

4.3. Introduction to Greek philosophy; Hivo 1979/1980 Second year.

4.3.2. part II (pages 151 to 337).

In *Metaf. 1003a 20*, Aristotle says: "There is a science which regards being as an object and immediately its essential properties. It is distinguished from all special sciences, for none of them considers being in general, but isolates a certain area of being and of this area alone it considers the essential properties, -- for example, the mathematical sciences." This is the doctrine of being ('ontology' appears only begin the XVIIth century, with Goclenius, *Lexicon philosoph.*, 1613). Although a theory of being is present with Platon, - yes, although, already since Parmenides, it hesitantly paves its way, yet Aristotle is its formal founder.

M. Heidegger (1889/1976), the great fundamental ontologist in existential thought, criticizes Ariatotle's metaphysics as onto.theo.logic: indeed,

1/ the consideration of 'being in general' and 2/ that of 'highest' (i.e. divine) being' coincide (giving them precedence over all 'second' philosophies, such as a/ mathematism, physical, b/ ethics, economy, politics; c/ poietics): they are together, onto.theo.logic, - logic, because logical analysis (see Organon) is fundamental.

And, indeed, one can also design an ontology which 1/ is god-free and 2/ is logic-free (sophistry presupposes such an ontology) but whether this nonconforming (i.e. breaking with the archaic-religious tradition) ontology which Heidegger urges, will solve the deep crisis of Western man today better than the ontotheological one, is a question mark. -

In any case, ontotheologica has a fourfold structure, which we have already touched upon with Platon's Light/Dark metaphysics (cf. pp. 102/103 supra):

(i) preconstitutive, i.e., before every arising and passing away of the beings surrounding us, lies the light of divine reality (with its number forms (Puth.), Ideas (Plat.), or forms (Ar.) as informing rules for things,

(ii) constitutive, i.e. lying in the arising and passing away itself, is the light of divine number forms, ideas, or forms;

(iii) informative (cognitive), i.e. the unconscious or conscious cognizance of the arising and perishing regulate the number forms, idea and/or forms from the divine Being and its Primal Light;

(iv) deontically, i.e. ethico-politically (for man), the numberforms, idea or forms of the Primal Light work normatively and cybernetically (in case of deviation they adjust, anyway) - which, from the ontology, 1/ the theo(logical) and 2/ the logical aspect, removes immediately the aforementioned quadrilateral.

Especially sophistry, scepticism and similar sophistising or sceptical philosophical currents will soon make clear to us whether there is so much to be gained by a pure, 1/ God-free and 2/ logic-free, ontology, except for this one, i.e. the most general framework of ontology, which remains after one has put all its interpretations between brackets (epochè, suspension of judgment). This is Heidegger's merit, apparently.

Conclusion. - H. Blackham, *Humanism*, 1968, pp. 106/107, notes that, in Demokritos and Platon, already present are the two enduring and thoroughly opposed views that still characterize our time:

(i) Demokritos and Sophism see the fuisis as a reality which in itself is not rationally ordered; man can learn to make this reality useful by adapting his interest to the fuisis and, conversely, the fuisis to his interest; to this end he should transform his own fuisis by a learning process based on experience;

(ii) Pythagoras, Socrates, Platon, Aristotle - each in their own way, see the fuisis as rationally ordered in themselves, i.e. as the work of a designing divine spirit; man, with his “spirit”, (reason, intelligence), does good by studying the fuisis, following it and thus making the divine design real; better, indeed, man cannot do otherwise.

(i) Platon’s view

This leads, Blackham says, a/ to Puritanism, i.e. strictness on principles of a theological, physical, intellectual or ethico-political nature, - e.g. his totalitarian-looking utopia which takes Sparta rather than Athens as its model, or b/ to Neo-Platonic theosophy, ‘n alienation from the world and the body, Blackham always says; - this is ‘anti-humanism’.

(ii) Demokritos’ view.

This leads to ‘reasonable’ life as expressed a/ by Epikouros (-341/-271) in a universalist sense, i.e. not limiting itself to the (narrow) views of one or another polis, or b/ by the later ‘humanists’ according to the circumstances.

Blackham notes that Aristotle was shaped by Platon’s influence and retained, until his death, the same religious spirit and interest, but with a stricter intellectual conscience, developing his conceptual analysis and broadening the scientific basis of his philosophy by means of philosophical concepts that determined his method and new themes. This led Aristotle’s thinking - not to theosophy and mysticism - but to the separation of 1/ professional scientific research and 2/ actual metaphysical philosophy, at Alexandria.

Assessment of this ‘humanistic’ view.

(i) The Blackham view works with “white-black” opposition, - which always leads to caricaturing;

(ii) Blackham is, from his unconscious depths, allergic to religion, which, always, is “objectionable” in his eyes, while a-religion is always affirmed, - where in fact a/ these views intertwine and b/ “good” and “evil” can be found both among “humanists” and among “non-humanists.

One example: Platon too feels the fuisis to be somewhat non-rational; Platon too adapts human interest to the fuisis, and the fuisis to human interest; Plato too goes through ‘a learning process,’ etc. - ‘White-black’ is questionable.

III.A. Hellenistic - Roman classical philosophy (-320/4-200).

Hellenism. -

‘Hellenizein’, Hellenic speech, Hellenic life, gives Hellenismos, Hellenism, which, meanwhile, in our present parlance, has two meanings: (i) belief in classical Hellenic culture (if need be with disregard for Hellenistic-Roman times), (ii) belief in all Hellenic culture, including Hellenistic-Roman.

J.G. Droysen (1808/1884), the Prussian historian and politician, created the term “Hellenismus” in 1836 to designate the time between 1/ the death of Alexandros the Great (-325) and 2/ the annexation of Egypt (after the battle of Actium (-31) by Octavian, the later princeps Augustus, against Antonius and Kleopatra) in -30,- this in his work *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (History of Hellenism), (1877/1878²), in which he studied the cultural unity in the multiplicity of monarchies that Alexandros the Great had left, at his untimely death, as “a very bloody legacy.”

As V.L. Ehrenberg, *Hellenistic Age*, in *Encyclopedia Britannica* 1967, 11, pp. 322/334, says: Droysen “forgot” Rome. This twofold:

(i) +/- -200 the pressure of Roman conquests begins to weigh on the Hellenistic world until its absorption in -30;

(ii) although absorbed into a new empire, Hellenism, as a culture, continues to flourish, indeed increases, so that one can speak of a second Hellenism under Roman rule. It is the transition from classical to Christian culture.

The main feature is, at first,

(i) the mixing of Macedonian and Hellenic populations, which, in various forms (military, administrative, judicial, artistic, scientific, philosophical, etc.), came along with the conquest, with the native or indigenous populations in Anatolia, Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia, etc. (in Egypt, for example, treasure troves of gold and silver). (in Egypt, for example, one estimates the ratio of 1 million Greeks to 8 million Egyptians), - mixing, which had long been prepared, in many places, by the Hellenic colonizations all around the Mediterranean;

(ii) the mixing of Hellenic culture that spread with the Eastern cultures (especially with its religions) -

The Ancient (Near) East. -

Hellas, in its Ionian-Aiolian expansions into Anatolia, has always had contact with ‘the East’, which gradually seeped in (one thinks of Platon’s and Aristotle’s informations about the religion of the Parsis (= Zoroastrians)). - see e.g. above p. 92 f., but, after Alexandros’ death especially, a deeper contact begins.

Therefore a short characterization of the Eastern cultures. J. De Keyzer, *Beschavingsgeschiedenis van het Oude Oosten*, (Civilization history of the Ancient East), Antwerpen, 1941, however outdated, still offers a valid scheme. -

(i) **Ethnographic.** - Egypt, Mesopotamia (Sumerians, Elamites, Akkadians, Babylonians, Assyrians, - only the Sumerians are non-Semites)

these are the two oldest nuclei of civilization, - the Syrian-Palestinian “corridor” (with its Semitic populations, Phoenicians (= Canaanites), Hebrews, and its non-Semitic Philistines), Anatolia or Asia Minor (Hittites, Hurrites, Phrygians, Lydians, mainly Indo-Europeans), Iran (Present Persians, Sogdians, Baktrians, - Indo-Europeans). Behold the principal peoples. -

De Keyzer does not mention Kush, ancient Nubia, south of the second to the fourth cataract in the Nile, centered around Napata and, later, Neroë, as capitals (Napata is conquered by the Romans in -23), known for its Kandake’ s (reigning queens, one of whom came into contact with Augustus).

Cf. J. Leclant, *Het rijk Koesj* (The kingdom of Kush), in *Koerier* Kr. 78 (Oct. 1979), p. 55/57. Kush is important because of its contact with black Africa. -- Oerartoe is also unknown to De Keyzer; reference should be made to B. Piotrovsky, *Ourartou*, Geneva/Paris, Munich, 1969 (Oerartoe became, in the Bible, Ararat, - in the Latin Bible Armenia). This is to show how historiography discovers progressively.

- (ii) *International.*

- The main occupation was the struggle for dominion and the establishment of great empires, founded successively by the Babylonians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Neo-Babylonians, Medes, and, last but not least, Persians, with whom Alexandros will deal. These empires, result and dream of ‘imperialism’, created an immeasurable melting pot of peoples and cultures, something to which Alexandros responded - this all the more so since the Easterners themselves, as it were, asked for one great peaceful empire and greeted him as a ‘liberator’.

- (iii) *National.-*

Unlimited monarchy (Oriental ‘despotism’) characterizes most empires or kingdoms. The monarch, ‘son’, ‘descendant’ or also ‘stadholder’ of the deity, was the possessor of the country with its entire landscape, subjects included (according to body and property). He was a priest, but also a legislator, judge and commander of the army. The so-called people were subordinate to such a dominate. -

Only Israel was an exception, except in the king’s time - and even then. - Alexander, his successors, the Diadochen, - later, the Roman principes (who then become domini), will mirror that monarchy.

- (iv) *Socio - economic. -*

The ‘East’ was predominantly agricultural (arable farming, cattle breeding). Industry and trade was especially strong in Anatolia, the Syrian-Palestinian corridor and the Nile Delta.

Trade, especially by the Phoenicians and Arameans, was essentially barter (with grain and, later, precious metals as means of exchange), until the Lydians invented coin and the Persians spread the currency economy (the golden Dareikos), which led to fabulous treasure collecting for them, at Soesa and at Persepolis. - Something that Alexandros will generously take advantage of, so that the Mediterranean becomes trade sea, more than before.

- (v) **General cultural.** -

S.V.Kramer, *L' Histoire commence à Sumer*, (History begins in Sumer), Paris, 1975, is a reworking of a book, published twenty years ago, with a cultural-historical exciting thesis, viz. "The Greek miracle had a predecessor.

From the third millennium before J.-Chr., the Sumerians had invented writing, founded the first city-states, articulated the first codices of law, given the first literary expression to myth, to epic, to a deeply felt lyricism that heralds the finest texts of the Old Testament."

In this reworked edition (thirty chapters) he expands his thesis even further: the ancient civilization gives the real beginning of all possible branches of human activity as national government, politics, education, literature, philosophy, ethics, legislation, jurisprudence, agriculture, medicine.

The author is formal: he gives what is "definitely acquired" certainty. Page 97/121, gives the "first" cosmology: the author says that the philosophy of the Sumerians is obviously not a Hellenic physical with its Milesian empiricism or Platonic idealism - the rational - logical that extracts the universal from the private and/or singular (abstraction), is still undeveloped. Yet there is true cosmology, as well as true ethics (o.c., pp. 122/127), as well as true paideia (o.c., pp. 33/39). -

It is not surprising, then, that the Hellenes, before Alexandros, yet especially after him, eagerly embraced Eastern culture.

In summary: (i) literature, especially among the Semites, is the most developed; (ii) architecture is masterly (temples, tombs, palaces); (iii) subject sciences are there, though mainly practical, strongly magical yet ('sacred') not in a Hellenic way, of course. (iv) philosophy as well; a view the Eastern cultures have but not expressed in a Hellenic way. -

Main feature: conservative-traditional; which does not mean that there is no evolution: cultural history proves it; but it is, compared to the Hellenic-Western, slower, though not without typical Eastern refinement, several times. - The alphabet, the time system, the system of weights, - all this has been transferred to Hellas and the West; also initial astronomy (pure and astrological) and medicine, not to mention the Bible which has an enormous planetary influence. The pyramids still command reverence.

- (vi) **Religious.** - Two main types:

(a)1 Naturism, i.e. religion closely related to fisis, nature; - polytheistic interpretation of nature (many function gods (i.e. with special task in cosmos and humanity), arranged around 'a supreme god);

(a)2 clear chthonic underlayer (cf. M. Stone, *Eens was God als vrouw belichaamd*, (Once God was embodied as woman), Katwijk, 1979; cf. the Hellenic underlayer of the same nature: J. Hawkes, *Dawn of the Gods*. London, 1968; cf. also C. Bleeker, *De moedergodin in de oudheid*, (The Mother Goddess in Antiquity), The Hague, 1960, *Encyclopedia of World Religions*, London, 1975, pp. 19/22);

Names such as Inanna and Ishtar (Mesopotamia), Isis (Egypt), Anahita (Iran), Kubele (Phrygia), Astarte (Phoenicia), Athtar (South Arabia), Athar (also Atargatis, Syria), point to the telluric sky-king religion;

(a)3 fertility religion; connected with the previous strata (cf. K. Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion*, (Right and limit of natural religion), Zurich, 1954, S. 295/305, on the conflict between Bible (prophets) and such religion);

(a)4 spirit belief; - the demonology of the Bible is partly rooted in it;

(a)5 priestly castes of all kinds;

(a)6 magic, both cognitive (divination) and technical (magic); -

(b)1 Israelite monotheism - together with the henotheism of Persia and of Egypt (Ekhnaton: Atonism), to a much lesser extent -;

(b)2 the ethical dualism of Persia - these latter religions contrast with the former. - Semitic sense of sin, Egyptian belief in immortality, Persian love of truth and morality; - have become enduring aspects of culture.

It should be noted, with H. Obbink, *Cybele, Isis, Mithras (Oosterse godsdiensten in het Romeinse rijk)*, (Cybele, Isis, Mithras (Eastern Religions in the Roman Empire)), Haarlem, 1965, that the Eastern 'mysteries', from the days of Jesus especially, have exerted profound influence, also on the West.

- Behold all too succinctly what 'East' and 'Eastern culture' mean: with that world Hellenism was confronted and, conversely, that world was Hellenized.

Expansion of Hellenism:-

P. L'éveque, *L'aventure grecque*, (The Greek Adventure), Paris, 1964, pp. 484/523, gives an overview of the Hellenic oikoumenè (overall inhabited and known world). Colonization and trade relations also conquests lay the foundation.

(i) Barbaric Europe: Sarmatians, Scythians (N. v. Black Sea), the Danube-Balkans (Thracians, Geten, Dacians), the Celts (Gaul) - think of Hellenistic Massila (Marseille) -, of the Kelto-Ligures (Provence), the Kelt-Iberen (Languedoc-Roussillon), - the Iberen (Spain);

(ii) the Middle - Mediterranean: Carthage, Rome (as well as both empires);

(iii) Africa: Nubia (Kush) - Homer knows the Pugmaioi, Pygmies, from whom he evokes battles with Greeks;

(iv) Arabia - Eratosthenes describes the four southern Arabian tribes -;

(v) Asia: Baktria (between N.-Iran and India) - Greek inscriptions have been found in South Afghanistan, India, - there have been Greco-Baktrian and Greco-Indian empires; yes, the Asian steppe and China - unmistakable archaeological finds prove that Greeks and Hellenic culture penetrated as far as this, through Baktria especially. -

"If Rome emerges completely transformed from its contact with the Hellenistic empires, if the Celts, Ibers or Nubians arrive at a more human way of life thanks to those empires, the Indians owe them only a new sense of beauty." Thus L'évêque, o.c., p. 523.

The remarkable thing about the extensive Hellenization is that it is non-violent because Hellenism was an irresistible temptation.

Periodization; of Hellenism.-.

V. Ehrenberg, a.c., thus distinguishes two Hellenisms. we explain this in more detail.

(I) *The first (= oriented to the East) Hellenism.* - Ehrenberg distinguishes three times. -

(i)a. -323/-280, i.e. the troubles of the Diadochen wars (under Alexander's successors), ending by the battle of Kouroupedion (-281). From this a new community of states arose in the form of three monarchies: Macedonia (Antigonians), Pre-Asia (Seleukians) and Egypt (Ptolemies). -

(i)b. -280/ +/- -160, i.e., the creative age, based on balance of power of monarchies, characterized by Hellenization of large areas; philosophy and the professional sciences play a major role; --

(i)c. -160/-30, i.e. on the basis of decline of monarchies, rise of Eastern states and culture and growing Roman conquests, a time of religious and mystical movements.

-- The East contributed, according to P. Lévêque, o.c., p. 483, almost nothing in the field of literature and science, a little more in the field of art and philosophy, but almost everything in the religious field.

“The Greek of Egypt, if he is sick, will first turn to a Greek physician, who will apply a method of diagnosis, a treatment, a manual of prescriptions, all of an almost purely Hellenic nature. But, doubting that he will regain his health in this way, he will gladly, above Thebes, into the mountains, hike up to the tombs, to beg for the healing of Amenhotep, the son of Hapou, “a very good god,” as the almost all of the graffiti set in Greek express it.” (o.c., *ibid.*)

What does this mean? a/ That the distinction between the second and third ages, (i)b and (i)c above, lies only in a more and a less; b/ That this is the direct continuation of the entire fourth century: “One returns, of necessity, to the following profound incongruity which we pointed out, at the outset: this century which is the century of Aristotle, is also the century in which the nostalgia for the divine, for the first time, emerges with such violence.

Everywhere the irrational triumphs, to which one surrenders with lust.” Thus Lévêque, o.c., 390. In other words, in this field the Hellenistic Greek living outside Hellas learned nothing essential from the Orientalist: a/ secular, deconsecrated science and philosophy, on the one hand, and b/ on the other hand, religion were the two strongly coexisting components already before Hellenism, The religious components were, however, strengthened and supplemented with foreign aspects.

Three centers. - A great and beautiful city civilization arises in this context.

(i) Alexandria had a ‘mouseion’, museum, i.e. a place in connection with the Muses or the art inspired by them, especially a place of literary education (thus there was a mouseion in the Academy and the Lyceum); that of Alexandria is founded +/- -280 by Ptolemaios Soter

(-367/-282), the first of the Macedonian princes of Egypt, on the advice of Aristotle's pupil Demetrios of Faleron (\pm -350/...); a hundred scholars, coming from the four quarters of the world, could do research there, paid by the Ptolemies (later by the emperors). It also hosted conferences and other cultural activities; -- more or less connected with this was the famous library, which, when it went up in flames in the days of Julius Caesar, is said to have contained at least fifty thousand scrolls.

(ii) Second center was Antiocheia.

(iii) The third was Pergamon. Libraries were established wherever Greeks settled. The intellectuals of Hellas therefore readily flocked to those centers.

In conclusion, from Macedonia to India, Greek was spoken, the *koinè*, the common language, and a common mentality developed. In this melting pot we situate a few facts:

(i) as G. Bartelink, *Geschiedenis van de klassieke letterkunde*, (History of classical literature), Utrecht/Antwerpen, 1971, p. 121ff., says, most of the Old Testament at Alexandria was translated into Greek (Septuagint) that text became the biblical text of the diaspora and, later, of the first Christians;

After the translation of the Old Sumerian hymns into Babylonian, this translation is the first major attempt to translate from one language into another and such that 'translation' ranges from a/ strict verbatim rendering to b/ 'free' translation; this translation was done by the Seventy who worked under the protection of King Ptolemaios II Philadelfos (-367/ -282) and his successors;

(ii) W. Clarysse and A. Wouters, *Een rijke bron van kennis over de Oudheid*, (A rich source of knowledge about antiquity), in *Alumni Leuven* 8:3 (Sept. 1977, pp. 21/23, point to papyrology, started in Leuven in 1936 and grown to world fame: papyrus was the writing material in antiquity, mainly preserved in Egypt, because of the ultra-dry climate; the oldest papyri date from \pm -2. 500 (pyramid era), but 'papyrology' means the study of the documents between a/ the conquest of Egypt by Alexandros (-323) and b/ its conquest by the Arabs (+650), i.e. the Hellenistic era.

Of Sappho 264 fragments were found; of Platon there are papyri, copied less than a century after his death; of Aristotle the complete "State Institutions of the Athenians" was found (in which he reveals himself as a historian); in many areas the papyri are a pre-eminent documentation of Hellenism.

One example: on the basis of epitaphs, tax receipts and mummy inscriptions one can show that the average age in Egypt at the time was barely thirty-five years; - which gives pause for thought about the ancient impression that becoming and perishing were the hallmarks of the *fusis*.

(II) *The second (= Roman-Eastern) Hellenism. -*

Meanwhile, Rome gradually, establishes its empire: in -168 the Roman province of Macedonia comes into being, in -129 Asia (Pergamon), in -30 Aegyptus (Egypt); in +70 Jerusalem falls; - from +114 to +117 the provinces of Armenia (the ancient Urartoe), Assyria, Mesopotamia come into being. -

This while, in the West, -58/-51, Julius Caesar conquers Gaul (with the first Rhine crossing and crossing into Britain taking place in -55). -49/-46 J. Caesar conquers Spain-

Two periods concerning emperorship:

(a)-27: Octavian receives the honorary title “Augustus” (the exalted); he becomes “princeps,” the first among equals (principate);

(b)1 +37/ +41: Emperor Caligula replaces the ‘principate’ with the Hellenistic-Eastern god-kingdom (dominate on the horizon);

(b)2 +274: Emperor Aurelian becomes “dominus et deus” (lord and god); at the same time the solar worship of Emesa (sol invictus) is introduced as the state religion;

(b)3 +297: under Domitian, the actual dominate (i.e., full monarchy around the divine emperor) is introduced.

-- As M. P. Nilsson, *Les croyances religieuses de la Grèce antique*, (The religious beliefs of ancient Greece), Paris, 1955, p. 99, says, begins (after the philosophical enlightenment (sophistically understood)), about one century after the conquests of Alexandros (-336/-323: he dies in -323 at Babylon of the fever), the great return of the people to religion, and Eastern religion very particularly.

As F. Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, (Eastern religions in Roman paganism), Paris, 1929-4 (1905-1), pp. 1-2, says, Rome found, in the West, the basis of its armed forces (the legions of the Danube and the Rhine were always much more reliable than those of the Euphrates and the Nile), yet, even before Constantine the Great (+324/ +337: in +330 Byzantium is given the name Constantinopolis as Christian imperial capital) shifts the center of gravity to the East, Rome found in the West industry and wealth, technical skill and artistic creation, reason and science, not to mention its main operation, religion.

‘Second’ Hellenism. -

Indeed, the Roman era differs from the Alexandrian-Diadochic era:

(i) the Eastern states of Hellenism disappear into Roman provinces;

(ii) a the pax romana, the Roman peace, replaces continuing unrest, at least until +/- +220 the “crisis of the ancient world” sets in, as Germanic and Sarmatian (N.), Persian (O.), Berber and Moor (Z.), begin to encroach as “mounted frontier peoples”;

(ii)b one true oikoumenè, inhabited world, emerges in that framework;

(ii)c Latin, as a language, emerges alongside the Greek koinè;

(ii)d Roman law and the Roman forms of government, at least to some extent in the East, find acceptance everywhere. Yet

In spite of these real differences, Hellenism remains: “Certainly, Rome conquered, little by little, Hellas and the Greek kingdoms, while the Greek princes controlled the high satrapies - that is, provinces headed by vassals called ‘satraps’ - and took possession of western India.

Yet everywhere, the flourishing of exchanges and the access to Greek culture that resulted reinforced the wealth and prestige of the leading popular strata, Roman nobilitas, Baktrian and Indian élites collaborating with the Greek occupiers.

At the ideological level, religious syncretisms, in which Hellenism more or less plays a role, represent a valuable contribution to the acquisition and maintenance of power, - in Rome, to the advantage of the naturalized imperators, namely on the basis of their personal relationship with the gods, - in India, where a Hellenized Buddhism - the so-called Greek-Buddhist art of the gods - is practiced.

In India, where a Hellenized Buddhism - the so-called Greek-Buddhist art is dated today as being from the first century A.D., thus from after the end of Greek domination - alienates the masses from this earth by presenting them with the fanciful hope of an afterlife which will reward them, so to speak, for their patience here on earth.” According to P. Lévêque, o.c., p. 540: - o.c., 525, the author lists the similarities with the first Hellenism:

(i) the whole of the Eastern part of the Roman empire remains Greek, linguistically and culturally speaking;

(ii) Hellas itself experienced, in the second century AD, a revival (“Renaissance”), embodied in minds as diverse as 1/ Plutarchos of Chaironeia (+45/+125), eclectic Platonist, 2/ Loukianos (Lt. Lucianus) of Samosata (in Syria) (+120/185), the shameless writer of recreational literature, the widely travelled rhetor, and 3/ Pausanias somewhere from Anatolia (+/- +150/180 his akmè or pinnacle of activity), the land- and ethnologist, author of a ten-volume *Periègèsis tès Hellados*, a guide to travel through Hellas at that time. -

This while in the West

(i) the most dynamic provinces are at the same time the Hellenized provinces, for a long time, viz. Baetica, i.e. Southern Spain, Tarraconensis, i.e. N.E. Spain, Narbonensis, i.e. Southern France, and Africa, i.e. the region around Carthage, and

(ii) Rome’s general Hellenization (a/ rhetoric as paideia (Isocrates), b/ art (up to third century), c/ literature, d/ religio, e/ philosophy (Stoa, under the Antonini (+96/+192) or adoptive emperors, their second name), f/ autocratic monarchy conception).

(iii) The crisis of the third century A.D., which shakes the Roman oikoumenè to its foundations sees a/ the resurgence of Platonism (theosophically hinted at) and b/ the breakthrough of one Eastern religion, Christianity.-

Conclusion: however different, a/ the purely Hellenistic and b/ the Roman-Hellenistic periods are fundamentally one.

Indus Civilization and Hellas. -

P. Lévêque, *L av. gr.*, 520, writes: “Some Eastern elements of Pythagorism may be Indian. In any case, the “great year” of 10,800 years which, according to Herakleitos, allows the celestial bodies to take up their positions again, is likely.

One knows that people like Dodds doubt the ‘Oriental’ in Pythagorism;--this not without serious reasons.-- “Aristoxenos of Taranton, disciple of Aristotle, mentions the visit to Socrates of ‘an Indian sage who teaches him that, without knowledge of divine things, one cannot know human ones: true or false, this anecdote did not appear nonsensical.” -

“The history of the professional sciences (astronomy and medicine especially) would, of this influence of the East in the West, also provide examples. The Hippocratic tracts know Indian methods of healing. The treatise “On the Winds” explains the disease originating from the circulation of the winds in the body according to Brahmin reflections. Platon, in his *Timaios*, explains the body equilibrium emanating from three essential substances, air, phlegm and bile, - ‘a doctrine classic in Indian physiology.’ -

Conclusion. -

a/ For the Voorsocratiek and Classical, if there are Indian influences, they are (i) uncertain and (ii) scarce. However, trade relations and envoys do bring increasingly intense contacts, over time.

b/ The Hellenistic period, after Alexandros’ conquests up to the Indus, intensifies the interaction, of course. For example, one admires the Indian gumnosofistai, i.e. literally the naked (gumnos) living wisdom teachers. “The Roman era alone experiences the true development of intellectual contacts, thanks to increased trade relations. Then India works its way into the astronomy, astrology, medicine of the Greeks and, perhaps, imitates their theater. Conversely, one can suspect ‘an Indian influence on the Hellenic novel or on the thinking of the Gnostics and of Plotinos (+203/+269).” (o.c., 520). In other words, even in Hellenistic times, Indian influence is (i) scarce and (ii) mostly uncertain.

India’s early cultures. -

(1) Archaic culture was discovered, 1921/1924: city civilization (Mohenjo Daro, Harappa) existed, +/- -3000 / - 1500 (‘Indus culture’), with palaces, houses, jewelry, writing, statues. etc. The idols of the gods, phallosvering, moon goddess, sacred animals, snake demons, etc., give ‘an outline of the primal religion, which was ‘fruit-hair religion’ (chthonic). The bearers were probably Dravidas

(2) +/- -1500/-1200 the Aryans (+/- -2500/-2000 situated in the South Russian steppes around the Aral Sea) invaded. They form the upper layer of the population with its four castes (Brahmins; - noble warriors; - farmers, merchants, civil servants; - serving people), own language (Sanskrit), Rigvedar religion (+/- -1000) finished, from which +/- -600/ +400 the oldest Hinduism (Brahmanism) emerges) Cf. C. Bleeker, *Het geheim van de godsdienst*, (The Secret of Religion), Wassenaar, p. 31.

Hinduism

This religion, according to F. Moller-Kristensen, *Indische Religionen*, in J. Asmussen / J. Laessoe/C. Colpe, *Handbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, (Handbook of the history of religion), Göttingen, 1972 (Danish: Kobenhavn, 1968-1, 1972²), II, S. 373/513, a fusion of non-Aryan and Aryan religions, begun around -600 (o.c., 377): objects of worship from the earliest Indus culture closely resemble those of later Hinduism, - e.g.

a/ statues of women (so-called ‘mother goddesses’, ‘sky queens’)

b/ a deity enthroned in a kind of yoga pose, surrounded by animals (reminds one of Shiva, the Lord of animals, the great yogi), linga (male organ of power) and yoni (female organ of power),- both are also found in the Shiva religion (o.c., 376). So that the oldest Hinduism, also called Brahmanism, appears as a fusion of (Rig)veda religion (Aryan upper class) and original Indus religion (lower class). Cf. C. Bleeker, o.c., 38/43.

Further Indian development. -

a/ Indus religion; **b/** (Rig)vedar religion (Vedism) **c/** Oldest Hinduism (Brahmanism) form the background against which +/- -500 Buddhism and Jainism arose. -

Buddha

He lived around -560/ -480. He is the contemporary of Puthagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitos.

Hinayana Buddhism, then Mahayana Buddhism (which is much more socially sensitive and folk-oriented than Hinayana) and Vajrayana Buddhism (the Tantrism interpretation of Mahayana) show us the development of Buddha’s system in and also outside India. -

Vardhamana,

better known by his nickname Mahavira (the great hero), lived from about -540 to -470. He was a strict ascetic. In 1961, officially, there were still two million Jainas (Mahavira devotees) in India. ‘Jina’ means ‘victor’, i.e. one who has attained salvation. Hence the name Jainism, - system that did not get beyond India.

Note: - In Tibet, two strata are discernible: (i) the oldest, indigenous, Bonism (‘beunism’ pronounced), which is a polytheism, and (ii) Lamaism, which includes Hinayana, Mahayana and Tantism (‘an androginie religion). -

In China, Sh’en or meditation Buddhism exists, since +61, alongside Taoism (Lao-Tse (-604/-517)), which emphasizes the yin or passive-feminine aspect (// Aristotle’s dunamis), shadowy-moist aspect originally, emphasizes, and Confucianism (Khong-Foe -Tse (-551/-471)), which is ethical-political and emphasizes the yang, originally sunshining-dry, masculine-working aspect of the universe. -

In Japan, Buddhism exists primarily in two forms: **(i)** Amida Buddhism (which emphasizes ‘grace’) and **(ii)** Zen Buddhism (‘zen’ is Chinese sh’en) which aims at ‘satori’ (‘a kind of rapture’) and this in two main forms, Rinzai (paradoxical) and Soto (dwell-meditative) - against Shin-to(ism) as a background (Japanese primal religion).

Spiritual life. -

Spiritual life continues in the framework created by Alexander the Great. We will go over it quickly. But first of all its new social characteristic:

(i) individualism, which since the days of Proto-sophistic has put the individual in the foreground, is fully expressed by a/ the personal support of the lyric poet, b/ the philosopher's craving for a personal point of view and c/ the personal needs of the religious soul;

(ii) the basic community, the small-scale group - they are the new "home" of the individual: a/ the cenacles of poets, b/ the workshop of artists, c/ the "school" of scholars and philosophers, d/ the "brotherhoods" of religious circles prove it. -

What does this double fact mean? It means that the paideia politique, the humanitas civilis, the civic education in line with the state, has given way to a paideia which means the personal education of the individual on the basis of a number of private learning processes. Thus W. Jaeger, *Paideia I*, 16.

The agology of modern times, says Jaeger, stems in a straight line from that Hellenistic agology. And H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l' éducation dans l'antiquité*, (History of education in antiquity), Paris, 1948, pp. 139ss., says that, after Aristotle and Alexander, the ancient paideia only really becomes itself:

(i) the noble kalokaigathia (fusion of clean and moral good through musical and gymnastic education disappears;

(ii) the literary school education, takes its place. -- This literary, rhetorical schooling is no longer situated, as it was in Attic times (Sophistic, Socratic), in the democratic polis: "This means that from now on the individual no longer has any political freedom. He is no longer a citizen as before, but a bourgeois. Is there nothing left of Greek freedom? Yes, there is.

The individual who continues to seek freedom retreats to the refuge of science, religion and philosophy and in these areas will experience the spiritual freedom which Socrates had already proclaimed. (W. Peremans, , *De Griekse vrijheid*, (The Greek Freedom), Hasselt, 1978, p. 19). That "spiritual", understood intellectually-rational and religious freedom is situated in the professional sciences, philosophy and the religious idea of salvation.

Yet one must not exaggerate: Alexander has universalist tendencies. He wants to merge the 'barbaros', the non-Greek, with the Greek; after all, for him, the latter is also a human being. 'Human' becomes a/ more than polis-related, even b/ more than PanHellenic concept; c/ it becomes universal! Alexander marries Roxane, the daughter of a Sogdian nobleman; he then marries three Persian princesses, - he appreciates the local inhabitants, their customs and manners, including their religion: thus he restores the temple of Mardouk in Babylon and that of Amon in Karnak.

'Human nature'

This now becomes the common characteristic of all the 'people' who have a place in the great Alexandrian living framework, whether they are Hellenes, Macedonians, Persians, Baktrians, Indians, Romans or Egyptians.

Alexander, who was a Hellenist - he founded some thirty-four cities called "Alexandria" and intended them to be, among other things, centers of Greekization - was nevertheless universalist enough to bring from India, for example, an old-fashioned Brahmin named Kalanos and to allow him to be burned at the stake to free himself from earthly life, which must have been an abomination for a life-friendly Hellenist.

-- The universalist idea of man extends, in the Stoa, to a cosmic dimension: as with Herakleitos and other Voorsokratiekers, the Stoic knows himself to be a "citizen" not only in the local polis, not only in a Panhellenic political framework, not even only in the Hellenistic empire, but in the overall cosmos or universe. He is "cosmopolites," universe citizen.

The telos, finis, objective, of the paideitio of the Hellenistic man is above all practical: **(i)** given the new and uncertain world in which I live, **(ii)** how should I live (ethically, morally) and how do I become happy (eudemonically)? Behold the situation, summarized, and, equally summarized, the response to it. The answer given to it is strikingly negative: a.patheia, a.taraxiai, - desire-lessness, failurelessness.

Typology of the mental life.-

One may classify the mental life, especially literary, as follows: **(a)** rhetoric, **(b)1.** human sciences, **(b)2** natural sciences, **(b)3** occult sciences, **(c)** belletrise (= entertainment literature). Let us quickly go over these domains.

(a). Rhetoric. -

The popular speech and the speech to the court fall away because of the disappearance of the polis; what remains is the entertainment speech, and this as a school speech. - Demetrios of Faleron (-344/-), known to Aristotle, is said to have introduced, as an exile in Alexandria (Eg.), the 'diatribè', the school speech, about imaginary cases, as follows: from the dialogue with two, developed the speaker who, declamating alone, replaces both himself and his conversational partner.

The second characteristic of the period: the diatribe is morally directed against the shortcomings of mankind, thus becoming a rhetorical moral philosophy. - Two currents made use of the diatribe:

(1) the Kunish itinerant preachers (see above p. 87 (Neo)kunikers)), a.o. Dion of Borusthenes (Olbia) (-300/-350).

(ii) the Christian ministers.

As currents there are **(i)** Asianism.**(a/** weak, lush Anatolians demand 'graceful' style; **b/** vain, bloated ones demand the so-called bombastic style); **(ii)** Atticism (+/- +200) responds and returns to the

Attic rhetors (Isokrates, Demosthenes and others - cf. pp. 68/69, 123 supra); in other words, by its imitation in later times of the classics, Atticism became a classicism. -

In Roman circles the two currents found imitators: Cicero, the great orator, eclecticist (-106/-43), former student of the Greek school of rhetoric at Rhodes, sought the middle ground.

Deuterosophistics (Second Sophism). -

It represents ‘a reaction against the classicist Atticists and is ‘a Neo-Asianism. Indeed, under the “good emperors,” from Nerva to Marcus Aurelius, +96/ +180, Hellenic rhetoric lives on in new form:

(i) it pervades the whole of literary life; (ii) it enters, in it like Protosophism, into the center of life. It was, however, in contrast to Protophilosophy, not an enlightenment movement in the strict sense, despite its far-reaching resemblance.

Filostratos Lemnios - to be distinguished from three other Filostratoi who were his relatives - (-191/-), in his *Bioi sophiston, Vitae sophistarum*, described the mentality and personality of the sophists of the time. They were itinerant teachers, from Mesopotamia to Gaul performing in the larger cities: the centers, however, were the cities of Anatolia’s coast, Ephesos, Miletos, Smurna,- later also Athens and Rome.

The showy speech was their specialty and this for any audience. They were sought after, admired and loved by both rulers and the common people. Like the first Sophists they were often wealthy: they worked for honorary wages and received gifts from emperors and high officials. Often they were public officials in Gaul, Spain, Africa, Hellas, Anatolia, (including envoys).

Aristeides from Nusia (Anatolia) (+129/+190),

He was one of the most prominent, and says: “The rhetor should have a righteous disposition: he should do the righteous thing himself and encourage the other people to do it.

He should be a prince.” This ideal, this paideia, does not refer to people like Gorgias of Leontinoi, certainly not to immoral sophists like Trasumachos of Chalkedon, Kallikles or Menon (see pages 64, 69 supra but to Protagoras of Abdera, yes, to Isokrates (see page 123). The “second” sophist is the educated man and speaker, even philosophically trained, preferably. -

Dion of Prousa (now Brussa) in Bithunia (Anatolia), +/- +40/112, nicknamed ‘Golden Mouth’ (Chrusostomos), practitioner of the Neo-Cunic diatribe, was familiar enough with philosophy to work it out as a life basis. In +82 he was exiled from Italy and Anatolia for political reasons; he wandered around the Balkans and Asia and immersed himself eclectically in Kunish and Stoic philosophy; convinced of his divine calling as a soul healer, he lived his ideal. Restored under Nerva, he resumed political and rhetorical works.

We also mention Herod Attikos of Marathon, (+101/+177); -- Libanios of Antiocheia (Syria) (+314/+393), the rhetoric teacher of several Greek church fathers, in a later period. - Cf. O. Schönberger, ed., Philostratos, *Die Bilder (Griechisch - Deutsch)*, (The images (Greek-German)), Munich, 1968, S. 7/10; 17/ 20: Philostratos Lemnios (+/- +170/+245), was himself a sophist: at the imperial court in Rome he belonged to the circle of Iulia Domna, the mother of Caracalla; to her he addressed the 73rd letter with a defense of sophistic.

She commissioned him to write *The Life of Apollonios of Tuanas*, the Neo-Pythagorean (end of first century AD), a work in the service of the policy of exchange between East and West. The work *Eikones* is 'a high point in the antique description of arthistorical objects. -

Thanks to such figures, the word 'sophistès' - practically equivalent to rhetor - "acquired an all-pervading brilliance" (o.c., 8). -

How far the influence of the second sophistry went, shows us E. Flourey, *Hellénisme et christianisme: Saint Grégoire de Nazianze et son temps*, (Hellenism and Christianity: Saint Gregory of Nazianzus and his time), Paris, 1930, pp. 72/88. This saint (+329/+390) from Cappadocia was "no less saturated with the juice of Hellenism than with the marrow of the two testaments (i.e., of the Bible)." (o.c., 74). Yes, he was "too much a friend of rhetoric and eloquence to make it far in philosophical contemplation" (o.c., 80), such was his under the influence of Deuterosophism. -

As S. IJseling, *Retoriek en filosofie*, (Rhetoric and Philosophy), Bilthoven, 1975, p. 24, says: "Also the Church Fathers, who, in addition to being great theologians and believers, were also great orators or preachers, were almost all formed in the rhetorical tradition. They knew that faith is a matter of being convinced and that this faith had to be proclaimed by persuasive and persuasive speech. Faith exists only thanks to proclamation".

It is this tradition which, at the time of the Italian Renaissance, was taken up again by the Jesuits, who even made rhetoric their main subject. All this shows how we are still living from Deuterosophistics (e.g. in the doctrine of proclamation).

(b)1. Alpha - sciences. -

Among the professional sciences one should mention philology, philologia (philosophy of words, i.e. linguistics, which, at the same time, is a science of the mind), which is linked to librarianship. Among the professional sciences we find philology, philology of words, which is, at the same time, culturology and literary history: Zenodotos of Ephesus (-325/-260), Kallimachos of Kureno (-310/-240) - who was also a poet -, Eratosthenès of Kurene (-275/-195) - who was also a mathematician and geographer -, Aristarchos of Samothrace (-217/-145) are the founders. Hand in hand with this went chronologia, chronology, i.e. the science of dating and of the dates of history, especially literary history, *Timaios* of Tauromenion (Sicily) (+/- 300), *Geschiedenis van het Westen*, (History of the West), introduced the chronology according to olympiads, i.e. a universal instead of a local arrangement of historical facts.

The historiography

This continues the high lore of the golden age. “What Alexander was denied, fell to rising Rome: a herald of its greatness and its deeds, whom it grasped in its world-historical significance and wanted to paint” (Wendland-Pohlenz). This herald was a Greek, Polubios (Polybius), from Megalopolis (+/- -210/-120).” (E. von Tunk, *Kurze Gcschichte der altgriechischen Literatur*, (Brief History of Ancient Greek Literature), Einsiedeln / Köln, 1942, S. 71).

His work is, in forty books, the first world history, -again a sign of universalism. - Polubios calls his historiography ‘pragmatic’, i.e. reflecting the pragmata or facts (not narratives).

Today, “pragmatic” means **(i)** reflecting causal relations or **(ii)** aiming at a result in a causal way. Like Thoukudides, Polubios also pays attention to the causal connection of facts, from which follows the usefulness of the lessons of history.

Like Thoukudides, Polubios is ‘a.theos’: he does not believe in ‘gods’ as masters of historical facts. Like Euripides, he is irrationalist: the ‘tuchè’ (capricious coincidence) confounds many human attempts and prospects.

Individualistic as he is, he claims that the individual can make his own life, notwithstanding fate. So do the peoples. -- Also, there is a noticeable shift in his adoration of Rome: first a boundless admirer of Rome, he becomes increasingly concerned about the abuse of power and about the results of Rome’s imperialism. The book is the first major model of koinè.

- Variants of historiography.

(i) Summary (e.g. Diodoros from Sicily (tss. -100 and -1), **(ii)** Rhetorical (e.g. Dionusios of Halikarnassos (contemporary of Emperor Augustus), Kassios Dion (Cassius Dio) of Nikaia (Bithunia) (+155/+235)), **(iii)** Biographical (e.g. v. Ploutarchos of Chaironeia (+48/+122), who each time compared a Roman and a Greek with educational intentions).

Remark - The folklore

This emerged, both among chronologists and historiographers and among poets (e.g. Kallimachos of Kurene (-310/-240), - Aitia, Origins, i.e. four books on celebratory customs, shrines, cities etc.).

Geography,

Thanks to the Alexandrian-Diadochic living space, geography continues: Putheas of Massilia (-350/ -285), seafarer who, from Marseilles, sailed past England as far as ‘Thule’ (which was either Norway or Iceland); especially Strabon of Amaseia (Pontos) (-64/+21) in his Geografia (1. Critique of Homer, Eratosthenes; 2. Physical-mathematical geography; 3/10. European countries; 11/16. Asian countries; 17. African countries) offers ‘a stoic philosophy of geography; also Pausanias from Ludia (+/- -150: Periègèsis). - Again, that universalist trait! The fuis anthropinè, natura humana, is common to all humans.

(b)2. Beta - sciences.

Rhetoric,- philology, chronology, historiography, - yes, even, somewhat, geography' - they are all rather Attic (sophistically-Socratic) in spirit; the following subjects, on the other hand, are 'natural science', more in the spirit of Milesian history and fusikè. -

(b)2a. *Mathematism.* -

The Pythagoreans, somewhat the Zenonian Eleates, later the Platonists in the Academy, - they had all practiced mathematics (see page 23 supra). Eukleides of Alexandria (+/- -300) summarized the whole field in the thirteen books of his *Stoicheia* (*Elementa*), building on his predecessors, elaborating what they had not yet achieved.

Archimedes of Syracuse (-287/-212), the greatest mathematician of antiquity, killed at the siege of his father's city by the Romans (Second Punic War) he was a scientific advisor in the defense of the city - is known for his statement: "Give me a foothold somewhere and I'll move the earth" (minimum force moves maximum weight) and for his exclamation "Heurèka, Heurèka!" (when he determined the ratio of silver to gold in the crown of Hieron II, the monarch who was his friend). Geometrical mathematics, but also mechanics was his domain. In this he is a distant ancestor of Galileo Galilei, in the Renaissance period.

Hipparchos of Nikaia (Bithunia) (-190/ -120) the astronomer, founded, +/- -150, the triangulation. - The Alexandrian school of mathematics existed well into the Christian era (Pappos of Alexandria (+/- +300; Diophantos of Alexandria (+/- +250, the first Greek who approached numbers not geometrically (as, since the Pythagoreans, customary) but rather in what is later called 'algebraic' sense: A pure arithmètikè arises in that way, a number mathematics in a more modern sense, finally, Hupathia, mathemation queen, Neo-Platonic in direction, is stoned by Christians in +415.

(b)2b *Astronomy* -

A legacy of the physicalists who "regarded" the heavenly dome. It has two basic hypotheses:

(i) heliocentrism with Aristarchos of Samos (-310/-230) as its proponent ("The fixed stars and the sun remain unmoved and the earth revolves around the sun in the circumference of a circle, the sun being at the center of the circle",- Archimedes states his thesis; "The earth rotates on its own axis",- thus according to Ploutarchos); later Seleukos of Seleukia (on the Tigris) around -150, tries to defend heliocentrism;

(ii) Hipparchos of Nikaia, the greatest of the Hellenic astronomers, noticed a new fixed star in -134, - which led him to compile a catalogue of the celestial bodies that lasted until binoculars were invented in the 17th century; he was, however, a geocentrist thanks to an extremely ingenious model of thought. This controversy anticipates Copernicus' time!

(b)2c Medicine. -

The Asklepios sanctuaries (Epidaurus, Pergamon), - Kos (with its famous Asklepieion) and Knidos, continue to live on and, again and again, the physical method continues, although the archaic method also continues.

Hippocrates of Kos (-460/ -377), as well as the Corpus Hippocraticum, focus research in the Alexandrian and Pergamon schools of medicine.

Herophilus of Chalkedon (between 300 and 250) was the dogmatic physician of Alexandria (where his school was still flourishing at the end of the first century AD), - a great scientist (who emphasized reasoning) but at the same time a practical man (who put experimentation before reasoning) who was a pioneer of anatomy; he discovered the nervous system and explained its general functioning by pointing to the spinal cord and the brain. He held the thesis that health is the indispensable foundation of all physical and mental happiness.

Erasistratos of Keos, contemporary and colleague of Herofilos, at Alexandria, founded physiology and his books were still being read in the fourth century A.D.; although rather theoretical (he was Demokritean in orientation), the circulatory system attracted his attention. Until Harvey, his authority on that point applies.

- Galenos (Galenus) of Pergamon (+129/ +199)

He is the greatest physician of antiquity. He studied in Hellas and Alexandria, started his practice in Pergamon in -157, goes to Rome in -162. He was eclectically dogmatic: Platon and Hippocrates, to a lesser extent Aristotle, were his inspirations; yet he expressed his own judgment as much as possible.

Anatomy and physiology, in particular, occupied him: his physiological detective work, based on experimentation, was masterly, especially in the neurological field. Convinced generalist, he was against specialization as his contemporaries understood it. He was also individually oriented: the physician has to deal with individuals and medicine cannot be accurately expressed in general statements. - Galenos was a monotheist and teleologist, so religious that even anatomy was God worship for him. -- Alongside the very great after-effects of Aristotle comes those of Galenos: his works, for the use of doctors - students, were still published in the first half of the XIXth century.

Conclusion:

“Hellenistic science has limits that one cannot hide. (...) Yet one is amazed at the progress achieved ‘He who understands Archimedes and Apollonios, says Leibniz, regards with less admiration the moderns.’“

This flowering is all the more remarkable in that it represents, all in all, the end of ancient science (P. Lévêque, *L'aventure greque*, (The Greek Adventure), 1964, p, 462).- - As E. Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsgedanke*, (The idea of progress), Zürich / Munich, 1977, S. 34/35, says, the idea of progress is found mainly among active natural explorers and this is concerning natural scientific progress or among those who are interested in it. After the fifth century B.C., this observation stands out.

(b)3. Mystical-magical sciences. -

Bolos the Demokritee (+/- -200) according to Suidas (= 'n lexicon) 'a Neo-Pythagorean, native of Mendes (the Egyptian city in the Nile Delta, known for its 'holy goat'), is the first 'anèr fusikos', physicist, 'physicalist' in the Hellenistic sense of the word, viz. one who is aware of the 'fusus' (if necessary and preferably in, the plural: fuseis, naturae), i.e. the occult, magical-mythical properties of nature and its parts.

The new meaning, religious-historically speaking, is the aninistic-dynanistiic meaning of nature (knowledge). - His main work, *Fusika dunanera*, Occult physics, considers fusis or nature in its three realms: a/ the inorganic (rocks, metals), b/ plants, c/ animals and humans.

But not like the natural science(s), since (Demokritos and especially since) Aristotle and his pupil Theofrastos, in the attitude of *theoria*, *contemplatio*, without intentions of usefulness or utility, merely looking at a/ the division (into species and subspecies) and at b/ the causal connections (centered around the *morphe*, *forma*, form, which governs all this. - no, Bolos has the attitude of the magician who seeks the occult usefulness.

"This criterion of usefulness is decisive. It best marks the boundary where two worlds diverge." Thus Festugière, *La révélation d' Hermas Trismégiste, I (L'astrologie et les sciences occultes)*, (The revelation of Hermas Trismegistus, I (Astrology and occult sciences)), Paris, 1944, p. 194, speaking of the Aristotelian and the Neo Pythagorean fusis conceptions, which, indeed, live side by side as two almost hostile worlds from the second century B.C.

1/ The celestial space is not viewed as a 'form' (with upper and lower layers) which Aristotle 'considers', but astrologically, i.e. to 'read' the fate of men in it;

2/ The properties of rocks, plants and animals are studied, again magically, i.e. to trace their occult 'powers' and make them usable;

3/ The metals are studied 'alchemically', not to extract a contemplative 'form' (*energeia*) from them, but to find the formula that can lead to transmutation into a precious metal (gold, e.g.). -

The property study is e.g. The property study can be seen e.g. as follows: a/ yellow amber attracts all light objects except basiliscus and oiled objects pull iron, rubbed with garlic, no longer attracts iron; - b/ murik (plant) small blue- or red-flowered plant, poisonous to animals, removes evil occult influences; - c/ the body parts of the chameleon possess occult 'powers'; the fallen epidermis of a snake promotes menstruation; the tongue of a frog, placed on a woman's breast, makes her confess; the hyenagal cures eye ailments, etc; -

Further: the sympathies (salamander/fire, snake/fennel seed, swallow/(smelly) better: fragrant shire) and antipathies (ibis/snake, snake/oak leaves, snake/spittle of a fasting man, lion/cock, lion/fire, etc.) fill the book (also called "on sympathies and antipathies").

Father Festugière, o.c., 37, defines the concept of 'sumpatheia' (originally meaning pity, also sympathy with (the suffering, the feelings of) the other) between the heavenly bodies (and the 'spirits', 'gods' that inhabit them), on the one hand, and on the other, the subhuman realities exist 'chains', i.e. occult links; application: 'a certain plant may only be picked under the protection of a certain celestial body (or zodiac sign); 'a certain rock is only magically 'active' (effective,- always that 'pragmatism' instead of 'theoria' in Aristotle's style), if one utters a certain invocation over it (which concerns 'a spirit' or 'god').

Conversely: a certain 'god' ('spirit') only obeys (in a 'theurgic' act, which harnesses its 'power' in the service of the magician(s)) if one makes a certain sacrifice to it or if one can condense the 'fusus', (i.e. the magical-mystic essence) and the 'powers' associated with it, into an effigy that one has made.

-- In order to find out these 'sympathies', the 'historia' (method of investigation), common since the Milesians, elaborated by Aristotle, is not sufficient;

(i) Egypt, with its temple sages,
(ii) Chaldea (Mesopotamia) with its astrologers,
(iii) Persia (Iran) with its magicians (cf. p. 93 supra and
(iv) India (more accurately Indusland; now Pakistan and Afghanistan) with its fakirs,-- they are, with (v) the Hebrew prophets, the paradigmatic regions. Their 'historia' is more thorough than the classical Hebrew. Bolos, in his *Cheirokmèta dunamera* (Occult precepts), which deals with the artificial 'sympathetic' precepts, has drawn on apocryphal works of Dardanos, Zoroaster, Ostanès and others for this purpose.

