189) is the bearer of Humanism. In the burg, i.e. fortified and secure residence, especially in times of need, if necessary surrounded by ramparts or walls, possibly with a trading post, the burgher stands out against

- (i) the vagant (pilgrim, minstrel, peddler, sailor, wandering knight, adventurer) and
- (ii) the lord, who surrounds himself from serfs or serfs,-- something, to which the citizen certainly never wants to belong.

2. *Hélène Védrine, Les philosophies de la Renaissance*, Paris, 1971, 15ss., characterizes humanism: "Undoubtedly, in Florence, a rich and (relatively) democratic city, the great themes of humanism are being worked out in a new framework of life:

- (i) The power of man,
- (ii) The responsibility of the state citizen,
- (iii) the freedom of research."

Hence the criticism - traditional since le Roman de la Rose (*note*: two-volume work, +/-1237, +/- 1277) - of the uselessness of monks and the mendicant orders: instead of defending poverty and solitude, one advocates the glorification of work and the family. A whole ethic emphasizes the civic spirit, commitment to this world, profane culture (...), as well as the wealth acquired through trade and industry.

Far is the time, where- in S. Francis of Assisi (1182/ 1226; H.O. 159) preached holy poverty. Also, the old dream of the coincidence of temporal (secular) and spiritual (Church) power had collapsed: one has sighed too much under the popes and emperors (H.O. 159v.) to believe in their promises anymore." (o.c.,15). In other words: laicization (H.O. 146) continues in Humanism.

H. Arvon, La philosophie du travail, Paris, 1961v 9ss., says that, in the Renaissance era, active-productionism - outside of any sacred sense of purpose - prevails over "contemplation" (H.O. 119).

H.O. 195.

3. *Karl Vorländer, Phil. d. Renaiss.*, 14f., says: "In Italy is the cradle of humanism.

(i) In the midst of the tremendous widening of the horizon of vision and of traffic by the geographic discoveries (H.O. 172vv.; 189) and, soon, also favored by the invention of printing (HO 181v.), man - not only at the universities and in the schools - appears as something independent, seeking to know and live himself, facing the world that meets him.

(ii) Gradually this movement seizes on all the educated classes: merchants, princes, popes, as it includes the glorious house of the Medici (at Florence), are among its most famous promoters."

4. "Ad fontes" ('To the sources') - i.e. to language, art and conceptions of pre-Christian antiquity - : such is the exclamation. In particular: over the Middle Ages ('the Gothic')! -- "The Renaissance itself, to its own glorification, invented the later generally accepted trinity 'antiquity/middle ages/new age', in which the Middle Ages lay like a shaded valley, between the luminous heights." (*Th. Geiger, The Creative Vanguard*, 67).

According to Geiger, this is assumed by historians who pay attention to art and literature.-- But, according to him, rationalism is the hallmark of the new age: the "rational" view of life and the world and the "rational" revision of all conditions of life.- - "No one would argue that the early 'rinascimento' (i.e., Italian Humanism) was a major 'rational' culture. The 'rational' basic traits of later western and central European humanism, judging by the whole, do not come from the revival of the Antiques, but from other sources." (O.c.,68).

It should be noted, however, that a Machiavelli (H.O. 191) already thinks 'rationally',--no doubt. In this sense Geiger's opinion must be improved. But it is true: rationalism evolves, as time goes on.

5. *Bruce Cole, The Renaissance Artist at Work (From Pisano to Titian)*, New York, 1983, points out that the Renaissance artist, on the one hand, still thinks very traditionally (mid-century), although, on the other hand, through his emphasis on the individual subject and on the purely aesthetic (free of religion), he is modern. 'Transition period'.

H.O. 196,

6. *The Metzler Literatur Lexikon* (1984), 201, confirms the views of Geiger and Cole: against the thesis of Burckhardt et al. it is claimed, there, that Humanism and Renaissance have remained 'voraufklärerisch' (not yet actually Rationalist). The Humanists continue to falter too much in incorporating cultural-historical paragons ('auctoritates'; H.O. 111), namely the Antiques. They do discuss among themselves who, among those paragons, deserves the highest quotation.

