

**5.7.2 Introduction to Modern and Current Thought.**  
**MHD Philosophy (third year) 1983/1984**

**Part II, pp. 151 to 289**

HD 128

thoroughly engrossed in 'philosophy' yet, as Dodds, o.c., 105, brilliantly summarizes, "To take a look too deeply into the nature of the world is very dangerous." Indeed, as Dodds explains, the 'beneficence' of the 'historia', as a withdrawn life - see e.g. p. 70 *supra* (Anaxagoras, Empedokles' friend) -, saves the 'contemplative' life from, among other things, political difficulties - a theme the Epikoureans will take up (-400/+400: very long time, that is) -.

But the deepening, purely speculative - see above p. 4 (The collection of the non-hylic abstractors) -, of the questions of life has Empedokles - like so many doubters - exhausted." (The contemplative life) - says Dodds, o.c., 106 - is (...) the refuge of despair".

If we now compare Empedocles of Akragas - see *above p. 67/70* -, we immediately see the small difference: Empedocles is religious-theosophical; Euripides is religious, but critical-physical. If both had a great interest in religious and paranormal realities, the difference is clear: Euripides is a hermeneutic and truly 'balladsque' thinker of antiquity.

In our age of pragmatists and behaviorists, of theosophists and spiritualists, of Freudians and Jungians, - says again Dodds, o.c., 112 - "Euripides, who Ca. Swineburne (1837/1909), the English writer, could be called a playwright and a deformed monkey, is, for our generation, one of the most sympathetic figures of antique literature." Speaking of 'interpretations' of the same Euripides!

**(3) B2a. The religion of fate.**

*F. Flückiger, gesch. D. Naturrechtes, I (Die gesch. D. Europ. rechtsidee im Altertum und im frühen Mittelalter)*, (The History of Natural Law, I (The History of the European Idea of Law in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages)), Zollikon/ Zürich, 1954, 43ff., illuminates, as a legal historian and theologian, another moment of Euripides' philosophy, namely the idea of fate.

"For this poet, who lives already in the time of the Greek enlightenment - see *above p. 21v. (Xenophanes of Kolophon)*, the Olympian - let us understand: the non-Echonic - deities have certainly become problematic, but in their place the ancient belief in fate comes to the fore once more.

## MHD 129

But the 'power' of destiny works - in Euripides' eyes - not only indirectly, through oracle (see *above p. 45/49 (Heraklitean frame of thought)*) and curse word (i.e. a magical-mantical speaking, which works destiny), but immediately, i.e. through demonic 'forces of nature, -- this insofar as we (i.e. F. Flückiger) designate as 'demonic' a higher power which rises in man himself and controls him".

In other words humanism - see *above pp. 115/116 (Anaxagorean analogue)* - with its humane abductions, occurs, here in the naturalistic-depth-psychological form.

F. Flückiger, o.c., 44, specifies: "Euripides is the first who brought 'nature' ('fusus') and 'divine right' ('dikè') into an intrinsically necessary connection. He did this, namely, in the aforementioned sense: the 'divine' destiny works itself out in the forces of nature, which are (1) the drive and (2) the character ('thumos', 'mania'). They get hold of man and demand from him 'dike' (restoration of justice).

Here is (...) the origin of natural law to be sought" (see *above pp. 40/45 (dialectics)*)-even differently the author, *ibid.*, expresses this extremely important basic idea:

- **a/**"What the 'deity' - in the Euripidean sense, of course (see *above p. 127* (aithèr-or fire deity-power situated in the fusus itself - determines as destiny, that out of it must 'anankaios' (necessarily) receive its fulfilment."

- **b/**"Yet the abductive basis is new: the 'divine' origin is no longer really Zeus or moira (the goddess of fate), but the power, which, immediately in the fusus itself, is lived through." - So much for this eminent legal historian.

### (3) B2b1. *Applicative model 1.*

F. Flückiger, o.c., 44f., develops his thesis.-- in 'The Raging Herakles', one of Euripides' dramas (perhaps from -416), the force of nature is the 'Lussa' (whose first meaning is 'rabidness', but which metaphorically -- analogously (see *above p. 101v.*) -- can denote human aggression in all its forms).

## MHD 130

The 'lussa', urge to attack, is 'transmitted' by the 'Aither' (fire deity) (this language is purely metaphorical, of course): it is the rage, which takes hold of the 'hero'.

She proceeds in two tenses:

(1) Heracles, under the pressure of this unconscious drive, destroys his own house and kills wife and children.

(2) Then: the frenzy leaves him, as if it were a kind of autonomous "power" nestled in his innermost being; only then - not before - does he come to an understanding (the "reason or intellect" comes only afterwards), becomes anxious, collapses.

He 'rationalizes' - Freudian term to indicate that someone, though apparently unconsciously 'driven' (motive), nevertheless imagines a 'rationally appearing explanation' (i.e. the actual 'rationalization') - and says - this time in chthonic language - "collectively we are crushed by the hand of Hera (the supreme goddess, wife of Zeus)" (Herakl. Main., 1392). It is, ostensibly, a "doom transmitted by the deity" (id., 919vv.). It is not his own fault - one can already see the typical depth-psychological justification at work here -, but a fate, which 'Lussa' sends him, that throws him and what is his (house, family) into calamity.

*Note.--* Euripides goes so far as to use mythology to disguise his "rational-intellectual impotence behind the 'ridiculous' mythology of popular religion.

In doing so, it does not even hide the fact that, in the archaic-religious sense, "Lussa," as transmitted by a deity, is more than a natural process and certainly, most certainly more than a cheap condoning and "justification" (here in the prefatory sense "rationalization") for immoral acts.

Archaic man recognizes, after all, two types of guilt:

a. the unconscious guilt, but which is and remains really "guilt" (and asks for forgiveness);

b. the conscious guilt, which, here in enlightened thinking ("language play"; cf. *supra pp. 33/40*), is fundamentally the only recognized guilt.

MHD 131

*P. Ricoeur, Finitude et culpabilité, ii (Le symbolique du mal), (Finitude and guilt, ii (The symbolic of evil)), Paris, 1960, 9/150 (les symboles primaires: souillure, péché, culpabilité), (primary symbols: defilement, sin, guilt ), has pointed out, in his own - Protestant-rational - way, how ethical-political "evil" exhibits three types:*

- 1/ blemish, stain, uncleanness' (very ritually conceived, according to Ricoeur );
- 2/ sin (offense against some order);
- 3/ guilt consciousness, guilt awareness (psychologically lived form).

Ricoeur sees in it, rather, phases, which, culture-historically, succeed each other. Which is correct. Yet they are, in my opinion, lasting moments of the same presence of the ethical-political evil. And thus: simultaneous (or as good as).

Go figure, in Herakles.

***Observation.***

The brutal, undoubted fact of the Lussa (with its events), *above p. 129v.* briefly outlined.

***Clue.-- abductive phase.***

The lussa, as a force of nature, which takes hold of the hero, is the necessary and/or sufficient reason (the 'thumos', the unreasoned, preconscious ground, from which the 'raging' action bubbles up, compulsively, lets Lussa through). Actually, in Euripides' view, this is the reason without question. But he suspects - among other things and especially as an initiate - that 'more' ('the other'; *see above p. 124*) is hidden behind it: namely the fisis insofar as 'irrational', 'demonic'.

***Clue.-- Abductive-mythical***

The "myth" is, for Euripides, the clumsy-suggestive formulation of that "other," which, remains mysterious, but, perhaps, reveals itself somewhat.

Then, in that abductive form, the necessity and volition reason (regressive reduction) is twofold:

(i) the genealogical 'evil': on the very lineage of Heracles weighs a time-honored blood debt (once, by an ancestor, a murder was committed, making himself and his descendants 'unclean', 'be-smet', (contaminated), 'be-vlekt', (stained) after such an offence against the power-laden ('sacred') order - which is 'sin' (in Ricoeur's language play)); this requires - before the judgment seat of 'time' (*see above p. 3* (Anaximandros' order of law)) - a 'tisis' (penance, restoration of justice);

(ii) Committing the slaying of Lukos, the conqueror, who, also threatened his wife and children, - and this selfishly, i.e. without the authorization of the deities, who, as destiners, prescribe the actual rules of conduct.

## MHD 132

It is true that Lukos himself has brought a fate upon himself: he has honourably challenged the deities (consequence: he is “stained” (Ricoeur’s first type), having crossed that boundary against an existing order (sin; in Ricoeur’s language play)). He will have to undergo dikè, restoration of legal order.

Yet that does not make Heracles’ bill: twofold he will pay ‘tisis’ (fine). The goddess Iris, who is the messenger (‘angel’) both from one deity to another and from the deities to men (here: the hero Heracles), and also from the heroes to the deities, is sent by Hera, who chases Heracles: Iris brings an ‘evil’ (calamitous) daimon (which in Euripides means fate, though with that mysterious-mythical atmosphere around it) and emphasizes - according to Flückiger - that the frightful thing that is about to take place is ‘dike’, law and order. She ends her speech by saying, ”The deities would stand nowhere, if (Herakles) did not have to give ‘dikè’.” (Her. Main. 841).

**Note.--** One is not mistaken:

(i) The physical is the true abduction: human nature (with its immanent daimon der Lussa, in the very heart of the hero) is the true stage;

(ii) the myth is a kind of ‘aura’, which articulates and reveals the hidden order of destiny (yet underworld, Olumpos; Hera, Iris etc. are demythologized).

### **(3)B2b2. *Applicative model 2.***

In *Medeia* we encounter an analogous structure.-- The drama”Mèdeia” (Medea) dates from -431.-- In order to understand the”tragedy” of the play properly, one should know a little of the Argonauts’ passage.

Jason, the leader of the Argonauts, succeeds in acquiring the golden fleece (the coat of a divine ram), from Thessaly (the land of magic), but not without the magic of the Colchic Medeia, who had fallen in love with the young Helen and whom Jason, out of conceit, marries. In time, the couple settles in Corinth, where the tragedy takes place.

MHD 133.

In *Medeia*, in other words, a type (see above p. 111vv, where the type is biological; here we are talking about a mythological type) emerges: a young hero fights against a dangerous enemy (here: Aiètès, king of Kolchis, on the east coast of the Black Sea); thanks to the help of the enemy's daughter (here: Medeia), the hero (here: Jason) conquers.

Apparently, as in all myths, this structure (basic model) is worked out in all kinds of variants (a linguistic and cultural phenomenon which the structuralists study, preferably logically substantiated (i.e. with schemata, which represent the stoicheiosis (see above p. 2); regarding structuralism, see also above p. 90 (binary operations, which, incidentally, also occur in linguistic and cultural phenomena such as the myths).

**Consequence:** Euripides had a certain choice.

In *Medeia* we meet another mythological type: "Medeia (...) is the daughter of the subterranean ruler, Hades (sound related to Aietes). She helps Jason (...). Yet the marriage between the immortal (Medeia) and the mortal (Jason) is, as often happens, not accompanied by happiness (*J. Geffcken, die Griechische Tragödie*, (the Greek Tragedy,), Leipzig/Berlin, 1911-2, 110).

In *Medeia*, the scenario is, briefly, the following: at Corinthos, Jason becomes engaged to Glaukè, the daughter of Kreon, prince of the city who wants to send Medeia into exile.

Medeia, arch sly, asks for a single day's postponement of departure.

(1) She sends Glaukè a robe and a golden crown. When the latter wears that robe and crown, she dies. Her father, Kreon, catches her in his arms: he too dies.

(2) She kills, single-handedly, the two children she has with Jason. The play ends with a "deus ex mechina": the sun sends her a chariot, drawn by winged dragons, with which she flees to Athens, where she marries Aigeus, the son of Pandion.

In this demonic way, Medeia deprives her ex-husband of what is most dear to him and destroys him psychologically.

MHD 134.

***Depth philosophical hermeneutics.***

*cfr. supra pp. 32/32.12* (metaphysical and human unconscious as a scenario indication).

**(A) *Observation.***

The story (scenario) is the observed fact

**(B)1. *The human unconscious as a necessary and or sufficient reason.***

Mèdeia-Exodos (1002/1419) - meditates, "By the vengeance deities of Hades! It will not happen that I let my children be humiliated by my enemies! (...).

The event ("scenario") is completely programmed and not reversible. Already now, the crown on her head, the young monarch (Glaukè) dies. I definitely know that! But, going down the road of utter calamity, I will send upon them (i.e. the two children) an even worse calamity. I am therefore going to address a word of farewell to them". (Mèdeia gives sign: the two children come to her).

"Give, children, thy right hand to thy mother in greeting!" -- (Mèdeia, embracing them, kisses her children).--"O most lovely hand! O most loving mouth! O noble appearance and countenance! Be happy ... but on the other side! Things - here, on earth - thy father (i.e. Jason) has taken from thee. O pleasant embrace! O soft skin and pleasantest breath of my children! Go away! Go away!"--(Mèdeia dismisses them).

"I simply cannot look at my children anymore, crushed as I am under my mischief.-and, in doing so, I begin to realize ('ma(n)thano') what evil deeds I will dare to do. But the 'thumos' (the urge) is stronger than my will. Yes, the drift ('thumos') is the cause of the greatest evil things among mortals." (1059/1080).

As *Flückiger, gesch. des Naturrechts*, I, 45, says: the 'daimon' (= destiny power, which is both deity and drift ('thumos' -- somewhat identical with Freud's drift and 'desire') working in man) - here the daimon of vengeance is the motive, until Mèdeia begins to realize it (motive).

**(B)2. *The metaphysical unconscious as abduction type 2.***

Vv. 764vv: Mèdeia says: "O Zeus and Dikè (legal retribution) of Zeus and light of the sun. Now we shall be like those who gain a beautiful victory over enemies. That way we are on. Now there is hope that my enemies will pay punishment according to justice.

MHD 134 (bis?)

***Hermeneutic structure.***

By "hermeneutic structure" they mean here the way Euripides interprets the scenario.

***Observation.***

The undistinguished fact is recounted in the scenario.

***Abduction. (1)***

An excerpt will clarify E Euripides' interpretation. Medea in the Exodos (1002/1419), meditates so to say, "By the vengeance spirits of Hades, it will not happen that I let my children be humiliated by my enemies. (...) The fact is completely finished and cannot be escaped. Already now, with the crown on her head, the young princess (Glaukè) dies in her veils. I definitely know that. But, going down the road of utter misfortune, I will send upon them (the two children, who are in the palace, in another room) an even worse misfortune. I am therefore going to send them a farewell word".

Medea gives sign: the two children come into her room.--"Give, children, your right hand to your mother in greeting." - Medea embraces her children and kisses them.

"O most loving hand, most loving mouth. O noble appearance and countenance. Be happy, but on the other side. Things here, on earth your father (Jason) has taken from you. O pleasant embrace and soft skin and sweetest breath of my children. Go away! Go away!"

Medea lets them get away from her.--"I just can't look at my children anymore. I am overwhelmed by my accidents. In the process, I begin to realize ('manthano') what evil deeds I will dare to do. But the thumos, the urge, is stronger than my will. The 'thumos', the drift, is the cause of the greatest mischiefs (evil things) among mortals." (1059/1080).

As Flückiger, *Gesch. d. N.*, I, 45, says: the "daimon" (destiny power) of revenge is the motive (as distinguished from controlled motive).

***Abduction. (2)***

However, Euripides sees depth psychologically. -- In the third Epeisodion (663/823), 954vv, Medea herself utters: "O Zeus and 'Dikè' (= legal retribution) of Zeus and light of the sun". Now we shall be like those who gain a fine victory over enemies. We have gone that way. Now there is hope that my enemies will pay righteous punishment ('teisein dikèn').

MHD 135.

(...). All my wills ('boulumate') I will utter to you (always: Zeus, dikè, sun deity). So catch words that do not cause lust.--I will send one of my servants to Jason and I will have him ask to come under my eyes. Once he is here, I will speak sweet words to him, viz. that I agree, -- that a princely marriage (with the princess Glaukè) is a beautiful thing, after he has betrayed us (Medeia). (...). I will (...) send the children with gifts in their hands to the bride (Glaukè). (...) A light veil and a crown of driven gold. If she accepts and wears that 'cosmos' (ornament), she will die away miserable, as well as all who will touch this young girl. With such magic agents ('farmakois') I will anoint the gifts.

Yet now I change my prayer word: I weep over the kind of work that lies ahead of us next. For the children I will kill, mine. No one is there who will keep them from it. After I have destroyed the whole house of Jason, I shall go out of this country, fleeing from the murder of my dearest children and pressed under the burden of a most unholy work. For, friends, to be laughed at by my enemies is not to be borne. So far! What gain would living on give the children? I have neither homeland nor house nor refuge from calamities".

It should be noted that Medeia, here, lies, for she has, just now, found refuge with Aigeus (at Athens): she deludes herself into a fallacy, in order to give her "thumos" a rationalization.-

"I committed a sin the day I left the paternal home, having been persuaded by the words of a Greek man, who, with the cooperation of a deity ('sun theoi'), will pay righteous punishment ('teisei dikèn'). Never again will he see the children born of me. From his new bride he will never conceive children, since, thanks to magic means, the 'ananke' (the need) is there that this unlucky woman dies in an unlucky way, a gentle one.

## MHD 136

On the contrary, one takes me for the opposite kind: insufferable to my enemies, benevolent to my friends. The most famous life is such a person's own". Again in the Exodos, 1231/1235, the choirmaster says: "Apparently, 'ho daimon' (the deity of fate), with many calamities, strikes today, rightly ('endikös'), Jason, O unfortunate one (i.e. Glaukà), how do we feel pity, daughter of Kreon, on account of thy fate.

Thou who hast gone to the gates of the underworld ('eis haidou pulas') for the reason of marrying Jason".

"The chorus agrees that the daimon of vengeance - the author expresses by this the two abductions in the same title - rightfully strikes Jason ('endikos').

On top of that, fate vindicates Medeia. Dike makes it get her. Helios (the sun deity) rescues Meadeia in the dragon chariot from the grip of her persecutors.

Leaning, the chorus concludes the tragedy: 'Of many (things) is Zeus, on the Olumpos, the destroyer ('tamias'). The deities ('theoi') accomplish ('krainousi') in an unexpected way ('a.elptos') many (things). The things, which are believed, do not materialize. Some deity ('theos') finds a way out for things, which one does not think will occur. The fact (of this tragedy) - 'tode prasma' - had its end in such a way!

The justice proper to destiny is not only salvific and orderly, but also destructive and frightening." (F. Flückiger, o.c ., 46).

In other words, to speak with WB. Kristensen, destiny is 'harmony of opposites' (see above pp. 24/ 26).

**Note --** Even in the *kuklops*, a still, to a high degree, satyr play, there is talk of "dike": the arch-smart Odusseus makes the grossly materialistic kukloos, a fantastic creature who knows only pleasure and bloodlust, a dracula avant la lettre -, drunk with wine, while muttering, Knowing well that wine will harm him and righteous punishment he will, soon thereon, pay. (421/422)

MHD 137

**(3)B3. *The balladsque religion of fate.***

**(1) *Applicative model of ballad.***

J. Van Eichendorff (1798/1857), from the Heidelberg younger Romantic school, has left us a typologically pure (*see above p. 112*) model of ballad (deriving from the Late Latin ‘ballare’ (to dance); ballad is a kind of dance song, which, for German-sonologists, we (try to) translate.

*Lorelei* (this title bears

(i) ‘die (also : der) Lei, i.e. rock and

(ii) ‘Die lure’, i.e. the (female) elf or nature spirit).

a. ”It’s late already. It is already cold. What dost thou ride, lonely through the forest? The forest is long. Thou art alone, thou fair bride. I will carry thee home”.

b. ”Great is der men’s amount and stratagem. Of grief m ‘n heart is broken. Well does the forest horn wander to and fro. Oh! Flee! Thou knowest not who I am!”

c. ”So richly dost is steed and wench . So wondrously beautiful the young body! Now I know you! God help me! Thou art the witch, the lorelei.

d. ”Thou knowest me. From high rock watches, silent, my lock deep in the Rhine. It is already lat. It is already cold. Thou shalt never come out of this forest”.

*Note.* -- On TF 1, on 25.03.84, under the title ‘la plus belle soiree de ma vie’ (an Italian film (1972) by Ettore Scolo), a film by Friedrich Dürrenmatt, The breakdown with the car (the story of dottore Rossi, who, with his ultra expensive car, ‘breaks down’) was played, which is typologically (*see above p. 112; also 133 (mythological type)*) model-identical.

Dottore Rossi ends up, indeed, in a kind of strange ending, where former judges, in order to pass the time, perform a kind of judicial game”in order not, in their retirement time, to expire.” Rossi, as the accused, gets himself tried and sentenced on a richly anticipated supper evening, in that ”grim” way ... for the sake of pure play.

The next day, however, he is presented with an extremely expensive bill, which he, rich as he is, pays anyway. He is escorted out with choir and singing and music. But - and here comes the ‘lorelei’:

MHD 138.

(i) Before seeking a night's rest, Dottore Rossi, in the city, where the Swiss-precisely on time-closing bank presents him with a closed door, encounters a sexy girl, with leather attire and voluptuous bosom, on a very expensive moto. Carried away by his rich-man's lust for all things sexy, he chases, in a fast ride, the motorcycle, which eludes him. Until he breaks down. This is how he ends up at the courthouse lock. However without any understanding of what that lock, seemingly a very welcoming restaurant, actually is.

(ii) Throughout the typically jet-setting or traveling-catty evening, an equally sexy waitress serves up, with whom - both because of the retired judges and, above all, because of the hot Italian businessman "Dottore Rossi," who is on the true origin of the much money, which he comes to put into a Swiss bank account, as if by scrutiny, - it comes to "Liebeleie," even after having fiercely dreamed of a mad motorcycle ride with the mysterious waitress.

In the morning, it still doesn't dawn on Dottore Rossi that this waitress is identical to the eve's temptress, whose motorcycle was deliberately positioned so, in the parking lot, that he couldn't leave without her.

(iii) Until Dottore Rossi, on his way to the bank, but, unfortunately, with his condemnation parchment to which he, as if it were a precious memento, loves with all his soul, next to him in the car, again bumps into the 'lorelei', skimming past him: only then do his eyes open. He recognizes the motorcyclist and the waitress. On the 'hunt' (in speed and naivety) after her, he, meanwhile, takes up one of the former 'judges' of the 'court' of the eve, in his car.

Discussion: until Dottore Rossi, furious, makes her get off because this mysterious "judge" makes him "guilty" not legally - the human court is, for former judges like him, only a comedy - but ethico-politically. Only then does the motorcycle skim past him seductively. In wild pursuit, Dottore Rossi wants to overtake the lorelei, coveting it.

MHD 139.

At that tragically comic moment she lures him into a hairpin bend, where he has to brake, but the rolled-up 'condemnation parchment' locked in a stiff sleeve, which he did not notice, has 'fallen' between his brake pedal and the body - seemingly by accident, all of them - and prevents the brake from getting a grip on his mad dash. With the 'blissfully erotic smile' on his face, Dottore Rossi crashes 'into the abyss'.

It should be noted, that unlike the full-fledged ballad, even at the moment of his downfall, still Dottore Rossi does not realize who that girl is and what she is actually accomplishing to him: his '(God's) judgment.

In von Eichendorff's ballad, on the other hand, as in the Euripidean tragedy, usually the typical delay of understanding ceases: the tragic hero(s) sees, suddenly, what he (she) is up to, namely, when it is too late.

**(2).- Appl. model of the ballad.**

*L.Uhland* (1787/1862) (German Romanticism) with von Eichendorff. one of the top figures of the 'purified' Romanticism (Schwabische schule), left us *Die Rache* (The Revenge).-- See here a translation -

**a.** The servant stabbed the noble lord to death. The servant was, himself, like, a knight.

**b.** He stabbed him to death in the dark forest. And cast the corpse into the deep Rhine.

**c.** Has donned the equipment blank. On the gentleman's steed cast himself franc.

**d.** When he wants to jump over the bridge. Suddenly the steed stands and rears back.

**e.** When he gave the golden spurs him, suddenly it swings him, -- wildly --, into the stream below.

**f.** By arm, by foot, he swims and struggles. The heavy armor forces him down.

So much for - as literally as possible - in order to reflect the precise atmosphere somewhat - this again typologically pure ballad. *See above page 111.*

**(3).-- The regulatory model (type, idea).**

**(i)** *Holger Olof Nygaard* (Duke univ.), *Ballad*, in *Enc. Brit.*, Chicago, 1967, 3: 20/22, 'ballad' is called a 'folk song', poemed by nameless poets each time with variants, transmitted orally, distributed internationally, which is essentially a story of a dramatic action.

## MHD 140

Yet the, since the XVIIIth e., specifically-balladesque Nygaard practically does not mention. (in *R. Foncke, hundred German Ballads*, Antwerp, 1944, 10/12, gives the most fascinating specifications (type-descriptions).

The author cites Börries von Munchhausen (1874), one of the naturalist ballad poets. The lyric poem is utterance of the mind. The epic is the long narrative poem; the ballad the short form of it. Von Münchhausen distinguishes, in the structure of the ballad, two layers.

**a/** The bottom layer is empirical-actual. I.e. the story describes a seemingly ordinary, if necessary shocking event. Methodologically we call this moment (living aspect) the moment of perception. *Cfr. supra p. 10.*

**b/** The upper layer or the upper process, as von Munchhausen says. "Essentially, the action - the actual object of the story is meant - has not only 'Grund' (i.e. testable empirical reality), but also 'background', i.e. that above the camp of the heroes, on the moors, invisible in the sky, the 'einherier' (i.e. the fallen warriors in Valhalla are fighting." (o.c., 11).

If we correctly interpret v. Munchhausen, he metaphorically describes the following idea: the necessary and / or sufficient reasons or regressive reduction (said above p. 10v.) of the foreground narrative lies in the mythic-sacred domain.

One now rereads -- starting from what v. Munchhausen says -- higher p. 124 (the whole life / the other); (129divinely determined destiny (background) / natural forces (foreground: drive, character); 130 (natural process (foregr.) / mythology (background)) 131 (meth. scheme); (132note -- physical / myth); 134/136 (meth. scheme).

**Note.--** As an argument of authority we took here *J. Geffeken, Die griechische Tragödie*, Leipzig / Berlin, 1911, 95/101 (the "weltanschauung" of Euripides).

**a.** One need not look for a "closed rational system" in Euripides. For that he is too much of a real poet.

**b.** Basic insights, - that is.

**b1.** The critical-skeptical truth-drivenness of the "rationalist" called protosophists (o.c., 95f.) "beherrscht Euripides ganz" (mastered Euripides goose).

**b2.** "(...) This urge for truth (...) forces Euripides, relentlessly, to perform both moments.

MHD 141.

He has moved the pros and cons of almost every question back and forth in his own deliberations. Caught up in these contradictions, he, often, fails to arrive at true decision making.” (o.v., 96).

### **B2. Euripides a protosofistic attitude**

Euripides has, with respect to the mythological-traditional religion, which in his works, in spite of everything, continues to play a decisive role, a protosofistic-like attitude.

#### **B2.1. On the one hand, it is abundantly clear:**

The subjects of the day, moral-political considerations above all, checking on the behavior of one’s fellow men, -- all things -- according to Geffcken, (o.c., 97) – that ”render almost whole and entire the original form of (...) the myth illusory.”

Thus, e.g., even the priestess of Artemis (the sister of the ‘splendid’ sun-god Apollon), Ifigeneia, exhibits the most crass disbelief regarding the so-called ‘divine’ institution of human sacrifice: ”more sharply could Euripides not deny the saga.” (o.c., 97).

Thus, e.g., when, in his *Electra*, the deity who orders the mother’s murder is”most harshly censured (ibid.);--with which the myth is at once ‘abolished’ (abolished).

Thus, further, the polemic against deity legends without more. ”If the deities commit wickedness, they are not ‘deities.’“

Thus Euripides’ judgment, summed up in a proverb,--judgment verified in numerous attacks on the bad example of the -- all laws themselves breaking -- deities, on her all too ‘human’ behavior, on her mendacious oracles (*see above pp. 45/49* : an appl.mod. of ‘ambiguous’ oracle.” (ibid.).

#### **b2.2. Righteous and truthful**

On the other hand, the proposer argues, the poet is far too righteous and truthful not to look the other side of the ”religion question” squarely in the eye and emphatically make it his own conviction.

“Thus, e.g., in his *Bakchen* (a play, which ‘glorifies’ the Dionusian service (*see above p. 126v.*)), he (...), notwithstanding strongly ‘rationalistic’ ideas, which also emerge here, in the *Bakchen*, and notwithstanding

MHD 142.

the fact that Euripides, in the one who persecutes the Dionysian service, sees no criminal, the overwhelming orgiastic being of the bakchos servants and servants in scenes so compelling that one can well understand how the opinion of those who claim that Euripides converted in old age has been able to take root.” (o.c., 97).

We refer, herewith, to his paragon, Herakleitos (see above p. 56ff ‘Understanding Method’).

Geffcken, o.c., 97/98, continues, summarizing ”For nothing is further removed from this serious and all riddles of existence meditating thinker than irreligiosity: out of ‘religiosity’ (the author meant: real religiosity) he professes no ‘religion’ (the author meant: an unaccounted-for form of religion), in so far as a Greek, bound by a thousand ties to ancestral morality, can do so.” (ibid.).

**b3.** What, in our view, still most, perhaps, makes Euripides’ life description a balladsque one, is his ‘*Historia*’. Yet the historia (‘close examination’; Geffcken, o.c., 98: ‘gnau betrachtet’) of (self)deception and sham reality.-- This we now explain, first, contemporary.

**b3.1.** *P. Ricoeur, le conflit des interprétations (Essais d’ herméneutique)*, (the conflict of interpretations (Essays of hermeneutics)), Paris, 1969,148/151, briefly discusses the three great unmasking thinkers of our present age:

(i) K. Marx (1818/1883), who unmasked the false justice of a so-called Platonic-idealist and Christian culture, starting from its economic basis (infrastructure);

(ii) F. Nietzsche (1844/1900), who unmask the apparent veracity of an all too rhetorical thinking, starting from the vital ”rhetoric” of ”life”, which ”deceives” itself and fellow man (out of ”will to power”); cfr. *S. IJsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy (What happens, when there is talk? )*, Bilthoven, 1975, 130/143 (Nietzsche and philosophy),--and this, all idealism and Christianity notwithstanding;

(iii) S. Freud (1856/1939), who unmasked the sham reality of so-called consciousness, especially in the ”posh” midst of our idealistic-Christian culture, starting from the unconscious mechanisms, which ”cause” the conscious psychic life.

## MHD 143

All three - Ricoeur says, 149, unmask consciousness and of themselves and of 'being'. Although each of them exposes a different moment of that 'false consciousness'.

(a) But this is only the critical-dialectical side (see above pp. 21vv. (Xenophanes' critique of society and religion; his critique of criticism or meta-theory); 65 (skepticism)).

(b) The other side is a hermeneutic or theory of interpretation and *praxis* (see above p. 1; 13.1 (Alkmaion); 22vv. (Xenophanes); 26v., 33/36, 45/49 (Herakleitos' hermeneutics). It consists in deciphering the products of our conscious life for their 'authenticity'.

### **B3.2.**

(i) Euripides unmasks interpretively the sham justice of accidental society.

a. "What sad role does money play! How outrageous is its power!" (Geffcken, 98).

b. "Euripides sees through life: to his clear gaze do not escape the degrading effects also of poverty, which, shortly after his time, one does not tire of praising as the normal, the true situation of life of the morally high man". (ibid.).

c. "What is the nobility, which does not have the necessary resources! What are 'kings'! How miserable is so often their being".

d. *E. De Waele, Medeia*, Antw., 1949, VIII/IX, says: "The state of individual and social inferiority, in which the Athenian woman of the V-th e. still found herself, stirred Euripides' mind. In the life of seclusion, which the woman led - never did she go out unaccompanied; she did not visit; she received at home only wives and relatives - the poet found the cause of many an incomprehensible attitude to life, suppressed moods and desires a striking mixture of good and bad character traits."

(ii) Euripides rejects the sacrifices, if they do not spring from pious attitudes to life. He laments, above all, the guild of seers.(...) Thus the soothsayers, whom Euripides introduces, are but pushy talkers. (...)

#### MHD 144

He wants to approach the deity without mediators; he tears open the fabric of popular belief; he breaks through the barrier that priestly self-importance has erected. In his eyes, everything that is gloriously blown up is like that, behind which 'nothing' is hidden. It is an abomination to him". (Geffcker o.c., 98).

One can compare such summaries of Euripides' critique of both deception and self-deception, somewhat, with Nietzschean cultural criticism.

**(iii)** De Waele. *ibid.* says: Euripides conceived it as his poetic vocation to illuminate these psychological riddles in concrete cases.

**(a)** Euripides was less attracted to the typical (*see above p. 111: from individuals to types*) and idealized man. As Sophocles of Kolonos (-496/-406) portrayed him.

**(b)** But all the more to the individual case, -- with all the hateful, atrocious, pathological, or morbid, that lay within it,-- with all that lay outside the norm.

Sophocles pithily expressed the difference of opinion between him and his younger contemporary: "I portrayed people as they should be. Euripides as they are!".

***In summary:*** Sophocles: typ(olog)isch and idealized; Euripides: individual and unidealized.

**a.** "Living in the midst of war misery, he estimates fame and brilliance of battle low. As intensely as he loves Athens, Euripides is bitter towards Sparta, whose mendacity, militarism, and immoral education of women he vehemently scorns. Consequently, war laurels are nothing to him, and the fame of field lords is often bought all too dearly Therefore, he desires peace." (Geffcken, o.c., 98).

**b.** "(...) In Euripides' works, not only the interests of the moment come to the fore. Also the people of his time. Almost all the heroism is torn from these everyday men. Menelaus becomes a poor soldier for Troia.

A Jason (*see above p. 132vv.*) is a worn-out squire. Orestes is a pathological figure.

MHD 145.

Many a patched-up ragamuffin went through the orchestra (i.e., the space between the stage and the viewing audience, where the chorus was located), to the mocking jubilation of the comedy.” (Geffcken, o.c., 99).

Again: not without analogy with Freud’s cultural criticism. Especially if one adds the rest (one thinks of the ‘Lussa’ (see above p. 129vv. (aggression); 134vv. (drift, daimonically seen); *E. von Tunk, kurze Gesch. der altgriechischen Litteratur*, Einsiedeln / Köln, 1942, 23:

“The world enacted by Euripides is full of urges and passions. The eros (love drive), which his colleagues (Aischulos, Sophocles) did not process or only processed in an indicative way, dominates the scene in all its variants. On that stage, murderous lust and blood frenzy, cowardice and betrayal play no less a role”.