In order to find out the "sympathies" ("correspondences", correlations of an occult nature) the Hellenic historia should be accompanied by (i) a divine favor ("grace") and / or (ii) magical skill, - things that exactly those Easterners, real or imagined, have possessed, since ancient times and with which they surpass the Hellenic classical intellectualism and rationalism (which is inadequate for that purpose).

As Fr. Festugière, o.c., 41, writes: the program of philosophy and the sciences related to it includes in God-given knowledge of the being ('n ontology thus), which:

a/ synchronically, reveals the structure of the universe (especially the heavenly bodies therein), as well as the 'fusus' (i.e. occult nature) of rocks, plants, animals, humans and spirits (the 'realms') and,

b/ diachronically, the cycles (kukloi, cycles) of the universe and its parts, i.e. beginning, middle and end of times, of sun, moon and heavenly bodies, of the seasons. - Bolos' works reflect this program: in addition to his *Fusika*, he wrote about symbolism, miracles (Thaumasia),- about magic (Paignia), alchemy (Bafika), astrology, - about mantics, medicine, agriculture,- about tactics, ethics, history

(*Peri Ioudaion*). One sees ‘an encyclopedic corpus!

-- The new ‘occult’ paideia relies heavily on astral religion. Therefore a word about astrology. Two books are to be recommended here:

(i) P. Festugière, *La révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, II (Le Dieu cosmique)*, Paris, 1949: from Platon’s *Epinomis* - see above p. 119v. - runs an astrotheological line through Aristotle’s (youthful) *Peri filosofias*, the Stoa (about which later), the eclectic dogmatism of Cicero, the treatise *De Mundo* and Philon the Jew, up to Hermetism;

(ii) A. Bouché - Leclereq, *L’astrologie grecque*, (Greek astrology), Paris, 1889 (anastatic: Bruxelles, 1963): “What Manetho (+/- -280) did for Egypt, at the beginning of the third century B.C., that the priest Berossos from Chaldea did for his country” (o.c., 36). Was Manetho Egyptian high priest at Heliopolis under the first two Ptolemies (-367/-246), who wrote *Aiguptiaka* (Egypt’s history to -323 according to dynasties), Bèro(s)sos was priest of Bel (‘n deity) and compiler of *Babuloniaka* (Babylonia’s history) in three books, dedicated to Antiochos I (Soter) (-324/-261), whose significance lies in the publication in Hellenic milieu of Babylonian history and astrology, resp. astronomy, which are so intimately intertwined.

Around -260 Hellenic astrology comes into being as a result of Berossos’ work: he even settles on the island of Kos to teach astronomy resp. astrology to the medical students there. On p. 87 the author summarizes the dogmata of astrology:

(i) By virtue of general ‘sumpathia’ (solidarity in the occult field) the heavenly bodies exert an influence on the earth (particularly on man, who is connected to the whole world), in accordance with their nature (especially their ‘power’);

(ii) This influence proceeds along currents of ‘forces’ (‘effluents’), rectilinear in nature, and is aimed at making the ‘patient’ (who undergoes the influence) conform to the agent (who influences);

(iii) The influence depends on the position of the heavenly bodies with respect to the earth and/or the other heavenly bodies; consequently: that influence is, of course, complex, subject, in addition, to competing influences, according to nature and magnitude (if necessary to the degree of reversal);

(iv) The paired influence of the heavenly bodies creates, at any moment, ‘favorable’ moments of various kinds which can be exploited as they occur (catarchy system);

(v) The influence at the moment of birth is so strong that it determines fate once and for all (fate, which, henceforth, is highly independent of further ‘favorable’ circumstances) (genethliological system). -- These dogmata or principles suffice to justify decisions and elaborate applications technically. Except for the Stoics, the philosophers and scientists were generally averse to Chaldean astrology, however far-fetched; the Stoics defended it (o.c., 544).

-- Alchemy also has its fixed place in the occult whole.

A Word about it. P. Festugière, *La révélation d' H. Tr.*, I (l'astrologie et les sciences occultes), Paris, 1944, pp. 217/282, gives us 'an insight. The word comes from the Arabic 'alkimiya' - al (= article) + non-Arabic noun (either chemi, i.e. black or chuma, i.e. melting process) - and refers to an operation,

1/ namely, the manufacture of gold, silver, etc. or, more correctly, the transformation (transmutation) of ordinary metals (lead, iron, tin, copper) into precious metals according to a threefold process:

(i) dyeing the surface of common metals with a layer of precious metal (gilding, silvering),

(ii) varnishing, which produces a noble appearance, (iii) mixing metals to achieve a noble appearance;

2/ weight increase was a second aspect, without change of appearance, by adding other metals. -- "Greek-Egyptian alchemy, from which all other alchemies derive, was born from the fusion of a fact and a doctrine.

The fact is the praxis, traditional in Egypt, of the techniques of goldsmithing. The doctrine is a mixture of Greek philosophy, especially borrowed from Platon and Aristotle, and mystical dreaming." (o.c., 218/219). Beginning as a technique, alchemy grew over time into a philosophy, indeed a religion.

The transition from Ancient Egyptian technique to philosophy, according to Festugière, o.c., 219, occurred through Bolos of Mendes, who a/ gave the 'bafic' (bantein, immersion) precepts b/ 'a physical' foundation ('a theory). Later, the classic *Fusika kai mustika*, Physical and mystical data, consisting of (i) precepts, (ii) a summoning story (i.e. Ostanos, a Persian magician, summoned from the hades, accompanied by a daimon, gives an indication; "The books (of my father) are in the temple") and (iii) polemical and doctrinal expositions.

After this first groundwork one has a/ apocrypha (the fashion at the time.) b/ Zosimos the alchemist (III th or IV th e. A.D.), native of Panopolis (Egypt), the equal of Bolos, and c/ the commentators who are technicians, thinkers or dreamers.

Alexandria (Eg.) is apparently the cradle of Hellenistic alchemy, which, in addition to Hellenistic aspects, has Chaldean, Egyptian and Jewish yes, Persian aspects. That, later, alchemy was of interest is proved by Emperor Diocletian (+264/+305) with edict containing the renewal of all Egyptian books on manufacture of gold and silver. Cf. T. Burckhardt, *L'alchimie (Science et sagesse)*, (Alchemy (Science and wisdom), Paris, s.d., p. 29. Cf. also M. Berthelot, *Introduction à l'étude de la chimie des anciens et du moyen âge*, (Introduction to the study of ancient and medieval chemistry), Paris, 1889 (anast., Brux., 1966).

Conclusion. - The occultist view is to be found, besides in 'physical works, in (i) novel literature (Philostratos, Apulios of Madauros (+ 123, ...)), (ii) allegorical literature (Horapollon), yes, (iii) ecclesiastical works (Basileios, Ambrose, Augustine.

(c) Purgatory Literature. -

Aristotle says that art provokes one of man's purposes, namely relaxation. A better name would be 'bellettrie', i.e. literature whose first (therefore not only) purpose is to create beauty, in which man is absorbed in relaxation.

(c)1. Poetry. -

The Hellenistic age sees the "doctus poeta", the learned poet, the intellectual poet, emerging alongside the more traditional inspired poet.

(c)1a. The epic

Homer remains the prototype, yet the epic is renewed by Kallimachos of Kurene: he wants to record myths and sagas that have not yet been worked on briefly and individually in a "new" epic (e.g. Apollonios of Alexandria (-295/-215), vehemently opposed by Kallimachos and his circle, writes, in +/- 6.000 verses, Argonautika (the Argonauts' passage yet, in spite of its Homeric archaizing intent, this is not a classical but a classicistic work. Famous and persistent is the fact that he is the first to introduce eros into the epic (*Jason and Medeia*, - followed by Virgil in and Dido episode). - In the IVth / V-th century there is a third epoch: Koïntos (Quintus) of Smurna (tss. +300 and +400) with his *Posthomerica* and especially *Nonnos of Panopolis* (Eg.), tss. +400 and +500, with his *Dionusiaka* (the God Dionusos goes to India), a work of +/- 25.000 verses (the most voluminous of antiquity), universalistic in mentality; - becoming a Christian he writes Paraphrasis on the Gospel of John.

(c)1b. The lyricism:

This knows

(i) the epigram, i.e. 'a mini - piece; e.g. Kallimachos of Kurene's examples: "Someone told, Herakleitos, thy death. A tear moved me: I remembered how often the two of us saw the sun set from the place where we met. But thou art perhaps now, thou friend from Halikarnassos, long since dust and ashes. Yet thy nightingale songs live still, on which Hades, the all-scraping, lays not his hand." (Kallimachos does not learn of the demise of his friend from Karia (Anatolia) until long after his death); - on Timon of Athens, a contemporary of Perikles, who was a hater of men, Kallimachos, in sophisticated spirit, poems: "Timon, thou art no more: what hatest thou, the darkness or the light? - 'The darkness! ' For of thy kind (i.e., 'men') there are more in Hades. "" (Cf. H. Rüdiger, *Griechische Lyriker*, Zürich, 1949, S. 250/251; 343/344); since there are more 'people' in the darkness of the underworld, Timon, out of hatred of people, hates that darkness more (!)

(ii) the elegy; so Kallimachos' Aitia (about which higher). -- The classical elegy was sung; the Hellenistic one recited or read.

(c) 1c. The drama.

Know a/ the 'new' Attic comedy, which recalls Eutipides rather than Aristophanes: it paints the 'little man' in his everyday life;

b/ also there is the satyr play and tragedy with Lukofron 's (of Chalkis: +/- -250) Alexandra; and, finally,

c/ the mimos (mime):

A kind of comedy, which, tss. -460 and -400, originated in Sicily, and now lives again thanks mainly to Theokritos of Surakousai (Syrakuse) (+/- -300/), known for his rural and urban mimes, called 'Idylls'. 'Eidullion', diminutive of eidos, image, so literally 'little picture', means 'small poem', 'fleeting poem'. Theokritos depicts the cow and goat herders of his Sicilian homeland in their colorful daily life, 'bukolic' (boukolikos, bucolicus, pastoral), i.e., conjuring up 'a rural elysian or paradisiacal life in all simplicity.

Note.- The hymnal; -

The humnos, hymn, is a type of literature which has existed since the Homeric Hymns (VIIth ed. about): it is a festive song in honor of a deity and of a narrative nature.

Kallimachos of Kurene turns it into something lyrical. The last specimens of that kind were the Orphic hymns, created +/- +300. Immortality belief of the soul, soul displacement (metempsychosis), mortification (askèsis), animal flesh prohibition, - these are the main theses: the Orphic believes that the soul - cf. Puthagoras, Platon - is imprisoned in the mortal body, that true life is that of the soul and that this only begins after death, that the soul should be purified, and this by soul displacement and thanks to the redeeming god, Dionusos.

As a secret doctrine and praxis, Orphism had no temples, no theological system: only rare literary remains from late antiquity provide an insight.

H. Rüdiger, o.c., 286/277, gives an extract " *Wierook ter ere van Hupnos* " (Incense in honor of Hupnos) (Sleep). - Sleep, prince of all blissful (gods), of mortal men and of all living creatures that the wide earth nourishes. Over all (creatures) thou alone rules, all (creatures) thou comest to wrap the bodies with soft bands.

Troublemaker, in possession of pleasant refreshment in the midst of sorrows, dispenser of holy consolation in all sorrows, thou also instill the anxiety of death by rescuing souls from distress, for, of course, thou art the relative of the Lethe (the Forgotten) and of the Thanatos (death). Yet, Blessed One, I beseech thee: approach me kindly, thou who with benevolence saves the initiates (mustas) by virtue of divine works."

(c)2. Prose.-The belletristic prose decays into two types.

(c)2a. Novelism. -

The novella (short story) is, in archaic times, in the epic and in historiography, yes, in all literature. For example, Herodotos powdered his *Historiai* with novellas.

It is only in the Hellenistic period that the novella becomes 'an independent type. Aristeides of Miletos (+/- -100) with his *Milèsiaka* (Milesian histories) was successful in Rome (*Milesiae fabulae*, "burned tales"). Cf. J. Werner, ed., *Erzählungen der Antike*, Birsfelden / Basel, s.d., which offers an overview of this type of literature.

(c)2b. Novel Literature. -

The novel, like the novella, sticks out, initially, either in the epic or in the historiography (one thinks of Xenophon's Kuroupaideia).

In the Hellenistic epoch, the novel, - travel novel, war novel, love novel, shepherd's novel, etc., becomes - independent. Now it is the case that 'belletry';

1/ apart from beauty experience, can also be written

2/ à thèse i.e. with didactic ulterior or principal intentions.

The existentialists, in our century, have shown that the work of art can be the bearer of a (philosophical or non-philosophical) 'message', i.e. a thesis which is recited and defended in it. - Thus *Euhèmeros* of Messene (+/- -300) in his travel novel *Hiera Anagrafè*, Sacra scriptura. In that book the sophist Euhemerus (Evhemerus) describes a so-called journey to the island of Panchaia in the Indian Sea: he had found there a large golden pillar, in the temple of Zeus, on which the "praxeis", the "jeeston" or "transactions" of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus were written, so to speak, by Zeus himself.

He also 'saw' there the column of Artemis and Apollon, written by Hermes. According to the first document, Zeus, during his earthly life, was a glorious conqueror who subjected the whole earth to his laws, handed out kingdoms to his relatives, and had divine honors awarded to him everywhere - one feels, through that fantasy, Alexander the Great on his conquests. -

Athena was a warrior queen; Aphrodite was a courtier who elevated a Cypriot monarch to the rank of goddess because of her exceptional beauty; Demeter was a Sicilian princess whose daughter was violated by a wealthy man from the island, nicknamed 'Plouton' because of his fabulous wealth, and who acquired 'apoth(e)osis', deification, because she supplied the city of Athens with wheat in times of famine, etc.

This view is called 'Euhemerism': gods are, in fact, human beings but deified afterwards because of exceptional achievements.

1/ In addition to the historical model of Alexander the Great, experts also believe that

2/ The Eastern, especially Egyptian, 'anthropomorphic' (thinking in terms of human models) theology;

3/ Also the Greek traditional, since Homer common, 'anthropomorphic' theology which thinks god as 'higher' power-full humans (see page 17 supra), thinks like the Eastern theologies in this matter.

4/ But a new aspect is exposed: the "humanistic" (reducing to the human) Sophistics, the criticism of the Epikureans and Skeptics (about which later) and, more generally, the secularizing tendency of Attic philosophy transform anthropomorphic theology into a "secular" thesis: the "gods" are "only" human beings.

5/ Also the Christians (Lactantius in particular) use Euhemerism for apologetic (faith defense) purposes to denigrate paganism. Cf. L. Gernet / A. Boulanger, *Le génie grec dans la religion*, (The Greek genius in religion) Paris, 1932, pp. 504/507.

The love novel, -

This was pure or mixed with a travel or war novel, flourished especially from the second century A.D.: Heliodoros of Emesa (Syria) wrote *Ta peri Theagonèn kai Charikleian Aithiopika*, (Aithiopic histories of Theagones and Charikleia), (about the beginning of the third century A.D.); this pagan, influenced by sun worship and Neo-Pythagorism, recounts the adventures of Charikleia, the white daughter of the princes of Ethiopia, who is abandoned by her mother and adopted as a daughter by a Hellenic priest, at Delphi.

When she is of marriageable age she falls in love with Theagènes, who, after many adventures, brings her to Ethiopia, where everything ends in a happy ending. This rhetorical work was translated in the XVIth century, displaced the Middle Ages popular books and influenced the modern novel and drama. -- Longos of Lesbos, a contemporary of Heliodoros, is the author of *Poimènika ta kata Dáfnin kai Chloèn*, Shepherd's Novel about Dafnis and Chloe: this idyllic work was even favored by Goethe.

Satirical.-

Loukianos of Samosata (Syria) (+120/+185), sophist, who reached Italy and Gaul, author of dozens of works, is the most brilliant writer of the imperial period, but also the satirist for whose critical mind nothing is sacred, i.e. inviolable (nihilism in the ethical sense), - which made him compared to Heinrich Heine (author of "*die Lorelei*").

In his *Leugenvriend* ,(Friend of Lies) Tuchiades (= Loukianos himself) ridicules the representatives of various philosophical directions who tell each other stories of lies; at the end there is the "sorcerer's apprentice" (the transformation of a broom into a water carrier), which inspired Goethe as a motif for his *Zauberlehrling*.

Epistolography. -

The epistolary form is partly rhetorical exercise partly novella or novel. Alkifron of Athens, sophist of the second e. A. D., follower of Loukianos, left us 118 letters, allegedly written by fishermen, peasants, hetairen, parasites in the fourth century, on Attic everyday life (the erotic letter prevails in them). -

To quote a Roman: Pliny Caecilius Secundus, Plinius the younger (61/112) left nine books of highly stylized letters, which include a ghost history (cf. H. Gasse, *Erz. der Antike*, 82/84).

"There was a house in Athens that was large and spacious but was enchanted and fraught with misfortune. In the silence of the night there was the ringing of iron and, if one listened more closely, the rattling of chains, first coming from far away, then very near. Then a ghostly figure appeared, a gaunt graybeard with a long beard and shaggy hair: his legs were shackled and his hands shaken. The inhabitants, sleepless in their fear, went through terrifyingly sad nights, after which, because of the sleeplessness, illness followed and, if their fear increased, death.

For, even during the day, they remembered the apparition, though it had disappeared, and the state of fear persisted longer than its causes.. Consequence: the house was given up and was doomed to stand empty; it was left whole and abandoned to the ghost of terror.

Yet it was offered again and again, by publication, in case a buyer or tenant could be found who knew nothing of the dire calamity in the house. -- Then the philosopher Athenodoros came to Athens, read the advertisement and, when he heard the low price, which seemed suspicious to him, he informed himself. Everything was explained to him and, in spite of this, indeed for this very reason, he rented the house.

As soon as it began to get dark, he had an army post prepared in the front part of the house and asked for a desk, pencil and light. He sent all his housemates deeper into the house, while he himself, with thoughts, eyes and hand, was completely absorbed in writing, so that his busy mind would not imagine ghosts of which he had been told, and insignificant outbreaks of fear.

At first, silence reigned at night as it does everywhere. Then iron tinkled and chains rattled. He did not look up, but remained himself and closed his ear to the sounds. Thereupon the noise grew stronger, approached and sounded as if it were already on the threshold, indeed already inside the room. He turned around and saw the shape and recognized it. She stood there and beckoned with her finger as if to call him. But he signaled to her with his hand that she should wait a little, and bent down again over the worktable and the stylus. Thereupon the ghost, over the head of the writing sage, rattled with and chains.

When he turned around, it beckoned him as before. Immediately he raised the lamp and followed the ghost. The shape moved with slow steps, as if the chains weighed it down. When it had entered the courtyard of the house, the ghost suddenly subsided, leaving his companion alone. He then picked grass and leaves and laid them down in that spot as a sign of recognition.

The next day he went to the authorities and asked them to excavate the place. They found bones firmly riveted together with chains, de-fleshed and emasculated by the shackles, - the remains of a body that had decayed with the years. The remains were collected and buried at public expense. After the rightful burial, the house remained free of ghosts thereafter.” -

What is the purpose of this excerpt? Theophrastos of Eresos (Ios) (-372/ -288), disciple and successor of Aristotle, describes, in his *Charaktères*, *Character Types*, 16, the *deisidaimon*, i.e. man living in constant fear of *daimonos*, spirits. The spirit eater was a repeatedly occurring human type in ancient Hellas (as in all archaic cultures, for that matter), even in Hellenistic times. Well, the sage Athenodoros, like

Epikoeros (about which later), does not know this deisidaimonia, spirit fear, but on other grounds: Athenodoros appears to be familiar with nekropolitan (we now say 'spiritoid', 'spiritist') phenomena. The deceased who has not had a "rightful" order to earth, in z' monoidism (being controlled by one thought), finds no peace until the living do something about it. Manism (ancestor worship), all over the world, knows this phenomenon. Cf. J.-A. Festugière, *Epicure et ses dieux*, (Epicurus and his gods), Paris, 1968, pp. 73ss. (on deisidaimonia).

Conclusion.-

Claire Préaux, *Le monde hellénistique (La Grèce et l' Orient)* (The Hellenistic world (Greece and the East)), (-323/-146), Paris, 1978-1, II, p. 607, writes: "The unexpected success of Alexander's campaigns and the fall of the Persian empire hammered into the minds the uncertainty about tomorrow. Demetrios of Faleron expressed the uneasiness of his epoch concerning the coincidences of blind luck. Polubios, who has preserved the memory of it (29:21), he too, and a century and a half later, is sensitive to the abrupt changes of fortune which Rome imposes on the Greek world.

Yet, although he invokes chance in the matter of history (cf. P. Pedech, *La méthode historique de Polybe*, (The historical method of Polybius), pp. 331/354), he manages to reduce its share. All this shakes the sense of certainty and confidence in a fixed ranking of values. Which provokes several cultural responses". The book then mentions three types of cultural response to that uncertainty situation:

(i) the novel and the new Attic comedy

This brings forward a series of adventures associated with war and corsairs, thus expressing the feeling of uncertainty, but defuses it by showing that an accident often brings happiness and a happy ending; in other words, the entertainment literature reassures, gives a foothold by trusting in a happy ending.

- Thus Heliodoros of Emesa, *Theagenes and Charikleia*: Charikleia falls into the arms of Theagenes; both escape from Delphi thanks to Kalasiris, an Egyptian priest visiting them, - end up, after adventures, on the coast of Egypt and fall into the hands of pirates there; at Memphis they meet Kalasiris again, who dies there; behaving like brother and sister, they get, through many threats to their lives and honor, to Meroe as prisoners of the Ethiopians who were then at war with the Persians; almost sacrificed as firstfruits of victory, they are recognized and their marriage is sanctioned by the parents of Charikleia; - Longos' *Dafnis and Chloe*, more eros charged, ends analogously;

(ii) the religions of salvation,

thanks to 'mysteries' (ordinations), grant these a different kind of hold;

(iii) the philosophies

These seek support in an ethic (of detachment mainly).

Classical philosophy in the Hellenistic-Roman framework. -

Cl. Préaux, *Le monde hellénistique*, (The Hellenistic world), II, 607, asserts that the detachment ethics of these philosophies of the time are for intellectuals -- and thus, she says, for aristocrats, not for the poor -- -- they have a detachment role: the Kunics want a counterculture, the Epicureans seek indifference - the Stoics are fatalistic (focusing on fatum, fate, as inescapable), the Skeptics suspend judgment; all schools, except the Stoics, are averse to “action,” d. i. political commitment.

Though ethical (which, except for the Stoics, now becomes more a political than political), yet they are strongly reasoning (logical-dialectical) in nature. - What is also striking is that the philosophy is first of all school philosophy: the Old Pythagoreans, in southern Italy, already had an old tradition in that respect; Platon founded the Academy in -387; Zenon of Kition (Cyprus), the founder of the Stoa, arrived in Athens in 311, founded the Stoa, Porticus, Colonnade (school) in 310; Epikouros of Samos bought the Kèpos, the Garden, in Athens in 306, five years earlier, as a teaching center.

This, while at Megara Stilpon, the third leader of the Megarian school (p. 85 / 86 above), attracted a large audience (he lived -380 / -300 about) and Menedèmos of Eretria (-319 / -265), student of Stilpon, mentioned above, and of Faidon (at Elis) - see p. 88 above - at Eretria himself founded a school where he taught. Quantitatively this can be said:

Theofrastos, who after Aristotle taught at the Lykeion for about thirty-four years, must have had about sixty students a year (cf. C. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy III (The Hellenistic - Roman Period)*, 1959, p. 2). -

Next to the technical school philosophy, also for a wider public - more ‘rhetorical’ i.e. as general education - ‘lessons’ were given or ‘preached’ by a few persons in particular, i.e. by Bion of Borusthenes (-300/ -250) in the form of diatribe (see page 164 above about the school speech), - an example which finds imitators, especially later in the Roman period, so that then both school philosophy and popular philosophy exist side by side. - Something which, in a certain sense, already dates from the days of Platon and Isocrates (see p. 96, 15 supra).

The triad of ‘dogmatism / eclecticism / skepticism’. -

W. Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, pp. 69/ 71; 232/ 253, quotes St. Gregorios of Nussa (+335/ +394), the great Christian church father: “The idea that only in dogmas must piety (eusebeia) lie, to whom is such a thing peculiar as to the Hellenes?”

In other words, intellectualism and rationalism are typically Hellenic, even in matters of religion. Dogma’ (intellectual-rational conception or content of thought), ‘sustèma’ (system of dogmata), ‘hairesis’ (secta, group adhering to the same dogmata or system), - these are three typically Hellenic words.

Applied to religion, this triad gives “theologia” ((with Platon first), the doctrine of gods, as the intellectually-rational Xenophanes (pp. 16/17 supra) already designed them to some extent.

“A figure like that of Xenophanes demonstrates well how philosophy, with the firmness of intellectual conviction that characterizes it, can give rise to the defensive reaction called ‘dogmatic assertion’, similar to our impatience when we hear nonsense being uttered.” (o.c., 70).

Indeed, Xenophanes’ Silloi (Mock Poems) give us samples of such a rational - intellectual protest: “Everything Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods which, with men, is but scorn and disgrace: stealing, adultery, mutual deceit.” (Fr. 11)

Xenophanes chuckles at mythical theology with its inconsistent concept of deity, - deity which Xenophanes himself thinks is intellectually very pure: “Yet, if the oxen and horses and lions had hands or could paint with their hands and finish works like men, then the horses would paint like horses, the oxen like oxen, and form such bodies, as each species itself has ‘a view.’” (Fr. 15).

Hear what Xenophanes (On Nature) says in opposition: “One God, among gods and men the greatest, neither in form nor in thought equal to mortals.” (Fr. 23)

Or still: “(The deity) is all eye, all mind (noei, thinking), all ear.” (Fr. 24).

Still, Xenophanes is not yet “dogmatic,” but, in his intellectual enlightenment and its protest against mythical nonsense, there is a “dogmatic” trait. -- The origin of the concepts “dogma”, “system”, (of dogmata), hairesis (later “heresy”) or dogmatic group is not to be found in the Hellenic religion; not even in the East; the root of it lies in Hellenic philosophy at the end of the Attic period and in the Hellenistic period: for then philosophy was divided into “schools” (“sects”) which opposed each other on the basis of (a system of) dogmata and thus formed groups.

-- L. Cerfaux, *Jésus aux origines de la tradition (Matériaux pour l'histoire évangélique)*, (Jesus at the origins of the tradition (Materials for the evangelical history)), DDB, 1968, p. 48, writes: “Tradition is the great educational principle of all ancient civilizations.

At the time of the New Testament, it gave birth to a regular institution in all groups on a doctrinal basis, whether philosophical or religious: the doctrine of the founder is passed on by the latter to a privileged disciple who, after his death, succeeds him in the leadership of the group and so it continues. The verbs ‘pass on’ and ‘receive’ characterize the technical vocabulary of the tradition. One finds it, for example, in the philosophical schools, in the mystery religions, in Hermetism, as well as in Rabbinism.

Our research has shown us that Christianity, in addition to its charismatic aspect, also had an institutional character: the active presence, which was decisive, of the Apostles, witnesses of Christ in the first communities, imposes on the latter the principle of transmission.” (Luk 1:2) Indeed, what do we see?

a/ After Platon (+/- in -347) comes Speusippos as school leader; after him, in -338, Xenocrates; after him, in -314, Polemon (until -269), - together they form the Elder Academy.

b/ After Aristotle's death, in -322, comes Theophrastos, who, in -288, is succeeded by Aristoxenos, etc., - they form the Older Peripatetic School.

c/ In -270, Hermachos of Mutilene succeeds Epikouros in the Garden.

d/ Zenon is succeeded, in the Stoa, in -263, by Kleantes of Assos, etc., - they are the only ones who are able to do so.

In other words, with the dogmatic principle, goes the paradigm or tradition principle: one delivers a precisely articulated doctrine: except for the Pythagoreans, this was new in philosophy. - That all this arises precisely in the shocked and uncertain, holdfastless Hellenistic age is understandable: an intellectual-rational holdfast satisfies a number of natures which, without it, become unlivable. Around this dogmatic hold, the small community that emanates from the “school” becomes established.

Against this ‘dogmatic’ mentality other mentalities set themselves up:

(i) above all and most sharply, the skeptical mentality, which doubts ‘true’ knowledge either in all domains (which is only an attempt, or in a limited domain (e.g., the logical, the religious, the ethical domain);

(ii) also the eclectic, who considers true knowledge possible, but hermeneutically-exegetically oriented, on the insights of others, predecessors and contemporaries, shifts either coherently or syncretistically (i.e. incoherent, non-conjunctive doctrines yet adhering to them at the same time);

(iii) finally also the rhetorical mentality which, like e.g. Isokrates, is very well aware of its non-depth research and derives ‘general education’ without technical philosophy from the ideas of a culture, e.g. the philosophical one (one thinks of Deuterosophism; see above). -

It could be said that eclecticism represents a fastidious, fastidious dogmatism, where skepticism aggressively claims doubt and rhetoric is unpretentious thinking but with cultural intentions.

Note: - ‘Dogmatic’ and such can also be used pejoratively: ‘dogmatic’ means

(i) meliorative, apodictic, i.e. rigorously deciding on purely rational and reasonable grounds;

(ii) used pejoratively, means to assert uncritically, especially in the sense of evading all challenge and criticism of propositions one proclaims as true

(1/ stubborn, **2/** authoritarian, or **3/** a-prior, as C.S. Peirce has noted).

C.S. Peirce, *The Fixation of Belief*, in *Popular Science Monthly* 12 (1877), 1/15 (see E. Walther, ed., C.S. Peirce, *Die Festigung der Ueberzeugung und andere Schriften*, (The consolidation of conviction and other writings.), Baden-Baden, s.d., S. 42/58), claims that there are four main methods of fixing a belief:

(i) *the method of tenacity*,

the method of tenacity: one rejects everything that can vote or force the personal opinion to change (ostrich politics);

(ii) *the method of authority*,

Those in authority (state, church, special interest group) systematically reject anything that the group belief can vote or force to change, while holding on to a doctrine, ideology or system of thought (collective ostrich policy);

(iii) *the apriori method*:

Involving personal preference, one designs axiomata that one presents as “rational and reasonable” and, in public debate, discusses among oneself (thus most metaphysicians and philosophers);

(iv) *the scientific method*,

Also called the method of external permanency: the scientific method abandons the three previous standpoints to test only the external permanence of a given fact by means of abduction, i.e. starting from hypotheses which one applies in practice as a check on its truth (= pragmatic idealism), whereby the emphasis is very strongly placed on the fact that others can also repeat the same starting points and tests (= logical socialism); this method is typical of modern scientific research. -

What to think of this? (i) Peirce schematizes, as so often, like a logistician, and confuses the real person with the designed schema: all people fall under the four methods: e.g. scientists are (i) stubborn and obstinate (ii) stuck in group beliefs (one thinks of Th. Kuhn’s critiques; (iii) start from personal preferences which they, unconsciously, present and discuss as ‘rational’ (as the so-called metaphysicians) (iv) experimentally investigate objective factuality (existing outside any mental binding), starting from hypotheses which they, in confrontation with others, test. --

Never has humanity adhered ‘purely’ to any of the four logistically preconceived methods. - Neither did the philosophers: a patient historical study demonstrates this abundantly. In the case of Aristotle, for example, his gen(n)etic doxography shows that the others weigh in and that he does more and differently than cast doubt on personal intuitions as ‘rational’. Which does not prevent him from (i) being stubborn-necked, (ii) group-bound (e.g., when he identifies with the ‘free’ man to deem the slave less so, however humane), and (iii) pushing through preferred intuitions, Milesian-empirical (p. 42 supra) minded, he was (iv) also keen on scientific objectivity, which examines how things, processes, independent of the subject, are and proceed.

Criteriaology.

- Criteriaology is that part of logic / epistemology which deals with the criteria of truth and especially the certainty of truth. -- Term from the Leuven school of philosophy.

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- Criterion, criterion, means of discernment, means of distinguishing between what is real and what is apparent. -- Criterion is a sign by which one recognizes a concept or a reality. The Greek word *kritèrion* appears after Aristotle and is used throughout by the Stoa. The word "mark," "standard" is also a valid translation.

-- *Evidence, readiness,*

This is that property of being (intelligible or real) in so far as it reveals itself to a knowing being. This objective property works out, in the subject, certainty. Certainty" is that condition of a knowing being which makes it judge, interpret, without fear of contradiction.

Consequence: the secure agreement with a judgment excludes all doubt. - What is less opposed is e.g. 'moral' i.e. strong but not absolute certainty (practical certainty) such that one can, in praxis, act safely, without, however, being absolutely or absolutely certain. In that case, there is strong reason to assert.

-- 'Opinion' is 'a judgment that does not advocate absolute or even moral certainty. It is a judgment that is based on probability in one degree or another.

One feels that criterion has something to do with dogmatism and skepticism.

a/ the dogmatist is convinced that criteria exist to confirm more than phenomenal realities (**1/** general concepts, **2/** paranormal phenomena, **3/** divine and supernatural realities);

b/ the skeptic, on the other hand, believes that one never gets beyond phenomenal certainty and that the "rest", the transphenomenal, that which is not immediately given (and thus not amenable to any phenomenology whatsoever, which merely describes the phenomena, excluding any dogmatic interpretation of those phenomena), should be put in parentheses (Einklammerung).

D. Mercier, *Critériologie générale (General Theory of Certainty)* (General Criteriaology (general Theory of Certainty)), Louvain / Paris, 1923, says: "The object of the treatise (...) is the dissection of our certain knowledge and the philosophical investigation of the foundation on which its certainty rests." (o.c., 1).

Another word, even more recent, which predominates especially in Germany and England is 'epistemology' (from the ww. *epistamai*, I know; *epistèmè*, science), the scientific study of science, i.e. of the constitutive elements of science. Certainty is a condition of science: also, criteriaology is 'a theory of certainty.' -

The use of the word 'analytic' is in the spirit of the Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition (o.c., 1/5)

Ancient Materialism.-

Two books are recommended:

(i) F.A. Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, (History of materialism and criticism of its meaning in the present day), 1866-1, - a work written by a non-materialist Kantian and which especially values materialism (not as an ideology but) as a method (of natural science especially);

(ii) J. J. Poortman, *Ochêma (Geschiedenis en zin van het hylisch pluralisme)* (History and meaning of hylic pluralism), Assen, 1950, criticizing Lange's concept of materialism: according to modern, especially XIX-th' century materialism is:

(i) all 'being' i.e. all reality, 'matter' (i.e. the ontology of that materialism sees nothing but matter: 'being' is essentially 'hylic'(material) being);

(ii) typologically (specifically) seen there are aggregate states, viz. solid, liquid and gaseous matter, but these species belong to the one basic species of 'matter' as modern, especially since Galileo exact working natural science (physics, chemistry) imagines them; - this unity of species prompts Poortman to speak of 'monistic' materialism; indeed, a/ not only the aggregate states belong to the one (monos, unicus) kind of matter; b/ also the soul, the consciousness with all that goes with it, that too belongs to the one kind of matter, as a side effect (epi. Phenomenon) or something like that.

- It should be noted that, within this monistic materialism, there are two variants - which Poortman does not address:

(i) the mechanistic conception of that one matter - one thinks of the moderate and the pure mechanists among the Voorsokratiekers; one thinks of C. Vogt (1817/1895), J. Moleschott (1822/1895) and L. Büchner (1824/1899), past century -;

(ii) the 'dialectical' conception, adhering to G. Hegel (1770/1831), the dialectical - idealist, with K. Marx (1818/1883), F. Engels (1820/1895), further with Lenin (1870/1924) and the Leninists;- with the 'dialectical' - one might say 'hylozoic', yes, Heraklitean materialists, 'being' is essentially 'matter' but 'dynamic', i.e., a.k.a., living and active, yes, revolutionary (turnabout,), where mechanistic matter is purely atomistic. Yet both variants, mechanical and dialectical, hold on to the one substance-form that constitutes all factual and possible 'being'.

- Against this, Poortman posits two other views.

(a) Dualistic materialism. - In line with K. de Jong, *Die andere Seite des materialismus* (The other side of materialism), (1932), Poortman points to Demokritos' concept of the soul: the soul consists of a special kind of atoms, viz. fine, smooth and round atoms; moreover, he points to Epicureanism: the soul is a 'fine' (material) body; to the Stoa: the soul is in a kind of body (though different from the visible one);

Lange himself mentions these views without ever deciding on a plural of matter; no: he sticks to the one substance (monistic);

Poortman points to Galenos' spirits of life, which were also conceived as 'material' (also mentioned by Lange).

As G. Heymans, *Inleiding tot de metaphysica op grondslag der ervaring*, (Introduction to Metaphysics on the Basis of Experience), Amsterdam, 1933, p. 133, says, for dualistic materialism:

- (i) all being is material in nature (as for monistic),
- (ii) but it supposes, in the living (and animate) bodies, besides the general substance, still a special kind of substance, to which the phenomena of life and consciousness are bound (and not the inorganic phenomena); vgl. Poortman, o.c., 18;

- ancient hylozoism

This view of matter as essentially alive - so the Milesians and Neo-Milesians (Diogenes of Apollonia) - is one form of materialism, but for the Hylozoist all being is both material and alive ('dead' matter simply does not exist: all matter possesses an initial 'consciousness', 'striving', 'sensation' and so on); yet he does not arrive at a plural of 'matter'; a stone, a piece of wood, somewhere possesses 'life' (zoö) in all its materiality (hulè);

Comparable with it, somewhat, is animatism (of primitive and archaic cultures: the whole fuis, naively conceived as material, is animated (animatus in the Lt.) without the presence of individual souls in that fuis (the substance in all its forms) - globally animated);

Similar also, with it, is animism (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 1867) which, in all material objects, living and non-living, sees an indwelling soul or spirit, distinct from its material 'dwelling' and peculiar (individual) to those objects; -- as G.R.S. Mead, *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition*, London, 1919, p. 145, says, the idea of 'a finely materialized reality, in connection with 'soul', is "one of the oldest beliefs of mankind": i.e. the animist too is knowingly and willingly somewhere dualistic materialist from so far as he distinguishes 'soul' ('spirit') from body;

- all pre-Platonic philosophies,

Not only the Milesian all pre-platonic philosophies are physicalists. They do not yet know the distinction 'matter/spirit' and, in this sense, they are 'materialisms', i.e. naive-minded matter is their concept of being but not exclusive but inclusive (i.e. what we, since Platen, call immaterial realities, they treat (methodically, not ideologically) materialistically); -

F.Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft*, (History of natural science), I, 124, notes: ... only with Empedokles of Akragas does groping 'hulè' (substance) begin to distinguish itself from moving cause (viz. 'eros', 'filia' / 'neikos').

But the arithmoi (numbers) of Puthagoras, the being (on) of Parmenides, the fire, resp. the Logos of Herakleitos and the elements or particles of the mechanicians, - they are all material (in that inclusive sense), - which does not prevent a more-and-other-than-material aspect from clearly shining through in all those thinkers or schools, especially where archaic-religious realities come through;

it should be noted (cf. Poortman, o.c., 22) that **a/** certainly the naive materialisms like animatism and animism; **b/** but also the reflective materialisms like Hellenistic hylozoism and the Hellenistic pre- and post-Platonic materialisms (Stoa and Epikurism included) are religious materialisms:

God, gods, souls, extraterrestrial phenomena, pre-existence after death, all these become conceivable in such a dualistic materialism; it is but modern monistic materialism that dismisses supernatural and extraterrestrial data in an atheistic and secularistic sense.

(b) The hylic-pluralism. -

The Hellenistic age also knew the theosophies, especially the Neo-Platonic theosophies. Well, the latter are sharply distinguished from the Stoa and Epikureanism: both Neo-Platonists and Post-Platonic materialists (Stoa Garden) take two kinds of material, yet:

1/ for the Neoplatonists the soul is immaterial (where for Stoa and Garden it is material), which does not prevent it from having an ‘ochèma’, vehiculum (currus, chariot), vehicle, which is material but which consists of a finer materiality (subtle soul body, fine or rarefied body connected to the soul);

2/ also the deepest reality, the ‘being’ in its general being, is non-material but spiritual although susceptible to material (coarse and fine material) modes of being, which is not the case for Stoa and Garden (their ontology is materialistic) however dualistic - materialistic).

Hylic pluralism therefore means that view which accepts more than one type of substance (dualistic materialism is one type of hylic pluralism; Neo-Platonism is another type of hylic pluralism): ‘pluralism’ is acceptance of plural; ‘hylic’ (hulikos, materialis) is acceptance of plural concerning substance. -

The term ‘pluralism’ concerning substance’ is all the more necessary since some thinkers - e.g. Proklos of Konstantinopolis (+410/+485), the Great Neo-Platonist of the Athenian school, - hold the view that the (immaterial) soul possesses more than one tenuous or fine material soul body and of different coarse densities (the closer to ordinary substance, the ‘coarser’ that subtlety is). Cf. Poortman, o.c., 24

-- More to the point, the term “hylic pluralism” is needed for a moment for a different dimension of the problem:

(i) thinkers like Demokritos of Abdera or some medieval Augustinians do assume another substance but never speak of a subtle body (soma, corpus, body, is not the same as hulè, materia, substance).

(ii) others assume that the subtle substance assumes body-form (so Proklos a.o.); modernly one sometimes says ‘meta-organism’ (against the ordinary organism of biology);

(iii) others assume subtle life-spaces (cosmic spheres) called ta platè (enk.: to platos) in Neo-Platonism.

IIIA(I). *The dogmatic philosophies.*

(I)a. *The Socratic traditions.*

(I)a1. *The ancient Academy*

(Speusippos and his successors up to -265) continues the Pythagorean thoughts of the ancient Platon: the ideas are segregated arithmoi, number forms. They tarry on Platon and systematize him. -- The oldest Peripatos (Theofrastos and his successors) turns away from the “difficult” metaphysics of Aristotle to pursue two goals: (i) the culture of the professional sciences (see above) and (ii) the elaboration of ‘a popular ethics.

(I)a2. *The canonists*

(Bion of Borusthenes e.a., - see above) work out a popular ethics (in diatribes) which implies a hedonic Kunism. The sophist tradition (sensualism: the entire consciousness of man is based on sensory experiences, - something which easily goes hand in hand with materialism) with its emphasis on the subject lives on here. Cf. F. Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, Leipzig, 1905, I, S. 54ff. where Aristippos of Kurene is attributed ethical materialism: hedonism fuses with the cynical tradition (often blatant cynicism).

(I)b. *The two dogmatic materialisms: Stoa and Epikurism.*

(I)bI, *The Stoa (Stoicism) (-300/+180).*

J. Brun, *Les stoïciens (Textes choisis)*, (The Stoics (Selected texts)), Paris, 1957, pp. 5/6, divides the developmental progress of the Stoa into three phases:

(i) the Ancient Stoa at Athens centered (-301) in the Colonnade (stoa, porticus) called ‘poikilè’ (the painted colonnade), since Zenon of Kition (Kupros) (-336/ -264): Megaric logic, Heraklitean physical and Kunic ethics, - behold the threefold structure of ancient Stoic thought), which essentially wants to be ‘an ethics that creates a way out of the second great crisis (after the Sophistic) at the end of the fourth century, which spread too much skepticism and eristics (from +/- -300 to +/- -150);

(ii) the Middle Stoa (-150/-50): the Stoics undergo the influence of New Academy (-265/ -110): skepticism undermines (the high Platonic tradition and also) the Old Stoic tradition; tendency to eclecticism; beginning of romanization with Diogenes of Babylon (-240/-150);

(iii) the Late Stoa or Roman Stoa, since Seneca of Cordoba (Sp. (+1/ +65): Cato the Younger is the new ideal of self-control in eclectic spirit (-50/+180). Zenon of Kition (-336/-264), according to M. van Straaten, *Kerngedachten van de Stoa*, (Core ideas of the Stoa), Roermond, 1969, pp. 15/16, in -313 to Athens and acquainted himself with the Voorsocratic and Socratic philosophies:

a/ Krates of Thebes, the Kunieker, and Stilpon, the Megarieker, acquainted him with the minor Socratics;

b/ Polemon of Athens, third schoolmaster of the Academy (-314/-269) taught him (for a longer time) Platonism.

Outline of the Stoic system. -

The question arises why Zenon moves away from the (great) Socratic with its concepts, ideas or forms: N. van Straaten, *Kerngedachten van de Stoa*, p. 29, says that the Stoa thinks 'functionally' and not ontologically.

Not the being in its depth and generality, the being as such, but the process (kinèsis, motus i.e. the happening and, on a higher level, the action or treatment (active and passive), is central. In other words, what something 'is' in its deepest being, the Stoic leaves cool: he puts this in brackets as a 'black box', i.e. as an 'unknown' which, provisionally or definitively, cannot be found out.

A/ Does not Aristotle, *Peri hermeneias* 3 (in fine), himself say: "Being (einai, esse) is not a characteristic (sèmeion) of 'a given: even if one says 'being' (on, ens), this is 'an empty (pilon) word, for it means nothing. It only acquires meaning in connection with 'another' (given, word) and, without that other, it does not give off any thought content."

B/ This means that there is only one way out to valorize that 'being', namely, the lemmatic-analytic method (which Platon elaborated at the time to clarify the network of ideas): 'lemma', i.e., provisional assumption that 'being(the)' means something. Thus one arrives at the 'functional' method of the Stoics: the being in their process-character is an event, yes, they act and treat; let us start from that and work with it and see the result (pragmatism). -

Van Straaten thinks that this consideration only of the functional (how things work, without taking into account their deeper nature, -- which, by the way, shows itself in the workings -- explains why Stoic thinking occupies such a large place in modern philosophy of will, which, partly under the influence of the natural sciences, is functionally oriented. -

The big difference between "functionals" and "ontologists" ("metaphysicians") is:

1/ that the ontologists know very well that "being(de)" is an unknown and that one only attains it lemmatically-analytically, i.e. functionally,

2/ while the functionals tend to have nothing left but "functions" without "being(de)", - which leads to a kind of nihilism, if one thinks it through. This was strongly pointed out by C.S. Peirce, the pragmatist!

Logic. -

Zenon was probably the first to use the word 'logikè' (logic, theory of mind) (instead of the earlier dialectic or analytic).

(i) Formal logic now becomes judgmental logic: **a/** a sentence (utterance, proposition) is the element with which to work; **b/** reason consists of sentences that are interrelated; the study of those interrelated judgments is logic (cf. the Megarian logic of Philon the Megarician, supra p. 87) which is a difference from Aristotle, who started from, concepts (and inherited the content and scope) and dissected judgments as concepts intertwined.

(ii) The theory of knowledge (epistemology) is **a/** sensualist: the contents of consciousness (knowledge) come from sensory experience(s).

That sensualism is a Socratic and Klein-Socratic inheritance. **b/** That sensualistic theory of knowledge is also materialistic, i.e. it looks into the fusions around us, sees the multiplicity of things and their processes, coming into being and (its reversal) decay, and explains that multiplicity of 'forms' and their coming into being and decaying - not starting from concepts, ideas or forms (Grand-Socratic), but - from the substance(s).

How do sensualism and materialism relate?

F. Lange, *Gesch. Des Materialismus*, I, 54/55, explains that.

(i) Superficially it is so: in the inner (psychic) life one is sensualist; in the outer domain one is materialist;

(ii) Fundamentally, it is different:

(ii)a. the consistent sensualist is a subjectivist:

a/ of the form quantity and its processes (coming into being and passing away), of the substance(s) which, according to the materialist, constitute the essence of it, i.e. of the outer world directly the sensualist knows nothing (with certainty);

b/ the sensualist knows something only of his own perceptions of things (not of things directly);

c/ how these sensory perceptions relate to external things is a question mark to him: what the sensualist encounters are not the (material or immaterial) things, but the perceptions of them;

(ii)b. the consistent materialist claims that perception is indeed investigable in its relation to the external (material) world because 'perception' is one of the many purely material processes in the universe; the subjectivist separation between (material) perception and (material) external world) the consistent materialist does not accept. Up to there Lange. -

In fact, (inconsistent) sensualism and (in)consistent materialism go together. as here in the Stoa: both, after all, actually emphasize substance at the expense of idea or form (Aristotelian).

The Great Socrat will say that the relationship between external world and sensory experience is one in which the form (or idea), present in the substance, penetrates the consciousness of man who thus comes to an understanding of that external world.

Meanwhile, according to the Stoa:

a/ sensory experience leaves an image of memory. A collection of memory images constitutes an experience; a collection of similar memory images and related experiences constitute a universal 'ennoia' (representation, content of consciousness).

b/ These "ennoiai" (contents of consciousness, representations) are "koinai", notions communes, common concepts, common to all people. They are 'emfutoi', innatae, innate (and in this sense 'fusikai', naturales, natural, i.e. given with the nature of man. They are also 'prolèpseis', praesumptiones, anticipations, prior insights.

c/ What do these insights refer to? To three things: (i) the moral data (right/justice, good/evil), (ii) since Cicero: immortality; (iii) God - triad which one finds in Kant.

These common understandings, as distinguished from the concepts which have been built up only through artificial thought construction, form the core of the thought life of men.

d/ From the agreement of men (*consensus gentium*) regarding the content of these common notions, Stoa concludes on their truth, i.e. on the correspondence between these conceptions and reality.

Example taken from Seneca (*Letter 117*): “As a rule, we attach great importance to the assumptions common to all men and regard it as proof of truth if, in one area or another, there is general agreement.

a/ Thus we believe in the existence of gods, among other things also because in everyone dwells a suspicion of the gods and nowhere exists a people so deprived of all legality and morality that it does not believe in the existence of one or another kind of gods.

b/ When we try to come to an understanding about the eternity of souls, it is of no small importance for us to see the agreement of people who either fear the subterranean gods or honor them.” K. Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion*, Zürich, 1954, S. 17, says obliquely yet correctly, “This proof *ex consensu gentium* (from the agreement of the peoples) passed, after the revival of the Stoa in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries, side by side with the rest of the inventory, into the ‘natural religion’ of the *Aufklärung*, as a parade piece.” In any case, this proves the universalism the Hellenistic peoples’ multitude own.

Physics. -

Heraklitean hylozoism prevails here: the idle substance (hylic aspect) is directed by the active principle, “die feurige Vernunft der Welt,” (A. Lange, o.c., 111), the firelogos (or firepneuma also called). This, after all, pervades matter in a formative way and thus gives rise to the form quantity of the universe - which is thoroughly material, even where that ‘form’ is God, soul, virtue, mind or whatever. The universallogos or universallience, the steering principle of all being, is ‘a rational substance, - not a pure spirit as with the Great Socratics. This is the ontological materialism of Stoa.

- The hylozoic character of that physics is shown by the fact that the unity of the whole, which “gathers” the multitude, is **a/** alive (*zoion*, *animale*) **b/** animated (*empsychos*, *animatus*), **c/** wise (*noëros*, *intellectualis*) and **d/** reasonable (*logikos*, *rationalis*). -

This hylozoism will be revived

1/ by the natural philosophers of the Renaissance and

2/ by the French materialists of the XVIIIth e. (Denis Diderot (1713/1724), founder and leader of the *Encyclopédie*).

- More or less in the sense of the Neo-Milesian physikos Diogenes of Apollonia (Vth e.), the universe is teleological in nature: ‘n steering universe understanding directs (steering) everything after all.

- Periodicity also characterizes the universe: all being originate, regularly, and perish out of, resp. in fire (as far as they are air, water, earth)

for fire is the basic element from which everything arises (which is air, water, earth) and in which everything decays again. Cf. Herakleitos, supra pp. 27, 29/30. -

Even more: a world fire will periodically cause everything that exists in form quantity to rise again in pure fire; upon which then a new world will arise. - This is the doctrine of eternal return, but expressed in Stoic terms: “There will be again a Socrates, a Platon, and each of the people with the same friends and the same fellow citizens. (...)”

This recurrence will not occur only once but many times; or rather, all being will recur eternally.” Thus Nemesios of Emesa, Christian bishop (+/- +400) on that Stoic thought. (Cf. J. Brun, *Les stoïciens*, 1957, p. 50). - As one knows, the eternal return of all being is one of the histories of ancient Hellas, even outside Stoics. The myth preceded this.

- The Pantheistic character of this view - already obscurely present with Herakleitos - is evident: the (fine) material God, who is firelogos or firepneuma (fire spirit), is immortal, perfect (teleio, perfectus), blissful (makarios, beatus), rational (noëros) and reasonable (logikos, rational), morally perfect. He is demiouros, creator of the world, yes, patèr, Father, of all being, pronoia, providentia, providence, as immanent governing principle of all being.

One and the same - universalism concerning religion - God is called Zeus, Athena, Hera, Hephaistos, Poseidon, Demeter; - these are merely - different names (// thesis) for one and the same nature (// fisis). ‘World-soul’ would be a good description for such a god. -Well, there is, with some later Stoics, a tendency to conceive of God as a transcendent person.

-- *Sympatheia, cohesion, of all being with all being,*

is therefore a Stoic keyword par excellence, comparable to the sympatheia of the occultists (cf. p. 171 supra). This universal coherence is interpersonal but also cosmic: “A drop of wine, thrown into the ocean, has an effect everywhere in the universe” (according to a Stoic saying on the matter; cf. M. van Straaten, o.c., 30).

Panlogism (one might say “absolute rationalism”) is another characteristic: the universe logos permeates all being through and through. Consequence: everything is thoroughly reasonable and rational.

Fatalism. - The course of creation and decay is lawful, obeying the “nomos koinos” (lex communis), the universal law, also called Heimarmenè, Fate (predestination). The Stoic is convinced of the inevitability of all events.

In that Heraklitean, sympathetic, thoroughly rational, fatal, divine being of the universe is situated, according to the Stoics, man, who in miniature (micros cosmos) has similar characteristics.