Yet there is one point that is "aufklärerisch" (Enlightened), namely, the fight, by the Dutchman Erasmus, against (i) superstition and (ii) dogmatism (H.O. 134).

Conclusion: along with Machiavelli's harsh Rationalism in matters of state (H.O. 195), the Waldorf of an Erasmus testifies to the fact that Humanism was, in part, on its way to Enlightenment.

e.-- Humanism and Christianity.

Bibl. stitch pr:

-- W. Jaeger, *Humanisme et theologie*, Paris, 1956;

-- R. Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, London, 1952.-- Niebuhr typifies five types of relationship "Humanism ('culture') and Christianity".

(1) H.O. 27/31 taught us that archaic man thought culture and religion (sacralization) together. There is, in other words, no problem 'culture / religion', since culture proceeds in a thoroughly sacral way.

(2) Things change, in antiquity e.g. with the secularization (desacralization; H.O. 146) introduced by Protosofism (-450/-350; H.O. 5/7: Protagorean model): if 'culture' proceeds essentially without deities, the question arises "To what does religion then still serve?"!

Likewise at the end of the Middle Ages: if state (Macchiavelli), economy (H.O. 147v.), education, etc., proceed without sacredness, to what does Christianity still serve? But also conversely "What means, for Christianity, profane culture, advocated by humanism?". To this Niebuhr distinguishes five kinds of answers.

(i) Between culture (humanism) there is irreconcilable opposition.

This was defended by Tertullian (155/230), who was a Montanist (Montanus, a convert, from Phrygia (tss. 100 and 200), wanted to replace the Church hierarchy with inspired prophets (H.O. 162)),--as well as by Lev Tolstoy (1828/1910; apostle of non-violence; adherent to an ascetic-mystical (H.O. 118) Christianity, mixed with Rationalism.

Conclusion: man must radically choose between, Humanism or Christianity.

H.O. 197.

(ii) Between culture and Christianity there is a profound contradiction : culture is profoundly sinful; but Christ also converts and restores man culturally, such that culture is Christianized.

This was defended by S. Augustine of Tagaste (H.O. 100vv.: Aug. social criticism), as well as, in a Modern way, of course, by Jean Calvin (= Cauvin; 1509/1564; founder of the Calvinist or Reformed Church at Geneva; he, was exceptionally dogmatic and intolerant, but founded a capitalist Christianity: labor, finance etc. are religious).

(iii) Between culture and Christianity there is a relative opposition in that culture is the work of the sinner and faith is the work of the gracious Christ;--a certain commitment to culture is therefore possible and desirable.

This type is represented by M. Luther (1483/1546), the founder of the Reformation.

(iv) Between culture and Christianity there is a distinction: Christianity transcends culture, as nature is transcended by supernature; but, given that nature is elevated to a higher level by supernature (purification), Christianity contributes in an essential way, to culture.-- This is defended by Thomas Aquinas (H.O. 106; 111; 125).

(v) Between culture and Christianity there is, in essence, no distinction: Christianity brings true culture.-- According to Niebuhr, this is the position of the Freethinking Christians.-- H.O. 136; 141 gave us samples of this (Lamennais; Liberal or Freethinking Protestants).

The relationship 'humanism/Christianity' in the Renaissance.

Bibl. stitch pr:

-- H.J. Blackham, *Humanism*, Middlesex (Eng.), 1968, 112/116 (Renaissance),-- religiously hostile;

-- E. Coreth, *Einf. i. d. Phil. d. Neuzeit*, I (*Rationalismus- Empirismus- Aufklärung*), Freiburg, 1972, 14f. (Humanismus),

-- Catholic; -- especially: Fr. Hermans, *Histoire doctrinale de l' humanisme chrétien*, I/IV, Tournai /Paris, 1948,-- in which M. Ficino (1443/1499; Neoplatonic Humanist), Pico della Mirandola (1463/1493; Neoplatonic), Lefèvre d' Etaples (1455/1537; Humanist theologian), Erasmus (1469/1536; HO 191), Thomas Morus (1478/1535; canonized), S. Francis de Sales (1567/1622; Bishop of Geneva; canonized) are discussed as the Christian Humanists of the first hour.