In which the proposer points out the aftereffects on world literature ”across the classical period to realism and naturalism. The first of all naturalists fared as well as with all his followers. In striving to avoid the exalted, the idealized, the untrue and unreal, he grasped at the hateful, the repulsive, the sickly and the pathological.” (K. Heinemann)”.

So much for von Tunk’s crass but truthful judgment. Which makes him related to a certain psychoanalytic sphere. No doubt.

(iv) But one major difference, apart from others, is between the three great current ”critical-materialist” expositors - Marx, Nietzsche, Freud - and Euripides:

Euripides starts from a very specific religious abduction (*see above pp. 124/126 (initiation); 126/ 128 (Aitherreligious physical); 128vv. (destiny religion).*

The **a.** economic reduction (Marx), **b.** linguistic-rhetorical and vital (Nietzsche and **c.** the unconscious mechanisms (Freud) are there, though only as foreground.

The background is the legal order of the Aitherreligious physical (*see also p. 3 (Anaximandros’ legal order).* One thinks of the Dike, quoted several times above. This archaic-religious and at the same time physical legal order with its balladsque structure makes Euripides thoroughly different from the three mentioned ‘unmaskers’, although Euripides himself is, undeniably, unmasker.

MHD 146.

**Excerpts.**

**1. The legal moment.**

**(1) Cultural-historical linkage.**

F. Flückiger, *gesch. d. Natur.*, I, 52, distinguishes three law types and layers.

a. The archaic-sacred law, spoken of from Anaximandros (*see above p. 3/4*) to Euripides, in hoof case, at least.

b. Customary law, which, of course, expresses the oldest layer of law in a kind of jurisprudence, in which "judges" learn to pronounce justice" according to growing and evolved "customs" (one thinks of a judge, who made a special, in the tribe, valued judgment, with which he becomes exemplary in following cases

c. The 'political' or city-state law, which, once the cities emerged as units of law, emerged, -partly tradition-fixed partly innovative; at once the administration of justice broke free from the grip of chthonic-sacred family and tribal jurisdiction and became purely-what we can now somewhat characterize as-civil law.

**(2) Ethnological linkage.**

P. Schebesta, *Origins of religion (results of prehistoric and ethnological research)*, Tiel/Den Haag, 1962, 59, gives a still extant vestige. ('superdtitio', what survives from before) of archaic-sacred law, mixed with customary law, of course. He speaks of the magical-dynamic moment:"A Negro, robbed or insulted, does not demand 'compensation' or 'punishment' (the author means: in our Western sense) for the offender, but restoration of life force.

We refer, for this, to *supra pp. 3/4 (speculative-hylic abstr.); 12 (Euripides' spec.-hyl. abstr., viz. Aither as primal and soul substance (cfr. also 12/ 13.1; 67/ 70))*.

Euripides' aitheric-hylic conception of law is a deduction for facts established by him - as an ordinary commonsensical person - of a particularly poignant nature, which, always, are debatable from a purely secular standpoint, but "which - to use Ricoeur's expression, when he speaks of myth - are thought-provoking."

**(3) M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit, I, Tübingen, 1949-6, 134ff. (Das Dasein als Befindlichkeit)*, (Being as a state of mind), speaks of the life of mind.**

MHD 147.

(A) *His basis of perception* is what he calls "the most familiar and commonplace: the mood, being (so or so) put."

(B) *The abductions*, which he considers possible, o.c., 134, are:

(1) the psychology of moods; - i.e. positive spiritual science, which he says, with regard to the life of moods, lies 'noch völlig brach' (still completely fallow);

(2) the fundamentally-ontological or "existential" abduction:

"The mood exposes 'how one is or becomes!'" He gives an appl. mod.: "The often persistent, even and colorless absence of being 'tuned' - which should not be mistaken for 'displeasure' - is such that precisely in it the (human existence ('dasein')) comes across as an object of reluctance.

'Being' is, as a burden, exposed. Why 'one does not know'". (ibid.)-- It is in this zone of perception that Euripides must have had his basic observations.

The big difference with e.g. the phenomenologist (*cfr. infra vlz. 232vv.*) Heidegger lies in the fact that Euripides, like just about all the pre-socratic philosophers, in spite of the enlightenment (*cfr. supra p. 21vv. 70 (scientific)*), continues to think hylically, i.e. primal and soulful.

**Explanation.--** We saw that true philosophy (*cfr. supra p. 5 (analogy 9 (being-saxiomata); (1) ontolog. 'horizon');-- up to there the identitive mode of philosophizing;-- 2 (universe principle); 3/4 (primal and fine-material principle); (4) world-soul(substance); 12vv. (mystical-magical identification 40 (idea of totality, both hylic (primal and soul-material) and logical 88 (unity theory as distinguished according to its essence from philosophy)),-- viz. that real philosophy consists, time and again, in starting from either an observation or an abduction and asking oneself, in the process, the question: "How should the universe, 'being', the totality (or whatever one may call the concrete-living whole, in which, as in one's living world, one is 'at home') be such that the observed or abducted thing becomes, precisely in that universe, in that 'being', in that totality, conceivable, 'meaningful', on the contrary?"*

## MHD 148

Well, that situating in the whole - always on the basis of partial identity (*cfr. supra pp. 5;12*) or, as Heidegger tends to say 'in-der-welt-sein' (*cfr. Sein und Zeit, 52ff.* (Das in-der-welt-sein überhaupt als grundverfassung des Daseins, i.e. the 'in-the-world being' without more as the basic structure of (human) existence) can take place in more than one way.

Aristotle, e.g., expresses himself in terms of (identitive) ontology (*see infra p. 217v.*); Hegel in terms of (thought and destiny) dialectic (*see infra p. 226v.*); Heidegger in terms of existential ontology (identitive' ontology (*see hereafter*), Scheler in terms of ideation (*see infra 231*).

But invariably the sensitive ('seeing') human being will really substantiate (i.e. make justifiable) all these merely speculative ways of situating himself in the totality of 'being' by identifying himself in an ethereal or subtle way with 'the whole' ('being', 'totality', 'welt' etc.). The theosophies of antiquity, in all their variety of forms, 'found' themselves in this primal and soul material way (*cf. supra p. (13Ad 4: Man as 'soul'* (understand: daimon) is the 'meeting point' ('ek-sistenz', Heidegger would say) of all that is primal and soul material).

Without this - one calls it 'theosophical' or whatever - insight into man as a microcosm, who is at home, no matter what, in the macrocosm (*cfr. supra p. 5*), any insight both into the living and thinking world of very many philosophers and into that of most real artists like e.g. a Euripides, is not possible.

The real artist - as Platon already said - is 'mainomenos', 'outside himself', i.e. situating himself in the whole of being, thanks to his (artist's) sensitivity.

One can speak about this in terms of 'befindlichkeit' (capacity to find), like Heidegger does (who (*see further page 186*) returns to the pre-socratic 'truth-bearers' (artists, among others) or in terms of 'sensitivity', like the paranormologists do,-- the core is real philosophy, i.e. situating oneself, with respect to an observation or an abstraction, in the whole 'being' (universe, 'welt', totality). In this well-defined and, in my opinion, irrefutable sense Euripides was a true philosopher, but who used tragedy to express his 'ek-sistenz' (situating oneself in the whole).

MHD 148.1

(4) Applied to the concept of 'right'/'wrong', this amounts to this. --

(A) **Observation.**

"Blessed all those who acquired the method of 'investigation' ('historias') and do not move on the basis of prejudice to (fellow) citizens or unrighteous practices ('praxeis'), but who investigate ('kathoron') the ever-youthful 'cosmos' (legal order) of the immortal 'fysis', especially the way in which that cosmos came into being and along which developmental path ('hopèi')." (Fr. 902).

Research' on (un)law, at the time of Euripides, began to fall into the hands of sophists (judges, lawyers) with good and ... with evil (tampering with the file, tampering with money, 'influence'). On the other hand there was, as now, the ineradicable 'feeling' ('Befindlichkeit'; cfr. supra) in most people that somewhere and some day justice will be done.

(B) **abduction.**

If - somewhere and sometime (time; cfr. supra p. 3/4 - 'law' existed in the deeper, cosmic - fluid sense, then there is, even for the most outraged by 'the 'apparatus' of sophisticated jurisprudence, hope for 'dike', restoration of law.

From this abduction Euripides deduces legal situations - sometimes balladic, but always real - which formed the core of his tragedies. In this well-defined sense we have - *supra p. 137vv. - la plus belle soiree de ma vie* briefly overflow into his structure.

**Note.--** Scheler's system of conformity (*see high p. 64*) taught us to see both distinction and similarity between religion (expressed in theology, and philosophy. Euripides gives us a typical presocratic model of conformity (model identity) between Dionysian religion and philosophy.

## **2. The Dionysian moment.**

King Archelaos, the highly musical prince of the Macedonians, towards the end of Euripides' life, calls him to his court. The 'demonic' creation (at least according to Geffcken, o.c., 94), which glorifies the Dionysian service, the bakchen and the 'poignant' tragedy *Ifigenia in Aulis* date from that time the Cretan Zeus worship and the (Thracian) Dionysian service in its most recent form found Euripides' philosophy (Kuiper, o.c., 384/390)." It was not Euripides' intention to destroy these popular beliefs.

## MHD 149

Or, as a second Lukoërgos, to venture into a battle against the "raging deity" (the author means Dionusos). Without insincerity, here, the poet could bow his head, because Dionusos, however increased in all-encompassing power and multifaceted significance, had remained of a more daimonic than "divine" (the author means "divine" in either a rational-intellectual sense (*see above p. 147*) or a Biblical-Christian sense) nature.

He was not so much in personality as a force, and Euripides therefore did not need to bring him before that same court of morality by which the other Olympians had been judged.

Hence Euripides does not avoid this deity but, rather, reveres it highly:

(i) not only in (... ) a choral song, in which, perhaps, the enchantment of the old saga controlled the poet (... );

(ii) nay, in the course of an entire tragedy, Euripides sought the opportunity to draw out the deeper meaning of that power, which the crowd honored in Dionusos."

One cannot better express the hylic abstraction, which Euripides performed on the deities, than Kuiper did it, almost a century ago, with Dutch thoroughness of thorough research.

He says, o.c., 385v.: "It is not, in the first place, the giver of wine, whom we see honored by Greece in Dionusos, but a chthonic deity, to whom the fanatical women's sheaf (the bakchai) . (...), with wild enthusiasm, used to implore to render to the earth, stiffened from winter's cold, the long remembered fertility."

Not only in the less refined Macedonia, in the north, -- also in Attica itself, Dionusos was, in this way, gradually more and more honored: "By the semblance of holy torches the Thuiades (i.e. the women dragged along in Bakchian-Dionysian ecstasy) rocked the cradle of little Dionusos Liknites - 'licknite' - 'licknite'. the women of Attica, dragged along in Bakchian-Dionysian ecstasy, went up to Delphi to worship the cradle of little Dionusos Liknites - 'liknites', to whom one sacrifices the holy (corn) wan - forcing him to revive himself and the sleeping nature. At the same time the college of the 'hosioi' (the pure), composed of Delphi's first citizens, made solemn sacrifices at the tomb of the chthonic deity." (o.c., 391).

## MHD 150

Yet we listen to the poet himself, *bakchai* 272vv: "This is the daimon, the new daimon, whom you mock. I could not pronounce his greatness ('megethos') concerning power ('megethos' is, here, philologically, the extent of power), how extensive he will be, over Hellas. Two ('forces'), after all, O young monarch, are first-rate among men:

(1) Demeter, the goddess - she is 'ge', the earth (...). She feeds, with dry (nourishment) the mortals;

(2) the one who became equal, the son of Semele (= Dionusos); he invented the moist drink and brought it forth for the benefit of the same mortals. (...)"

*Bakchai*, 297v.: "Mantis' (i.e. seer) is this 'daimon'. After all, that which is peculiar to the Bakchian mysteries ('to bakcheusimon') and which resembles madness, possesses much seer power".

"If we wish to determine the value of this statement, (...) we begin by noting that an eye-catching distinction exists between the reverent tone of Teiresias' values about Dionusos and Demeter and the bitterness of reproach, there Euripides' heroes often added to the other deities. This reverence is unfeigned and explicable.

Euripides honors, in these two types of deities, the eternal fertility of immortal nature, the 'power' of the earth, which recreates itself again and again, under the fertilizing breath (*pneuma*; see above p. 3) of the 'aither'. She was then called 'Demeter', 'Ge', Dionusos". (Cooper, o.c. 397v.)

### **(4) *The priority of women in Euripides.***

#### **(a) *Testimonials.***

1. *E. De Waele, Medeia, Antwerp, 1949, viii/ix:* "Psychological study has become Euripides' drama. Every tragedy, which he writes, is a striving for insight into the heart of man, -- for insight especially into the heart of woman."

2. *J.Geffcken, Die griechische Tragodie, Leipzig/Berlin, 1911, 99* "Das von Euripides entdeckte weib" (the womanhood discovered by E.), which Euripides, in ever new typical - see above pp. 111/112 (biological); 133 (mythological) - appearance form staged:

MHD 151.

**a.** As daimonically avenging itself, when it felt, in its deepest womanhood, hurt (*see above pp. 134/136 (hermeneutic or structure of interpretation)*), as Medeia.

**b.** As heroically sacrificing herself for her husband, as Alkèstis, or heroically following her husband in death (by burning with him), as Euadnè;

**c.** As if from unrequited passion (meant to be love drive) sinking into glow and, slyly evil, leading the "beloved" to ruin, as Faidra;

**d.** Practiced as a coquettish art of seduction - until the last moment - as Helenè.

More than one woman, among the aforementioned women, is not a "heroine," but each among her is a "true, empirically observed manifestation of 'the woman.'"

Euripides seems to have seen at work here the "harmony of opposites" (*see above pp. 24/26 (Kristensen's genius text); 40/43 (dialectic); (51) the dialectic concept of "cover"; 56/64 (understanding method)*), much more clearly than in the soul of the man, which, because of its intellectual-rational emphasis (more than an emphasis it is not), exhibits that "harmony of opposites" less clearly.

What Geffcken seems to insinuate: "The stride, which leads from Medeia to Alkestis, is great. In both dramas we see women before us, whose fate (*see above p. 128vv*) is the husband. Both women show us a scene of parting as the mother of her children. But, what is moving and poignant about Alkestis, Medeia has translated into the terrifyingly daimonic." (o.c., 116).

That Geffcken, by this, is correctly hinted at, may be seen from what he says in introduction to Alkestis: "The Thessalian king Admètos (cfr. Homer, *Il.*, 2: 713), whom we meet, in the drama, for whom his wife descends into the underworld, is, originally the deity of the dark realm itself.

## MHD 152

Alkestis was, originally, in archaic-grey primeval times, the woman resembling him, who, as Persephonè (i.e. the underworld goddess), another name for the 'wife' of Plouton (i.e. the underworld god), descends with her husband into the womb of the earth and, again rises from it." (o.c., 101)

3. *ER. Dodds, der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, Zürich/ Munich, 1977, 99:"( ... ) those female figures, who, as Euripides himself, are thinking beings: (...) Medeia, Faidra, Hekabe (Hecuba), Elektra (for it is a peculiarity of Euripides that his 'thinkers' are almost exclusively women".

Dodds, the great classicist of Oxford, could not have given us a greater reason to dwell on Euripides! We are, here, faced with a philosophically highly trained poet, who also ascribes thinking capacity to the 'beautiful' sex, -- and this, in a society that is completely contemptuous of women (*see above. 143*).

Euripides must have had a particularly necessary and/or sufficient, even, reason or ground for risking something so revolutionary for the then "mentality" of men. In my opinion, this necessary and/or sufficient ground lies in his religion itself (and nowhere else). Apart from being a religion of fate (I borrowed the word 'religion of fate' from F. Flückiger, but, however true it may be, it is one-sided), it is also a religion of women.

*JP. Vernant, mythe et pensée*, II, 80:"Le dionysisme est, d'abord et par predilection, affaire de femmes". (Dionysism is, first of all and by predilection, an affair of women).

4. *K. Kuiper, Philosophy and Religion in the Drama of Euripides (Contribution to the knowledge of the religious life of the Athenians at the time of Perikleës)*, Haarlem, 1888, 40svv., calls attention to "four female figures": Alkestis, Poluxenè, Makaria, Ifigeneia.

Without following Kuiper's emphasis on immortality, we go over these four extremely diverse and yet somewhere "equal" figures.

MHD 153

#### 4.1. *Alkestis*.

*Homer, Iliad*, 2: 714/715, says of her:” (...) Eumèlos, who, by Admètos, gave birth to Alkèstis, the ‘divine’ (in the sense of ‘like Zeus according to his manner’: ‘dia’) among women, the noblest (‘aristè’) according to beauty (‘eidos’) among the daughters of Pelias.”

The scenario.

The saga tells the following.-- Pelias, the young girl’s father, promises to ”give” her as a bride to the young man, who would bring him lions and wild boars, harnessed to a chariot. *Cfr. Supra p. 133 (mythological type)*. Thanks to the god Apollon, Admètos succeeds in the test of strength. He marries Alkestis.

But, on the wedding day, while he is making sacrifices to the deities, ‘forgets’ - *cfr. supra p. 128vv*. Fate (which, with Euripides, bears names like ‘Moirà’, the (un)personal, power, which disposes everything, -- ‘Ananke’, the all-controlling necessity, -- ‘nomos’ the supreme law, to which all human laws owe their origin (*see supra p. 43*),-- ‘dike’ (*see supra p. 3 (penance)*; (*132fine*) (*134just punishment*, etc.)) - - ‘Nemesis’, the order-restoring necessity, -- etc.)-- That fate, therefore, ‘wills’ it so -- Admètos, Artemis, who, when he enters his bridal chamber, delivers to him a room full of serpents -- the omen of death that cannot be avoided.

But Apolon, who was a great friend of the family (he had served as a slave there), obtains from the goddesses of fate that Amètos, who was dying, will escape from fate if someone from his environment, his family, thus, in the first place, sacrifices himself to death (descent into Hades), in his place (substitute ‘sacrifice of life’).

We dwell on this mythical theme so extensively because it is a very frequent theme in the myths of fate and also in the real ballads (see above p. 137vv.).

It proves that the typically inescapable in the so-called religion of fate, actually, in principle, does not exist. If only someone can be found willing to, by the sacrifice of his merely earthly, incidentally, - the ‘hylic-aitheric’ life, it is true, one cannot simply ‘sacrifice’, if one is not of a supreme level of hylic-aitheric life-force - by the sacrifice of the merely earthly ‘life’, break the ‘kuklos’ (cycle) of life and death, as the demonist-egoist man has once introduced it into thought, here, on earth.

## MHD 154

In other words, the religion of fate, as it is usually understood, is a misrepresentation of archaic-hylic religion and 'philosophy', -- misrepresentation which, solely and exclusively, is on account of 'selfish' beings, both among humans and among 'daimonic' and/or 'divine' beings.

Precisely because of this, "daimon" as a term, has come to coincide with "devil" or "demon" in the Biblical-Christian sense.

Ferès, Admètos's father, and his wife, Admètos's mother, refuse, though already old and without yet being able to expect childbearing; -- children are, in archaic-hylic cultures, really "wealth," i.e. life(s) owed to underworld benevolence. Only Alkestis is found willing.

Listening to her prayer, "When she heard that the 'hèmeran tèn kurion', the royal day', was there, she took a bath, in running water, with her beautiful body. She took, immediately, from a cedar room, clothes and jewels and adorned herself with them honorably. Then, standing before the hearth, she prayed "Despoina, ruler (noted that, probably, Persefonè, the underworld goddess, is meant), since I am going 'kata chthonos' (under the earth), I will ask you, for the last time, kneeling (before your image), to take care of my orphans. Bring one child, in time, to a beloved bride and the other to a noble groom. See to it that not - as the one who bore them dies, - my children die before their time, but, on the contrary, that they, as happy people ('au.daimonas', literally: gifted with a good daimon), on patriotic soil, live a pleasant life to the end. (...)". Then she went into the bridal chamber and threw herself on the bridal bed. There she wept and said what follows: "O army station, where I loosened my virgin girdle for the sake of that man for whom I am dying, farewell.

MHD 155.

For I do not hate thee. Thou hast only lost me. I die like one who shrinks from betraying thee and her husband. Thou shalt possess another wife, who will not be more sensible, but may be a good destiny. Falling to her knees she reverently kisses her bridal bed.”

To be honest: this ‘pagan’ - for it ‘worships’ e.g. household deities, which our Catholic missionaries, just about everywhere, vehemently fought against, as ‘demonistic’ - seems to have marital morals after all! We make this oblique remark to point out that one need not ‘look down’ on ‘those pagan religions’ too easily. There will be Christian women who will ‘hesitate’ in accepting Alkestis sacrifice. Or will there not? (cfr. Alk.,158/183).

#### **4.2. Poluxene.**

This daughter of Priamos, Troy’s prince, and Hekabe learns that she will have to fall as a victim on Achilles’ grave. When she hears this, ”she does mourn her mother, but her own fate she does not lament.” (Cooper, o.c., 406).

She herself declares ”Dying has come to me as a better fate” (Hek., 213). Reason: her life had turned out to be so hard that she was allowed to speak this way.

She says - Hek., 547vv. - that she dies ‘voluntarily’ and offers her neck for victimization without trembling and, in doing so, makes only one condition, namely, ‘to be killed in the name of the deities, but free and unbound: ”As a free woman I want to die. Behold: a king’s child is ashamed to be called ‘slave woman’ in the realm of the dead”.

#### **4.3. Makaria.**

This daughter of the sun-god Hèrakles is presented, in Euripides’ Hèrakteidai (Heraclidae), as philosophical and progressive. However, her youth, ”full of the dangers of exile” (Kuiper, o.c., 408) had made her” bitter against life” (ibid. When she learns that the generation of the Heraklians (descendants of Herakles) will only be saved if at least one of them enters the underworld (i.e. dies) she is ”immediately prepared to sacrifice her life”. (Kuiper, o.c. 407).

MHD 156

**4.3. a.** The background of Hèrakteidai can be considered model-identical with *Mario Puzo, The godfather* (1969: on A2 (29.03.1984) started *La saga du parrein*, a nine-part serial based on the mentioned novel). *Cfr. also M.Puzo, godfathered documents* (M. Puzo on himself and his mafia denials), The Hague, s.d.

That *The Godfather* has ‘something’ -- a truly balladic structure -- in it,-- everyone ‘feels’ that. But the ‘naming’!!! -

That *The godfather* has struck as a behavioral model; in the pedagogical field, proves what *M. Puzo, The godfather Documents*, 269v., writes: ”There is now a game for children on the ‘market’ And what they have called ‘the godfather game’ and which is supposed to ‘teach’ the children how to steal and how to rob and get rid of the ‘people’.”

Well, if Hèrakteidai can become topical, among other things, because of this, then an ultra-small word about Makaria ‘s place in the”mafia” of her days.

Argos is the capital of Argolis (Peloponnèsos). Eurustheus (in Hom., II., 19: 123, among others, king of Mukènè) is ‘turannos’, the non-democratic type of local ruler in ancient Hellas.

Iolaos, the son of Ifikleès, is the nephew of Hèrakteidai, with whom he, in his youth, fought together. The Hèrakteidai (descendants of Heracles) are hated by Eurustheus and, by this tyrant - for this is how Euripides portrays him - sent into exile. (Herakl., 164vv. - Athens is the free, i.e. democratically governed, polis (o.c., 198vv.).

There the Heraklings found refuge, having fled from one polis to another. ”Wherever Eurustheus learns that we have found refuge, he sends his ‘heralds’ and causes us to be driven out of that polis.” (o.c., 16vv.).

Thus they arrived at Marathon, a district in Attica (near Athens the free). There as ‘hiketai ‘supplicants), i.e. as hopeless, appealing to the deities and the sacred hospitality of the shrines of these deities, they ‘sit’ at the altar of the deities, protected by ‘themis’, the oldest sacred right.

MHD 157.

W. Schilling, *Religion und Recht*, Urban Bücher, 1957, 139/144 (*‘Menschenrechte im lichte der religionsgeschichte’*), (human rights in the light of the history of religion), says that ”in the light of the history of religion, the rights of man (i.e. of the individual as his own way of being (as voluble only with himself; *cf. supra p. 5*)) are not first and foremost the result of the doctrine of natural law of the French Revolution (1789/1799), which dethroned the deities and put ‘reason’ in their place”. In other words, the secularization of society continued.

“With the consequence - says W. Schilling, o.c., 187, - that, precisely as a result of this dethroning, the ‘rights’ praised as ‘inalienable’ and ‘inescapable’ became, in the course of further development, highly alienable and evitable.” Cf. *supra p. 145* (bottom).

The author points to an inner contradiction within the system of archaic religion, which he, one-sidedly, incidentally, but in a limited way very correctly, brands as ”folk religion.

1. On the one hand, because blood and kinship is the basis of ”people” as a people, the one, who is precisely not blood and kinship, is ”stranger(s),” indeed, ”enemy” and/or ”enemys. The people’s law is limited to the people’s associates. ‘To a greater or lesser extent, this type of law corresponds everywhere to the basic attitude peculiar to the primitive mentality.’

Add to that, among other things, the fact that, within that archaic legal framework, there were very often preparatory rights, peculiar to individuals or groups.

Result: ”human rights” in the modern-current sense of” absolute legal equality of every individual as an individual” did not, apparently, exist.

2. On the other hand, there are, equally clearly, preforms of real ”human rights”- and, thus, valid also beyond the narrow framework of popular law.

a/ Where, in the ‘modern’, i.e. ‘progressive’ and ‘enlightened’ total state, a persecuted person can find absolutely no ‘place of refuge’ within the boundaries of precisely that type of community, there does exist, in archaic-religious society, a refuge that is still institutional. The Greeks called this ‘hieron a.sulon’, inviolable sanctuary (asylum).

MHD 158.

Every persecuted person had the opportunity to go there and was untouchable there, precisely because he - and also because he - had put himself under the protection of a deity. (o.c., 142).

‘Sitting at the altar’ was the aphoristic expression of that profession. Slaves, respectively slaves and strangers also had that right.-- With the fact that the Heraklians ”sit at the altar” – as ”supplicants” - Euripides’ tragedy begins. Iolaos, who, with Herakles, had performed, among other things, one of the twelve ‘works’, at Eurustheus, -- the old Alkmènè, her granddaughter Makaria and her sisters and brothers,-- these are the ‘supplicants’.

**b/** still other forms anticipate human rights. - For example, the Greeks believe in the intervention of the deities if the policy does not provide legal assistance. Reason: either as thematic law or dikè law or the two together (i.e. the law, specific to either the chthonic or the primordial deities), the deities provided legal aid.

As an appl. model: thus Athens had a sanctuary, dedicated to Thèseus, an Attic ”hero,” the Thèseion or asylum of slaves: through it the slave lifted the property right of the owner (*see above p. 42*), in that he could desire to be sold to another.

*F. Flückiger, gesch. d. N., I, 14*, gives a splendid example: in the ‘agora’ (army and/or people’s assembly), under Zeus’ protection, there was freedom of speech, even if one rose against the army chief, for example. For example, Diomèdès, holding the sceptre, turns to Agamemnon and says:”Son of Atreus, you first, I must speak against, as if without understanding, as this is themis (i.e. archaic or primal law)!

It should be noted that Euripides was a convinced democrat.

Dèmofon, Athens’ leader, who, notwithstanding the practically certain declaration of war on the part of Argos’ tyrant, wants to protect the supplicants, even with armed force, if need be, says (vv. 468vv.):”Fearful (...) are, to their enemies, growing up noble youths, who are mindful of the Harsh treatments inflicted on their father. These are the things, which (Eurustheus) must prevent”.

## MHD 159

If we now return for a moment to 'la saga du parrain' (the godfather), we find that it is with precisely the same 'care' that the mafioso (mafia member and/or leader) 'begins': in other words, the 'plot' or 'knot' (that which sets off the tension and the drama) is identical. With this of Euripides' drama 'The Heraklians', -- of course, except for the saving sanctuary, since the godfather situates himself in a secularized society, immediately, with no transcendent, i.e. extra-secular, way out, as in a frame of mind and life, which is utterly 'tragic' (i.e. hopeless). With Euripides there is one tragic side. The 'negation' or way out of it, apart from 'asylum', is female self-sacrifice.

### 4.3.b.

Like a thunderclap, the two-fold message arrives.

**a.** Dèmofon reports that Eurustheus, with the Argean army, is approaching, yet also that Athens is under arms.

**b.** He also reports, however, that he has brought together all the seers - typical of the archaic stratum of the society of the time - and that, on the one hand, there are many differences, among themselves, among the declarations of God, but that, on the other hand, on one point they are all unanimous viz. to Kore, the daughter of Demèter, a 'virgin girl, born of a noble father', should be sacrificed. (vv. 389/409).

Now Dèmofon is not a monarch "in possession of a tyranny, such as is exercised over barbarians" (vv. 423v.)! Consequence: the victim cannot come from the Athenian side. At that dramatic climax, Makaria steps out of the asylum temple and learns the exact facts: "In the execution of that (oracle's) word shall we obtain salvation?" Iolaos replies, "In that, indeed! The rest: that we have solved with luck". - Makaria: "Now fear no more the hostile lance of the Argeians; for, I, before it is imposed upon me by command, gray man, am ready to die and to be slaughtered.

## MHD 160

After all, what shall we say, when, if this city (Athens) deems it worthwhile to run a great danger, for our sake, tipping the burden on others ourselves, faced with the choice of saving ourselves, we dare not die? No! All the more so since it would rightly provoke a mockery, on the one hand, to complain while we, as supplicants of the daimons, sit at their altar, and, on the other hand, as descendants of the one who is our father, do not seem naturally able to face the disappointing things. In what situation does such a thing go together with people, who are in their place?" (vv. 498/510).

A little further, Makaria says, "Lead me but where my body ought to die. (...). The most beautiful and best find ('heurèma kalliston') I have found who yet no longer cling to life: 'eukleos lipein bion', gloriously leaving life." (vv. 533.)

Eukleia" - being gifted with a good reputation, image, impression, is often looked upon with contempt by us moderns and Christians. However, if one wants to analyze the matter in depth, one does discover, on the one hand, a kind of honor (too easily identified with Freudian narcissism), which combines both self-esteem and moral-social sense, but, on the other hand the weighing through of an objective order, for whose high sanctity and 'value' (not in the sense of Nietzsche, again, of 'Werteschaetzung', (Valuation), but of reverence for value) one effectively commits oneself (all 'Iustprinzip' notwithstanding) and sacrifices.

We remain convinced that our 'critical' ('psychoanalytic', - 'nihilistic' and/or 'socially critical') contemporaries can learn something from that ideal, that abduction, of 'eukleia'. They will then perhaps leave this life with more 'glory'! Self-sacrifice for the others is certainly not the strongest side of today's man, made 'critical-unmasked' by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. (*cfr. supra pp. 142; 145*). For that he believes too little in a value beyond himself".

**Note.--** It is nevertheless clear that Makaria, after that sacrifice, for himself, does not expect much more.

MHD 161.

(i) she does ask, "If ever deliverance from your calamities and return (to your homeland) befall you as a favor of the deities, think of your 'soteira' (rescuer) as in need of a funeral ceremony." (vv. 586v.)

(i)a. With this word, which Euripides - probably deliberately - puts in Makaria's mouth, she expresses a very high value. *WB. Kristensen, Cool. Contr. to the Knowledge of Ant. Gods.*, A'm, 1947, 201/229 (*the antique conception of servitude*), explains, brilliantly, i.e., with understanding of the archaic-sacred substructure, just what a 'soter', a 'soteira' is; esp. o.c., 223vv. is revelatory: Herakles - Makaria's ancestor, by coincidence - is the typical heros - according to Kristensen - i.e. "the divine man or human god, who, in death, is honored as benefactor and savior of men." (o.c., 223)

That - with this - the step to Biblical religion is taken, Kristensen, apparently, also sensed: he refers to Isaiah's immortal chapter on "the servant of the Lord" and, immediately to Daniel's page on "the son of man. See also, o.c., 283vv. (the Savior is the 'third'), dealing with the Balladesque structure of the savior(s).

We emphasize Euripides' "soteirai", rescuers, because, in our opinion, we have nowadays more than enough "critical" people, but far too few "rescuers" (rescuers) based on service. This abduction (that ideal) can be learned in the pagan works of the 'demonist' Euripides.

(i)b. But the whole of Makaria's willingness to sacrifice comes into its full balladic sphere, when one reads on: "That I receive the most beautiful and best (funeral), is 'righteous' ('dikaion'; cfr. dikè), for I was near you, not as below my level ('andeès'), but I died for my 'genos', (sex). Those treasures are (henceforth) my possession instead of filial wealth and young girlhood, if, at least, there is something to possess, 'kata chthonos', under the earth. Should, however, there be nothing available there! For, if the departed, even on that other side, shall have cares, I know not whither any shall turn. After all, the defunct continue as the most powerful panacea against mischief". (vv. 589/596).

MHD 162.

Indeed, both for the majority of archaic Greeks and, in particular, for Euripides himself, *nada* existence is a shadowy wandering existence, if not, by a religious intervention (including an appropriate funeral liturgy, as *Makaria* demands), this state of affairs is changed.

**(ii)** The question - posed today all over the globe by the so-called Revitalization religions - arises: from where do women, who sacrifice themselves with such a ballad-like perspective, get the necessary energy or life force to cope?

**(ii)a.** We refer to *pp.* 124 (the other, a nameless thing, which gives 'light'); 124/126 (the Cretan-Zeusreligio); 148/150 (Dionysian rel.); 126v. (hylic-aitheric interpretation of the two aforementioned religions); (145the legal order inherent in that hylic-aitheric rel.; see also 148). In other words, although protosophistically, yes, Socratically driven towards pure conceptual thinking; with the exhaustion of vital energy inherent in such intellectual rationalism, Euripides overcomes this devitalization by a reinterpretation (hermeneutics) of the archaic-mythical basis; in this reinterpretation the hylic abstraction (in his case aitheric) plays a major role.

**(ii)b.** Contemporary, S. Kierkegaard (and typical Kierkegaardian existentialism) (1813/1855) can count as that "thinker" who posed the problem of "Malakia" (Thoukudides, 1:122; 2:40; etc.), energylessness, in the context of modern "rationalism" (in its intellectualist-speculative and its empiricist-skeptical forms).

**a.** Indeed, Thukudides (-465/-401 (-395)), in his eulogy of Periklees (40), says: "We philosophize without energy" ("philosophoumen aneu malakias"). The reason for this phrase lies in the fact that 'thinking' easily disempowers and eats away or corrodes the vital-archaic breeding ground in the subconscious.