Ethics/politics “All this sounds materialistic enough. Yet this materialism lacks the decisive feature: the purely material nature of matter, the origin of all phenomena, purposeful and spiritual included, from movements of matter and this according to general laws of motion.” Thus A. Lange, *Gesch. d. Materialismus*, I, 110 who, of course, strongly advocates mechanistic materialism.-

J. Rehmke, *Gesch. d. Philosophie*, 1959, S. 69ff., further defines this more-and-less-than-pure-mechanical materialism: “On two guiding thoughts, the Heraklitean pantheism and the Aristotelian dualism of ‘industriousness’ and ‘idleness,’ rests the physicality of the Stoa.” Rehmke finds the two, in themselves, incompatible, but, in fact, nevertheless together in the Stoa. From there, also for ethics, the dichotomy between the two positions, but reinforced by two other influences:

(i) the Eleatic-Megarian (cf. pp. 87/88 supra), for whom ‘being’ and ‘good(s)’ are identical (so that ‘evil’ and ‘non-being’ also converge) and which reinforces Heraklitean pantheism;

(ii) - the Kunisch-Platonic, for whom reason, resp. reason and lust are opposites and which reinforces Aristotelian dualism (cf. pp. 88/89; 112, 116 supra).

Ad (i).- The Megarian doctrine that the real being is the good, connected with the Heraklitean pantheism which claims that the firelogos is all being, leads to the Stoic doctrine that the blissful life which arises from the good is rooted in that firelogos.

Consequence: blissful life, i.e. virtue(iness) or praxis Aimed at the telos or goal, consists in living in accordance with the fisis (fusei homologoumenos zèn), - fisis coinciding with the firelogos. Cf.: what P. Festugière, *La rév. d’ Herm. Tr. II, (Le Dieu cosmique)*, pp. 260/340, is called the cosmic god, i.e. the world-soul (= god), of which the human soul is but a sparkle, is good in its reasonableness and controls all happening, yea, all action and treatment (of something else). -

However, the theodicy, i.e. that study which attempts to reconcile actual evil, physical and especially ethical-political, with such an essentially and naturally good act of god, arises here: 1/ is man, 2/ is the celestial god, above him, still free?

Ad (ii) - The Hellenic is thoroughly convinced: man is the worker of his fate, - is, in his actions, free. The Stoic, as a Hellenic, as Herakleitos already did - can hardly ignore that. But, in that hypothesis, man must be able to act both according to the divine fisis and also against it.

How does the Stoa explain this fork in the road? In the soul lies the Aristotelian duality of industriousness (energeia, immateriality) and passivity (dunamis, materiality), - a duality which is reinforced Kunisch-Platonisch; the industrious is reason; the passive is a sense of desire (pathos, passio). This is freedom.

Thus we understand the following text from Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic emperor (121/180) (J. Brun, o.c., 157): “The substance of the universe is obedient, capable of assuming all forms. The mind which governs it does not possess in itself any principle which incites it to evil, because it possesses no evil, it commits no evil and nothing undergoes any evil from it. According to the laws of reason everything proceeds, everything comes into being in the world.”

-- Stoic *apatheia*, numbness.

Virtue rests on insight into the divine good, is therefore learnable and can be taught; but not without Askèsis, exercise (‘an Aristotelian thought); furthermore not without *apatheia*: the complete elimination of the (lust or unlove) feelings, which for the ‘wise’ and ‘virtuous’ simply do not exist (!), with the Stoic, goes beyond *ataraxia* (undisturbedness), with the Epicurean, who merely wants the feelings not to influence the decision of the will.

With the Stoic, this is the inference of the dualism between workaday reason that governs and controls, and the idle (un)lustful feelings, which “obey,” are flexible down to the wire. The askèsis, exercise, in apathetic action especially is appropriate here, because it does not destroy the (un)lustful feelings - that is not possible - but it paralyzes them in the soul which, in this way, becomes ‘reasonable-intelligent’, through and through. This is how one understands the Kunish in the Stoa and the rejection of the Kurenaic-Epikoitic aphorism.

-- Epiktètos of Hierapolis (Frugia in Anatolia) (50/138), like Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, Roman-oriented late Stoic, writes in his *Encheiridion, liber manualis*, Manual, - cf. J. Brun, o.c., 131: “The women, while still young, are called ‘mistresses’ by her husbands.

Such women therefore observe that her husbands value her only by virtue of the lust they provide them with, and therefore think only of making themselves beautiful to please, and put her whole trust (and all her expectations) in her jewelry. Nothing is more useful and necessary than to devote oneself to making her understand that they will only be honored and respected to the extent that they show wisdom, morality and modesty.”

One feels the exercise of the ascetic through this moralizing! -- It is therefore not surprising that ‘an adherent of the emotionally-chthonic religion of nature like K. Leese *Recht u. Grenze d. nat. Religion*, S. 28, writes that the Stoa, resurrected in Th. More (1478/ 1535), Jean Bodin (1530/1596), Herbert lord of Cherbury (1581/1648), to be from H. Grotius, Shaftesbury, J.Locke (the great Aufklärer in England), J. Toland, J.J. Rousseau, Voltaire, Leibniz, Wolff, Lessing, Kant, Schiller and others, the vital and emotional chthonic religion has strangled Western European consciousness.

Stoic politics. -

As Festugière, *La rev. d' H. Tr.*, II, 270ss., explains, the “sage” feels cosmopolitès, world-better citizen of the universe, not in the negative sense of Diogenes the Kuniaker (who felt bound to no polis), but positively:

(i) all men to whatever family, city or nation they belong, - Hellenes and barbarians, - freemen and slaves, - they are all equal beings according to their universal nature and belong to the same politikon sustèma, the same cosmopolis;

(ii) even more: the cosmopolis also includes the celestial bodies as gods (from which divinity is derived the phenomena that depend on them: years, months, seasons), according to Chrusippos from Kilikia (-260 (?)/ -207), the second founder of the Stoa; celestial gods and humans have the same “law”, because, fundamentally, the same nature (especially according to the soul).

-- *Companions*

These did feel attracted to this Stoic paideia on several occasions. Antigonos II Gonatas (- 320/-239), son of Demetrios I of Macedonia, knew Zenon in his youth, whom he continued to revere, and Bion of Borusthenes, the Canon. Now:

a/ The Kunics thought that a ruler is essentially characterized by ponos, effort, willpower expressed in self-control and service.

b/ What also the Stoa advocated. The “wise” ruler does his duty daily and the only reward he expects lies only in that strict fulfillment of duty. The cynical ruler is thus not a turannos, who selfishly makes his own well-being prevail; no, he is a ‘glorious slave’, i.e. servant of his subjects. In that servitude exists the ponos, burden, of ruling. Also: Antigonos did not, like Alexandros, want to be approached as a ‘god’: “The slave who is lasanoforos, i.e. urine potion, to me, nowhere experiences that I am a ‘god’.” he said to the poet Hermodotos, who flattered him!

Unmistakably, a series of princes in Hellenism, besides being ponosensitive, were also fil.anthropoi, humani, human-friendly beings (cf. Festugière, o.c., 301ss.). Thus Ptolemaios Filadelfos (-300/-240), who, over seven meals, is said to have consulted the seventy-two translators of the Old Testament, at Alexandria concerning the duties (deontology one would now say) of the sovereign:

a/ the second day he asks how a monarch is philanthropos, people friendly; answer: by being merciful.

b/ also the seventh day the fuisis (nature of being, nature of behavior) comes up as philanthropia and self-control. -- The theme occurs with Isokrates of Athens, the great rhetor (-436/ -338), as well as with the other rhetors, to denote

1/ the “compassion” of the judges toward the accused or

2/ the inter-civil benevolence. Later the meaning broadens and moves in the direction of Biblical charity. The Stoa contributed to make this virtue universal.

Conclusion. - The Stoa exerted very great influence, in late antiquity and later. One of these influences they touched upon briefly, namely, the proofs of God:

(i) the cosmological God proof (Chrusippos, Cicero)

This assumes that the fisis is the effect of the cause, God (1/ the eternal order of the universe, 2/ the heavenly bodies and their course especially, are a/ beyond man, yea, b/ every finite being, as the worker; - S. Paul, *Rom.* 1:20, says: “God’s invisible being, his eternal power and goodness, are, from the creation of the world, by some reflection, clearly knowable from the created.”.

(ii) The teleological (physical-theological) proof of God

Kleanthes, and Cicero, among others, take as their starting point the wise and beauty-laden purposiveness which again is seen especially in the celestial gods (sun, moon, stars), but in the whole fisis, to conclude a purposive, steering power, far above a/ man and b/ all the finite ordering agencies; Kant speaks of it only with regard;

(iii) the ontological proof of God

This proceeds from the pure concept of “perfect being” (Kleanthes)
a/ man, the best and noblest being, cannot, because of the evil in him, be the best and noblest being without more,
b/ as, by the way, no finite being; only God answers to the pure perfection. -

S. Paul therefore draws the natural God proof to the ethical conclusion, “God’s wrath descends, from heaven, on all the wickedness and unrighteousness of men - he means the extra-Biblical ‘Gentiles’ who violate the truth by unrighteousness. After all, what one can know about God, can also be known by them. (...) To be excused, therefore, they are not.” (*Rom.* 1:18/30).

Not surprisingly, St. Paul had gained Hellenic paideia in his youth. One major improvement over the Stoa: the Biblical god is not pantheistic world-soul, but Yahweh, the transcendent God, to such an extent that the question arises whether the Stoic proofs of God are applicable to a non-world-soul God, without more.

The astrotheological slant

(see above p. 172), up to “the astrological, at the Stoa, lives on in the Byzantine liturgy:

(i) in a theotokion (song in honor of Mary) it sounds: “You became the house of the never-setting sun, (meaning God the Son) of Him who created the stars, the great ones, and put them in their place, in omnipotence, pure virgin, bride of God. Therefore, release me now from the darkness of passions.” (M. Kirchhoff, *Osterjubiläum der Ostkirche, Pentekost.I*, (Easter jubilee of the Eastern Church, Pentecost), S.42.

(ii) in a Trinity canon, by Metropanes of Smurna (IXth ed. A.D.), it is sung, “Illuminate, divine Light, those who, in hymns, sing of the light triune in persons yet one in being, that they may always look up to your luminous rays. May I, by those rays, be saturated with your sweet and luminous and wholly blissful glory. Faithfully I exalt thee in the ages.” Astrotheology at its Biblical best!

(I)b2. *The Epicurean (The Garden) (-300/+400).*

As A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, (Technical and critical vocabulary of philosophy), Paris, 1968, 292, says, “epikurean” in the vernacular means one who is a lover

a/ of pleasant life, enjoyments, comforts, good graces, and good food and drink;

b/ but in such a way that a certain pickiness works selectively in all that. - Where does this cheap interpretation of Epikur(e)ism come from? It dates back to antiquity: both supporters of Epikouros and enemies of him have interpreted his austere and strict doctrine in this way.

-- Fr. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, (Ludwig Feuerbach and the Ausgang of Classical German Philosophy,), 1886-1, III in fine, notes the pejorative meaning of ‘materialism’:

The narrow-minded (Philister) understands by ‘materialism’ eating, boozing, eye lust, carnal lust and haughty behavior, greed for money, avarice, greed, profiteering, stock market swindling, - in short, all those filthy defects which he himself silently cherishes.” Cf. Marx / Engels, *Ueber Religion*, (About religion), Berlin, 1958, S. 190.

Engels opposes this with the word “idealism” - according to the same “narrow-minded one”: belief in a/ virtue, b/ general human love and, without more, c/ “a better world. -

Immediately one sees how words are to be situated in a language if they are to be understood properly: the Stoic is convinced though dualistic materialist; the Epicurean is this too; and yet: both are high-minded, stern, yes, religious materialists. As W. Jaeger, *A la naissance*, 11, notes, the Epicurean is a system that also ends in a theology, like almost all other Hellenic systems.

Erikouros of Samos (-341/-271).

The life of Epikouros is important to the understanding of his teachings. His father, Neokles of Athens, arrives on Samos in -352/1 as a clerouchos, i.e. someone who, as a colonist, receives a parcel of land but remains a citizen of the motherland: the Athenians, in those troubled days, expelled the Samian owners from their island and distributed the land among Athenian citizens.

Thus Epikouros was born on Samos, but as an Athenian. His father lived off the land and was also a schoolmaster. In -327, fourteen, Epikouros went to Teos, on the Anatolian coast, not far from Samos: he was taught there by Nausifanes of Teos (+/- -360ff.), 1/ rhetor, 2/ mathemationist and 3/ sage of the demokritean tendency, in a famous school, where rich youths of the coast and islands gathered. From Kausifanes Epikouros learned, during three years, among other things, atomism and the doctrine of Demokritos. Two years of military service in Athens (-324/-321): there he got to know Menandros of Athens (-342/-292), the later Attic comedy poet (see p. 174, about the new Attic comedy, supra), who as a connoisseur of men had learned from Aristotle’s pupil Theofrastos, but as a human being was a time-honored ‘epikurean’.

Perdikkas, regent of Asia, expels, after Alexandros' death, the clerouchos of Athens on Samos in -322.

Consequence: Neokles flees to Kolofon (Anatolian coast), in Ionia, where Epikouros joins him in -321 (twenty years old). There the latter learns what it is to be an exile and poor, with weak health, prone to disease! Eleven years of solitary contemplation and consideration make him a self-made man, who in -310 settles in Mutilene (Lesbos) to teach (where he acquires Hermarchos, his first successor in later times, as a friend), to move, from there, to Lampsakos (on the Hellespont), where he again acquires a series of pupil-friends, some of them wealthy and who help him financially.

In 306, five years before Zenon of Kition, the Stoic, founded his school, he settled in Athens where he bought The Garden. Except for two or three trips to Ionian friends, his life passes quietly, until he dies, -270, after terrible pains caused by an intestinal disease.

To his friends at Lampsakos he writes: "Look: the most beautiful day of my life! It is the last. My bladder pains and my stomach pains go on and on, always very intense, without losing any of their intensity. But in the face of all this, I see the joy of my soul when I think back to our earlier conversations. Thou, who hast remained faithful to me (Idomeneus viz.), since youth, as well as to philosophy take care of the children of Metrodoros." (Cf. J.-A. Festugière, *Epicure et ses dieux*, (Epicurus and his gods), Paris, 1968, pp 25/31). -

His will bears witness to the same "fil.anthropia": the poor, the meagre, the slaves, - they should be helped, even the slave women, by his disciples. Thus he sets Mus, his old confidant, as well as two slaves and a slave girl at liberty, as an example to follow: all my comrades in philosophy, who, from their own property, have provided for my needs and who, after showing me all the signs of friendship that were possible, have chosen to grow old with me in the study of philosophy, may, as far as I can take care of them, not lack any necessary thing. "

Also the enagismata, i.e. the sacrifices, not to a god but to a deceased person or a demigod, are regulated, furthermore, the celebrations of the day of birth are laid down.

Reason: they provide joy to the group soul. - Unanimism or group soul could be called such, to use a modern analogy, namely the naturalistic novel formula of Ina Baudier-Bakker (1875/1966), especially in *De Klop op de Deur* (The Knock on the Door), (1930), in which the writer describes the mutual relations of the many members of one family in her three successive genera, very much outside of all world conflicts. Even the somber atmosphere and the loneliness and misunderstanding could be called "epikoenographic.

The 'deipna', i.e. dinners, feasts.-

After his death Epikouros also had the afternoon and/or evening meals, the twentieth of each month, recorded. Originally this was a festive custom in honor of Apollon Eikadios (Parnessios).

Epikouros here follows a general custom but in his own way: the foundation of a philosophical school in Athens was only possible - the archaic view is clearly felt here - in the form of a thiasos (religious brotherhood was the basis), i.e. a cult college, - which did not go without common sacred acts (sacrifices), followed by the inevitable sacrificial meal (one thinks of our funerals with a meal).

Platon's Akademeia, Aristotle's Lykeion were thiasoi of the Muses (Aristotle and his disciples held their sacrifice and sacrificial meal at every new moon). -

In his second farewell address at the Last Supper, Jesus says, "I no longer call you servants (doulos in the Gr., i.e. slaves, literally), for the slave (doulos) does not know what his master (kurios, who has full power over the other, lord) is doing; but I have called you friends (filous amicos) because I have made known to you all that I have heard from my Father." (Jo 15:15).

Well, coincidence or not, those who participated in sacrifice and sacrificial meal, at Athens, called each other 'filoi', amici, friends. Even more: "The Epicurean friendship (filia) is an end in itself. It is no longer merely an intermediate on the road to wisdom (sophia, sapientia): it is wisdom itself. (J.A. Festugière, *Epicure et ses dieux*, p.43).

Admittedly, the enagismata (death sacrifice meals) take on a partially shifted meaning with Epikouros: the parents and the three brothers (Neokles, Chairedemos, Aristoboulos) of Epikouros himself, his friend Poluainos, - after his death, himself, Metredoros are the celebrated ones in the foreground, while the 'friends' keep in their minds the memory of the 'form' of the perfect and all-embracing beings, viz, according to Festugière, o.c., 34, the gods (who thus do not remain excluded without more), who are the invitees to celebrate, in joy, together with all the members of the Epikourean family, to the exclusion of the licentious or those in soul confusion or the outsiders, at least insofar as these do not favor the Epikourean disposition.

"By acting in this way one does not seek vain popular favour, but, acting according to the laws proper to nature - always the fuisis, but again in a new version - one remembers all those who show benevolence towards us, so that they may help us to celebrate these ritual meals appropriate to those who together practice philosophy in order to attain bliss." Thus "an ancient text. The deep "unanimous" atmosphere of joy is the overriding motif of Epikouros who once said, "One should laugh and practice philosophy at the same time."

De filia, amicitia, friendship. -

“On the whole it may be said that all the philosophical schools of antiquity, present themselves as foci of friendship.” (J.-A. Festugière, *Epicure*, 37). Indeed, from the Pythagorean schools of southern Italy, through the Platonic Akademeia and the Peripatetic Lykeion, to The Stoa and The Garden: philosophy and friendship go together! Yet The Garden differs from all the previous ones.

a/ The Pythagoreans are strongly initiatic and politicized;

b/ The Academicians, like the Pythagoreans, are mathematikoi (arithmetic, geometria, music, and astronomia), devote themselves to rhetoric, and especially politics;

c/ the Peripateticists want rhetoric, mathematism, strict to the professional sciences inclined philosophy, strongly “theoretical” (contemplative). -

At first sight, the eros, resp. filia, plays a first priority role in the Akademeia: in order to arrive at the theoria, contemplation, of the supreme beauty of the world of ideas, one develops and “elevates” (sublimates) the lower eros (especially paidierastia) which, in the dialectic, is expressed at a higher level. Yet this eros and the filia connected with it remain rather means: with Epikouros the filia is both different and an end in itself!

- One feels the difference clearly if one examines the role of the woman. - With one exception, Axiothea, the Arcadian, who had read a part of the Politéia, women were excluded from the midst of the future politikoi that was the Academy. -- In the unanimous atmosphere of The Garden, women were welcome to:

(i) lawful husbands like Themista, the wife of Leonteus of Lampsakos;

(ii) hetairai, i.e. women who make love outside a conjugal context, ranging from the full sidekick to the pure court maker (yet never to the public woman (prostitute): thus Leontion (who will marry Metrodoros), Mammarrion, Hèdèia, Erotion, Nikidion, Dèmèlata.

-- *The hetaira,*

This one, in the days of Epikouros, as an erotic companion, was precisely not purely scorned (certainly not as in rougher Rome, where they are called ‘scortum’ (‘skin’)):

(i) she is primarily an erotic object;

(ii) she was, if let in, the wife’s slave;

(iii) if necessary, like Glukèra at Menandros (where short-cutting of the hair takes place), she is humiliated. -

In Epicurean middle, however, this situation changes:

a/ the hetaira, the erotic life companion, had a ‘soul’ and that ‘soul’ was valued; therefore she was treated as a fellow human being on an equal footing with the other ‘friends’ and ‘girlfriends’. More so:

b/ Epikouros notes Leontion’s demonstration of intellectual and ethical qualities; he therefore allows her to preside over the group (each member could take turns being president).

-- J. Duché, *Le premier sexe*, (The first sex), Paris, 1972, p. 240, dealing with the status of women in Epikouros, insinuates that one can have them without objections,

as in 'tool' and thus 'exterminate' ('exterminate')! Steller, as a shrewd journalist, quickly mixes up a few texts, taken out of context, and very much misinterprets Epikouros.

He quotes a text that J.-A. Festugière also discusses but completely different. Here is the situation.

In the midst of the confusion of the time, the second great one (after the turbulent days of the Sophist crisis), many (especially younger) people were looking for a "soul leader", a "soter", a saviour (cf. Festugière, *La révélation d' H. Tr.*, II (*Le Dieu cosmique*), p. 307 (in the context of philanthropia or humanity)).

Thus Puthoklès who turns to Metrodoros complaining that "the sting of the flesh drives him to abuse erotic pleasures" (Festugière, *Epicure*, 65, 40/41).

How does Metrodoros respond?

a/ "If you do not violate the laws and do not in any way upset good established morals - if you do not inconvenience anyone among your neighbors, - if you do not squander your energies or squander your possessions, surrender to your inclination without conscientious objection." So much for the first reaction: it is worthy of the ethics of the time (which is not biblical-Christian, but not yet what Duché insinuates, which omits the conditions listed in the 'if' sentences (laws and morals, - neighbors, - forces and property)!

b/ However, listen to what immediately follows: "However: it is impossible not to be brought to a standstill by at least one of those barriers, viz. the erotic pleasures have never benefited anyone! It is already much if they are not harmful." Duché reduces the advice of Epikouros (whom he exchanges for Metrodoros) to: "Livre-toi sans scrupule à ton inclination." (o.c., 240). Compared to what Festugière says about this, Duché's performance is rhetoric, indeed sophistry rather than pragmatically sound information.

The truth about sex morality in the Garden is: (i) eroticism is situated within ancient, pagan ethics (which presupposes a set of conditions, far from any easy immorality); (ii) eroticism is identified as easily harmful.

Conclusion.- (i) The filia (friendship) is, cf. Philodèmos' of Gadara (-110/-35), Epikourian who arrived in Rome in +/- -75, imitation of the gods, who would not be 'teleioi' (= perfect concerning happiness/bliss), if necessary by virtue of initiation) without friendship;

(ii) "Friendship goes joyfully around the world; like a herald it makes the following appeal to us all: 'Awake that ye may congratulate one another!' (Festugière, *Epicure*, 57); in other words, just as in the mystery religions, having attained 'teleiotès' (perfection of happiness), one wished one another 'makarios', blissful, so too the friends in Epikouros' circle wish one another 'blissful' because of the friendship they have achieved, which "among all the goods provided by wisdom is far the greatest good" (o.c., 57). Like Platon's dialectic, Epikouros' wisdom is a kind of "initiation" that prepares bliss.

The Epicurean System. -

(i) Beatitude consists in ataraxia, undisturbedness (with emphasis on afobia, fearlessness, and aponia, freedom from pressure); this theory of beatitude (eudemonolote), the core of Epikouros system, is central to the ethics, which governs the other two subjects.

Main condition of the ataraxia is:

a/ the limitation of desires, especially the desire for property and wealth as well as for honor and fame, indeed the detachment from them and

b/ the certainty concerning suffering, especially that suffering which is attached to the belief in gods (especially the astral gods) and to the soul as an immortal being (fear of death).

(ii) The intellectual certainty concerning suffering (and its main causes, gods and immortality) can only be reached by a correct interpretation of the fusiologia, natural science, - not the texts of the poets or the subjects of mathematics, i.e. It is only natural science which provides the correct interpretation of phenomena and is the true propaedeutikè, the preliminary science, to the real certainty of suffering and its causes. - Here, in summary, is the teaching of Epikouros.

(A) Canonics (Logic, theory of thought). -

Epikouros, probably orienting himself after a work of Demokritos, *Peri logikon*, canon, called the doctrine of thought, “doctrine of guiding principles” (or criterion of truth). Canon, regula, rule, means, originally, reed, straight rod, etc.; metaphorically, kanon means rule, model, principle, guideline and dgl.

Epikouros’ canonical or epistemological theory of sensory phenomena: “One should always adhere to what is shown by each of these phenomena and, as regards the opinions that attach themselves to what is shown, one should treat those phenomena separately, as regards the appearance of which various explanations can be put forward without disregarding the testimony of the phenomena below. (Letter to Puthklès; Festugière, *Epicure*, 115).

Thus the waxing and waning of the moon: this phenomenon can be attributed to more than one cause: “One can resort to all kinds of explanations that the phenomena below give us in order to do justice to these aspects of the moon, provided that one is not possessed of the ‘one’ method and rejects all other methods without reason.” (o.c., 116/117).

Likewise, the regular or irregular course of the heavenly bodies: “To ascribe only one cause to these phenomena, where they prompt a plurality of explanations, is pure folly.” (o.c., 118).

Sensualism. -

a/ As with Demokritos and with Zenon of Kition, here too the sole source of knowledge is sensory experience: necessary and sufficient condition of knowledge content ('information') is the (external) sensory observation, to the exclusion of reason and reason (which play a processing but not a content-giving role, as with Socrates, Platon (idea) and Aristotle (form)). The sensory evidences are for Epikouros the decisive norm, 'kritèrion' (criterion), of truth. -

b/ As with Demokritos and Zenon of Kition, here too is materialism; i.e. unlike the exclusive sensualists, such as Protagoras of Abdera, the sophist, (who took this subjectivistically, after all he knew of fisis, was sense experience, but whether that sense experience was anything more than a subjective impression, he did not know for certain), Epikouros explains sense experience materialistically: it is a material process. Cf. p. 39 supra (Demokritos' eidola doctrine): to perceive the moon is to absorb an eidolon, simulacrum, image, of the moon, - eidolon which detaches itself from her, and draws itself into the looking one. -- Of course, this is about dualistic materialism, which accepts more than one kind of substance, as mentioned above.

Comprehension. -

The general concepts -- which Epikouros sees as well as Socrates, Platon, and Aristotle, of course -- arise, logismoi, ratiocinando, by reasoning: they are memories of many similar sensory perceptions (cf. p. 189: the Stoa also sees the universal concepts in this way). On them man builds up judgments and reasonings, but concepts, judgments and reasonings are true, i.e. true to reality, only if the underlying sense experiences are true. In other words, there is rationalism here but no intellectualism (or idealism): reason, which is one with the intellect, processes (while organizing) the sensory data, but it does not provide real thought content. Here one feels the split between Great-Societism and Sensualism (Demokritos, Sophism, Lesser-Societism, Stoa, Garden).

Extra-sensuous and super-sensuous data. -

Like all sensualists, Epikouros reduces the knowledge of the unobserved (imperceptible) to the one criterion of truth, namely sensory experience. So the atoms; so the future things: either they, as the general representations (= concepts) are reduced to the perceived or they do not contradict the perceived. Thus also sense of lust and e.g. sense of taste are explained.

Conclusion of the canonical. - Epikouros opposes both the scepticism (of sophistry or of Purrhon) and the Great-Socracy: the *energeia*, *evidentia*, *apparentness* ('evidentiality') of the senses is the criterion without question.

(B) Physicalism (Fusiologia).

Atomistic materialism, yet dualistic (like the Demokritic and the Stoic), - such is the core of Epikouros' physical. It is not surprising, then, that K. Marx writes: "French and English materialism always remained in an intimate relation to Demokritos and Epikouros." (Doctor's Dissertation, 1841). Similarly, Pierre Gassendi (1592/1655) was an admirer of Epikouros: he sought, as a natural philosopher, to connect Christianity and atomism.

The senses give us - not direct evidence (*energeia*, *evidentia*) but - 'sèmeia', signs, of the existence of atoms and 'kénon', vacuum, empty space in between (between the fullness of the atoms). In other words, the atomic theory is not an 'evidence' of the senses; it is only a 'hypothesis', a supposition, based on sensory experience through reasoning. -

All being is spatial; every process ('movement' of creation and decay) is purely mechanical, i.e. movement of atoms. There is an infinite number of atoms, just as there are an infinite number of worlds (which the Stoa, with its unity and oneness, saw differently).

Demokriteic atomism

This is the word for Epikouros' fusiologia, except on two points:

(i) i.p. an original vortex movement ((*dinos*, spin, - so e.g. Epikouros posits the falling movement of atoms in empty space as a principle of universe formation: according to form and scale (though in distinction to Demokritos), also according to weight different atoms, which (again in this respect different from Demokritos) are not infinitely divisible, possess a falling movement with *par. enklisis*, *clinamen*, deviation, gifted which explains that they collide with each other and accumulate (also something that Demokritos did not claim).

As already noted above, Epikouros introduces here a profound innovation in atomism, viz. i.v. determinism (i.e. the view that the phenomena of the universe are so closely related to the preceding phenomena that only one resultant is possible; m. a.w. a view of thought that focuses on necessity and, ethically, fatalism), he posits indeterminism, and namely a coincidence indeterminism: the atoms diverge from a "free" self-evident movement that happens by chance.

In other words, to 'save' human freedom - which was evident to a Hellenist - Epokouros argues that such a thing as 'freedom' is present in atomic movement;

(ii) the Demokritean many worlds existing simultaneously are apart thanks to *metakosmia*, *intermundia*, interworldly spaces: in these, unlike Demokritos, Epikouros situates the gods' abode:

Epikourean soulology.

As with Diogenes of Apollonia, with

Demokritos, the soul composed of a special kind of substance: “The soul, according to Demokritos, consists of fine, smooth and round atoms, similar to the atoms of fire. These atoms are the most mobile, and, by their motion, which pervades the whole body, the phenomena of life are produced.” (A. Lange, *Gesch. d. Mat.*, I, 46).

Demokritos thus distinguishes body and soul, in this similar to the dualists like Platon - to the great displeasure of modern materialists, Lange says (o.c., 46) - distinction which he, moreover, valorizes ethically: -

- 1/ the material soul is the essential in man;
- 2/ the body is only the ‘vessel’ of the soul;
- 3/ the soul is the first thing we have to take care of;
- 4/ Happiness dwells in the soul;
- 5/ physical beauty without reason is something animal.

You see: Demokritos is far removed from the ‘animal’ conception of man as advocated by the XIXth century materialists (one thinks of Nietzsche).

More than that: according to Demokritos - analogous to Diogenes of Apollonia, who understood this, however, in a hylozoic way - the finer soul matter is “durch das ganze Weltall verteilt” (spread throughout the entire universe, - Lange o.c., 46). This universal spreading of that mobile matter goes in the direction of what, later, the Neo-Platonists will call “to platos”, (living) space, i.e. not a body but a space filled with finer matter (see hylic pluralism supra p. 187 at bottom).

-- Lange, o.c., 47, points out that Aristotle ridiculed Demokritos’ conception of man: the way in which, in Demokritos, the material soul moves the body resembles the fable that Daidalos had made a movable statue of the goddess Aphrodite, and the ‘explanation’(!) given by the actor Philip, namely that Daidalos had probably poured quicksilver into the interior of that statue of the goddess.

In exactly the same way, according to Aristotle, Demokritos lets man be moved by the mobile atoms of the soul in his body! - According to Aristotle, thinking choices move the body of man.

a/ Which is correct, but tries to explain the right mechanism which comes into play, without a soul body, -

b/ Which is questioned by many a thinker. After all, the soul body is, in the thought of many dualistic materialists and hylic pluralists, the intermediate between thinking decision and gross material body, bridging the jump between pure spirit and gross material reality, according to the principle “Natura non facit saltus” (Nature does not make jumps).

Epikouros, completely in Demokritos’ line, sees the soul as a soma leptos, corpus subtile, an icy or subtle body, spread throughout the whole body, most similar to breath (pneuma, spirit) with a dose. (krisis, mixtio) heat (A.Lange, o.c., 120). Cf. C. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, III (The Hellenistic - Roman Period), p. 22.

‘Lepto.merès’, subtilis, consists of two word parts:

(i) leptos means first of all “that which is stripped of its skin”, e.g. grains; then: narrow, thin, fine, etc.;

(ii) lepto.merès then also means what consists of fine, thin particles, subtle, fine.-material.

The soul-body relationship. -

“The body covers the soul and directs perception towards the soul; it is, through it, partakers of sensation along with it, but incompletely, and it loses this sensation when the soul disperses.-Disintegrates the body, then the soul, along with the body must disintegrate.” (Lange, o.c., 120).

In other words, the particulate soul is mortal. However dual, yet, contrary to the Stoic view, man is one and, at death, decays, just as the whole process of creation and decay of the fuisis. -

It is true that the soul, like the atoms, once it has passed the “free” falling movement (and become things which constitute the multiplicity of forms of the fuisis), is not subject to necessity: it is “freely” willing and acting, though indeterministically, i.e. it chooses between more than one possibility “unconditionally”, i.e. by chance. This is the basis of ethical action.

Epicurean theology. -

As for Demokritos, gods exist for Epikouros. Reason: there are sensory perceptions which point to their actual existence: e.g. “great” eidola, images, human-like, appear to sleepers in the dream. This repeated perception, thanks to the subtle fuisis of the eidola in the apparitions, makes the belief in gods “enarges gnosis”, evidens cognitio, apparent knowledge, and a lasting general understanding (prolèpsis). - However, these gods are composed of even finer matter (finer atoms) than that of the human soul.

Astrotheology. -

Sun, moon, heavenly bodies are not divine beings. Those who claim such (as Platon, Xenophon, Aristotle, the Stoa), are working with hupolèpseis pseudeis, falsae suppositiones, false assumptions, - not with prolèpseis, true general concepts. -

Epikouros takes real “gods” to be deistic, i.e. they exist but do not care about our world. They do not care about the government of the universe. Those gods are in the ataraxia, the undisturbed bliss; they are immortal. They are morally superior beings, too distinguished to behave as the mythologists and poets and their not-quite-knowledgeable imitators imagine, without any sensory experience as a basis. Anger, irresponsible preference for some favorites, being subject to the effect of sacrifice, - all such imperfections are not peculiar to the true gods. They are, on the contrary, pure kalokaigathia, beauty and moral distinction; - something in which Epikouros approaches Platon.

(c) Ethics. -

Two names are used to characterize the type of ethics peculiar to Epikouros, hedonism and eudemonism. Since the use of words in this regard is very fluid and differs from author to author, we will specify briefly. D. Julia, *Dictionnaire de la philosophie*, Paris, 1964 says:

“Eudemonism (from the Gr. eudaima, happy; from eu, good, and daimon, genius, spirit), doctrine according to which happiness should be man’s highest goal. Eudemonism is distinguished from hedonism, which conceives of happiness as the immediate pleasure and nothing else. - Eudemonism includes Epikurism, which sees in intellectual pleasure the highest happiness. - Eudemonism is opposed to the rigorism of Kant’s ethics e.g., for whom the real moral good is not to be happy but to earn happiness.”

- Demokritos. -

On p. 40 supra we have outlined, all too briefly, the ethics of Demokritos (his archaizing agology). As J. Rehmke, *Gesch. d. Phil.*, 1959, 24/26, puts it: Demokritos counts - and rightly so - as the first materialist in the pure sense, i.e. as the one who associates being as such with

(i) spatial being (full and empty) and (ii) pure movement of spatial being; -- Demokritos’ ethics, according to Rehmke, o.c., 26, as well as A. Lange, *Gesch. d. Mat.*, 1905, I, 48/49, is lofty and not easily reconcilable with his purely material conception of human being: like the Eleates (Parmenides, Zenon et al.; cf. p. 19v.) and the Herakliteans (cf. p. 22v.), Demokritos distinguishes strictly -- his older contemporary Protagoras the Sophist (p. 61v. supra) reinforced him in this --

(i)a. perceived world and (i)b. real world and (ii)a. perception and (ii)b. truth situated in thought. Indeed:

a/ as truth-containing thought critically shifts the sense-perceived data down to the ‘true’, i.e. the spatially moving (in the exclusive sense),

b/ Similarly, this same critical thinking separates, from the sensory experiences, that which provides euthumia, the joyful peace of mind, from what disturbs that peace of mind: what the sensory world offers in terms of gold, herds, etc., is dual in relation to euthumia; what, however, this same euthumia unambiguously brings about, is essentially dual (and, as with Herakleitos above all, lies inwardly, in the reflective man):

a/ control of one’s own desires, especially those for possessions, as well as of the states of mind, fear and hope, and

b/ spiritual formation and intellectual development.

In other words, the perceived, sensual experience, is to be distrusted, but the sensual perception controlled by reason and intelligence, connected with developed thinking (which grasps the ‘true’ from the confused multiplicity of sensual impressions), is to be valued. Demokritos’ ethics revolves around a concept of eudemony and is therefore the oldest eudemonism. Aristotle’s concept of ‘eu.daimonismos’

i.e. happy praise, means the fact that someone is considered happy, not only in fact but also in law (i.e. happiness is understood as the meaning of life); - this differs from epainos, general praise for a character and from enkomion, praise for a singular act (Eudemic Ethics II, 1, 1219b). -

Thus Demokritos writes: "Eudaimony (beatitude) is something of the soul (psuchè) and also kakodaimoniè (unsalvation, poverty)." (Fr. 170). Or still: "(Bliss) does not dwell in flocks and gold: the soul (psuchè) is dwelling place of those who are (bliss)." (Fr. 171).

Speaking for this dualistic materialist is the following text: "It is more appropriate for men to be concerned about the soul than about the body (somatos); for, on the one hand, the perfection of the soul compensates for the weakness of the body, but body strength without thinking capacity (logismou) improves the soul in nothing." (Fr. 187).

Hedonism is certainly not Demokritos' thesis: "The best thing for man is to spend his life, as much as possible, in good spirits (euthumètónti) and, as little as possible, in displeasure. This would be the case if he did not direct his lust (tas hèdonas) toward mortal things." (Fr. 139). Or: "Euthumiè (= gladness of mind) comes to men from measure concerning pleasure (terpsios) and balance (summetrièi) concerning life.

Lack and abundance easily overturn (metapiptein) and cause great excitement in the soul. (Fr. 191).

Also, "The Great enjoyments (terpseis) lie in contemplating (theasthai) those works that are beautiful." (Fr. 194). At last: "One should not grasp every experience of lust (hèdonèn), but only that experience of lust which is attuned to the beautiful (kaloi)." (Fr. 207).

- Aristippos of Kurene

(cf. above p. 89), the Lesser-Socratic, we have already touched upon. A. Lange, *Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, S. 54ff., speaks of "ethical materialism" in Aristippos.

As a good Kantian, Lange distinguishes three types of materialism, i.e., idea-free philosophy:

a/ theoretical materialism (see above: all theorizing that assumes material beings and their mechanical motion);

b/1. practical materialism, - something Lange defines as Fr. Engels (cf. supra p. 186): "the prevailing tendency to material profit and pleasure" (o.c., 63); this is an incorrect form of ethical materialism;

b/2. ethical materialism is that ethics which determines the tèlos, goal of life, not starting from an unconditional idea but from the striving for a desired state (o.c., 64).

All three are called Lange 'materialism' because they, each in his own way, start from the 'substance' (somewhat Aristotelianized) (and not from the form), where 'substance' is

a/ is not the matter of visible and tangible things around us, **b/** nor a vague theoretical concept of matter, inherent in the so-called theoretical consciousness, **c/** but, apart from these two, is also - and this is the ethical aspect - the urge with the accompanying feeling of lust and unlove (the 'matter' of which acting consists, among other things).

To what does the ethical materialism of Aristippos amount? Aristippos came from the hot north coast of Africa, where the Hellenic trading colony of Kurene, Oriental opulence and Hellenic paideia blended together; as the son of a rich businessman, clean of stature and pleasant homme du monde he was welcome everywhere (in Athens). He was akin to Socrates, but was more a sophist by nature, attuned to lust, lustre and influence (Aristotle calls him a sophist). From there, two kinds of thinking:

(i) Socrates had taught that the good, in that it promotes human well-being, is at once, pleasing. Therefore, if the good, that which is worth striving for, coincides with the pleasurable, - so Aristippos reasons - then in the long run the pleasurable is the good (worth striving for); look: what does everyone strive for? That which is pleasurable and because it is pleasurable! That is the fisis, the nature, of man which sets him on his way (again that nature-concept). (Happy) bliss is therefore the télos of life.

(ii) Here the principle of choice is introduced both Socratically and, even more so, Demokriteically-Sophistically: the virtuous man, the 'wise', is the one who knows that eudemonistic-hedonistic principle (insight as steering power, as with Demokritos) and thus, amidst the limitless multitude of lust-provoking things and processes, does not indiscriminately respond to things but chooses self-controlled the things full of lust and thus proves that he is not the slave of his lust but the lord ('echo; ouk echomai'), I hold; not I am held; - ...

Horace of Venusia (Apulia) (-65/-8), of whom Emperor Augustus predicted that his works were "immortal," expresses this as follows: "mihi res (non me rebus) subiungere conor" (I try to submit things to me (not me to things)); one knows that Horace clearly underwent Epikouros' influence. In other words, sophos, sapiens, wise(geer), is the one who knows how to enjoy reasonably, i.e. knows how to find the pure experience of lust and avoids the deceptive experience of lust.

-- The three Kurenaics after Aristippos. -

The hedonic eudemonism of Aristippos is hinted at threefold:

(i) Hègèsias of Kurene, lecturer at Alexandria (Eg.), discusses the practical feasibility of Aristippos' ideal; he observes that this earthly life never gives eudaimonia (a/ blissful life is impossible; b/ even smart-free life is impossible;

Conclusion: suicide is the only way out; hence his nickname peisithanatos, i.e., who recommends death, - something that caused him to be deposed as 1eraar);

(ii)a. Theodoros of Kurene, kunieker in the ground, the Atheos, who had to flee from Kurene, for the sake of atheism, noted that Aristippos' ideal was not attainable in friendship, family or state contexts: the eudaimonia is only 'marginally' (on the edge, indeed, outside the social context) attainable;

(ii)b. Annikeris of Kurene recommended the friendship, family, and fatherland context as the main condition.

-- Epikouros's eudemonism. -

“The hedonistic school, which, in Annikeris of Kurene (+/- -300), regains ‘a moderate optimism, finds its continuation in that of Epikouros, who supplements the morality of Aristippos with the physical of Demokritos.” (A. Weber, *Histoire de la philosophie européenne*, Paris, 1914-8 p. 66).

The small-Socratiekers live on! “The moral idealism of Antisthenes - the Kunieker - distorted by the exaggerations of his disciples - cf. p. 88/89 supra (Diogenes of Sinope) -, made its reappearance under a form that was new and worthy of so great a commitment, namely, the doctrine of Zenon (of Kition) and the Stoics.” (ibid., 69)

- Which proves the enormous influence Socrates had. Which also proves that one should not be blinded to the Great Socratics! Unmistakably, Epikouros achieved ‘an ethical-eudemonical synthesis (‘synthesis’, the meliorative form of eclecticism, - something which proves that one should not strike too strongly at Epikouros’ contested ‘dogmatism’).

a1/ Thus, for example, one should note his pessimism, i.e. his doubts about the practical feasibility of eudaimonia: the world he, the scholar and the pessimistic Kurenaicist alike, sees as filled with ‘evils’ (geographically: barren deserts, arid mountains, treacherous swamps, inhospitable icefields: - Biological: thorns and weeds, wild animals;- Human: diseases, premature deaths, greed and honor, fear of gods, afterlife fears, etc.).

a2/ Thus his limited but real inclination to marginality: like a Kunieker he wants self-satisfaction (reduction of needs to the “necessities”; independence from external circumstances; distance from the state, business, the pursuit of success, even - though well understandable - from family and marriage): to distinguish between doing philosophy for oneself and doing philosophy for Hellas, is to imitate him and be “happily praised” by him (Festugière, *Epic.*, 45).

b/ Unmistakably, the hedonic eudemonism of the Kurenaics weighs in: ‘a sophos, sapiens, sage, is only one who,

1/ on his own, autarkic,

2/ with reasonable calculation,

3/ shuns the unpleasant and pursues the pleasurable.

One sees, as in Demokritos - who had a great influence on him - and in Aristippos, the principle of choice at work (Lange would say: he is not concerned with a practical (meaning: easy and low) materialism but with an ethical materialism). Nevertheless, a piece of fuis, nature’s aptitude, is necessary for this; only those who have aptitude for it can further develop that hedonic eudemonism of a choosy nature, through education and practice.

Foresight is another condition of eudaimonia: to strive for something full of lust upon which - causally - discomfort follows is unreasonable; not lust in motion (the momentary experience: “verweile doch; du bist so schön” (expressed in Goethean)) but stable lust is the goal! Here he distances himself most from Aristippos who advocated the instantaneous.

- Divine Ethics. -

The gods, of a finer substance, exist; their attributes are:

- (i) (bliss) bliss, which includes burden-free (a.ponia) and undisturbed (a.taraxia),
- (ii) imperishableness.

Consequence: with cosmos, the universe, they have no affinity ('deism');

a/ demiourgos (universe-orderer, - shaper), as designed by Platon, does not exist; -

b/ pronoia, providentia, providence - hylozoic one with the fuis, as conceived by the Stoa, is not there either.

c/ That implies that a teleology since Anaxagoras and Diogenes (of Apollonia), since Socrates especially introduced in philosophy, makes no sense: there is no purpose coming from higher powers that deliberately govern the world. As C. de Vogel, *Greek Philos.*, III (The Hellenistic - Roman Period), 1959, 31, notes, Epikourism is 'a kind of "mysticism", viz. in the sense that its ethos is god-following:

1/ in friendship **2/** one studies the fuis, **3/** to lead a blissful and burden-free - undisturbed existence like the gods, **4/** whom one remembers at meals as kindred spirits.

Again that principle of choice: out of religion Epikouros chooses, like all hedonics before him, what gives eudaimonia, in a very immediately enjoyable sense!

a/ One should hold him for one of those who oppose the growing infidelity. He himself believes in the gods and in the benefits of religion. He is punctual regarding honorable acts of a traditional nature; he is, fundamentally, 'a pious man as the ancients understood it.'" (Festugiere, *Epicure*, p. 87). He considers such to be "living according to the fuis" (ibid., 90), - something that says a lot with him.

b/ Yet he fastidiously banishes from religion all that smacks of deisidaimonia, fear of gods and spirits both for this earthly life and for the hereafter, for countless people around him - it is even claimed that his own mother, deeply religious as she was, was "superstitious" in this sense - lived in constant uncertainty and fear. Cf. p. 177/179 supra (the example of the fear of spirits and a 'philosophical' attitude towards it); cf. also p. 12/14 (the link between crossing borders (hybris, arrogantia)/God's judgement), as well as p. 43/44 (the cycle of crossing borders, with Herodotos); p. 54/57 (the same crossing borders, with the tragedians).

Indeed, one can take the connection between boundary crossing and punishment of God :

a/ healthy religiously, **b/** yet, as several times, also fearfully and superstitiously. Against the scrupulous and superstitious interpretation of this, all enlightened spirits have, for a long time, reacted; such as Aristotle, who wrote the Hellenic aphorisms "Know thyself", (i.e. know that thou art but a man and not a god; therefore do not transgress) and "Nothing too much" (i.e. Do not exceed the limit which the gods, in their "envy" ("evil eye"), have prescribed for you), criticized as unfounded; yet, with Aristotle, this was because he saw man as a thinking-thoughtful being, as a god-like being (and a.k.a. the equal of the gods). - In this sense one should understand Epikouros.

“If unlimited leniency in building the temples, unlimited generosity in celebrating the gods’ festivals could have kept the gods for Greece, no city could have laid more claim to the name of piety, of theosobeia, than Athens. Just as no square was without a shrine, no street without an outer, so no deka (ten days), yes, almost no day passed without a holy festival.”

Thus in the juicy older Dutch, K. Kuiper, *Wijsbegeerte en godsdienst in het drama van Euripides*, Haarlem, 1888, p. 3 (‘n werk dat nog zijn hoge waarde behoudt).

Situate in such a cultural context the following extract from Festugière, Epicure, dealing with a booklet by Ploutarchos of Chaironeia (+45/ +125) on the deisidaimonia as it was seen in the Epikorian tradition (pp. 77ss.):

“Does the deisidaimon come across the smallest miscalculation, see: he is discouraged and develops from his sorrow painful, heavy sadnesses, from which he will not be able to rid himself; he accumulates within himself feelings of fear and terror, suspicions and anxieties, ceaselessly complaining and sighing.”

What else: “When one hears him busy, it is not because he is unhappy, but because the gods hate him, he is punished by them; this is the reason why he has to atone. He is convinced that all that he endures is his fault and due to himself.” (o.c., 79).

Or still, “How to address a deisidaimon? How help him? He sits there, out of doors, foolishly dressed in his ugly sack or girded with repulsive rags! Often he wallows unclothed in the mud, loudly confessing some faults, some omissions, which he has committed, - shouting that he has drunk this, that he has eaten that, that he has followed that path, against the permission of his daimon.” (o.c., 80).

Fr. Festugière adds “Ploutarchos invents nothing: the inscriptions confirm his assertions. We possess such public confessions engraved in stone? (ibidem). - Thus we understand that hedonic eudaimonists saw religion as a hateful source of afflictions and both the concept of God and religion, pick and choose purged from such excesses. Thus Epikouros.

- *Unbelief in the afterlife, Epikoureösch.* -

The belief in punishment in the afterlife is, in Hellas, very old: the nekaia or underworld visit, which Homer describes (Odusseia e.g.) everyone knew.

Thus Kéfalos, the father of Lusias, who confesses that he is tortured, the older he gets, by the fear that he will have to atone in the underworld for the mistakes he may have committed during his long life. (Festugière, Epicure, 81).

Thus the painters who made the Hades pains a favorite theme for their works of art (ibidem). - The soul, says Epikouros, carefully studied according to the fusiologia, the natural science, is subtle but mortal just like the body.

Done with the unsavory superstitions of the common man or the unenlightened intellectual.

Epicurean critique of astrotheology. -

As indicated on p. 122 supra (Platon's Epinomis) and p. 173 (astrology), after Platon a new intellectual religion emerges, star worship, which advocates theatricals:

(i) the celestial bodies establish an order in the universe and humanity that is immutable (the immutable, after all, is higher than the changeable, which comes into being and perishes!);

(ii) the celestial bodies are animated beings with powers of perception and reason, - thus they are personal deities. As Festugière, o.c., 106, says: such a religion, especially in midst where deisidaimonia prevails, gives rise to fear, hope, yes, but even more to despair and fatalism. - It is therefore understandable that Epikouros, always following the elective principle, supported by 'a natural science, also rejects that as pernicious and disquieting superstition. Astral religion presented itself as a high science. Epikouros sought to prove that it was false science, for:

a/ the heavenly bodies are but accumulated masses of "fire

b/ and ascents and descents, positions and eclipses of heavenly bodies and all such things "all that contributes in nothing to our eudaimonia" (o.c., 111).

Only accurate knowledge of nature and its system of causes redeems us from such superstition. - Epikouros saw in the astral gods "an even greater danger for eudaimonia than the traditional Olympian gods of popular belief, which were still influenceable by sacrifices, etc.: the Necessity they represent appalled him. - One does not forget that Platon and Aristotle were behind this new intellectual religion; that the Stoa in her way (she thought of them as impersonal powers in a Necessity-controlled universe) advocated this belief: Epikouros had to rebel against high authority.

Godlessness - but then as Epikouros conceived it - was the way out of such superstition. However, it contributed to viewing Epikourism as an atheism - which it was not at all in its core. There will be Epicureans who will draw that conclusion.

Conclusion. -

Cicero (-106/-43) says that Epikourism "animated the whole of Italy" and Epikourian epitaphs can be found in Italy, Gaul, Roman Africa ("I was not; I have been; I am not: I do not worry about it").

There was Lucretius (+/- -94/-55) with his masterpiece of poetic philosophy *De rerum natura* (On the nature of things), an exposition in verse of Epikouros' thoughts. The high point in Rome of Epikourism is under Emperor Augustus, to give way, under Tiberius and Nero (+14/ +68), to the later Stoicism. -

A. Lange, *Gesch. d. Mat.*, I, 143, notes: "Still the materialists of the last century - the XVIIIth - studied and absorbed Lucretius, and it is not until our days that materialism seems to have completely detached itself from the old traditions."

One sees how long the West was influenced by Epikouros.

III A(II). *The septic philosophies (-320/+200).*

Introduction. -

In this introduction (A) we will deal first with the political and then with the intellectual genesis of skepticism, and then (B) give a definition of terms with the necessary explanations.

(A) *The Genesis of Skepticism.* - Cf. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, pp.40/ 550, on the political causes, which, in summary, constitute the second great crisis-the first being the Sophist crisis.

(i) *The political causes.-The principal ones are as follows:*

(i)a. *The culturological cause.*

This is mainly of a comparative nature: Alexander's time and that of the Diadochen thereafter show a multitude of peoples with their different cultures, on a scale which far exceeds the comparative culturology of the Sophists. From Macedonia and Egypt to India, a horizon opens up which gives rise to 'relativization', i.e., to regard as relative (or relative) what was previously regarded as absolute (i.e., absolutized): one thinks of the other language and terms, the other customs, the other religions! The polis, for example, had always placed an 'absolute' trust in its gods and goddesses: its defense against the great monarchs (e.g. Alexander, the Diadochen) was considered 'absolute'. Alexander, the Diadochen) was always done in the name of those gods and goddesses; well, also the enemy had his gods and goddesses (an Alexander, who attached great importance to this, certainly): if now the polis loses against him, this is at the same time a victory of the gods and goddesses of the enemy and a defeat (with crisis of confidence) of its own gods and goddesses; - struggle between people was, then, struggle between two pantheons, i.e. two gods' entirety! To understand this, one reads Homer.

-- One lives in the soul of people like Purrhon of Elis (-360/-270), the later founder of the Old Scepticism, or of his teacher Anaxarchos of Abdera, nicknamed the Eudaimonikos (i.e. who emphasizes eudaimonia or (bliss) as the highest good), in, who, both, experienced Alexander's campaign in Anatolia, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Indusland (today's Afghanistan and Pakistan), to see what kind of "relativization" inevitably had to occur in their mentality. -

The religious crisis, just outlined, became even more profound, at least for the Hellenes, when Alexander allowed himself to be worshipped as the son of Zeus in -324; - this in the wake of his long and perilous journey, in the Egyptian desert, to the shrine of the god Amon, the high god of the Egyptians before, from -664 (destruction of Thebes (Eg.) by the Assyrian invaders) the god Osiris filled this function. There people had greeted him as Zeus' son (they equated Amon with Zeus), - him who was so concerned with the gods of foreign nations!

This Eastern model of government is going to divide the Hellenistic thinkers:

(i) Kallisthenès of Olunthos, 'a cousin of Aristotle; accompanied as

Alexander on his conquests: he started by describing him as Zeus' son, but, in -327, he opposed the introduction of the *proskunèsis*, *adoratio genuflexa*, in favor of the prince; this cost him his life and made the Peripatetic school definitively hostile towards Alexander; Kallisthenes was too much of a Hellenist to be able to cope with this deification;

(ii) compare with this the Anaxarchos of Abdera just mentioned, who was highly esteemed by the monarch and who, against the Hellenic mentality, did accept the deification, perhaps out of flattery.

(i)b. *The culturological cause*

This is, besides religious, also simply ethical, everywhere the princes are introducing *turannis*, the utter autocratic rule, which was so abhorred by the Hellenes, traditionally; consequence: brutal violence prevails, in Hellas and the conquered territories, especially by the gangs of plundering soldiers and the settlements between citizens; treachery, deceit, murder, torture, etc., are on the rise, much more than in the past. -

One thinks of the murder of Kallisthenes of Olunthos by Alexander and that of Anaxarchos of Abdera by the Kupriotic monarch Nikokreon!

-- Particularly shocking was Demetrios Poliorkètès (-336/ -283): flatteringly the Athenian People change the *nomos* (law, custom) so that this *turannos* might be prematurely initiated into the mysteries ('ordinations') of Eleusis ('an ancient, venerable institution in honor of Demeter); that people sings, in his honor, the *Ithufallos* (*ithus* = straight (up); *fallos* = 'sacred' penis; they wore 'sacred' penis during the *Bakchi* celebrations while singing the song, also called *ithufallos*); that same people sings:

"What Demetrios imposes is sacred to the gods, lawful for men!"; that people erect temples in honor of the courtesans and lovers of Demetrios, who, celebrating, takes up residence in Athens, where he sullies the temple of Athena in excesses by introducing orgiastic rites in Hellas, - public. He himself says aloud that, at Athene, not a single high-minded soul can be found anymore!

-- As already said (higher pp. 163, 179), *Stoa*, *Epikourism* and *Scepsis* belong to be situated in this shocking *Sitz im leben* (life situation) as reactions of people who try to save what can be saved in such a crisis situation.

-- It should also be noted that the rapid collapse of the (Persian) empire of the one who was called "the Great King" made clear the mutability and fragility of those old political structures, - which incited to venture of power and to distrust of populations.

(ii) *The intellectual causes.* -

These fall into two types, general and specifically skeptical.

(ii)a. *The general causes*

These are defined by P. Festugière, *La rev. d' Herm. Trism. I* (L'astrologie et les sciences occultes), Paris, 1944, pp. 7/9,

briefly outlined: he points to the very essence of Hellenic thought:

a/ in very limited but high-minded circles both experimental natural science (cf. supra pp. 168/169) and technical research in all kinds of fields were carried out; - with regard to technology, reference should be made to B. Gille, *Les mecaniciens grecs (La naissance de la technologie)*, Paris, 1980, especially pp. 54ss. (L'école d'Alexandrie), who points out that the scientific and technological spirit was not to be found in Athens but in the periphery, Ionia (Milesian mentality) and southern Italy and Sicily (Pythagorean mentality), and that this spirit lived on especially in Alexandria, designed by the urbanist Dinokritos of Rhodes, and on Rhodes; -- also, in addition to the aforementioned beta sciences, the solid humanities are practiced (cf. above pp. 166/167: alpha sciences);

b/1 Generally, however, Hellenic thought is, according to Festugière, very rhetorical, i.e. geared to a general education, useful in society; - one is thinking of the Attic spirit and Sophistics (p. 58/77 supra: Protosophistics; p. 123 (Isokrates) and Deuterosophistics (p. 164/166); - rhetoric has something superficial, too verbal, and showy not to arouse scepticism in so far as it does not itself arise from scepticism;

b/2 Alongside this is philosophy, which since Socrates and Platon (cf. above p. 96 (Pl. and rhetoric), has opposed this (hollow) rhetoric sharply; but, within philosophy, a duality arises again:

(2a) Periphrastic philosophy is, to speak with Polubios, 'pragmatic', i.e. close(er) to the facts - o.g. historia, inquisitio, research, following, with the Milesians. and it is akribès, subtilis, precise, with the Pythagorean and Pythagorean-Eleatic mathematicians (cf. supra pp. 167 (Milesian), 32/33, 168 (Pythagoric));

(2b) Attic philosophy, on the other hand, is particularly averse to business experimentation or calculation and is speculative (theoria) in attitude: what C.S. Peirce observed (vide supra p. 183), Festugiere also observes: "One quickly satisfied oneself with a superficial observation, in order to immerse oneself as quickly as possible in the method of the new constructions, which then suffered from the same defects as the previous ones one demolished. Thus all philosophical schools accused each other of misunderstanding the facts at the base." (o.c., 8). Festugière says there are two variants: one departed, so to speak, from sense perception but

a/ one departed from an ill-processed data to build dogmata on it - what the four great schools did, the Academy, the Peripatos, the Stoa and the Garden, - or

b/ one departed from the relativity of sensory experience to declare any dogmatization impossible, which is what the Scepsis did. (O.c., 8).

Although this value judgment of Festugière rather misses the profound influence of the Hellenistic philosophies and its reality character, still there is quite a bit of truth in his assertion: relatively experience- and control-free reason had too free a hand and became logomachia of delusional (especially Stoic) dogmatic or equally delusional (especially Pyrrhonic) skeptical allure.

(ii)b. *The more particular causes*

These are mentioned by Festugière, *La rev., II (Le Dieu cosmique)*, Paris, 1949, p. 344 (cf. supra p. 180: popular philosophy), viz. the diffusion and, immediately, leveling of culture and this twofold.

b1. The introduction of eisagogai, introductions, i.e. simplifying manuals of philosophy, with which most intellectuals are satisfied for the rest of their lives; -- Chrusippos from Kilikia (Anatolia) (-280/-207) began with the introduction of an Eisagogue, i.e. a catechism-like, easily understandable introduction to Stoic philosophy in a clear form; this second founder of the Stoa (i.e. the Elder) was first a student of the Neoist movement.) was first a pupil of the Neo-Academician Arkesilaos of Pitane (Aiolia) (-315/-240); then he followed Kleantes of Assos (-331/-232), the successor of Zenon of Kition in the Stoa, whom he himself succeeded in -232: Chrusippos set out to combat Academic skepticism and to build up with deep religious and heavy seriousness a multifaceted Stoic system.

b2. The one-sided use of doxographs (doxa = opinion; grafia = description) replaced the personal and direct reading especially of the Voorsocratic fusikoi; since these usually very dry and schematic descriptions of opinions amounted to cataloguing summaries, superficiality was encouraged instead of a personal thoughtful consideration of the data themselves. Thus all systems were, as it were, 'equalized'.

(ii)c. C. de Vogel, *Greek Phil., III (The Hell.-Roman. Period)*, Leiden, 1959, p. 187, indicates the precursors of the Scepticism of Purrrhon of Elis, the founder.

a/ *The pre-Socratics*

These decay into three types:

(a) the Paleo-Milesians (Th., Anaxima, Anaxime) and the Paleo-Pythagorians (V. Brochard, *Les scept. gr.*, 3) never qualify for cause for scepticism;

(b) a The Eleates, culminating in the Sophist Gorgias of Leontinoi,

b. the Herakliteans, culminating in Kratulos, 'an extreme Heraklitean, and in the Sophist Protagoras of Abdera and

c. the Mechanicists, especially the Atomists (Demokritos) ending with Metrodoros of Chios (fourth e. B.C.), who claims that "we know nothing, not even whether we know anything" and on Anaxarchos of Abdera (p. 214 supra) cited above, the outspoken skeptical companion of Alexander on his tours and the friend of Purrrhon of Elis, whose indifference he praises, prepare scepticism;

(c) *the Sophists*

(cf. Protosophistics higher pp. 58/77), who carry through the distrust of sensory experience of Eleates, Herakliteans, and Atomists to either theoretical doubting or even ethical-political doubting, without, however, achieving the stark rational justification or the equally stark indifference of the later, true Skeptics, set out nicely for thoroughgoing Skepticism, so that V. Brochard, *Les scept. Gr.*, 33, says: "Sophistics itself is far removed from true skepticism." Indeed, Purrhon of Elis, its founder, was even the open enemy of the Sophists (o.c., 46). Reasons:

(a) logical: they devote themselves to all 'technai', artes, arts (i.e. sciencespen without profound theoretical claims), while Purrhon is strange, indeed indifferent to these arts; they devote themselves to dialexeis, disputing; Purrhon is silent, averse to all dialectical discussion;

(b) physical: though averse to the physical, the Sophists used its achievements e.g. for education; Purrhon simply does not address it;

(c) ethical-Political: the Sophists were mostly keen on money, honor, glorious life, which was liberated, thanks to their subjectivism, from all kinds of conscientiousness, at least among the immoral among them; Purrhon lives poor, simple and austere, irreproachable, - beyond any political activity.

b/1 *Socrates* - cf. the Platonic dialogues - is strongly aporetic, i.e. inclined to aporia or desperation, undecidability as a result of his searching method; he is methodically more skeptical, not ideological, for he is a very dogmatic thinker (conceptualism).

b/2a. *The Great Socratics.*

These are similar to Socrates: Platon loves aporetic conclusions (he leaves the question open) and constantly seeks (methodical skepticism) the for and the against, although he is very dogmatic (idealism); Aristotle is equally aporetic: for and against are given their due; his induction theory, includes the "dialectic" (in his sense); i.e. the provisional induction without scientific value in the strict sense; yet he is dogmatic (hylemorphic conceptualism);

-- Socrates, Platon, Aristotle, all three are not rational; they are intellectualist, i.e. the contents of knowledge do not come only from the senses, but the intellect (nous, intellectus, reason, to be distinguished from dianoia, ratio, reason) gives, of itself, contents of knowledge which the senses can never provide (e.g. the generality of the concept of the universe). v. the generality of the concept; the comprehensive concept of being): their dogmatism is intellectualistic (which appears, with Platon, from the beyond the physical 'dialectic' (his metaphysics) and, with Aristotle, from the beyond the physical (= second philosophy) reaching first philosophy (his metaphysics).

b/2b. *The Lesser Socratics*

These have been influenced by Socrates' intellectualism, but go back to the skeptical Voorsocratiekers.

- *The dialectical Lesser - Socratics,*

At least the Megarics (Eukleides of Megara), connect Socratic ethics with Eleatic physics; well, this is 'monistic' in the sense that only the being is both conceivable and explicable and - yes - real, while the fisis with its multiplicity and mutability of forms (inorganic, organic, human and cosmic domains and 'being') is 'an illusion', - which promotes skepticism.

This rather negative ontology, as with Zenon of Elea, who introduced reasoning from the absurd, as also with Euboulides of Miletos, pupil of Eukleides of Megara, develops into eristics (= disputational techniques), - which calls into question the seriousness of the thinking. The influence of Parmenides, Zenon of Elea and Gorgias of Leontinoi can be felt here.

- *The ethical lesser-Socratics*

These are even more clearly on the way to skepticism.

(a) The Kunics, from Antisthenes of Athens onwards, certainly from Diogenes of Sinope onwards, the shameless ones, have, logically speaking, returned to a thinking that calls into question Socratic notions in the face of sensory impressions schematized by reason, while, ethically-politically speaking, by their cultural pessimism they undervalue the high intellectual work ethic and thus give rise to skepticism;

(b) The Kurenaikers are the clearest: Aristippos of Kurene, born cosmopolitan, eager to sit in the courts of the tyrants (e.g. with Dionusios of Surakousai, where he meets his opposite Platon (cf. supra pp. 88, 125), who is rather distrusted by Dionnsios, whereas he was loved by him because he knew how to make "something" out of every situation), is

a/ sensualist: Like Protagoras, he claims that we have no intellectual insights but only sense impressions as a source of knowledge; yet, differing from Protagoras, Aristippos claims that we know nothing about the things which reach us through those impressions: 'sweet'/'sour', 'hot'/'cold', 'white'/'black', etc. are pathè, passiones, states of ourselves (subjective states), but whether they represent an objective quality of the things outside us, is very much the question.

Reason: from that point of view people differ both from individual to individual (individualism) and from moment to moment (actualism)! Says Aristippos: "We are like a besieged fortress: isolated from the outside world!".

This means that the Kurenaeans are pure phenomenists: man, as a knowing being, does reach the fainomena, apparentia, the phenomena (that which immediately shows itself to our attention), but not the outside world, the cause of the impressions. We stand at the gate of real Scepticism.

b/ As Lange says, Aristippos is ethically a materialist: pleasure is the content of the eudaimonia,-in which he differs, of course, from Purrhon who is closer to the strictness of the Kuniekers and Stoiekers.

c/ The dogmatic materialisms always give rise to scepticism, however paradoxical this may sound: they only accept sensory experience and its reasonable processing (pure rationalism) without the light of reason as Socrates but especially Platon (theory of ideas with light metaphysical bias) and also Aristotle (though hylemorphically weakened) understood it, intellectualists as they were. -

That this is so is shown among others by the Stoics by their functionalism (see page 189 supra), i.e. the viewing of the behavior of the being without including their “being”, and by the Epicureans by their ambiguity consciousness concerning sensory impressions (incidentally, the last great Sceptics of antiquity, as e.g. Sextos Empeir, were the most important ones). e.g. Sextos Empeirikos, are to a great extent Epikoureans, drawing the skeptical conclusions from Epikourism).

(B) *The essence of Skepticism.* -

As V. Brochard, *Les scept. gr.*, 56, says, the disciples of Purrhon of Elis gave themselves names:

- skeptics, (skeptomai, I investigate by observing attentively, verifying, perceiving;
- the difference from the historia, inquisitio, investigation of the Milesians lies in the fact that the latter, close to the fusis, are absorbed in the information they inquire; the difference from the theoria of the Socratiekers lies in the lack of penetration to the higher principles of a metaphysical nature); they investigate ... endlessly;
- zetetics (zètèsis is searching): not finding they search ... endlessly;
- aporetics: desperate, indecisive they do not come to an agreement with a judgment;
- efectives: they suspend ... endlessly suspend their judgment; epochè, suspensio iudicii, suspension of judgment is an essential aspect of Skepticism: one does not judge. One sees that these four terms describe four aspects of Skepticism.

***General outline.* -**

One could say that, starting from the classical tripartite nature of the main subjects of philosophy, the skeptics remain stuck in the first, logic, to touch, minimally, the second, physical, and to become dogmatic in some way in the third, ethics-politics; reason:

a/ one can suspend judgment - at least outwardly. That one can do it for oneself, inwardly, is impossible: the light of reason is too strongly directed to conscience for that - one can, therefore, suspend one's judgment,

b/ but with regard to acting, praxis, this is impossible, because, even the omission is still a choice, a decision, both concerning the fusis of oneself and surrounding things and concerning the permissibility or impropriety of one's action. -

Conclusion: and physically and ethico-politically one acts in any case, though not 'theoretically', but in an all-hiding manner.

-- Further explanation.

- The word 'sofos', -è, -on, sapiens, wise (correspondingly also sofia, wisdom) is used, in Greek, for persons and for things: someone is or behaves wisely; something is 'sofon ti', aliquid sapiens, something wise', i.e. it bears witness to wisdom. -- Now, wisdom is

(a) logical: a man is wise, when his thinking is in agreement with reality; he is in the (logical) truth and not in the conscious lie or the unconscious mistake: the agreement, i.e. the one - one unambiguous relation, between his insight (information) and the corresponding reality, is there;

(b) physical

(metaphysical with Platon and Aristotle): the universe bears witness to 'wisdom'; - thus Socrates was - like many pre-socracy thinkers - convinced that the universe was purposefully ordered (teleology: Anaxagoras' Nous e.g. (p. 37 supra); Diogenes of Apollonia (p. 38 supra); etc.): the universe bears witness to sophia, wisdom; i.e. the nature of things responds to thought, insight; it is 'insightful', 'informed'; - which appears from the archè, principium, the principle that directs; in other words: the being and their movement are in the (physical) truth; there is a unified relation between a (preconstitutive) thought and (the constitution of) the things of fuis; -- this form of truth is called 'metaphysical' 'truth

a/ in the Platonic sense there where he says that the demiourgos (world-creator, ordering-power of the fuis) follows the ideas as a model to create order in matter and

b/ Aristotelian sense where Aristotle talks about the first philosophy (i.e. theology) as a model of the second philosophy;. -

Biblical writers and thinkers will (think St. Augustine) - say that God, following the ideas he carries within himself, created the world out of nothing (which then means that the world is 'true' in the metaphysical sense: it answers one - unambiguously to God's ideas);

(c) ethical-political:

Ht behavior, both ethical action and poietic (productive) making, corresponds to norms of reality; it testifies to 'wisdom' and truth, i.e. one - unambiguous relation between norm and behavior; -

So e.g. is someone sincere on the conscious level (his behavior, his words) according to the reality concerning conscience) and/or real (authentic) on the unconscious level (his behavior, his words correspond to his deeper nature and the deeper nature of the reality around him).

Well, the Skepticism, since always, but especially since Purrhon of Elis, is the crisis of those threefold truth and/or wisdom, which are the core of all humanity (not only of science or philosophy): this crisis is valuable as far as man was in the threefold untruth (un-wisdom); it is disastrous as far as this is not the case.

Content and Scope of Skepticism. -

After the general outline above, we are in a position to define the concept of scepticism.

(a) As stated above (supra pp. 61/62), in the fuis there is a duality, viz:

on the one hand, the fainomena, apparentia / visibilia (visas), the phenomena, i.e. the collection of all that, however it may be, sensory or intellectual, shows itself to consciousness in an immediate way, i.e. as being there without more, and in this sense undeniable (and therefore not susceptible to a/ searching, b/ indecision or c/ judgmental suspension); For example, someone accuses me in court; it gets dark; I feel pain in my foot, etc.; and,

on the other hand, the a.dela, in.visibilia (invisa), the invisible, hidden, i.e. not immediately given: this collection is the object of doubt, search, indecision and suspension of judgment.

-- This dichotomy is ancient:

(i) it forms the basis of archaic thought:

This thrusts forward from the immediately given to a/ 'mysterious' force (dynamism), b/ 'mysterious' soul(lichamacy) (animism) and c/ 'mysterious' Godhead (primordial monotheism); - to the 'mystery' in the fuis;

(ii) it forms the basis of philosophy in Hellas and beyond:

The thinker who both sensed and expressed this duality very early and very sharply is Herakleitos of Ephesus; for example, he says: "Nature likes to hide"; as an example of this, "Invisible harmony is stronger than visible"; as a practical corollary of this, "Men allow themselves to be deceived by reason of visible things and the knowledge of them." (Cf. G. Burckhardt, *Heraklit (Urworte der Philosophie)*, Wiesbaden, 1957, S. 22, 27, 8). -

This begins in Hellenic philosophy with the historia, personal research, concerning fuis: the Paleo-Milesians see behind the being, i.e. in their Sitz im Leben (situation and language) the visible and tangible things at the disposal of man, - behind the phenomena they see the archè, principium, the principle that governs that fainomena (water of Okeanos, unlimited, air).

After them, the three great tendencies are already more theoria, speculatio, contemplation: they see behind the phenomena either arithmos (number-form harmony, - Pyth.) or being (Parm.) or the opposites unifying Firelogos or -Heelalverstand (Herakl.).

Then the Mechanicists see behind the phenomena first of all one indivisible and uniform unity spread out in a 'number' (= multitude that gathers) of elements, which are either mathematically workable (Theon of Smurna, - cf. p. 31 supra) or materially divisible and transportable anyway (moderate Mechanicists and radical (Atomists)).

The Great Socialists see behind phenomena either understanding (Socrates) or idea (existence of something conceivable, - Pl.) or form (force governing genesis, - Ar.). The dogmatic materialists see behind the

phenomena either substance that lives and thinks in a godlike way (Stoa) or substance that is in principle purely mechanical, yet also “deviant” (Epikouros).

-- Versatility of phenomena as such -

The phenomena as such can be approached in more than one way. Three types of approach in particular are briefly outlined.

a/ The dilettantic approach:

Platon (Politeia 5:480) speaks of *filodoxia*, - a word which, normally, means desire for fame (like to be famous, - a tendency which typified many Hellenes), but which here means desire for phenomena: the *filodoxos* is a lover of phenomena and stands opposite the *filosophos*, the wisdom-bearer, sage.

I. Kant, the great critic of the ‘Aufklärung’, in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 1781-1,1787-2; also uses the word ‘philodoxy’ in the sense of dilettantism that raises philosophical problems but without the will to solve them scientifically and with general validity (cf. A. Lalande, *Voc. Techn. et crit. d.l. Ph.*, Paris, 1968-10, p. 771). This is a first superficial form of dwelling on the phenomena.

b/ The methodical approach can be understood in two ways:

b/1. professional science:

Here the distinction between phenomenon and ‘fact’ is situated;

(i) a fact is a phenomenon (‘an immediate and therefore undeniable fact’) but described and delineated as an observation fact and correctly formulated (P. Janet);

(ii) a phenomenon or phenomena is that same fact but in its first, vague approach, - descriptive; one thinks of the ‘phenomenology’ of P. Teilhard de Chardin who precedes his evolutionary interpretation of the phenomena (facts) with a description of the phenomena;

b/2. philosophical:

Here we find the phenomenology of E. Husserl who, as a first phase of the factual approach, suspends all theory, all interpretation, in order to record purely and simply, purely and simply, the appearing as such; in an analogous sense G. Hegel, last century, had already conceived his *Phänomenologie*;

- In both cases it is about more than philodoxy: it is about the first processing of the phenomena, i.e. the precise description of phenomena, but with the exclusion of everything which is not a phenomenon (descriptive philodoxy; one could say).

c/ The ideological prejudice or scepticism

This differs in a certain sense in nothing from the methodical except in the fact that it considers any further approach somehow irresponsible, indeed pointless: “(The skeptic is) he who, deliberately, for general reasons, doubts everything except phenomena, and holds on that twist.” (V. Brochard, *Les scept. gr.* p. 2). “This skepticism (...) does not know whether something is true and makes no judgment beyond the phenomena.” (ib.)

-- Here the distinction between methodical doubt and ideological doubt is situated.

a/ Methodical doubt was made world famous by R. Descartes (1596/1650) - le doute methodique - and by E. Husserl (1859/1938), who introduced this methodical doubt of more than phenomenal reality into his intentional phenomenology. What the ancients called epochè, suspensio iudicii, suspension of judgment, (concerning more than phenomena), since the Pyrrhonists, thus has a long after-effect, reaching into this century. The methodical doubter is sure of more, yet he rationally 'pretends' he is not sure. -

b/ The ideological doubt, if it is real and sincere, is the same but with inner uncertainty: it is the attitude of the one who has lost his (vital and rational) certainties; here there is no as if - attitude, one IS uncertain, one does not act uncertain!

-- *There are two kinds of certainty:*

the vital-existential certainty and the logical-rational certainty. Someone can be thoroughly convinced of the sincerity of his wife's love and yet not be able to prove this logico-rationally throughout his life; someone can be completely certain of God's existence and yet never be able to rationally justify this existence. - Doubt is also situated in two places: someone who doubts purely methodically, is vitally-existentially certain but not rationally-logically. Someone in a crisis of conviction has lost precisely this first, prelogical certainty: he doubts ideologically, even if he is convinced with masses of 'proofs'.

-- *There is an in-between kind:*

One can be inwardly certain and yet outwardly behave as uncertain! Among the so-called skeptics there must have been a number of such two-faced people: basically they are in bad faith (a theme developed by J.-P. Sartre). One can also be insecure inwardly and yet behave as sure outwardly! The inside and the outside do not always correspond unambiguously! But this is psychology and falls outside our research here.

-- Sometimes one defines methodical doubt by the word 'provisional' and says that ideological doubt is 'definitive': this is incorrect! For one can, if one finds no strict proof, doubt methodically all one's life, and one can, if one gets out of one's crisis of conviction, doubt only 'provisionally' and nondefinitely in the ideological way.

-- *Phenomenism, phenomenalism.*

The term 'phenomenology' seems to have been first used by the German Lambert (1728/1777). -- Phenomenalism means certainty about the phenomena but uncertainty, yes, unknowability of more than phenomenal realities, without however denying them (agnosticism concerning transphenomenal reality).

Phenomenism is the same but one denies even the existence of transphenomenal reality. -

--The real full skeptic is phenomenalist: he doesn't know!

So that phenomenology (description of phenomena) is here a central fact: phenomenology is always departing from the certain, unquestionable: the skeptic is always a phenomenologist; yet, by his phenomenism (the transphenomena are there but unknowable), moreover, by his phenomenism (the transphenomena are not there), he makes of his phenomenology or phenomenal description an ideology instead of an open method.

Skepticism is the closed phenomenology! It is also the maximum doubt and the minimum certainty, not methodical but closed, ideological. - It is an ideology because the skeptic a/ knows more and b/ offers this as proven rationally. Why?

1/ There is no one who does not transcend phenomena in one way or another: anyone who claims he does not and backs this up with 'proofs' is an ideologue; for he offers as proven what is unproven.

2/ This is clear from the history of Skepticism: all skeptics have a varying but minimal dogmatic disposition; yes, they can be divided into "schools", precisely because of the minimal dogmatism they SHOW. - Basically, Skepticism is therefore always in a minimal way "bad faith" (one does not (quite) mean it)! - One sees Hellenic Skepticism evolving from maximum skepticism to ever greater yet varied dogmatism, - so untenable is so-called full skepticism.

(b) *The ambiguity of skepticism according to its extent.*

Skepticism can be described according to its extent:

a/ The so-called universal doubt is 'a merely methodically pronounced word or lie: one simply cannot doubt the phenomena! Unless in words!

b/ The doubt is therefore always private: one always doubts well-defined parts, domains of the fuis.

-- The question arises: how does one arrive at the word "universal doubt"? This does not come from the things and processes around us, but from the subject that we are. Already the ancients came up with the following "facts" again and again: the dream (especially at night), drunkenness, insanity especially show us that a person can get into a state in which the distinction between phenomenon and nonphenomenon blurs to such an extent that he mixes up appearance and reality and this in an honest way. However, two remarks:

(i) a dream, a drunkard's or an insane person's reality is as certain as a phenomenon can be; it is something else to situate it in the whole of fuis: only there does it appear that this "reality" was not the kind of reality for which it was taken, within the limits of those states (which does not prevent it from being a reality without question);

(ii) these types of error one extends to the whole life of consciousness: if only the whole of life were such a 'state' hidden from us? A dream all through life; a drunkenness or a madness all through life?

It is this irresponsible induction (generalization) that gives the impression that the whole consciousness of man is within 'an aberration or 'an ignorance. from the part (singular or private) one concludes to the whole (universal). -

How easily one applies this, at least to one's fellow man, is shown in Mk 3:1/35: "Then Jesus went home, but the crowd gathered again so that they could not even eat: when His relatives heard this, they went in to arrest Him, saying, 'He is insane!' But the scribes, who had come from Jerusalem, said, "He is possessed of Beelzebub, and devils he casts out by the prince of devils." Jesus called them to Himself and spoke to them in parables, "How can 'a satan cast out Satan?"

"To label someone as insane - that is what the Hellenes and Jews did - to label someone as possessed - that is what the Jews most certainly did - is to label him as utterly alienated from himself. The same can be seen in the amazing ease with which intellectuals today write off as schizophrenic someone whom they do not understand (someone with an "alternative" view). One sees that the skeptical problem is old and recent. -

Yes, it is this mania for writing off fellow men who think and act in an alternative way as alienated from themselves and reality that Jesus, loco citato, denounces: "Wrathful, Jesus turned his gaze over them - apparently the Pharisees and scribes - grieved at the blindness of their hearts (in Greek: Porosis, hardening, callousness, petrification), and said to the man (with the withered hand): 'Hold out your hand! This one stretched it out and his hand was healed. Thereupon the Pharisees went and immediately conspired with the Herod followers against Him, to bring Him down."

In other words, the good that Jesus did - on the Sabbath - was a sufficient reason for His opponents to eliminate Jesus! That Jesus calls such 'blinding', 'hardening' of the heart, i.e.. A dazed self-awareness, is not surprising. The good that Jesus does, they label as evil: one of the many applications of what Diogenes Laertios, speaking of Homer, says: "(...) interpret the same subjects in different opinions" (see page 61 supra).

-- *Now a word about private doubt.* -

As is understandable, the Skeptics focus sometimes on this transphenomenal theme and sometimes on another transphenomenal fact.

(a) *As to the physical:*

Aristippos of Kurene (supra p. 219) e.g. doubts the real existence of the external world (consciousness is a 'fortress' isolated by siege); but so does (L. Berkeley (1685/1753), starting from the enlightened empiricism (for him only the inner and immaterial world existed); for materialists like Demokritos, Zenon of Kition and Epikouros only matter exists, if necessary subtly conceived, but no immaterial reality (which A. Comte and the positivists e.g. continue.

What, of course, is very susceptible to denial or epochè, judgment suspension, is the deity. One thinks of the ‘criticism’ of the philosophers - from Xenophanes of Kolofon (see above p. 13) - of the popular gods and goddesses, who had an archaic reputation. 13) - on the folk-gods and -goddesses, who were an easy prey for the educated as the folk-religion was not based on a physical body; one thinks of the criticism of Karneades of Kurene, the Neo-Academist, with his criticism on the (Stoian) gods; on the mantis as well he aimed his arrows: what is cheaper than criticism on paranormal phenomena? -- What, of course, was also the target of skepticism was the concept of “causality”: the relationship “cause-effect” or, conversely, “effect-cause” was criticized by Ainesidemos of Knossos (Crete).

(b) As to ethics-politics,

One may think of the criticism by Karneades of Kurene of the concept of justice, especially in the sense of physical or natural law, or of the concept of ‘eudaimonia’ in one sense or another interpreted as. -

(c) As to logic,

There, of course, is the concept of truth, certainty and no less the existence of concepts, ideas or forms, as well as of arithmoi (numerical forms) as entities with their own independent status from matter, -- which in ethico-politics has its repercussion on the concept of “norm” or rule of conduct, and in the physical on the concept of “natural law” as regulating power of the movement of entities. Parallel to that the telos orientation (purposefulness) in physical and ethico-politics (one defends most easily the coincidence and the capriciousness (tuchè, fortuna) e.g.).

To sum up: the last skeptics, especially Sextos Empeirikos, attack not only the three main subjects of philosophy, but also the mathèmata or learning subjects of the (Alexandrian) enkuklios paideia, general education, (grammar, rhetoric,- geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy). This is justifiably called ‘systematic’ Skepticism: what Hellas had built up thinking and feeling, is gnawed at the root. One might call this the collection of all private criticisms.

-(C) The subjectivism of Sophistics. -

What relationship exists between Skepticism and subjectivism? Protagoras signifies a great, decisive turning point in the history of Greek philosophy. He is the first who no longer started from the ‘object’, the external nature, but from the ‘subject’, the spiritual being of man. In this he is, unmistakably, a forerunner of Socrates.” (A. Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, I, S. 57).

Others, too, from a different angle, make the same observation: “One knows (...) how Greek Sophistics rests at once:

1/ on a criticism of the knowledge of the senses, by pointing out the delusions of the senses and

2/ on a critique of the general concept or idea, - it was said then that the general

a/ stood outside the continuous movement of phenomena as well as

b/ outside the singular realities, which are the only real ones. - What does this twofold critique amount to?

It follows, first, that we have certainty only in respect of subjective realities - thoughts, images, sensations, etc.; second, that objective realities may well be simple illusions. There is only one world that is certain: the world of the subject; consequently, man is the measure of all things.” (R. Jolivet, *Les sources de l’ idealisme*, Paris, 1936, pp. 205/ 206).

-- How strongly these three aspects are related -

a/ mistrust of sensory experience (we regularly err when we hear, see, touch, taste, smell, etc.), and a/ mistrust of the senses (we regularly err when we hear, see, touch, taste, smell, etc.). (hearing badly, misjudging; - disagreement between people who smell, see, taste the same...)

b/ the belief that the general can never be found in things, which are always individual,

c/ the conviction that only our inner experiences are certain (the ‘subject’) -, this coherence even appears from Platon: the general is not to be found in (but outside and above the sensory things, but in the ideas (to which the sensory things ‘participate’): Well, these universal ideas are not found by man in the outside world around him but in his soul: by entering into himself (the ‘subject’) the ideas are awakened; - of course it is not Protagoras’ subject (which is only a bundle of ‘sense impressions’) but the Platonic soul which, in a previous life and in another, higher world, has given the ideas (d. i. the universal insights into things) has beheld,... but still: the ‘subject’ weighs strongly!

a/ Distrust in the senses,

b/ the conviction that the universal can never be found in the things around us, and

c/ the impression that only the inner world is ‘certain’,

these three, in different ways, are present together both with Protagoras and with his convinced opponent, Platon. (Cf. O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus, I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus)*, Braunschweig, 1907², S. 441).

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Aristotle sees that problem and solves it with his theory of abstraction (o.c., 550/552): the general ‘forms’ (= ideas) are in the sensory things and our knowledge is both sensory and transcendental at the same time, external and internal at the same time. That is hylemorphism. Thus Aristotle avoids the temptation of phenomen(al)ism, - no matter how phenomenological he begins, i.e. how he attaches to the phenomena and their description as a certain basis. -

Thus we understand how the Platonic Academy could shift to skepticism, while the Peripatetics evolved to professional science. -- What conclusions flow from the subjectivism of Protagoras (and indeed from all subjectivism, including that of a Platon)

i/ Subjectivism is a kind of relativism.--

A. Lange, *Gesch. d. Mat.*, I, 58, points this out: “The statement ‘Something is’ always needs a more precise precision: ‘a relation to what that something is or becomes’. Otherwise, nothing has been said. Likewise, Büchner (185 supra) says - in order to make the ‘thing in itself’

to contend that “all things exist only for each other and mean nothing without mutual relations” and, still more accurately, Moleschott (185 supra): “Without relation to the eye into which it sends its rays, the tree is not there.” In other words, with these two nineteenth-century materialists, that Subjectivist relativism still lives on:

a/ For Demokritos, the Atomist, the atom was an idea he had conceived, starting from the sensory perception, but it was a “thing in itself” (it really existed, independently of his subjective representation of it, in him);

b/ For Protagoras the atom was first of all an idea of Demokritos but it was highly doubtful whether it existed “in itself” (see page 23: Parmenides’ catholic he-auto); for in his case a kind of phenomenism is already taking root which says: “to be is to be for someone (subject), namely as a phenomenon”! -- Which does not prevent Protagoras from consistently pushing that phenomen(al)ism (and thus becoming dogmatic). But that is exactly what the Sceptics will do, in Aristippos’ style (the besieged fortress of the ‘I’).

ii/ Subjectivism is ‘a kind of humanism (anthropocentrism), -

And it is well ‘in individualistic humanism. - If, in the first instance, we do not reach things in themselves, but only the (sensory) perception of them, locked up in our Aristippean fortress as we are, then the center of the whole fisis lies not in the cosmos around us, but in us (in the ‘subject’, as one says in modern terms).

“Most characteristic of the philosophy of Protagoras are the following tenets of his sensualism:

(1) man is the measure of all things, - of the being concerning the fact that they are there, - of the nonbeing concerning the fact that they are not there;

(2) mutually contradictory statements are equally true. (...) Man is the measure of things, i.e. it depends on our findings how things appear to us and this ‘appearance’ - here to be understood as ‘proving’, showing itself, though with an undertone of always possible error - is the only thing given.

Thus not man according to his general and necessary qualities, but each individual at each individual moment is the measure of all things.” (A. Lange o.c., 58). -- This recalls Herakleitos of Ephesus:

“The awakened - i.e., those people who, like himself, have gone through a process of consciousness - have a world (cosmos) that is one and common, while the fallen asleep, each for himself (hekaston), merge into a solitary (idion) (world)”;

“It is appropriate to follow the common: although the Logos is common, yet the many - think of the ones who have just fallen asleep - live as if they had a self-willed (idian) mind” (G. Burckhardt, *Heraklit*, Wiesbaden, 1957, S. 4; 6).

Before subjective individualism existed, Herakleitos typified it. Cf. Epikouros’ ideology (single-minded doctrine).

Overview on the major Scepticisms.

(II)A. Pyrrhonism.

(i) *The life of Purrhon of Elis (-360/-270).* -

He was poor, learned to paint but was only mediocre as an artist. His teachers were Bruson of Herakleia (Pontos), a sophist, probably a pupil of Eukleides of Megara, and, later, Anaxarchos of Abdera, the Eudaimonian, a Demokriterian, with whom he took part in Alexander's campaigns. On Alexander, Purrhon made a poem, by which he earned ten thousand gold pieces. In the Induslands (+/- present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan) he got to know the *gymnosophistai*, naked wisdom le-rraars, among whom he may have met Kalanos, the *gymnosophist* who came along with Alexander until he died, proudly and courageously, "a voluntary death.

"It may be assumed that such events made a deep impression on Pyrrho's mind and determined, at least in part, the turn his thinking would later take." (V. Brochard, *Les scept. gr.*, 53).

On his return from Indusland, Alexander, thirty-three, in -323, in Mesopotamia, contracted a fever and died. Whereupon Purrhon returns to Elis. There he lives in all simplicity and regularity, acquires the esteem of his fellow townsmen, who appoint him high priest and, after his death, think of him with a statue, which Pausanias, traveler and geographer (p. 167 supra), +/- -150, still mentions as to be visited. Except the poem on Alexander he wrote nothing, but we know his teachings from his pupils.

(ii) *The doctrine of Purrhon.* -

Three things are important, says Purrhon:

a/ what is the being of the *pragmata*, i.e. the actual being of the *fusis*?

b/1 what *tropos*, attitude, should we adopt towards them?

b/2 what will be the result for those who behave in this way? With these last two questions we are in the eudemonically conceived ethics-politics.

(ii)a. *Logic.* -

Pyrrho is a radical logical pessimist, as P. Sertillanges, *Le problème du mal*, Paris, 1948, p. 97, says: he is such an enemy of evil - physical and ethical - that he does not want to hear either good or evil spoken of (aphasia, speechlessness); convinced as he is of the fact that especially thinking with its questions poisons eudaimonic life, he attacks thinking itself at the root.

The *doxa*, the opinion, i.e. the dogma or conception which man forms about the *fusis* while thinking, - this is the root par excellence of all evil. "Banish opinion about nature, and ye banish evil!" Father Sertillanges expresses it strongly, but there is truth in it:

a/ sensory knowledge-the only one we have (sensualism)-gives us only "phenomenal" knowledge (phenomenism);

b/ the *sensus communis*, the established opinion, based on it, is worthless as a dogma: the aphasia, not saying anything about it, is the form of *epochè* or suspension of judgment which Purrhon upholds, which he does not even justify theoretically.

(ii)b. *Physics.* -

Purrhon's closed phenomenology leads to an aversion to all logomachia

(a/ Sophistic dialexis and eristics, b/ Platonic Stoic or Epicurean physical based on reasoning) concerning the fuisis: what is certain is that I belong to say, "That wall is white; this honey is sweet". But: is that wall 'in itself' (kath'heauton) white? Is that honey 'in itself' sweet? The 'being' of wall and white, of honey and sweet is unknown!

"I describe nothing (Ouden horizo, nihil definio)", "Nothing is graspable (katalèpton)", "Neither yes nor no", - these were his sayings. - Reason: everyone is in the (Aristippean) fortress of his' self! The fuisis of the wall is white for the sighted, yet colorless for the blind; the fuisis of the honey is sweet for the normal taste, yet different or nothing for the not - normal. The same theme leads to more than one doxa, dogma opinio and, what is more, there is antilogia (= isostheneia) equivalence of opposing opinions. Consequence: indecision concerning the fuisis.

(ii)c. *Ethics-politics.* -

Purrhon's closed phenomenology leads to a peculiar ethics. An epitaph of 'a Pyrrhonist reads "It is I, Meneklès, the Purrhonian, who considers all that men say as equivalent, and who has established, among men, the way of ataraxia, undisturbedness." (P. Levèque, L'aventure grecque, 456).

Not like the Sophists, who are committed to the polis, yet indifferent Purrhon responds: the adiaphoria (indifferentia, indifference) applies to the value - judgments.

Rule: there is no amenable fuisis of things or deeds; there is only nomos (law, custom, established opinion). Application: honorable/ shameful, right/ wrong, good/ evil are not based on fuisis but on fainomena and nomos. -

This indifference turns into apatheia, insensitivity - think of the Kunish and especially Stoic insensitivity (supra p. 194) - : the 'wise' (the ideal since the Paleo-Milesians) is both indifferent and insensitive, if he wants to reach the eudaimonia. -- Thus he reaches the ataraxia, the undisturbed, the ideal of many Hellenistic people.

-- The question arises: from where did Pyrrho ever get this 'a complete inner peace radiating indifferentism? The Kunics were the same, but too presumptuous and too prancing. The Stoickers, in their most successful specimens, were like that too, but at the cost of effort (ponos) and falseness. -

The lessons of Bruson and Anaxarchos brought him halfway; the gymnosophists did the rest. (Thus V. Brochard, o.c., 74).

-- Yet a question arises here. Apuleius of Madauros (Africa) (+125/after +170) rhetor (deuterosophistick), gives in his' n Florida a sketch of the gymnosophists: they are no herders, traders or warriors; their specialty is sapientia, wisdom, practiced by masters and pupils (magistri, discipuli). Well, this wisdom has as an attribute a deep aversion to physical or mental inertia.

Apuleius gives examples: before the young people go to table, the masters ask “what good they have done” since sunrise. One answers that he has reconciled two quarreling fellows and removed suspicion from their hearts. Another that he has obeyed his parents. A third that his own thinking or the discourse of others has taught him something. The one, however, who cannot present a good deed, has no right to food and is expelled from the building to work without food. Cf. P. Vallette, *Apulée (Apologie et Florides)*, Paris, 1971, pp. 130/132. -

Did Purrhon see this type of gymnosophist or an even more worldly type (like Kalanos) and did he interpret them according to his personal nature? In any case the frame of thought is Hellenic with Purrhon, if Indian slant is possible.

- Politics. -

Pyrrho “expects nothing, hopes nothing, believes in nothing. And yet: he lives like those who do believe and hope.” (V. Brochard, o.c., 73). Skepticism, expressed in ‘a closed phenomenology, goes hand in hand with practical dogma! Like all opinionless people, he is conformist; he lives like everyone else. The *sensus communis*, the established custom, is his actual rule of conduct concerning

- (i) morals: his’ morality was that of a quiet fellow citizen;
- (ii) laws: his ‘righteousness was worthy of those of others;
- (iii) religion: he accepted a priestly task in the community.

- He liked to be alone, in deserted places, and was rarely seen at home. One day he was caught talking aloud to himself; questioned about this he said, “I am thinking about the means of becoming a good person.” His indifference to what people think is shown by the following:

With his sister Filista, a midwife, he collaborates, if necessary, in the kitchen in the cleaning of the utensils or the washing of the sow; or, on occasion, he goes to the agora (market) to sell court fowl and suckling pigs himself. But still further he drove indifference: when one went away, if he was speaking, he spoke on! Yes, one day his friend Anaxarehos of Abdera, the eudaimonian, got into a swamp: without giving any help Purrhon continued on his way. He was blamed, but Anaxarchos defended Purrhon’s indifference! This looks like dogmatic indifference with a skeptical preface.

(iii) Pyrrho’s immediate pupils.

These again valued thought work in itself. Thus Timon of Flious (Argolis) (-325/-235). This Fliasian was poor by birth, earned his living by dancing, took lessons from Stilpon the Megarician and in Elis he met Purrhon, whose follower he became. To make a living he traveled around as a Sophist and once he was well enough, he lived independently in Athens. In his *Silloi* (Mock Poems) he ridiculed all dogmatists; in his *Indalmoi* (Thoughts) he defended skepticism and broke down all dogmatism. -- This Physician,

mocked by nature, excelled in hostility toward Arkesilaos of Pitane, the founder of the Neo-Academic Skepticism, who was a gentle and very kind man: one day Arkesilaos asks Timon why he had returned from Thebes. Answer: "To look at you and laugh at you!". Later, however, Timon reconciled with him and after his death gave a laudatory eulogy to Arkesilaos.

(iv) General conclusion. -

The mentality of Pyrrhonism can be typified twofold:

a/ in the spirit of the Milesians and especially of the Atomist Demokritos, they are sensualist in attitude: empirically they examine the sensory data and, if established thereon, the prevailing mores and attitudes;

b/ they are highly effective, i.e. in their 'superstition' (= closed phenomenology) to the phenomena they are agnostic towards all transphenomenal data. Cf. V. Brochard, *Les sc. gr.*, 96/97. -

We say "phenomenistic superstition in the phenomena": does not W.-E. Hocking, at the time prof at Harvard University, that it is not religion that is credulous towards the phenomena of *fisis*, but irreligion; indeed, that it is precisely religion that responds invincibly incredulous towards the phenomena (W.-E. Hocking, *Principes de method en philosophie religieuse*, in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 29:4 (oct.-déc. 1922), p. 453).

Indeed, W. Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, p. 11, rightly points out that the Scepticism is the only Hellenic philosophy, which has no theology. The 'philodoxy', the adherence to the phenomenal to the exclusion of the extra-phenomenal, that is both the discussion strength and the vital-ethical weakness of Scepticism.

(II)B. The Neo-Academic Skepticism.

(i) Introduction. -- The Older Academy has a series of school leaders: Speusippos (-347/ -338), Xenokrates (-338/-314), Polemon (-314/ -269). Other Paleo-Academians include Herakleides of Pontos (-390/ -310), Krantor of Soloi (Kilikie) (-335/ -275) - the intimate friend of Polemon (of Athens), Krates of Thebes (-365 -285), who was a Kuriaker, and of Arkesilaos of Pitane (-314/ -240), who was his brilliant student.

-- The New Academy or Neo-Academic Skepticism

This is classifiable as follows:

a/ Second Academy (Arkesilaos of Pitane, school leader from -265); -

b/ Third Academy (Karneades of Kurene (-214/ -129; whose successors included Kleitomachos of Carthage (-187/ -110), the sternly skeptical disciple of Karneades (who left no writings), who published Karneades' thoughts in many books and, gravely ill, committed suicide)): onward:

c/ Fourth Academy (Philon of Larissa (Thessaly) (-160/ -80), who teaches that the being is not Stoic but knowable in itself and thus dogmatizes). school leader from -110);

d/ Fifth Academy (from -88 school leader is Antiochos of Askalon (-130/-120), Old academic but in eclectic manner.

This is about the Second and Third Academies, replacing Old dogmatism with ‘an Academic liberality and critique.

(ii) Arkesilaos of Pitane (-314/-240). -

Studies at Athens, first with Theophrastos of Eresos (-372/-288), the first successor of Aristotle at the Lykeion, then with Krantor of Soloi, just mentioned. This Krantor his intimate friend, made him, later his whole property over. Probably he knew Pyrrhon of Elis.

(ii)a. Logic. -

With Arkesilaos we are faced with a polemical Scepticism: all the schools of the day, especially the Stoics and the Epicureans, insisted on securing a so-called *kritèrion*, criterion, test of truth (in the logical sense of “correspondence between conception and reality”). -

The Stoa, against whom Arkesilaos first addressed himself, claimed that there was, among the types of sensory perceptions, one which they called *fantasia katalèptikè*, reality representation. This cataleptic representation is so convincing, so irresistibly obvious, so manifest, that it should be given priority as a criterion of truth, well distinguished from all other perceptions which are not so convincing and therefore questionable. - Arkesilaos countered that mistaken perceptions were equally ‘convincing’ in certain situations.

Consequence: the ‘convincing character’ of some Stoic representations is not a safe criterion of truth. One supposes that he appealed to the illusions of dream, drunkenness and insanity, which appear very convincing and as ‘real’ to the dreamer, the drunk and the insane. (Cf. V. Brochard, o.c., 107).

But Arkesilaos went on: the Pyrrhonists, noting that the truth, in fact, had not yet been found, did not, in their factic (purely fact-based) agnosticism, rule out finding it; Arkesilaos argues that for every “true” (“convincing”) representation, one can find another, untrue, which appears equally “true,” works equally “convincing.

Consequence: he is not only factually agnostic; he is fundamentally agnostic: not only is truth not found, it is untraceable.

Consequence: not only does he apply the Socratic-Platonic searching method; he applies the Pyrrhonic Scepticism, but with Socratic-Platonic means.

(ii)b. Ethica - politika.-

Here Arkesilaos is more dogmatic: he accepts ‘a criterion viz. the eulogon, the reasonable. The duty is that which is eulogon, reasonable. That duty is the way to eudaimonia. - Here he sets himself against the Pyrrhonist, who simply adhered to custom and law, conformist; no, Arkesilaos relies on insight, personal insight from case to case. What then appears as eulogon is rule.

Arkesilaos' method consisted of not putting anything forward himself, not answering a question, but like Socrates but a Pyrrhonian Socrates - dealing with all possible subjects that interlocutors brought up: he let the others speak as much as possible and then sceptically undermine them.

For example, someone said, "Pleasure is the highest good (eudaimonia)." That made him immediately argue against it! But practically - for himself - he was obliged to call the action with serious reasons eulogon as 'duty'. -

One has daubed his private life, though probably with much slander. He was rich, very gifted, yes, beautiful in appearance. He was successful, especially with the youth who gathered around him, even though he dared to tell them the harsh truth. He was good at heart: one day he learned that Apelles of Chios was ill and without means of subsistence; coming to visit him, he saw the situation and said with humor, "One sees here only the four elements of Empedokles, - fire, air, water and earth, and thou, thou liest not well." As he put the pillow in order, he slid under it a money belt containing twenty drachmas. Apelles' helper discovered the amount and said, "That is such an artifice of Arkesilaos!" His former teacher of mathematics, Hipponikos, went insane: Arkesilaos took him into his home and cared for him until he was completely cured.

Conclusion:

putting things and their nature in parentheses, Arkesilaos focused, like the Sophists, on the logically sound character of the assertions of others, yet with a result similar to that of the logical empiricists (i.e. British logical atomism, the logical or neo-positivism of the Wiener Kreis, and the Anglo-Saxon logical or linguistic philosophies of language):

"Certainly, thought has taken a curious step in renouncing the consideration of the nature of things in order to be interested in the meaning of words. It amounted to renouncing metaphysical phantoms in order to occupy oneself with linguistic realities. But, apart from that, the concept of meaning is no less illusory than the concept of being. " (L. Vax, *L' empirisme logigue*, Paris, 1970, p. 69).

Analogously, Arkesilaos states:

a) well, there is no criterion of truth that has generally valid prescriptive value,
b) but to which criterion of truth do the destructive ones of Arkesilaos himself correspond? He too cannot present a criterion for his own assertions 'against' dogmatism, except the dogmatic eulogon, "it is reasonable to assume that.

(iii) *Karneades of Kurene (-214/ -129).* -

He is the founder of the Third or strictly new *Academica*. As teachers he had Hègèsinos, third successor of Arkesilaos, as well as Diogenes of Babylon (-240/ -152, 'n Oud-Stoieker (his teacher in dialectics). He thoroughly studied the writings of Chrusippos the Kilician (cf. 206 supra).

His life has only one public act: together with the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, and the Peripatetikus Kritolaos of Faselía (Lukia), who reintroduced metaphysical contemplation in the Lukeion, he formed an Athenian envoy to Rome in -156/-155 to undo a fine imposed by Rome. Growing old, he became gravely ill and wasted away. Against the Stoic objection that he lacked the courage to commit suicide he brought up: “The fúsis that formed me will also know how to destroy me!”.

(iii)a. Logic. -

His theory of knowledge and theory of thought exhibit, for the first time in the Skeptical midst, in addition to a negative, deconstructive criticism, a positive, constructive part (the probabilism).

He states:

a Universally valid criterion of truth does not exist. Reason:

a/ the senses are insidious (think of the stick in the water looking broken (which in reality is not broken); think of the pigeon’s neck plumes which, once in the sun, show ‘a spectrum of color);

b/ reason is just as fallible. Moreover, what can a criterion of truth be but an ‘Athos,’ a state of mind that springs from the enargeia, evidentia, apparentness?

Well, there is no convincing representation beside which one cannot put another, untrue representation that looks equally convincing, at least within certain limits. Karneades refers to the phantoms of the dream, to the hallucinations (false perceptions) of the inebriate and of the insane. More to the point, outside of any dream state, intoxication or insanity, the discrimina (discretio, distinction) of the normal inebriated person in waking state is prone to error.

Proof: twins that are not distinguishable (discriminable); two eggs, two grains, two hairs, - how will one distinguish them infallibly? Well, once one is mistaken, what guarantee does both sense and reason have of knowing themselves infallibly?