**b.** Kierkegaard identified an analogous (*see above p. 101vv.*) phenomenon.

MHD 163.

Do we listen to his texts.

(1) "Ah, what a difference.

a. The holy three kings went only on a rumor. But that moved them to travel that long way.

b. The scribes knew a lot better. They sat and studied in scripture - like professors. But it did not set them in motion.

a/b. Now, was there more 'truth' a. in those three kings, who ran after a rumor or b. in the scribes, who remained seated in spite of their knowledge?" (A. Van Munster, *Kierkegaard (a choice from his diaries)*, Utr./Antw., 1957,

(2) "Everywhere 'mind'!

Instead of 'unconditional infatuation': marriage of convenience. Instead of 'unconditional obedience': obedience based on reasoning. Instead of 'faith': knowing reasons. Instead of 'trust': guarantees. Instead of 'venture' and 'probability': sober calculation. Instead of 'actions': events. Instead of 'individual' (here in the existential sense of 'vitaly committed person'): some specimens. Instead of 'personality': impersonal objectivity. And so on, and so forth". (o.c., 143v.)

(3) "As it went with Socrates, so it goes, proportionately, with Christ: admirers they have had many (and, among these admirers, also a few, who knew what admiring is). But "followers"! They had only very few. The difference between a follower and an admirer is

(i) that the imitator is "ethical" in terms of what

(ii) the admirer is 'aesthetic'.

An admirer 'is' himself a 'different being' from the admired one. -- An imitator 'is' the admired. And that is the only true 'admirer!'" (o.c., 78).

By "ethical" Kierkegaard means someone who, with conviction, possesses actual implementation; by "aesthetic" he means someone who is absorbed in something with feeling and imagination, but never comes to praxis, to action.

(4) "One must, in fact, have suffered very much in the world (39 *understand* (Dilthey), 235 *idea* (Scheler)) - become very unhappy -, before there can be talk of loving one's neighbor.

MHD 164.

Only at the self-denying cessation of earthly happiness, joy and prosperity, -- only then,-- does the "neighbor" arise. -- Therefore, the 'living in the immediate' man, in fact, cannot be blamed for not loving the neighbor. For this "living in the immediate" man is too happy than there can be a neighbor "for him. Anyone, who is 'attached to earthly life', cannot love the neighbor. That is, 'for him' the neighbor does not 'exist'". (o.c., 61 ).

Kierkegaard means by "the immediate" to mean "the world and life, as they appear to unthinking people, who are still absorbed in life and the world unripe, non-immediate (i.e. for a consciousness): he who lives in the "immediate" (unthinking) is still like a sleeper. Unawakened.

(5)"All that 'world-history', those 'grounds' and 'proofs' for the truth of Christianity must be jettisoned! There is only one 'proof': that of faith. If I really have a belief, then my belief is always 'deeper' than the grounds.

It is, in fact, the conviction which begets the evidence. It is not the evidence that begets the conviction". (o.c., 89)

In other words, Kierkegaard here comes to understand that reason (the mind) represents a surface level. But that, beneath it, lies a depth level of life. That is the necessity and/or volition of 'conviction', 'discovery of the neighbor' 'following', 'movement', -- in a word of 'existing', at least 'existing' in the 'authentic' (= ethical) sense.

In doing so, Kierkegaard overcomes the impasse of rationalism as a devitalization phenomenon.

In the language of our Euripidean self-sacrificing women: 'Eukleia' instead of 'Malakia' or, in the modern language game: 'generosity' instead of 'criticism'. -- That we are correctly interpreting *Kierkegaard* may be seen in his *Kritik Der Gegenwart* (1846):

"(a)1. 'Morality' ('ethical' life) is 'character', the 'ingrained' ('charasso'). But the sea, e.g., has no 'character', nor does the sand.

MHD 165.

But abstract rationality ('rationality') has none either. Reason: the character is precisely 'the inwardness' -

Kierkegaard means by "inwardness" the mean character of one's ideas or contents of consciousness -.

(a)2. Immorality - Kierkegaard means evil acted out - is, as energy, also character.

(b) 'ambiguity' ('ambiguity', non-committal), on the other hand, is there when one possesses neither one (i.e. morality) nor the other (i.e. immorality). And existential ambiguity it is, when the qualitative disjunction (i.e. distinction) of qualities (Kierkegaard means (the distinction between 'good' (morality) and 'evil' (immorality)) is weakened by a gnawing 'reflection' (Kierkegaard means a 'critical reflection').

(i) The uproar of drives is "elemental" (Kierkegaard means "rising from the prerationalist depths")

(ii) the volatilization by 'ambiguity' is a gentle, but day and night gnawing 'sorites' (summarized reasoning): the distinction between 'good' and 'evil' is negated by a light-hearted, distinguished, theoretical knowledge of evil, by a haughty cunning, which knows that good is not valued and achieves no result in this world, -- so that that 'good' is 'stupidity' to begin with. No one, through good, is carried away to a great deed; no one, through evil, is overwhelmed in a heaven-sent sin. To that extent, no one can blame the other. And yet: for this very reason there is all the more substance to 'talk', for the 'ambiguity' is an incessant stimulus and eloquent in an entirely different way than the joy for good and the abhorrence of evil." (*Th. Haecker, Uebers., S. Kierkegaard, kritik der Gegenwart*, Basel, 1946, 20f.).

One sees that Kierkegaard saw and denounced the Malakia, the devitalization. But his solution ignores the hyllic-final, as well as the depth psychological (Freud, Jung, Adler), to a great extent. It is a third way. But concerning the same problem.

MHD 166.

**Note .-- Romanticism as positive thinking.**

Joseph Schelling (1775/1854), who, in 1798, at the instigation of JG. Fichte (1762/1814), the philosopher of the creative "I," and of JW. Goethe (1749/1832), the great poet-thinker, became professor at Jena, where, in the circle of the romantics both the romantic and, concretely-individual, his later wife K. Schlegel, met, is the founder of what is called - with a very unpleasant - 'German irrationalism'.

(i) It is true that Schelling provided Romantic thought with the clearest philosophical articulation.

(ii) However, it is equally true that Schelling, through a long search, became a follower (and founder) of positive philosophy (which one should distinguish completely from A. Comte's (1798/1857) 'positivism' - also called by himself 'philosophie positive'). Briefly formulated, 'positive thinking' - understood in Schellingian terms - boils down to this.

Schelling, in his last period, called 'negative' philosophy, that type of thinking which assumes only the concept (see further Socrates),--at least the merely abstract, life-foreign concept). He labels this mentality as "philosophy of the 'what'" (where "what" stands for "the essence of something, abstractly-foreignly signified).

Schelling, in this same last phase of thinking, calls it 'positive' philosophy, that type of thinking - 'thinking' is always 'rational' (one never forgets this, certainly, here, in this 'irrational' context) -, which proceeds from actual life, think of Marx's expression (*see above p. 145*) 'life process'. He labels this way of thinking, his own, founded by him, as 'philosophy of the "that"' (where "that" stands for the fact or, in mid-century-scholastic language (*see above p. 33v.*) -"existence" by mid-century thinkers contrasted with "essence" i.e. the "what" (abstract-foreign "being") of something, where "existence" means the fact that something exists).

This "philosophy of existence" Schelling found best expressed in the fact that "God" (a reality, which Schelling, throughout his life, was not able to formulate so clearly, by the way) reveals itself in (a) myth and (b) revelation (in the very Biblical sense).

## MHD 167

It should be noted here that, in 1841 Schelling becomes a professor at Berlin University "to fight against the system of GWF, denoted as 'atheistic'. Hegel (1770/1831)". (H.Arvon, *La philosophie allemande*. Paris. 1970. 22). With 'passion' - Thus H. Arvon. o.c ., *ibid.*, his courses are followed by

1. The future anarchist leader M. Bakunin (1814/1876) whose rebellious ideas, anarchist as they were, were radically opposed to those of K. Marx. But were adopted and applied by the Russian nihilists, who, being anti-authoritarian as they were, wanted to raze the absolute authority of the tsar to the ground;

2. Jakob Burkhardt (1818/1879), the art historian who, in Basel, became the colleague of Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900) and who acquired world fame with his *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (1860), a work that is constantly being republished and, for the beginning of the modern period, remains a fundamental work. Even if one should adjust it on some points; as e.g. by E.Cassirer (1874/1954), *The individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance philosophy* (Dt. text in 1927) ;

3. Soeren Kierkegaard (1813/1855). The "father" of contemporary existentialism, which, starting from lived situations, reconnects abstract thought in itself with "life" (but, now, not culminating in romantic-estheticizing world flight), which Kierkegaard, unlike the Hegelians of the left, interprets religiously Christian;

4. Friedrich Engels (1820/1895), the friend and fellow-warrior of K. Marx.-- It is he who, in a newspaper article, in 1841, December viz, He writes: "If you, now in Berlin, ask someone who has some idea of the power of the 'spirit' over the world, about the battlefield where they are fighting for the supremacy of German public opinion in politics and religion, i.e. over Germany itself, you will be told that that battlefield is at the university, precisely in room no. 6 where Schelling gives his courses on the philosophy of revelation.

MHD 168

#### 4.4. *Ifigeneia*.

The drama *Ifigeneia in Aulis* has not come to us entirely preserved. It bears the marks of Euripides' evolution. The plot is the following: Agamemnon, who wishes to march against Troy, learns that his enterprise - a panhellenic enterprise, incidentally - will succeed only if he sacrifices his daughter *Ifigeneia*. This is how the oracle demands it. - See above page 159.

The harmony of opposites (*see above p. 151*) at work in the soul of the woman, is clearly evident in *Ifigeneia*.

(i) on the one hand, the future smiled at her, - her, who retains a happy memory of childhood in her father's palace. No wonder that the demand of the divine speech evoked her abhorrence of death and "nothingness" after death (*see above pp. 161/162*): "Ah! Do not force me to contemplate what Hades holds." Or: "Nothing awaits us under the earth. Meaningless the man who wishes to die. Yea, a life of misery I deem still infinitely better than the cleanest death!" *If. I. Aul., 1211/1253*).

(ii) On the other hand, there is, - instead of the darkness of the underworld - in her ideas; - which seem very protosophistic (cf. her mockery of the 'naive' faith of King Thoas, vv. 1176vv.), at least under one point of view, "the noblest of her minds" (Kuiper, o.c.408).

In a lament she expresses her frustrations, but she comes, at the same time, to the full consciousness of her vocation (Kuiper, o.c. *ibid.*). In that new, sacrificial self-awareness, "death too takes on another form for her" (*ibid.*). "Forgetting her own desires, she utters the words that elevate her to an ideal of Attic patriotism.

"Not for thee, only, -- for all Hellas thou, O mother, hast given me birth. Her death shall discipline Ilios (the archaic name for Troy), avenge Hellas, restore peace. Eternal gratitude will be the reward for her untimely death". -- Thus, always, Kuiper, o.c., 408v..

One sees it: again the *eukleia* (*cf. supra b1z.160*).

MHD 169

**B.4. Demiokriteic atomistics.** (169/180)

1. As for Empedokles (cfr: *supra pp.* 67/70), Anaxagoras (cfr. *supra pp.* 70/123), one should start from the problem state, as expressed in the mechanistic-atomistic abstraction (cfr. *supra p.* 66).

**2.1. Leukippos of Miletos** (-500/-400),

Ionian, moves to Elea, where he becomes a pupil of Zenon (see *above pp.* 15/20). Around -450 he founds, in Abdera (Thrace) his own philosophical school. He becomes, however, in time, completely absorbed in his pupil.

**2.2.a. Demokritos of Abdera** (-460/-370).

This versatile thinker, of whom we, unfortunately, do not have much more to read (too much was lost), occupied himself with cosmology and general physics (atomism), where he abducted last, really indivisible particles (which, therefore, were not infinitesimally divisible), 'a.toma', 'atoms' (in the then, antique sense, of course), in and behind the empirically observable phenomena of creation and decay, of equilibrium and constancy, etc., abducted (hypothetical status of Demokriteic atomism), which were only, mutually, distinguishable under point of view of:

(i)a geometric shape (such as the letters n and for instance),

(i)b size (magnitude) (as e.g. the letters z and Z),

(ii)a rotational movement (as, e.g., the letter n appears to be a rotated z),

(ii)b arrangement (stoicheiosis; cfr. *supra p.* 2; so az and za); to which belongs the fact that in itself, in its smallness, an atomon possesses neither quality nor self-movement (it is thus purely quantitative and 'inert' or 'slow' (i.e. it is moved only from the outside)); -- Which implies pure mechanism,-- the first pure mechanism on the microscopic plane, at least, in Greek thought.

**2.2.b.** Since man - and, immediately, all that lives - is merely physical (see above p. 77v. (*secularization*); 80v. (*unity theory*)), - in contrast to e.g. Empedokles' theosophy, which elevates all that lives (and especially then man) above inorganic-sexual matter.

MHD 170.

As a result, Demokritos is obliged to interpret life and, above all, man physically. - We do say "interpret," for, as by W. Röd, *Gesch. d. Phil.*, I, 188, says, "In the proper sense of 'scientific' neither Leukippos nor Demokritos have thought." In this, then, they differ thoroughly from Anaxagoras.

### **2.2.b1. The Mechani(cicisti)sche psychology.**

(i) Beyond the atoma, which either emphasizes again, are not those of our present experimental physics, - 'composing' ('making up') the visible things - ,

(ii) there are 'smooth' and 'slightly mobile' atoma, primal particles, which compose the soul. The soul substance consists of round - and, precisely because of this, very mobile - primordial particles. Because they move steadily, they generate heat.

(ii)1. Those soul-oil particles are identical with all that is 'fire' (cf. *above p. 27vv. (Herakl. model); 57vv. (arch.-rel. model); 126vv. (Eurip. model).*-- One can see how strongly the archaic-religious mentality, - here too, at the foundation of Western materialism, - continues to reverberate.

(ii)2. The soul substance is the abduction (necessity and/or volition) for

a. the body movement,

b. life,

c. thinking.

It is nourished by breathing: the breath air contains, after all, the smooth and mobile 'atoma', which make up the 'fire'. As a result, the loss of fire atoma is constantly replenished.

When, however, at the cessation of the breath of life, the supply of fire atoma ceases, man dies. Forever. For he is only atoma and its incorporation. Nothing more.

(iii) Perception as a process.

Demokritos' philosophy of perception is a pure appl. mod. of mediatism. This means that, at least as far as things surrounding us are concerned, we do not perceive things directly (that would be immediatism or intuitionism). See here how Demokritos conceives of this.

(a) From things emanate 'aporrdai' (emanations). These are images, 'eidola', of those things.

MHD 171

(b) These "images," which, incessantly and in all directions, move about, penetrate, among other things, into the "pores" of our sensory organs (they are, after all, particulate or subtle): there they produce an image of perception, which reaches into our brains.

(b).1. Demokritos answered a raise, "How can very large things -- e.g., a mountain -- penetrate our senses?" -- Demokritos answers, "There emanate from our sensory organs *aporrdai*, effusions (this is then a subjective input); only the contraction of external and internal effusions 'constitutes' perception - and its 'image'.

**Excerpt.** -- This mediatic theory of perception was adopted by Epikouros of Samos (-341/-271), the founder of Epicureanism (-400/+400), an eight-hundred-year philosophy. Through Lucretius Carus of Rome (-99/ -55), in his *De rerum natura* (on the 'nature' of things), this atomistic materialism became known throughout the Latin world.

**Note.--** JJ Poortman, *Vehicles of Consciousness*, Utrecht, 1978, II, 31, says, in reference to the soul-matter conception of Demokritos, that this is, undoubtedly, materialism, but, to say the least, the prototype of dualistic materialism. There are, after all, indeed nothing but material things - the human soul, included - but there are different types of matter. Which, of all things, our current coarse materialists, mostly, do not assume.

**Note.--** That poortman is right, appears from what follows.-- Not only from coarse material, but also from fine material beings continually emanate *eidola*, 'images': so e.g. from *daimones*.

*Sextos Empeirikes of Mutilènè* (+/- +150), the great skeptic, *Adv. Math.*, 9:19, says:"D. Claims that certain 'images' (approach) people, partly beneficent, partly evil. Therefore he also wished to meet auspicious 'images'".

In this way Demokritos abducts telepathic perception (in dreams and 'faces' (visions)).-- Also the evil eye ('*baskania*', through envy especially, directed at someone evil 'aura' or *aporroia*).

**Note.--** He also abducted poetic "genius" (giftedness) analogously.

MHD 172.

Röd, o.c., 194, says: "It cannot be excluded that Demokritos attributed the aidola to real, i.e., beings consisting of atoma (in this case, well, of the finest kind) and, at once, assumed something divine."

One can, assuredly, compare this "divine something" with e.g. Euripides' "nameless something" (see *above p. 124*).

In other words, the intellectuals of those days -- even an Anaxagoras (*see above p. 119vv, universe understanding*) -- no longer believed as the people, but still assumed "something" that was more than this earth and its secular reality.

JJ. Poortman, o.c., 31, says: "It is evident that Demokritos clearly had an eye for what, later, would become known as occult or parapsychological phenomena".-- In any case: 'seers' - also today - feel the (second) seeing as 'images', which, if necessary, reduced or increased to the scale (subjective input), penetrate them (her) and which, as Sextos remarks, can have a good or evil effect. This testimony of a contemporary nature 'verifies' to some extent the abduction of the 'eidola' (see *above p. 13: primal testing*).

**(b)2.** Demokritos has clearly - and in a dualistic way (cfr. *Cl. Ramnoux, Héraclite, 341/ 385 (Naissance de l' âme)*, where it points to psychosomatic dualism, a.o. and esp. with Demokritos) - to the distinction between 'aisthesis' (perception) and 'noësis' (reason, understanding). Yet how precisely Demokritos delineates rational-intellectual 'realities' is, in his materialist system, difficult: the 'finer' conceptions seem the only way out. He works e.g. with the notion of 'atomon', 'kenon' (vacuum, the empty), etc., which are unobserved and, thus, intellectually constructed, abducted 'realities'.

Here, if he is consistent, Demokritos should, in addition to objective mediatism (the aidola are something that is neither subject nor object, more something "in between"), also uphold subjective mediatism: the concepts of reason, after all, are something in the subject itself without an eidolon; so that the subject here is locked into itself.

MHD 173.

This mediatic bottleneck question is all the more pressing as Demokritos himself says (Fr. 119), "Men have formed ('eplasanto') a 'tuches eidolon' (an image of chance) as a pretext behind which they hide their own desperation ('idiès abouliès')."

In other words, man can also create an 'image' himself! -- It is the word "eidolon" in this fictive sense that made Bacon, among others, speak of "idols" (merely "imaginary" ideas): The beginning of a critique of ideology was immediately in sight.

Demokritos formulates the doctrine concerning the 'secondary' qualities of perception as follows: "By virtue of agreement ('nomoi') there is color; by virtue of agreement there is sweetness; by virtue of agreement there is bitterness.-- But by virtue of reality ('eteèi') there are atoma and emptiness."

Galenos of Pergamon - (+131/+200), the great physician, quotes this text and adds, "Demokritos made the senses say to the understanding, 'Pitiful mind ('dianoia'), from us (sensory perceptions) thou takest the proofs ('pisteis') - credentials - to surpass us with it?-- Thy ruin becomes thee this surpassing!"

This seems to imply a skeptical statement both towards the senses (only the quantitative data of the atoma and the empty space in which they are moved are real) and towards the mind. -- And yet, however seemingly incoherent, Demokritos values intellectual-rational knowledge. He does not fall into the individualism of Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410), his contemporary, the great philosopher: according to Demokritos, the true -- and also the good -- is somewhere identical for all but individual moments.

### **2.2.b2. *The mechani(cist)ical ethics and politics.***

Since humans are only a part of the physical whole, Demokritos is a supporter of a naturalistic ethic/politics.

(1) The norm is the soul such that the constellation (*stoicheiosis*; cf. *supra* p. 2) of its soul substance remains or becomes undisturbed. Being well ('auesta'), the 'euthumia', the wellbeing of 'all in balance' is 'telos'.

MHD 174.

That 'purpose' is central.-- Thereby, like the puthgoreans, philosophy has an agogic sense: "Medicine ('iatrikè') heals the disease chain of the body. Philosophy ('sophia') takes away from the soul its urges ('pathon')". The soul remains, thus, central in this materialism, viz. as an aggregate of atoma in equilibrium.

(2) The means (infrastructure) of ethics/politics are, at a minimum, twofold.

a. There is the immediately pleasant (hedonism): people, thoughtlessly, name "good" which is "pleasant," "bad" which is unpleasant.

b. Yet, for Demokritos, who acts rationally-intellectually, those "value-experiences" are only or at most "symptoms" of true good or evil, i.e., contributing to the telos or goal or breaking it down. 'Hedonist' Demokritos is most certainly not without question. Rational-intellectual reasoning only uncovers the means to the end. Let us listen to this first materialist.

"For men it is more fitting ('harmodion') to form thoughts concerning the soul than concerning the body. For the perfection of the soul rectifies the weakness of the body. Body strength, however, without reasoning ('logismou'), does not make the soul any better". (*Fr. 187*).

"If ever thou openest thy inward parts ('sauton endothen'), thou shalt find a storehouse and treasury, varied and subject to evil things in many ways." (*Fr. 149*).

In other words, is - *Fr. 187* - the body not without more norm, also the inner or soul life is not, without more norm. One compares the unmasking of the soul with that of the Puthagoreans, when, at the bottom of the soul, they reveal the daimon (with its madness, mania).

**Conclusion:** Demokritos speaks, apparently, at least two language games (*see above p. 33vv.*):

(i) the traditional-Hellenic (balance, reasoning, emphasis on the soul, unmasking of the un(der)conscious soul life; also pleasant, unpleasant, etc.);

(ii) the physical-automatic language game, which, difficult, can represent the previous language elements.

MHD 175.

The peirastic reduction (review) of the ethico-political abductions above are situated in destiny.

(i) Negative.

“The unchurched (fools, ‘axunetoi’; see *above p. 32*) come to understand on the basis of unholy fate (‘dus.tuheontes’). (*Fr. 54*).

“Many, who do the most outrageous things, are continually engaged in the cleanest and best words.” (*Fr. 532*). --”It is necessary to devote oneself to works and deeds of ‘virtue,’ not to words.” (*Fr. 55*)

In other words, the failure of the telos is testable in virtue of

a. absence of works, deeds and

b. in virtue of failed lot.

These are falsifications of an apparently - in retrospect - false abductive premise.

(ii) positive.

“Many, who have not learned the intellectual, live, nevertheless, ‘intellectually’ (‘zosi kata logon’) (*Fr. 53*).

In other words, Demokritos has a certain skepticism about the reading process. The meaningful doing is, apparently, not in the learning process, but deeper.

He who wants to live with ‘euthumia’ (balance of mind), - should not perform many things - neither private nor public (political) -; he should not prefer things that exceed his ‘dunamis’ (strength) and ‘fusis’ (nature) - see *above p. 11* (*the ‘fusis’ of ‘molu’*) - two terms from the (‘archaic-religious language game, although already ‘physically’ adapted -.

Yet, on the contrary, be on guard so that, when the (good) ‘tuchè’ (fate) befalls him, and seems to lead him to ‘more yet’, he represses it and does not take on more than his possibilities. Limited abundance is, after all, better than excessive abundance”. (*Fr. 3*).

In other words, the measure - once the norm of deities, now norm, of a rational nature, of the euthumia - is, as traditional-Hellenic, contribution to the telos. (Again: more than one language game).

See also *Fr. 191* (“Humans acquire euthumia thanks to measure (‘metrioteti’) concerning lust and ‘symmetry’ (balance) concerning life.”).

**Conclusion:** here we sought verification, resp. falsification of normative (eth.-polit.) abductions (see *above p. 13* (bottom)).

MHD 176.

**Note --** We interrupt, somewhat, the account of Demokritos's morality and politics with a text by Fr. Engels, Marx's collaborator: "By 'materialism' the narrow-minded ('der Philister') understands eating, drinking, peeping, lust and pride, greed for money, avarice, greed, profiteering, swindling,-in short, all the filthy vices, to which he gives himself over, himself, in all silence. By 'idealism' the narrow-minded understands the belief in virtue, general human love, and, without question, a 'better world!'" (*Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, (Ludwig Feuerbach and the Exit of Classical German Philosophy, II, in fine).

Why do they cite this protest of the dialectical materialist Engels? Because idealist and Biblical thinkers, among others, systematically misrepresent Demokritos' ethics and politics in a hedonistic sense. Even if there are more or less 'hedonistic' (lust philosophical) moments in Demokritos' normative philosophy, it is simply unfair to 'dismiss' them as 'materialistic' in the pejorative sense above. Or even in an even less grossly materialistic-naturalistic sense. --

We now commit this so-called interruption from the other side.

"Demokritos's world view explained Platon of Athens (-427/-347) from an ethical-political flaw. He speaks of "those, who bring down everything, from the heavens and the invisible, to the earth. Such, bringing down everything in the body, one should (...) first make better, before trying to "teach" them anything" (*Plat., sof.* ).

Demokritos he nowhere mentions by name,-- something which, already in antiquity, was noticed. According to Aetion of Taranton (+/- -370/...), an Aristotelian, known as a musicologist, (...) Platon wanted to have all the texts of Demokritos accessible to him burned. But the Pthagoreans Amoklas and Kleinias dissuaded Platon from doing so: it would have been purposeless anyway, since these texts were already in too many hands (*Diogenes Laertios, ix, 40*).” (*O. Willmann, gesch. d. Id., I, 349f.*). --

This communication from an arch-idealist like D. Willmann speaks volumes.

MHD 177.

*H.J. Blackham, Humanism*, Harmondsworth/ Baltimore (USA), Ringwood, 1968, 10ff., says: "Platon and Aristotle are the greatest names in Greek philosophy. Their own excellence of merit is, perhaps, a sufficient reason. But time and 'chance' (being lucky) played their parts. The works of most other philosophers of a stature, which can revitalize with that of Platon and Aristotle, viz. Demokritos, survive only in fragments. In the case of Protagoras of Abdera (see *above p. 173*) something, narrowly, survives. The thinking of Platon and Aristotle proved to be congenial (i.e. gifted with the same genius or daimon) with Christianity, which may have triumphed, and its theologians, established by the Roman state. The lore, founded by Demokritos and Protagoras, was "anathema" (cursed) to the Christians.

Platon and Aristotle were - no doubt - shining lights in the firmament of culture. And yet: under most points of view from a humanistic standpoint, Platon is the 'enemy' (sic: the ennemy (cfr. *infra 199*) and Demokritos - of whom, as somewhat apparent, Platon was desperately envious - is the 'champion' (sic: 'the champion')."

To this religiously hostile humanist Blackham, whose ideas, also with us, in particular, by the humanist alliance, except for local-individual moments, are not only defended, but also and especially vehemently proclaimed.

One sees it: not the rational-intellectual, but the daimonic genius basis decides, rather, on 'preference', also in the spirit and soul of the 'liberals', i.e. those who

**a/** not be self-willed (see *above pp. 31/32*); who also do not

**b/** straightforward (see *above p. 33*), but, as *CSS. Peirce, The fixation of belief*, in: *Pop. Sc. Monthly*, xii, 1877, 1/15, says: "To consider the influence of 'natural' preferences permissible, -- so, however, that under the influence of those preferences, men

**1/** speaking to each other and

**2/** View things, under different illuminations, in order to develop, thus, gradually, opinions corresponding to natural causes.

MHD 178.

CSS. Peirce, a.c., continues, "This method resembles, somewhat, that which brought art performances to maturity.

The most perfect example of it, however, is found in the history of metaphysics (Peirce means the systems, usually of a heavy nature, which, from Aristotle on, especially, absorbed the thought energy of the "thinkers"). Systems of that type (see above p. 111vv.) proceed, usually, from:

-- not of observational facts (*see above p. 10vv.*), -- at least not to any great extent.

-- They became elected mainly because their axiomata (abductions) had the appearance of agreeing with reason.

This is a technical term: it means:

- (1) Not what corresponds to perception;
- (2) but that to which we are inclined to believe".

CSS. Peirce, a.c., then gives an appl. mod.: "Platon e.g. finds it 'consistent with reason' that the distances of the celestial orbits, among themselves, are proportional to the several lengths of string, which, in a musical instrument, produce harmonic sounds.

Many philosophers have been guided, as to their main conclusions, by reflections of that type."

He continues: "For it is clear that another man (than e.g. Platon) would find Kepler's theory (*see above p. 81*) that the celestial orbits are proportional to the (...) orbits of the various regular bodies, 'more consistent with his reason'."

CSS. Peirce, a.c., gives a second, more generally appl. mod. "(This liberal method)-he calls it 'apriori method'-has been found, most of the time, to be merely unsuccessful. It turns 'research' into something analogous to the developmental progress of 'taste'; taste, however, is, unfortunately, more or less a fashion issue. Consequence: the metaphysicians have never reached a firm agreement. On the contrary: from its inception until today (1877), the pendulum swung back and forth between a more material and a more spiritual philosophy."

MHD 179.

O. Willmann, o.c., 350, confirms, splendidly by the way, what CSS. Peirce says: "The pernicious influences of atomism, which Platon feared, remained quite limited. The idealistic trait of the Greek being, which also prevailed over (proto)sophistry (-450/-350), did not allow such a thing to become a 'power'.

Also, when Epikouros (-341/-271) re-founded this sham philosophy (Epikoureism (-400/+400)), in order to construct his philosophy of lust upon it, the 'nobler', on physical theology (viz, that archaic doctrine of deities, which paves the way for 'physical' philosophy) going back to Stoic doctrine (-400/+200) - a philosophy, which, earlier, at least, was Heraklitean (see above p. 24v.) oriented - weighed against Epikoureism."

It is remarkable that - here from the spiritualist-idealist side - thinking etc. is spoken of in terms of preference or non-preference, as well as in terms of power relations, just as we, just now, saw the humanist-materialist 'thinkers' doing the same, but starting from 'the other side'.

**Note.--** This refers to what S. Kierkegaard (see *above pp. 162vv;167*) wrote: "Most people are 'subjective' towards themselves and 'objective' towards others, incredibly 'objective', sometimes.-- Oh! The task is just: to be objective towards oneself and subjective towards all others." (A. Van Munster, *Kierkegaard (a choice from his diaries)*, 59).

Or still: "Humanity almost never makes use of the freedoms it has,-- such as freedom of thought. Instead of that freedom, they demand -- as 'compensation' -- freedom of speech." (o.c., 15).

**Note -- K. Marx and the Demokriteic atomistic mechanics.**

(1)"French and English materialism remained, always, in intimate relation to Demokritos and Epikouros." (Thus *Marx* himself, literally, in his doktoratsthesis, *Differenz der demokritischen und Epikureischen naturphilosophie*, (Difference of the democritical and epicurean philosophy of nature,), Berlin, 1841).

(2) Furthermore, Marx sees in Demokritos an enlightened (see *above pp. 21/24*) thinker of democracy.-- Which Röd, o.c., 19a(Fr. 251), confirms.

MHD 180.

(3) Marx criticizes, rightly, by the way, mechanism (see above *pp. 68; 169*): in Demokritos' nature absolute compulsion reigns. Epikouros, however, abrogates both freedom and necessity.-- In the Marxist-revolutionary philosophy, freedom is a necessity and/or a sufficient condition for revolution against the established order; otherwise, even the most revolted proletariat is not capable of transforming revolt into real revolution of society.

(4) Marx reproaches, also to Epikouros, the absence of real "dialectics" (see above *p. 40vv.; 51* (reversal as reg. mod. of revolt, which turns into revolution).-- After all, Marxism is not a mechanistic-materialism, but a dialectical materialism. Hegels' influence works after.

## **2B -- *The protosophist-humanist idea.* (180/187)**

### ***Introduction***

As for all previous thinkers, we dwell on the first sophistry (as distinguished from deuterosophism (under the Emperors of Rome)) from a modern-contemporary point of view.

### ***Bibl. Sample.***

-- S. IJsseling, *Rhetoric and Philosophy (What Happens When People Speak?)*, Bilthoven, 1975, 13/76 (*antiquity, Middle Ages*); 77/168 (*modern-contemporary*);

-- P. Foulquié, *la dialectique*, Paris, 1949 (7/40: the old; logical-rhetorical dialectic; cfr. *supra p. 6vv. (proof from the absurd)*; 15vv. (*eristics*); 21vv. (*metatheory*); 140vv. (*Euripidean sophistry and rhetoric*); 162vv. (*malakia*), 41/125 (*the new, Hegelian-Marxist dialectic*; cfr. *supra p. 24vv. (Kristensen)*; 40vv. (*reg. mod*); 94vv. (*quantit./ qualit.*); 142vv. (*criticism*))

-- Ch. Perelman, *Rhetoric and argumentation*. Baarn, 1979 (*the reasoning types of the (ancient, rhetorical 'dialectic')*);

-- G. Fauconnier, *General theory of communication (an overview of the scientific theories)*, Utr./ Anw., 1981, 19vv. (*Rhetoric and communication theory*). The humanist-rhetorical hermeneutics of the protosophists. (180/183) Theoretical relativism - Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410), the first 'Humanist', i.e. that type of thinker, who, takes as the basis of man's thinking - professional scientific, rhetorical and, ultimately, philosophical.

MHD 181.

Indeed, Sextos Empeirikos, the systematic skeptic, says of him, "Protagoras claims that man is the 'metron' (mensura, measure, i.e. norm of all being, i.e.

(i) of the actual existence of those being that exist, and

(ii) of the non-factual existence of the nonexistent. 'Measure' means the 'kritèrion', criterion, i.e. means to distinguish (discriminate), and 'being' means the actual things. Thus, man is the criterion of all things. Sextos adds, "Protagoras also poses, for man, only the problem of the existence of the 'fainomena' viz. the 'visible', immediately evident or given things and processes exist with certainty; what lies behind, below, above, in those immediate data is uncertain. The subject, man, is central.

*Note --* Protagoras drew inspiration mainly from Herakleitos' mobilism.

***Gorgias of Leontinoi*** (-480/ -375),

who was inspired by Parmenides' immobilism and unity philosophy, as well as by Zenon's eristics (technique of refutation), puts, just like Protagoras,-says Sextos Empeirikos'-an end to the existence of the criterion of truth (i.e. the data, as they are in themselves, independent of the human subject), though differently from Protagoras: in his "*On the Non-ness or on Nature*" (the title of the book is purely Parmenidean) he "proves" three ("nihilistic") theses.

(i) There is nothing, neither 'being' nor non-being;

(ii) if being existed, it was unthinkable;

(iii) if being existed èn, by hypothesis, was nevertheless conceivable, it was not expressible and undecidable.

Regarding the latter, Gorgias says: "Even if it be known and thought, the being is indivisible from another. For if there are realities which exist outside us and are objects of the sight, the hearing, the synthesis, how can these realities, which can be grasped by sight or heard by hearing - and not vice versa - be revealed to anyone else? By means of the word we indicate the being, but that word is neither the things in themselves nor the being. Consequently, we do not communicate to the interlocutor the being, but an expression which differs from the things in themselves". (*GP. Dumont, les sophists (fragments et témoignages)*, Paris, 1969, 75).

***Excerpt. -- The Protosophist epistemology (theory of knowledge).***

It is of exceptional importance to modern and current thinking.

**(i) *Negative dialectic on knowledge:***

**a/** Sense knowledge is unreliable; reason:

MHD 182.

(1) it happens that we err (do not perceive something correctly; do not understand a word correctly e.g.);

(2) the protosophists - along the lines of Parmenides and Herakleitos - generalize these private and singular errors: all sense experiences are fallible;

**b/** the mind-reasonable knowledge is unreliable;

reason: it is, essentially, general knowledge, by which it obscures the singularity of things and processes; it is knowledge of the unchangeable, by which it obscures the incessant changing of things and processes.

**Conclusion:** *Protagoras* has, in his name, two books, entitled ‘*Antilogiai*’, i.e. opposing arguments; the work of an unnamed ‘*dissoi logoi*’, i.e. double arguments, gives us applications of such baggage: the good and the bad, the praiseworthy and the reprehensible, the just and the unjust, the true and the false, the being and the not being, the teachability of wisdom and virtue, the competence and the incompetence, etc., are always treated with arguments for and against so that one does not come to a decision (suspension of judgment, core of skepticism).

(ii) **Phenomenism.** The ‘*fainomenon*’ is the core of this mentality, i.e. the representation, which arises from the meeting of the perceiving subject and the perceived object. That is all that man knows and thinks.

**Consequence:** (1) Certain we are only of our subjective impressions (thoughts, conceptions, imaginations, perceptions); (cfr. *supra p. 65; 170v. .*);

(2) Uncertain is the “objective” outside world, which, perhaps, fundamentally, is a delusion, an illusion.

(iii) **Materialism.** For Protagoras et al. the “phenomenon” is

(1) a physical and material fact; consequence: (2) man is trapped in the material world of subjective impressions, of which he himself is the measure.

**Empiricism.**

1. The word ‘*theoria*’, (speculatio, speculative thinking) is attributed to Puthagoras (-580/-500): he saw himself as ‘*theatès*’, contemplator (speculator) of truth, i.e. reality as it is in itself.

2. The word ‘*noèsis*’ (thinking) stems from Parmenides (-540/...): being, i.e. that which is something ‘*kath’ heauto*’ (secundum seipsum, in itself, independent of our impressions), is grasped by that ‘*noein*’, thinking. -- Both thinkers lie at the origin of speculative thinking, which, behind the ‘*fanerà*’ (the visible things) or ‘*fainomena*’, blots the phenomena, the ‘*adèla*’, the invisible data, the invisible, analogous to the (deity-led) mantic (‘*seeingship*’), but with ‘*logismos*’, rational reasoning (cfr. *supra pp. 83/85* (the *systechy*: ‘*visible / invisible*’))

MHD 183.

The word 'fronesis' (contemplation) comes from Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465): reality-viewing, right thinking, but both attuned to practical behavior. This type of speculative thinking also transcends empiricism: it 'sees', deciphering, the invisible code of nature: fire, multiform and with many names,-the logos, the order of the universe, which is 'harmony of opposites'. Well, theoria, noësis, fronesis, as speculative methods, are rejected by philosophy. In their place comes "empeiria," sensory experience, subjectively operating, tied to physical-material phenomena or "phenomena. This is the core of all empiricism.

***Practical-normative relativism.*** (183/184)

The negative or, with a current buzzword, "critical" dialectic or reasoning of the sophists leads to ethical-political consequences. The deities, the general concepts, the sensory evidences, - all that had been disenchanted. What norm of behavior rises from that great void? The enlightenment, begun with Xenophanes of Kolophon (-580/-490), the critic of religion and culturologist, continued in mechanistic professional science and protosophism: archaic thought was viewed with contempt or, at least, with doubt, and natural philosophy, insofar as speculative, became problematic.

With those axiomata, ethical-social life was reinterpreted:

(1) ***Hippias of Elis*** (+/- -400) asserts that the "nomos" (law, custom, convention if need be), which, until then, set limits to the Greek "eleutheria" (libertas, freedom), vehemently defended against the Persian absolute princes, was the "turannos", the oppressor and displacer of (now differently understood, i.e. lustful) freedom;

(2) ***Polos and Trasumachos*** claimed that "for the strong man 'right' is that which (lies) to him (advantageously);

(3) ***Kallikles*** said that "every man possesses the 'right' (understand: the principle permission, dependent on power, in its execution), to indulge his desires, at will and whim." One cannot more blatantly express the fundamental crisis - now not of the speculative and/or religious method of thought, but - of society.

Add to this

**a/** Athenian democracy, with its Perikleian loose way of life,

**b/** the overgrowth of rhetoric or art of reasoning,

**c/** the Peloponnesian War (-431/-404),

**d/** the prosperity after the Persian wars,

and one understands that the era as a whole was in crisis.

*Cfr. E. Will, Le monde grec et l' orient, (The Greek world and the East,), Paris; 1972, 473s.*

MHD 184.

W. Peremans, *Greek freedom (message and warning)*, Hasselt, 1978, cites Platon, *The state*, VIII 562/563, where he describes the anti-authoritarian conception of freedom then prevailing: "I can well imagine that a democratic state, thirsting for freedom, will not know how to keep pace. (...). Leaders who have nothing, and subjects who have everything to say, - that is the formula' (...).-- The father gets used to placing himself on an equal footing with his son and being afraid of his children; the son considers himself as good as the father and neither spares nor fears his parents, because, yes, he wants to be free (...). In such a polis it is the master who fears and flatters his pupils, while the gentlemen studying look down on their teachers from on high. The situation is no better with home teachers. Young people put themselves on a par with the elderly and oppose them in word and deed. Immediately the latter adapt themselves to the youth and exhaust themselves in jokes and jests: in order not to give the impression of silliness and bossiness, they imitate the youth."

Platon must, apparently, have seen the real conditions with his own - critical - eyes, to write such a thing. - They are not without resemblance to present day.

***Digression.*** (184/187)

***Rhetoric (eloquence).***

**(a)** *The paideia of the protosophists included*

**(i)** Grammar (the word and the language),

**(ii)** The dialectic (reasoning and arguing and

**(iii)** rhetoric (convincing, resp. persuading, fellow human beings).

W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 397ff., says that these three fundamental subjects - later called the trivium - form the basis of the formal formation of the West. With the input of the Puthagoreans - quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy; see *above p. 4*) - they make up the system of the seven liberal arts. "The Greek system of higher learning, as constructed by the protosophists, now dominates the entire civilized world". (o.c. 400).

**(b)** *Rhetoric dominates that formative system.* -- Apart from precursors, in Sumeria and Egypt, which are unmistakable, the Greeks are nevertheless the founders of eloquence. And of its theory.

**(b)1** *Koraks of Surakousai* (Syrakuse, Sicily) (tss -500 and -400) specialized in judicial rhetoric (for the reason of the many trials), distinguished, in a speech, three parts: **a.** prooimion (introduction, preface), **b.** agones (debates,- a typically aggressive name), **c.** epilogos (conclusion); -- as a foundation he saw 'eikos' (probabile, which though not true, is nevertheless probable).

MHD 185.

In other words, the (necessity and/or sufficiency) reason or ground, on which a forensic reasoner (assistance, lawyer) can rely, in the debates (war of words), is, usually, not strictly logical-scientific, but then reasonable.

Here the rhetoric diverges from Anaxagoras' experimental-analytical physical (see *above p. 70f.*) and/or the stoicheia (elementa, i.e. fundamental basic insights) of geometry of Hippocrates of Chios (-470/-400), which had axiomatic-deductive structure, i.e. postulated axiomata and/or postulates and, according to strict logical deduction, derived theses from them.-- In other words, the (judicial) eloquence gets intellectual status. In other words, (judicial) eloquence is given an intellectual status.

### **(b)1.bis Teisias of Surakousai.**

Apprentice to Korax begins the classification: **(i)** forensic rhetoric and **(ii)** deliberative rhetoric are specifically distinct types. Indeed, the court is something different from the 'ekklesia', the popular assembly, which has to vote e.g. laws. Well, Teisias is the teacher of Gorgias of Leontinoi, Isokrates of Athens (-436/ -338), the rhetor par excellence, Lusias of Athens (-440/-380), the orator (forensic esp.) and logographer (who wrote reason for others). Yet, with that, we find ourselves at Athens (Attica).

*Note --* Gorgias introduces a third type of speech, namely the epideictic or showy speech (in addition to the judicial and political). -

### ***Note -- Applicable model:***

Korax always taught Teisias to be right in the 'agon,' -- on condition that the latter gave him his fee, if his first plea proved Korax's system of learning to be efficient. -- But Teisias does not plead but becomes rhetor (speech teacher) himself, more brilliant than Korax; does not pay. -- Korax takes Teisias to court.

(1) Teisias:"I prove that your demand for payment is without (sufficient) reason or ground: either I convince you that I owe you nothing (in which case you waive your demand, of course) or I do not convince you (in which case you must waive your demand, for my first plea is not 'efficient').

(2) Korax:"Either you do not convince me, but then you must pay me, or you do convince me, proving that my learning system is efficient, and you must also pay me."

### **(b)2 Isokrates of Athens.**

The great educator - rhetor of antiquity. -- The structure of speech: **(1)** 'Proöimion' (inl.); **(2)a.** 'diègèsis (narratio, story, - to situate the theme); **(2)b1.** 'Pistosis' (persuasion, on the basis of 'peithö', i.e. not 'hard', strict logical arguments); **(2)b2** 'agon' (convincing evidence, on the basis of logically strict arguments, i.e. 'apodeixis', 'hard' evidence); **(3)a.** 'anakephalaiosis' (recapitulatio, concluding overview and summary); **(3)b.** 'pathètikon meros', (pathetic conclusion).

MHD 186.

**Rhetorical philosophy:** according to Isokrates, reason and the art and science of reason are not

1. life-less (strange) contemplation (speculative philosophy).
2. eristics (purely 'critical' or refuting technique (see above pp. 5/6 (Zenon)),
3. Belletry (word art practiced purely for aesthetic value),
4. Forensic rhetoric (more than "lawyer work");

It contains, if need be, all four as ingredients, but it is essentially something else. Thus Isokrates clearly opposed the protosophical rhetoric, but also the Platonic theory of reason and art. Cfr. *S. IJsseling, Rhetoric and philosophy (what happens when one speaks?)*, Bilthoven, 1975, 26/35 (Isokrates and the power of the word), 38/39;

"Philosophy is alien to life and alien to the world; it has little practical significance. Of course, one must take serious note of philosophical problems: that is part of the general culture. (...) Philosophy is (...) clearly subordinate to the ideal of being eloquent and lively. The most important thing is that in life - both individual and communal - one knows how to manage". (o.c., 39).

**Note.--** According to E.Curtius, Homer (+/- VIII -th e.) is the founder of rhetoric: the Iliad is the half and the Odusseia the two-thirds speeches.-- Yet with that we are in the archaic art of rhetoric.

(1) *WB/ Kristensen, Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions*, A'm; 1947, 125/148 (*the divine herald*), expertly explains how the 'classical' (viz. the 'enlightened', intellectually-reasonable) man has lost the proper understanding of sacred eloquence: the 'antique' (understand: archaic) word is present in the soothsayer, the poet even and the orator: it establishes destiny (good fate or destiny) because of the deities - the chthonic or earth deities and the ouranic or heaven deities - transmitted;

(2)a. *Cl. Ramnoux (Etudes présocratiques)* speaks in an analogous sense;

(2)b. M Heidegger (1889/1976), the great German existentialist (foundational study of ontology), taps into the presocratic conception of (i) truth, (ii) language and speech: in an archaic sense, therefore, he calls these three realities 'being-founding', cfr. *S.IJsseling*, o.c., 32v.-- Yet Heidegger is still clearly far removed from the truly archaic conception of words (he is and remains too philosophical, though presocratic).

(3) All this proves the enormous desacralizing effect of rhetoric, in all its variants. She demonstrates the secularization of the word abundantly.

MHD 187.

**Note --** *Platon* of Athens (-427/-347), -in his dialogue *Gorgias*, a polemical-eristic dialogue against the protosophical rhetoric, remarks that the rhetorical discourse cannot impart real insight ('epistèmè', sciëntia, 'science'), since it only wants to impose 'doxa' (appearance; apparent knowledge, mere opinion).-- To which Gorgias replies that, purely rhetorically, one can nevertheless 'make the hearer(s) think', as is desired and deemed righteous. It also drives their actions into a meaningful and just orbit.

To this *Platon* replies (always through Socrates) that pure and truthful knowing, of what is 'righteous' and/or 'desirable', 'meaningful' and/or just' at the outset of rhetorical agitation (exercising power) is necessary condition of true rhetoric

In the *Faidros*, *Platon* specifies, clearly less aggressively, that there is good and bad rhetoric. However, we will discuss this further.

### **IA(2) *Classical philosophy and its grievance crisis* (-450/-200). (187/241)**

Socrates of Ahene (-469/-399) restores philosophy. He does this with double emphasis:

(i) i.e. instead of being nature-oriented (physicist, 'cosmological') he is human-oriented humanistic anthropocentric anthropological);

(ii) instead of being vague-understandable he is understandable (logical). -- These two traits will become enduring legacies of the West.

***Starting from Socrates, this philosophy develops in two times:***

***Foundation of Attic philosophy* (-450/-320);**

***Decline of classical philosophy (Hellenistic-Roman) (-320/ +200).***

The "epistemological cut" is formed by Alexandros III of Macedonia, nicknamed "the great" (-356/-323), who, from -335, begins his conquests.

### **IA(2)a. *The rise of Attic philosophies* (-450/-320).**

Attica is the region around Athens, which, after Ionia (Miletos first of all) and Greater Greece (s.-Italy and Sicily), becomes center, until the conquests of Alexandros the Great, of rhetorical, professional scientific and also of philosophical life.

### ***Summary of the Socratiek.***

(a)1. The central object: man, but as a classical being, i.e. detached from (i) the archaic - mythological and (ii) the natural-philosophical world of thought.

(a)2 The goal: agogia (welfare promotion, destiny enhancement), primarily through the intellectual-rational "teaching" of "virtue" (virtue).

(b) The method: we deal with this when discussing *Platon*.

MHD 188.

***Socratic maieutics.***

Socrates' mother was "maia", midwife; her profession "techne maieutikè", maieutics. -- Socrates uses the word metaphorically (metaphorically) to characterize his method of communication and interaction -- better expressed, his significance or method of understanding.

***Irony*** ('eironeia', jokingly feigning ignorance); eristics (convincingly proving that the opponent is equally ignorant); positive: inductive conceptualization and determination of being.-- Such is Socrates' maieutic method, which essentially makes use of conversation, possibly argument. No more, therefore, of the 'inner word', in which many philosophers, scholars and rhetoricians had seen the heuristics or finding process of insights, judgments and reasoning. Socratic is group dynamics.

(1) ***Gorgias of Leontini*** (see above p.181) had radically questioned the possibility of significant acts with favorable results.

(2) ***Socrates, Platon, Aristotle***, all the great democrats in a word, saw in reasonable understanding in the theoretical and practical fields the foundation of every humanistic society. Significance, concretely, is dialogue, possibly in the form of scientific conversation. Socratic maieutics is and remains to this day the firmest method of inquiry, even in the professional scientific field. Reason: one interlocutor acts cybernetically (improving) on the other; only the group - and not the individual, with his 'inner word', - is real scientific power.

***The Small-Society Christians.*** (188/193)

**(a)1. *The eristic-dialectical school of Megara.***

Eukleides v. Megara (+/- -400, Euboulides of Miletos (ll. v. Eukl), Parmenidean-Zenonian (see above p. 15 (Eleatism)), developed eristics, founded by Zenon: rebuttal convincing either by strict logical proof or by rhetorical argument of one's fellow man as opponent.-- Such is the keynote of eristics.

***Applicative model. the "pseudomenos" (liar).***

One asks someone, If you say you are lying, are you really lying or not?

(i) Does he answer, 'I am lying; then the questioner replies, 'if thou claims that thou art lying and thou art really lying, then thou art not lying:

(ii) if he answers, "I do not lie," then one replicates, "If thou sayest thou liest and thou sayest the truth, then thou liest.

(i) Structure: starting point, the truth definitions, then prevalent,

(ii) one applies them (applicative model)

(iii) with the intention of breaking down this definition (critical-negative) and refuting it, one deduces from this applicative model 'an incongruity (contradiction, contradiction).

MHD 189.

(iv) Twice, here in 'the liar', one applies 'antistrophè' (Demokritos, Platon already knew this method: one refutes by deduction of the negation from the proposition to be contested).

Euboulides' "liar" captivated many Greek thinkers (reasoners). He even fascinated the logicians of our century. Cfr. *Ev. Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics*, Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 78vv. (*The 'paradox' of the 'liar'*). Reason: the structure of the reasoning is fascinating. The criticism of 'the liar' lies in the fact that in the statement 'I lie' one has real judgment (no meaningful assertion); one can, after all - what Platon, Aristotle et al. presuppose - make no investigation as to the truthfulness or otherwise of that statement. As long as the thought content of that assertion is not confronted with the facts themselves, one does not know what one has to gain from it.

### **(a)2. The dialectical elic-eretric school.**

Faidon of Elis (+/- -375), Menedèmos of Eretria (-319/-265) also identify eristically. -- Menedemos claimed that to say, 'man is white' is false; reason: the thought-contents 'man' and 'white' are not volitional. 'Being' was, for him, only validly understood, if one understood it as full identity. Consequence: saying: 'what (so) is, is (so), is valid; applicative: 'what is white is white' or 'man is man; because, in those cases, is full identity and not partial identity.

Now it is clear that, except in 'tautologies' (identity judgments), 'being' is also used validly in analogical judgments: if I say: 'Man is mortal'; I do not claim: 'Man is nothing but mortal', I only mean: 'under certain point of view (perspective) 'man is' mortal'; I never mean that the whole 'being' of man is volitional with 'mortal-ness'! (cfr. *supra p. 5; 14v. (Elea); 74v. Eksk.*)).

**Conclusion:** the 'dialectics' of Socrates, combined with eleatic ontology as well as with protosophistics, easily gives eristics. To interpret is, as said, also to combine (de- and connect).

### **(b)1 The Paleocune (Paleocynical) ethicists, politicians.**

Antisthenes of Athens (-440/-365), Diogenes of Sinope (-400/-325). -- Antisthenes combined Socratic, rhetoric (Gorgias of Leontinoi) and even mythology.-- He taught kunosarges (a gymnasium) which may have given rise to the name 'kunikos' (dogmatic, 'cynical').

### **Digression.-- Nominalism.**

On dialectics, Antisthenes was, like the Megarics: only volitional judgments are (eleatically) true; the other judgments ('man is good', 'Socrates is human' e.g.) are false.

MHD 190.

Yet judgments like "the good is good", "man is man", are valid (as tautologies). -- Again that Parmenidean-Eleatic thought-structure (language-structure): only the systechy "to be" (vol-identical) / "not to be" (absolutely not identical)" is valid; there is no intervening term "partly identical / partly non-identical" (analogous). A number of thinkers and reasoners cannot escape from the grip of Parmenides' systechy (pair of opposites).

***Nominalistic deduction from eleatic axiomata.***

The razor-sharp thought systechy now receives a logical consequence of stature:

(i) the systechie 'singular (one: indivisible and irreducible to something else/ composed', in unison with the elatic systechie (being/ non-being), leads to the assertion:

a. singular realities are not 'definable' (i.e. one cannot give a determination of being of them in the language form of: 'Man is a being that thinks' e.g.)

b. Compound realities are definable, but only by enumeration of the constitutive constituents;

(ii) the systechie 'singular (individual being)/ concept (general or universal being)' is also radical: the identical in Charikleia, Penelopeia and Brisèis is that they, all three, are man and woman; yet, for Antisthenes, there is no analogue, but only a full or absolute identity; consequently, "Charikleia, Penelopeia and Brisèis 'are' men, women" means:"(They) 'are' nothing but (man, woman)".

The individual is understood only volitional and thus: the individual cannot be summed up under a general (universal) concept. Nominalism is precisely the thesis that the individual (individual being) is utterly or absolutely individual and thus not amenable to being (expressed in a (universal) concept). Antisthenes therefore sharply attacked the Platonic theory of ideas, as well as the Socratic and Aristotelian (general) understanding.

(iii) The systechie 'true/ false' and the systechie 'judgment/ contradiction' are also included in this same parmenidean-eleatic absolute contradiction: since one either says something ('being', volidentically understood) or nothing ('non-being'), there is only true judgment without error) and judgment (proposition) without contradiction containing judgment! Speaking of a structure of thought and language.

***Digression.-- Ponos or willpower ethics, -politics.***

Antisthenes starts from mythology: the hero Heracles, as a "sotèr" (savior, rescuer) reaches the highest "good," thanks to twelve difficult "works" ("ponoi").

MHD 191.

Antisthenes takes the heroic behavior of Heracles - in line, incidentally, with Socrates' austerity ethic and politics - as the definition of 'virtue', but the speculative - intellectualistic aspect of Socrates is omitted: reason, learning, are not virtue! The heroic effort of the will, 'ponos', 'is' virtue. (cfr. *supra p. 162vv.*).

This heroism is, likewise, caught within an absolute systechia: 'lust/ lust mortification'; the 'sophos', sapiens, the sage, concerned only with his 'soul' and its 'virtue', its 'highest good', kills every lust experience in himself as the enemy without question of man as 'heros', heroic being. In the mythological sense of that word.

The norm, the criterion, of heroism is the sober, returning to the original 'fysis', 'nature', complacency ('autarkeia'). All that, through purely human intervention, since the rise of culture, has been added to that original (culture-free) 'nature' is purely agreed, 'conventional; free and non-committal labeling:

- (1) **behave in a supposedly "decent" manner, particularly the fashion;**
- (2) the distinction between "freemen" and "slaves" and life in the "polis," understood as the local city-state (vis-à-vis strangers);
- (3) The traditional religion (the enlightened, disembodied aspect; see above) that everything is rejected. As 'non-thing' it is understood as 'nothing'. Just like the protosophists ('nomos' (convention)/ fysis (real nature among others), though not in a hedonistic sense, like them, - one sees the combining of elements and recombining of them - the systechy 'nature/culture' is taken absolutely and interpreted as an applicative model of 'its/ nothingness'.

One knows how Diogenes of Sinope took this marginal ethic and politics to the extreme:

- (1) community life ("commune") of children and women;
- (2) Shamelessness ("cynical" means, today, still "shameless") in dress and behavior were advocated by him.

One also knows how, under the Roman emperors, cynism had clear acclaim, proclaimed by itinerant convention-free, austere, marginal "preachers," cosmopolitan in mentality.

### **(b)2 The kurenaic ethicists, resp. politicians.**

Fourth re-designation of the socratiek is done by Aristippos of Kurènè (-435/ -350), student of Socrates, by Theodoros 'atheos' (the godless) and, +/- -300, by Hegesias of Kurènè. Aristippos, after the death of Socrates, became a wisdom teacher in the style of the protosophists (traveling around, getting paid for teaching). At the court of Dionusios of Surakousai (Syrakuse), for example, he met his counterpart, Platon.

MHD 192.

***Excerpt.-- Sens(ual)ism and phenomenism.***

(1) Starting point: the individual is absolutely individual. See above (eleatic axiom).

(2)a Not "the" (general) man exists, but the individual (individualistic humanism of the protosophists); this individual man still differs from (individual) moment to (individual) moment; (syn- and diachronic) differences are absolute; there is no such thing as a common characteristic which unites them, in essence. -- Something like this had already been proclaimed by Protagoras, the sophist. Cfr. *supra pp. 173; 180/181*.

**(2)b1 *Phenomenism as deduction.***

"We are like a besieged fortress: isolated from the outside world." Thus Aristippos. Man, such an individual, isolated outwardly and locked up within himself inwardly, perceives only the 'fainomena', the 'phenomena', i.e. that which appears (of things), the phenomena, nothing more. We see, hear, touch, feel what immediately shows itself to us. Nothing more. Phenomenism, in other words. Cfr. *supra p. 65 (skepticism)*.

**(2)b2 *Sens(ual)ism as deduction.***

Like Protagoras, Aristippos claims that we do not possess intellectual insights (concepts, ideas), but only sense impressions (sensus = sense organ).

**(2)c. *Sensist phenomenism as a summary:***

What Protagoras did not assume, Aristippos assumes, viz. we feel the systechia 'hot/cold', we taste the systechia 'sweet/sour'; we see the systechia 'white/black; yet, what the being, through those impressions 'are' in themselves (as Parmenides advocated), that is unknown to us; we have only our 'pathè' (passions, that which we undergo, in sensory perception).-- This sensist phenomenism is the essence of skepticism (scepticism).

***Digression. Hedonism (ethical-political materialism).***

Starting point: sensist phenomenism (I, thou, everyone is locked in his intro- and retrospective inner"world" as an absolute individual, solely full identical, without any partial identity with anything else). Cfr. *Supra p. 172v. (mediatism)*.

(i) The objective-universal good, of his teacher Socrates, makes no sense in such an 'immanence philosophy' ('immanence' = 'inwardness'). As the only norm, criterion, of 'good' there is the purely sensory, purely phenomenal perception of the subject. Subjective perception is 'hedone' (pleasure principle), as Demokritos, the atomist, and the protosophists had taught.

(ii) this subjective experience of lust is then still actualistic: not the moment that is past (retrospective); nor the moment, which I expect (prospective), but the present, actual moment is, fully, a moment of lust, as volitional with itself.

MHD 193

(iii) The moment, here-and-now, to the exclusion of everything that this actual, individual moment (absolutely) is not, is the lustful moment of the body not that the 'spirit' - one wonders what 'spirit' could mean to Aristippos; certainly not that which his teacher Socrates understood it to mean - and the lustful moments of the 'spirit' mean nothing; they 'are' really, though they derive the lustful character from the body.

The colloquial word 'materialist' means, much to the chagrin of many philosophically trained materialists, 'enjoyer' and with the emphasis on bodily enjoyment. 'Hedonist' is meant. Cfr. *supra p. 176vv. (materialism / hedonism)*.

(iv) The 'felicific calculus' or happiness, pleasure calculation of Aristippos. Socrates' 'mind' still works after all, in his student: the 'fronèsis' (intellectual deliberation), after all, is an integral element of the pleasure experience: the 'mind'

(i) opts, in the context of a differential, for the smooth, gentle movement of lust, - passes by a lustless state, as e.g. sleep, indifferently, and weathers the 'ponos', the burden, as if to be avoided;

(ii) chooses the maximum of lust and the minimum of burden (second differential of lust experiences).

(v) The Socratic primacy of the inner works somewhat in Aristippos: "I want to possess, not be possessed," says Aristippos. Which points to self-control. Already Socrates had relied on the fact that the "good," as he understood it, in that it is welfare-enhancing (agogic), goes hand in hand with the pleasurable. Aristippos understands this as follows: he who does not control himself perverts his pleasure. So that, under this point of view, the kurenaicer and the kunieker are not so far apart.

### ***The grandocrats.***

#### ***a. The academic (platonian) philosophies.***

Platon of Athens (-427/-347), the founder of transcendent idealism (the ideas are "transcendent" (transcend) the being of "fysis" (nature)). -- Speusippos (-347/-338: leadership of the acadèmeia), Xenokrates (-338/-314), Polemon (-314/-269), Hèrakleides Pontikos and others.

#### ***Excerpt: The concept of idea, idea.***

Starting point: Socrates' general concept, linguistically represented by a generic name ('onoma', nomen). If the girls Kirkè, Brisèis and Charikleia bear 'proper names', then the term 'girl(s)' is a generic name. The proper name, expression of the full identity of Kirkè, etc., denotes only a single being. The generic name, on the other hand, designates more than one being, viz. all possible and actually existing (here:) 'girls', including the three proper names, which constitute but a private collection.

MHD 194.

(i) The question arises, "On what does the generic name rely?" In other words, why exactly do Kirkè, Brisèis and Charikleia have as their generic name "girl"? The (necessary and sufficient) reason is: they have common properties; ontologically expressed: they are part-identical among themselves precisely for the reason of those common peculiarities. This common characteristic is present in her 'being; her 'being' ('ousia', 'essentia', being-wise).

This aspect, obvious to Socrates, Platon, Aristotle, is, particularly strongly voiced by the medieval scholastics. It is said, therefore, that they are, very particularly, essentialists. Cfr. *supra p. 5 (full and partial identity)*.

(ii) The question arises: since the species name

a/ is more than a mere name - which is what the nominalists claim (see above p.189v), who see in it only a 'nomen', 'name' - and

b/ something conceivable, something thought, is a thought-content, a knowledge-content, present in our mind, which sees, 'beholds' the part-identical in the (here:) many girls -- which means something which is both thought and still 'real' -, how is it possible that, at least some, knowledge- and thought-contents - e.g. "two plus two is four", "the whole is greater than the part" etc. - are apparently also true, even if there was never any application of them in the nature surrounding us? How is it that, at least, some of the contents of knowledge and thought - e.g. "two plus two equals four", "the whole is greater than the part" etc. - are apparently also true, even if there has never been the slightest application of them in the nature that surrounds us?

According to Platon, this fact points to an "idea" ("eidos") , i.e. something purely thought yet real, which, independent of concrete-individual realizations (private models), is from all eternity and to all eternity "true" and - what is more - basis, axiom, of wisdom and, especially, of philosophical wisdom.

This fact indicates the transcending (transcending) of both the concrete-individual realizations and our subjective thought movements, which constitute the general understanding.

That which simultaneously extends beyond material realizations and beyond our subjective thought acts is idea.

Even more: according to Platon that eternal, transcendental model is more real than its 'images' (representations, realisations); reason: long before those realizations existed, in the 'cosmos noètos' (mundus intellegibilis, the world of knowledge and thought), those regulative models, which, were they not existent, would simply make the existence of the realisations impossible. They are both source ('archè', principle, principium) and model, paragon, of its realizations, which, like the whole fuis, arise and perish. Which is precisely what these ideas do not do. These ideas are truly the "being" of Parmenides, that, outside and above the fuis and its arising and passing away, are "eternally" there.

MHD 195.

**Digression. The concept of methexis (participatio, participation).** (195/197)

We observed, since Parmenides and the Eleatic concept of being, which knows only full identity, without any partial identity (i.e. without analogy), that the thinkers, seized by this "dialectic" of "absolute" identical "being" and equally "absolute" nothing (without a middle term, which would make it, instead of a contradictory systechy, a differential), had no place left for

- (i) general concept or, platonic, idea, as well as for
- (ii) the bond, which binds individuals together (social dimension, if human).

This gap, already made clear in our exposition of the small-society thinkers (*e.g. p. 189 supra (tautologies, nominalism), (190 absolute heroism), 191 (phenomenistic sensism, hedonism)*), has, of course, not escaped people like Socrates, Platon, Aristotle; on the contrary: their whole urge to complement lacunar socratic thinking is aimed at creating "room" for partial identity and the ontology connected with it.

Platon, especially, created a term, which essentially pronounces partial identity: 'methexis' (participatio), participation. One could also take the modern word (i) communication and (ii) interaction to represent 'methexis'.

Immediately the crushing importance of the term in question becomes abundantly clear: it is more than mere 'thought' or mere 'reasoning' in the parmenidean-zenonic, 'eristic' sense.

A. Lalande, *vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, (technical and critical vocabulary of philosophy.), Paris, 1968-10, 742, defines "methexis" as follows:

a. the relationship of the sensory givens to the ideas;

b. the relation of those ideas, which are not mutually exclusive (contradictory ideas are therefore excluded), among themselves. -Till there Lalande.

M. Müller/A. Halder, *Heders kleines philosophisches wörterbuch*, Basel/ Freiburg/ Wien, 1959-2, precis:

ad a. The relation of individual being (cfr. Lalande's sense-given being) to ideas;

c. the relation, of the 'image' (in platonic Greek: 'to eikos', imago, image;) to the primal image ('paradeigma', copy, paragon, which is at the same time origin);

Müller / Halder give, as an applicative model of this meaning 'c', the relation of man to divine being (especially in scholastic philosophy); -- one can very confidently add: 'especially in patristics, not least Greek patristics' (to which we shall return in Part II).

MHD 196.

Concerning the relation 'creator/creator', *P. Foulquié/ P. Saint-Jean, dictionnaire de la langue philosophique*, Paris, 1969-2, 514s., observes that the term 'participation' - which we, henceforth, use as a dutchification - in Platonism and in the Platonically inspired philosophies, means:

**ad a.** The way in which the entities of experience 'participate' in a higher world (with Platon the 'cosmos noëtos', the world of knowledge and thought; *see above, page 13*);

**ad c.** (the way in which those same beings of experience 'participate' in the last instance, in the supreme being, the origin of all that they 'are'; -- in other words -- may we add, meaningfully, the higher world converges, finally, in the supreme being.

Mentioned dictionary immediately adds, "(participation) includes the distinction of what participates (the participating aspect) and that in which it participates (the 'participated' aspect), especially (the distinction ) of the creature and the Creator; at once the philosophy of participation escapes.

1/ monism (about which further) or

2/ Pantheism (also discussed further),

as both are implied in 'emanatism' (about which later)".

**Note --** The first thinker, who as a pagan platonist, apparently saw the connection between ideas-(world) and the deity (as supreme being, is Albinos, a neo-platonist thinker (+/- +125/+190), who claims that the "ideas (ideai), models of individual things and, also, of their concrete forms (eidè), are nothing but the thoughts of God." (*E. De Strycker, S.J., concise history of ancient philosophy*, Antwerp, 1967, 184).

**Note --** Hieroanalytically (religious science), the Platonic concept of participation is ancient. Lalande, o.c., 743, refers, for this, to the religious scientist *L. Lévy-Bruhl (les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures)*, (the mental functions in the inferior societies).

L.-Br. says: the 'participation' is a mindset, which predominates among the peoples of 'lower' (?) civilization - one sees the 'enlightened' mentality at work in the ethnologist L. Br. In the derogatory term 'lower'. According to this 'mentality', fundamentally, all beings, even the most different ones from each other, make up "one and the same 'being'" - one must take the sociologist ethnologist's expression 'one and the same being' with a thick grain of salt -.