Consequence: people who do not take this fallibility into account, constantly making what is called a “light judgment. This is the fundamental error of dogmatists, who, relying on a supposedly universally applicable criterion, think they can make infallible judgments. Fallibilism is Karneades’ conclusion. Consequence: epochè suspend judgement.

b/ But it is not so simple: one has to believe, one has to act! Instead of the eulogies of Arkesilaos, Karneades introduces the pithanon, the probable. Karneades recognizes the legitimacy of some beliefs, dogmata. This position is called probabilism (Lt: probabilis = probable).

The fallibility of the senses and reason should not prevent us from believing in probable observations and reasoning. The fantasia pithanè is its convincing (probabilis) degree - Z ‘n pro-and-contra method made all philosophies come across as equally valid (divisio Carneadea). Which prepared eclecticism.

Apart from the convincing character of observation, there is a double aspect to the substitute criterion Carneades proposes instead of the objective truth of dogmatists.

(i) *The Gestalt character of perception,*

Let us say its unity in multiplicity: if I see Socrates, for example, I see at the same time his face, the size of his stature, his philosopher's robe; I hear him speak; - at the same time I see the things in which he is situated, the air, the (sun)light, the earth on which he walks, the sky space; I see his friends. These circumstances form a coherence: if one is missing, it diminishes the 'convincing' character of the observation, to which no aspect may be noted that is in flagrant contradiction to the whole. --

(ii) *The detailed character of the observation:*

The detailed examination ascertains this associative aspect of the Gestalt. For example, a man who is pursued by an enemy suddenly notices a cave; on approaching it, he thinks, in a first impression, that an enemy is in it; for lack of time, he avoids it (appearances suffice); if he has time and enters it, he notices, e.g. A rolled-up bar: his first impression is that of a snake; but, on closer inspection, he sees no movement, in winter, when the snakes are fossilized, he will be doubly careful; the test (kriterion) is e.g. to strike that 'bar'/'snake' with a stick.

Conclusion:

a/ Carneades is a subjectivist (closed phenomenologist), because, for him, the human soul is 'a (Aristian) fortress, isolated from the outside world;

b/ Nevertheless, there is a moderation on the practical level: the **a/** convincing, **b1/** structural (Gestalt) and **b2/** detailed (associative) character offers a useful criterion.

Behold Carneades' skeptical certainty theory.

Consequence: given the non-coercive character (the merely probable character) of observations, man is free. Carneades underlines the non-necessary character of man's agreement with his observation.

(iii)b. *Physical.* -

Cf. pp. 191/192 supra, where the Stoic doctrine of fisis is expounded:

a/ the material fisis is 'a hylozoic hee1; **b/** with 'a Heraklitean Fire Logos omnipresent in it; **c/** this Fire Logos is divine: in Zeus he is conceived personally and his aspects (functions) are given the names of popular polytheism (Athens, Dionusos, etc., which, for the Stoa, are "allusions" (symbols), not really personal realities as for the mythical folk religion); **d/** this multi-aspect Firelogos directs the universe purposefully and to the best of ends. -- well, Carneades disavows that Fire Logos and finalism and optimism.

- Carneades opposes the fisis as the work (the sign) of a high power, which is "wise", i.e. here providential (and among other things, teleologically or finalistically inclined): **a/** the orderly character (e.g. of the seasons, of the heavenly bodies - cfr. astrotheology), **b/** the character directed to the welfare of man or even of every being, - Carneades as unproven, indeed, as contrary to the data (e.g., the paradoxical assertion of the Stoa that diseases, disasters, harmful animals, etc. "for the good of man" are there).

Karneades opposes the “gods” (der Stoa especially, but his reasoning speaks much more generally) as “inhabitants” (of a higher, man-transcending (- cf. p. 185 on the Stoic God proofs) nature) of the universe: his objection, - personal opinion or not? His favorite pupil, Klitomachos, never succeeded in ascertaining Karneades’ personal opinion, - such was his sophistic redoubt and contestation. -

His objection is: “De fuis is sufficient to explain everything” (to understand: without gods or higher influences, - whereby he does not hesitate to appropriate a *sumptheia* concept which, on a cosmic level, is the echo of his Gestalt conception of perception, but with the impression that the universal interaction is then real and active after all).

Is it in this sense that, just before his death, he said, “The fuis that made me will also know how to destroy me”? - saying which seems to express a Stoic submission to the necessity of fuis!

Theodicy. -

Theodicy is that part of theology which deals with the relation between deity and evil. Now, this eminent Stoic problem is also a Karneadian hobbyhorse:

(a) the gods provided (according to the Stoa) man with reason: look at that man when he uses his god-given reason to commit crimes, in which he brilliantly surpasses the ‘reasonless’ animal; look also at how ‘good’ man is subordinate to all that is unscrupulous; is that the ‘work’ (sign) of a reason-gifted deity who ‘wisely’ governs the universe and mankind?

(b) the gods, as happy beings, according to the Stoa, possess all the virtues:

1/ prudence, i.e., the shifting ability to choose wisely between good and evil, is useless in beings who are impervious to switching between good and evil;

2/ the control is only useful if one stands in front of very attractive things (one is not self-controlled, if one stands in front of an old decrepit woman!); which is useless with perfect gods in the sense of being useless to them;

3/ courage, which does not consist in letting sweet wine be drunk, but in allowing oneself to be burned alive (is Kalanos still a model?) or in allowing oneself to be torn apart without complaint, is useless and thus meaningless with gods above such deeds.

4/ Wisdom, here, sophisticatedly, defined as the ability to bring clarity to dark matters, is, for gods not knowing darkness, without possibility of application and therefore useless! -

Already in antiquity people wondered what Karneades was, sage or sophist. It is understandable why this question was asked of a supposedly Platonic or Socratic “thinker” or better a “Reasoner”.

-- Stoic materialism concerning deity

This is, of course, something that immediately serves as a target:

(a) there is no body that does not decay -- Karneades, like Aristotle and all the hyper-spiritualists on the human soul (lelchamancy) - cf. supra pp. 185/ 187 on dualistic or pluralistic materialism and hylic pluralism - , blind to an immortal corporeality which was accepted by some later Stoics, also under Neo-Platonic influence perhaps, Karneades concludes from this - apparently very much at odds with his own anti-lightness-judgment skepticism of a probabilistic nature - simply to the mortality of gods as corporeal beings;

(b) everything that possesses senses is subject to change; conclusion: the gods of Stoa, as living, hylozoic beings possess sensory experiences and are thus subject to change (which immediately brings mortality, according to Karneades).

-- Folk religion. -

Karneades is equally merciless to the folk-gods usually haughtily regarded by Hellenic intellectuals: in the style of the anti-religious-speaking Sophist Prodikos of Keos - see above p. 73 -, one should, according to Karneades, be regarded as a folk-god. 73 -, one should, according to Karneades, declare all natural phenomena to be 'gods', if one accepts the current and especially sea god Poseidon; - there is no middle way: either all natural phenomena are 'gods' or they are reine fuis (see the already touched upon physicalism or naturalism of Karneades as a redetwister, who, apparently, chooses this position, which the least of them adopt, for the sake of its advantageous discussion value).

-- The Mantic. -

"Platonic philosophy gives credence to prophetic ecstasy (mania); the scientific spirit of Aristotle, on the other hand, makes him very suspicious of the various mantic techniques. Then Stoics and Epikoureans developed contradictory theses: for the Stoics, mantics (the art of divination) did exist and the gods were too good to withdraw such a precious commodity from humans;

Epikouros, on the other hand, thoroughly banishes mantics from his universe doctrine: for him, there is no providence and the universe is organized full of unchanging laws. This (Epikourosian) thesis was also that of the New Academy, founded in -265 by Arkesilaos. One will find in the philosophical reason of Cicero the after-effects of these contradictions and debates: though disciple of the Stoic Poseidonios, Cicero will not fail to ironize the popular belief to the mantic." (R. Bloch, *Les prodiges dans l' antiquité classique* (Grèce, Etrurie et Rome), Paris, 1963, p. 12).

-- The mantics are divided into two major types:

a/ the mantikè enteknos (technikè), in the Lt. *divinatio artificiosa*;

b/ the mantikè ateknos (adidaktos), in the Lt. *divinatio naturalis* (o.c., 34). This classification follows Karneades in his merciless criticism of these paranormal phenomena.

The art of divination does not serve for anything: not for the senses, not for the arts ('a physician serves for the illness, 'a flute player for playing the flute, etc.), not for mathemata (arithm., geom., muz., astronomia); not for dialectics, physical or ethics: are we going to ask duty of 'a sacrificer (haruspex)? The art of divination has no domain of its own that is not mastered by a specialist a/ simply expert or at least b/ much better.

To claim, as the Stoa does, that the art of divination is the provision of chance things is untenable: either the future is determined by chance, but then no prediction is possible, or it is necessary, but then everything is fated and chance prediction is nonsense. At length Carneades criticizes

a/ the 'artful' (entechnos) art of divination,

This interprets according to fixed rules, signs situated outside the human being, such as victims' walls, 'miracles' ('a calf without a head at the liver'), thunderbolts, etc..

All such things, in which the unenlightened crowd believes, are either results of the sumpatheia (continuity) of the fasis or of god intervention.

1/ If dependent on sumpatheia, then one does see the connection between the swelling of the liver of rats and the winter solstice, between the growth of oysters and shellfish and the phases of the moon, between the vibrating of strings and other strings which one first made vibrate - these are repeatedly established facts -; but where is the sumpatheia or continuity (connection) between a tear in the liver of a sacrificial animal and the profit which, proceeding from it, is predicted to me?

2/ If dependent on god-intervention, then one doesn't see why these man-loving gods speak so darkly that one still needs an interpreter to understand such signs? -- All these so-called signs are due to chance. Or rather, says Carneades, to an unknown cause.

b/ The non-scientific or 'natural' art of divination,

This is based on divine inspiration which makes the seer speak or gives the dreamer dreams. It is no less open to criticism: the divine pronouncements (oracles) sometimes come true and sometimes do not, or they are evidently biased (the Puthia had it for Philip, for example); more than that: they are dying out (we hear less and less about them); the dreams are sometimes true, sometimes false; they are so dark that they need an interpreter: are they not rather traces of impressions received by the soul beforehand in its waking state? Religion, which Carneades does not want to destroy, must free itself from such delusions.

The humanity of Carneades. -

The Stoa, started from a logical proposition: every statement (about present or future) is either true or false, and from' a physical proposition: every movement presupposes a cause. From this' follows determinism and, for human life, fatalism (belief in fate).

If the first two sentences are true, then all that the universe shows is determined and predictable and there is no place for freedom -

a/ Herakleitos, Demokritos, the Stoa, - they tended toward such a physical;

b/ Epikoureans rejected them. Also Karneades but unlike Epikouros, who dared to claim that there were sentences that were neither true nor false and that there were cause-free (accidental) phenomena. Which caused both logicians and physicalists to protest.

Karneades is convinced **a/** that nothing happens without cause, **b/** but that our free will has no external and prior cause, but that causation lies within itself, in its nature which is itself cause, independent of previous or external causes. Karneades rightly stresses the distinction between pure sequence and causality: it is not because one event follows another that the latter is the cause of the former! The real cause precedes and, above all, is caused by an action and force which follows it.

This problem of a succession of events, including our free will decisions, is still posed today: the reflexive philosophy of J. Nabert (1881/ 1960), who was inspired by Kant and Bergson, emphasizes something unjustifiable in the will. The will is outside the causal chain of e.g. the motives that 'move' us and yet it is not separate from it. -

That problem touches upon P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d'hermeneutique)*, Paris, 1969, pp. 211/221, (where he solves it by introducing a theory of signs: the act in which our free will express(es) itself is a sign (which Ricoeur also calls "phenomenon," i.e., that in which our will "appears," - will that is utterly invisible but at work)). -

This ambivalence also manifests itself in the main directions of contemporary psychology :

a/ beside the 'objective' methods (Galton's survey, Fechner's and Weber's psychophysics, Janet's or Pigate's comparative method, the systemtheoretical method, there are

b/ the 'subjective' or introspective methods (Maine de Biran's description (from within), Bergson's 'intuitive' method (which delves into the deeper self), the reflexive method of Lagneau, Lachelier, Alain (universal scope of individual events), the phenomenology of Husserl, - all methods that take self-perception as their starting point).

Karneades sees **a/** that everything is caused, - but **b/** that our free will, woven into that chain of causes (which makes possible the 'objective' study of our behavior), represents 'its own, outside yet above it' 'cause' (which is only introspectively accessible).

- Karneades' subjectivism

This, then, has pioneered here: reflexive self-perception is first clearly at work with him. Even if this phenomenistic view brings him close to what has been the case since the physician Cl. Brunet, *Journal de médecine* (1686) called solipsism.

The solipsist (solus = alone; ipse = self) claims that the individual self - Aristippos' fortress, sealed off from the outside world - is all reality and that the subjective phenomena represent, yes, are that outside world! Or, at least, that one cannot prove otherwise. Modern idealists escape solipsism by distinguishing, among other things, between individual I and "universal" I.

(iii)c, Ethics/politics. -

At Rome in-156 Carneades gave two speeches on justice according to his pro- and contra method: on the one hand he argued that justice does not lie in the fuis, before and above the agreements (nomos = custom, law) of men, who know only one rule, self-interest, which changes according to times and regions.

Thus the most powerful peoples - e.g. the Romans - have only one rule: their own benefit and advantage, otherwise they would give back all their conquests and return to their own villages and cities.

Likewise the individuals: one who has an unwilling slave, how shall he sell him? Shall he say that he is unwilling? If yes, then he is righteous but naive and crazy (for the sale will be a flop); if not, then he is cunning seller but unrighteous and unscrupulous.

-- Casuistry. -

That kind of moral philosophy which deals with concrete cases and their analysis is called casuistry (Lt: casus, case). Carneades is at the origin of casuistry.

So e.g. 'a castaway sees a weaker than him with a life board. What shall he do in conscience? If he takes it off, he saves himself but is unrighteous. If he does not, he pays for it himself (perhaps uselessly, since the other is already weak), but he is righteous.

One does not forget that, the day before, Carneades at Rome, had defended just the opposite thesis, appealing to Socrates, Platon and Aristotle, yes, to the Stoic Chrusippos! - His own opinion is obscure: one knows that in bundle he saw possible ethics: a/ hedonistic (enjoyment), b/ smart-avoidant (ataraxia e.g.), c/ immediate (emphasizing the first goods as health, normal senses, strength, beauty, development of mind (perhaps) as telos).

Klitómachos never traced his personal thesis. Doch Noumenios claims that, once Carneades was out of the discussion, he, in conversations with and friends, "spoke like everyone else." Yes, that, if he, in his disputes, questioned righteousness, he implemented it in his conduct.

Note. - M.T. Cicero (-106/-43), the great Roman orator, is Neo Academic but in an eclectic way. In him one can see how this Hellenic thinking continued to have an effect in Rome and in the West.

Also St. Augustine (+354/-430), the great church father of the West and the most gifted thinker of Patristics, underwent such influence.

Indeed, V. Brochard, o.c, 124, says: “An impartial examination (...) shows at least that (Karneades) was ‘a powerful mind.’ From Aristotle to Plotinos, Hellas has had none greater; only Chrusippos could dispute him the first - rank place.”

(II)C. *The Heraklitean skepticism.*

The so-called New Skepticism includes, to begin with, two thinkers who surpassed Pyrrhonism, which undergirded only (i) sense knowledge and (ii) established opinion: (i) Ainesidèmos who undercut science and (ii) Agrippa who undercut truth, both as such (i.e., science without more and truth without more). We now dwell on these two.

(i) *Ainesidemos of Cnos(s)sos (Crete).*

This Cretan lived around -50 and taught at Alexandria. He seems to have had Neo-Academians as his teachers. -- The general direction of Ainesidemos characterizes V. Brochard, o.c., 272/273 as follows: “(Sextos Empeirikos) says that (he) conceived skepticism as ‘a way to the doctrine of Herakleitos and that a/ he accustoms the mind to see that the opposite things appear together in the phenomena, b/ to teach it to see that in reality they are one. In other words, what is together but still apart in the phenomena is, in fact, in the deeper fuis, one and coinciding. Cf. pp. 25/28 supra.

(i)a. *Logic.* -

The (theory of knowledge and) theory of reasoning decays into two parts.

a1/ The summary of the theses of the predecessors

This concerning sensory experience and (supported on it) established opinions in the tropoi, forms of opinion (opinion formations) also called topoi, platitudes, or logoi, justifications; - these ten tropoi may be summarized as follows:

(a) the core is relations. (no. 8), i.e. each datum is never ‘in itself’ alone, but in relation a/ to other data with which it is experienced together (cf. Gestalt character with Karneades) and b/ to the one who, together with those others, experiences it - something is ‘right’ not in itself but in relation to something else (‘to the right of that chair there’); -- the same expresses the mixing (no. 6), i.e. every given thing never appears alone (‘pure’, ‘unmixed’) but connected with something else - a/ the purple does not have the same color in the sun as by the night-lamp (again, the Gestalt character of Karneades); b/ the purple ‘shines’ pale and whitish before the eyes of jaundiced people -

(b) the other constitutions of opinion are but exemplifications (applications, examples) of those two central tropes:

(b)1. the objective (the object proper) tropes are the perspectivity (= perspective character - emphasized by Fr. Nietzsche and the existentialists) - (no. 5): ‘a ship; a/ seen from afar, looks small there motionless, b/ up close however, large and moving; ‘a branch in the water ‘appears’ broken, outside straight; ‘a painting ‘shines’ with

relief worked out from afar, - up close this seems to be an optical illusion; the light of a lamp 'shines' faintly in the sunlight, in the darkness however brilliantly;

Conclusion: a/ the angle of view under which 'something' is viewed, approached, b/ together with the medium through which one approaches that 'something' ('n given), determines the perception (what Ainesidemos calls 'distance', 'place' and 'location' ('placement')); this 'puts into perspective' the 'being' of that given; -- in fact, this constitution or mode of formation of perception is both objective and subjective at the same time, -- something we would now, with Husserl, 'call intentional' (the subject as designated to the object and vice versa);--

(b)2. the objective tropes are: the connection between the distributive and/or collective changes of the object and the qualitative jumps that go with them-something that Hegelian and Marxian dialectics has again brought to the fore:

(i) distributively 'something' changes when, spread over a number of units (= elements), it occurs more frequently or more rarely within the same interval: "assueta vilescun""; things that are ordinary, decrease in sensational value, as e.g. The sun, which we see every day - where a comet, because of its small frequency, causes astonishment and sensation; in regions where the earth regularly trembles, one is no longer startled by it in the long run (which proves that it is not the sun itself or the earthquake 'as such' but their frequency that 'qualitatively' appear and act on the senses);

(ii) something changes collectively when the 'mass' (quantity) and its parts or aspects change: individually the grains of sand of a mass of sand are 'prickly', together they are 'soft'; - a small dose ('mass') of wine strengthens the soul, if one gradually increases it, in time the quality will turn into its opposite: It will have a harmful effect (thus: not the wine 'in itself' but the dosage has an effect on the senses and the body); the gradual quantitative change generates a qualitative leap;

(b)3. the subjective tropes, which concern the observer (the subject), are the following:

a/ the animal structure and its modifications (comparative): the touch e.g. is not the same for a shellfish, poultry or a scaly animal; the taste differs according to whether the tongue is dry or moist;

b/ Perception differs from animal to human: oil is good for humans, but deadly for wasps and bees; sea water, in sufficient quantity, is poisonous for humans, for fish it is its 'element';

Conclusion: not what is but what appears, - this is what sensory experience teaches us; by the way, the greater excellence of man over animal - the Stoa emphasized this a.o. is relative: a dog for example has a perception which is finer than the human (e.g. the smell);

c/ the human structure and its modifications: indeed, like the animals differ among themselves (ad a) and man and animal differ among themselves (ad b), people also differ among themselves:

a/ physically (e.g. an Athenian woman once drank thirty drachmas worth of hemlock (= wild chervil, product for the poison cup) without experiencing anything at all, where others are fatally affected from much less) and

b/ spiritual (some are dynamic, enterprising the others slow, inert); for each of these types the world and the things in it look different (who now has “the true being” fixed?); - when one says: “ ‘the great mass’ has it right”, Ainesidemos replies that the great mass in Hellas thinks and perceives differently than in Babylonia;

(b)4. the subjective tropes, which concern the observer, not outwardly but inwardly:

a/ the senses differ from one another: a perfume pleasant to the sense of smell is distasteful to the sense of taste; rainwater, soothing to the eyes, gives throat hoarseness and pneumonia; b/ the observer goes through different subjective states:

a1/ physical (waking state/sleep; freshness/fatigue)

a2/ soulful (love/hate); love makes us see things differently, cleaner than hate (same things namely);

b1/ honey comes bitter, for those who have jaundice;

b2/ drunk people see the world differently than sober people; - also diachronic: a child sees the same things (‘s house e.g.) differently than an adult or an elder. -

Here are the tropics (ten in number), when one adds ten about the differences of laws, customs, beliefs:

a/ the Egyptians embalm their dead, the Romans burn them, others throw them in the swamp;

b/ The Egyptians let brother marry sister, the Persians let son marry mother, the Hellenes forbade it by law; and so it goes with religions, philosophies and poetic stories. -- One sees that the comparative method is used, that the differences exposed by that comparative method are exploited, against any dogmatism which thinks it has found an easily universally applicable kritèrion, test of truth.

a2/ *Truth as such is (as dogmatism) undone:*

If truth is ‘something’, then that ‘something’ is 1/ either something sensory 2/ or something thought-content (thought-content) 3/ or something that is both sensory and thought-content 4/ or neither one nor the other.

Well, all that is impossible. To conclude: there is no truth which can easily be achieved by means of dogmatic criteria: it is clear that the dogmatic interpretations of ‘truth’, not truth per se, are always affected here. The truth criterion that was in the ascendant is meant, - not truth itself.

Note: - Those who are familiar with the structural method, inherent in the various structuralisms of the present day - will have established that, in the tropics, time and again a structure (i.e. a set of elements or aspects functioning as elements), in principle identical (one), in fact modified (many), is central.

The main structure is the relation 1/ between a phenomenon and its environment and 2/ between that same phenomenon and the observer (resp. opinion former), in which both the data and the surrounding things and the subject who observes, are 'mixed' (mixed) with the rest of the structure; the side-structures are in fact parts or aspects of that main structure (like e.g. the perspective under which the observation proceeds).

Thereby, 1/ that structure 2/ and its sub- or sub-structures are collections whose parts (elements, aspects) interact (are mixed, to speak the language of Ainesidemos; - intermingle): Contemporary names such as Gurvitch (objective sociological structures), Levi-Strauss (abstract mathematical ethnological structures), Lacan (unconscious structure of psychoanalytic nature), Saussure (language structures), - diachronically: Wallon, Piaget (genetic, child psychological structures), Hegel, Marx, Lukacz (sociological (dialectical) becoming structures), etc. , point in an analogous direction.

Cf. e.g. Encyclopédie du monde actuel, 4471, *La philosophie*, Paris, Favrod, 1977, pp. 188/189. Cf. *Savoir moderne, La philosophie*, Paris, Marabout, t. 3, pp. 606/ 646 (more detailed and technical). -

But there is one big difference: instead of being conceived as science-building, the "structures" here, in Hellenic late skepticism, are conceived as science-destroying, at least to some extent, because, from Ainesidemos on, thanks to his Heraklitean intellectualism and ditto rationalism, a very edifying intention emerges.

Why? Because one gets away from that narrow conception of criteria which the dogmatists, simplistic as they were, wanted to push through in order to arrive at truth as - M. Heidegger, the great existentialist - ontologist emphasized it - a. lèthia, on.hiddenness, i.e. direct feeling and seeing of what things are, - and not truth as an application of criteria in a simple way, equally easy for all, - which rather obscures.

(i)b. Physical. - Here there is a double aspect:

(i) to know the fuis, one can directly dissect the genesis, genesis, and indicate the cause of an established fact;

(ii) in order to get to know the fuis one can also work in reverse, i.e. from the effect or outgrowth to the invisible cause (whereby the effects are 'signs' (symptoms) of the cause hidden behind them). We will explain this very briefly.

Ad (i). - Eight new and differently conceived tropes illustrate here the thought of Ainesidemos. The partial (private) explanations are e.g. the following:

1/ An uncertain phenomenon like the rising of the sap is explained by 'attraction' in analogy with the rising of water in a sponge (which is disputed by some); - i.e. explaining the uncertain (phenomenon) by the uncertain (cause);

2/ to explain the certain phenomenon of the regular celestial order of motion by mutual pressure (which precisely does not generate regular order of motion, as a cause);

3/ do as the Paleo-Milesians do: explain the certain phenomenon of the Nile floods by arbitrarily choosing rain, wind, sun, and snowmelt as possible causes (i.e., snowmelt)

4/ Do as the Pythagoreans do: explain the certain phenomenon of the distance of the planets by musical proportionality (which is a non-event 'cause' and has not even been tested against the phenomena);

5/ doing like Aristotle: explaining a phenomenon like the comets from the confluence of steam (coming from the earth) (as a cause) because that 'cause' fits in his system, while other possible causes are left out;

6/ doing like Epikouros: explaining the phenomenon of indeterminism (freedom) by *par.en.klisis* (clinamen, deviation) as 'cause', notwithstanding that such a thing goes against the rest of the atomistic system, - what Aristotle does through system excess, Epikouros does through system deficiency;

7/ explaining the phenomenon (such as e.g. seeing) as if it had the same structure as other very accessible phenomena, i.e. by analogy with the appearance of images in a dark room (the process of seeing might be different). -

8/ The total (universal) explanations, are e.g. explaining all being, as Anaxagoras, by *homoimereiai*, as Demokritos (Epikouros), by *atoma*, as Aristotle, by substance and form, - things that go beyond the established notions of y'all and are invented 'causes'.

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Ad (ii). - The indirect way, i.e., to regard the phenomena as 'signs' (symptoms) of something invisible and by mere reasoning - as Stoa and Tuin do - to clarify the cause, Ainesidemos refutes by claiming that there are no 'signs' which reveal invisible 'causes'; he relies on the ambiguity of those signs. Yet this section has not come to us very clearly.

(i)c. Ethics/Politics. -

In contrast to the Neo-Academy, here is a return to Timon of Flious (and Purrhon): 1/ the *ataraxia*, undisturbed by *epochè*, suspension of judgment, and 2/ doing as custom and law dictate (practical conformism) are the 'rule'.

Note - The dogmatic aspect (or second stage of life?) of Ainesidemos is 'a kind of Herakliteism: being is 'air' (see p. 11 supra: Anaximenes of Miletos; p. 40: Diogenes of Apollonia). As a principle, it is 'now' (the present moment), which, multiplied, 'becomes' day, month, year (genesis *metablètikè* understood as multiplication); it is at the same time also 'one', which, multiplied, 'becomes' two, ten, one hundred, etc. That principle, 'mixed' with counterpoise, is also a principle. That principle, 'mixed' with opposites, 'becomes' all possible 'phenomena' which are, however, in their nature, one.

(ii) Agrippa (tss. +80/ +120).

His life is unknown. But his topical list is interesting. It is more abstract (more general) than those of all its predecessors: it attacks the concept of truth as such. Point of departure: the phenomena.

(1) The phenomena are either sensory or conceptual.

(2) Those two kinds of phenomena are relative, i.e. the sensory with respect to the observer, the intellectual with respect to the thinking (object-subject relation).

(3) After 1/ the two types of phenomena and 2/ the subjective approach to them (relation) 3/ the disagreement remains: some say that the sensory is “true”, others that the thought-content is “true”, others again that certain sensory and some thought-content are “true”. Three propositions for one fact.

(4) The decision: either epochè, judgment suspension (= scepsis) or dogma, proposition. If dogma, then need for proof (lining) arises:

(4)a. in order to prove a sensory phenomenon, one shall either appeal to another sensory element or to an intellectual element; but intellectual elements one should, in their turn, prove, which then, in their turn, are again in need of proof: they to infinity (limitless need for proof);

(4)b. In order to escape this limitless need for proof, one can claim that the content of the thought is proven, but, if this is done by another content of the thought, one falls into the limitless need for proof of the previous time, and, if this is done by a sensory data, which is proven as regards content, then, again, there is a need for proof “in infinitum”. - Agrippa calls this ‘di.allèlos tropos’, mutual substitution, circular reasoning, like a dog chasing its tail! ‘Dialleel’ also says. -- How topical this dialleel still is, is shown by W.W. Bartley, *The Retreat to Commitment*, Dt. *Flucht ins Engagement (Versuch einer Theorie des offenen geistes)*, Munich, Szczesny, 1964, e.g. S. 117/118 : pure (unmixed or pan-) rationalism stands or falls on two propositions:

(a) a rationalist relies on rational criteria or rational arguments of authority and the evidence that goes with them;

(b) a rationalist relies only on such proven rational criteria or arguments of authority. According to the intellectualists (Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza), the rationalist relies on intellectual intuition (to which all authority, all criterion is attached); according to the empiricists (Hume), the rationalist relies on sensory observations (to which all authority, all criterion is attached). -

“The history (of attempts to make this true) is a history of failures.” Thus Bartley, o.c., 118. I. Kant was the one who dealt the final blow to the claims of pure rationalism. There is no criterion, neither intellectual nor empirical (sense.), that escapes the dialleel! Even now, in the twentieth century: the rationalist cannot rationally “prove” “everything”! Cf. D. Mercier, *Critrerologie générale*

Paris/Louvain, 1923, p.60 (“Progrès sans terme ou cercle vicieux.”) Bartley characterizes the tragedy of modern rationalism, which goes back at least as far as Epiktètos (Epictetus) of Hierapolis (+55/ +135), ‘a late Stoic (according to Bartley, o.c., 117), as follows:

“The greatest defect of intellectualism was that it excluded far too much and still ascribed rationality to untenable insights; the greatest defect of empiricism, on the other hand, was that it excluded all too much and dismissed very well plausible insights as irrational: it therefore showed itself to be too narrow for the purpose it was seeking to achieve.” This brings us to the fifth tropes. -

(5) To avoid the diallel, one can give up all proof (provisional or definitive) and put forward ‘a supposition (postulate, axiom) as a hypothesis, underlying, which, unproven or unprovable, one assumes as a starting point of a dogmatic nature. This then is the rationally unpretentious dogmatics. One sees that with the first two tropes Agrippa repeats Ainesidemos, but with the last three rein introduces logical (dialectical, eristic) considerations. This means that something new is introduced, namely the zètèsis. The further search of the previous Skeptics is cut off: all further search will get stuck in the diallel and / or the hypothesis. All possible truth is not dogmatically provable!

- The existentialists, since S. Kierkegaard (1813/ 1855), are the ones who have grasped this deadlock of all dogmatic thinking very well: the individual, not bound, yes, not bound to a generally valid criterion of truth, has only one choice, the leap into the non-rational! He commits himself to an “idea” that is only valid for him as an individual.

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W. Bartley, o.c., wrestles, as a rationalist, with this thesis, especially by Protestant theologians (of the Neo-Orthodox persuasion i.e. who broke with “liberal” or liberal Protestantism, - one thinks of K. Barth, E. Brunner, R. Niebuhr, P. Tillich a.o.) mercilessly explored against rationalism: also the rationalist does not “prove” his propositions, he too starts from a “hypothesis” and is therefore non-rational!

Bartley rightly points out that there is still a difference between

a/ the existentialist ‘leap’ (i.e. hypothesis - acceptance without rational certainties) and

b/ a rationalism which gives up its’ purity (i.e. its’ rational dogmatism) but yet does not let growing evidence slip.

The pragmatism of C.S. Peirce also goes down this road; cf. K.-O. Apel, ed. C.S. Peirce, *Schriften*, I, Frankfurt, 1967, s. 85. Also - which Apel emphasizes - Marxism, but more akin to existentialism, goes that way by conceiving rationality ‘historically’, in ‘a constant search of reason for insight; o.c., S. 13ff. Ainesidemos and his immediate successors were (...) only dialecticians, who advocated the sunètheia, the behavior conforming to the prevailing norms. The last skeptics were physicians with empirical minds.

(II)D. *The empirical skepticism of physicians. Introduction.* -

Cf. pp. 45/47 on older Hellenistic medicine. Hellenistic medicine (about which we have already said a word, supra p. 170, with regard to the three most conspicuous representatives) decays, to a certain extent, into four schools:

a/ the dogmatic medicine, which, rather leaning towards the Stoa, - Herofilos of Chalkedon (-300/ -250) e.g. -;

b/ the empirical medicine, which, rather adheres to Epikouros - Erasistratos of Keos (-300/-250), e.g. - she is a minimizing dogmatism;

c/ methodical medicine or, perhaps more correctly, medicine, which is close to Skepticism and, according to its methods, is not so different from empirical medicine;

d/ Pneumatic medicine, which is closer to Eclecticism, founded by Klaudios Agathinos (+50/+100), a student of the Stoic Cornutus, which adopts four principles, namely hot/cold and dry/humid, - principles governed by a steering principle that “directs” the entire body, called “pneuma” (spirit). - It is good to know this to better understand the Skeptical healers. Galenos chose - eclectically - from all four but with Stoic dominant.

(i) *The two pioneering physicians.* -

Menodotos of Nikomedia (after +150),

He wrote against Asklepiades of Prousa (Bithunia) (tss. -20/ +40), ‘an empiricist - physician, is the first to unite a/ the Epicurean inspired empiricism b/ with skepticism to methodical medicine. He possessed a sense of natural scientific method rare for Greek antiquity. Unfortunately, like Timon of Flious, he was very prone to cursing. -

Theodas of Laodikaia,

He was a contemporary of Menodotos of Nikomedia, emphasized that medical knowledge rests on the triad of science already clearly distinguished by Aristotle, namely a/ aisthèsis, sensus, perception; b/ mnèmè, memoria, memory of what repeatedly occurs in the same way, and c/ hèn tou homoiou theoria, compa-ratio similitum, the comparison of similar things (analogia) cf. Analytica Post, in fine - a/ observation, b/ history and c/ analogy, - the foundations of the experimental or experimental method.

(ii) *Sextos Empeirikos (Sextus Empiricus) (+/- +150/+200).* -

Little do we know of him also. *Purhnoneioi hupotuposeis*, Fundamentals of Pyrrhonism, gives

(1) the basic concepts of Scepticism and also the purpose and method of Pyrrhonism,

(2) refutes the dogmatic logic and theory of knowledge and

(3) refutes its physical and ethics. *Pros dogmatikous, Contra dogmaticos*, Against the dogmatizers, takes a detailed approach. *Pros mathèmatikous*, Against the lecturers, criticizes grammar and rhetoric, mathematism, astronomy and music (insofar as conceived dogmatically). It is considered the second part of the previous work. One understands from its titles why one speaks of “systematic” skepticism in Sextos.

(ii)a. The skepticism of Sextos.- 251 to 300 bis

This decays into three major parts.

(ii)a1. Logic (and theory of knowledge). -

The sceptical method consists in comparing the phenomena perceived by the senses and the 'phenomena' grasped by the mind (comparative or comparative method) with the intention - not to arrive at positive decisions but - to play them off against each other (sceptical method of comparison): this leads to isostheneia, sameness (of the arguments), which forces to indecision (epochè) and, so to say by coincidence, to ataraxia, undisturbedness, concerning (not the phenomena but) the adèla, the transphenomenal things and processes, about which the dogmatist thinks he knows so much. This indecision is a purely individual matter (the skeptic speaks only in his own name: "thought I" is his expression) and a purely subjective impression (Aristippos' castle!). This skeptical method of comparison is enshrined in tropoi, i.e., judgment suspensions (see above). The 'construction' of the skeptical 'thesis' is the deconstruction of the dogmatic which decays into three parts. This antirhèsis, 'refutation' (contradiction) is undogmatic: it limits itself to claiming that the dogmatist is not right, not that the skeptic is 'telling the truth'!

-- Concerning logic.-

a/ A criterion may be threefold:

a/ the desire itself as 'judge' of truth (who would claim that?),

b/ the instrument by which that judge of truth works (that would be sense or reason or both together: who would maintain this?),

c/ the particular use which that judge of truth makes of his instrument, sense or reason (the 'convincing' perception: of the Stoa e.g.: who would maintain its validity?)

b/ Not only is there no criterion of truth, there is no truth: it would either be phenomena (and who will ascribe 'truth' to the phenomena?) or transphenomena (who will ascribe 'truth value' to such disputed invisible things?) - That leaves the hypotheses of the dogmatists: they presuppose what they ought to prove!

-- Two points we emphasize because they are instructive. -

a/ The doctrine of signs. -

There are (perhaps) invisible, not immediately given things. Types:

(1) once and for all invisible, unattainable things (kathapax adèla) - the number of grains of sand in the Libyan desert, the few or unpair number of celestial bodies -;

(2) relatively verbose things:

(2)a. conjunctively hidden things (pros kairon adèla) - I do not see the city of Athens now, but, in principle, I can see it -,

(2)b. structurally hidden things (fasei adèla) - the skin pores or the void if they exist, I do not see immediately -- Now, about these invisible (relative!) things I get information in two ways:

ad(2)a. the memorials (sèmeion hupomnèstikon) expose the conjunctive hiddenness,

ad(2)b. the pointer signs (s. endeiktikon), expose the natural or structural hiddenness.

Examples of signs:

ad (2)a. the word 'Athens' makes me think of the actual city, if I am already informed about Athens and the word 'Athens'; the smoke makes me think of fire (if ...); the scar refers to the injury;

ad (2)b. the sweat that runs over the skin points at pores; the body movements indicate something like a 'soul' (animating 'force'), which is of course invisible. -

a/ Against the memorials, the skeptics have nothing to say (their sunètheia, their conformism, with what 'everyone' ('men', - 'das Man- would say M. Heidegger) thinks, holds them back!).

b/ The more starkly they disprove the pointer and, speculate on the relation between the antecedent ('this woman is lactating') and the consequent ('so she is pregnant'), viz. to criticize that inference in the cringe-worthy manner typical of the skeptics.

b/ The induction doctrine. -

The induction or generalization is of course the eager target of the skeptics: one has the pretension to reach, to prove, the universal (all possible cases) by means of the singular or private (some, a single case)! The dogmatist forgets that

a/ if one knows only some cases, the generalization proceeds on a narrow basis

b/ knowing all cases, is impossible, because 'all possible' are 'infinite'!

(ii)a2. Physical. -

Movement (= change), origination and decay (birth and death), number (number) and whole and part, body, place, god, - all this is undermined as an uncertain hypothesis in an ever-growing series of 'refutations', to which we will not here return. In particular, the concept of principle (cause) suffers because it is the central physical concept. Here, as overall Sextos borrows very much from his predecessors.

(ii)a3. Ethics/Politics. -

Good/evil (righteous/unrighteous); wisdom as the art of attaining the good (righteousness) and avoiding the evil (unrighteousness); the learnability of these concepts and the art of living them out in life, - all this is attacked, always in that logically petty spirit, in order not to have to accept an absolute truth concerning morals and social science. -

For example: the deeds of those who are not philosophically trained and the deeds of those who are philosophically trained show no "difference" (there is no criterion to make that difference clear); - they worship their parents or are honest in matters in precisely the same way;

Conclusion: the sage does not get beyond Jan and Jan (conformism); his 'wisdom' is useless, indeed, imagination or at least she gives that appearance!

(ii)b. The empirical method of sextos.

This is the constructive part of the doctrine of the doctor-skeptics. The Neo-Academics had a reasonable or probable position; Ainesidemos had his Herakliteism.

(ii)b1. The empirical thrust. -

Serapion of Alexandria (-200/-150) is the founder of the empirical (empeirikè) method. He wrote *Pros tas diaireseis* and *Therapeutika*, in which

a/ individual observation, indeed, experimentation came first;

b/ then the statements of recognized authoritative persons;

c/ if neither of the previous two sources of knowledge was available, one had to resort to the transition from the like, to the like (what the dogmatists call ‘analogia’, partial resemblance, but what the empiricists call ‘epi.logismos’ (analogy reasoning) since Menodotos). This is how the physician was supposed to work. - As a founder Filinos of Kos is also mentioned (predecessor of Serapion of Alexandria, who would have lived around -250). However, one knows little about him with certainty, - They are both ‘methodists’.

The Epicurean method. -

Epikouros of Samos (-341/-271;-see above p. 197 ff.) asserted that the senses (which contain truth) provide the first data of ‘science’, that memory collects the ‘facts’ and prepares prolepsis, anticipatio, prospect, and that logismos, reasoning:, built on the sensory data, creates ‘science’. -

Zenon of Sidon (born+/- -150; from whom Cicero took classes at Athens in -79/78), Epikourean, added to Epikouros’ doctrine the transition from the equal to the similar - which he may have borrowed from the empiricists, - by which things naturally invisible (transphenomenal) become known (Epikourean dogmatism). However similar, Epikouros’ empirical method has dogmatic intent, that of the ‘empiricists’ only ‘phenomenal’ value (implying skepticism).

As mentioned on p. 249 supra, both ‘empirical’ methods do rely on an insight that goes back to Aristotle (with histriad ‘perception / memory / comparison’). In that tradition Menodotos and Theodas should be situated, when they, second half second century AD, emerged. They combine both skepticism and empiricism. Sextos is of the same kind.

(ii)b2. General outline. -

Which is the dogma-free, science-free, philosophy-free, purely practical “doctrine” of Sextos and the empirical Sceptics?

-- Logically. -

The Sceptic has senses and reason, given to him by the fuis: he uses them with a view to utility (utilism, pragmatism). - Thus he approves of grammar insofar as it teaches children the parts of speech, the parts of words, reading and writing, - purely activity.

But he rejects that “grammar” which thinks it can grasp the “deeper nature” of “the” word and “the” letter and has to develop profound theories about it. He accepts the rhetoric that teaches good knowledge of words and use of language, not the “profound” pretentious “rhetoric” that loses itself in “beautiful” speeches without much content or usefulness.

Physical. - The skeptic knows himself *fusis* and surrounded by *fusis*: as ‘*methodios*’, methodician, he does not remain indifferent like *Purrrhon* but he practices *technè*, *ars*, art (understand: professional science) thanks to his ‘method’. - Not the dogmatic science, which a/ studies the *archè*, *aitia*, *principium*, *causa*, principle, cause, or b/ the essence (concept, idea, form, of the *fusis* or c/ another transphenomenal ‘reality’.

No, the ‘methodical’ *tribikè*, which starts from repeated experience and thus arrives at *theorèmata*, ‘laws’ (which establish regularity in the phenomena), and which elaborates these laws into a whole which is then called the *technè*, *ars*, ‘art’ (better: professional knowledge, professional science).

- **Thus e.g. the astronomy.** - Not the ‘mathematical’, profound *astronomia* of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (who, dogmatically,
a/ the ‘being’ and
b/ the ‘cause’,
c/ yes, the transcendental reality).

- Nor and certainly not the astrology of the Chaldeans. (Babylonia) which loses itself a/ in astrotheological reflections and b/ in occult practices - one thinks of the Stoics, who, astrotheological as they were, considered the *fusis* as a living being that was intelligent - just like the *Platon* of the *Epinomis* (see p. 122 supra) (cf. also pp. 191/192 supra on the Stoic pantheistic physical, which elaborates that Platonic religious world-worship in its materialist - religious way.

-- No, the ‘methodical’ *astronomia* is practical (*biotikè*, attuned to life) observation of the earth, the weather, so that one can predict rain, foresee nice weather, know about earthquakes, etc.

- **So e.g. and especially medicine.** -

Not, as with the dogmatists, sensory experience and strict “proof” of a/ the “being”, b/ the “cause”, c/ the transcendental “mental content” or reality. No: pure sensory experience, but then threefold unfolded!

- **a/ The *tèrèsis*, perception,** -

also called *aut.opsia*, own eye witnessing. - This is plural:

(a1) natural, i.e. based on *periptosis*, pure chance: e.g. I do a fall; my head hurts; - I open a vein, blood and I begin to heal;

(a2) improvised (*autoschedion*), i.e., based on an (instinctive) sensation: e.g., I am not well; I have a dream in which I see myself drinking something to heal; awakened, I drink water and wine; I improve (or, which is also possible, I worsen);

(a3) experimentally (*mimètikos*, *mimètikè tèrèsis*, imitative, i.e. repeating the same thing repeatedly in order to know better: e.g. I find that, executing the dream, I improve by drinking; I try it out by repeating it. By this last process I arrive at *theorèma*, lawfulness: I establish that, a/ repeating the same thing, b/ the same result can be established. Thus the ‘art’ becomes *tribikè*, ‘learned’ (scientifically valid). Thus true *technè*, professional science, emerges.

- The methodical (skeptical - empirical) theory of disease. -

It is an application of. -

1/ The disease is measured by the symptoms, i.e. those phenomena that are inconsistent with the fūsis. The disease is a *sundromè*, syndrome, concurrence, of symptoms, which arise, last and disappear simultaneously. Some symptoms are persistent (*sunedreuonta*), others changeable (*sumbainonta*). - Apart from the symptoms,

2/ the internal and external conditions are considered:

a/ age, nature of behavior of the sick person, **b/** soil, season, climate. - Thus a disease can be (not “determined” as the profound dogmatists want to do but) “distinguished” (discriminated) and thus one arrives (not at a dogmatic “definition”, “determination of essence” but) at a “description”, better “description” (*hupotuposis*, *hupografè*) of the “phenomenon” of disease. -

b/ De *histora*, the history. - As mentioned on pp. 41/42, 44 *supra*, this is purely Milesian heritage. Yet here *historia* is already connected with past research. All empiricists are very ‘historical’ minded and mirror the experiences of their predecessors vested with authority. Menodotos, however, placed a strong emphasis on the control, the testing of the testimonies of the past, especially in the initiative, i.e., experimental field (identity of data).

c/ The transition from the similar to the similar (*hè tou homoïou metabasis*). - This is the third form of *tèrèsis*, experience, perception rather: **a/** what our own perception never met, **b/** what the past experience never mentioned in history, **c/** what is thus new, that can be mastered by departing from related data. -

This in more than one way:

(c1) on the basis of the resemblance of the parts of the body: e.g. what worked with the arm, probably works with the leg, given the similar function (moving);

(c2) from the similarity of the syndromes (illnesses) in the same body parts: e.g. one treats diarrhea and dysentery (abdominal flow with mucus and blood) with the same medicine;

(c3) on the basis of the same medicines. -

Rule in the three types of transition: similarity and difference (what the dogmatists call ‘*analogia*’, analogy), but on the basis of inductive reasoning (*epilogismos*). Here no strictly profound ‘proof’ is given of **a/** ‘being’, **b/** ‘cause’ or **c/** ‘higher’ reality, but a departure from a simple succession of ‘phenomena’, nothing more, yet which repeats itself. Herodotus in particular hammered on this point. -

This is the aspect of ‘progress’ (‘creativity’). -- The *tèrèsis mimètikè*, the imitative or trial-and-error perception only becomes real *tribikè tèrèsis*, scientific perception, according to Menodotos, if it is based on transition from equal to equal.

It is then truly inductive:

a/ before the test there is only probability;

b/ after the test there is certainty. Ordinary imitative observation repeats the same thing without introducing formal induction.

The professional science supported by epilogismos (induction concerning phenomena order):

1/ differs not only from dogmatic reasoning from a/ being or b/ cause or c/ transcendent reality;

2/ it also differs from the ordinary routine, where one, uncritically, piles up facts without checking them (what e.g. polytechnicians do who remain stuck in the anecdotal. No, the methodist seeks a middle ground:

1/ reason distinguishes him from the anecdote - accumulator

2/ phenomenal reason distinguishes him from the dogmatist. -

Menodotos does not want to be a dogmatikos but also not an ordinary tribakos (// tribon or tribonikos), i.e. an ill-considered polymath.

Note.- It is clear - and V. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, (Greek skeptics), pp. 375/ 380, points this out - that modern empiricism is a re-emergence of the old Sextian empiricism. -

Founded by F. Bacon (1561/1626) and Th. Hobbes (1588/1679), elaborated by J. Locke (1632/1704) and D. Hume (1711/1776), the two great English Enlighteners, very notably elaborated by A. Comte (1798/1857), the founder of positivism (which conceives of even the human or humanities as natural sciences), and empiriocriticism (R. Avenarius (1843/1896), E. Mach (1838/1916), as well as the Als - Ob - denken (H.Vaihinger (1852/1933), - after a special interpretation had already been preceded by EB. de Condillac (1715/1780) in sensualist direction -, empiricism lives on until Neo-positivism (Wiener Kreis with its logistic empiricism: a.o. R. Carnap (1881/ 1970)). For the sake of this long, though re-defining after-effect, we have treated the empirical physical in a little more detail.

Ethical-political.- Two major rules govern, according to V. Brochard, o.c., 360, the ethico-politics of empiricists:

a/ the idle disposition in human nature is the first rule: if the methodist is hungry, he eats (without 'higher', 'metaphysical' backgrounds concerning diet e.g. as with the Pythagoreans); if he is thirsty, he drinks;

b/ he follows the customs and laws of his region: e.g. for the methodist religion is a practical (biotikon) good and irreligion an evil. -- A kind of conformism, therefore.

General conclusion. - The fierce criticism of Sceptis covers three domains (V. Brochard, o.c., 393/430):

a/ the sensory knowledge (Ainesidemos' ten tropes; Karneades' psychological analysis) as direct reality knowledge;

b/ the indirect scientific knowledge, as conceived by the dogmatists

1/ the deductive form,

2/ but also the inductive form meaning causality (Ainesidemos' critique of science);-what I.Kant calls 'analytic' and 'synthetic' judgments; -the methodist sees only succession of mere phenomena concerning causality;

c/ the knowledge of truth (the five tropes of Agrippa), which always gets stuck 1/ either in unlimited necessity of proof 2/ or in diallevel or 3/ in hypothesis.

Value-judgment. -- As V. Brochard, o.c., 394, observes, one misses, next to the sensory intuition (direct contemplation, contact), the intellectual intuition:

Indeed, what F. Brentano (1838/1917) writes: "What characterizes every psychic phenomenon is what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages have called the 'intentional' (or still: 'mental') presence. (...).

In representation it is something that is imagined; in judgment it is something that is assumed or rejected; in love it is something that is loved, in hate it is something that is hated; in desire it is something that is desired." (Psychology vom empirischen Standpunkt). All consciousness is reference to something objective.

A. Meinong (1853/1921), J. Rehmke (1848/1930), especially E. Husserl (1859/1938), with his intentional object description or phenomenology, assume a direct contact of an intellectual nature. What the skeptics miss. They do not go "zu den Sachen selbst." -- "To live is to act and to act is to choose, to elect, among several possible acts, that which one considers the best.

No action without judgment. In that case, what becomes the Skeptical maxim: 'One should suspend judgment?' (V. Brochard, o.c., 411). Indeed, man 'judges' even without words.

What Herakleitos did when he ate barley in besieged Ephesus (G. Burckhardt, Heraklit, Wiesbaden, 1957, S. 35/37 (also his dicing with the children in Artemis' temple is a 'message' proclaimed without words). The prophets did it too: cf. A. Van den Born, *Prophetie metterdaad*, (Prophecy in deed), Roermond / Maaseik, 1946 (Jeremias smashes a jar, carries a wooden yoke, throws a book into the Euphrates, etc.).

That is what all Skeptics did, willy-nilly, where they act (practically, biotikos) 'dogmatically'! See at my words, not at my deeds! - That shows us to what the type of 'contemplator' (theorètikos), which Anaxagoras (see D.E. Gershenson / D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Scientific Method*, New York, 1964, pp. 3/4) first exhibited in Athens, leads, if not corrected by common sense. Excess of theoretical life leads to skepticism.

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J.-J. Rousseau (1712/1778) liked J. Locke a lot (according to P. Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européenne* (The crisis of the European conscience), (1680/1715), Paris, 1935, p. 422). This spoke of 'uneasiness' (which Hazard translates by 'inquiétude', uneasiness. Indeed, skepticism creates uneasiness: Mgr. Baunard, *Le doute* (Ses victimes dans le siècle présent), (The doubt (Its victims in the present century)), Paris, 1866-1, 1921-11 proves it: a whole series of thinkers (Th. Jouffroy, Maine de Biran, Santa-Rosa, G. Farcy, V. Cousin, E. Scherer) and poets (Byron, Fr. Schiller, G. Leopardi, a number of Frenchmen) live through the uneasiness of skepticism. -

Nietzsche (1844/1900), however, lived through this uneasiness most acutely in his nihilism, which, in his case, includes a/ positivism, b/ but also radical secularization of

- 1/ the logical principles,
- 2/ the physical becoming with its conflicts of power and
- 3/ the ethical-political goals, ideals. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Der europäische Nihilismus*, (The European Nihilism), Pfullingen, 1967.

IIIA(III). The eclectic philosophies. (-50/+200).

The word. - The army physician Galenos of Pergamon (+131/+200) designates a class of physicians by the word 'eklektikè haireisis' (secta eclecticia, elective streak or school). Diogenes Laërtios (+200/+250) says that a certain Potamon of Alexandria, contemporary of the Emperor Augustus (-31, +14), founded a new haireisis, school and streak, called 'eclectic' because Potamon picked out what was to his liking, from the systems of the other haireisis, schools and streaks. Indeed; Potamon connected his Stoa with Platonic and Aristotelian teachings.

The word content. - This, as in all such philosophical things, is threefold.

a/ Fashionable meaning. - As a philodoxy it is a strong phenomenon. P.Festugière, *La révélation d' Herm. Tr., II, Le Dieu cosmique*, (The revelation of Hermes trimegistos, II, The cosmic God), Paris, 1941 (pp. 341/369, (*Les origines de l' éclectisme*), ((The origins of eclecticism)), outlines the fashion that emerges in the first century B.C. Yes, it begins to emerge from -200. He characterizes this fashion as follows:

(i) a religious dogmatism, which maintains that 1/ the fuis is 'clean', indeed, 2/ that the fuis is a miracle worthy of love and veneration, because she is, in her deepest being, 'god' and 'divine' - which is expressed in the 'reasonableness' and 'providential purposefulness' that the fuis shows to those who look; after all, she is 'god' only and yet known by many (mythological) names, in the many cultures of the Hellenistic and Roman world; - this vague but scattered religion is the 'cosmic' one;

(ii) a philosophical eclekti(ci)sm, which, from several systems, the Stoa, but also Platonism and Aristotelianism not from the very closed Epicureanism -, draws a kind of commonality: 1/ greatness and usefulness of wisdom and philosophy: 2/ unity of the fuis with interdependence of all its parts (sumpatheia, concordantia, connectedness), - to name the main points.