"The objects, the beings, the phenomena can be, in a way incomprehensible to us, at the same time themselves and something else. One sees the part-identical structure in "at the same time being itself (volidentical) and something else(part-identical)! L.-Br. continues: "In a way equally incomprehensible to us, they radiate and capture forces, 'des vertus' (the French for 'mysterious force'), properties, 'mystical' influences, which make themselves felt outside them, without ceasing to be where they are."

MHD 197

--"Mystical" here means something like "for our, Western, reason and intellect not to grasp and not to understand.

L.-Br. concludes," In other words, for this mentality, there is opposition between 'singular' and 'plural', between 'the same' and the 'other', without forcing one of the (two) terms to be affirmed, if one denies the other or vice versa. This has only second-class significance". (L. Lévy-bruhl (1857/1939) is well known for his emphasis on the contrast between 'Cartesian' (i.e. Modern-rationalist) and 'primitive' mentality). Cfr. *supra p. 164 (depth level)*.

*M. Eliade, De myth van de eeuwige terugkeer* (The myth of eternal return ), (*archetypes and their repetition*), Hilversum, 1964, 37v., says:"In each of the examples (...), the same 'primitive 'being conception' is expressed: an object, an action only acquire reality in so far as they imitate or repeat an archetype. Only through repetition or participation does something acquire reality; everything that does not possess an exemplary model is 'devoid of meaning', i.e., lacks reality.

People will therefore strive to become archetypal and paradigmatic. This striving may seem paradoxical in that the people of ancient cultures only recognize themselves as real insofar as they stop being themselves (at least in the eyes of modern man) and limit themselves to imitating or repeating the actions of others. In other words, precisely in so far as he ceases - the author means in the modern sense - to be himself, he sees himself as really, that is, truly himself.

One could therefore say that this 'primitive' ontology possesses a Platonic structure. Platon could, in that case, be considered the philosopher par excellence of the 'primitive mind-set', i.e. as the thinker, who succeeded in giving a philosophical account of the modes of existence and behavior of archaic humanity.

Of course, this does not detract from the 'originality' of his philosophical genius; for the great merit of Platon remains in his attempt to justify theoretically this vision of archaic humanity and this by means of the dialectical means, which the spirituality - the author means by this: the arsenal of understanding - of his time made available to him."

Until there Mircéa Eliade, the renowned religion scholar

Yet, with Lévy-Bruhl and Eliade, it should be noted that both place too little emphasis on the fluidic aspect, which is the substructure of the participation idea; this is, however, pronounced in the 'apeiron' of Anaximandros of Miletos (-588/-524). Cfr. *also pp. 27v; 126; 133; -- 64 ('conformity system' of Scheler)*.

MHD 198.

***Digression.-- Dialectics.***

*P. Foulquié, la dialectique*, Paris, 1949, an excellent work, which gives the systematic semasiology (study of meaning) regarding the word 'dialectic', distinguishes two major types of 'dialectic' (198/200)

**(a) *The eristic dialectic***, (195/200)

which begins with the parmidian Zenon of Elea (see *above p. 15vv* (in connection with *the fundamental crisis of mathematics*)); -- the key features are summarized by Foulquié as follows.

**a/** The goal of Zenon (and all eristicians) is negative, i.e. they do not want to prove a theorem and/or prove their own system of theorems; their goal is to tear down the theorems and/or system of theorems of the opponent. "It is a negative dialectic (or reasoning and reasoning art or science)." (o.c., 14). One could also say 'critical dialectics'.

**b/** The elaboration of that critical-negative goal is:

**(1)** One does not start from true premises (axiomata),

**(2)** but of presuppositions, peculiar to the opponent, who adopts them either provisionally or definitively; in the mid-century-scholastic logical centers this was called "argumentum ad hominem" (argument against the human opponent).

Conclusion: here, in the eristic dialectic, the fellow human being is, essentially, "opponent" (reasoning and reasoning enemy).

**(a) bis** the proto-sophistic dialectic is a variant of the eristic one: there too the fellow man is 'enemy' (to put it mildly: 'rival', especially in the political field); he must - with 'all' means of reasoning and argument. In other words, the (proto)sophist uses - pragmatically, i.e. with a view to achieving a goal (here: a political goal, at least in the main) - eristics as a means of eloquence, i.e. to achieve the goal of the 'enemy'.

**(i)** conviction by logically valid means and/or

**(ii)** persuasion by logically dubious or even "sophistic" (i.e., deliberately logically invalid) means. cfr *supra p.185 (the relativistic-skeptical worldview)*.

**(b) *The dialectic of destiny***, which Foulquié o.c., 41ss., starts with Herakleitos of Ephesus (cfr. *supra p. 40vv.*), is, essentially, centered around 'struggle'; yet, for the Heraklitian, this struggle is only a struggle of words and thoughts; it includes all possible forms of 'struggle'. (mobilist abstraction), is, essentially centered around 'struggle', yet, for the Heraklitian, that struggle is only among other words and thoughts; it includes all possible forms of 'struggle' (see the harmony of opposites, shown, p. 41vv..supra, in the short quotations).

**Note --** The destiny dialecticians -- e.g. Hegel, Marx et al -- like to use the word "contradiction" (contradiction) to name the ordinary, non-logical contradictory.

MHD 199.

In Latin, that difference is expressed by "aut" (ordinary antithesis) and "vel" (utter antithesis, contradiction).

***Appl. mod.***

(1) either singing or dancing (which was called the beginning logistic "logical sum" of "singing" and/ or "dancing"); "aut";

(2) either singing or not singing (which expresses 'contradiction' in the strict sense of the contradiction principle: "Either 'is' something, (so: singing here) or 'is' it not (so: not singing here); 'skin'. In both 'either - or' - forms there is alternation (alternation of one by the other). Yet the logical difference is thorough, though hidden under the linguistic confusion of sounds, which is conveniently, abused in the 'rhetoric' of modern dialecticians. Cfr. Foulquié, o.c., 41/42.

**Note --** Depth psychologically speaking, in the two-three dialects outlined above, is at work what the ancient Greeks called 'agonologia', i.e. the struggle through word art or word science

(a) Agonistes means 'every man, who fights either by speech or action against an opponent and before an audience'; one thinks of the 'prot.agonist', 'deuter.agonist' in the Greek theatrical plays e.g. (cfr. *supra p. 185: agon*).

(b) 'Agonistès' also always means 'fight' conceived as 'game', i.e. 'fight' with a predominantly uncertain outcome such that the tension of the 'game' remains in it, together with the shading, that all this is nevertheless, fundamentally, not (so) serious.

(c) 'Agonologia' is, therefore, always connected with what the Romans called '(h)arena', i.e. (literally) the sand, the sandy soil of an amphitheatre for either games or fights - the 'associative' value of this alternation is typical. Whoever assumes, that 'dialectic' is always agonologia, play and/or fight, understands Platon's reaction against the three aforementioned types of dialectic, which he wanted to replace with a truth dialectic. Which (1) is something entirely different and (2) is actually philosophy. Cfr *supra pp. 176/179 'the enemy' / 'the champion'*.

Psychoanalytically (Freudian) seen: the three dialectics mentioned above cover a barely concealed aggressive basic attitude towards the fellow human being as fellow human being, even if this was called, in the ancient milieu, 'game' (joust with words) or 'fight' (word fight; in French so much more clearly expressed: 'joute d' esprit (oratoire)' (for quarrel, debate)).

It was precisely from this,- from the confusion between 'getting it right in a debate' and 'finding objective truth in the form of a conversation, if necessary containing a dose of argument, together' - that Platon wanted to escape!

Now we can see what blatant degree of disregard for the profound tendency of Platon's rejection of the aforementioned three dialectics Nietzsche (1844/1900), the great critical-materialist-unmasked:

MHD 200.

Nietzsche saw, in the radical rejection of the dialectics of power and demolition, "an expression of Platon's hidden desire for power and of his envy of the prestige, which the orators, in antiquity, enjoyed and the power, which they possessed." (*S. Jsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy*, Bilthoven, 1975, 16). The author adds, "This is, of course, a typically Nietzschean position." Nietzsche's 'psychology', precursor to Freudian psychoanalysis, sees a-priori nothing but 'hidden' - (cfr. *supra pp. 142; 145 (hermeneutics)*) - power and gender tendencies. Yet such a mania of interpretation has value only,

(i) insofar as, indeed, the real man, "hidden" from himself, is guided by unconscious tendencies ("drives") and

(ii) insofar as it reveals the "hidden" tendencies of Nietzsche himself.

We do not, therefore, cry along with the debunking wolves, who vilify Platon a-priori, i.e., based purely on their own unproven axiomata.

### ***The Socratic-Platonic dialectic.*** (200)

One cannot separate Platon from his teacher, Socrates. Therefore, we integrate Socrates' dialectic into that of Platon.

#### **(1) *The socratic dialectic.*** (200/205)

Foulquié, o.c., 15ss., says, rightly, that Socrates, against the sophists, - pay close attention against whom - applied the eristic reduction to the incongruous, so often practiced by contemporary mathematicians, rhetors, etc., in order to get their process of consciousness going; he confronts them with their own devilry, by pushing them, with the nose, into their own inconsistencies.

Foulquié, *ibid.*, thematizes, then, the constructive dialectic of Socrates, which expresses itself in the themata; thus e.g. piety, justice, wisdom,-- the beautiful,-- courage. Of these -- thanks to induction, Socrates, in conversational form, whether or not seasoned with contentiousness, -- builds up a being definition.

***Applicative model:*** in the *Theaitetos* (a dialogue by *Platon*), *Theaitetos*, prompted by Socrates, successively gives as an essence definition of science

1/ sensory experience, 2/ true opinion (*doxa*), 3/ true judgment, provided with its justification (necessity and/or sufficient reason or ground). One sees the re-establishment of philosophy yet not on a purely natural-philosophical basis, but on a general-philosophical basis. In other words, philosophy, in its full extent, only gets off the ground with Socrates.

***Applicative model:*** instead of starting from the general (universal) determination of being, one can also start from the private or even the singular model: in the *Menon*, *Menon* says that the "virtue" (understand: virtue)

(1) for the man, consists in running the policy soundly;

(2) For the wife, in decent housekeeping;

MHD 201.

(3) for the child, the third person of age, a crowd of others, in yet something else. In other words, although all the subjects live in one and the same world and are all confronted with the same problem of virtue, they still take up, each separately, an own, viz. singular, resp. private angle of vision ('glasses', perspective). This offers two advantages:

(i) socratic maieutics, through its inductive action, introduces a rich experiential material (empirical aspect) and

(ii) it is non-authoritarian, thus escaping dogmatic indoctrination.

What is called "the cycle of empirical science" is clearly at work here.

(1) Observation (collection of factual material): Socrates draws attention either (informative subject) to science or (normative subject) to virtue; he confronts the partners with both phenomena in their own circle;

(2)a. abduction (hypothesis formation): suddenly 'sees' one: "It is sense; if 'science' is that, then I understand 'science' as fact and by that name." The other: "If 'virtue(ility), is sound government of the polis, in the ecclesia (people's assembly), then I understand that word and the reality 'indicated by it'."

In other words, 'sense experience; resp. 'sound polity' are the necessary and sufficient condition to 'understand' Socrates' word and the reality indicated by it. The explanation is found.

(2)b. deduction (derivation of testable predictions):

(i)"If 'science' is 'sensory experience', what if one is dealing with 'true opinion'? Let us examine".

(ii)"If 'virtue' is 'sound polity', what if the woman, who, in principle, does not participate in the ecclesia, is confronted with 'virtue'? Let us see".

(2)c Induction (confrontation of the hypothesis with new factual evidence):

(i) not all cases of 'true opinion' are at the same time 'sense experiences' (one thinks of someone, who calculates with numbers e.g.); so the definition is only private (partial falsification, partial verification);

(ii) 'virtue' is, for the then wife, 'sound housekeeping' and has nothing to do, at least so it seems, with 'sound policy administration', unless the 'soundness' ('sound' is shown, inductively, to be correct (verification)); 'policy administration' is shown, as administration, though not of the policy, but of the house circle to be valid (partial verification (administration), partial falsification (policy)).

MHD 202.

(2)d. Value - judgment (evaluation): given the partial verification result, further search for a better definition is required. -- Cfr. *Supra p: 10/13*.

**Summary:** Socrates rescues Hellenic thought from the foundational crisis (mathematics, natural philosophy, rhetoric)

(i) by the foundation of the scientific conversation; -- all science, all rhetoric and all philosophy includes speaking to each other about the theme, if necessary with discussion and/or eristics (refutation); well, by systematically introducing definitions into that conversation and justifying them inductively, Socrates taught his contemporaries not merely to speak or discuss, but to speak and argue scientifically,-- and this with the necessary 'Akribeia' i.e. scientifically rigorous accuracy. If only all conversations today were at this level! -- Alongside the axiomatically deductive method of geometers (*Hippocrates of Chios* (-470/-400, *stoicheia*, elements) and the experimental method of Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428), the maieutic method of Socrates is the third definitive achievement of scientific thought.

(ii) By connecting (synthesizing) empiricism and speculative thinking, Socrates robbed (sensory) perception of its blindness (lack of thought models) and 'speculation' of its emptiness (lack of factual material). See *above p. 182 (empiricism of protosophism); (186 Isokrates' empiricism)*. This synthesis also remains valid to this day. After all, as Foulquié says, Socratic conversation is a back and forth between singular resp. private models and regulative (universal) models.

Socratic maieutics is a foundation of depth psychological-paranormological dimension of thinking.

A. Lalande, *Vocabulary*, 1968, 589, notes that "maieutics," practiced by Socrates in several of *Platon's* dialogues, including the *Menon*, is the awakening of already unconscious thought content in the interlocutors.

(i) G. Rager, *Hypnosis, sophrologie et médecine*, Paris, 1973, 180/181, notes that already the sophist Antiphon of Athens (-480/-411),-at Corinthos, at a certain time, in a room on the agora, tried to cure people through language and, in that context, practiced dream reading.

(ii) Socrates called the art of consciousness 'maieutikè': in the *Theaitetos* (150/1151c) Platon has him say: "My maieutics has the same general properties as those of the midwives, except that mine helps the men to give birth, and not the women, and looks at the souls in its labor of giving birth, and not at the bodies. (...). So entrust yourself to me who am the son of a 'maia' (midwife) and a midwife myself. Try to answer my questions as accurately - akribeia - as possible". In other words, Socrates thought of the interlocutor as autonomous and, in his autonomy, still approachable somewhere, so that awareness on his part was possible.

MHD 203.

(iii) We know that Socrates and Paton responded to Gorgias of Leontinoi, where the latter questioned the signification (communication process) (see *above pp. 181; 188 (maieutics)*).

*Ew. Beth, The philosophy of mathematics 31v.*, says: "It is (...) remarkable that Platon - this is already abundantly clear from the (...) *Menon* (a dialogue of *Platon*) - adopts the third proposition of Gorgias, at least in so far as he too considers 'communication' - in the sense of transferring - 'knowledge' from one head to another - impossible. (...) The 'communication' can, according to Platon, never serve to impart to someone 'knowledge' which he/she, previously, did not possess. It only brings to full consciousness what he/she - unconsciously - already 'knew' beforehand. Herein consists the obstetric art, which Plato has Socrates, again and again, demonstrate". (o.c., 31 ).

In other words, in the pre- or unconscious, 'knowledge' is present anyway (cfr. *supra p. 164 (Kierkegaard)*). That is true 'depth psychology' somewhere.

(iv) There is, however, more.

(1) according to *Xenophon of Athens (-427/-355)*, a student of Socrates, - in his *Memoirs of Socrates*, 1:2,

a. Sacrificed Socrates to the deities (often at his home, often at the public altars);

b. did not hide the fact that he engaged in manticism (divination; signalling): he used to claim that 'to daimonion' (his personal daimon) gave him signs ('sêmeinein');' thereby Socrates contrasted this kind of manticism with that which consists in responding to the interpretation of divine statements (see *above pp. 45/49*), - of e.g. bird's-eye view, signification, sacrifice.

Reason: the interpreters themselves know that it is the deities, who, through those external signs, give directives.

Thus, e.g., *Xenophon* (o.c., 4:8,5) says that Socrates found that his daimonion was against him considering his defense once he was accused in court.

MHD 204

(2) *Platon, Apology*, 31d, allows Socrates to speak: "Something may seem strange. Here and there I give advice to everyone and occupy myself with just about everything. How is it that (abduction) I, nevertheless, do not dare to act publicly, to speak to the people or give advice to the polis? It is because, as you have already heard me explain many times and in many places, something divine, something like a daimonion, has come to me. It is something that has accompanied me since my childhood,--a voice, which, when the time comes, always prevents me from doing what I would like to do, but never incites me to anything.

Conclusion: a fortune-telling voice heard Socrates--"thanks to a heavenly favor"--who, according to Platon, gave only obstructive directives,--according to Xenophon, also encouraging ones.

Apparently, compared to the Puthia at Delphi, Socrates is not in rapture, but utterly with himself.

(3)a. Already *Ploutarchos of Chaironeia* (+45/+125) wrote a little work "*Peri tou Sokratous daimoniou*" (the genio Socratis). Ploutarchos is a Platonic philosopher and, also, a priest at Delphi.

(3)b. The phenomenon of an inner voice is, in religious phenomenology, frequent. Cfr. *Pinard de la Bullaye, S.J., Les analogies psychologiques*, in: *settimana internazianale di etnologia religiosa*, Paris, 1926, 77, distinguishes

a. profound, b. ordinary, and c. striking phenomena. Among the latter he situates "the inner words" (if distinguished from the ordinary "voice of conscience"). And A. Poulain, *des grâces d' oraison (traité de théologie mystique)*, (of the graces of prayer (treatise on mystical theology), ), Paris, 1901-4, 291ss. (*paroles interieures*), ((inner words),), says that e.g. St. Therese of Avila (*life, xxv/xxvii; castle, 6: iii/ix*) testifies to this:

"The inner words are perfectly clear ...; the soul hears them much more clearly than if they could be heard through the senses.

In other words, the phenomenon as such (as a perception) is unquestionable and, what is more, is present in completely normal persons (the psychologically disturbed can also hear such words, of course). The real question is in the abduction (see *above p. 10; 201*): How can such a voice be explained (regressive reduction); how is it testable? Socrates appears, in virtue of the result, to have verified (cfr. 13 supra).

MHD 205.

In any case: the "daimonic" inner voice of Socrates

(1) proves, unmistakably, a theosophical moment in the "classical" (understand: comprehensible-rational) Socrates (cfr. *supra p. 11 (mythic-theosophical)*; (*12orphic-theosophical*); (*67Empedokl. Appl. mod.*))

(2) insinuates that, for Socrates, in his dialectic, i.e. his conversation technique, insofar as it is really maieutic, abduces a depth psych-paranormological moment, really in accordance with his own perception: i.e., as Socrates, in himself, experiences a daimon(ion), so also he abduces one in the interior of his interlocutors. If this - has not been historically so, then something incomprehensible has happened (cfr. *supra p. 102vv.*) from a hermeneutic-humanist point of view (cfr. *supra p. 56* ('understanding', understand: fellow-humanist-hermeneutic method); - (*142euripidean appl. mod.*)): would, then, Socrates never, ever have thought that dialectic partners -- a daimonic power, possibly in the form of an inner voice, as he, since his youth, experienced himself, was at work? The most elementary essentiality -- the typical hermeneutic moment (in the fellow human sense, at least) was clearly obvious! This seemingly obvious thing rarely comes up, in our rationalist history books of philosophy, where they speak of Socrates. As we saw - *higher p. 177vv.* - CSS. Peirce this preferred thinking.

## **2. The Platonic Dialectic.**

Socrates was not Platon, even though Platon was the genial - or, rather, somewhat, at least - congenial student (cfr. *supra p. 'congenial'*). Congeniality does not thoroughly exclude 'genius' difference. And such is the case here. Let us consider.

(2).1."One identifies, often, (the dialectic) with the theory of ideas. This is, in my opinion, done entirely wrongly. What, already, can be seen from this is that Platon speaks of the 'dialektike techne' (see *p. 114 supra*), translated: the dialectic both skill and science, the art (and science) of discourse." (*EW. Beth, The Wisb. d. w., 32*).

MHD 206.

According to Beth's interpretation, Platonic dialectic amounts to "the art of conversation" ("asking and answering questions, being able to hold oneself and others accountable, formulating sharp definitions, overcoming objections, etc.). In other words: the Socratic conversation. See above.

**(2).2.**"The ideas are the eternal paragons (for Platon) (...), thanks to whose imitation (see *above pp. 193/197*)

**a/** the material world of our surrounding bodies becomes part of being and

**b/** the thinking minds of men become partakers of truth and wisdom ('methexis').  
(...).

The (divine) revelation ("fèchè") has handed down to us that which we call "reality

**a/** does not spring only from the one and the many (see *above p. 5*),

**b/** but also something that is determinate ('peras') and indeterminate ('apeiria') (cfr *supra p. 4 (primal substance)*) as two intertwined moments ('xumfuton').

This implies that - given the way things are - for each of these things we ought to look for a model (example: 'idea') and - given that such an idea is present in him - we will also find it. (...) the deities (...) have handed down to us this way of 'historia' (see *above p. 2 (research)*), of learning from others and of passing on learning to others". (*O. Willmann, gesch. d. Id., I, 1/3*).

No one better than the thoroughly Platonic-minded Willmann knew that the conversation technique Beth is talking about had, in essence, notwithstanding Beth's rather naive-mathematical interpretation, idea exploration - and not, as Beth wrongly insinuates, - idea learning - which would be all too dogmatic-mathematical, in parmenidean style, incidentally - as its content (of back-and-forth of question and answer in group and inductive - socratic on defining conversation).

**(2).3.** Where Beth does get it right, is in his assertion that, at a certain point, Platon saw the 'stoicheiosis' (see *above p. 2*), i.e. the linking of 'elements' into a coherence of ideas (see *above p. 1955vv.* (the three types of 'participation'), saw it as one of the possible subordinate tasks of the exploration of ideas (cf. *Beth, The philosophy of d. mathematics, 36vv.*).

MHD 207.

(2).4. In which Beth, of course, also gets it right, is the ‘anamnesis’ (memory).-- already Socrates had pointed either to what was present in the unconscious (of concepts; see *above p. 202v.*) or, perhaps, to the daimonic in that unconscious (see *above p. 203v.*).

Beth - and in my opinion quite rightly - considers the theory of memory (actually: anamnesis-abduction, nothing more; no real and full reincarnation belief) as (what he calls) ‘a hypothesis ad hoc’ (i.e. something that fits as an abduction into Platon’s stall). This ‘memory’ from a prior existence in the world of ideas (which Platon invariably calls ‘kosmos noëtos’, i.e. (merely) thought-content world) ‘explains’ (one of the possible necessary and/or sufficient reasons) why it is that one ‘understands’ (forms understanding) and the other does not ‘understand’ (does not come to ‘understanding’).

*As appl. mod.* they cited the teachability of moral-social good behavior (eth.-pol.).”Virtue (i.e. eth.-virtue’) is, in someone, not thanks to his nature (‘fysei’), -- also not thanks to learning process (‘didakton’), but the one, who gets share in it (see *above ‘methexis’; p. 195*) to him/her it becomes a ‘share’ through ‘divine ‘moira’ (distributive work; cfr. *supra*, but as a natural force, p. 153), ‘Aneu nou’, without ‘nous’ (*see above p. 119vv.;--verbal effort*)”. Thus *Platon* himself in his dialogue ‘*Menon*’.

*As a second appl. mod.* Beth himself points out that, in the ‘*State*’ (a dialogue), *Platon* disputes the view that one can make ”knowledge enter into a soul, as one gives, to a blind person, the face.” Everyone has, according to Platon in his soul, a capacity and an organ for learning. It is a question of turning this organ with the whole soul away from the visible and perishable things towards the invisible and imperishable ideas, which Platon calls the true ”being” and which is summarized in the one, unique idea of the omnipresent ”good”. (o.c 32). As Beth points out: there *Platon* himself does not venture to recall.

*Last appl. mod.:* in the same ‘*State*’ *Platon* sees in mathematics as a theory of the independent quantitative ‘forms’ (structures) precisely the ‘ideal’ means of practicing the asceticism (dying off) of the ‘nous’ (spirit) in it. No more, in the depths of its dialectic, than that. (Beth, o.c., 32v.).

MHD 208.

**Excerpt. -- Platonic interpretation of the Eurudikè figure.**

G. Schwab, *Greek myths and sagas*, Utr./Antw., 1959, 57/62, recounts, somewhat rationally spun out, Eurudikè 's fortunes.

(1) Eurudikè is the most charming of the Naiades, stream nymphs.

(a) She is married by the mythical singer Orpheus, who is an Appolonian (and thus ouranic, where Eurudikè is chthonic).

(b) her marital bliss was very short: with her playmates, one day, Eurudikè went to dance, on a green meadow or in the green field. But she is chased by the agricultural deity Aristaios, who watches over both agriculture and stockbreeding. While dancing, she was fatally bitten by a viper, at the heel, causing her to go, under the earth' (see *above pp. 161; 168*). Leaving Orpheus as inconsolable.

(2) Viewed with Platonic eye, i.e. abducted, this goes in the following direction.

(a) The concrete-individual (see *above p. 5 (full- identical reality)*) is thought away. Shoots over the abstract: the woman, the river nymph, dancing on the green field, marriage with the husband or spouse, etc., etc..

(b) if possible, the mathematical moment is abducted: here e.g. one nymph vs. many nymphs (see *above p. 206*).

(c) diachronically, history (mythical process) is reduced to a second abstract: the ouranic man married to the chthonic woman loses them after a very short time (which is a typical mythological structure: see *above pp. 112; 133; 137*;

**In passing:** the current structuralists (see *above p. 2 (stoicheiosis); (48below); (90binary editing); 91v. (systems theory); 101vv. (analogy reasoning)*) find in this very platonizing reduction (reduction) to abstracata pretty much the end goal of their analyses).

(d) finally, Platon situates all the foregoing in "the" good, i.e., the summary idea - without more, if need be through an ascending ranking (higher beings, ideas, comprise more, among themselves, than lower, i.e., private ideas).

**Concluding remark.**

(1) **The German Romantics** (see *above p. 166v.*) have left us with a maxim which, perfectly, applies to the typically-Platonic side of the dialectic discussed above: "Grau, mein freund, ist alle theorie. Grün des lebens goldner Baum". "Grau, m 'n friend, ist alle theory. Green of life golden tree".

One only has to go through e.g. the structuralist 'analyses' to meet the devitalization again (see *above p. 162v.*). The socratic-platonic 'science' with its induction method, its 'abstracta' (merely comprehensible entities) has indeed re-established the parmenidean-zenonian 'reasoning' (see *above p. 14v.*) and also the protosophist 'reasoning' (see *above p. 180v.*) and, at the same time, sanitized, but, at the same time, established the devitalization process even more firmly.

**(2) The "devil's circle" of dialectics.**

P. Foulquié, *La dialectique*, Paris, 1949, 21, gives us Platon's own means of reflection: "You have seen - I think - that young people, once they have tasted the dialectic, (a) abuse it, (b) make a game of it. That they (c) use it to contradict incessantly. That they (d) in the wake of those, who refute them (see *above p. 9; 15 (eristics)*; etc.), refute them, in their turn (see *above p. 185*). Like young dogs they find pleasure in pulling and tearing, by reasoning, those who approach them" (*Platon, The State, 7, 539b*).

(3) All this does not prevent the presence, in the dialectic, as Platon (Socrates) once launched it as a 'new philosophy', of a core, which is useful. But then the archaic basic concept 'methexis' (participation) emphasized by M. Eliade (see *above p. 196v.* ). We shall be able to make use of it later on.

Also the 'idea' as a concept, active for and in things and processes (idea-force). Cfr. A. Fouillée (1838/1912), who conceives of all contents of consciousness at once as causal (cfr. *supra p. 92v.*) and activating energies.

MHD 210

**(4) After-effects.**

The "academeis" (academy), Platon's school, goes through an already phases:

1. the older academy, which further elaborates the Platon of his last years, viz. puthagorean Platonism (the ideas are transcendental number forms (see *above p. 4vv.*)

2. The skeptical academy (cfr. *supra p. 65*),

2a. The second academy (Arkesilaos (-314/-240)),

2b. The third academy (Karneades (-214/-129));

2c. The fourth academy (Philon, the teacher of the Roman eclectics (see *above p. 65*) MT. Cicero (1-106/-43));

2d. fifth academy (Antiochos; T.Varro (-116/-27; more eclectic); -- both of the last phases are a loosening from methodical skepticism and a re-dogmatization (eclectic).

3. Neoplatonism (+205/+600) is a puthagorean Platonism that becomes abundantly theosophical (see *above p. 12 (Orphism)*; *67vv. (Empedokles)*; *202/205 (Socrates)*) becomes, in the spirit of late antiquity, with its oriental influences.

**Conclusion:** Platon's after-effects are simply gigantic. Reason is, apparently, the radical openness of mind of dialectics as a conversation technique, which allowed the varying spirit of the times and problems to be accommodated.

**b. The peipatetic (Aristotelian) philosophies. (210/238)**

Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322), the founder of immanent idealism, which claims that the "ideas" are in (immanent) things and their processes;

Aristotle was a student of Platon for twenty years; the education of Alexandros the Great (see *above p. 187*) was entrusted to him; in -335 he founded the peripatos (his school at Athens). The older peripatetics: Theofrastos of Eresos (Ios) (-371/-288) schoolmaster (-322/-288); Aristoxenos of Taranton (-370/ ); Eudemos; Dikaiarchos; Dèmètrios v. Faleron, and others.

**1. Aristotelianism as a generational religious phenomenon. (210/216)**

a. *W. Jaeger Paideia*, I, 208, says that we find primordial mythology at the very core of Aristotle's thought; as appl. mod. he gives the "love" (minnedrift) of the being to the unmoved "mover," who, as it were, a kind of omnipresent deity, "moves" the universe, i.e. makes it go through the process of creation and decay.

MHD 211.

**b.** *P. van Schilfgaarde, Aristotle*, The Hague, 1965, 11, says: "In Aristotle's philosophy fertility, reproduction, creation, come to the fore. No doubt he and Aleksandros held the great conversations about the Samothracian gods".

### ***A Word Explanation.***

**(a)** in -334 Aleksandros, with forty thousand soldiers, crosses the Hell's Ferry. That much time later, he stands, successful on the banks of the Hufasis, a tributary of the Indus (today the Shindu, the Indus). There, on the eastern border of his huge empire, he erects an altar stone as a boundary marker, in which is inscribed, "To Heracles and the Samothrace kabeiroi."

Herakles is a typical hero (see *above pp. 155/165: Euripides' Herakleidai; 190v.: heroic ethics/politics of the Kunics*). -- The kabeiroi, kabiri, the kabires, the Hellenes called 'the great deities' ('megaloi theoi' ('megaloi daimones' too)). These samothrakian deities - Aksiokerses and his son Kadmilos, the goddesses Aksiokersa and Aksiëros - were worshipped on the island of Samothrakè (Samo.thraikè), since archaic times. Phallic rites (see *above pp. 56/64 (especially 61): the ever-living and - life-giving 'fire', 124/128 (Euripides' Zeus-idaios religion, aitherically interpreted); 148/150 (the Dionysian moment)*).

Further asylum law (see *above pp. 156/159*) and maritime protection were linked to the Samothrace "mysteries" (see *above pp. 124/126 (initiation concept)*).

The Kabeiroi were also worshipped in Macedonia Aleksandros' homeland. According to Aristophanes of Athens (-450/-385), *Peace* (a play), were, since long, at Athens initiates of the Samothracean Mysteries. The great orator Dèmostenès of Athens (-384/-322) also alludes to it.

These mysteries were, incidentally, related to those of Dèmètèr, the earth goddess, and of Dionusos.

According to Plutarchos of Chaironeia (+45/+125), precursor of Neoplatonic theosophy, King Philip II (-382/-336), the father of Aleksandros the Great, and the later Queen Olumpias, his mother, were initiated into the Samothraic Mysteries as children.

***Conclusion:*** it is very likely that Aristotle knew these mysteries well.

MHD 212.

(b) FWJ. Schelling (see *above p. 166*) wrote, in 1816, an essay on the deities of Samothrakè, -- proof that the theme has survived antiquity.

Van Schilfgaarde, o.c., 75v., applies the generative ground scheme as follows.

(a) The capstone or syllogism can be schematized as follows: B is A (every human being is mortal); well: C is B (Socrates is a human being); so C is A (Socrates is mortal). Or, o.c. 73, put another way: the middle term B (human) connects the maior (mortal) with the minor (Socrates),-- where A is called maior, because it has a greater magnitude (denotation) than the middle term (there are more beings mortal than just human beings); C is called minor, because its magnitude is smaller than that of the middle term (Socrates is one instance of human).

(b) "The middle term - B (the idea of 'man' as simultaneously belonging to 'mortal' and 'Socrates') - Aristotle calls the 'ground' ('aition'). - With the 'ground' or the 'cause' science begins. The cause, after all, brings forth, as does, in mating, the male seed.

In the syllogism, it is operative, living and counting: one can compare it to a living, creating family tree (...)" (o.c., 75)

(c) "One can understand the syllogism as a strict, proving form of Socrates' conversation (cfr. *supra pp. 200/205* (Socrates' dialectic).-- The conversation too is a living, fertilizing efficacy.

(a) It begins with a question. This relates to the terminus minor, the term of conclusion (C = Socrates): "How is this particularity (with this 'tode ti', 'this-here-and-now', in Aristotelian language play, denoting the concrete-individual)?"

In other words, how is it possible to incorporate that 'this-here-and-now' (C = Socrates) into a scientific construction (about this 'W' see more later)?

(b) The 'architect' of this structure is the middle term (B = human as encompassing C (Socrates as specimen) and itself encompassed by A (mortal)):

(a) The concluding speech is not a derivation from two propositions: such a derivation could never contain anything new, never anything different from what, already, was said in the preceding propositions.

MHD 213.

She would always be "petitio principii" ("a vicious circle or circular reasoning").

(b) The conclusion does not reason towards the conclusion. It starts from the conclusion, wants to justify it: it arranges (cfr. *supra p. 2 (stoicheiosis)*) particularities (C = Socrates, i.e. S (singular), or, also, P (private) and generalities (B = human; A = mortal; i.e. U (universal)) in the future order ('stoicheiosis'). This creates a scientifically sound whole".

(c)"The syllogism is only rarely used explicitly but, after all, it stands silently in the background of any scientific argument.

(1) His (...) 'truth' rests on a business or 'material' content.

(2) its imperative character, its 'correctness' (i.e. logical consequence or rigor) follows from its 'form'. -- This two-sided content and imperative validity, substance and form(force) - characterize Aristotle's philosophy and science."

(d) Aristotle distinguishes different 'figures' (think of course first year: ab and inductive key figure) (...). The example given here - the deductive type or figure - is called the 'first figure'. The others are dependent on it". (cfr. *supra p. 10vv.* (abduction; de-d.; re-d. or in-d.); (201Socr. reduction with ab-, de-, ind. moments)'.

(e)"Aristotle's successor Theophrastus (see above p. 210) examined, in particular, hypothetical closing arguments. 'Rhetorical' reasoning focuses on probabilities or indications." (o.c. 76)

*N. Rescher, Hypothetical reasoning*, Amsterdam, 1964, studied such hypothetical, i.e., uncertain ("problematic") or suspect ("improbable") or, even, assumed to be "false" reasoning.

Also *A. Meinong* (1853/1921), (*Gegenstandstheorie*); *ueber Annahmen*, (object theory); about assumptions), Leipzig, 1910-2, treats these 'rhetorical' reasonings.(cfr. *supra pp. 184/186 (Rhetoric)*).

Aristotle's distinction between apodeictic reasoning (scientific evidence) and 'dialectic' reasoning (rhetorical discourse) rests on this. The latter starts from what the interlocutor (hearer) also assumes (rapport as the basis of argument).

MHD 214.

Cfr. *supra* pp. 181 (Gorgias's critique of the possibilities of understanding); 188 (Socrates's construction of the possibilities of understanding); 203; 207.

In other words, among scientists, the understanding is based on logically certain (apodictic) data (observations ('facts') and reductions); among non-scientists - the great masses - Aristotle foresees a constructive basis, namely, that on which they agree (certain and uncertain or 'dialectical' premises (observations ('facts') and reductions: so e.g. at court, in popular assembly, in ordinary conversation, in 'academic' speech.

**Note.--** In this strict view there is an ideology-criticism (cfr. *supra* pp. 21/24 (*metatheory*); (173 *idol-criticism*)): 'ideology' has the appearance of strict reasoning; science is strict reasoning. All propaganda, which adorns itself with 'scientific' arguments, -- all publicity, which wants to be 'scientific', etc. are not approached naively here. They are usually 'dialectical' (= rhetorical), not apodictic. This implies that Aristotelians are difficult to manipulate, i.e. influenced by rhetoric. Those idiosyncratic (see *above* p. 32 (*method of tenacity*); - (33 *method of authority*) - 177v. (*method of apriory*)), the orthodox and/or the liberal methods should give way to the sensible, i.e. scientific method, which strictly distinguishes between 'apodictic' and 'rhetorical' ('dialectic'). Immediately all indoctrination is cut off.

This strict distinction between 'apodictic-scientific' and 'rhetorical-dialectical' language play (see *above* p. 33vv. (*Wittgenstein*)) also supports, among other things, the distinction between 'pragmatic' and '(purely) logical' (argumentative) conversation. Cfr. *supra* p. 79.

**Note:** Max Scheler's idea of conformity (generative) religion and "science" (professional science, philosophical science) has a curious application here. Cfr. *supra* p. 64 (*Herakl.*); (162 *Eurip.*) 196v. (*Platon*). Aristotle sees, in rigorous reasoning science, a begetting, generation, on the extension of the generative religions of Hellas. So that in those religions there is a model of 'thinking' as process, generative process.

MHD 215.

c. O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie (philosophische Propädeutik)*, Wien, 1959, 409/433 (*Latentes und entwickeltes sein*), (Being, latent and developed), sees, nevertheless, alongside the purposive mine (love) drift (Jaeger; cfr. *supra p. 210*) and the generative process structure (van Schilfgaard; cfr. *supra pp. 210/214*), the ge(n)netic moment: "The need to include a vital-psychic or organic principle in the fundamental concepts, Aristotle recognizes. Even myth he does not reject:

(i) one could call the life spirits of plants 'nymphs' (see *above p. 208*) and 'hamadruades' ('hama.druas' = 'druas', dryade, which is one with a tree (specifically: oak)); (...);

(ii) 'Animated' can be called the sky, as the origin of movement.

(iii) In a sense (cfr. *supra p. 101vv. (analogical reasoning)*) all natural beings have 'life'" (o.c., 410).

Willmann adds (*ibid.*): the word 'fusus' (nature) is an appropriate expression for the vital moment. 'Fusus' means, after all,

a/ the driving force, in, behind the process,

b/ the development, the growth process itself,

c/ the thing so created, the product of the process (cause, process, result).

**Note --** O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id., I*, 479, explains this further: "In the systechny 'dunamis/ energeia' (lat.: 'potentia/ actus'; potential or possible being/ actual or realized being), first of all, the organic process stands before Aristotle.

(i) The living being exists in the seed, 'dunamei', potential, as something that exists only in disposition;

(ii) on the other hand, in its fully developed state, 'energeiai', actual, as something worked out. -- Thus 'dunamis' (potentiality, disposition, disposition) stands in relation to 'energeia' (act, realization) first of all as a germinal state in relation to a state of maturity, (...);

**Conclusion:** two periods of existence of the same being".

**Note.--** O. Willmann, *Abriss*, knots, to what precedes, a methodological scheme: "When the thought movement follows closely how something, from its inception, has developed, then it is genetic (from 'gennètikkos', -- what belongs to genesis; thus better written as 'genetic').

MHD 216

We think 'gen(n)etically: when we e.g.

1. Closely follow the becoming of a plant or
2. The creation of an empire or
3. Checking the history of a literary work, from its first conception to its completion.

We grasp 4. the spatial forms 'genetically', when we grasp (...) the circle as a product of rotation (...) arising.

5. We understand a word family "genetically" when we view it, as growing from its root,

6. a lexicon article, when we derive the various meanings from the root meaning".

Above all Aristotle himself has shown us the genetic method, by always starting from his predecessors and contemporaries, in order to build up a problem state (see *above p. 73: appl. Anax. mod.*), before speaking himself: He situates himself in the tradition (tradition hermeneutics) and does not have the self-willed or liberal pretension of having 'found everything himself'. Yet he also never lapses into the rectitude method: for that he was too personally minded (cfr. *supra pp. 32/33: Herakl. Analogon; 214*).

It also implies that Aristotle thinks creatively eclectically (see *above p. 65*): he founds a new, indeed encyclopedic, system.

**Conclusion:** when we examine Aristotle's generational religious style, we are faced with an impressive fact, which is still valid today as "ktema es aei" (Thoekudides).

Compared to Puthagaras, who postulated cosmic number forms as abductions (axiomata) (*see above p. 4ff.*) with Platon, who postulated ideas as abductions (*see above p. 193ff.*), Aristotle is clearly just as idealistic - in the broad sense of postulating 'thought-content realities' -, but genetically - more immanent. Number forms and ideas are, in Aristotle's system, much more organically fused with living and historical reality. In this sense, he is more 'realistic', more real, in the sense of 'much more attached to perception'. This trait will remain with Aristotelianism, later, in its many phases, right up to the exaggeration, so that a dose of 'platonizing', as a corrective, will work favorably.

MD 217.

## **2. Aristotelianism as a theory of science.** (317/338)

We have heard it, especially from Van Schilfgaarde: Aristotelian thinking wants to be - as much as possible - apodictic and, therefore, purely scientific.

*EW. Beth, The Philosophy of mathematics*, 63vv. Outlines, accurately, the theory of science of Aristotle as follows. It concerns, apparently, deductive or, better, abductive-deductive science. Beth enumerates the system (coll. struct.) 'W' of proposition and of.

**1.** All of W's theorems relate to a certain area of "real" objects. (217/236). Beth calls this Aristotelian 'realism'.

However, on this, two comments.

**(1)** According to Van Schilfgaarde, this should be understood as follows.

**(a)** For Platon (*see above p. 193f*) and Immanuel Kant (1724/1804), the greatest thinker of the European enlightenment (*see above p. 24*), 'science' lies in the inner relation between the judgments,--in the 'autonomous' creative power, therefore, of my 'reason', which 'constructs' 'the thing', as e.g. happens in geometry. (...) In accordance with this, the concluding words (*see above p. 212v (syllogism)*) have a purely 'formal' (i.e., dispensing with any content of the judgments), regulative meaning.

**(b)** For Aristotle and GFW. Hegel (1770/1831), the founder of romantic (*see above p. 166v.*) influenced dialectics (about which more later), 'science' lies in my encounter or 'conversation' with the 'thing', which reveals itself, in that conversation.

For them, the judgment (or thesis) is not an independent act of my reason, but a testimony, (in the form of) an affirmation or rejection, by the 'case'. In accordance with this, the concluding speech (syllogism) (...), for Aristotle and Hegel has a constructive, 'constitutive' power".

In other words, since Platon and Aristotle two thoroughly different conceptions ("interpretations", abductions, nothing more) of "science" have been circulating, which creatively-eclectically (*see high p. 65*) complement each other. -

**(2)** *G. Jacoby, Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik*, Stuttgart, 1962, 11, says: "There exists (!) a total 'field' ('object') of our thinking.

MHD 218.

This field is without limits. It includes everything,--what is real and unreal,--what is already thought and still unthought,--what is contradictory and incongruous,--what is possible and impossible. For ‘unthinkable’ is nothing. Not even the ‘unthinkable’. For, by the fact itself, it is already ‘thought’.”

Jacoby is a rabid defender, in a modern-temporary way, of Aristotle’s logic against the claims of logicians (i.e., those who practice mathematical logic). He correctly interprets Aristotle’s concept of being: all that is not absolute nothing is ”something,” and therefore, in any case ,”real. Also the axiomata (abductions) of e.g. modern-day mathematics and axiomatic-deductive logics. One thinks of the axiomata of non-Euclidean geometries. Were Aristotle alive today, he would, if he applied his concept of being, speak with complete certainty as e.g. Jacoby, his interpreter.

G. Jacoby, o.c., 21ff., rightly opposes, what he calls ‘ontologization’ of Aristotelian logic. Reason: the pure logic of Aristotle looks, in ‘being’ (i.e. non-nothing; *cfr. supra pp. 9; 14 (parmenidean-zenonic fallacy 74vv.(fallacy by Gershenson and Greenberg))*) only at the part-identical moments and these disconnected from the being whole (i.e. from the living-meeting reality). But, within that typically logical complementation, the fact remains: all that is, (as thought object (thought field)), is object of thought operations and thus logical.

**Conclusion:** the dichotomy (complementation) of Platonic-Cantorian science of ideas and/or thought, on the one hand, and, on the other, Aristotelian-Hellenic science of reality is only, as stated (*above p. 217*), apparent: one conception cannot exist without the other and vice versa. More to the point: it is precisely because of this dichotomy that both the one and the other science(s) conception arise.

***Digression on ‘ontology’.***

*cfr. supra p. 9* (parmenidean-zenonic ‘ontology’ (better true: ‘continuity theory’); especially (*5th differential ‘full-, part-, non - identical*)).

MHD 219

**Aristotelian ontology** - Already Platon, against Parmenides and Zenon, went down that road - is essentially identitive, i.e. focused on identity(s).

(1) *Ch. Lahr, Logique, 537s.*, says, "Non datur scientia de individuo" (a medieval Scholastic maxim, (*11: biolog. Appl. mod.*) meaning, "There is no 'science' (possible) concerning the (concrete -) individual"). Lahr gives two reasons.

**a. Synchronous:**

"In all nature there are no two beings or two facts, which are absolutely identical" (o.c., 537). Consequence: definitions, laws, typology, etc. (see above e.g. p. 111/112) would, in order to be strictly reality-based, have to be based on the same facts. (see *above e.g. pp. 111/112*) should, in order to be strictly true to reality ('realistic'), be abducted for each being, each fact - taken individually. Banked and endless task, of course, given the banked and endless wealth of beings and facts of reality, 'being'.

**b. Diachronic:**

"Supposing one does succeed in abducting (definitions, laws, typologies concerning every being, every fact), there is still the fact that every individual changes incessantly and the fact arises and disappears. (...).

"If an object changes in a continuous way, it can never be 'known'; for, while one examines it, it becomes, with respect to itself, different, and one cannot 'know' whether it still exists or what it has become." (Platon, Kr.)

Therefore, the individual cannot become an object of science.

- (a) The endless multiplicity, the extreme complexity,
- (b) its eternal mutability are 'an absolute impediment' to this".

So much for Lahr. But it is clear that what is meant here is not the general concept of 'science',; but the very private concept of 'science of the absolutely identical in space (synchr.) and time (diachr.)', especially when Plato (and Kant) speak.

In other words, we are faced here with a second dichotomy (complementation) - in addition to that of science as the mutual coherence of intellectual content and as the 'language' of reality itself (*see above p. 217*) -, namely that which attributes to 'science' as its object the completely identical and that which, in addition to the completely identical, also attributes to 'science' as its object the not completely identical

MHD 220.

(2) *M. Müller/ A. Halder -Herders kleines philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Basel / Wien, 1959- 228, notes that romanticism (see *above p. 166v.*) conceives the ‘being’ of a being or of being-without-more in a new way, namely as the incomparable-unique, volitional (see *above p. 5*) reality. Thus e.g. an event, a person(s), a cultural operation. One can easily add: a landscape.

There is, strictly speaking, in its full identity with itself, only one Aristotle, only one Euripides. There is, taken full identically (one also says, in mid-century-scholastic language play: ‘materially’ taken, as opposed to ‘formally’ or part-identically) only one city of Athens. There is, always ‘materially’ or according to absolute identity with itself (reflexively, loopily), only one stage figure from Euripides’ works, who is and is called Makaria (see *above p.; 155/167; 144*).-- To this, always romantically, responds the individual understanding, which is a real ‘understanding’, but non-scientific in the sense of structural and/or structural knowledge (similarity/distributive structure; coherence/collective str.). ‘Science’ of the singular, on the basis of the dichotomy: ‘this-here-and-now’/the rest of all that is in fact’ That is the individual or ideographic complement.

(2).bis. *M. Müller/ A. Halder, Herd. kl. phil. Wb.*, 100, says that, concerning ‘logic: apart from the traditional Aristotelian and the recent logistic schools of thought, there is a ‘metaphysical’ logic, which sees the whole as a frame of being and thinking And, immediately, situates all that helps that whole to exist - every concrete being - in that ‘whole’. As one possible application, the authors cite Hegel’s dialectical logic.

In other words, where romanticism - see above (*uniqueness; see also above p. 112 (type as a collection of individuals)*) - sees and wants to understand the singularity (even if this is its own type of ‘understanding’), there it opens the eye of the merely scientifically thinking human being to the concreteness, the mergedness, the totality, -- now not in the abstract sense of e.g. systems theory (*see above p. 91v.*), -- but in the living - organic sense of ‘totality’.

MHD 221.

**Note** -- ‘Organiscism’ is a term, which, often, is confused with concrete thinking. Reason: one confuses concrete totality (‘wholeness’) with abstract (part-identical) totality-- Cfr. supra p. 40vv. (Herakl. ‘totality: first of all hylc); 127vv. (Euripid. ‘totality’, again primarily hylc (aitheric));-- further p. 80vv. (Anaxagoras’ ‘totality’, unit-theoretical rather than hylc and, thus, abstract).

Historically: romanticism thinks and individual and total; but one abstracts, from that total, either the individual (*see above p. 162vv.*), like Kierkegaard, or the totality (*as above p. 40; 142*), like Marx (in Hegel’s wake). Listen to how Kierkegaard, from his exaggeration, puts Hegel’s exaggeration in the thick of things.

“How often have I not developed that Hegel, in fact - like a pagan - makes human beings a species gifted with reason. Reason: in an animal species (*cfr. supra p. 111v. (typolog. induction)*) the individual always has less to mean than ‘the species’. The ‘species of man’ has the peculiarity, - precisely because each individual is created in God’s image - that the individual is higher than ‘the species’. Admittedly, this can be misunderstood and has been fearfully misused. But this is Christianity. And this is where the battle, actually, must be struck”. (*A. VanMmunster, Kierkegaard (a choice of his diaries)*, 103v.) --

**a.** *Cl. Bernard* (1813/1878), *introduction à l’ étude de la médecine expérimentale* (introduction to the study of experimental medicine ), (1865), which became normative, for a good part, for positivist professional science, abductively postulates that every organism (biological) constitutes a typical (*see above p. 111v.*) unity (‘totality’), which Bernard *characterizes* as ‘milieu interieur’ (inner living center) (with which he, in any case, overcomes every mechanism (*see above pp. 66/67; 86vv. (Anaxagor. model); 169vv. (Demokriteic-atomic mod. )*))

**b.1.** K. Goldstein (1878/1965), behavioral descriptive bio-psychological organicist;

**b.2.** *M. Merleau-Ponty* (1908/1961), *phénoménologie de la perception* (phenomenology of perception ), (1945), existential and thus concrete rather than merely organicist psychologist.

MHD 222.

**c.1.** General systems theory (*see above p. 91vv.*) and especially, cybernetics (*see above p. 3*) (*Anaximandr.*); (*right 44balance*); *46vv.* (*border crossing / 'dike' - structure*); *91vv.* (*purposeful system*); even, somewhat, *113vv.* (*finalism or teleology*)) are a generalized 'organicism' or, as the professional language now puts it, 'organismic' theory. -- Yet -- with the exception of Merleau-Ponty -- again, like the previous organismic theories and methods: abstract, part-identical.

**(3)** At last, after eradication of misunderstandings, we can define ontology more precisely. Real ontology as distinguished from any subject science is science of the full identity. If even for a moment the partial identity is taken as the actual object, one is in subject science. In our view the first to have clearly realized this - philosophically, at least - is and remains Hegel. Even if it is true that he has failed both in his purely 'dialectical' (understand: creative-eclectical (*see above p. 65*)) and in his 'organistic' misunderstanding of his own very correct design of real ontology or, as he says, dialectics,

Here understood as science (philosophical science, then) of the concrete individual. One thus distinguishes very sharply the (*198vv.* (pre-socratic and socratic dialectic views); *205vv.* (Platon. mod.); *213v.* (Aristotel. mod.)) dialectics from the Hegelian one, which, until Hegel, wanted to be the only concrete-individual science.

Admittedly, as Van Schilfgaarde, very correctly, saw, Aristotle always starts from the 'tode ti' (this being here and now) - *see above p. 212v.* -, but the fact that Aristotle himself, as a tone-setting 'science', considers mathematics, especially geometry, "the pure expression of 'science'" (*V. Schilfgaarde, Aristotle, 79*), proves, sunnily, that 'science' for him at least remains abstract (part-identical, formal). In this sense, Aristotle is no more 'realistic' than Platon or Kant. "It is Hegel who crosses this border (from abstract to concrete-individual 'science')." (Thus Van Schilfgaarde himself, o.c., 79).

## MHD 223

**Note.--** Ideological criticism we already saw above (*see higher p. 214*). In particular: all that presents itself as apodictically certain assertion, of a scientific nature, and is not, is ideological (Aristotle says dialectical’).

Yet, with Hegel, the word ‘ideology’ and ‘critique of ideology’ takes on a totally new meaning: also and, even especially, apodeictic science - in all its actual and possible forms - is, concretely individually speaking ‘ideology’ (construction of ideas, only partially identical with concrete-individual ‘being’).

Every scientism (*see above p. 70ff.* ) condemns itself to ”ideology” because of its ”formal” (i.e. part-identical) interpretation of ”being”, which by definition, if correctly understood, is and always remains concretely individual. Rationalism - in all its forms, including the Aristotelian-thomistic of mid-century ecclesiastical scholasticism - has forgotten this massive and massive fact, - to such an extent that the ”nismus scientificus”, the mania for being ”scientific” (and not concrete-individual) - see above Lahr’s position on this 219 (which is the ecclesiastical one) -, has been thrust upon us by most Greek thinkers.

**(4)** however, Aristotle himself had all the means in hand to be concrete-individual (and, in that volitional sense, real).

**a.** *O. Willmann, Abr. d. Phil.*, 453, says, citing what Aristotle himself writes (*Peri herm.*, 3 in fine):” ‘Being (‘*einai*’) is not a ‘*sèmeion*’ (characteristic, inheritance, implicate) of an object. Even if one says ‘on’ (‘being’, being), this is an empty (‘*psilon*’) word. After all, it ‘says’ ‘nothing’. (Aristotle means nothing within the totality of ‘being’). Only in connection with something else does it acquire meaning”.

**b.** *E. Treptow, Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Metaphysik und der zweiten Analytik des Aristoteles*, (The connection between the metaphysics and the second analytics of Aristotle, ), in: *Epimeleia* (Munich) 1966, 5, 83f., says, summarizing his study the following.

**(i)** ontology (theory of being, ‘metaphysics’) cannot prove its own object apodeictically (one cannot define ‘being’, ‘being’ (see above p. 219 (Lahr)); only intuitive (direct observation; cfr. *supra* 79v. (pragmatic; thought-economic) induction (of one’s own type) and analogical reasoning (of one’s own type, again) (see *above p. 101vv.*) can serve the ontology as a basis.

## MHD 224

(ii) ontology can - also cannot - prove the foundations of the subject sciences; these must acquire for themselves an object, a method etc. Reason: being is absolutely universal (transcendental) where the objects of the subject sciences - mathematics, biology, geography, etc. - are private. 'Being' - so says Aristotle himself (*see above p. 223*) says nothing unless in connection with 'something', i.e. with private and singular data.

c. The question arises, rightly, to what then does ontology serve! We show this by an appl. mod. of Aristotelian subject science.

(1) **Observation.**-- All men have, at certain times (time) and places (space) observed the phenomenon -- i.e. the undeniable fact (*see above p. 65 (skepticism); (182phenomenism); 191v. (phenomenism)*) - of the lunar eclipse observed.

(2)a. **Abduction.**-- Aristotle gives a first interpretation (Treptow, o.c., 51): if (lunar) eclipse amounts to the absence of (lunar) light, then the astonishing fact (*see above p. 10*) of eclipse becomes comprehensible (necessary and / or sufficient reasons); regress. verkl.);

Which for Aristotle makes possible a first 'nominal' or 'semantic' definition: 'sterèsis tis fotos' (absence of light). In this definition of lunar eclipse there is already a kind of science of the fact and essence of the phenomenon. Let us say: a lemma (*see above p. 10*), i.e. a provisional interpretation, which one is not sure is correct, but it is used as if it were correct.

(2)A. **bis. Abduction.** -- Aristotle says on this: one can define eclipse as the fact that the moon, of itself, is incapable of shadowing. Which is correct. -- However, as in abduction 1, so also here: the true definition, which is the causal or causal definition (not only necessity, but also sufficiency), has not yet been reached.

(2)a.ter. **Abduction.** -- Aristotle says: if in the interval 'moon/sun' the earth is pushed in between, then, only, really, the phenomenon is causally indicated; i.e. really explained. But then there is a full, cause-indicating definition.

MHD 225.

One sees the fundamental role of definition or determination of being in Aristotelianism (*cf. supra p. 188* (Socratic maieutics with its inductive conceptualization and determination); 200/202 (appl. model of 'definition')). The definition is the 'precipitation' (image, model (*cf. supra p. 5*)) of observation-with-determination (abduction "the full definition, the 'actual 'ti esti' (what is right it), is then: "the eclipse is the failure of the light of the moon (abd. 1), for the reason of the interposition of the earth (between moon and sun) (abd. 3) - because the moon does not give light of its own accord (abd. 2)" (*cf. Treptow, o.c., 51*).

It is clear that the basic rule of "necessity and/or sufficient reasons" (separately necessity, jointly sufficient) is decisive here, in the defining itself:

1. The absence of light (abd. 1),
2. The lightlessness of the moon (abd. 2) are necessary factors in explanation, but they are not sufficient; individually they have their effect, but insufficiently.

Collectively and together with the actual cause, which is the system concept (collective structure) - they really 'explain'.

**(3)b.** From the foregoing complete definition deductions can be made concerning the future behavior of the moon (in unison with sun and earth), which are model-identical with the definitions (*see above p. 79v. (pragmatic abd.)*).

**(3)c. Peirastic reduction.**

If the deductive predictions come true effectively (verification), then new facts show that the definition appears to be correct as an interpretation. *Cfr. supra p. 12v.*

Now where is the ontology active here? She is the horizon (M. Heidegger's expression), i.e. she bestows the necessary and / or sufficient basic abductions, which are identitive. It is clear that only the coherence of moon with sun and earth (and the three properties of moon, sun and earth, understood with them) is explanatory. Well, 'coherence' is one type of partial identity of (three) full identities: the moon, under point of view of giving light or not, is partial-identical (i.e. not isolable from sun and earth). To see such an identities is precisely ontology.

MHD 226

‘Being’ is identity (full or partial identity). Yet the full identity of the moon (with that of the sun and the earth) is only a part (member, element) of the whole ‘being’. That gaping, gap, between private and singular being, on the one hand, and, on the other, universal (transcendental) ‘being’ can be called, with M. Heidegger (1889/1976), the fundamentalontologist among existential thinkers, ‘ontological distinction’ (ontologische Differenz).

This gap is such that, on the one hand, ‘being’ is the horizon, within which every (singular and/or private), ‘being’ allows itself to be situated (ordered) - cfr. Stoicheiosis (*see above p. 2*) -, yet, on the other hand, one can never deduce a (singular or private) ‘being’ from the universal (transcendental, comprehensive, omnipresent) ‘being’.

That this tension “‘being’/’being” is really so is shown by the eidetic or essential distinction (‘eidetic differenz’): the being of a being (‘being’) - its ‘eidos’ (Platon, Husserl) - is what there is to ‘being’ in something. One cannot say what something is, if, as a horizon, ‘being’ in general is not, at least implicitly presupposed. To this comes down the so-called priority of ontology (and, immediately, philosophy, --for it is nothing but ontology) over the subject sciences, which situate themselves within that horizon willy-nilly.

### ***Comparison with Hegel’s “deduction”.***

(1) GWF. Hegel, How ordinary human reason conceives philosophy, -made clear by the works of Herr Krug (1802).

Krug understood ‘deduction’ in Hegel’s dialectic (say, concrete-individual thinking in the rationalist sense: he imagined Hegel ‘deducing’ all things from a-priori principles (abductions) - i.e. from abstract thought - and thereby seeking to ‘prove’ the ‘necessity’ of those things. Krug had challenged Hegel to ‘deduce’ the existence of every dog and cat, even the existence of his penholder, from ‘the concept!

(2) Hegel served Krug in reply.

(a) ‘proving’ the existence of dog, cat, penholder is useless. That existence is given. Hegel’s point of departure is ‘the living whole’ (of ‘being’), in which the fact (observation, here of the banalities ‘dog’, ‘cat’, ‘penholder’ etc. occurs, as given.

MHD 227.

In other words, existence is the starting point,--even in the case of the explanation of the lunar eclipse.

**(B).1. Abduction.**

The abduction of 'immediate' consciousness (164 Kierkegaard); 2; 233 (c.s.), (something that, somewhat, refers to the 'philosophy of common common sense' (*Cl. Buffier, SJ, Traité des vérités premières* (1717);-- *Th. Reid* (the Scottish school) (1710/1796), *An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense* (1764)) tends to find the dog, the cat e.d.m. or even the lunar eclipse 'natural' (i.e. without evoking any problem): the existence of said facts and the phenomena themselves are there, without question. In Hegelian language: the thesis or proposition.

**(B).2. Abduction.**

After this first, 'immediate' or 'naturally' 'spontaneous' 'thetic' abduction, there comes wonder: suddenly those things are not (anymore) 'natural', self-evident: the question of how, by which, why, etc. arises. This is called the indirect reaction (abduction): antithesis ('courtship').

**(a1)** Seen with the eyes of a Kepler, a Newton e.g., it becomes: 'If the moon revolves around the earth, according to orbits so and so mathematically and mechanically expressible, then that astonishing fact is 'explained' (understandable).

**(a2)** With the eyes of a biologist e.g., the dog, cat, etc. 'becomes' a species (type; *cfr. IIIvv. (typological reduction)*): if so (typically) denoted, then dog, cat, etc. becomes intelligible (biologically speaking).

Behold two possible abduction types (intelligibility types: cosmological, biological). Two 'reversals' (antitheses).

**(b)** With the eyes of Hegel, however, who looks on concretely-individually ("dialectically") in wonder, it becomes yet another abduction. Kepler's, Newton's view reduces the phenomena to their mathematical-mechanical.

**(1)** That is isolating a part ('moment') from the whole: the qualitative moment also counts! One thinks of the lunar eclipse simply as a human experience.

## MHD 228

The same is true of the dog, the cat: as a pet e.g., man "experiences" something about his animal that is qualitative and not ordinary type knowledge.

Synchronous siting in the whole.

(2) Reducing professional science, secondly, misses the diachronic moment: 'being' is a gigantic process. In that process, the 'phenomenon' of dog, cat,-- penholder, - moon, lunar eclipse, etc., occurs: Hegel sees this as a sequence of 'phases' (which he calls moments). Out of the unreceived, undeveloped 'being' of the beginning of that process emerge, simultaneously and in succession, in a universe-encompassing event of differentiation, all beings. In this Hegel situates cat, dog, penholder and moon, etc.

Diachronic situating in the whole.

Looking with Hegel's eyes means both the naive, non-questioning (taking everything for granted) mentality (abduction 1, i.e. the immediate abd.), and the scientific-scientific mentality, which, in itself, is already non-naive, wonderfully questioning, antithetical consciousness (abduction 2, i.e. the indirect abd.), 'deny', i.e. see it as private and 'finite' in relation to the whole as a process (of 'being'). It is the look, which, in the second power, is 'antithesis'.

(a) well, Hegelian-dialectical 'deduction' says something: If the whole and the total process exist, then this (singular, private) phenomenon is 'comprehensible' here (space, and now (time) as a 'moment', i.e.

(i) as a member of the total collection (the being, -- the whole, the process),

(ii) and included as part of it in the course of the process. 'Moment' thus means something twofold:

1/ included in the coherence of the whole (synchr.)

2/ included in the course of the process (diachr.). The whole process, the whole 'is' not(s) - empty (*see above p. 223*) without the moments. The moment, all moments together 'are' not(s). - Horizonless - without the whole, without the process, which is the 'being'. Both - whole, process;-- moments - are only understandably correlative.

MHD 229

Dialectical 'deduction' is, then, secondly, to say: If this phenomenon here-and-now, that phenomenon there-and-then, all phenomena exist, then the (universal, transcendental, all-encompassing) whole and process is intelligible' as its 'horizon'.

The concrete is not there without the individual (and private), is not there without the concrete (fused with the whole process).

**Conclusion:** we face a double antithesis:

(i) the opposition between the immediate and the mediate (which is, e.g., biological and cosmological);

(ii) the contradiction between the first - professional science - indirect and the second - philosophical-dialectical - indirect.-- The thesis has been reversed (*see above p. 51*) into a first and second courtship.

### **(B).3. Abduction.**

One now reads first *p. 65* (creative eclecticism (synthesis of antitheses)); even, as a model, *p. 24* (dogmatic, septic, critical)).

Indeed, the ontological difference between (finite) moments and (infinite) processual whole forces Hegel to think the moments of thesis (thesis) and courtship (antithesis) together and together (cfr. *supra p. 4* (*Puthag. 'harmony' 24/26* (*Kristensen*); *40vv. (harmony of opposites)*)).

This is done in two ways.

1/ The naive-immediate sense (common sense), which took everything for granted, yet was curious (and thus questioning), is, in a sense, right: after the explanation (subjective; dialectical), man resigns and finds the phenomenon and/or the whole process again, on a higher plane, self-evident. Synthesis.

2/ The subject-scientific-meaningful and the dialectical-meaningful sense are, at first sight, conflicting, yet, finally harmonious:

(a) the subject science consciousness gains, in depth, by seeing philosophically dialectically itself as one moment in the whole process and

(b) dialectical consciousness gains by incorporating, in precision, Subject-Scientific moments. Synthesis of opposites.

(1) Thesis, (2) courtship, (3) summary as structure.

MHD 230.

**Note.--** For a relatively simple overview of Hegel's dialectic, see *Ga. Van den Bergh van Eysenga, Hegel* (ed. Ha. Ett), The Hague, s.d. A.m. 67/69 (*Hegel's criticism of Krug and of Newton*);

Thorough is *D. Dubarle/A. Doz, Logique et dialectique*, Paris, 1972; especially the mathesis and the logique serve, here, as critical starting points; interesting especially is o.c., 201/237 - (*Usage et abus du mot 'dialectique'*).

**Note.--** *L. Vax, l' empirisme logique (de Bertrand Russell à Nelson Goodman)*, Paris, 1970, 10s., gives a 'critique' of the Hegelian thought of B. Russell (1872/1970), which, of course, in the scientificism (see above p. 70vv. (Anaxag. model)). Russell proceeds from the systechy 'atomism' (the universe is a collection of individuals)/ 'monism' (the universe is a continuum, a coherence). B. Spinoza (1632/1677), the Cartesian, and Hegel are models of what Russell calls 'monism'. He caricatures monism as follows:

(1) initial statement: 'I am an uncle'.

(2) 'Monistically' interpreted, this implies: the 'complementary' statement "I have a cousin" ("I have a cousin"). These statements imply complementary: "I have a brother (sister)" and, immediately, complementary: "I have a sister-in-law (brother-in-law)".

Which, complementarily, implies that I and my brother (sister) say "I have parents." And so on. And so on. And so on and so forth!

"Each of the being, who inhabit this world, would not exist without the other being. (...) No human being allows himself to be isolated - except by abstraction - from the whole human world. This, in turn, is situated in the world of living beings. Etc. ... The isolated individual is an abstraction. Only the totality is concrete". (o.c., 9/10).

(3) 'Atomistically' interpreted: the universe is a collection of singularities, which are distinct, like a heap of sand consisting of individual grains of sand. Each grain of sand is a concrete reality. It is their collection, the pile of sand, that is an abstraction.

Two comments.

1/ as an analogy (*see above p. 101vv.*) Hope Sand is certainly debatable as a model of the universe.

MHD 231

Incidentally, Russell, as a pacifist advocate of human rights, has seen, in his actions, the opposite of a lot of grains of sand in humanity.

Cfr. *Sj. Doorman, B. Russell*, in: *CP. Bertels / E. Petersma, ed., Philosophers of the 20th century*, Assen / A'm / Bruss., 1972, esp. 33/36 (emotional commitment; political fil.).

Russell gives the inevitable impression, in his polemic with Hegel, of speaking not scientifically but rhetorically (out of "emotional allergy").