- Every 'rhetor', every educated man who had gone through the enkuklios paideia, the general education, at Alexandria especially persevering (the seven 'arts' with some philosophy), lived, without much pretense, from those two holdfasts. And this, says Festugière, up to the end of Hellenic philosophy, after Plotinos (o.c., 343). But the climax is situated between -50 and + 200.

b/ Methodical significance. - A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire*, 1963, p. 258, says that, as a method, eklexis consists in bringing together reconcilable propositions from several systems which, as a whole, are irreconcilable (i.e. omitting irreconcilable propositions from them).

c/ Ideological eclecticism. - Here two fundamentally different types should be distinguished.

(1) There are multiple syntheses of theses from different systems: a Platon, an Aristotle e.g. elaborate on their predecessors and contemporaries but from a higher point of view from which they systematize the borrowed pieces into a new unity. This very Lalande 'creative' (creative) eclecticism.

(2) There are, however, inferior “syntheses” - not worthy of the name - in which no higher unifying insight incorporates the propositions from different systems in a logically coherent way. Thinkers who practice this kind of eclecticism are systemless.

- Eclecticism points to exegesis, commentary, - text explanation. Every thought is to some extent commentary on what parents, environment, ancestors, masters et al. have expressed. In this sense it is not the personal-creating, ‘real’ thinking about oneself, the others and the universe which springs from the individual himself (‘genuineness’, ‘authenticity’ of the existentialists), but ‘second’ interpretation, reinterpretation, in the footsteps of others (authority, tradition).

Thus, interpretation forms a chain of interpretation and reduplication, - theme that is very much in evidence with C.S. Peirce, as well as with the current structuralists. -- This theme is also expressed in the so-called Formgeschichte (history of forms or types of literature, e.g. in the Gospels) and, on a larger scale, in the Traditionsgeschichte (history of tradition: one examines where and with what significance a tradition e.g. a parable of Jesus - originated and how it was passed on and literarily processed, - which comes down to a series of interpretations, which show the unity of a chain in its multiplicity. -

The history of philosophy shows the same “chains” of interpretations and reinterpretations, giving rise to philosophical tradition and communication.

***The Hellenistic eclecticism.* -**

L. Gernet / A. Boulanger, *Le génie grec dans la religion*, (The Greek genius in religion), Paris, 1932, pp. 507/512, speaks of ‘philosophical syncretism’. - ‘Sunkrètismos’, i.e. doing like the Cretans, making an alliance with the opponents, syncretism is the same as eclecticism, though not without a pejorative note. -

The origin of eclecticism should not be sought among the Epicureans (with one exception) or among the Sceptics, except in the Fourth Academy (Philon of Larissa (after -110, head of the Sceptical Academy with a return to dogmatism (truth exists, and the Fifth Academy with Antiochos of Askalon (-88/ -68 head of the Academy), who accomplishes the return to dogmatism .

Antiochos (-130 / 20 / after -69) a/ decisively combats Carneadian probabilism and b/ introduces into the Academy the Stoic dogmata (a pantheistic physical), which, superficial as he was, he understood to be common to Platon and Aristotle. Cf. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, pp. 217/220, where it appears that, relatively correctly, he expounds the Platonic theory of knowledge but does not reconcile it with the Stoic theory of knowledge (of persuasive representation), which he also adopts.

With respect to ethics he assumes what Platon and the Stoa could equally assume, namely virtue as the highest good and understanding it “reasonably”, but he also assumes, beyond that strictly Stoic virtue, bodily and sensory goods. a Mixture!

According to Gernet/Boulangier, o.c., 508, one can outline the fashionable “syncretism” that is primarily Stoic, Platonic and Aristotelian as follows:

(a) a Stoic support base; **(b)** Platonic, Peripatetic and (Neo-) Pythagorean elements; **(c)** subject sciences, the occultist included; **(d)** star worship (cf. cosmic religion in its astrotheological aspect); **(e)** the theology and demonology of popular religion (gods and daimones).

One already feels the difference with an Antiochos of Askalon, who is only on the way there. -- The man who paved the way par excellence, Poseidonios of Apameia (Syria; Askalon is also not far from there), the Middle St. Stephan (-135/ -51), who

a/ both contested the secularizing interpretation of Stoicism, which his teacher Panaitios of Rhodes (-185/-110) eroded religiously on a Skeptical basis.

b/ if he broadened the straightforward Older Stoicism with the fashionable thoughts just listed. First of all Poseidonios was a scientist: history, geography, physics, astronomy interested him (and he wrote about them).

But he was first of all a philosopher, and a religious philosopher at that, who regretted how the philosophical schools fell short of religion: he wanted to fill in its gaps by complementing it synoptically. -

As a basis he took the Old, orthodox Stoa, with its dogma that says that the whole fuis testifies to a divine omnipresence that works providentially, and with that other dogma that claims that astrology and mantics (divination) are valid in the intellectual and reasonable fields.

Such is the doctrine of Zenon of Kition, Kleantes of Assos (-330/ -232) and Chrusippos of Kilikia (-280/ -207); cf. pp. 188, 217 supra. - Yet Poseidonios, who is the founder of primitivology (and at once folk: is interested) - he opened the eyes of the ancient world to the primitives outside the Hellenic world - supplemented this orthodox Old Stoicism with Platonism (because of its doctrine of the soul) and with folk religion (because of its doctrine of gods and daimones).

His doctrine of souls is Stoic: the souls are (fine)material - dualistic materialism - a fire-dem animates them); after death they ‘fly’ (‘travel’) to the ‘higher regions’ (though not beyond the lunar or lunar sphere); there they become ‘daimones’ (spirits) amidst a crowd of other daimones, without losing their individuality (at least as long as a fire-set does not destroy the universe).

Notwithstanding this Stoic doctrine of souls that knows no retribution in the afterlife, Poseidonios believes in a kind of physical ‘judgment’ (shifting):

1/ the souls who are sufficiently ‘clean’ from any stain, ‘fly’ at once to the lunar sphere, where they enjoy the harmony of the celestial sphere;

2/ the souls, however, who are ‘stained’, remain sucked in by the earth and its sphere and subject to the punishing necessity of reincarnation (reincarnation). Behold the Stoic eschatology, with, perhaps a (Neo-) Pythagorean contested element

In summary, the fashionable eclecticism typified by P. Festugière is the “genus” (broadest class), in which a syncretism such as that of Antiochos or of Poseidonios is situated (subclass).

Typology of Hellenistic eclectisms.-

J. Rehmke, *Gesch. d. Phil.*, (Hist. d. Phil.), 1959, S. 76/77, says that among the subjects advocated by the Eclecticists, not logic (with theory of knowledge, as with the Sceptics), but ethics with politics takes precedence, in the spirit of the dogmatists, while always some dogmatism forms the support.

(i) Stoic eclectics. -

The so-called Middle Stoa with the skeptical Panaitios of Rhodes (-185/-110), the “syncretizing” Poseidonios of Apameia (-135/-51), who counted among his disciples Cicero (-106/-43) and Pompey, the great triumvir (-106/-48), and exerted great aftereffects; --

The Late Stoa (around Cato the Younger of Utica (-95/-46) as the ideal of a sage who serves the public welfare with high rigor) with Seneca of Cordoba (Sp.) (+1/+65), influenced by Poseidonios, teacher of the Emperor Nero (at whose command he had to open his veins, because Nero no longer tolerated his ‘living conscience’!), Epictetus of Hierapolis (Frugia) (+50/+138) and Emperor Marcus Aurelius (+120/180), the man who is the introduction to Herodian of Syria, *Tès meta Harkon basileias historiai* (in eight books, a work describing the ‘crisis’ in Rome (up to 238):

cf. M. Brok, *Herodianus (Crisis in Rome)*, Bussum, 1973, pp.20/23; indeed, under this eclectic Stoic, disasters such as the plague, flood and earthquake took place, not to mention the wars on the Danube and in the East.

(ii) Kunish eclectics. -

The strongly anti-religious tendency of earlier Kunics, especially since Bion of Borusthenes (= Olbia) (-325/-255), which already shows eclectic features, develops, in the course of the first century B.C., into a double tendency:

a/ the first, influenced by Poseidonios, grows into a mystifying kunism (after death, the soul of the “sage” blends into the harmony of the great “Universe”),

b/ while the second, hedonistic in conception, embodies nihilistic streak (which definitely combats every God belief and every soul belief). Dion Chrusostomos (+40/ + 110), dependent on Poseidonios, is such a religious Kunish preacher, with others (Demetrios, Oinomaos, Demonax, Peregrinos Proteus). Cf. Gernet/Boulaner, o.c., p. 487.

(iii) Eclectic Peripateticists.-

Subject scholars especially are to be found here (building on Aristotle). -- Andronikos of Rhodes (+/- -70) the publisher of Aristotle’s forgotten works. - Klaudios Ptolemaios of Alexandria (second century A.D.), the great astronomer and geographer, founder of the Ptolemaic universe. Galenos of Pergamon (+129/+199), the physician, is classified by some as an eclectic Aristotelian. Alexandros of Aphrodisias (early third century AD, lecturer at Athens (+198/+211) commented on Aristotle.

(iv) Epicurean eclectics. -

In the second century AD a few Epicureans are situated who addressed the masses instead of closed (Garden) circles. Thus Diogenian of Oinbanda (Lukia), who concerned himself with the problem of dying and, in addition to his works, had an Epikurean message of consolation inscribed in a large stone in a public square. So also a certain Diogenianos, mixed up in the polemic of the New Academy against the Stoic Chrusippos. -- These Epikoureans are exceptions, given the affinity between the Garden Philosophers and the Skeptics: both are little suited to eclecticism.

(v) The Middle Academy.--

From the Fifth Academy (der Neo-Akad.) with Antiochos of Askalon, the Academy develops eclectically, and in such a way that Neo-Platonism begins to come into view. -

Thrasullos of Alexandria (/+36) was an astrologer at Rhodes: the Emperor Tiberius (-6/+2) became his supporter and permanent adviser. - Ploutarchos of Chaironeia (+45/+125), a historian already mentioned on p. 163, but also and especially an ethicist-politician, but with a very broad interest in all kinds of human problems and solutions (especially Academic, Middle→Stoic, (Neo-) Pythagorean, yes, Aristotelian) is especially worth mentioning here. From +95 he was priest of Delphi. -

Theon of Smurna (+/- +115/+140), author of a mathematical introduction to Platon. - a Zekere Albinos, pupil of the Middle Platonic Gaios (+100/+150, - who connected deification (the(i)osis) and virtue), is the proposer of a systematic introduction to Platonic doctrine but with Peripatetic and Stoic elements. -

One of the most fascinating eclectic Platonists is certainly Apuleius of Madauros (Africa) (+/- +125) who received his training at Carthage and at Athens. His works reflect the “syncretistic” atmosphere of the second century AD.

His *Apoloogia* (Pros de magia) is a self-defense: at the instigation of his friend he had, after hesitation, married his mother (Pudentilla), but the brother of that friend afterwards accused Apuleius, in Sabrata (before the court), of ‘illecebrae magicae’, love magic.

His *Metamorphoses* (The golden ezel), (The golden donkey), is a novella describing the adventures of Lucius who, through careless curiosity about black magic, turns into a donkey and, in that metamorphic condition, endures severe ordeals until, thanks to the goddess Isis (also called Tuche, Fortuna (XI,15)), he turns back into a human being through initiation into the mysteries of Isis, the ancient Egyptian queen of the sky.

“The salvation history, thanks to the grace of Isis, of a fallen being” (D. Robertson / P.Valiette, Apulée, *Les Métamorphoses*, Paris, 1965, t. I, p. xxxiv). His *De Deo Socratis* deals with the daimonion of Socrates. -

The Platonist Attikos (+150/200), anti-Aristotelian, linked Stoic elements with Platonism. - Kelsos (Celsus) wrote +/- +178/180 the first frontal critique of rising Christianity from a dualistic (emphasizing the opposition between God and matter) Platonism.

After-effects. -

a/ Apart from the immediate effect, namely, the uniting into one common front of the related, anti-sceptical systems (Stoa, Platonism, Peripatos especially),

b/ is to note the preparation of the various theosophical or also 'mystical' syncretism. About which later.

-- The XVIII-d' century Enlightenment

This had many thinkers who advocated an eclectic philosophy adapted to the rationalistic atmosphere of the time as the highest and above all most personal liberal form of thought. -

An offshoot of this is the Eclecticism of V. Cousin (1792/1867), who claimed that all systems are 'constructed', starting from pre-existing elements, - elements that belong in 'the' (beyond any individual-personal consciousness) 'reason'. From there, Cousin defended spiritualism eclectically:

a/ Maine de Biran's spiritualism,

b/ German idealism (he brought German thought into France), and c/ Scottish Common-Sense - or Common-Sense philosophy, - three directions which, each in its own way, combated modern skepticism, - Cousin synthesized into a religious rationalism. -- which proves that, *mutatis mutandis*, history repeats itself!

For the sake of great religious and cultural-historical interest, here is an excerpt from Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* (XI, 1/7, where the appearance of the Queen of Heaven Isis is described) - -

Lucius tells us that, when the moon is full, he wakes up at night, plunges (seven times headfirst into the waves, - which, as a number, fits pre-eminently religious acts according to the 'divine' Puthagoras); bathes in the sea and prays to Isis as 'regina caeli' (queen of heaven, - title given by the Litany of Our Lady, among others, to Mary, the mother of God):

"(...) Queen of heaven, whether thou be Ceres (Demeter), Venus (Aphrodite), or whatever high queen of heaven - said the thought - assist me in the height of my poverty, (...) return Lucius (subdued in metamorphic condition as a donkey) to Lucius (understood as human) (...)"

Again, Lucius is asleep. "Hardly had I closed my eyes, or, from the sea in its midst, with a countenance, rising above the waves, adorable even to gods, a divine countenance arose; then, gradually, the whole body showed itself. (...) - Follows then a detailed description of the clothing and jewelry of Isis (especially the "cloak of a strong black color, resplendent with a gloomy sparkle around her woman-in-law's body, with the edge and the fabric itself studded with stars, is unforgettable to Lucius.

As gestamina (attributes) Lucius mentions the Isis ratchet (right hand) and the golden lamp with menacing viper's head (left). Her sandals were braided palm leaves (victory sign) She was fragrant with 'Arabic perfumes' as she said, "I come to Thee, moved by Thy prayers, (...) as highest of deities, (...) first of the inhabitants of heaven (...)." Then follows the message.

III B. Hellenistic - Roman (Theosophies (+250/+600)).

Introduction.-

The concept of theosophy consists of two elements 'theos', deus, god, and 'sophia', sapientia, wisdom. - All religious philosophies - apart from Scepticism, all Hellenistic philosophies are, apart from Protosophism and, to some extent, Epikourism, which still have a theology somewhere, however meagre - derive wisdom from god in one way or another. Yet that broad meaning is not what we are talking about here. -

Is theosophical any system that advocates a theoria, contemplatio, contemplation, of God (in the broad sense), with, in that contemplation, an extra- and supernatural "knowledge" (also a contemplative knowledge) of "being" (all being, in the universal sense); this contemplation of God and, in Him, of the being, is achieved by the development of a natural disposition present in every human being but, in fact, only developed in a part of human beings. - Thus understood, theosophy is a current known to all cultures. - However, in the

XVIIIth century

the word was particularly excised from the 'Illuminés', viz. the illuminati Germaniae, members of the secret society founded by the university professor Adam Weishaupt (1748/1830), who played a role in the French Revolution in an anarchic spirit (of overthrow of all established powers and of a return to unity); in addition to these Bavarian 'Enlighteners', the word is also taken out of the Martinists, the disciples of Claude de Saint-Martin (1743/1803), the secretary of Martines de Pasqually (1727/1774), the founder of a kind of Masonic lodge ('Ordre des Elus Cohens'), on spiritualistic foundations, but theürgic (practising high magic - compulsively summoning high spirits). -

In the XIX -th century

the meaning narrows and is mainly said of the Theosophical Society, founded by Ms. Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, a Russian aristocrat (1831/1891), gifted with supernatural gifts, and Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832/1907), American agricultural engineer and Freemason. Founded in 1875, Theosophy has developed a troubled past to the present (pantheism, Hindu and Buddhist fundamentalism, occultism, mysticism are features of it). -- The more recent designations are but species of the general concept.

Hellenistic mysticism. -

With this name J. Rehmke, *Gesch. d" Phil.*, 1959, S. 77, works to designate the theosophies. - 'Ein Ergänzungsstück zur Skepsist (a completion of Skepticism),- this is how Rehmke calls this mysticism.

Indeed, J. Poortman, *Raakvlakken tussen Oosterse en Westerse filosofie*, (Intersections between Eastern and Western Philosophy), Assen/ Amsterdam, 1976, pp. 146/161 (*The One Truth and the Limits of Skepticism*), says of L. Wittgenstein (1889/1951), "With all his skepticism and with all his positivism, he nevertheless also comes to speak of 'das Mystische'. This is for him 'Unaussprechliches' (o.c.,160). Wittgenstein proved rationally that the irrational existed, and lived, in later life, withdrawn.

- This, this duality 'skepticism/mysticism', can only be understood from a two-worlds theory. This works with darkness/light duality:

a/ intellectual-rational thinking, (as an ideology certainly, but also as a method) gets stuck in the Sceptis; for the mystic this is the one-eight' (= darkness) of the senses and the mind (one does not see anymore; it is intellectually-rational 'darkness'); from there the epochè or suspension of every dogmatic judgment and the limitation to the phenomenal;

b/ but this is only the negative side: some (God)revelation opens the intellectual-rational eye for the light; - natural reason (and intellect) gets stuck, extra- and supernatural reason (and intellect) finds a way out; secular (bound to this earth) thinking gets stuck, sacred' thinking rescues itself. -

Rehmke points to a kind of 'turning point':

a/ classical man, from Socrates on, is intellectualist in ethical-political matters (thanks to knowing, virtue is possible);

b/ the theosophist (mystic) is ethicist concerning logic and epistemology (virtue is the possibility condition of rational insight). -

The ancient theosophists express this in the pairing 'unclean/clean'.

a/ sinful and God-fearing thinking gets stuck in its impurity (i.e. ethical inadequacy)

b/ the morally responsible and God-fearing thinking saves itself in its purity (i.e. ethical asceticism and conscientiousness). - In fact, Rehmke exaggerates: 'turnaround' is incorrect; 'interaction' would be better; for the theosopher is not an irrationalist: he maintains the validity, indeed the scientific value, of his way of thinking.

- Fideism. -

'Fides', faith, is the root of this word. Faith is a dogma, assertion concerning more than phenomena, upheld on the basis of trust in other than purely rational grounds; especially the authority argument plays here: on authority (religious authority, scientific authority, etc.) one assumes something.

Of course, there is blind faith and reasoned faith: the latter works with reasonable-reasonable arguments, first to support the credibility of the authority, then to test the assertion of the authority. -

Is theosophy now fideism? Yes and no: yes, because without a minimum of belief in a/ a god, b/ contemplation of god, c/ contemplation of being in god, one is never theosopher or becomes theosopher; no, if this would include reason-free 'leap' of belief in the rational-dark the field of transphenomenal reality. Theosophists continue to 'think'. -

Mysticism. -

'Mysticism' comes from the Greek 'muein', retreating into one's inner self, meditative absorption, which

a/ a closing off of the ordinary experience of the external world and

b/ an absorption into a "different" world. The word 'mysticism' has a multifarious language, which we briefly outline. (i) Two 'flat' meanings:

(i)a. the sociological meaning of a naive, bewitched absorption into some expectation' (thus one speaks of Marxist or National Socialist 'mysticism');

(i)b, the secular meaning of ‘world-flight’; of a kind, the scientific meaning as e.g. J. Sageret, *La vague mystique*, (The mystic wave), Paris 1920; - this scientist, for whom ‘science’, (scientia, science) is the only, necessary and sufficient access to the truth (o.c., 169), deplors the rise of the ‘mystical wave’ starting from

a/ of the ‘scientific’ philosophy of H. Poincaré (1853/1912), which holds a kind of conventionalism (agreement-based thinking) concerning science(mathesis),

b/ of the energetism of W. Ostwald (1853/1932) and E. Mach (1838/1916), two empiriocritics, who adopt a dynamism that sees ‘energy’ in material and psychic phenomena (which P. Duhem (1861/1916), with Poincaré a critic of science, also adopts)

c/ of Bergsonism (H. Bergson (1859/1941)

d/ of pragmatism (W. James (1842/1910)) and

e/ of the spiritualist positivism of E. Boutroux (1845/ 1921);

(ii) an epistemological meaning; is called ‘mystical’ any philosophy that relies either on intuition (contemplation) or on ‘feeling’ (feeling, ecstasy, etc.) or on both as access to truth -

(iii) philosophical meanings: ‘mysticism’ is the belief in the possibility and desirability of a progressive or abrupt unification of the human soul (according to mind, spirit, soul-body, etc.) with the Supreme Being (deity, Trinity, etc.) such that

a/ a type of knowledge is attained which is more than simply rational, **b/** a mode of being which transcends the ‘natural’ and **c/** a morality which transcends the secular; - ‘Mystical’ is of course also understood to mean the ‘natural’.

‘Mysticism’ is, of course, also excluded from parts or aspects of this unification, e.g. from the ecstasy which is a peak experience of it, as Humanistic psychology calls it (A. Maslow).

Reference may be made, among others, to J. Hondius, *Bewustzijn en topervaring in Hindoeïsme, Boeddhisme en Existentialisme*, (Consciousness and peak experience in Hinduism, Buddhism and Existentialism), Deventer, 1974; Mouni Sadhu, *Konzentration und Verwirklichung (Die besten Methoden zur Erweckung der Seelenkräfte)*, (Concentration and Realization (The Best Methods for Awakening the Soul’s Powers)), Bern/Munich/Wien, 1958-1, 1974² (// Concentrations), which is in line with W. Atkinson (and is Eastern in tone); - further L. Wijnberg / P. Warnaar, *Religieuze ervaring in de spiegel van het bewustzijn*, (Religious experience in the mirror of consciousness), Apeldoorn, 1974; J. Needleman, *De nieuwe godsdiensten* (The new religions), Amsterdam, 1975 (a book that tries to outline the Eastern religions and the ‘mystical’ core of all religions in Zen Buddhism, Meher Baba, Subud, Krisjamoerti movement, Transcendental meditation, Yoga, Sufi religion, Vedanta, Tibetan religion, - Humanistic mysticism, all in the USA (since the California ‘mystical’ revolution); D. Schaafsma, *Godsdienstig Leven in Amerika* (Religious Life in America), The Hague, 1975 (including on some twenty-five religious communities).

In these and similar works something comes across of the ancient theosophies but in a contemporary way. Of course there is also “mysticism”, i.e. union with something other than the Supreme Being (deity), - e.g. with nature as a mysterious whole (e.g. “sumpatheia”) - one thinks of Levy-Bruhl’s primitive description (“participation mystique”).

That this is also true of ancient 'mysticism' is shown by P. Festugière, *La rev. d' Herm. Tr.*, I (L'astrol. et les sc. occ.), 1944, pp. 361/362. -

(A) *The 'gnosis', i.e. the mystical knowledge, on the basis of unio mystica*

(mystical unification), a/ repentance (into oneself), b/ upon which, in that inwardness, in that 'immersion', 'god' is known in a 'one-word' way, c/ from which then follows some form of knowledge of being - e.g., an alchemical insight, a medicinal ability, a worshipful operation, a science (occult or non occult), a religious revelation, etc.). "For all knowing is summed up in this one knowing: he who communicates with God draws from the very source from which all truth springs." (o.c., 361).

(B) *Yet now listen carefully to what the eminent scholar says immediately afterwards,*

as a corrective: "Undoubtedly the piety, to which (this half-scientific half-religious literature) gives rise, exhibits very diverse forms." (o.c., 361) Here is the explanation, which he gives:

(i) the aura emanating from the stars (the astrotheological variant of 'god') are, if need be, personified in daimonic beings or, alternatively, are associated with daimones, whom one was supposed to propitiate by sacrificial rites and prayer formulas;

(ii) in other cases the 'astral' (i.e. to stars 'attached' (sumpatheia)) emanations are held for direct emanations of the 'First' (mean: Highest) God; in that case the 'piety' consists of becoming one with that omnipresent source of Being, after one has purified the 'eye' (i.e. the mystical faculty of knowing) of the soul by abstinence, avoidance and conscientious living. -

Ad (i): the first method leads, according to the writer, o.c., 362, to a demonology, the doctrine of daimones (the word 'devil' in our present language is not very suitable to convey precisely the antique meaning: the ancients did not see in it perfect beings but also not necessarily evil beings), - daimones doctrine, through which the Hellenistic world in fact revived the archaic and primitive world of living.

Ad (ii): the second method with its spiritualization and ethicization led, under some points of view, to Christianity. "It is not impossible that the same pagan souls alternately followed now one path, then another, that, after having immersed themselves in the coarsest magic and its 'operations', they lost themselves, afterwards, in arousals of love for the hypercosmic (i.e., transcending the cosmos) God. One encounters such disparate things in Emperor Julian." (o.c., 362).

Conclusion: the word 'mysticism' thus belongs to be determined as a/ repentance b/ to become one with an extra- or supernatural 'Power' (numen, sacred agency), either the highest being (the supernatural God) or a daimon (the extra-natural a/ 'gods' and 'goddesses' or even b/ 'dead men' such as swordsmen, heroes, etc.). The word 'theo.sophy' should also be understood in its part 'theo-' as ambiguous.

Note -

a/ For the ‘technical side’ of theosophy, mysticism or whatever one wants to call it now, I refer to W. Tenhaeff, *Het spiritisme*, (Spiritism), ‘s-Gravenhage, 1971-5, p. 237/252 (Het meta-organisme) about the soul-body as organ of sensitivity and p. 253/277 (*Rond het probleem der uittreding*) about the out-of-body experience by means of the soul-body as an instrument of theosophic or mystic ‘knowledge’ (‘gnosis’). Indeed, insofar as ancient theosophy had to do with daimones - understood as gods (see above p. 17 on the twofold concept of God) or heroes or at least as ‘psychically’ gifted beings in the hereafter - it would now be called ‘spiritism’ (spirit summoning). -

b/ For the technical side of the unio mystica with the Supreme Being, a part of theosophy or mysticism, I refer to G. Walther, *Phänomenologie der Mystik*, (Phenomenology of mysticism), Olten/Freiburg i.Br. 1955², where one finds a phenomenological description of a Catholic mystic with regard to her experience of God.

- Remark.

How varied “theosophy” or “mysticism” can be, is shown by M. Buber, *Extatische konfessionen*, (Extatic confessions), Berlin, s.d., a book that offers in anthology form texts from the Indian, Islamic, Neo-Platonic, Gnostic and Christian mystical literature; as well as by R. C. Zaehner, *Mysticism (Sacred and Profane)*, Oxford, 1957, in which natural mysticism, pantheistic and theistic mysticism are separated.

Of course, a classic such as A. Poulain, *Des grâces d’ oraison (Traité de théologie mystique)*, (Graces of prayer (Treatise on mystical theology), Paris, 1901, is still more than recommendable (especially for people who want to take the dangerous path of theosophy or modern related forms of mysticism). In a more Patristic sense, A. Stolz, *Théologie et mystique*, Chevetogne, 1947 (Dt. original: Salzburg, 1935) is also recommended: one feels through it the Christianization of the ancient theosophies.

- Remark. -

The word ‘gnosis’ (originally meaning ‘knowledge’, has already been used above:

a/ Festugière, o.c., 360, says that this word designates “the knowledge of the divine - to be understood in the broad sense outlined above of ‘extra- and supernatural’ secrets”(which amounts to an illumination, i.e. a light emanating from some ‘divine’ (extra- and/or supernatural) power), to distinguish this knowledge-type from the secular, usually called ‘rational’, knowledge.

b/ But ‘gnosis’ or better Gnosticism also means one movement out of the multitude of theosophies (which wanted to create a theosophical Christianity but outside the Church, yes, against the Church). -- So that the name ‘gnosis’ is ambiguous!

Hellenistic-Roman syncretism - ‘Syncretism’ is eclecticism but with a pejorative note (i.e., the bringing together of disparate, unrelated things, including inferior things, in a systemless or coherence-less manner). Often the word is also used for eclecticism in the religious field.

Syncretism, like theosophy and mysticism, can be understood, as R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, *Syncretism*, in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1967, v. 21, p. 565, says, as “an unconscious, natural development” that one encounters in all cultures. However, three variants attach to this.--

(1) The first fashionable form

a/ as at the time of Hellenism and the Roman Empire, which took strongly the form of a growing flood by Eastern religion of the West, or

b/ as at our days now: does not M. Eliade, *Méhistophélès et l' androgyne*, Paris, 1962, p.7, say: “A.N. Whitehead has said that the history of Western philosophy was finally a series of footnotes on the philosophy of Platon. It is doubtful whether Western thought will be able to hold its own in that splendid isolation (= pillarization). The modern period differs too much from the previous periods for that: it is characterized by the confrontation with ‘strangers’, ‘foreigners’ and their worlds, - strange worlds, which come across as unfamiliar, exotic or archaic.

The discoveries of depth psychology as well as the appearance on the horizon of history of non-European ethnic groups actually represent the incursion of “strangers” into the previously closed field of Western consciousness. (...) The Western world is in the process of radically changing itself as a result of these discoveries and encounters.” A new humanism (understood as paideia, culture type), which will be something different from what we know so far, is growing:

a/ Orientalism, **b/** history of religion, **c/** depth psychology - and we can safely add sensitivity training and Movement of the Human Potential - all this should be processed in a contemporary “syncretism” (which M.Eliade points out in his *Occultisme, sorcellerie et modes culturelles*, (Occultism, witchcraft and cultural trends), Paris, 1976 (Eng.: 1976)). -

(ii) The second methodical form

of syncretism is the ordered will, in cultural confrontations, to adopt or exchange valuable elements and aspects: the strongest form is e.g. a pagan who converts to Christianity because, after mature deliberation, the Christian religion appears to him as the truth, without, however, throwing the rest of his culture overboard (e.g. by giving a mystery cult custom a Christian application). The Jesuit mission in China assumed adaptation to Chinese culture. Contemporary hermeneutics of proclamation seek a point of contact with the hearer in order to proclaim the Message, starting from there. -

In all of this, “syncretism” takes place, which **a/** brings together elements that do not belong together **b/** in a methodical way. Thus, one feels that in the Hellenistic-Roman period, countless people systematically selected and brought together elements, without further pretense. --

(iii) The second methodical form

The ideological sunkrètismos goes further: one is convinced that the truth, is in the synthesis of various elements; one seeks, whether loosely or systematically, an overarching view of the multiplicity of cultural elements. -- The three forms easily intertwine.

The great late antique cities are the centers of syncretism par excellence.

Alexandria (Egypt), for example, is a melting pot of religious and philosophical 'synthesis': thus Ptolemaios I Soter (-367/ -282), the first Macedonian king of Egypt (after Alexander's death),- the founder of the worship services of Serapis (Osiris) and Alexander; Ptolemaios, II, Philadelfos (-308/-246), the successor of Pt. I, was the creator of most of the scientific system of Ptolemaic financial administration as an "enlightened monarch.

This did not prevent him from introducing the ruler worship, with priesthood, of Alexander and extending it to a growing number of dynasty members; he who, on the island of Faros in the bay of Alexandria, built a tower of light, he who built the Mouseion and the library at Alexandria, was at the same time the protector of the seventy translators of the Old Testament and the phallus worshipper, who had a ritual phallus one hundred and twenty cubits long carried around in procession and reverently venerated by the people and sung in verse. -

At Alexandria will arise, from Antiochos of Askalon (+ -68) and Poseidonios of Apameia (+ -50), Neo-Platonism, which D. Barbadette, *Le Neo-Platonisme Alexandrin*, in *Dictionnaire pratique des connaissances religieuses*, Paris, 1927, t.v.v., p. 623, called Alexandrian eclecticism or syncretism (about which more later). -

Rome is, after Alexandria, the second great melting pot of religions and ideas: H. Pinard de la Boullaye, *L' étude comparée des religions, I (Son histoire dans le monde occidental)*, (The comparative study of religions, I (Its history in the Western world),), Paris, 1929-4, pp. 43/44, mentions that Mithriacism (Mithras worship: Mithras is an ancient Indo-Iranian sun-god, already known to the Hellenes t. Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/)), with astrotheological elements mixed in via Chaldea (Mesopotamia), penetrated Rome around -60 (under Pompey's consulate ?); that the Isis cult (Isis, an Egyptian sky queen, the wife of Osiris and the mother of Horus, - main figures in the oldest Egyptian religion), after being legally forbidden in -58, -53, -50, -48, yes, up to under Emperor Tiberius in +19, is allowed under Emperor Caligula (-37/+41).

The Anatolian mother goddess Kubele (Cybele), the central figure, with Attis, her young consort, in Anatolia's fertility religion(s), from Frugia, is introduced to Rome in -204, yet only made venerable to the Romans under Emperor Claudius (+41/+54).

Under the Severi (emperors from +193/ +235), the Syrian Baals become almost the dominant religious figures (Baal 'Lord', 'Possessor' is the name given in the Old Testament to Western Semitic (Canaanite) deities (with Asherah (= Astarte) as their female counterpart) who control fertility). -

That Rome is also a philosophical fusion center is clear from the following pages. - Around +110, Tacitus (+55/+120), the Great Roman Stoic historian, writes that at Rome, in his days, coming from all sides and displayed; all 'atrocia' ('cruel things') or 'pudenda' shameful things) can be seen. (Annal., 15: 44).

Religions and religious revival(s).

H. Pinard d.l. Boullaye, o.c., 44/ 45, points out that three layers can be distinguished concerning religion:

(i) at the base the local or local religions

The primordial populations that made up the Roman Empire, in which the 'superstitions', i.e. folkloric remnants of the ancient archaic clan and tribal religions live tough.

(ii)a. the political religions,

which fall into two types, a1/ the national - the folk religions of the nations that made up the Roman Empire, and which are already, in themselves, an amalgam (eclecsis, syncretism, 'synthesis') of more local religions - and a2/ the one, international, general-Roman official state religion(s) and also imperial religions (which is not quite the same as Roman religions);

(ii)b. - What Pinard does not mention - the intellectual-religions,

b1/ which differ from the local primal-religious traditions among other things by their emphasis

1/ on the 'classical' (i.e., since Proto-Sophistician times the individual) human being,

2/ on a kind of ethicization (i.e., a moral purification of so-called immoral (i.e., chthonic in particular) and magical (regarded by secularizing intellectuals as 'superstition') elements and aspects - all this together is called 'spiritualization' - and

b2/ which differ from the official, political religion(s) by being non-officially bound and by being theoretical. -

The imperial period is a time of religious revival. This was clarified, among other things, by E. Eyben, *De religieuze beleving van de jongeman tijdens de Romeinse oudheid* (The religious experience of the young man during Roman antiquity), in *Onze Alma Mater* (Louvain), vol. 27 (1973):3 (pp. 172/188) - see above p. 80 (Euripides' Hippolutos, one example of 'mysticism' or 'theosophy') -

Two major layers can be distinguished in the 'revival' (to use a contemporary word now, which rather indicates one kind of revival):

(i) religious philosophies, such as 1/ the Stoa (exalted idea of God, cosmic religion (conceived astrotheologically), high morality of duty) 2/ the mystical Alexandrian or Neo-Pythagorism (meant strict mortification, prayer, meditation, liturgy, 'mystery' ((in)consecration) and 3/ the mystical Neo- or Alexandrian Platonism (theosophy, 'mystery' or (in)consecration, magic, miracles, prophecy, world- and especially substance- and body-less ethics and ecstasy);

(ii) mystery religions or mystery cults,

i.e. **a/** more or less described by many antiquities, **b/** but only since the Aalst man F.Cumont (Aalst, 1888/1947), internationally known specialist of late antique religions, especially Mithricism, and R. Reitzenstein, clearly delineated religion-types, which H. Obbink, *Cybele, Isis, Mithras (Oosterse godsdiensten in het Romeinse Rijk, (Cybele, Isis, Mithras (Oriental religions in the Roman Empire), Haarlem, 1965)*, typifies as follows: **a/** within the framework of an esoteric 'congregation' (small group), **b/** in which no class distinction is valid anymore, **c/** one practices theosophy or mysticism (see above), **d/** centered around a bringer of salvation or heiland, who by his death and resurrection, brings salvation to those who participate in its 'mysteries' liturgy

Much has been written about the “mysteries,” though sometimes extremely hypothetical because the commandment of silence that prevailed in the mystery communities has hidden much. Nevertheless, the theosophical character and the figure of the savior emerges, which is a resurrection of the klan and tribal damsels of the archaic religions. Cf. P.W. Schmidt, SVD, *Heilbringer bei den Naturvölkern*, (Healers among primitive peoples), in *Settimana Internazionale di Etnologia Religiosa*, IVa Sessione, Milano 17/25 Sept. 1925, Paris, 1926, pp. 247/261, article in which the renowned Catholic historian of religion gives name, task, astral-mythological forms, relationship to the Supreme Being (here the primal monotheist is speaking!), origin and ethnological antiquity of the salvific messenger are briefly but thoroughly discussed; in the same report book, reference should be made to H. Junker, *Die Osirisreligion und der Erlösungsgedanke bei den Aegyptern*, (The Osiris religion and the idea of redemption among the Egyptians), *ibid.*, pp. 276/290; to B. Allo, *Les dieux sauveurs du paganisme gréco-romain*, (The saving gods of Greco-Roman paganism), *ibid.*, pp. 290/304, where the author concludes:

a/ the divine saviors of ancient paganism granted only, an earthly salvation, especially health.

b/ The mysteries and mystical religions of the syncretistic era secured the salvation of the soul through magical rites or forms of gnosis, which only very sporadically very feebly and accidentally sought to purify the moral life. This salvation was the result of union with a higher deity and not with the second-class figures of the ‘suffering gods’.” (o.c. 304).

H. von Glasenapp, *De niet-christelijke godsdiensten* (The non-Christian religion), Antwerp/Utrecht, 1967, pp. 116/118, gives a typology of the Hellenistic mysteries:

a/ Greek mystery ‘games’,

The ones indigenous to Hellas were:

(1) the Eleusinian mysteries (Dèmèter, Korè, Jakchos), in which, from Emperor Augustus onwards, many emperors had themselves initiated - these were very old and well known in Hellas;

(2) the Dionysian Mysteries (cf. p. 12/13 above, in connection with Orphism, which, as a religion of mystery, was also centered around Dionusos as the bringer of salvation rising from his ashes);

(3) the Sabazios mystery plays, centered around Sabazios (Sao(u)azios, a Thracian-Phrygian serpent god, sometimes confused with Kurios Sabaoth of the Septuagint (syncretistic);

(4) the Orphic Mysteries, about which, in passing, higher, now and then (pp. 15, 17, 18 (the(i)osis by Pythagoras as known with Orphism), 33/34 (Empedokles, 54 (exiled-soul myth), 80 Euripides), 175 (Hellenistic Orphic hymnody)), - indicating the great influence of the Orphic Mysteries on Hellenistic philosophy;

(5) the Samothracian mysteries, which were centered around the Kabires (chthonic deities) (about which supra pp. 129, 130, - Aristotle and Alexandros were initiated.

(b) Eastern Mysteries from Anatolia.

(Kubele, Attis (her son-lover), from Egypt (Isis, Osiris (also called Serapis or Sarapis since the Ptolemaics)) from Persia (Mithra (s), whose shrines were discovered as far away as Vienna and Frankfurt and even (in 1954) in London. The Syrian Baals does not name the author.

The relationship between the Eastern and Hellenic Mysteries. -

“The Eastern Mysteries will always derive the most from the Mysteries of Demeter, when they shall enter into the Greek world.” Thus E. Des Places, *La religion grecque (Dieux, cultes, rites et sentiment religieux dans la Grèce antique)*, (Greek religion (Gods, cults, rites and religious feeling in ancient Greece) Paris, 1969, p. 307.

What do they derive from the Eleusinian mysteries? E. Briem, *Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung der Hellenistischen Mysterien*, (On the question of the origin of the Hellenistic Mysteries), Lund/Leipzig, 1928, S. 41 says that the Hellenic religion provided the groundwork for Hellenistic syncretism. Yet he discusses the Babylonian and Egyptian mysteries first: “The main task of the ancient Eastern mysteries - the Babylonian and the Egyptian - was thus, concludes the author, o.c., S. 46, by an act of worship and sacrament in which the deity was

- a/ mimically-dramatically fights against the powers of evil and death and
- b/ overcoming them, securing life in its entirety.

In Babylonia this was not the case; they did not continue the train of thought and did not come to the conclusion that life is safeguarded by the Mysteries even after death, that things will be better and happier in the hereafter for the participants in the feast of worship than for others. In Egypt with its strong interest in death and life after death, on the other hand, it was natural to arrange the whole set-up in this way.

The intermediate step was undoubtedly embalming: this was originally a pure preservation process of the corpse; however, it is incorporated into the Osiris cult in which, in addition to the dead man, the dead god was also embalmed. Thus the entire Osiris cult drama was transferred to man: just as Osiris died and rose, so too will man who is treated in the same way. (...)

A line of thought, which developed into a complete identification of the dead (human) with Osiris. As far as we can now judge, however, they did not go so far in Egypt as to regard a union with Osiris already in this life as a guarantee of immortality, so that they had living people play the role of the god in the cultic drama, in order to become one with him already in this life and to acquire a completely secure basis for immortality.

This step was taken in the Hellenistic Mysteries.” The novelty of the Hellenistic Mysteries is: “The mystic (i.e. initiate into the Mysteries) does not merely look at the fighting god; he himself plays the role of the god and becomes a god who overcomes death.” (o.c., 49). The deification idea we have already signaled above (p. 18). -

a/ Where exactly the sacramental act at Eleusis consisted in, one no longer knows (because of the commandment of silence) - one thinks that, in the ‘sacred’ basket a female genitalia was carried around processionally (o.c., 54) -

b/ it is practically certain that the oldest (Mycenaean) Eleusinian rites were fertility rites (of a chthonic nature);

c/ either it is certain that, in more recent times, a betterment of fate after death was central.

-- E. Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsg.*, 1972 (Eng.), 1977 (Dt), S. 174, says that the Minoans and Mycenaean -- for the actual Hellenes -- had no temples but

(i) palace sanctuaries, as at Knossos (where, therefore, were the private chapels of the Minoan kings) and at Eleusis, where there was first a Mycenaean palace and then, in the same place, the mystery hall was built, called "the king's house," so that the first Eleusinian mysteries may have been the private mysteries of a Mycenaean royal family -

According to Dieterich and Körte the main sacramental act would have been that the mystic (= initiate) took a female genital statuette as an imitation of the mother's womb, took it from the sacred basket, slipped it over his body (to symbolize his rebirth from the womb of the Earth Mother), as a telluric rite of fertility (see E. Briem, *Zur Frage*, S. 54), - where 'fertile' should be understood broadly, i.e. as aiming at the fertility of every effort (not only plant or animal or human fertility, which in it represents only one kind, i.e. the reproductive effort);

(ii) The other cult sites of Minoans and Mycenaean, according to Dodds, o.c., 174, were mountain dens and walled quarters on mountain tops (again, really archaic 'places' power-laden!) - E. Briem, o.c., 55, quotes the Homeric Demeter hymns (5: 480/ 483:

"Olbios, i.e., blessed, is he among men on earth who has seen 'tade' (these things), (viz. the hiera or sacred images and the rite in which they are used; - symbolic rite, which visibly contemporarizes the deity, so that, actually, in and through this symbolic rite (= sacramental cultic drama, the core of all 'mysterion', mysterium (in)ordination), one sees the deity, in her struggle with death and her resurrection from death, which

a/ here closely corresponds to spring after winter - agrarian -

b/ but meaning more than that, i.e. life in all its facets, including the afterlife), blessed who has seen 'these things': the one who does not attain these holy goods, the one who is unhappy, will, once perishing under the influence of the mold-moist darkness (i.e. in the underworld never suffer the fate of his peers (abbreviated: who did not 'see' those 'holy things')." (Cf. Dodds, o.c., 179).

"Here we have, in plain language, the earliest European formulation of a religious dogma, which has had a long (if not exactly glorious) history,-the dogma that salvation in the hereafter depends on participation in certain rites in this world. It goes back at least to the seventh century B.C.; whether it goes back even further, we do not know at present (it could be Mycenaean; it could also be a product of the archaic period of Greece).

In any case, it made Eleusis, during classical and post-classical times, one of the greatest religious centers in the world." Thus Dodds, o.c., 179/180)). -

Incidentally, the Demetermythe, with her daughter Korè, abducted by Hades, is also about underworld residence and earthly fertility.

Note - For the Mithras Mysteries cf. F. Cumont, *Les mystères de Mithra*, (The Mysteries of Mithras), Bruxelles, 1913³; M. Vermaseren, *Mithra, ce dieu mystérieux*, (Mithra, this mysterious god), Paris / Bruxelles, 1960; - more general is F. Farwerck, *De mysteriën der oudheid en hun inwijdingsriten*, (The mysteries of antiquity and their rites of initiation), I, Hilversum, 1960,- in which one chapter in particular is pointed out, viz. *Magie en mysteriën* (p. 2/126):

- 1/ jargon,
- 2/ preparations (vegetarianism, sexual abstinence, etc.),
- 3/ clothing and masks
- 4/ sacrifices (cake, animal, blood sacrifices, etc.),
- 5/ spoken words,
- 6/ performance time (preferably at night), -

all of which point to magic as the structure of the mysteries; but in particular ecstasy (rapture (and expansion of consciousness; cf. o.c., 127/135) and other forms of ‘floating attention’ with its ‘free associations’), visions (the ‘seeing’ of the appearance of ghosts of deceased persons, of daimons, of gods and goddesses) and predictions (prophecy in the stricter sense), which accompanied the initiation, especially if it could be labelled ‘successful’, point to the result of the magical act and to its ‘theosophical’ character; so that the author concludes:

“From the examples given it is abundantly clear that the similarity between magical acts and mysteries is so great that we may assume that magic played a large part in the initiations, indeed, that the entire initiation was essentially a magical process, although of course other elements were also involved.” (o.c., 114). It is, at once, clear that Theosophy too was “essentially” magic. The structural similarity is too striking for this. -

After-effects. -

E. Briem, *Zur Frage*, S. 67, says: “The view that participation in the cultic mystium offers to man a guarantee of eternal life and union with God, pervades even more Christianity with its strongly eschatological (i.e. concerning the end times) slant taken from Judaism. For the Hellenistic Mysteries do not represent the end of the series of development.

This development continues in Christianity with its cultic mystery elaborated on Hellenistic soil: although Western Christianity is taking new paths, the entire Eastern Hellenistic cultic drama is still alive and well in the Greek Orthodox Church.” - Dom Odo Casel, the great Benedictine, once devoted himself to spreading among us, Western Christians, something like a cultic mystery concept regarding Catholic liturgy and the like (cf. O. Casel, *Glaube, Gnosis, Mysterium*, Münster (W.), 1941). About which later. -

The Incarnation of Christ,

The Incarnation of Christ, as the eternal Son of God, his suffering and death - descent into the underworld - the analogue of Hades of the chthonic Hellenistic religion -, his resurrection from the dead, his ascension into heaven and the sending forth of the Spirit as the result of that ‘mystery event’ - all this is presented in the liturgy in a figurative way (especially in the consecration of the Mass), is the Christian mystery of the cult - according to E. Briem, o.c., S. 67 - still countless numbers seek help in their distress therein, says Briem.

Apocalypticism. -

S. Aalen, *Apocalypticism*, in *Biblical Historical Dictionary*, I, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1969 (Dt. orig.: Göttingen, 1962/1966), p. 94vv. defines 'apocalypticism' as

(i) the literary genre to be found, in part, in the so-called apocalyptic books and (ii) the thought content that forms the basis of those books.

Central is the revelation or unveiling through visions of divine secrets concerning

(ii)a. diachronically, the structure of universe and world history (prehistory, salvation history turning points, end times especially),

(ii)b. synchronically, the role of the deity, the 'angels' (good spirits) and 'demons' (evil spirits) and other sometimes vaguely defined 'powers' active in the universe and the human world, - the two worlds, this world (the secular side of existence) and the other world ('hereafter'),

(ii)a/b. especially the general and private or even individual 'eschatology', better called 'judgment theory', which clarify the hereafter consequences of the ethically good (reward) or ethically bad (punishment) on this earth (heaven-hell).

S. Aalen says that many religions have such revelations, but that an "Apocalypse" of the end times is rare. -

Thinking in 'world period(s)' -

'World period' is not used here in a general but specifically religious sense, i.e. for religiously understood world era(s). -

(i) The Hellenes knew, since Hesiod of Askra (-80/-700) - see page 9 supra about the mythical theologians -, in his *Werken en dagen* (Works and days), metallicity imagined 'world-time-periods', viz. the golden (paradisiacal, realized under Kronos), the silver (with sickness, aging, grief, labor), the bronze and the (current) iron era (the latter with its 'Pandora's box', in which all 'evils' were contained but not without the 'elpis' or hope).

Hesiod wishes (ff 174v.) to have been born either before the present iron age or after the present iron age, so that there is talk of cycles (kuklos, cyclic view). -- In Iran one also knew four metallicity indicated empires as well as four periods of three thousand years; in Indusland one also knew cycles; also among Chaldeans (Mesopotamia) one spoke of ten elders before the deluge and several periods thereafter (until Alexander the Great and until the end of the world).

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(ii) Judaism recognizes, among other things, four world empires (symbolized in horns, metals, animals (so Dan 2: 38/43), yearly weeks and 'jubilees' (so Dan 9:24), etc. The New Testament rather limited itself to two 'world-periods', this 'world' and the 'world to come' (Mt 12:32, where sin against the Holy Spirit as not forgiven neither in this world nor in the next is discussed). The Church, e.g. through St. Augustine and Bossuet, also speaks of world-periods: thus in *De civitate Dei* there is also mention of a divine and an earthly 'world-kingdom'. -- Thinking in 'aniones' (eons, 'ages' or 'eternities'). -- This word means something analogous to 'world-period', yet 1/ far or 2/ long and this in the extraordinary degree (extraordinarily far or long).

M. Rissi, Eon, in *Biblical Historical Dictionary*, II, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1969, pp. 11/12, says that in the Old Testament, there are three variants of this large-scale world(age)

a1/ extraordinarily far in the past (prehistoric times, ‘in the beginning’; e.g. Gen 6:4 about the Nefilim (‘giants’) who lived on earth ‘in those days’),

a2/ extraordinarily far in the future (so Gen 13;15 about the land Yahweh gives to Abraham and ‘his posterity forever’) or

b/ extraordinarily long-lasting; (‘everlasting’, - as in Gen 21:33, where Abraham plants a tamarisk at Bersabee, calling on the name of Yahweh the ‘everlasting’ God).

-- In Judaism, especially its apocalypses and its wisdom books, the word “century” (eon) takes on the connotation of hereafter or coming, contrasted with “this” world.

-- In the New Testament these Old Testament and Jewish meanings recur; e.g. when one speaks of ‘eternal’ (aionic) life (i.e. hereafter life); also the doctrine of the two eons or centuries (or worlds), developed in Judaism, from the first century before Christ (see above), occurs (the present and the coming or future ‘century’ (‘world’)).

Remark. - There is also a Gnostic meaning, which practically does not occur in the Bible, i.e. eon as personification (hypostasis); better to call them ‘eon beings’.

Genesis and types of ‘apocalypticism’. -

After this digression into world-historical thought, one can now understand what follows.

(1). The Jewish apocalyptic.- From +/- -200 to +/- +200 the Jewish apocalyptic flourished. Yet there are older examples: Isa. 24/27 (on the judgment of God with destruction, messiah faith, triumph), Isa. 65/66 (end of the book); Ezek. 37/48 (beginning with the vision of the barren bones). -

a/ This literature is Prophetic (and continues the Israelite prophecies)

b/ yet there are non-Israelite elements and aspects and alienating ones too (so mysterious images, numbers-‘mysticism’; so also visions; or so called ‘testaments’ of ‘wise men’ (‘prophets’, ‘seers’) from prehistoric times, to whom they are attributed, Enoch e.g.) The *Sitz im Leben* (situation from which this way of speaking and especially writing becomes understandable) is the difficult times one experiences.

- Hellenistic-Jewish

are the Sibylline oracles (sayings of God), put in the name of the so-called Sibylle (fortune-teller, visionary), which can be found in various places and which described the course of history - texts of which Jews, but even more Christians, made use in order to proclaim their philosophy of history in Hellenistic circles. The main contents are:

a/ defense of biblical monotheism against idolatry;

b/ announcement of the great world judgment at the end of time (with paradise to follow)

- Religions and religious revival(s) or “revivals”. -

H. Pinard d.l. Boullaye, o.c., 44/ 45, points out that three layers can be distinguished regarding religion:

(i) at the base the local or local religions of the primordial populations that made up the Roman Empire, in which the ‘superstitiones’, i.e. folkloric remnants of the ancient archaic clan and tribal religions live on with an archaic life;

(ii)a. the political religions, which fall into two types,

a1/ the national - the folk religions of the nations that made up the Roman Empire, and which are already, in themselves, an amalgam (eklektis, syncretism, ‘synthesis’) of more local religions - and

a2/ the one, international, general-Roman official state religion(s) and also imperial religions (which is not quite the same as Roman religions);

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b1/ which differ from the local primal-religious traditions among other things by their emphasis

1/ on the ‘classical’ (i.e., since Proto-Sophistician times the individual) human being

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b2/ which differ from the official, political religion(s) by being non-officially bound and by being theoretical.