2/ The present systems theory shows, in its far-reaching applicative side, that the universe is more than a loose heap of grains of sand: one reads e.g. *L. Apostel, ed., de eenheid van de cultuur (naar een algemene systementheorie als instrument van de eenheid van ons kennen en ons handelen)*, (the unity of culture (toward a general systems theory as an instrument of the unity of our knowing and acting), Meppel, 1972, to see how, in fact, cohesion does bring together the 'loose grains of sand' in the human domain. It is not, however, that the authors of the book are dialecticians in Hegelian style!

It should be noted that Russell does caricature a weak side, which e.g. Kierkegaard - albeit from an analogous exaggeration in an individualistic sense - also saw (see above (cfr. *supra pp. 220/222: organicism criticism*)).

***Comparison with Max Scheler's "ideation". (231/236)***

*M. Scheler* (see above pp. 64; 196v.; 214), in his *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, (The position of man in the cosmos), Darmstadt, 1930, 60ff., briefly explains what 'ideierung' is. The term designates the process by which our consciousness constitutes an idea. We summarize this in order.

(A) Perception.--"I have pain in the arm." Behold the appl. mod., from which Scheler starts.-- The ambiguity is evident from what follows.

(B)I. Abductions of "technical intelligence". -- By this word he designates professional science. Or 'positive' science.

(B)I.a. Nosological (disease-causing) abduction.--"How did that pain arise?". To this the physician-nosologist responds, "If in the arm a 'tumor' is proliferating, then the pain-inducing fact is understandable (necessary and/or sufficient ground)." First 'positive-scientific' abd.

(B)I.b. Therapeutic abduction.--"How can that pain be eliminated?"

MHD 232

From this questioning, the practicing physician abducts, again, differently: 'If the (nosological) diagnosis is correct, then - because of model identity (*see above p. 79v.*) - this medicine will be therapeutically valid here and now!

*Helmut Kuhn, Auf den Spuren der via media (Max Scheler als Faust)*, (On the trail of via media (Max Scheler as Faust)), in: *Rheinischer Merkur* (1974:33), says that M. Scheler "resisted the exclusive claim to scientific validity of positivists". 'Positivism' (also: 'empiricism') in the more recent sense of David Hume (1711/1776), the pinnacle of English enlightenment (*see above p. 21ff: Xenophanic model*), and of Auguste Comte (1798/1857), the socialist positivist,

(i) should by no means be confused with the positive philosophy of a romantic nature of e.g. Schelling (*see above p. 166v.*),

(ii) yet boils down to two tenets:

a. Facts ('facts', 'les faits') in the sense of sensory perceptible phenomena - cfr. *supra pp. 70/123* (Anaxagorean model); *169/180* (Demokritean model); (182'empiricism'); *191v.* (kurenaic sens(ual)ism and phenomenism) - are the sole, all other data (however human) exclusive basis of 'science';

b. Those "facts" (in that very secular sense) include:

b.1. Adopted ("protocol statements") and

b.2. according to their lawful connections (*see supra pp. 92/96 (Baconian induction)*) to be theoretically formulated (*cfr. supra 73 (empirical and theoretical); 82/83 (harmony of observation, resp. experiment and 'analysis')*).

From the references, indicated a moment ago, it is clear how Greek also empiricism, positivism in the modern-present sense, is. The question arises: how does Scheler overcome this scientism?

### **(B)II. Abductions of 'phenomenological' philosophy.-.**

'Phenomenology' (as a word, first used by *JH. Lambert, Neues Organon* (1764), and, thereafter, regularly redubbed) is the name for the method of E. Husserl (1859/1938; *see above p. 79* (pragmatic)). It can be defined as the science (-logy) of 'phenomena' (data of all kinds: ideas, feelings, perceptions) which reveal themselves in consciousness (phenomeno-).

MHD 233.

(1) The phenomenologist, like the empiricist/ positivist, addresses facts, but reduces (“reduction”; here in the descriptive sense) to facts of consciousness.

In view of the fundamental importance of this premise (abd.), we will let a solid connoisseur speak for himself: A. De Waelhens, *Existence et signification*, (Existence and meaning,), Louvain/ Paris, 1958, 89s, who discusses a geographic appl. mod:

“The handbooks of geology ‘explain’ mountains, rivers and forests; they ‘describe’ their formation.-- Yet, in the last analysis, I -- as an ordinary person -- cannot know, about which the writer of the manual is speaking to me, unless we, first of all, -- like him and with him -- agree that we call ‘mountain’, ‘river’, and ‘forest’ that which we meet (257: *Peirc. Mod*; 112 *biol. Mod.*) by going ‘to the outside or into the mountains’” (o.c., 89).

In other words, long before geologists ‘abducted’ the geographic phenomena, people - from prehistoric times to the present - have ‘met’ the same phenomena, i.e. known them as facts of consciousness. That, beyond this first, ”naïve” (“immediate”, *see above p. 227*)”encounter”, confrontation, contact with the phenomena, other ”encounters” (understand: abductions) are also possible, - prove to us the mythical transformations of these naïve-immediate givens. For example, in the mythical abduction (*see above p. 13; 172*), the mountains regularly function as meeting points of the underworld, the earthly world and the heavenly deity. Cfr. *supra p. 83/85* (systechy ‘visible/ Invisible’).

As stated above, professional science - it too - exceeds the ”facts” of ordinary, immediate consciousness, but reasoning.

**Conclusion:** both myth (*106 Anax. Wn.*) and professional science (scientistics) converge in the single living world of”immediate,” day-to-day experience.

(2) The phenomenologist disables (= reductive moment):

a. all tradition (what others have taught us about the phenomenon; *cfr. p. 33 supra* (*righteousness method*));

b.1. All subjective judgments (what we, each of us, individually, ”think” about the”phenomenon” (*cfr. supra p. 32* (*idiosyncratic method*)), *177/179* (*liberal method*));

MHD 234.

We emphasize that phenomenologically speaking, even the liberal method - insofar as it is a-priority (assuming subjectively abducted axiomata; - whether materialistic or idealistic-spiritualistic is of no importance) - should be eliminated;

**b.2.** all theoretical abductions (hypotheses, proofs, etc.).

**Result:** 'Die Sache selbst' (to pragma), i.e. the given in consciousness and only that given. 'Zu den Sachen selbst' is the slogan Husserl formed to express that, that object-bound.

**b.3.** The 'I' and its approach ('the acts' says Husserl; e.g., my aversion to a myth, which I approach phenomenologically; my preference, my involvement ('engagement') in a political phenomenon).

**c.** The factual existence of the consciousness-fact or -phenomenon, situated outside my actual consciousness of it.-- Also, yes, especially that, Scheler considers especially of decisive importance: the pure idea is exposed only if its factual existence is 'waived'. This does not imply that this extramental actual existence ('existence', cf. *supra pp. 162/167 (Kierkegaard; exist)* is 'denied' or 'regarded as unimportant without question'.

On the contrary. But methodical elimination is necessary to obtain the pure (219+111: non datur scientia de individuo + typol. ind.) eidetic or "ideating" beholding (intuition).

That - that only - is true intentional or Husserlian phenomenology. 'Intentional' because the 'intentio' (the mid-century Scholastic word for consciousness) or orientation of our consciousness toward the conscious facts is its core. 'Encounter', by the way, in this language game of phenomenology means 'intentio' (not to be confused with will or intention, which is only one type of full 'intentio').

Only now, after these essential clarifications, can we take up Scheler's text again. Which we do now, immediately.

### **(B)II.a. Scheler's own 'ideational' abduction"**

"I can, however, also conceive of the same pain in the arm as an applicative model of the very alienating and, in the highest degree, astonishing (*see above p. 10 (surprising discoveries)*) essentially profound situation, namely, the 'fact' (even such a thing is 'fact', though this is not 'fact' in the positivist sense; *see above p. 232*) that this world is 'uberhaupt' (as such) stained with something like 'pain', 'evil' and 'suffering'.

MHD 235.

In that case - in that abduction I will ask the question differently:

(1) "What 'is' (*see above p. 218vv. (ontology)*) now - actually - the 'pain' itself, apart from the 'fact' that I have them now (time) and here (space) itself (full identity)?"

(2) "How, secondly, should (must: necessary and / or sufficient conditions) the 'ground' (here in the sense of 'horizon': *cfr. supra p. 226 (ontolog. difference); 228 Hegel 's totality of things be there so that such a thing as 'pain without more' ('evil without more; 'suffering without more')* is possible?" (*Compassionate Understanding: 163v. (Kierkegaard), 39*).

One sees the dichotomy of Aristotle (ontology/ subject science), Hegel (totality/ moment) returning in the form of 'phenomenon'/'world horizon. An identical view of reality is hidden under different terms.

**(B) II.b. Buddha's applicative "ideation".**

Sidharta Gautama, as 'mouni' (ascetic) 'buddha' (the awakened one; *cfr. supra p. 31vv. (Herakl. model of 'awakening')*) nicknamed, lived in India between -600 and -500. Scheler sees in his conversion history an appl. mod. of his own eidetic ideation.

(1) "The prince sees one poor, one sick, one dead, after being kept, in his father's palace, for years, isolated from all 'negative' (i.e. representing pain, evil and suffering) impressions.

(2) He 'abducts' ('grasps'), however, those three accidental ('contingent') here-now-so (space/time/phenomena) looking facts. Immediately (intuitively-inevitably) - the eidetic or ideating beholding - as simply applicative models of a, in them to be grasped (abducible) essential state of the world (the universe)." (o.c., 60f.).

One sees, clearly, in the dichotomy "phenomenon that is 'negative', world state," the model identity between Scheler's phenomenology and Buddha's religion.

MHD 236.

**Conclusion.--** Scheler summarizes the role of ideas, which emerge from the ideation process.

1. They put, at the disposal of all positive sciences, the supreme abductions ('axiomata') first, on which only the direction (note : Scheler, like Aristotle, limits himself to the 'supreme' abductions, i.e. the ontological-ideal, not the abductions specific to every professional science, which, she herself, has to draw up) for a 'fruitful (a) perception, (b) deduction and induction, thanks to intelligence (see above p. 231 ('technical intelligence')) and discursive thinking, can be pointed out.(thus, literally, Scheler).

2. They offer, for philosophy (metaphysics), whose final goal is "the knowledge of absolute being," as Hegel aptly said, "the window opened on the 'absolute' (being)!" (Thus, again, literally, Scheler, o.c., 61f.).

**Note.--** Noteworthy that Scheler too defends the devitalization of the merely intellectual-rational 'ideas', which he, however, defends as that through which man is like reaching above the pure animal. (o.c., 61: 'The animal is not capable of such a thing as ideation'), observes with bitterness, incidentally (see *first p. 162/168 (malakia)*): "The 'spirit' (i.e. the ideative faculty in man) 'ideates' life. But life alone possesses the capacity to make the spirit - from the stage of its simplest goal-directing activity to its operation, to which we attribute 'spiritual' (transcending matter) meaning - workaday and realize it." (o.c., 96).

This is, Schelerian speaking, tragic, for 'life' is - at least, for the Scheler of the last period, in which he had lost his Catholic faith - 'blind urge', i.e. - according to himself literally - life urge, (*supra 32.2v.*) sailing through the whole cosmos (from 'dead' matter to spiritual man) which stands 'blind' in the face of all spiritual (higher) ideas and values, -- which Scheler - one is not frightened - calls 'Dämonisch' (demonic; cfr. *supra p. 37 (Herakl. mod. of 'demonia')*; (*47 polyth.-demon.*); --56vv. to 64; 126vv. (*chthonic rel.*)) is called.

MHD 237.

So much for the long but absolutely necessary commentary on the first Aristotelian axiom on 'W' (science).-- The rest of the science-founding axiomata will now come across as sunlit.

**2.** All propositions (= judgements, statements) of W are 'true'. -- The explanation of this is located higher *p. 217v.* (G. Jacoby's interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of being as a 'field' of our consciousness).

**3.** If certain propositions belong to W, then an arbitrary logical inference (see *supra pp. 212/214 (syllogistics)*) from those propositions belongs to W as well.-- This proposition justifies the name '(axiomatic-) deductive 'science (cfr. *supra p. 11v.* ). In particular: the application of syllogistics (in its deductive figure), to propositions of W, gives as a logical result, however often repeated, each time propositions, which, within the system W (see *above p. 21/24 (metatheory)*) fit as elements of the same structure (see *above p. 2 (stoicheiosis)*).

**4.a.** There are, within the system W, a finite number of terms (concepts, ideas; cfr. *supra p. 193v. (Platon. idea; cf. 232/236 (Husserl. Schelerian idea); 200/202 (socrat. 'concept')*) demonstrable of such a nature that 4.a.1. their meaning needs no further explanation (= first evidentiary postulate; cfr. *supra p. 223v.* (bottom: intuitive induction; *analogy reasoning*); *225v. (gap, ontol. distinction)*). As one says: "The concepts in question are, on first conscious thought through, 'somewhere obvious'" - - Which, of course, is highly questionable.

**4.a.2.** The meaning of all other terms -- the complement -- employed in W can, solely and exclusively, be described by means of the aforementioned (basic) terms.-- This points to the completely closed system (cf. *above p. 91vv. (quasi-closed system)*).

**4.b.** There are, within the closed system W, a finite number of propositions of such a nature that 4.b.1. their truth seems 'obvious' (cfr. *Ad 4.a.1 (evidentiary postulate)*) (*second evidentiary postulate*);

MHD 238.

**4.b.2.** The complement (all other propositions within the closed system W) can be derived, pure logical reasoning (cfr. syllogistics; *supra* p. 11; 212vv.), from the aforementioned basic propositions ('axiomata' stricto sensu).

*Note.--* Beth himself says, herewith, that postulates 4.a.2. and 4.b.2. Express the 'stoicheiosis' (cfr. *supra* p. 2) typical for the aristotelian conceived ax.-deduct. science. The 'archai' (principia, principles), also 'amesa' (immediately, i.e. without deductive processing, evident basic concepts and sentences) are, aristotelically, of course, valid at the same time as points of departure and as parts (file division)). One thinks of the begetting-religious axiom (see *above* p. 210vv. (*esp.* 213)), which shines through here.

*Note --* it is self-evident that Aristotle recognizes two thoroughly different systems W:

(1) the ontology, which works with universal being terms (see above p. 217v. (G. Jacoby's field of thought)) and

(2) all possible professional sciences, working with private and/or singular being terms.-- This does not prevent that, as axiomatization-deduction succeeds, the system W outlined above is model-identical in both types of science

Incidentally, to our days, although differences concerning what is called 'evident' (evidentiary postulates concerning terms and judgments; especially at the very base (first concepts and first propositions)) also, the system W remains valid. Thoe kudidean: a 'ktèma es aei'! This is a definitive achievement.

### **3. After-effects.**

1. The paleoperipateticists (see list p. 210) turn - oh irony of peripatetic fate - away from ontology. They do, like their contemporaries, partly, at least, to positive or professional sciences of all kinds (see *above* p. 70vv. (Anax. mod.) and to folk ethics/politics.

2. The later peripatetics up to and including the Theosophical-Alexandrian (the latter between +400 and +700) - indicating the enormous vitality of Aristotelianism, even in late antiquity - evolve, like the later Platonists (see above p. 210), with their times.

MHD- 239.

**Ia (2)b. *The decline of Attic philosophies*** (-320/+200). (239/241)

**Introduction.**-- The other name for this time period reads

1/ Hellenistic-Eastern philosophies

2/ 'Hellenistic-Roman philosophies! Indeed, twice the international constellation changes.

(a) In -323 Aleksandros the great dies. Hellenism, i.e., the spread and dissipation of Hellenic culture sets in full force, which is called "Hellenism" (JG. Roysen (1836)).

(b) Between -200 and -30, the Romans penetrate those Hellenistic empires with their armies and incorporate them into their Empire. But Hellenistic culture also conquers Rome.

**Result:** Hellenistic-Roman period, lasting until after +200, of course. With that, the Greeks learn to think outside their narrow little country.

### **General Issues.**

*CJ. Bird, Greek philosophy, III, (The helinistic-roman period), Leiden, 1939, 1/3,* lists the characteristics.

1. Philosophy becomes school or academic philosophy: the Platonic Academeia ('academy' in the strict sense), the peripatetic school ('lukeion', lyceum),-- later the Stoic school (+/- -300) and the Epicurean school (+/- -307).

Exception: the kuniekers (*see above pp. 189/191*) popularize their philosophy to every benevolent person.

2. The main concern is:

a. amidst the uncertainties of large-scale empires,

b. as an individual

b1. moral-social good living and

b2. being happy. The "telos," goal (*see above p. 173*) of conscientious and happy living, governs thought.

*Claire Préaux, le monde hellinistique (le Grèce et l' Orient)* (the hellinistic world (Greece and the East)), (-323/-146), Paris, 1978, II, 607, says that three types of response to this concern for salvation occur.

a. The novel (e.g. Heliodoros of Emesa, Theagenes and Charikleia) and the new Attic comedy (which is euripidean in influence; *cf. supra p. 123vv.*) express, on the one hand, the sense of uncertainty (a series of adventures (war, corsairs) as fate), yet, on the other hand, also hope by, often, offering a happy ending (good outcome) as the outcome.

b. the religions of salvation, which in mysteries (*see above pp. 124vv.; 148vv. (Euripid.mod.)*) provide salvation from fate,--on the theosophical basis (*see above pp. 12v. (orphic model); 67/70 (Empedokl. mod.); 202vv. (Socr. mod.)*).

MHD 240.

**c.** The Hell.-Rom. philosophies. - Art (novel, comedy) and religion are forms of thinking. Edoch they usually get stuck in the rhetorical language game: thoroughly logical thinking minds want deepening, by rat.-intell. means.

Three types predominate (240/241)

**c.1.** The skeptic phil.-- cfr. supra p. 65. (-320/+200).-- Sextos Empeirikos, Sextus the 'empiricist' (cf. supra p. 73 (Anax. mod.); (170democr. mod.); (182protosof. mod.); (191kurenaic mod.), purrhonic hupotuposes ('hupotyposis' = model), 1: 4, says:

"The skeptical dunamis (reasoning) opposes the phenomena and the 'noöumena' (nooumene, i.e. what, in virtue of nous, thinking, is abducted, following the phenomena) and this in any way. Consequence: we go through the 'isostheneia' (see above p. 182 (contrary reasoning); 19v. (zenonic pocket position)), i.e. undecidability, of the facts and reasonings, first, through to 'epoche' (suspension of judgment) and, then, to 'ataraxia' (resignation)."

One cannot more brilliantly characterize skepticism as a whole.

**(i)** undecidability of data and arguments

**(ii).a** order suspension ('I, we, - don't know');

**(ii).b** acquiescence ('I, - we, - acquiesce in it').

The method is eristics (see above pp. 15/20 (zenon. mod.); 188/189 (megaric mod.), logical strict refutation, falsification. (cfr. 198v. (negative, falsifying dialectic)).

Three types.

**a.** Ethical-political skepticism. -- Purrhon of Elis (-360/-270),- hence the name 'purrhonism' (philosophy of doubt);

**b.** methodical skepticism.-- see above p. 210 (Skept. Acad.);

**c.** Systematic skepticism.-- Purrhonism and academic skepticism become thoroughly (creatively -ecl., but falsifying; see above p. 65).-- Aïnèsidèmos v. Kn. (see above p. 94v.); Sextos Empeirikos of Mutilene (+/- +150) falsifies logic, physical, ethics-politics (philosophy), as well as all the professional sciences, mathematics included.

MHD 241.

**c.2.** The ‘dogmatic’ fil.-- *EW. Beth, de Wijsb. d. wisk.*, 86, says that ‘dogmatic’ -- here -- does not mean ‘naive-confident’ and ‘uncritical’, but rather

- a. Starting from”abductions” (basic principles).
- b. to methodically-critically
- c. arrive at constructive opinions and/or propositions.

*V. Brochard, les sceptiques grecs*, Paris, 1969 (1887-1), 3, says: ”While the eleates (Parmenides, Zenon), Heraklitos,-- Empedokles, Anaxagoras, Demokritos are mentioned by name, by several skeptics, as precursors of skepticism, we see nothing of the kind following the Milesians and the Puthagoreans.” In other words, still deeply archaic-religious and unshaken (without malakia; *cfr. supra p. 162vv.*), these thinkers operate dogmatically.

**c.2.1.** The eclectic dogmatists.-- (-50/+200).-- *cfr. supra p. 65.*-- The skeptics undermine confidence in all professional science and philosophy; the eclecticists conclude from this the equivalence of all professional sciences and philosophies: they choose among all those systems. Some are more kunian, platonic or aristotelian; others more stoic or epicurean. But there is a strong tendency toward theosophy.

**c.2.2.** The religious materialists.-- ‘materialism’ means, here, the proposition (abduction) that all being is somewhere - fine or coarse material (*see above pp. 3/4 (hylic abstr.); 11/12 (myth.-theos. mod.); 170v. (hylic dualism)*) - is. One is not mistaken: however critical (eristic) Epicureanism may be of superstitious-unscientific religion, it is nevertheless somewhere, minimally, religious. The stoa is deeply Religious.

**(i)** de stoa. (-400/+200).

Zenon of Kition (-336/-264) connects (*cfr. supra p. 2 (stoicheiosis)*) heraklitean dialectic (*see above p. 24v.*) with kunian heroism (hero worship; *cfr. supra p. 190v.*). Romans in particular were attracted to it.

**(ii)** Epicureanism (the garden) (-400/+400).

Epikouros v. Samos (-341/-271) connects (stoicheiosis) democritical atomism (*see above 169vv.*) with kurenaic hedonism (philosophy of lust; *see above 191vv.*).

MHD 242.

**Ia (3) *The late antique theosophies* (-50/+600). (242/245)**

*Introduction.* -- cfr. *supra* p. 12 (*Orf.-puth. model*); 67 (*empedl. mod.*);-- (123*eurip. mod*); (202*Socr. mod.*).

### **1. *The Rise of the Theosophists.***

The crisis of the hell.-rom. philosophies (with its skepticist basis) set, among other things, on the road to transempirical methods of perception and interpretation (reduction).

#### **1.a. *Pagan theosophies.***

The interval” ‘deity’ (impersonal power/ supreme being)/ nature (humanity)” dominates thought with as intermediate realities

1/ The (platonist) ideas (*see above p. 193vv.* ), identified with the (pythagorean) number forms (*see above p. 4*), are identified with the divine ideas (‘god’s’ insights concerning nature and the cosmos (humanity included));--which clearly happens with Albinos the platonist (+/- +150);

2/ the”divine” (polytheistic) and/or”daimonic” (*see above p. 202*) beings, who mediate between deity and humanity.

The interval” ‘deity’/ finitude” reaches its furthest distance between ‘deity’ and matter. This ‘matter’ is easily pointed out as pure power, yet also as ‘miasma’, impurity. (*cfr. 3/4: hylic abstr.*).

The ‘telos’ (*see above pp. 173; 239*), the goal of existence, is sought in bridging the gap between ‘deity’ and the material world of nature (what is called ‘mysticism’: union, in more than one way, with the ‘deity’ (deification)). In that bridging of the gap between ‘deity’ and material world (between ‘light’ and ‘darkness’) magic also plays a (sometimes major) role.

**Conclusion:** mysticism and magic bridge the distance. -- Neopythagoreans, pythagorean platonists and hermeticists (joining a collection work ‘hermes trismegistos’ (corpus hermeticum) of mystical-magical nature) make up the three types of theosophy between -50 and +250.

MHD. 243.

**1.b. Aleksandrian - Jewish Theosophy.**

Biblical revelatory religion has an analogous structure vis-à-vis the pagan. Cfr. supra p. 101vv. (analogical ed.).

(1) The interval ‘deity’/’nature’ returns, within the Biblical system, under the form of the distance ‘Yahweh’ (supreme being)/’creation’“. Only, here, Yahweh is clearly ‘transcendent’ in the sense that, as a free creative Supreme Being, he is infinitely elevated above the finite creation, in whom he is, in an equally ‘transcendent’ way, present (immanent). This is monotheism.

(ii)a.1. The distance between Yahweh and creation is bridged by the ”breath” (“spirit”) of Yahweh. This ‘ruah’ (spirit of God, holy spirit) is cosmic-physical: from before the beginning of creation it rests on the empty and dark space) (Gen 1: 2); it is vital-biological: the ruah gives life to all creatures (*Ps 104: 29/30; Ps 33: 6; Gen 2:7; // Ezek 37: 5/6; 37: 9/10*); it is culturally-found-human : it ‘begets’ e.g. the judges in their existence and industriousness (*Law 3:10; 6:34; 11: 29*); he begets the artisans in their skill (‘wisdom’) (*Exod. 31:3; 35:31*) he ‘begets’ princes: so e.g. Saül (*1 Sam 11:6*); -- he also, at some point, clearly, crosses the rational-reasonable humanity stage into the messiah phenomenon: he will rest on the Messiah (*Isaiah 11:2*); proceeding from that Messiah, he will beget a pneumatic human type (*Joel 3:1/2*). -- This is clearly analogous to the hylic abstraction (cfr. *supra pp. 3/4; 6vv. (herakl. mod.); 126vv. (eurip. mod.)*): the primal substance as force (dunamis)).

(ii)a.2. The distance between Yahweh and creation is bridged by Yahweh’s wisdom. ‘Wisdom’ is cosmic-physical (*Proverbs 8: 22/36*); it is vital-biological and culture-found-human, -- like the ‘spirit’ (breath) (*Wis. 7:22vv.; 10:1vv.* ) -- This is clearly analogous to speculative abstraction (*see above p. 4vv.*).

(ii)b. The distance between Yahweh and creation is bridged by”creatures,” the angels and unclean spirits (demons, ”devils,” among them, Satan).

This corresponds to the polytheistic-demonistic beings of the pagans, the so-called Peoples.

MHD 244

(iii) Pagan theosophy (mystical-magical perception and interpretation) has its analogue in the men and women of God: the priests, the prophets (prophetesses), the apocalyptists, the sages, - they all bridge by insight and ability (wisdom and power, though derived from Yahweh, in virtue of grace, but nevertheless also acquired and worked out by human effort) the distance between Yahweh and mankind: they have a perception and an interpretation of their own nature, which exceeds the unholy average.

It is therefore not surprising that, on the one hand, the wisdom books in the Old Testament and, on the other hand, someone like Philon the Jew of Aleksandria (-13/+54; cf. others: -25/+50) applied the analogical method: they speak in the language play of the pagans (theosophy, among others) about Biblical data and, conversely, in Biblical language play about Pagan data. This is the 'reconciling' attitude.-- Cfr. *supra p. 102vv. (analogical reduction)*, where it is proved that analogy is not total identity. Those who do not respect this distinction fall into a kind of syncretism (religious eclecticism).

### **1.c. Gnostic-Manichean theosophies.**

In the second century A.D. especially a separate type of theosophy arises, which, model-wise, is analogous to the two preceding ones, yet places a strong emphasis on the distance or interval between 'deity' (if need be 'supreme being' (Yahweh)) and nature (creation), to such an extent that bridging them seems impossible. -- hence the name 'dualism'. The pessimistic interpretation (abduction) of nature and man also comes through strongly here.

### **2. The Neoplatonic Theosophies (+250/+600).**

#### **Introduction.**

(i) The interval "deity/nature", together with the bridging moments (ideas/number forms, divine/ daimonic beings; matter critique; mystical-magical life destiny), are, fundamentally identical with respect to the previous theosophies.

(ii) The great characteristic/distinction lies in the creative eclecticism (*see above p. 65*), in which all the ancient philosophies - the Platonic very particularly - are harmoniously joined together in an encyclopedic system, yet with strong pantheistic-monistic undertones.

MHD 245

**Overview** -- The founder is Ammonios Sakkas (+175/+242) at Aleksandreia. Three main tenets and an aristotelian-scientific undercurrent typify the richness of Neoplatonic theosophies.

**1. Plotinism** (speculative th.).

Plotinos v. Lukopolis (EG.; +203/+269).-- R. Harder, *Uebers., Plotins Schriften, Vc (Porfurios, Ueber Plotins Leben und über die Ordnung seiner Schriften)*, (Plotinus' Writings, Vc Porfurios, (On Plotinus' life and on the order of his writings, ), Hamburg, 1958, 1, typifies killing Plotinus: "Plotinos, the philosopher who lived in our time, belonged to that species of man, who is ashamed of being 'in the body'. Because of this mentality, he did not want to say anything about his origins, his parents or his country. He would not tolerate a painter or a sculptor in his environment (...)". (...)". -- Such body, and matter contempt is well characteristic of a whole bunch of Neoplatonic theosophists, -- just as now a number of Indian yogis may despise body and matter, out of an analogous mentality.

**2. Jamblichos of Chalkis** (... /+330) then fills the speculative mysticism of Plotinos with theurgy, i.e. the active-magical working with 'deities' (where the word 'deity' (*cfr. supra p. 12vv. (orf. mod.); (67emp. mod.)*) means both the neuter impersonal numen (power; dunamis) and the personal being who possesses that power).

**3. Proklos v. Constantinopolis** (+410/+485) synthesizes both Plotinos' speculative mysticism and Jamblichos' theurgy into an encyclopedic summary (*cfr. supra p. 65 (creat. ecl.)*).

**4. Maximos v. Smurna** (iv-the e.) put the theurgy fully there, greatly influencing Emperor Ioulianos the Apostate (+332/+363).

**5. Porfurios of Turos** (+233/+305) introduces, among other things, the logic of Aristotle (*see above p. 212*), at Rome, -- which Themistios (... /+390), at Constantinople, Ammonios, son of Hermias and pupil of Proklos, at Aleksandreia and Simplikios at Athens do.

Thus ends what may be called "the pagan philosophy of the Greeks.

MHD 246.

**I.B. *The Christian Philosophies.*** (+33/ +1450) (246/260)

***Introduction.*** (246/251)

Not only Mosaic revelation (*cf. supra pp. 242/244*), but also the archaic or primordial revelation which preceded it and reached all the way back to the beginning times (of mankind) is given its full exposure by the Good News. The consummation refers to the oldest; the presence of the time of grace refers to the most ancient. In this sense the Church prays, on the eve of Pentecost:

“God, who explained to us the wonders of the primeval times, thanks to the light of the new covenant! Christianity is universal both as regards all times and all peoples.” (*O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id., II, 20*).

This implies that philosophy, professional science and rhetoric,--that hylic and speculative abstraction, thanks to that universality, are integral components of Christianity.

The Aleksandrian-Jewish theosophists and the wisdom books of the Old Testament preceded us in this. The plan of salvation, which contains our deliverance from bondage and fate, dates not only from before the election of the Jewish people (Mosaic stage), but from before the creation of the world (archaic stage) (*1 Cor 2: 7; 1 Pet 1:20*).

Also: Paul, who knew Greek philosophy as common to the literate, speaks, in the Stoic language (*cf. supra p. 241 (26: herakl.: logos)*), of the proof of God's existence from the fisis (nature) and of the natural, all men common conscience, founded on the natural law; while John, in the language of Herakleitos, the stoa and Philon (*cf. supra p. 244*), speaks of Jesus, as the son of the Father. (*cf. supra p. 38vv. (hermeneutics); (56understanding); 205; 101vv. (anal. ed.)*). With fellow human understanding they speak, analogically, the language of the thinking Greeks to speak of Christianity. This implies that ‘philosophy’ (*cf. supra pp. 40; 88; 147; 235vv. )* is applicable to Christianity.

(A) Perception: the fact of the revelation of the Holy Trinity, in person and mission of Jesus, sent by the Father and who with the Father, sends the Spirit.

(B) Abduction: - Given that trinitarian revelation, how is totality to be understood?

MHD 247.

In other words, given the observed fact that, starting from Jesus and his church, trinitarian revelation takes root in all cultures, yes, in the universe, what changes in that universe (and, in part, in all those cultures), by allowing that process of triadic revelation to continue and persist? Or: how must that universe be that something like trinitarian action of an agogic nature is conceivable, intelligible, 'meaningful' in it? With that, the trinitarian life begins on the philosophical level.

**A1.** That trinitarian life has something to do with the cosmos, the totality, the mainly Greek Church Fathers have expressed: "With the body thou art in the grave,-with the soul in Hades, as God, --thou art in paradise with the robber, on the throne, Christ, with Father and Spirit, all-filling, itself unlimited." (*Killian Kirchoff, Osterjubiläum der Ostkirche, I, pentekostarion, Münster (Wf.), 1940, 19*).

Or still: "Everything is now filled with light: heaven, earth and the underworld (Hades). All creation should therefore celebrate the resurrection of Christ, in which it has found survival." (o.c., 3).

Indeed, apart from the incarnation, in an earthly existence, by which he became destiny partner with earthly reality, Christ, performed the descent into Hades and the ascension into heaven, as destiny partner and savior of what lives there.

**A.2.** What exactly did Christ, always one with the Father and the Spirit, change in the totality? -- *I Cor 1:24* Paul calls Christ "theou dunamin kai theou sofian" (Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam; God's power and God's wisdom).

This implies that

- (i) the primal substance (hylic moment) of the universe, was transformed by the "spirit" ("pneuma") of Christ and
- (ii) the "idea content" (speculative moment: the information in the universe) has been reimagined by new ideas (thought contents).

This breaks through, in earthly human life, in threefold form:

- (1) the Father (procreator) works, in all that is edifying, engendering (*I Cor 4: 14/20; 3: 5vv.* );
- (2) The son (Jesus) works, in all that is agogic (liberating from disempowerment and destiny) in virtue of destiny (the suffering servant of the Lord is also the glorified son of man;
- (3) The Spirit works in all that is Higher,"charismatic" giftedness (*I Cor 14: 4/12; 12: 27/31; Rom 12: 6/8; I Cor 14: 1/40 (structure of the assembly),--which was evident at Jerusalem (Pentecost) and in the house of Cornelius (Acts 10: 44/48)*).

MHD 248.

**B.1.** All this became possible because a woman, Mary, had the courage to begin it. Like her predecessors (*see above p. 150f.*, where women are described as "soteirai", rescuers), she became, first, '(suffering) servant of the Lord' (*Luk 1:38*) to, then, 'mother of the Lord' (*Luk 1:43; cf. Jer. 13:18; 1Co 2:19 15:12f.*, i.e., queen mother).

"In truth thou art exalted above all creation. For the God of creatures thou hast, in the flesh (poor humanity), given birth. Because of this, monarch, we, in thee, have a helper". (*K. Kirchhoff, Ueber dich freut sich der Erdkreis (Marienhymnen der byzantinischen Kirche)*, (*Ueber dich freut sich der Erdkreis (Mary's hymns of the Byzantine Church)*, ), Münster (Wf.), 1940, 114).