-- The imperial period is a time of religious revival.

This was clarified, among other things, by E. Eyben, *De religieuze beleving van de jongeman tijdens de Romeinse oudheid* (The religious experience of the young man during Roman antiquity), in *Onze Alma Mater* (Leuven), vol. 27 (1973): 3 (pp. 172/188) - see above p. 80 (Euripides’ Hippolitos, one example of ‘mysticism’ or ‘theosophy’) -

Two major layers can be distinguished in the ‘revival’ (to use a contemporary word now, which rather indicates one kind of revival):

(i) religious philosophies, such as 1/ the stoa (exalted idea of God, cosmic religion (conceived astrotheologically), high morality of duty), 2/ the mystical Alexandrian or Neopythagorism (meant strict mortification, prayer, meditation, liturgy, ‘mystery’ ((in)consecration) and 3/ the mystical Neo- or Alexandrian Platonism (theosophy, ‘mystery’ or (in)consecration, magic, miracles, prophecy, world- and especially substance- and body-less ethics and ecstasy);

(ii) the ‘mysteries’, mystery religions or mystery cults, viz.

a/ described more or less veer by many ancient writers, but only since F. Cumont (1868/1947), the Aalst-born internationally known specialist of late antique religions, especially Mithricism, and R. Reitzenstein, clearly defined type of religion, which H. Obbink, Cybele, *Isis, Mithras (Oriental religions in the Roman Empire*, Haarlem, 1965, typifies as follows:

a/ within the framework of an esoteric-swimming ‘congregation’ (small group), b/ in which no class distinction applies anymore, c/ one practices theosophy or mysticism (see above). d/ centered around a savior or savior, who through his death and resurrection, brings salvation to those who participate in its ‘mysteries’ - liturgy.

-- The ancient Christian apocalyptic. -

This forms the background of Jesus' action and proclamation: He assumes the two 'ages', this one and the one to come; He also assumes that 'the end' is approaching. He considers Himself the 'Son of Man', proclaiming yes, deploying the 'Kingdom of God' (Dan 7). -

Thus the synoptic 'apocalypse' of Mk 13: 4vv: "When Jesus thereupon left the temple, one of His disciples said to Him, 'Behold, Master, what stones! What buildings!' Jesus said to him, 'Do you see all these great buildings? Well, not one stone will remain on the other, but all will be destroyed! And, as He sat, on the Mount of Olives, opposite the temple, Peter, James, John, and Andrew questioned Him separately, "Tell us when this will happen, and what will be the sign of it all being fulfilled."

Thereupon Jesus began to tell them, "Beware that no one deceives you! For many will act in my name and claim to be me. And they will deceive many. And, when ye shall hear of wars and rumors of war, be not alarmed, for all this must come to pass, but it is not yet the end. People will rise up sign people, empire against empire: there will be earthquakes and famines, here and elsewhere. But all this is only the beginning of the woe." So much for this excerpt from the synoptic apocalypse (to briefly outline the so-called "signs" of the end times).

(2) The theme of the apocalyptic. -

S. Aalen summarizes them under three heads. -

a/ Synchronicity: a universe image with especially the throne of God, (in heaven, yes, heaven itself), as a symbol of God's working exercise of his royal power in creation, surrounded by his heavenly court - one thinks of Dan 7:9vv., where one speaks of the aged (old of days); one thinks of the son of man (with whom Jesus identifies himself) as judge of the end times -; that same universe, with its parts (a physical or cosmology), with its stars and weather phenomena, with its (if need be seven) heavens, its earth and its underworld, is sketched in visions and 'revelations' of all kinds (voices speaking e.g.).

b/ Diachronic

1/ overview of the history of salvation, especially the end times, with its earthly and its hereafter (heavenly or hellish) 'realms' (world ages, eons), which are either contrasted or harmonized;

2/ Therein the so-called eschatology, better called theology of judgment, gets a large share: as in the mysteries, the nadir of life gets a special interest: heaven, hell, after death or after the world judgment, as reward or punishment, with an intermediate stage between individual death and general world judgment, - all that is sketched in visions and other communications. As D. S. Russell, *Apocalyptic Literature*, in. Enc. Britann., 1967, 2, pp. 112/115, says, the Book of Daniel and the Apocalypse (Book of Revelation) of John are two typical works that give such an outline.

- D.S. Russell, a.c., characterizes the apocalyptic literature as follows:

a/ Sitz im Leben is mainly the persecution and the troubled times when the people (Jews, Christians, Hellenistic Jews and/or Christians) were very interested readers of such literature;

b/ the authors disappear behind “chosen ones” (Adam, Ezra, etc.), to whom God had communicated revelations of divine secrets and which are now made public, now that the time of their realization has come (pseudonymous literature);

c/ the nature of these books is ‘esoteric’ (heard by extra- and supernatural means (visions, dreams, transports, auditions, interpretations); their language is strongly symbolic (symbolic); animals represent people, nations; stars represent fallen angels, etc.

Note.- Zoroastrianism (Zarathustra religion in Iran) has apparently left its mark on Biblical and Para-biblical apocalypticism (which in itself is a form of syncretism).

Conclusion.- The comparison between

a/ the Hellenistic mysticism, mysteries and theosophies, on the one hand, and

b/ on the other, the Biblical apocalypses (Jewish and Christian):

1/ makes it clear that a structural similarity is present: the same universe picture, the same history picture, the same emphasis on judgment (eschatological aspect); the same external and supernatural sources of knowledge.

2/ However, this identity is not complete: the sharply opposing monotheism, moralism (the strong emphasis on a moral high life) and perhaps most of all messianism (the belief in the salvific role of ‘savior’, played by the Messiah), - these three characteristics exclude the Biblical apocalyptic or Hellenistic syncretism with its mystic-mysterical theosophy. -

One also does not forget that first the Alexandrian, then the Roman empire formed the common framework (Sitz im Leben) of the two.

After-effects. -

Two modern activities in particular continue apocalypticism’s special effect on prophecy:

a/ the basic research of historiography, as e.g. G. Harmsen, *Introduction to History*, Baarn, 1968, offers;

b/ the philosophy of history, this second type of reflection on historiography, which exposes the philosophical methods at work in historiography and in its foundation research; thus

W. Dray; *Philosophy of History*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964 (as a general overview);

R. Lavollée, *La morale dans l’histoire (Etude sur les principaux systèmes de philosophie de l’histoire depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à nos jours)*, (Morality in history (Study on the main systems of philosophy of history from antiquity to the present day)), Paris, 1892 (still worthwhile, including on G. Vico (1668/1744));

J. Daniélou, *Essai sur le mystère de l’histoire*, (Essay on the mystery of history), Paris, 1953;

K.Löwith, *World History (philosophical and biblical)*, Antwerp, 190;

H.Butterfield, *Christianity and History*, London, 1950. –

It should be noted here that it is not so much ancient Hellas as biblical revelation that favors historical thought’.

IIIB(I) The Theosophical Pioneers (-50/+250).

The Theosophists fall into two major types, the trailblazers, and the actual Neo-Platonists. Therefore, the two following chapters. -- Since the pioneers originate from two - three different centers, one should classify them into

a/ Pagan Theosophists (Hermeticists, Neo-Pythagoreans and Middle-Platonicians (who showed Pythagorean tendency; see higher p. 262);

b/ Biblical theosophists (Jewish-Alexandrian theosophists with Philon the Jew as the main figure) and Gnostic-Manichean theosophists).

(I)a. The gentile theosophical pioneers.-.

As a general thought one may indicate: dualism assuming an interval between God, with his divine ideas (which one identifies with the Pythagorean numerical forms and with the Platonic ideas), on the one hand, and, on the other, matter. These two stand in opposition to each other a/ as good and evil, b/ as light and darkness (hence the name 'light metaphysics', see above pages 99 and 102 on Platon), c/ as salvation and calamity; - between these two extremes stand first intermediate beings (especially the astral 'gods' and/or demons), then man); ethically one is oriented towards mysticism (and mystery religion).

(I)a1 Hermetism.

Hermetism is the tenor found in the Corpus Hermeticum. It is one of the many forms of theosophy, attributed, as it was then the custom, to some Eastern deity, prophet or magician. Here Hermes Trismegistos is mentioned as the mediator of revelations. The epithet 'trismégistos' (three times very great) is peculiar to Egypt as an epithet of a deity (ââ = megas megas).

Hermes, in itself one of the younger gods of the Hellenic pantheon (in fact one of the most archaic), was, with time, 'mixed', (identified) with the Egyptian god Thot (which was already established by Herodotus of Halikarnassos (-484/-424) (cf. p. 41 supra). The Hermes of the collection of writings of a mystical nature under that name has to do with the Hellenic god, but with what Hellenes, in Egypt, especially at Alexandria, attributed to Thot-Hermes, especially from the third century B.C. onward (according to P. Festugière, *La rev. d' Herm. Tr.*, I, Paris, 1944, pp. 67, 88).

The works date from the third century B.C. and later, are large in number and cover a wide field of domains; they represent the living religion of popular and developed people of the Roman Empire, especially in Egypt but also elsewhere. -

The role of Thot (Hermes). -

This is threefold:

a/ either Thot receives in dream form (oniric revelation) 'knowledge' (gnosis) of the highest truths concerning God, human soul and fisis, on account of the Nous (Intellectus, Reason), i.e. the Supreme God;

b/ or the same Thot descends on earth as a prophet of the aforementioned truths in order to pass them on to disciples (thus e.g. to Asklepion, Tat, king Ammon),

c/ or Isis, taught by Thot, acts as a transmitter to her son Horus of the same truths.

As mentioned above, the content, of the writings (= revelations) is:

a/ theological, cosmogonic (the fuis in its genesis), anthropogonic (the human fuis in its genesis) and eschatological (the consequences of human behavior in the coming aion ('century'); but that content is more than that:

b/ ethics (behavior determines gnosis; thus, right behavior causes gnosis) is important in the revelations; besides that, all human sciences are revealed, the occult (astrology, alchemy (see pp. 170/173 supra), magic, iatromathèmatikè (i.e. occult medicine), etc.) and the non occult (physical, astronomy, physiology, psychology, etc.).

In other words, it is the program that - supra pp. 7/8 (the six meanings of fuis) and p. 9 (philosophy, theology and professional sciences) - was outlined as the theme of Hellenic philosophy. Only the source of knowledge is special, i.e. esoteric-apocalyptic, which is consistent with the transrational meaning of fuis. As P. Festugière, o.c., 63, says not without exasperation: the sophos, sapiens, the sage who emerges from this, is a Doktor Faust (J. W. Goethe), 'le maître ès sciences occultes'. -

The 'seeing' of 'god'. -

The believing masses of late antiquity saw in the deity nearby, powerful, saving and healing 'people' of a higher order, who could be reached by entering their temple or by manipulating sacred objects associated with them ('sumpatheia').

The believing masses believed in dreams or visions in which 'gods' appeared: in the places of worship where the 'incubatio' (i.e. the 'saint' sleeps in a consecrated place in view of 'revelations') took place, one was 'visited' by e.g. Asklepios, the healing god. -

P. Festugière o.c., 51, says: "The Christians shared the established belief on that point." To say nothing of the New Testament, one notes that the most popular writings of Christian literature of the first centuries -

Pastor Hermae, the Acts of Martyrs, the apocryphal (not publicly accepted by the Church as inspired) Acts of Apostles, - later, the Lives of Saints - are full of dream visions in which God (or an angel) appears as a healer, revelator, or counselor."

This text by Festugière proves that one should not separate (well distinguish!) apocalypticism from theosophy. -- Plutarchos of Chaironeia (+45/+125), the higher named theosophical Middle Platonic, in his *On Isis and Osiris*, a work dedicated to a woman who was an initiate, says:

"The craving for the deity is the craving for the truth, especially for the truth concerning the gods; this craving is a desire, for which the study and the sleuthing resemble getting hold of sacred objects. This work of the mind is rather more sacred than all ritual purification or all sacristy care, and it is not the least dear to the goddess,

a/ whom ye revere above all things,

b/ Who is wise and sage and

c/ whose very name seems to indicate that knowing and science are particularly associated with her, since she is called, in Greek, Isis (...).

She collects, organizes, and gives by the hieros logos, the sacred communication, to those who are initiated into the theiosis, the deification, viz. that art which replaces fornication and pleasure-seeking by a life of restraint and by abstaining from abundant food and from carnal pleasures, - which gets us used to enduring the harshness and severity of religion, which culminates in the knowledge of the First God, the Supreme Lord, the Thoughtful One, - to seek Him, by keeping close to Her, by living with the Lord in Her intimacy, - to this end the goddess (Isis) exhorts.”(P. Festugière, o.c., 34).

-- Example of a god's mantel.

P. Festugière, o.c., 55/56, gives the account of the dream of Pharaoh Nektanebo (s) II (-359/-341), the last of the thirtieth dynasty.

“From (the hand of) Petèsis, the hieroglyphic engraver to King Nektanebo (s).-The year sixteen of Farmouthi, the 24th day, around the 22 -nd hour -follow Festugière: 5/6.07.-343 -, according to the natural order the first day of the full moon. During his stay in Memphis, King Nektanebo(s), after a sacrifice, asked the gods to reveal the future to him: he had the impression to see in a dream a boat made of papyrus - what in Egyptian is called ‘rômpe’ - that dropped anchor in Memphis.

On the boat was a large throne; on the throne sat the glorious benefactress who bestows the fruits of the earth, Isis, queen of the gods. All the gods of Egypt stood by her, to her right and left. Well, one among them strides toward the center - his size, by the king's estimate, was twenty-one elbow lengths - it was, by his Egyptian name, Onouris, in Greek Ares. He threw himself with his belly on the ground and said:

‘Come to me, goddess of the gods, - thou who hast immeasurable power, - who rules over all things in the world and who saves all the gods, Isis, be favorable to me, listen to me! As thou hast commanded, I have kept this region immaculate and healthy; and yet: while King Nektanebo(s) takes every possible care of me, Samaûs, whom thou hast charged with the office of high priest, has neglected my sanctuary and resisted my commands. I am excluded from my own sanctuary and the works in the aduton (i.e. that part of the temple forbidden to the unconsecrated) remain only half-finished because of the ill will of the chief priest. To this statement the queen of the gods did not answer. -

The prince, having had this vision, awoke and he ordered, in all haste, to send a messenger to Sebennutos (a city in Egypt) as far as the high priest and the prophet of Onouris. When both messengers were back at court before the king, he asked them what works were in progress in the temple, called Fersos.

They said, “Everything is finished except the engraving of the sacred letters on the stone buildings. (Which the monarch did finish.)”

- Second example of godly vision.-

The vision of the physician Thessalos. (If this is about Thassalos of Tralleis, then this text dates from the first century A.D.).

“Thessalos to Caesar Augustus, salvation! Many during their lives have tried, (...), to reveal the secret of many wonderful things, yet none of them has ever been able to work out his scheme because of the fateful darknesses that clouded his mind.

So it seems that I am the only one, among all those who have existed since the beginning of time, to have drawn up a wondrous discourse. Indeed, although I have undertaken a task that exceeds the limits of human powers, I have been able to crown it with the consummation that befits it, - not, however, without many trials and dangers.” -

Then Thessalos outlines his studies (grammar in Asia; philology, in Alexandria (see p. 162 supra, at bottom)).- “I was also uninterruptedly engaged in the lessons of the dialectical physicians (see above p. 250: perhaps the ‘dogmatic’ medicine), for I was burning with an incredible drive for this science.

Since the time had come for me to return home - for I was already sufficiently advanced in medicine - I started to rummage through libraries in search of science. I found a book by Nechepso, in which eighty methods of treating the whole body and every disease according to every sign of the Zodiac by means of rocks and plants were to be found (cf. supra pp. 170 and 172). I was amazed at the prodigious scale of the whole scheme.

Yet, apparently, this amounted to vain smoke of a royal conceit: for, however I tried to prepare the helical-hèliakos, i.e. what rises and sets at the same time as the sun, viz. a celestial pill, advocated by the author, I failed in all the cases in which I tried it on the diseases. This mistake appeared to me worse than death (...). I could not therefore remain at Alexandria for the sake of the derision of my colleagues. (...).

I also went through all of Egypt (...), determined if I failed, to leave this life by suicide. Well then, since my soul predicted to me, without ceasing, that one day I would have contact with the gods, I raised my hands to heaven without interruption, to beg the gods to grant me, by a vision in my dream or by an inspiration from on high, some favor of that nature, upon which I could go big, when, happy, I returned to Alexandria and my fatherland.

I arrived at Diospolis (Thebes), viz. the oldest capital in Egypt, possessing a multitude of temples, and I settled there. For there were priests there who were acquainted with literature and versed in many a science. I asked them one day if there was anything left of the effective power of magic. I found that most of them

were indignant because of my hubris regarding such expectations.

Yet there was one among them - he instilled confidence in me because of the seriousness of his morals and his advanced age - who did not disappoint my friendship. He assured me that he possessed the power to summon visions through a bowl filled with water - this is lekanomanteia, basin divination (lekanè, basin, bowl), lekanomancy. -

I therefore invited him on ‘ n, walk with me in the most deserted part of the city, without telling him what I wished. We arrived at a forest, bathed in a deep silence: there I suddenly threw myself with my face against the ground and, weeping fiercely, I held his feet in an embrace. Dismayed at this unexpected action, he asked me the reason for my act: I told him that my life was in his hands - that I had to speak to a god at all costs, - that if this desire was not fulfilled, I was ready to leave life.

Thereupon, after having raised me up and consoled me with the most benevolent words, he promised warmly to accede to my request and imposed on me a fast of three days. (...).

Thereupon, once out of the woods, we began to fast and, impatient as I was, I found these three days to be like as many years. The fourth day came: leaving early in the morning, at dawn, I went to greet the priest. The latter had a well-cleaned oikos; - room of sacred value, ward room; - prepared with all that was necessary for the (God) consultation.

I, for my part, always looking forward, had, without notifying the priest, brought paper and ink to take notes on what might be communicated (by the god).

The priest asked me if I wanted to speak to the ghost of some deceased person or to a god: ‘To Asklepios’, I told him, adding that he would reach the height of his benevolence if he would let me speak to the god alone.

He promised it to me without joy (his features showed it well), but he promised it anyway. He then locked me in the oikos, the wardroom, and ordered me to sit down opposite the throne on which the god should sit: he summoned Asklepios by the power of the mysterious words, - whereupon he went out after having locked the door.

So I was seated, destroyed in body and soul, at the sight so wondrous - for no human word could represent the features or the ornamental splendor that adorned the god, when the god raised his right hand and saluted me in this way:

O blessed Thesalo, today you are honoring a god, and soon, when men shall have heard of your success, they will honor you as a god. Ask me, then, of what thou wilt: I will answer thee kindly to all thy questions.

I, I could hardly speak, so much was I dismayed, and so much was my soul captivated by the magnificence of the god; yet I asked him why I had failed in trying the precepts of Nechepso. Whereupon the god said to me:

King Nechepso, however sensible he was and in possession of all the magical powers, did not receive from a divine voice even a single one of the secrets which you wish to learn; gifted as he was with a shrewd nature, he had seen through the affinities (cf. *sumpatheia*) of the rocks and the plants with the heavenly bodies, but he had no notion of the moments and the places where one should pick the plants.

Now, the growth and decay of all the fruits of the season depend on the influence of the heavenly bodies; moreover, the divine spirit, which, thanks to its most subtle qualities, permeates all substances (i.e. realities which form a coherence) - one may compare this with what is now called 'fluid', thin matter or the like, and what the author here understands to be 'divine' (among other origins) - spreads itself particularly abundantly in those places which the astral (= heavenly body, fine matter) influences successively reach in the course of the cosmic orbit!"

So much for the quote cited by P. Festugière. He goes on to say that the god Asklepios will 'reveal' to the physician Thessalos the important 'science' in question in a real discourse, the title of which is 'On the plants in so far as they are subject to the twelve signs of the Zodiac and to the seven planets. ' Here, then, is a piece of 'physical' revealed. -

In the epilogue to the Latin translation of this piece, Thessalos asks if there is any plant or rock that makes immortal: the god replies that there are many but that it is not good for man to know them. Whereupon he weakens and returns to heaven.

- Festugière notes that the Egyptian priest was given the choice between *theourgia*, god-calling (one might say *theomanteia*, *theomancy*, *divination*) or *nekuomanteia*, death-calling, death-sighting, - what would now be called spiritualism, usually.

This shows that the term 'theosophy' must be understood in the Hellenistic and not in the Biblical-monotheistic sense! -

The magic aspect.

P. Festugière, o.c., 283/308, dwells on the relationship between Hermetism and magic. Since this applies to the whole of Theosophy (and not only to the Hermetic streak in it), we clarify here, on the basis of his chapter on the subject, the possible magical underpinnings of Theosophical experiments. -

But first a little digression on the relation between religion and magic in ancient Egypt. C. Cantu, *Les mystères de l' archéologie: la civilisation des Pharaons (Réalité et magie dans l' Egypte de l' antiquité)*, (The mysteries of archaeology: the civilization of the Pharaohs (Reality and magic in ancient Egypt)), Paris, 1978, p. 163, says:

"The worship that the Egyptians performed in honor of their gods was thoroughly imbued with magic. Each day of their existence began with a magical act designed to ensure the daily victory of the sun over the darkneses and the dragon Apep."

E.A. Wallis Budge, *Egyptian Magic*, London / Henley / Boston, 1979 (1899-1), pp. xiii/xv, expresses already in 1899 his astonishment that the ancient Egyptians and knew a very high Religion and, with that intimately interwoven, even in their cultural highlights, a “gross and childish superstition” united in one religious system.

They were concerned with amulets, talismans, magical names, powerful words; more than that, they seem to have trusted that such things saved their souls and bodies, living or dead, with the same confidence they had in the death and resurrection of Osiris (o.c., xiv). -

The true reason for such wonders, which are very frequent, especially still today, touches on P. Schebesta, *Oorsprong van de godsdienst (Resultaten van het prehistorisch en volkenkundig onderzoek)*, (Origin of Religion (Results of Prehistoric and Ethnographic Research)), Tielt / The Hague, 1962, p. 63:

“For many magical practices parapsychology may provide a better explanation than religious history or philosophy of religion. If the magician (medicine man) derives his power from God, perhaps magic acquires something like a religious character.

P. Placied Temples, *Bantu Philosophy*, Antwerp, 1946, writes that his Baloeba could not understand why the missionaries wanted to forbid them magic. Surely it could not be wrong to make use of the means God had given man to maintain and strengthen his life force!”

In other words, if one has beforehand written off magic a/ either from a secular standpoint as superstition, b/ or from a demonological standpoint condemned it as the art of the devil, c/ or from an ethical standpoint suspected it as ‘black’ (i.e. unscrupulous) magic, then it follows that it is incompatible with religion in the higher sense. The question, however, is: is this really the case? In the incompatibility of religion and magic the proponent betrays his preconceived ideas.

- Types of magic in Theosophy.-

P. Festugière follows in typology Th. Hopfner, *Griechisch-Aegyptischer Offenbarungszauber*, (Greek Egyptian Revelation Spell), 1921/1924. He distinguishes three main aspects in the magic of the Papyri Graecae magicae (edited by K. Preisendanz in 1928/1931):

(i) an operation (poiësis, productio, production; praxis, actio, ‘act’) - this is the truly magical of the event: “Ce qu’il (= le magicien) veut, c’ est reussir dans l’ operation” What he intends is succeeding in the operation) -;

(ii) an articulation or formulation: the magician either utters a prayer (which is then the typically religious, in the sense of ‘reverently invoking higher powers’) or utters a summoning formula (as above p. 273: the Asklepios summoning) - in Greek this is called logos (word) or klësis (to, summoning) -;

(iii) after these two ‘working’ aspects comes the theosophical purpose of it, namely a manteia method of divination: it is here that Festugière classifies the types of manteia or Hopfner’s method of divination. However, to understand this, first a word of explanation. -

E. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 1966, pp. 283ff., talks about theurgos: the first man described, as far as we now know, as a theurgos, theürg, god-worker (god-caller), is a certain Ioulianos, who lived under Emperor Marcus Aurelius (Emperor +161/+180).

It is assumed that he called himself theurgos, i.e. one who acts on god(s), works them, to oppose mere theologoi, “god scholars,” who speak merely of god. That Ioulianos seems to be the son of a Chaldean philosopher (who was also called Ioulianos), the author of work in, four volumes on daimones.

Himself Ioulianos the Younger is said to have written *Theourgika*, *Telestika*, *Logia di epon*. This last work, *Iagia*, *Oracula*, is the well-known *Oracula Chaldaïca*. Both Ioulianoi are known as “power-packed” magicians.

Dodds wants to emphasize the fact that theurgy is not a Neo-Platonic creation (as is often claimed but comes from magical middens). -

E. Wallis Budge, *Egyptian Magic*, 1899-1, 1919, p. 6, notes that, in Exodus 7:8/13, Israelite magic (Aaron, at God’s command, casts his staff before Pharaoh and his courtiers, and it becomes a serpent) differs thoroughly from Egyptian (the Egyptian magicians did the same thing):

- a/ the magical working of the staff is done, by Aaron, at Yahweh’s command;
- b/ the same operation, seemingly, is done, by the Egyptian sorcerers, so that their god(s) obey them, people. -

In other words, apart from the Chaldean (Mesopotamian) magic, also the Egyptian would be theürgian. Of course, if one knows how ambiguous the word “god” is in ancient context and how ambiguous magic is, then this poses no problem except the problem of the essence of magic (as fluid manipulation).

- Theürgie can also be described -

cf. E. Dodds, *The Greeks*, 291, - as magic with religious purposes and based on a revelation with religious character; in other words, as theosophy;

a/ magic is then ‘vulgar’ to begin with (i.e. the stage for religious application or theosophy).

- Dodds briefly describes the major methods (o.c., 291/ 299) -

b/ but it becomes, if redirected to higher purposes, theurgy.

As ‘vulgar’ magic it is called goëtia, goëtie. - As goëtie or popular magic it is dual: it can be both white and black magic. Which does not prevent a number of people from identifying goëtia and black magic.

O.i. this is regrettable, for it is not because something is popular, ‘vulgar’, folk, that it is bad: folk people, without high speculative theosophical or apocalyptic intentions, can be very conscientious people, also and especially in their magic. -

As is evident from Hopfner’s jargon, the use of the words “theürgie,” “goëtie,” and even “magic” is fluid, and one is supposed to make out well from the context which language is at work. - A wiser classification would be this one that distinguishes between operations in which god appears or does not (directly) appear.

Here is an overview, but not classified according to the Hopfnerian classification, since it suffers from conceptual confusion.

a/ Visionary theurgies. -

Here the deity (resp. 'deceased') appears and in the following ways.

a/1. The ecstatic or transported mode:

The 'soul' (one understands the fine material soul body in the first place) leaves the (coarse material) body ('steps out', one also says) and is 'carried away', 'lifted up' to, as far as the 'heaven' (a fine material 'space', where gods dwell) and, in that transported state, 'sees', 'beholds' the god;

Festugière o.c., 281, says that it is "une mort anticipée", a death experienced beforehand: this implies that one adopts the theosophical conception of dying, the fact that the 'soul' (with a soul-body at least partly accompanying her) exits, not definitively, as in actual death, but provisionally (for, after the exit, 'rapture' or ecstasy, she returns to her gross material body) -; of this type Festugière, pp. 303/508, gives an example from the Mithras liturgy.

a/2. The evocative method:

The theosopher evokes, by means of some aphorisms (e.g. in Thessalos' case, here pp. 273, in the wardrobe, the throne) and power-laden words (ibidem), which activate the universal *sumpatheia*, interconnectedness (in the subtle realm; = fluidic interconnectedness or 'correspondence'), as a kind of communication channels, calls upon the god (here Asklepios); the god "becomes aware of that call" responds to it and descends from his heaven on earth and "appears" (becomes a phenomenon, apparition).

There are two variants of this:

(i) the person to whom the god appears is in a waking state (as in Thessalos' case).

(ii) the person in question is asleep and 'sees' the apparition in a sleep-dream state;

a/ cf. Pharaoh Netanebo(s), supra p. 271, but with the difference that here, at least in the text (which does not mention it), there is no mention of summoning rite:

b/ one thinks of the temple sleep with its dream revelations in the Asklepio temple (see higher p. 282) or,

c/ what Festugière, o.c., 295, gives as an example: "Take a piece of busses, molluscum silk (byssus, 'cotton'). on which, with myrrh ink (murrha is a kind of fragrant and medicinal tree resin), you write down the outline about which it is about. Turn this around an olive branch, place it against your head, to the left of your head. Then go to sleep, pure as you are, on a woven mat of rush or reed, on the floor, while you recite seven times, by the light of the lamp, the hymn 'Hermes, supreme Lord of the Universe'".

Such an Hermeshymn sounds as follows: "Hermes, supreme Lord of the universe, thou who art in the heart; circle of the moon, thou who art round and square, founder of the articulated word, (...), thou who sends (down) speeches of God day and night, make thy form appear, even to me who pray to thee, to me, mortal, piously imploring, thou warrior.

a/3. The mirror method:

This too is an evocative method of proceeding yet the ‘appearance’ is done through the medium of a matter. (lakanomancy: water mirror e.g.; lychnomancy: flame mirror) which gives a reduced image of the appearing god(s); one reads the example (Festugière, 288):

“Place an iron candlestick in the eastern part of a well-cleaned room; put on it a lamp not painted with minium (i.e. the Latin word for lead oxide (Pb3O4) of clean red color) and light it. Also light a censer and put incense on vine chips. -- That the child be virginal and pure. -

Note - So here a child is employed to promote the god(s) appearance. -

- (First) prayer.-

“Phisio, Iaô -- these are magic words, the actual meaning of which was known only by initiates --, I ask you that, on the day of today, the light and the sun -- Mane Ousiris, Mane Isis -- and Anoubis, the servant of all the gods, appear to this child and make this child to be enraptured and to see the gods, who all come to provide divine speech. -

Appear to me in divine speech, magnanimous god Hermes Trismegistos: that to me appear the one who created the four parts of heaven and the four foundations of the earth; come to me, thou in heaven (above); come to me, thou who art born of the egg. - I swear to you (gods in the plural), in the name of the one who is at Tapsati. That to me appear the two gods who accompany thee, Thath (= Thoth, = Hermes): the first god is called one Sô, the second Aph.”

Second prayer to recite. -

“Come to me, Spirit flying through the air, thou whom I (call) by means of aphorisms and ineffable words, come to this lychnomanteia, flame of light divination, which I work, and enter into this child that it may imagine the immortal form in a machful and imperishable light, because I (call) thee in my song = magic spell), Iaô, Eloai, Come to me, Lord, carried on the spotless light; come to me without lie and without anger and to your epoptès, seer, this child, appear! “. -

“Recite this prayer three times. - If, (at any time, -- stand by), the child says: (I see your Lord in the light (of the flame, -- stand by, then say: “Holy Hymeri!” And in this way he (viz. the god) answers. Question”. - To this the papyrue text. -

The peculiar words and, sometimes at least, phrases, which seem to us strange and unintelligible, are so-called magic words, which “work” by force of their (magic) use. -

It should be noted that there is no reason anywhere why, unlike the previous two, this type of theosophical summoning should be called ‘magical’ (as Hopfner does):

a/ all three are apparition types, more or less magical;

b/ all three are theurgic, i.e., summoning gods (with or without religious intentions). The first and third cases contain rapture (trance).

Note - The child (pais), who need not necessarily be a youth, but if need be the mathètès, the pupil, but is nevertheless often a young child, -- cf. Festugière, o.c., pp. 347/354, about the 'transmission' from 'master' (= technites) to 'child', resp. pupil, one of the forms of master-pupil relations so typical for that time, about which supra pp. 181/182 -- usually stands within a magic circle, with behind him the master (also called didaskalos), who is in physical contact with his 'child', usually with his hand on his shoulder.

The child participates a/ in the 'operation' and b/ in 'seeing' in the liquid of a basin (lekano-), in the flame of a lamp (luchno-) or in the glass of a mirror (katoptro - mantie) or something similar.

The child should be 'virginal' (parthenos); it should be a.fathartos, unspoiled (just like its master, by the way). It is the 'mystical' son of the master, i.e. it receives, to the exclusion of all others, the 'secrets' of the master. It receives the full 'lore' (paradosis, traditio), when it is axios, dignus, true. -- “

This kind of 'traditio' seems to have been the rule in Egypt, since the earliest times. Also: it is in Egypt that it has long corresponded to a reality: the father taught his own son.” (P. Festugière, o.c., 353). The author adds that most of the Hellenistic occult works were Egyptian works and that from here theosophy has adopted this 'traditio' habit.

Note - The people, involved in such magical claims, would now be called 'medias' (mediators). Indeed, the 'meson', medium, mediator, who is situated in this world, is nevertheless, at the same time, at home in the other world by virtue of some 'ability' or 'giftedness' (sensitivity) - see above on the 'world-periods' or 'eons' (centuries) pages 276/279 -.

The mediums or mediumistically gifted (also: mediamically gifted) are one important part of occult activity, as here in these mystical-apocalyptic theosophies. Even now, it is so: cf. J. Verweyen, *Die Probleme des Mediumismus*, (The Problems of Mediumism.), Stuttgart, 1928 (notwithstanding its age, still a philosophically sound introduction to "mediumism"). -

The child, spoken of above, is mediumistic in that the god "enters into him and puts him in a state of khatochè, ligatura, bondage (fascinated), which prevents him from doing what he wants, at least to a certain extent.

As A. Poulain, *Des grâces d' oraison*, (Graces of prayer.), Paris, 1901-4, pp. 164ss., says about the Christian mystics, so also here the child in his faculties of conscious nature is 'captivated', not transported; i.e. his faculties are directed by a 'power' in him towards another reality. Possession is the brutal degree of this.

Cf. Festugière, o.c., 51, where one could also speak of "inspiration" (inspired state). This is thus a special kind of mediality.

b/ Objectal theories.-

Called 'objective' because they are bound to objects: the god does not appear here (thus non-visionary), but he 'captivates' an object and moves it or changes some of its properties in order to convey his thought contents. -

One could call this, to a certain extent, 'fetish method': as A. Glyn Leonard, *The Lower Niger and its Tribes*, London, 1906, says, the teeth, legs, horns, tails, plumes, shells, pieces of iron, rags, etc., are the ones which the West African 'fetishists' so called 'venerate', are in fact, rather, the 'mediums', the intermediaries between this world (of descendants) and the other world (of ancestors and 'spirits'), through which the ancestors or the spirits reveal themselves.

So too here, in the Late Antique theosophies, where these 'object' channels of communication function theurgically. It should be noted that moving tables etc., so 'in' with some contemporary spiritists, hold the same principle.

Note - That children are 'gifted', sometimes to the great amazement of contemporaries, is proved by e.g. J.-P. Bourre, *Les enfants extra-sensoriels et leurs pouvoirs*, (Extra-sensory children and their powers), Paris, 1978. -

The onirolgy is still topical: F. Froböse-Thiele, *Traume: eine Quelle religiöser Erfahrung?*, (Dreams: a source of religious experience), Göttingen, 1957 (with theological introduction by O. Händler, preface by C.G. Jung and foreword by G. Frei, - which testifies to the high level at which the discussion moves in this work); -

That other cultures, closer to us, also have dream experiences, proves Henzen, *Ueber die Träume in der Altnordischen Sagaliteratur*, (On Dreams in the Old Norse Sagal Literature), Leipzig, 1890, in which, S. 55ff., it is asserted that 'gods' are too exalted to appear in dreams, that, however, demigodal beings beings (such as **a/** male and female guardian spirits of the ankle-, the sex or the country. Further, such as **b/** men and women of destiny, who announce imminent battles, and also **c/** 'alves', i.e. giants), who, despite their superhuman nature, are nevertheless in narrow relation to human life) are the most frequent manifesters in the dreams (o.c., 58ff).-

With regard to apparitions, G. Tyrrell, *Apparitions*, London, 1943-1, 1953², still a classic in this respect patronized by the famous 'Society for Psychological (understand: occult) Research.

Also E. Schering, *Die innere Schaukraft (Träume, Erscheinungen des Zweiten Gesichts und Visionen des Johannes Falk)*, (The inner power of vision (dreams, apparitions of the Second Face and visions of John Falk)), Munich/Basel, 1953, on the eighteenth-century seer-educator Falk (1763/) and in the spirit of V. Urbantschisch, O. Kroh, E. Jaensch, P. Busse, H. Zeman, F. Wilhelm et al, who examined eidetics (especially in children before the age of eleven), remains a solid work, which, like equally mentioned and many others, throws a current light on Hermetic theophanies and related ones.

Conclusion.- The relationship between magic and astrology, the core issue of the Theosophists, is, as W. Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, (Eastern religions in Roman paganism), Paris, 1929-4, p. 169 puts it, the following:

a/ the astro(theo)log starts from the sumpatheia, the connectedness, “between the celestial bodies, moving in the firmament, and the physical and ethical phenomena”; down on earth,

b/ while the magician assumes the sumpatheia or connection(s) that links and refers earthly bodies to one another, whether these “bodies” are those of rocks or of men or of anything else.

“From the determination of the occult powers and of the astral doctrine arose Hellenistic occultism” (Festugière, o.c., 359).

The sumpatheia or, if need be, antipatheia - that depends on the case - was either viewed and used independently of the astral sumpatheia (or antipatheia) - e.g., the action of one planet on another (see above p. 170 et seq.) - or in connection with the celestial connections (which was common, given the high authority of astro(theo)logy but not always).

So that, if need be, the magic, works astrology-free; which should not be understood exclusively but inclusively: it is not because the magician works astrology-free (or religion-free) that he denies the astral energies which permeate these earthly realities, (or religion); well on the contrary.

L. De Jong, *De magie bij de Greeks en de Romeinen*, (Magic among the Greeks and Romans), Haarlem, 1943², p. 130vv. cites a papyrus magica, magic papyrus, which **a/** structures love spells, **b/** without astral reference, **c/** but with evocative reference to gods or the like (distinction which J. Maxwell, *La magie*, Paris, 1922, p. 25, considers essential).

Kallikles would be happy to draw Athenodoras to himself. See papyrus of Paris no. 1456/1593: “Love arousal at a sacrifice of myrrh (murna). - Sacrifice myrrh on a coal fire, uttering the incantation. -

Incantation: Thou art that myrrh, the bitter, troublesome one, reconciling among the combative, the scorching one, forcing to love all those who do not care for love (...). Not far away to Arabia I send you (...), but (...), to Athenodora (...) that you may be of service to me in her, that you may bring her to me. If she sit, that she not sit (...), but only me may she keep in mind, only me covet (...).

Penetrate her soul and abide in her heart (...) until she, loving me, comes to me, Kallikles, and fulfills all my desires, - because I swore to you, myrrh, by the three names Ancho, Abrosax, Tro and the still more effusive and powerful Kormeioth, Iao, Sabaoth, Adonai, that you, myrrh, may fulfill my commands. As I burn and thou art able, so of her whom I love, burn the brain until she comes to me (...).” -

In this style the magic papyrus continues. Immediately it should be noted how easily the fundamental human freedom intake partner choice, in this pressure-mongering magic, is misunderstood.

De Jong, o.c., classifies the ancient (especially Hellenic) conception of (especially individual magic) as follows: **a/** the primeval times / - 450: naive

belief, very close to the archaic-primitive world;

b/ -450/ -100: unbelief is the dominant one, although some intellectuals more or less continue to believe in magic;

c/ -100/+50: the turning point, in which the dominant shifts;

d/ +50/200: a new faith (one thinks of Bolos of Mendes and its occult physical) emerges and spreads into broader layers of the populations of Hellenism;

e/ +200/ +500: the new faith is processed by the sages in a more or less beaming sense. -

One can see that this scheme reflects the developmental progress of Hellenism. Conclusion.
- That Hermetism is not yet dead but has remained a subcultural current shows the interest as shown by B. Gros, *La légende du Grand Hermès*, (The legend of the Great Hermes), in Questions de spiritualité, No. 22 (Jan-Feb. 1978), pp. 93/99.

Note on Orphism. -

On p. 272 supra - in the context of the mysteries - reference has already been made to the places in this course where Orphism is mentioned. - Still the following.

a/ Orphism is an archaic religion (the first Greek religion to have a founder):

b/ In the VIIth and VIth centuries it flourishes, especially in Attica and southern Italy.

c/ In the classical period, it is only Pindaros and Platon who understand its great bearing conceptions; for the rest, it is rather scorned by the intellectuals, because its high conceptions, especially about the individual in his moral and immortal soul, were mixed, by “priests” and quacks” in assertion, with inferior aspects.

d/ In the Hellenistic period it revives, of course, and becomes, along with Hermetism and related, currents of mystic-occult nature, one of the many points of interest of that period. Cl. Tresmontant, *La métaphysique du christianisme et la naissance de la philosophie chrétienne*, (The metaphysics of Christianity and the birth of Christian philosophy), Paris, 1961, pp. 266/ 270, sees Orphism in its oldest form, as a source of inspiration, if necessary in addition to other influencing factors, of Pythagorism and Platonism (pp. 176/289), of Corpus Hermeticum (and Hermetism) (pp. 283/ 289), of Gnosticism (pp. 289/ 292), of Manichaeism (pp. 292/ 319) and of Plotinos, the main figure of Neo-Platonism (pp. 319/ 363). All these currents are variants of the same basic insight, viz. man, in all his darkness-bound corporeality, is essentially soul, which is light-bound (light metaphysics); that soul has a history, viz. it experienced a fall or decay and ended up in matter, from which, steering-wise, it should be released. -- For the Orphicists the Dionysosmythe is the basic pattern and basis of their thinking. -

The metal plate of Ketelia. -

This Late-Orphic piece of metal, discovered near Strongoli, dates from the IVth - IIInd centuries B.C. and gives instructions to the dead Orphic for his journey in the other world: “You will find to the left of the house of the hades (underworld) a spring and just next to it a white cypress: you should not approach this spring. Another source thou shalt find, fresh stream of life force (...)”.

(I)a2. The Neo - Pythagor(e)ism. -

a/ In the days of Platon's students, especially Speusippos (school leader -347/-338) and Xenokrates (school leader -338/-314), thinking Pythagorism had merged into the Platonic Academy. But

b/ as a religious brotherhood, Pythagoreanism had persisted, and the poets (of the later Attic comedy) depict the Pythagoreans as eccentrics, who were vegetarians, made unbloody sacrifices, and practiced tacit seriousness, - all in Paleo-Pythagorean spirit.

In -100/ +200, a revival occurs, Neo-Pythagoreanism, which rediscovers the connection between Pythagoras and Platon, along the lines of the eclectic Stoic Poseidonios of Apameia (-135/ -51), called higher, inspired by the eclectic Middle-Platonic Ploutarchos of Charoneia (+45/ +125), and gives a new formulation to that discovery. -

This is not surprising. J.P. Vernet, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, (Myth and thought among the Greeks), II, Paris, 1971, pp. 95/124, dealing with the origin of "positive" (understand Milesian-empirical) thought and of "abstract" (understand Parmenidean being) thought, points out, with Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (1912), that Hellenic philosophy was religious in origin and nature, and, with E. Rohde, *Psyche* (1894), that, in the beginnings of Greek philosophical thought, a series of 'strange' figures, semi-legendary seers and purification magicians acted as 'sages', pretty much in the nature of Puthagoras, Empedokles and so on.

Cf. J. Pollard, *Seers, Shrines and Sirens*, London, 1965, which speaks in a similar vein.-- If then, in order to get out of the Skeptical crisis, thinking people revert to the pre-Skeptical thinkers, it is natural that old traits of knowledge should reappear. G. Vico (1668/ 1744) would speak of "corso e ricorso" (lapse and re-lapse). Indeed, Neo-Pythagorism clearly shows neo-sacred traits: the ancient sacred atmosphere returns in a new form (neo-sacred)!

Core thesis. - O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. ideal.*, I, Braunschweig, 1907², 3, 591, says that the Pythagorean-Platonic philosophy of those days breaks with the one-sided pantheistic view of the Stoa, which identifies God too much with the universe and sees spirit too much as purely material (even if it is a dualistic materialism):

a/ Adhering to Pythagoras and Platon, the multiplicity of phenomena is reduced to the unity of an interval, whereby one extreme is represented by a clear-thinking, exalted and morally high "pure", "spotless" Godhead, while the other extreme is represented an' "unclean", "stained" material world, which dwells in "darkness", unenlightenment and sin.

b/ "Between the unshakable unity of God and the world's pressures are situated, on the one hand, the star world, on the other hand, the world of paragons, i.e. the primal number forms and ideas, and, finally, the world of daimones." O. Willmann, o.c., 599).

-- It goes without saying that Neo-Pythagorism is a syncretism: Old-Pythagorism with strong Platonic leanings and Peripatetic and Stoic elements. This Pythagorean-Platonic theology and philosophy, says O. Willmann, o.c., 594, serves as a support for

1/ the Jewish-Hellenistic mysticism of Philon (= Jewish-Alexandrian theosophy),

2/ the social philosophy of the Romans and 3/ Neo - Platonism. Therefore a word about the two main characters.

(i) Apollonios of Tuana (Cappadocia)

(Early first century, end of first century). - He lived as an ascetic itinerant sage-teacher, who visited various countries, including India; his life was targeted under the emperor Nero (+54/+68) and, later, under Domitian (+81/96).

Psychic as he was, he foresaw Domitian's death. He gained his 'science' of occultism in Egypt, Babylonia (from the magicians there), Iran and Arabia.

(i)a. His theology is Pythagorean: so exalted is God, the 'First', the one, transcendent (kechorismenos), through whom only we know the other 'gods'. No honorific gift, no sacrificial fire, no sensual object suits Him! All that contains 'miasma', impuritas, impurity. Only the nous intellectus, the intellect, the noblest in us, possesses the inner word that honors God, - without any other tool.

(i)b. His belief in daimones and related ones, is in the line of Ploutarchos of Apameia, where the latter says: "Those who have discovered that a demonic genus stands between gods and men and connects both and maintains the coherence of them, have solved more and greater difficulties than Platon." (*De an. procr.*, 35 fin).

(i)c. His ethic is ascetic as stated above. Doch mysticism is with him coupled with magic: he is the great thaumatourgos, miracle worker, of antiquity. According to Filostratos Lemnios +/- +170/+245) - see above p. 166 -, the famous sophist who wrote his great life, he even resurrected a dead person. The book was widely read in late antiquity.

The history of the incantation of the "empousa" (empouse) should be mentioned. A first interpretation is: a terrifying female figure who has nocturnal sexual intercourse with men; whose blood soul she sucks out (vampirism) and who has the rare ability to create all kinds of shapes, including that of an attractive beautiful woman (think of the Erlkönig).

Its spell consists of insult: once insulted, she flees screaming. She is sometimes compared to a 'lamia', which devours both men and especially children (fluidic first of all). An emperor is sometimes seen as sent by Hekate, the goddess of the underworld, sometimes as Hekate herself.

Filostratos Lemnios tells that, at a certain moment, the Kunish philosopher Demetrios joins Apollonios and sends him his best pupils, among them the Lukian Menippos, twenty-eight years old.

Menippos was sensibly and athletically cleanly built. -- Many then had the impression, says Philostratos, that he was being courted by a strange woman, beautifully built, remarkably gentle, rich according to her claims. "She was none of these things but only gave the impression of being so.

According to himself the love story began as follows: one day he was walking alone on the road to Kenchreai; an apparition of a beautiful woman came up to him, took him by the hand and said: "I have loved you for a long time. She was, she said, Phoenician but lived in a suburb of Corinth, which she called by name.

"If thou, in the evening, comest thither, I will regale thee with song and wine, such as thou hast never drunk before." Menippos accepted, not realizing that the woman was only a phantom. - "Like a sculptor, Apollonios looked at Menippos; (...). He said, 'Thou beautiful young man, chased by beautiful women, thou cherishest a serpent at thy bosom, and a serpent thee! When Menippos expressed his wonder at this, Apollonios said:

'Thou hast a wife, not a wife. How is this? Dost thou believe that she loves thee? - 'Very much so,' said Menippos, 'judging by the gentleness with which she treats me! - 'Thou wouldst wish to marry them?' - 'It is desirable, a woman whom thou dost love, to marry her! - 'For when is the wedding feast?' asked Apollonios. - 'Very soon; perhaps tomorrow! -

Apollonios comes, when all are seated at the banquet table, asks about the bride and about the possessor of the silver and gold work and ornamentation; to which Menippos replies that his wife is the possessor (he possessed only his cloak).

Apollonios thereupon says that all that, like the courtiers of Tantalos, at once "is" and "is not": "The noble bride is one of the empooses, whom one calls lamiae and abominations. They want both the pleasure of love and human flesh, above all, and lure those who wish to eat them, with love lust".

To which the woman said, "Shut up and get out!", expressing her dislike and disgust at what she was hearing, mocking the sages as delusional babblers. Apollonios' unmasking remarks had the effect of volatilizing silver and gold work and, before all eyes, swelling (dematerializing) it, along with the entire meal setup. The shadow woman began to weep and begged to be separated with scrutiny and not have to confess what she really was. Apollonios, however, knew no stopping him: he penetrated her. Then she confessed that she was an empousa and that she fed Menippos with lust in order to devour him later, targeting 'beautiful and young bodies, because their blood was fresh and pure'. Cf. H. Gasse / J. Werner, *Erzählungen der Antike*, (Tales of antiquity), Birsfelden - Basel, s.d. S. 202/204.

(i)d. His influence was great: on a visit to Athens he is recognized by a group of students, just on their way to Ionia to listen to him. a Group of young Ionians abandons skeptical rhetoric to adhere to his philosophy. a Skeptic joins them. In a dispute over the immortality of the soul,

does not want to accept this, but for months begs Apollonios to reveal the truth to him.

One day, after a dispute, the septic dialectician falls asleep. Suddenly he jolts awake and exclaims eagerly: “I believe thee! Seest thou not Apollonios? Listen to the verses he recites about the immortal soul!” (Life v. Ap., 8:31). In other words, like a ‘god’, he appears to his interlocutor in a dream. Cf. higher p. 283 (Nektanebo’s dream appearance). -

On such phenomena rested the idea that Apollonios had already attained the(i)osis, deification, during his life (and was thus a ‘god’ somewhere): thaumatourgia, miracle-working, was sign of the(i)osis. Yet Philostratos of Lemnos insists that the miracles of Apollonios were not magically worked but sprang from a higher wisdom and intimate contact with God and/or gods (cf. C. De Vogel, *Greek Phil., III (The Hell.-Rom. Per.)*, Leiden, 1959, p. 351). -

As mentioned above, Apollonios also assumes intermediate beings
a/ created gods, e.g. the heavenly bodies and the ‘elements’, and
b/ human leading and protecting daimones.

O. Willmann, o.c., 602, notes that three variants occur:

a/ with Ploutarchos of Apameia, the intercourse with the guardian spirit takes place only through the inner hearing (one thinks of the inner voice of Socrates of which he speaks);

b/ with Apuleius of Madauros (see above pp. 251; 252) this takes place by visible appearance (of the queen of heaven Isis);

c/ Apollonios - and the later Neo-Platonics - do this by theourgia, - what is now called the summoning of spirits. -

In short, these three forms can be seen to be inclusive, not exclusive; they go together several times (an apparition is prepared, accompanied by an inner voice; an inner voice breaks through after theourgia, etc.). But one finds emphases that differ according to the tendencies.

(ii) *Nikomachos of Gerasa (Arabia) (+/- +100).*

This arithmetician, faithful to Puthagoras, sees the phenomena of this world and the fusis as joined and ordered (truly Pythagorean words!) according to the model of number forms, which exist for things ‘en tei tou technitou theou dianoiiai’ (in the mind of the making god, i.e. the world-maker). That is the mathematical idealism which a/ sees for, b/ in things ‘arithmoi’, number forms, which, c/ in our minds, are present in conceptual form. Of course, universal harmony is connected with this.

(iii) *Noumenios of Apameia (Syria) (+/- +150/ 200).* -

This one is the immediate pioneer of Neo-Platonism. Philosophy for him was Pythagorean-Platonic, but narrowly intertwined with great interest in Eastern religions: indeed, in the broad framework of the Macedonian and Roman empires, the broad interest of Puthagoras and Platon, found at the time a new field of comparative studies. Noumenios knew the Old Testament and he calls Platon “Mouses attikon” (the Attic-speaking Moses).

Noumenios' theology. - Characteristic is his tritheism (three-god doctrine).

(1) The blissful Good, living in ineffable, indescribable, deep, divine solitude (cf. Platon's highest Idea), mercifully guiding; - exalted high above all beings, he is called 'pappos', Primordial Father, Father (patèr), First God. As such, he is 'hestos', immobilis, immovable (immovably fixed).

(2)a. Deep below the eternal peace of the First God, Noumenios situates the Universe creator (better: universe shaper) or demiurge; he is the 'engonos' the inborn Son of the First God; the poiètès, maker; the Second God, who is kinotmenos, in motion. Where the First God does not perform 'works', the Second is starting point and end point of the visible, a.k.a. the human world, - the Providential One, who deals with the world.