**B.2.** The question arises, "How is it that, after twenty centuries of diffusion, this trinitarian operation seems to be in such crisis?" -- The answer lies in the totality itself: in virtue of force (hyleic energy; 'spirit') and wisdom (speculative ideas; information) moves all of creation, yet especially man moves freely, but with a, so far, very daimonic freedom (*cf. supra pp. 40/43 (herakl. mod. ); 126vv. (eurip. mod.); 202, 205 (socr. model)*);

*Biblical: Job: 4:18; 1:6f; Isaias 14: 12/14; Ps 58 (57); 82 (81); especially Luk 18:8* ("Will the son of man, at his coming, find faith on earth?").-- *Luk 2: 34/35*: Simeon says to Mary that her child will be a "sign of contradiction" ("sèmeion antilegomenon") and he ventures, in that context, to reveal the reasonings of many hearts.

Kierkegaard says: "That God has been able to create free beings beside Himself is the cross, which 'philosophy' (he means rationalistic philosophy) cannot bear, but to which it has remained attached." (*A. Van Munster, transl./intr., Kierkegaard (a choice from his diaries)*, Utr./Antw., 1957, 25). People like e.g. Euripides have sufficiently taught us that

1/ man free,

2/ but, above all, is daimonic-free (harmony of opposites).

MHD 249.

**c.1.** It is objected that actual, observable Christianity has remained below the level of messianic, "pneumatic" (i.e., animated by the Holy Spirit of God) man (*cf. supra p. 243*).

Indeed, all that exists - and thus also the trinitarian effect via 'ruah' (mind) and wisdom is ambiguous: one can make them idiosyncratic (locked up in one's own, idiotic circle of thought; *cfr. supra p. 32*), right-wing (locked up in authoritarian-tight circle of thought; *cfr. 32*), orthodox (locked in authoritarian-tight thinking circle; *cfr. supra p. 33*) and/ or liberal (locked in aprioritical dialogue; *cfr. supra p. 177*) (*cfr. Sir (= ecclesiasticus) 15: 11/20; Gal 6: 7/8; 5: 16/25*). Nevertheless, a number of Christians reached the level outlined by *1 Cor 12: 31/13:13* (love ('agapè', *caritas*) and in immortal terms, Izaak the Syrian, ascetic-eremite and also bishop of Nineveh, in his 'sayings' (published in Russian at Moscow in 1858; one found a copy in Dostoiefsky's bib).

"The heart of man - meant is the 'pneumatic-messianic man who has grown above the rational animal - overflows with love for all creation, for all that lives: for men, for birds, for animals, for daimones. When man's attentive gaze turns toward creation, he is moved to tears and an all encompassing and deeply nourished endearment takes possession of him. A keen sympathy with the suffering of that creation (*cf. Rom 8:18/23*) penetrates deep into the heart of man. He cannot see or stand the fact that a creature has to endure even the slightest evil, even the slightest sadness. For this very reason he prays, moved to tears, even for the wordless creatures, for the enemies of truth, for those who harm him. Praying, he asks that God uphold them and grant them forgiveness. Even for the creeping animals (the 'image' (*cf. Mark 1:13; cf. Ps 58 (57)*) of the polydemonistic 'deities') he prays, with an all-encompassing tenderness." (*VL. Solovjef (1853/1900), la justification du bien (essai de phil. mor.)*, Moscow, 1898-1; Paris, 1939, 72, nods to this text of Izaak).

Here it is assumed that even the daimon or depth soul of the Christian is converted (and not just his conscious soul).

MHD 250.

**c.2.** Particularly acute is the question of (dis)entitlement. -- *cfr. supra p. 3v; 128vv. (esp. 146vv. )*. The Bible knows, apart from archaic, customary and political law, which among the pagans, usually remains vague ('high god' belief). Thus *Ps. 58 (57)*:

"Is it really right, that thou, 'deities' (the judges are 'image' (*cfr. infra p. 195vv. (participation)*) of the polydemonistic deities) speak? Is it really the case that thou judgest the Adam children (people) according to the law? -- Yet not: with the surrender of thy heart (= daimonic freedom) thou cobblest together falsehood on earth, weighing what is arbitrary; - from the mother's womb they have deviated, the scoundrels! From their mother's womb they have gone astray, the scoundrels! (... ). God, smite, in their (serpent's) mouth, the fangs! (...) That they, into the earth, (flow) back, like water, which, into the earth, disappears! (...) then one will be able to claim, rightly, 'yet it makes sense, at least in the eyes of the righteous'. Truly: there is a god, who provides justice, on the earth".

Or *Ps. 82 (81)*: "Yahweh stands up, in the midst of divine counsel. In the midst of "deities" he passes judgment. 'How long wilt thou not judge according to right? Support the border crossing of the wicked? Rather stand up for the powerless, like the orphan. Provide the unfortunate, the needy with his right! Free the weak and the poor from the grasp of power of the wicked free them! -- Unconsciously, without awareness, the righteous princes wander in the darkness (the author means: the underworld), so that the foundation of the earth wavers. -- I, I have spoken: ye, do ye behave as deities? You, all of you? -- Evidently not! Thereby ye, being equal to men, shall die. All together thou shalt fall from thy throne! -- Arise, Yahweh! Judge the earth! Thou art, after all, the ruler of all nations". (*cfr. A. Bertholet, die Religion d. alten testaments, Tübingen, 1932, 130f.*).

One knows that Jesus, by His glorification, is judge over the living and the dead. He provides supreme justice. He judges, however, the soul, who decides the place of what lives; in the whole cosmos, in the totality. *Cfr. supra p. 13 (daimon)*

MHD 251.

**Conclusion.--** The 'soul' as the central theme of Christian philosophy and of the philosophical deepening of Christianity. – The "soul" (the "heart" (conscious soul) and the "kidneys" (unconscious soul)) is central. Without accurate soul understanding no understanding of what Christianity really is. -- Jesus, while, on Sabbath, under the spying eye of the Pharisees (and Scribes), in a synagogue, healing the man with the dry hand, says, wrathfully -- grieved at the blindness around him: 'May one, on Sabbath, do good or evil? 'Psuchèn sosai è apokteinei' (save the soul or kill it)? (*Mark 3:4*). It is noteworthy that he addresses the problem of the barren hand - not medically (cfr. *supra* p. 231v. (technical intelligence) but - 'soul'-related.

Generally he says, "What does it profit man to gain the whole world, and, at the same time to suffer injury to his soul, or: what shall man give in exchange for his soul?" (*Mark. 8:36vv.*). Behold the amazing fact of Jesus word and deed (perception).

**Abduction.** -- If the "soul" (also indicated by other terms) is really the individual in man (in every animated being, for that matter), through which he is concretely, i.e., fused with the totality (cosmos, universe, "being"), *cfr. supra pp. 219/221* (individual-concrete thinking of Romanticism)), then Jesus' action and word is understandable.

Indeed, the soul is the I (individual moment), but,

**a.** as hyllic (primordial and soul material) meeting point (*cfr. supra p. 13*), through which the I, as daimon or primordial center, is fluidly in touch with the whole fluidic cosmos and all that is in it; yet also

**b.** as speculative (rational-intellectual) openness to the whole "being" (universe) as a horizon of the self, which is therefore rational;

**c.** as an animating life principle of the body (precisely because the soul possesses the two previous aspects, it can "animate");

**d.** as an evolutionary moment, through which the self can grow beyond itself (the pneuma or messianic life principle (*cfr. supra p. 243*)) or, also, deteriorate (choose evil).

For these common reasons, Jesus grasped the barren hand soulfully.

MHD 252.

**Overview.** (252/260)

Christian philosophizing got off the ground in three major waves: patristic (church-fatherly), Scholastic, and modern-temporary

**1B (1) *The Patristic* (+33/800).**

From the introduction it will be understandable (deductively) that the Church Fathers (esp. bishops) perform a choice **a.** philosophical and **b.** religious.

***Philosophical.***

**a.** Are rejected: skepticism (*see supra* 240), except for methodical doubt (H. Gregorios v. Nussa, H. Augustine v. Tagaste apply it); epikourism (*see p.* 241), for its philosophy of lust esp.

**b.** is accepted, somewhat, as a subcurrent, the peripatetic phil. (*see p.* 238; *professional science*).

**c.** are well accepted: the academy (Platon; *cfr p.* 193vv); the stoa (*see p.* 241); Philon's theosophy (*see p.* 242),

**d.** is particularly favorably accepted: neoplatonic theosophy (*see p.* 244v. ).

**Note.--** All these systems do get thoroughly rethought. Or, rather: the Church Fathers express themselves, in the radically rethought language game (*see above pp.* 38/40 (*Vico*); *esp.* 33vv. (*Wittgenstein*), of the philosophers, when they speak of the gospel (analogy; *cf. p.* 101vv.).

**Note.--** Of course there are the numerous Church Fathers, who prefer rhetoric to strict philosophy (*see above p.* 185v. (*Isokrates*)). They founded consecrated rhetoric.

***Religious.***

**a.** Rejected: polydemonistic polytheism (in the name of the Trinity faith);--very particularly rejected is all that is sexually-magical religion (*cfr. pp.* 56/64 (*Dionysics*) 124/126 (*Cret. Zeusrel.*); 148.1/150 (*Macedon. Dionysics*)) and ditto"mystery cults.

**b.** is very particularly rejected: the gnostic-manichaeian theosophies (*see page* 244; they penetrated deeply into the church).

***Phaseological.***

**(1)** initial patristics (+33/325): Clemens of Aleksandreia (.../215), the founder of Christian theosophy; his brilliant disciple Origines of Aleksandreia (.../254); in the Latin West: Lactatius (+250/+32s);

**(2)** high point (+325/+450): two giants, viz. St. Gregory, v. Nussa (335/394) and esp. St. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430) who is the top figure of Church Father philosophy;

MHd 253.

Immediately he had the greatest influence on scholasticism;--one work, *the civitate dei* (On the City of God) which is the pre-eminent work on Christian philosophy of history and theology, it is named;

**(3) Decline (450/800).**

migrations of peoples; Sarazanian conquests; fall of the Western Roman Empire; esp. cultural decay.-- In the first place, however, Islam, rising (Mohammed (570/ 632)).- - Dionusios the are(i)opagite (+/- 500), who Proklos (*see above p. 245*; nickname: the scholasticist of antiquity), more or less Christianly reinterprets and exerts great influence on scholasticism; -- St. John v. Damaskos (.../ 749), the great systematist (Aristotelian, though with Neoplatonic-theosophical leanings);-- in the West: Boëthius (480/525), who, like Augustine, exerts the greatest influence on scholasticism.

**IB (2) *The scholasticism (mid-century ecclesiastical phil.)* (253/259)**

Three main influences define scholasticism (schola = school), which is, essentially, school philosophy, in contrast to patristics, which was much closer to life.

**(i)** Augustine (see above);

**(ii)** the Neoplatonic theosophies (see above),--and this along Proklos (*see p. 249*), Dionusios the are(i)opagite (see above) and Augustine, as well as the Islamic and mid-century Jewish philosophies (*cfr. p. 242vv. (aleks.-Jewish fil.)*);

**(iii)** the specific influence is exerted by Aristotle (*see above p. 210f.*), who, at a certain moment, will be called the philosopher without question, especially when, +/- 1150, he, translated into Latin, will be thoroughly studied in all his works (so much so that W. Jaeger says that one should wait until the XIXth century to experience, again, thorough Aristotle study).

***Main draw.***

*O. Willmann, Gesch.d. Id., II, 322ff., characterizes*

**(1)** Patristics as idealism (*cfr. supra p. 193 (pl. transcendent id.); (210Ar. Immanent id. )*), in that the Church Fathers became engaged in a life and death struggle against skepticism, which reduces all idea to mere subjective imaginary product, and against ancient materialism, which denies all idea without more.

MHD 254.

(2) Scholasticism, - according to Willmann, o.c., 322 - is 'realism' in that, on the one hand, the ecclesiastical (what he calls 'real') scholasticism takes a stand against that type of theosophy which is so absorbed either in a deity, which is certainly not the trinitarian deity of Biblical revelation, or in a world of ideas, that it reduces the perceived sensory realities to pure simulacrum (one remembers - *higher p. 245* -- how the arch-founder of neoplatonic theosophy, Plotinos, was ashamed "to be in the body," -- something which a truly biblical theosophy or philosophy based on divine revelation (*cf. supra p. 242ff.*) could not possibly accept).

This, while, on the other hand, the same ecclesiastical scholastics had to take a stand against the nominalists (*cf. supra p. 189v.*) called at the time "dialecticians" (i.e. logicians), who reduced the idea to a purely subjective imaginary product without any analogue in the sensory realities.

**Conclusion:** immanent idealism would be a better name than "scholastic realism," unless, like Willmann, one uses the term "realism" to express two points:

- a/ The sense realities are really real ( 'real' );
- b/ the idea or thought-sign (D. Scotus), in sensory perceived realities, is 'real'. Thus, dual 'realism'.

O. Willmann, o.c., 323, says that scholasticism is the model-identical continuation of patristic ("transcendent") idealism, in that scholasticism is

- a/ both, by natural means (by abstraction of ideas from the sensory data),
- b/ if, by supernatural means (through biblical revelation and its wealth of ideas) gets in touch with divine (understand: trinitarian) ideas.

### **Digression (254/259)**

Scotist-peircian drawing philosophy.

Duns Scotus (1266/1308) was besides Thomas Aquinas (1225/ 1274), a top figure of scholasticism: he is known as a 'critical' Thomist (Thomas adherent). In view of the importance of his work, both in terms of the history of mid-century philosophy and in terms of contemporary epistemology, we now turn to Charles Santiago Sanders Peirce (1839/1914), who, with his semiotic hermeneutics, calls himself a 'scholastic realist'.

MHD 255.

Something that may be called a surprising fact, in the midst of his milieu, the USA - university graduates at the time.

We take *M. Bense, semiotik (Allgemeine Theorie der Zeichen)*, (semiotics (general theory of signs)), Baden-Baden, 1967, which explicitly relies on Peirce, as a starting point. However, actually we cite appl. models in the style of *K.O. Apel, Szientistik, Hermeneutik, Ideologiekritik*, in: *K.O. Apel u.a., Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik*, Frankf.a.M., 1971, 7/44.

(a) D. Scotus opposes the Aristotelian-thomistic claim to be able to grasp the (full) essence of things and processes with the idea (concept), whether or not abstracted from sense perception (intuitive thomism).

(1) *Cfr. supra p. 13.1* (Alkmaion 's critique of the - what he calls - human, indirect knowing of the "being" of things and processes).

(2) Analogous to Alkmaion, who situates man between the "deity" (numen) and the animal, D. Scotus, too, situates human knowing: the merely mentally conceived (Peirce will say "abducted") idea differs from the Aristotelian-thomistic twofold, viz:

a/ the idea, in the human mind, is no more than an indication or "sign" (thought sign, then) - seen from the perceived;

b/ the idea - and in this Scotus, resp. Peirce, clearly surpasses Thomas in the actual sense - is, at the same time, by deduction of possible (touching the essence of the observed) interventions ('action' in virtue of 'self activity'), essentially 'experimental' (*cfr. supra p. 11 (full or peirastic reduction)*).

In other words, D. Scotus is, to our knowledge, the first to philosophize reductively (*cfr. supra p. 1*).-- This method is not new: the lemmatic-analytic (in short: analytic) method, regularly applied by the Puthagoreans and Platonists (without sufficient epistemological justification, however) is model-identical (*cfr. supra pp. 8/10*).

D. Scotus provides, actually, the puth.-platon. method, its scientific foundation.

MHD 256

(b) CSS's triadic interpretation of skotistic epistemology. Peirce. --

(1.) **Introduction** -- O. Willmann, o.c., 328ff., explains how the "enkuklios paideia" (the trivium and the quadrivium) is, scholastically speaking, a true hermeneutic.

(A) **Perception**. -- The sense experienced is starting point.

(B) '**Verstehen**'

(1) All 'verstehen' (literally), i.e. to point out its ideal or thought content, is - in the trivium (= grammar, rhetoric, 'dialectics' (i.e. mid-century logic)) first of all, 'verstehen' of word signs (written and/or spoken).

This view anticipates, very clearly, what, later, V. Schlegel, Schleiermacher, -- Dilthey conceive of as 'hermeneutics' (in the broad and thorough sense) (cfr. *supra p. 38vv.*)

(2) All 'verstehen' has - says Willmann, *ibid.* - afterwards or simultaneously, rather, as its task 'verstehen' of 'die Sachen' (literally), i.e., in its intention, the idea which, in text or spoken word, is communicated or at least expressed.

In the quadrivium -- mathematism, -- astronomy, music -- the young scholastic is directly confronted -- in puthagorean-platonic tradition -- with the idea or thought content, 'Die Sachen' itself (cfr. *supra pp. 231/ 236 (Husserl's, Scheler's 'ideation process,')*).

(3) Only then is the young scholastic confronted (direct knowledge or 'encounter' (cfr. *supra p. 232v.*) with the thought contents of either philosophy or philosophical theology ('doctrina sacra', 'sacred doctrine').

(2.) **Peirician "hermeneutics"**.

(I) **Semiotic pre-stage.**

(I). A. **Observation types.**

(IA.1. **Pre-scientific-sensory.**

Here lies a stone in the sun. I feel, with my hand for example, this stone. Thereupon I 'code' in a 'language game' (conversational language) the observation made and say: "This stone is warm". (Linguistically speaking, I add the notion of 'warm' (one-syllable relation) to 'this stone' (whereby the addition 'identitively-ontologically' (cfr; *supra p. 12*) is verbalized ('is')).-- 'Coding' means 'transposition into the moments of an already existing sign system',-- here the vernacular! -- such a perception-capturing utterance is called 'protocol utterance'.

MHD 257.

**(I) A.2. Pre-scientific-instrumental.**

Here lies the same stone, also in the sun. I take a thermometer and contact ('meet', -- type 2) the stone with it.-- On it I 'code', "This stone is 42° Celsius hot".

**(1) B. Clarity types.**

**Re (1) A.1.** (sensory).

Peirce introduces his famous triadic model.

(1) The "object" ("realization"), the stone and its heat (degree), he calls "a first" (a "first").

(2) The subject ('interpreter' or 'interpreter') - i.e. I either by hand or by the extension, the thermometer, of my hand - 'meets' ('contacts') or 'confronts' (233: Huss. Sch. mod.) me with the object. That relation ('relation') Peirce calls 'a second' (a 'second').

(3) I, the interpreter, attribute (add) to the thing being interpreted, the object, a (thinking and/or speaking) sign, namely the phrases above (in this case: protocol statements). That sign is called Peirce 'A third' (a 'third').

**Re (I) a.2.** (instrumental).

Peirce extends the concept of interpretation ("interpretation"), even to extra-human interpreters. So, here and now, the thermometer.

(1) The object, the stone and its heat,

(2) is contacted ('met'), but this time not by me, but by the thermometer ('relate'),

(3) to which it responds ('indicates'), through its built-in column of mercury, which represents ('models'; *cfr. supra p. 5vv.*) what it 'feels' (a physically discernible process, of course, yet which we, conversely, provisionally, from a commonsense experience (*cfr. supra p. 1*), interpret as 'feeling').

One sees the three moments of the triadic process recurring, yet on a physical level.-  
- All apparatus exhibits an essential semiotic-hermeneutic structure, in which and human and extramensual 'signifying' are both distinct and indistinguishable (*cfr. supra, for the description: p. 80v. (exact law.); 91v. (cybernetics); ibid. (systems theory with information theory; 94/96 (quality, quantitatively speaking); 105vv. (mathematical model).*

**(II) Private thinking as a triadic process.**

With Peirce, Josiah Royce (1855/1915), social idealist, also pointed to the intersubjective moment, which he called interpreting community.

MHD 258.

(a) Private thought - according to *WB. Gallie, Peirce and pragmatism*, New York, 1966, 82 – is "one's thoughts as what he/she says to himself." The inner dialogue with oneself says: "(1) This stone (firstness), (2) once met by me (secondness), (3) provokes the sentence: "He is warm. This sentence (sign) I say to myself as a philosophical-logical being, situated within the horizon of totality (*cfr. supra pp. 12; 40; 88; 147v.; 193v.; 220; 226; 228; 235 ;--12v.; 68; -- 246v.; especially 251 (soul/ totality)*) and situated everything within that horizon of totality.

(b) thinking together "within a thinking community implies that the I (as interpreter) transcends its self-will (*see above p. 32*) and learns to interpret together with a ye, yes, together with all thinking beings.

**(II) Joint thinking as a triadic process.**

Though the core is and remains the individual (*cfr. supra pp. 220; 219*), yet we 'are' essentially like what *Heidegger, Sein u. Zeit*, I, 113ff. (*Das in-der-welt-sein als mit-und selbstsein*) calls the 'in-the-world-being' as fellow and (self)self.

**1. Synchronous.**

"I (interpretant) say to you (interpretant) 'This stone is warm (sign)'"

**2. Diachronic.**

(a)"I, faced with this papyrus from the Egyptian desert, say, 'This papyrus is a text by Euripides'"

(b)"I (interpr. ) say to you (interpr.) 'This papyrus is a text of Euripides (sign)!"

One sees the triadic scheme at work in analogous form.-- With diachronic-social thinking we have entered tradition hermeneutics (*cfr. supra p. 33 (straightforward form of tradition hermeneutics); (65eclectic form of tradition herm.); 73/78 (Anaxagor. Mod. v. tradition herm.); -- 38/40 (Vico's philos. philology)*).

**Note --** *Cfr. supra p. 33v. (Wittgenstein's language-play concept: I, thou, -- we encode (see above 256) always and of necessity (see above 34; structuralism) in some language-play, embedded as we are in culture.*

**(II) Actual hermeneutic stage.**

**(1) Appl. mod.**

"If this stone is really warm, then my perception is seen - abductively, as 'object-like, 'intelligible' (*cfr. supra p. 10*). I.e., I (as totality-bound) situate the perception within the framework (totality) of e.g., reality-bound perceptions.

MHD 259.

**(2) *Appl. mod.***

(*Cfr. supra esp. p. 235*).”If all life, as necessary condition, has ‘warmth’ and this stone, insofar as warmed by the sun (especially then still), provides me, (by hypothesis) as feverishly the necessary (and, perhaps, sufficiency) condition of life, then this stone, as warm, has for me, here-and-now, a high and even paramount ‘sense’ (264: *Solovj.* ) (sense, hermeneutics in the philosophical sense).”

It is ‘in this sense’ that we all speak spontaneously (i.e. from our daimon; *cfr. supra p. 13 (hylic-daimonic soul); 251(triadic-daimonic soul concept)*) about e.g. ‘The meaning of something’ (e.g. our life, a disease (*cfr. Scheler’s example*), yes, however simple, this warm stone (also simple things and processes have a concrete, i.e. universe-bound or total ‘meaning’).

Whether we say, ”Such a thing has (at all, does or does not have) ‘sense’, in that sense only, is full hermeneutics. This implies that Peirce’s semiotics or Vico’s philology or Dilthey’s Hermeneutics, etc., etc., only become meaning (and thus true philosophy, which has no other ‘meaning’ - in the end), if the abduction is carried out by the I (daimon, soul), insofar as engaged in the horizon of total reality (ontological distinction; *cfr. p. 226*)

***Mid-century pluralism.***

(1) Except for the ecclesiastical and unchurchly scholastics (*see above p. 254*),  
(2) there were the Byzantine, the Islamic and the Jewish philosophies. Since the days of Romanticism (*see above p. 166v.*) and, even more, now that the ”*histoire nouvelle*” is teaching us to appreciate the Middle Ages (unlike the Renaissance and the Enlightenment), the real broad-mindedness of the Middle Ages is becoming somewhat apparent.

***Phaseology.***

This one will be ultra short.

(1) mid-century,  
(2) Modern and  
(3) neo-scholastics clearly demonstrate the exceptional vitality of church-school philosophizing.

MHD. 260.

**IB (3) *The non-patristic and/or non-scholastic Christian philosophy.***

It goes without saying (and certainly for those who study history of philosophy objectively) that, also outside the typical ecclesiastical philosophies; such as patristic and scholastic, there is real Biblical and, above all, Christian philosophizing. Especially since the late mid-century crisis of ecclesiastical philosophies - one thinks of the nominalistic (*cfr. supra p. 189v.*) 'Via moderna' (modern method), a.o. and esp. launched by the Lutheran forerunner William v. Ockham (1300/1350), a Franciscan, rather solitary thinkers have, time and again, been included, who try to articulate the Biblical revelation in a modern-contemporary way (understanding-analogical method; *cfr. supra p. 39v. (Vico); 101vv. (analogical reduction).*)

In the West, it should be noted e.g. haphazardly named: The Oxford Movement (1830/1850), in which Kard. JH. Newman (1801/1890) situates himself; S. Kierkegaard (1813/1855; *cfr. supra p. 162vv.*) and, in his wake, Christian or even simply Biblical existentialism;

In the East: the Russian Christian realists (*cfr. supra pp. 36/38 (N. Gogol); (249)Izaak the Syrian*) from G. Skovoroda (1722/1794) among whom Vladimir Solovyef (1853/1900) and the theologian Sergei Bulgakof (1871/1944) may be considered perhaps the greatest.

**II. *The modern - contemporary philosophies* (1450/present). (260/264)**

***Introduction***

Since this course is, essentially, a study of modern-contemporary thought, we shall confine ourselves, here and now, to elementary phaseology. It can be seen that very great agreement has been reached on the following dichotomy. Thereafter, however, the divisions diverge so much and the study of objective history is still at such an early stage that it makes no sense to put forward one 'sanctifying' division, if we do not want to fall into the aprioritical method (*see above p. 177vv.*).

**A. *From Renaissance philosophy to I.Kant's criticism* (1450/1781).**

The decisive fact, which, all modern contemporary thinking, directly or indirectly, controls, is exact subject science (*see above pp. 70/123 (anaxagorean prelude)*). According to *Chaim Perelman, Rhetoric and Argumentation*, Baarn, 1979, p. 151 ff, one main feature is the radical elimination of rhetoric ('arguing', 'arguing' (cf. *supra p. 134 ff*)).

MHD 261.

“The endeavor to build a philosophy of which all assertions are either self-evident or proved in a compelling way; leads to the elimination of all forms of argumentation and to the rejection of rhetoric as an instrument of philosophy.” (o.c., 151). Perelman (o.c 152) attributes this anti-rhetoric to “the theological background” (sic!) in R. Descartes (1596/1650), the founder of typically modern “rationalist” thinking, but also, says Perelman, in Fr. Bacon (1561/1626); (*cfr. supra p. 39; 92vv.*), the founder of typically modern “subjective” thinking.

In the meantime

**a./** since Marx, Nietzsche, Freud (*see above pp. 142;145*), in the context of a general cultural critique on materialist-atheist ‘foundations’, and

**b./** since Heidegger (*see above p. 186* (archaizing language and word concept.) and

**c./** structuralism (*cfr. supra p. 34 (unconscious structure effects)*),

**d./** as well as since the basic research of logic, resp. logistics and mathematics (*cfr. supra pp. 15/20* (ancient approach in eristics); *21/24* (ancient approach of the present metatheory)) a true uproar of revaluation of rhetoric has started. *Cfr. S. IJsseling, Rhetoric and philosophy*, Bilthoven, 1975, for some detailed insights on the subject.

***Digression.*** (261/262)

***Fundationalism.***

This word means “the abduction, that, if knowledge is to be valid, it must have as its necessary prefix, among other things, the fact that it is in any case (axiomatic-deductive; *cfr. supra pp. 11v; 18v. (system); 217/238 (esp. 217 and 237v. (Arist. Ax.-ded. System); -reductive (cfr. supra p. 10vv. (apag. mod.); 15vv. (eristic mod.); 90vv. (exper.mod); etc., etc.) ‘should be grounded’*“. In K. Popper ‘s (1902/1994) language play, this is also called “authoritarian structure of knowledge” (but then, somewhat, as one type of rightism (*cfr. supra p. 33*). Also *GE. Moore* (1873/1958) a.o. in his *A defence of common sense* (1925) criticized foundationalism,

*W. Bartley, Flucht ins Engagement (Versuch einer Theorie des offenen Geistes)*, (Escape into Commitment (Attempt at a Theory of the Open Mind),), Szczesny Verlag, Munich, 1962, sets out Popper’s insight (which Popper himself, already, from 1934, has advocated) regarding the Western European enlightenment (*cfr. supra p. 21v.*).

MHD 262.

**Bibl. sample**

-- E. Coreth, *empf. i.d. Phil. d. Neuzeit*, I, (Introduction to the Philosophy of Modern Times, I), (*rationalismus, empirismus, Aufklärung*), Freib., 1972, as well as GG. Granger, *Rational Thinking*, Meppel, 1971, e.g. take the word 'rationalism' in its narrow, i.e. intellectual-rational sense (the speculative reason; cfr. *supra pp.* 83/85 (*reg. mod.* ); 4/64 (*pre-socr. mod.*)). Since both narrowly defined 'rationalism' (intellectualism) -- R. Descartes, B. De Spinoza (1632/ 1677),-- (German form:) G. Leibniz (1646/1716) -- and 'empiricism' -- j. Locke (1632/1704), the actual founder of the enlightenment, G. Berkeley (1685/1753), especially David Hume (1711/1776) - together working out in the general-cultural field as 'enlightenment', 'lumières', 'aufklärung', 'enlightenment', under the motto 'the (speculative or empirical) reason, which wants to change life, environment (including the universe) and reason itself, up to the revolutionary (one thinks of both the French and the Marxist revolutions), Bartley, o.i. rightly, takes the name 'rationalism' in the broad sense, which includes both speculative philosophy and empiricist philosophy.

W. Bartley, in the spirit of K. Popper, *conjectures and refutations (The growth of scientific knowledge)*, London, 1963, in his book, 143ff., says, literally, "Our philosophical tradition - he means the Enlightenment - is, in its structure, authoritarian, even where it appears at its most liberal." (cfr. *supra p.* 177v.). Two wholly unknown - never penetrated to consciousness (cfr. *supra p.* 13 (*daimon*)) - philosophical dogmata (according to literally Bartley himself), which one, throughout the total 'philosophical' tradition, put forward unexamined (cfr. *supra p.* 10 (*abduction and well as lemma*)), are the cause of this authoritarian structure.

Those two "dogmata" are:

**a/** all "criticism" (cfr. *supra pp.* 15/24 (*eristics; metatheory*)) must inevitably be grounded (foundationalism);

**b/** the strictly "rational" (either speculative or empiricist) character of reason stands or falls with its axiomatic-deductive structure (also in empiricism).

MHD 263.

**B.I. Kant and the fundamental crisis of enlightened philosophies (1781+)**

Willmann, *Die wichtigsten phil. Fachausdrücke*, - Kempten / Munich, 1909, 83ff., brilliantly typifies Kant: 'Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik' (enlightenment and criticism of reason). *Cfr. supra p. 24* (neither Leibnizian dogmatism nor human skepticism, doch Kantian criticism). K. Popper, mentioned in passing, the favorite author of the former German Chancellor, H. Schmidt - is deliberately critical Kantian.

O. Willmann, o.c., 102, sees, after Kant's murderous "critiques" (from 1781 onwards), the following ways out (*cfr. supra p. 65*)

**a/ Re-establishment** (on new abductions) (so e.g. German idealism (Fichte, Schelling (*see above p. 166v.*), Hegel (*p. 226v.*), in which German romanticism plays a leading role (with Vico; *cfr. p. 38vv.*);

**b/ Shutdown by**

skepticism (*cfr. supra p. 65; 240*) and/or naturalism (*cfr. supra p. 169vv. (democr. At.); 181vv. (protosof. Crit. Dialectics); 191vv. (sens. and phen.); (241materialism)*);

**c/ scientism** (*cfr. supra p. 70vv. (Anaxag. mod. ); 172/175 (democr. mod.)* - 'epistemology' (criticism of knowledge), psychologism (one may add: sociologism, linguisticism, evolutionism and biologism, physicalism, logicism, etc.));

**d/ reclamation** of traditional philosophies (idealistic, materialistic (*cfr. supra pp. 176/180 (n.a.v. Demokr.)*)). - Till there Willmann's list.

**Today's generation gap.**

Fr. Muckermann, *Solowiew (Zur Begegnung zwischen Russland und dem Abendland)*, Olten, 1945, 15f., sketches a single model of the elaboration (*cfr. supra p. 11 (peirastic ed. )*) of the crisis of foundations, which founded the Enlightenment, literally and deliberately.

"The second son Vladimir, barely fourteen years old, broke with his family traditions. Whatever reminded him of religion and church, he removed, violently and, even, passionately, from his study (...). He spent whole nights studying the German materialists, like L. Feuerbach (1804/1872) or the French freethinkers like E. Renan (1823/1892), who, at the time, intoxicated and confused the Russian youth. (...).

MHD. 264.

His Father trusted his child, let him do it;-- talked to him, well, on occasion, about his grandfather, who was an Orthodox priest, told him, already an excellent connoisseur of Russian traditions, about the religious character of his people. Yet, beyond that, paternal concern never became violence. One point (...) - one single one - was emphasized: that these were very important questions of life, which had to be treated with seriousness, -- the seriousness that goes with it.

With time, Vladimir, whose heart was already beginning to feel a great emptiness, began to understand this (...). At nineteen, Vl. had overcome the crisis of his early youth. From total nihilism (the either theoretical or practical denial of all higher ideas, ideals and values; cf. *supra pp. 36/38: Gogol's evil antichrist; (160critical-unmasked thinking); 162/165 (malakia)*) Vl. has moved away, to return to the great traditions (cf. Willmann 's reclamation of trad. fil.) of his people. (...) The study of mathematics and of the natural sciences, which he had so fruitfully employed, was abandoned in favor of that type of philosophy which deals with the great questions of life." ((259; Peirc.) (cfr. *supra p. 235 (Schelerian model)*).

### ***The philosophical way out.***

It seems to us that neither the intoxication of rhetorical philosophies, nor any other form of own, right, liberal (cfr. *supra pp. 32; 33;177v.*) methods seems to withstand serious criticism. Only the way, shown to us by either the lemmatic-analytical method (cfr. *supra p. 8v. (math. Mod., yet anaically (cfr. p. 101v.)* to be applied) or the semiotic-hermeneutic method (cf. *supra pp. 254/259 (Skot. - Peircian method)*) - i.e. both summed up under a single name: the reductive method (cf. *higher pp. 10/12 (Math. and Eth. Pol. Mod.)*) - only that path, therefore, will overcome the present 'malakia', resp. nihilism.

A. T' Jampens, White Thursday 1984.