(2)b. Even more deeply situated is the Third God, the 'apogonos', the offspring of the Second God; the poiema, the creation, the fisis as thought of by the Second God. From where does Noumenios draw this threefold division, which is especially striking because of the gap that prevails between the First and Second God? -

(1) This conception is similar, at first sight, to the Platonic one in the Timaios; but a/ the Dèmiourgos of Platon is first in rank, not lower than the thought-content God (the Good) and b/ what is more, the substance, with Platon, is indeed imperfect and source of evil and wickedness; this substance, however, is not impure and defiling to such a degree that the supreme God must be conceived as beyond all contact with it. -

(2) This view is typical of Hellenistic substance pessimism: substance is conceived here miasmatically; it is so impure and defiling that God must be conceived ultra-transcendent.

In other words, the interval which with Platon (between the good and the substance) is normative, becomes here even wider (between the Supreme God and the stained - staining substance). -- This view is already found with Ploutarchos of Chaironeia, the eclectic Middle - Platonist (see above) and with Apollonios of Tuana (see above).

Both speak of sensory phenomena as afflicted with miasma (impurity) or with miasmos (contamination). From there an intermediate being, viz. the second God or inbred son, who guarantees the absolute immaculateness of the First as a kind of screen against the unclean created world (the so-called Third, 'god', - in the broad sense).

Consequence. - Since the(i)osis, deification, always remains the meaning of life, 'life' will here be understood mystically, and namely purity or disembodiment mysticism: in order to penetrate the First God by means of the Second (as mediator), man will have to dematerialize himself, - which leads to world aversion.

a/ With Aristotle, the thinking life was reason for world aversion (on a limited scale); but here it is much stronger world aversion.

b/ The contrast to the Stoa with its materialism is complete here. Cf. O. Willmann, o.c., 595/599.

Comment on the doctrine of souls as a doctrine of judgment.-.

F. Cumont, *Recherches sur le symbolisme funéraire des Romains*, (Research on the funerary symbolism of the Romans), Paris, 1942, describes the nadic states of the soul as a/ eclectic Stoics and b/ Neo-Pythagoreans especially see them.

All of them, under the influence of Poseidonios of Apameia, the eclectic Middle Stoic (-135/ -51), hold that the souls, after the death of the body, do not sink into the telluric (or earth) depths, but ascend to the divine stars and to the fires of the aither (ether, i.e. a kind of fine dust of the higher spheres), from which they originate, by descent:

a/ the souls should first purify themselves of their stains by passing through the subhuman spaces;

b/ thereafter they must rid themselves of the successive shells of their fine material bodies (vehicles) - cf. hylic pluralism - at each stage of their ascent into interplanetary spaces. Thus one understands the process of incorporealization or dematerialization that the soul purification goes through in order to achieve deification, - this after death. After all, matter is not only absence of perfection, but stellar source of stainedness: always that miasmatic conception of matter.

As C. De Vogel, o.c., 433, says, this conception is found in similar form 1/ in Chaldean astro(theo)logy, 2/ in the Gnostic parts of the Corpus Hermeticum and 3/ in the Mithras cult.

It should also be noted, with C. De Vogel, o.c., 430, that the káthodos, descensus, of souls is not always so 'evil':

a/ some descend with a view to catharsis (purification) and sotèria (salvation of other souls);

b/ others descend into the unclean substance with a view to the exercise of virtue and the improvement of one's own conduct. -- One should not always take matter-flattering mysticism to be so dust pessimistic!

-- The origin or genesis of substance pessimism. -

As P. Ricoer, *Finitude et culpabilité, II, (Ia symbolique du mal)*, (Finitude and guilt, II, (the symbolism of evil)), Paris, 1960, pp. 151/321, says, is :

1/ the god-abandoned autonomy or selfhood (as in Platon's transition from Kronos kingdom to Zeus kingdom - Kronos withdraws and that is where evil begins - or as, but differently, in the Biblical Adam myth);

2/ the tragic myth, with its destiny tragedy (as in Greek tragedy, with Aischulos or Sophocles, where man, overstepping his limits (hubris, arrogontia), comes under the pressure of an insidious daimon in his unconscious, who blinds him and drives him to his doom, or as in the Biblical serpent myth);

3/ the primal wanderer myth (as in Enuma Elisj, the Babylonian-Assyrian myth, - with Homoros and Hesiodos, where evil lies in the fisis of reality itself, so that good arises only through effort, and victory).

4/ The soul-searching myth (as with the Orphics), the possible explanation - from afar - of substance pessimism.

(I)b. The biblical theosophical trailblazers. -

“The Pythagorean-Platonic doctrine of God and principles formed the soil on which Jewish and Hellenistic contemplation (‘Spekulation’) met and were fused into a certain synthesis, called Judeo-Hellenistic mysticism” (O. Willmann, o.c., 607).

Syncretism: - Here we are faced with a typical syncretism, which, according to O. Willmann, o.c., 608, consists of the following ingredients:

a/ orthodox (= orthodox right-believer), conforming to the Old Testament, conforming to Mosaic revelation, - such as all that is derived from the Mosaic doctrine of God or angels, from Law piety and morality, etc.; - to these also belong the ingredients from orthodox oral tradition;

b/ ethnical (= Pagan), especially archaic but also more recent (Hellenistic) ingredients, some of which conform to Mosaic revelation, some, however, do not. -

One example be indicated. ‘n Central place occupies the Logos, Universal understanding, in Philon of Alexandria ‘s teaching: the ingredients come from the following angles:

a/ straight Mosaic:

a)1 the prophets speak of ‘a supernatural agent, whom Yahweh, in the form of the Messiah, promises;

a)2 the sophiologists (wisdom figures) speak of shohmah, sophia, wisdom, which is in and with Yahweh, but at the same time pervades the universe, constitutes the (physical) ‘truth’ of things and dwells in gifted souls, - which more or less intertwines with the Messiah of the prophets;

b/ non-sanctimonious-ethnic:

b)1 the Jewish ‘Kabbalah’ (in its non-orthodox part) spoke of ‘a preëxistent (pre-existent) Adam Kadmon, viz.

a/ a ‘primeval man’, prototype of the cosmos, a sort of divine being, which existed from the beginning, as a summary of the global fuis (from which it derives its cosmic dimensions: the fuis is like a man in the big picture);

b/ at the same time, this macrocosmic Adam (Kadmon) is the summary of the whole soul realm, in the sense that all souls, as preëxistent as he, are understood in him, from the beginning, as in the creator and leader of souls;

b)2 the Pagan mysteries - see above p. 242v spoke of mediating gods who descended as saviors:

b)3 Hellenic philosophers spoke of a figure in a similar sense: Herakleitos spoke of the Logos, the world mind, - in his wake, the Stoa, though very pantheistic; Platon spoke of the thinking God, who carries within himself the ideas of the fuis and Aristotle, of the theon, the divine, which, teleologically conceived in Anaxagorean sense, represented the realm of ends for the whole fuis; -

These are the syncretic sources of a doctrine of the Logos, which will long continue to have an effect in the pagan and biblical spheres. One thinks of Saint John the Evangelist, who says: “In the beginning was the ‘Word’ (Gr. Logos) and the Word was with God and the word was God. (...). Everything is through Him.”

(I) bl. The Jewish - Alexandrian theosophy (from - 150).

Preparation. - +/- -1,850 Abraham, departing from Ur (in Sumeria, then still situated on the Euphrates; the later Ur of the Chaldeans), arrives via Haran (in Upper Mesopotamia), in Canaan (= Phoenicia (Gr.), Punic (Lt)) (cf. Gen 12/15). This is the beginning of Hebrew culture, in a midst of pastoral nomads with minimal arable farming.

+/- **-1,250/ -1,230** Moses leads the exodus from Egypt, - signifying a new cultural input. After the Judges' Age (-1,200/ -1,025) comes the Kings' Age with Saul (-1,030/ -1,010), David (-1,010/-970) and Solomon (-970/-931). Then the Solomonic kingdom is divided (Judah/Israel: -931/721). Around -800 the Genesis story (with the Adam myth) is written: the beginning of the Old Testament books of revelation.

Around +/-721 the city of Samaria (Israel) falls, after three years of siege by Tiglath Pileser III, Assyrian-Babylonian ruler, and the population is deported to Mesopotamia (and replaced by Assyrian settlers, the so-called Samaritans, who will work out a syncretism). Under that Babylonian captivity, the Jews become familiar with Oriental (Mesopotamian and Iranian) myths, - of which remnants are found among the Essenes (-150/ +70), with their dualistic conceptions, and among the Therapeans (about whom Philon of Alexandria speaks), a sect in the vicinity of Alexandria, with mystical ways of life.

In -538 Kuros, the Great basileus (king) of the Persians, occupies the city of Jerusalem and allows the captives to return to their country, if they wish; signifying a restoration.

In - 333, Alexandros, after Syria, conquers Canaan, where the Jews and Samaritans live, on his passage to Egypt: the Hellenistic era begins;

In -63 Pompey conquers Jerusalem, ending the Macedonian epoch and beginning the Roman one. - Meanwhile, the diaspora, especially in Alexandria, come into contact with Greek philosophy.

Conclusion: one sees what melting pot of influences Canaan has been!

The Biblical (meta)physic. - O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id. , I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte d. antiken Idealismus)*, (History of idealism (Prehistory and history of ancient idealism)), Braunschweig, 1907², S. 102/118 (*Das alte Testament*), 17/193 (Thorah und Kabbalah); Cl. Tresmontant, *Etudes de métaphysique biblique*, (Studies in Biblical Metaphysics), Paris, Gabalda, 1955; -, *Essai sur la pensée hébraïque*, (Essay on Hebrew Thought), Paris, 1956, give an overview of the own, straightforward and also ethnical, philosophy present, expressed or implied, in the Bible. We now give an overview of these. -

Synchronicity. -

a/ Preconstitutionally: Yahweh, existing before the coming into being (constitution) of creation, controls, in the spirit of the 'negative' (i.e. opposing polytheism, pantheism and the like) monotheism, the entire fasis, which, at a given moment in time, was created by him. Neither emanatism nor preëxistent beings are accepted.

b/ constitutive: creation, the work of divine wisdom, unfolds itself, both dependent - and yet also independent of its Creator.

c/ Informative: man acquires knowledge of creation and its Creator through experience and thought.

d/ Normative (deontic): both nature and man are normed, governed, by the will of God, particularly by the “Law” (Decalogue). Especially the wisdom books give insights about this.

- Diachronic. -

The prophetic and apocalyptic books give a fragmentary but fixed scheme.

a/ Protological: the primal event (recounted in the creation week, made present in the Jewish week with the Sabbath as the day of rest) has as protoplasts (first created) Adam and Eve in Paradise.

b/ Kairological (turning point concerning): Adam, tempted by Eve, the latter herself the victim of the treacherous serpent (Satan, the telluric tempter), - sets, by the Fall (primal sin), the decay in motion; not, however, without further guidance from Yahweh, though no longer paradisiacal: under these saving and heel-restoring Divine acts, a second primal event prevails, the Exodus, o. Moses, of the chosen people, forerunner of all peoples, out of Egypt, - primal event which is made present in the annual Easter celebration.

c/ Eschatological (end-time): a definitive salvation, the final event, to be understood as Messianic, with judgment and resurrection, awaits. Such is the framework of thought that can be called Orthodox.

(i) Aristoboulos of Alexandria (probably +/- -150/ -100). -

The Pentateuch (five first O.T. books) are interpreted allegorically - in the flavor of the time - (rather than literally, so that the text is understood as a kind of parable transhistorically from “something else”). Above all, this Alexandrian Jew claims that Homer and Hesiod (the mythological theologians), the Orphic writings (also strongly mythicizing philosophy and mysticism), and Puthagoras, Platon, and Aristotle sprang from an early translation of the Old Testament into Greek assumed by Aristoboulos on purely speculative grounds. He does criticize the anthropomorphism in the Old Testament, but he remains thoroughly orthodox and theistic (among other things, there is no question of a pantheistic Logos doctrine, in the Heraklitean-Stoic sense).

(ii) Philon of Alexandria, nicknamed Philo Judeus (Philon the Jew),

Also called Philon the Pythagorean (-30/+45). Lived all his life at Alexandria, where he became head of the Jewish community, which he represented as an envoy to Rome in +39/ 40 (under Emperor Caligula (+37/ +41)).

The envoy question the exemption from the Roman civic duty of worshipping the emperor), some fifty Greek works have survived from him, especially Biblical commentaries.

(ii)a. Logic and epistemology. - A double text series is his basis: a: the Bible (as an expression of Hellenic thought) and b/ Greek philosophy

(as 'exègèsis', text explanation, of the Bible) are in full harmony with each other. - Old Testament revelation and 'law' are sacred to him: first the literal interpretation of the texts, then the allegorical interpretation; for "one should be attentive to both, to the knowledge of the hidden meaning (allegorical) and to the observation of the open meaning (literal)". For example, the Sabbath celebration has two meanings:

(i) the literal one of a full commandment of worship;

(ii) the allegorical of God's *energeia*, actuality, workaday reality in the face of man's idleness. He wants to understand the biblical miracle stories as factual stories. The Decalogue (Ten Commandments) is the basis of all legislation.

Like all Jewish theologians, Philon saw oral tradition as complementary to written revelation: scripture contains within itself oral revelation. From there are references to the Talmud. Philon distinguishes three stages of culture:

(a) the *enkuklios mousiké*, the music formative science (think of the seven arts, since Pythagoras and Sophism, elaborated at Alexandria into *enkuklios paideia*),

(b) the *philosophia*, i.e. "the concern for wisdom" (wisdom being "the knowledge of divine and human things and of their principles");

(c) wisdom itself, i.e., Mosaic revelation. Just as formative science is the "handmaiden" of philosophy, so philosophy is the *doulè sophias*, *ancilla sapientiae*, the handmaiden of (Mosaic) Wisdom.

- *Klemens of Alexandria* (/+215),

As a Christian, he opens the way to Patristic thought and will say, "As the formative sciences (*enkuklia mathèmata*) work together in the service of philosophy, which is the mistress of it (*despoina auton*), so philosophy in its turn cooperates in the acquisition (*ktèsis*) of wisdom (*Sophia*, i.e. here Christian revelation as the completion of Mosaic revelation)" (*Stromata* I). As H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, Cambridge Mass., 1948, explained, Philon stands at the beginning of three religious philosophies, a/ the Christian (which blossomed in the Middle Ages scholasticism), b/ the Jewish, and c/ the Islamic-Arabic, with the difference that:

1/ with Philon the sharp distinction between philosophical thought and religious revelation was still fluid and syncretic and

2/ he more often than not read scripture and oral tradition with philosophical-theological eyes. Cf. C. De Vogel, o.c., 354.

In any case, however the (trinity) formation sciences/ philosophy/revelation wisdom represent a progressive subordination, yet the multidisciplinary approach (see above p. 9 (theology, philosophy, professional sciences)) is clearly present in it and Filon's synthesis exudes the multifaceted spirit of Hellenic philosophy. - His experience of inspiration is remarkable:

"I do not hesitate to communicate what has happened to me countless times. - More than once, when I, after

I was in the habit of writing down my philosophical thoughts, and saw very clearly what ought to be written down, yet I found that my mind was barren and set in stone, so that I ought, without success, to procrastinate, and I had the impression of being locked up in puny opinions.

-
But at the same time I was astonished at the power of that which is in the thought, on which it depends to open or close the interior of the human soul. -

At other times, however, I began with an empty mind and, without more ado, I came to a breakthrough in the sense that the thoughts, like snowflakes or seeds, fell from above invisibly: something like a divine power seized me and animated me so that I did not know where I was, who was with me, who I myself was, what I said, what I wrote.

For now the flow of articulation was at my disposal, a pleasant clarity, a sharp look, a clear mastery of the material, just as if the inner eye could now see everything with the greatest clarity.” (O. Willmann, o. c., 609/610).

One may compare this with the katochè, ligature, shackle, of which Festugière spoke (see above p. 291) but here of the intellectual faculties (the inner eye viz. of the enlightened mind).

(ii)b. (Meta)physical. -

Here again the typical interval is present:

(a) preconstitutive is the high, incomprehensible, matter alien God, on the one hand, and on the other, the co-eternal, miasmatically conceived matter;

(b) constitutive is the Logos, the Universe Mind or Wisdom (see sophiology of Scripture), between the High God and the tainted and defiling matter, together with other spirits serving the High God, sometimes called daimonas sometimes angels (as in Scripture) or also ‘stars’ (astrotheological interpretation; cf. Stoa, etc.): all these intermediate beings give “form” to the in itself formless substance, so that the cosmos is the most complete work of the logos (and its co-operating intermediate beings).

In the Logos or Wisdom of the Universe are the ideas (Platon) and the number forms (Pythagoras), which are the possible forms of the in itself formless substance. See above page 240 concerning the Wisdom of the Universe or Logos.

- Soul teaching. -

Philon’s conception of souls is, like the rest, a syncretism of purely Biblical insights and ethnical ideas:

a/ souls are preëxistent (incorporeal, immortal) spirits, in the air regions;

b/ human souls are souls that approach the earth too much and unite with earthly bodies, thus becoming God-removed and defiled (which does not prevent Philon from also assuming a collective primal sin in a more or less Biblical sense: the fallen - angel doctrine). -

As a whole, Philon’s (meta)physical is: non-atheistic (“there is deity”); non-polytheistic (there is only one God); non-pantheistic (except in some places, where he mentions, in a Stoic sense, world-soul and Firelogos: - floating impression thus); non-fatalistic (God, through intermediate beings, is providential); non-polyphysical (there is one fisis)

(ii)c. Ethics/politics.-

As, for Philon, in the Platonic sense the ideas are:

a/ contents of thought (ennoëmata,- cf. Socrates and Aristotle also) yet also

b/ 'beingnesses' (ousiai,-which Socrates and Aristotle did not claim), so also the concrete, individual things and processes exist through participation (methexis) in those ideas; more so: knowing (informative aspect) and the moral-political life (normative aspect) is based on a participation in the ideas (to be situated in the Logos).

- Yet there is more here than Platonism and Logos theory: the theosophical concern prompts Philon to conceive of "seeing God" (cf. supra pp. 282/286) as a mystical, indeed magical, goal of life: the contemplative (speculative) beholding (direct intuition) of

(a) the fuis, as the most perfect work of the Logos, as the first prelude, and of

(b) the logos or Wisdom of the Universe, as the image (eikon, imago) of the Invisible God, as the second approach, is a two-fold approach to the contemplation of God, which is of course here strongly Biblical in concept.

-- The telos, since Socrates the main point of philosophy, -telos which eudamonia should provide thanks to aretè, i.e. man's fitness for purpose, is therefore contemplation, contemplatio. For this, however, a "pure", i.e. morally high quality life is needed, according to the Law and the Prophets.

This moderately demanding life is such that ecstasis, rapture, i.e. the state in which contemplation of God becomes possible, as the grace of the Invisible God, follows, in principle, already in this earthly life. -

By emphasizing the gracious, i.e. freely given, character, Philon separates himself both from the self-satisfied Stoics, which for him means pride, and from the lou-ter magical Theosophy, which for him is also the operative analogue of the morally self-satisfied Stoic intent.

- Of course, this contemplation of God is conceived as dematerialization, as ascension from the stained (miasmatic) dust: yet theosis or deification here remains childhood of God (i.e., then again, Biblical). One sees again and again the syncretism that bridges biblicism and ethnicism.

- Politics. -

a/ Philon is not so "mystical" as to foresee a very earthly eudaimonia or state of happiness (through a return to Israel) for the Jewish people as a whole.

b/ More to the point: the two - poleis or - cities doctrine, which presupposes an earthly state and a heavenly state, is present in Philon: he speaks with great praise of the emperors Augustus and Tiberius; Hellenistic monarch worship he tried to understand from Jewish patriarch worship; he is no enemy of Macedonian or Roman paeideia. It is true, however, that the Jewish people are protected by Yahweh according to a Godly judgment: anti-Semitism (i.e. Jew-hatred and persecution brings upon the anti-Semitic misfortune, yes death, through God's intervention, but through the fault of the persecutors themselves.

Conclusion. - Sofiologically speaking, we have the following to say about Filon's operation in the philosophical field. G. von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Bd. I (*Die Theologie der geschichtlichen Ueberlieferungen Israëls*), (Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. I (The Theology of the Historical Traditions of Israel)), Munich, 1961, S. 415/457, gives, in three chapters, an outline of sophiology, i.e. wisdom. -

(i) Von Rad distinguishes first of all empirical or experiential wisdom, i.e. expertise insofar as it discovers order and applies it to life, - which it expresses on an archaic level in proverbs (e.g. "From evil comes evil" (1Sam 24:14)). This empirical-gnomic (= proverbial) wisdom, says von Rad, o.c., 419, is based on the stubborn assumption that there is a secret order at work in things and in their course, which one discovers with much patience and through all kinds of painful experiences.

The (disorderly) multiplicity of phenomena is reduced to (orderly) unity by Israelite wisdom - as, for example, with the Hellenes. The correctibility (one thinks of Peirce's notion of fallibility) is one of its main characteristics. Yet the lawful order that governs "creation" is never without something "imponderabile," - referring to Yahweh, indeed, to mysterious forces and laws in creation.

In this sense, the world is never quite the fisis of the Hellenistic sages, who, apart from the simplistic atomists, -- and then again, Demokritos was too finely tuned not to know that all fisis is something imponderabile, imponderable -- also had the sense that the gods and unknown forces of nature were also at work.

-- At some point -- especially at the court of princes and in the civil service -- an evolved wisdom emerges, alongside and from that ancient wisdom of experience: a paideia, in which 1/ physical beauty, 2/ martial instruction, 3/ string games, and 4/ rhetoric (as throughout the East are central, constitutes numerous people of the upper social class.

In it (a) Edomite and Old Arabian, (b) Mesopotamian and (c) especially Egyptian wisdom influences converge. Cf. V. Rad, o.c., S. 427ff., where the archaic type of wisdom is called "elementary" and the new "didactic. -

Above all, a pragmati(cisti)c basic idea comes through here: the (ethical) good is always - in the long run, at least - the useful and effective, evil the ineffective, for to act is to be the cause of consequences (effective ethics), and this lawfully, without any particular intervention of God, although God is not foreign to this cause-and-effect relationship. Von Rad speaks of "Vergeltungsdogma" as an unfortunate name for this lawfulness.

(i) The second great type of wisdom, after or rather next to the empirical, is what von Rad calls the theological type of wisdom. This wisdom is inspired wisdom concerning the universe and its history, concerning humanity and peoples and their destinies. This wisdom goes far beyond the narrower framework of the historical and prophetic books.

As, higher p. 301, has been said about the Universe, with Philon, the ‘theological’, wisdom is a revelatory mediator, a meson or medium between 1/ the Godhead and 2/ the one who deals intimately with that wisdom (o.c. 439ff.): so in Proverbs 1/9 (especially Spr. 1:20vv.; 9:1vv.; see also *Ekklesiastikus* (= Jesus Sirach) 51:18 (24)vv.). -

Von Rad points to G. Boström, *Proverbiastudien (Die Weisheit und das fremde Weib)*, (Proverbial Studies (Wisdom and the Strange Woman)), 1935, S. 15ff., where the divine Wisdom as the straightforward counterpart of the Aphrodite parakuptousa (parakupsis is to look down sideways,-which the deers do to seduce): indeed, the wisdom women, in the service of the Queen of Heaven Astarte, acted as parakuptousai, - let us say: as seducers.

Likewise, in creation, divine Wisdom acts as a “recruiter” (Prov. 7:1f). Thus Wisdom, the mediator between 1/ the Godhead and 2/ humanity, yes, the whole creation, acquires feminine features. She is not Yahweh himself; she is a creature, but then the First Creature (Spr. 8:22), identical with the thinking content which God laid at the basis of the whole creation (one thinks of Platon’s thinking content god who carries all the ideas which ‘form’ the substance). -

It is here that the Pythagorean-Platonic world of numbers and ideas makes its appearance in the Biblical mentality. Yes, it is here that the intent of the theosophies makes its appearance in the Biblical world:

“Yes, He (i.e. Yahweh) Himself gave me reliable knowledge of things, to know the construction of the universe and the power of the elements, the beginning, the end and the middle of time, the turning of the sun’s position and the changing of the seasons, the cycle of the years and the position of the stars, the nature of animals and the nature of wild beasts, the power of spirits and the thoughts of men, the species of plants and the powers of roots. Hidden or visible, I have come to know everything, for the wisdom that made everything taught it to me.” (Book of Wisdom 7:17/21).

From such straightforward Biblical texts one can understand Filon’s intention: to acquire through the logos a ‘gnosis’ (knowledge) which is both inspired (and thus charismatic, as von Rad says) and at the same time rational-empirical scientific! That was the pretension of the Theosophists.

Two remarks

First remark: Here also a very peculiar scepticism occurs, which is expressed in Qohelet (= Ekklesiastes, Ecclesiastes) (von Rad, o. c., 451/457). Already Wis. 9:16/17 says: “Scarcely do we fathom the things of the earth; even what is obvious we understand with difficulty: who then shall fathom the things of heaven, who can know thy will, if thou didst not bestow wisdom, not send from above thy holy spirit?”.

Well, of that intellectual despair, Ecclesiastes offers us in utmost: “I have tried to distinguish wisdom and knowledge from foolishness and unwise, but I have seen that this too is only chasing wind, for the greater the wisdom, the greater the torment.” (Eccles. 1:17/18).

“Kohelet,” according to v. Rad, o.c., 454, “is anything but a nihilistic atheist. He knows that God created the world and controls it unceasingly through and through. But for man it is disastrous that he cannot come into contact with this divine mastering, because it is too deeply hidden. (...).

It does not come to a concordance of his actions with the God-ordained ‘time’ (auspicious moment); man always grabs beside it.” This means complete uncertainty, except on one point, certain death. v. Rad does not hesitate to call this ‘tragic’: a/ man’s life he does live himself, b/ but that same life is governed by an invisible divine power, which one never ‘understands’. -

It is to be regretted that K. Jaspers, *Ueber das Tragische*, (On the Tragic), Munich, 1952, S. 9, in his list of ‘tragic’ masterpieces, does not discuss Ecclesiastes. Homer, Edda and Saga and heroic sagas of the peoples,- Aischulos, Sophocles and Euripides,- Shakespeare, Calderon and Racine,- Lessing, Schiller,- the book of Job, some Indian dramas,- the tragedians Kierkerraard, Dostoefsky and Nietzsche, - they are all mentioned, but not Ecclesiastes, to which v. Rad, in my opinion, rightly points as a sapiential (= wisdom) tragedian. -

Does this not point in the direction of D. Bonhöffer, who says: “God makes us realize that we ought to live as people who finish life without God. God, who is with us, is that God who leaves us” (Mark 15:34: “My God, my God, why do you leave me?” cries Jesus on the cross)?

Cf. E. Brunner, *Got und sein Rebell*, (Got and his rebel,), Hamburg, 1958, S.135, where Ursula Berger-Gebhardt speaks of Brunner’s position in current Protestant theology. In this connection she refers to Jer. 31:31vv. and Gal 4:1v.: ‘wisdom’ (a/ in its elementary or archaic or b/ in its didactic or evolved form) makes man ‘mature’, personally thinking, ... with the consequences thereof (cf. Y. Congar, *Le mystère du temple (L’ économie de la présence de Dieu à sa créature, de la Genèse à l’ apocalypse)*, (The mystery of the temple (The economy of the presence of God to his creature, from Genesis to the apocalypse),), Paris, 1958, where the internalizing aspect of becoming an empowered person is discussed).

Second remark: What we have said above pp. 276/280 about apocalypticism is here given its place in the biblical whole: “A final broadening underwent sapiential theology through its fusion with apocalypticism.” (v. Rad, o.c., 450).

As v. Rad, *Theol. d. A.T. II (Die Theologie der prophetischen Ueberlieferungen Israëls)*, ((The Theology of the Prophetic Traditions of Israel),), Munich, 1961, S. 314ff., explains, apocalypticism is a/ wisdom literature b/ but with theosophical and historical concerns. The two-world doctrine is the framework in which the end-time events, as (mysteriously fixed from the beginning) the denouement of ‘evil’, which reaches its full measure at the end, are situated.

That “evil” lies in man himself (Dan 8:23/25) and is increasing on a world scale, leading to ruin. Above all, what von Rad underestimates - it situates itself on the mystical-magical plane. - So that one can distinguish three layers:

- 1/ historical description,
- 2/ prophetic descriptions interpretation,
- 3/ apocalyptic-sapiential interpretation. -

Indeed, every (even elementary) edition of the Bible distinguishes three types or genres of literature : **a/** the historical, **b/** the prophetic, and **c/** the sapiential, as Jer. 18:18 clearly enumerates them (three types of spiritual leaders, the priests with their 'law' (instruction), the prophets with their (God's) word, the wise with their 'counsel', run, from the exile, more and more together).

At the intersection of the a/ prophetic and b/ sapiential literature is situated, from -200 onwards especially, the apocalyptic, (see p. 277 supra), while in this the prophet Ezekiel (39vv) acts as the founder of a type of literature which culminates in the Apocalypse of Jesus (Mk. 13:4; see p. 279 supra) and of the apostle John. -

God's judgment is central to the apocalypses: 1/ on the Christian churches and on the whole church, - this in conjunction with an end of times (see 'eons', supra p. 276 ff.). God and the empires of the world - not Israel, not even the church(s) - are central. Such makes the apocalyptic genre sharply different a/ from the priestly and even b/ from the prophetic books, which think either Israel-centered or church-centered where the apocalypticists think cosmocentrically and situate God's actions both before the time of Israel or the church(s) and after the time of Israel or the church(s).

Moreover, "the apocalypticist, who reduces history to the basic forces at work in it" (*von Rad, II, 318*), reckons with a growth of evil until a great destruction - evil which, in man and the 'empires' set up by this autonomous man, is lawful, established from the beginning.

The prophets, on the other hand, attribute the catastrophes to interventions by God in history, - which is a complementary perspective (and not an opposite one, as von Rad, with his one-sided 'prophetic' attitude, believes, against the unity of inspiration of the whole of Scripture (which includes both prophetic and apocalyptic figures and books as different interpretations that go together).

What one-sided 'priestly' ('historical') and/or 'prophetic' thinking people find so difficult to digest is a/ the sapiential character b/ with its charismatic and especially its magical-mystical ('gnostic' says von Rad, II, 319) starting point. The sage, especially the apocalyptic sage, addresses the individual (not the whole people, like the priest and the prophet), and, in particular, that individual who, in apocalyptic context, has become skeptical and at the same time mystical-mystical.

von Rad, II, 21, does not hesitate to call the book Daniel "rather a great cosmological gnosis," which revolves around the notion of the divine secret (which is a/ in the unconscious of men and b/ in the universe, accessible only to the initiated ('chosen ones,' says the Bible)) at work).

- That this apocalyptic genre is tough in its survival is proven by Wassily Rosanow. *Apokalypse unserer Zeit*, (Apocalypse of our time), in N. von Bubnoff, *Russian Religionsphilosophen (Dokumente)*, (Russian Philosophers of Religion (Documents)), Heidelberg, 1956, S. 14/17 (the Russian Nietzsche); 159/182 (after the church(s) comes a new 'religion', though post-Christian).

(I)b2. The Gnostic - Manichaeian theosophies (flowering: +120/-250).

Introduction.-

H. Cornelis / A. Léonard, *La gnose éternelle*, (The eternal gnosis,), Paris, 1959, p. 104, says that the 'gnosis' (knowledge) is not an established (folk or state) religion; nor is it an intellectual religion (like the Stoa e.g. or Platonic astro(theo)logy); nor is it by any means a purely physical-ethical philosophy (such as Aristotelianism), even if it were to have a metaphysical basis (in the Immobile Mover who makes the universe purposeful, with Aristotle).

Gnostics are always people who have lost all faith

a/ in established or merely philosophical religions and

b/ in philosophies. In this they strongly resemble the Sceptic.

However, where Scepticism only honors a strongly secular (earth-bound, 'diessei-tige', bound to this world) phenomenology as an ideology, the Gnostic vows to a deeper phenomenology or phenon description, - just like all theosophy.

H.- Ch. Puech, *Le manichéisme*, p. 70, says: "What, indeed, is a 'gnosis' except a knowledge (...), but then a knowledge which is not only wholly directed to the search for salvation, but, moreover, (...) itself is salvation." (Cf. P.Foulquié/R. Saint-Jean, *Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique*, 1969², p. 303). The knowledge, which is at issue here, is the theosophical knowledge, as described above, but with its own nature **a/** looser from magic and alchemy, **-b/** more existential too (which is why it is possible for such historians of religion as Hans Jonas, Karl Kerényi, Simone Pétrement, Henri-Charles Puech, G. Quispel et al, approach Gnosticism phenomenologically, namely by defining it as an attitude to life (and indeed a religious attitude to life), namely as anxiety on the grounds of being cast into this world as beings not "of this world").

E. Gillibert, *La Gnose: ni l' Hellénisme ni le Christianisme ne suffissent à l' expliquer*, (neither Hellenism nor Christianity are enough to explain it), in *Question de Spiritualité*, No. 31 (juill.- août 1979), PP. 31/39, refers to the Messina Congress on the Gnosis in 1966, to define them. The congressmen concluded that the basic question of Gnosis was, "Who am I, really?" -- The answer is:

a/ man is body, yes, but he is more: he is a divine spark (word denoting both energy and insight);

b/ that 'spark' (informed energy) is

b1/ deviated from its goal, because it 'fell' into this world (from the other two - world doctrine), where fate (birth and death) reign, yet

b2/ can, yes, should awaken to free herself from the grip of the fate that this world means for her;

c/ self-knowledge is in that salvific and cybernetic event (which knows all myth) decisive

c1/ in fallen state the divine spark does not know itself as divine spark (obscured self-knowledge);

c2/ through self-knowledge, that spark regains itself;

d/ this ‘knowledge’ is simultaneously, purely or connected with a worship service, rites and/or mysteries, ‘saving’, - in which a personal ‘savior’ (or saviors) may or may not play a role;

e/ all this in the context of the theosophical interval between a very exalted, worldly and substance alien God Principle and this earthly sad world, within which first of all man moves.

Bibliographical note. - H.- Ch. Puech, *En quête de la Gnose, I (La Gnose et le temps)*, (In Search of Gnosis, I (Gnosis and Time),), Paris, 1978, (a.o. *Phénoménologie de la gnose*, in o.c., 185/213); II (Sur l’ Evangile selon Thomas), Paris, 1978 (the translation of the Gospel of Thomas; Leiden, 1959),-noting that the *Gospel of Thomas* (cf. the discovery of Nag-Hamadi (village in Egypt) in 1945, which gave us this first-rate document of the Gnostics in its entirety) is one of the most extraordinary sacred books of the Christian Gnostics; --

F. Bardeau, *Le livre sacré des Gnostiques d’ Egypte*, (The sacred book of the Gnostics of Egypt), Paris, 1977 (this is the text of the famous Pistis-Sofia, another famous Gnostic holy book);

F. Bardeau, *Le livre d’ Adam (Code Nazaréen)*, Paris, 1980 (the holy book of the Mandaeans and / or Sabaeans, one dual type of Gnostics); --

H. Jonas, *Het Gnosticisme*, (Gnosticism), Utrecht/Antwerp, 1969 (Eng.: The Gnostic Religion, Boston, 1958-1, 1963³), which provides a good overview;

S. Hutin, *Les Gnostiques*, Paris, 1963² (also a good overview). So far a choice from a plethora of works.

Heuristic model.-In order to make the Gnosis more accessible, here is the summary of the “great myth”, as represented by the *Evangelum veritatis* (Gospel of Truth) (cf. F.J. Schierse, S.J., Nag - *Hamadi und des Neue Testament, in Stimmen der Zeit*, (Hamadi and the New Testament, in Voices of Time,), Bd 168 (Jrg 86) (1960/ 1961), 7 (April), S. 47/62, especially S. 59). -

(a) Protology. - Starting point is the Father, the exalted God, and his dwelling place, called ‘plèroma’, plenitudo, fullness (cf. John 1:16): in the beginning the eons, angelic beings (or ‘gods’), dwelt together with the Logos, the Word (cf. from Herakleitos the Logos doctrine), in the God-fatherly fullness.

(b) Kairology. - Notwithstanding this ideal initial state, the eons did not recognize the Father (as Father) and separated themselves from Him, resulting in turmoil, terror, fear and forgetfulness; - immediately the planè, error, the error (a hypostasis of error), which is mistaken, concerning the proper being of the Father, gained power.

It is able to produce matter and, from that matter, based on the model of the errant eons of the higher world, to form the earthly world - one thinks of the fisis of the Hellenes - - moreover, the error is able to tempt those beings (eons) from the middle (between the higher world of the “fullness” of the Father and this world) who have sunk the furthest, namely to the border with this lower world, to dwell in human bodies; - this leads to the following result,

a/ except for the “material” people (hulikoi), who are only “creatures” of the error and, in time, together with the error, will be dissolved into “nothingness”,

b/ now also exist ‘eonic’ people, in whom a ‘trapped’ and error-ruled eon dwells, coming from the higher world. Behold the fall and decay that goes with it.

(c) *Eschatology*. - The Logos sees this disastrous condition: in order to free the eonon, both higher and lower (dwelling in humans), from their oblivion and, at once, to finish the universe, the Word (Logos) leaves the Father’s ‘fullness’ and communicates to them the saving gnosis, knowledge, of the Father; - the Word takes on ‘flesh’ (i.e. poor humanity).

The “error” (in the person of Jesus’ enemies) persecutes the Word and nails it to the cross, yet, by dying, it puts off its “torn rags” (20:31), i.e., its “flesh”, and puts on its indestructibility again. For the “redeemed” it returns in the “fullness” of the Father, to those places from which the eons had once departed.

It should be noted that the Odes of Solomon, hymns from the period +100/+150, Christian in nature but with a Gnostic-mystical slant, also reflect this myth (Incarnation, Descent into Hell and Ascension of Christ) as well as the doctrine of the soul (the ‘I’ of these psalms means, as with the Gnostics, sometimes Christ, sometimes the one who believes in him; the soul undergoes a theiosis, deification) contain, as the Gospel of Truth presents them, expressed in terms of truth, light, knowledge,- grace, unity, consummation, joy.

It should be noted, further, that the gospel of St. John exhibits strikingly similar structures and terms: according to St. Birènaïos (Ireneus), priest in +177, bishop in +178, died after +190, John wrote his letters and gospel against Kerinthos (Cerinthus), a Gnostic. St. John seems to have done this in strongly Gnostic language but as a straightforward Christian and not as a heretical Gnostic. -

Also St.- St. Paul (Rom 11/33; 15:14; 1 Cor 1:5; 12:8; 2 Cor 2:14; 4:6; 6:6; Philipp 5:8; etc.) also speaks of a righteous ‘gnosis’ and, like John, strongly focuses on the emergence of the Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, from the Father, the creation and fall of the ‘heavenly powers’ (comparable to the ‘eons’ of the Gnostics), the incarnation and the glorification of Jesus. -

All this to show that Christians cannot simply dismiss the Gnosis as a syncretism to be scorned!

World Religion. - G. Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion*, (Gnosis as a world religion), Zürich, 1951, presents Gnosis as a comprehensive religious-philosophical movement, which a/ involved pagan, b/ Jewish and Christian (and later c/ Islamic) centers in its maelstrom.

Gnostic philosophy. -

From the vast wealth of strains within the total Gnosis, let us extract the main traits.

(i) *Logic (epistemology).* -

Knowledge, but a revelatory knowledge in the Theosophical style, is central

a/ far from Socratic rationalism e.g.;

b/ even farther from Scepticism). –

The thesis of the Evangelists (Mark, Matthew, Luke), of the epistolographs, also of Paul and John in the New Testament is: Christianity preaches (proclaims) the death of the cross and the glorification of Jesus as God's wisdom which one should believe (= pistis, fides). -

The thesis of the Gnostics is a sapiential thesis: the incarnation and death of Jesus (sometimes obscured) and the resurrection which follows it, is a 'physical' (nature-emergency) event of degradation and degeneration, materialization and disembodiment, which the 'gnosis' does not believe but 'understands'. -- Hence the contrast 'pistis / gnosis' (faith / (knowledge of nature based on revelation)).

- Yet it is not so simple: the New Testament **a/** also describes faith as an enlightenment (gift of God) and **b/** faith is somewhere also real but veiled 'knowledge' (hence the gnostic aspect, especially with the two great mystics of the New Testament, Paul and John; cf. J. Huby, *Mystiques paulinienne et johannique*, DDB, 1946;

-- Christian mysticism that lives on in East and West (cf. J. Tyciak, *Profetie und Mystik (Eine Deutung des Propheten Isaias)*, (Profetie und Mystik (An Interpretation of the Prophet Isaias), Düsseldorf, 1953; id, *Morgenländische Mystik*, (Oriental mysticism), Düsseldorf, 1949)).

(ii) *(Meta)physical.* -

The theosophical duality (interval) governs the world view and this in two ways:

(ii)a. dualistic: the cosmos is broken up into an unknown, supremely exalted Godhead ultimate, on the one hand, and, on the other, an all-too-familiar, supremely expendable material world. Consequence: in order to explain the origin of this material world, one posits, between the "unknown" God and the Substance, a demiurge, a world-creator, who is usually conceived as "angry," "blood-loving," "cursed," and who transfers that anger, blood-loving, and curse onto his work, the material world (most Christian Gnostics identify that world-creator with the God of the Old Testament; - which the Jewish Gnostics then, of course, do not!). Furthermore, one usually posits, between the unknown God and this material world, a ranking of eons, whether or not divided into male and female (see above);

(ii)b. monistic: the cosmos continues to exist apart within an interval (as above) but from the One high Godhead lower beings (up to and including the material ones) appear, by efflux (ekroè, emanatio) or something like that; - this instead of proposing from the beginning two apart existing 'principles' (as the dualists do).

-- It is in this metaphysical interval that the anthropology (human science) of Gnosis is situated, which is typical of it: duality (interpreted dualistically or monistically) cuts man in two! Man is the prisoner of his corporeality: substance, especially in the form of body and corporeality, especially in the form of sexuality and arising and perishing (with corporeal ailments), act repulsively on the Gnostic.

“The irreconcilable Gnostic exhibits an invincible aversion toward the various manifestations of ordinary sexuality (sexual desire, sexual intercourse, conception, birth) and even toward the principal events of bodily life (birth, diseases, old age, death).

Such aversion to the body gradually leads one to regard it as a strange thing to be subjected to: one compares the body to a “corpse,” a “grave,” a prison,” an undesirable attendant” or an “intruder,” a “rascal,” an “enemy,” a “devouring dragon,” a “sea whose storms threaten to devour us. (S. Hutin, *Les gnostiques*, Paris, 1963², pp. 16/17). Hutin, o.c., 17, says that neither the Catholic (transient earthliness) nor the Buddhist (impersonal determinism) go so far in their body contempt: the Gnosis is an extreme form of miasmatic substance, body, and sex conception. -

In that metaphysical interval the Gnostic situates not only the matter but the soul of man himself is “stained” (sinful, impure), yes, diabolical, one even assumes two souls, a heavenly one (the real “I”) and a lower one, (the false, diabolical “I”). -

All this is all the worse where the Gnostics incorporate astrotheology into their system: the soul, wishing to liberate itself from that materially-stained grip, has to deal with the (seven spheres with, in each case, their ‘princes’, ‘archontes’, of the cosmos (resembling the Chaldean planetary gods), who subject the earth to their diabolical grip and who ‘await’ the souls who wish to escape, as ‘cosmic sentinels’, in order to cast them back into the dust and its defilement.

Reincarnationism. - Most Gnostics are reincarnationists: the terrifying cycle of rebirths is for Gnostics one of the saddest expressions of temporality, in which the soul, obviously an eternal, supra-temporal being, is trapped.

(iii) Ethics/Politics. -

One can already think what the *télos*, goal, is: liberation from the squeeze of the stained substance.

1/ This is done by the ‘gnosis’ first of all (see above).

2/ However, except for some sects, many Gnostics assume a ‘Saviour’ (such as the Logos of the Truth Gospel e.g. or someone like that, for there is a multiplicity of conceptions).-

3/ Besides ‘knowledge’ and ‘Savior’, many Gnostics also assume a liturgical initiation (with rites and mysteries). This often involves theurgy: before, even after death, magical words, magical seals or signs are provided which effectively effect liberation and purification (cf. Hermetism).

The attitude toward sexuality dominates all the ethics of Gnosticism

(Cf. the excellent article by Robert Amadou, *Les théories dualistes et la sexualité*, (Dualist theories and sexuality), in *La Table Ronde*, 97 (Jan. 1955), pp. 48/59). Totally logical: the hatred of the sensuous world implies, indeed, the hatred of sexual intercourse:

“To Salome, who asked how long the time of death would last, the Lord said, As long as ye, women, shall bring forth children! And Salome said to Him, ‘So I did well not to bear children! The Lord answered her, ‘Eat of all the fruits, but of the fruit that is bitter you shall not eat! Salome asked what she should understand by this, and the Lord replied: ‘When you shall trample on the garment of shame, the body, and when the two shall be one - male and female - then there shall be no more male or female: (Excerpt, preserved by Klemens of Alexandria (/+215), from *Evangelie der Egyptenaren* (the Gospel of the Egyptians), a Gnostic work from the second century A.D.)’ (S. Hutin, *Les Gnostiques*, p. 66). -

-The Gospel of Thomas also speaks in this sense: more than one of the 114 logia (dicta, sayings, statements), attributed to Jesus, as all the Theosophists liked to do in relation to an Eastern figure (one thinks of the Gnosticism). an Oriental figure (one thinks of Thot, the Egyptian god in the *Corpus Hermeticum*) - which, in principle, does not prevent that sometimes real Jesus sayings were kept by Gnostics, - which, practically impossible to make out anymore, unless by chance - , speak in the same sexist sense: “A woman in the crowd said to Him, ‘Blessed the womb that carried you and the (breasts) that fed you!!! He said, ‘Blessed are those who have heard the word of the Father and have kept it in truth. Come, indeed, the days when you will say, ‘Blessed the womb that did not receive and the breasts that did not suckle!’” (Saying 79; cf. H. - Ch. Puech, *En quête de la Gnose, II (Sur l’ Evangile selon Thomas)*, (In search of the Gnosis, II (On the Gospel according to Thomas), Paris, 1978, p. 23). -

The Catholic concept of marriage accepts that both the world and the body and sexuality are ‘fallen’ (original sin and original sin dogma), but that they, in themselves, are not bad. Consequence: procreation in marriage form is sacramental and priestly celibacy is only a relieving of an in itself good task. -

Not so for the gnostic: avoidance of all sexual intercourse is prevention of the fact that ‘sparks’ (souls) become trapped in a body, in’ n already in itself ‘tainted’ and ‘defiling’ sexual intercourse, which can never be ‘sacramental’.

Reproduction in itself is evil; marriage is tolerated only as indulgence in the face of human weakness. -

Yes, some Gnostics go so far as to degrade the body and sex, deliberately, by indulging in wild sexual intercourse. After all, excesses do not touch the “spiritual” man at his ethical core, according to the Gnostics in question. This led, in some cases, to a degenerate form of ‘sacred prostitution’, characteristic of some Eastern worship services.

Note on Manichean dualism.-

The term 'dualism' has two meanings:

(i) the theosophical interval, which is also assumed in monistic (i.e., assuming a single universe principle) Gnosticisms: Valentinus, an Egyptian, teaching in Rome between +135 and +168, e.g. explains the dichotomy of Light and Darkness in the universe from the one Godhead itself, which constantly 'darkens';

(ii) the true dualism, which explains the great discord from two from all eternity independently existing, 'principles' Light and Darkness, as e.g. Mani, an Iranian born at Babylonia (+/- +216) and crucified under King Bahram, Persian Sasanid (+/- +275).

(i) Logic (epistemology). -

"In the year that Ardashir I (king of Persia (...), the living Paraklet (/ Spirit as helper) descended upon me and addressed the word to me. He revealed to me the secret mystery (...) of the Light and the Darkness, the mystery of the battle (...) which the Darkness had instigated." Thus the theosophist Mani about himself. He saw himself as the fourth and final "prophet" after Buddha (from whom he imitated the ethical-aesthetic model of life), Zarathoestra (whose dualistic cosmology he adopted) and Jesus (whose eschatology he incorporated into his universal system).

(ii) (Meta)physics. -

Before heaven and earth and all that is in them existed there were two "principles," one good, the Father of Greatness, dwelling in the Light, the other evil, the Prince of Darkness, dwelling in the land of Darkness. Although the Prince of Darkness in the Greek texts is called 'hulè' matter, he is more than a philosophical concept: he is a mythological but active living person, who is angry and who, at a certain moment, at the limits of his area, sees the Light (and the Father) and, thereupon, hating - fighting, enters into battle.

(iii) Ethics/Politics. -

A strict asceticism, which, mortified, abstains from meat (vegetarianism) and from marriage, love-play, and childbearing, and which the elect (or truthful) can handle, while the hearers, the great mass, not living monastically, led a less strict life in the world. - Which strongly influenced Christian monasticism. - Cf. H. Jonas, *The Gnosticism*, pp. 227/256.

After-effects. - Although fiercely persecuted, Manichaeism penetrated into China and, especially in +300/ +500, into the West, where 'Neo-Manichaean' sects (Priscillians, Paulicians, Bogomiles, Cathars, Albigensians, etc.) continually emerged, until the Middle Ages.

Conclusion: - Up to our days Gnostic (including Manichean) insights, doctrines: rites and dgl. live on: according to H. Jonas up to Existentialism (o.c.347vv .) according to S. Hutin (o.c. 120 ss.) up to Romanticism, Symbolism and Surrealism (not to mention the occult societies).

IIIB (II) The neo - Platonic theosophy(s) (+250/ +600)

Introduction. - Around +250 Christianity clearly took off on a large scale (doctrinal, hierarchical, liturgical) so that it could fully compete with the state religion.

It even began to have a purifying effect on pagan religions (regarding the concept of God (monotheistic) and ethics especially). - Nevertheless, dying paganism reacted either with persecutions, which were bloody and refined (Decius (+249/ +251), Aurelian (+270/ +275), Diocletian (+284/ +305)) or with favoring of pagan religions (Mithracism with its solar cult) from especially the Severi (+195/ +235) through Aurelian to Iulianus Apostata (+361/ +365). -

In the course of the third century, two great challenges come to threaten Christianity: (i) Manichaeism (see above) and (ii) Neo-Platonism, which represents the strongest attempt of the ancient middles to build, outside of Christianity, indeed in opposition to it, a rational religion on a pagan basis. (Cf. H. Pinard de la Boullaye, *L' etude comparée des religions, I (Son histoire dans le monde occidental)*, (The comparative study of religions, I (Its history in the western world)), Paris, 1921, pp. 73ss.). -

From -347 (death of Platon) to +250, six centuries elapse: Greek, Oriental, Roman, Hermetic, Neo-Pythagorean, Gnostic and Manichaean ideas are absorbed, gradually, by Platonists, first at Alexandria, later at Rome, Antioch, Athens, Constantinople (as the Neo-Pythagoreans had done in those centers), and are processed into what is called Alexandrian syncretism (or eclecticism) or Neo-Platonism. The name 'Neo-Platonism' is correct in that this philosophy not only renews Platonism but incorporates this Platonism into a system, in which also all the other and previous main directions of Hellenic philosophy (except Epicureanism and Scepticism, of course), together with religious and mystical-magical conceptions (from the East), are processed and summarized with multifaceted power of thought into a mighty synthesis. So that we are here faced with an eclecticism of a methodical, indeed ideological nature (cf. pp. 258/259 supra).

Overview of Neo-Platonic philosophy. -

Before we go over the various shades, we give, for comparison with the other theosophies.

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(i) logic (epistemology). - The method of knowing is, of course, the theosophical (inspired knowledge along mystical, yes, magical path) yet syncretistic-encyclopedic, as just outlined, in a comprehensive system. -- From Porfirios of Tyros (Palestine) (+233/ +305), the disciple of Plotinos of Lukopolis (Eg.) (+203/ +269/270), Aristotelianism, with its logic, is introduced into Neo-Platonism. -- Yet it remains essentially a commentary-based, 'hermeneutic' philosophy.

(ii) (Meta)physical. - Panentheism, since Plotinos, is the basic idea: a/ God is the essence of all beings, especially souls (essence exposed when one peels off the material side); b/ those beings are a pure manifestation of God (in them).

“Pan-and-theism” is one kind of “pantheism,” namely, that pantheism which does not merge God into the world, but, conversely, conceives of the being of the world as a manifesting God, into whom they, in essence, merge. One also finds something like this in the Indian Vedanta philosophy.

But note that, syncretistically-encyclopedically, Plotinos also leaves room for polytheism (polygoddism of late antiquity), - something that Porphyrios and Jamblichos of Chalkis (Koilesuria) (+283/ +330), as well as Proklos of Constantinople (+410/ +485), as patrons of late antique polytheism, do even more so. - So that we stand for a synthesis of panentheism and polytheism.

(iii) **Ethics/Politics.** - Knowledge is virtue and that is theosophical knowledge. consequence: the ethics of neo-Platonism is mystical (intimate contact between God, respectively gods and goddesses and man), Yes, theurgical (high magic evoking gods). Which M. de Gandillac, *La sagesse de Plotin*, (The wisdom of Plotinus), Paris, 1952, p. 198, makes one say: “Convinced that nothing exists in the proper sense beyond the radiance of an infinite Light, which catches everyone according to the measure of his powers, Plotinos made room neither for the grace that saves the prodigal son - one thinks of Jesus’ message - nor for the technology that transforms nature - one thinks of modern technocracy - nor for the revolution that frees the slaves - one thinks of Marxism - “On the other hand, Neo-Platonism has strongly influenced Patristic philosophy (+33/ +800), Neo-Platonism, on the other hand, had a strong influence on Christian mysticism and occultism.

Overview of the major trends. -

The founder is Ammonios (Sakkas), who was at first a packet-bearer (‘sakkas’) (?) but studied for a long time at Alexandria, and then taught himself, without however writing (cf. Socrates) until his death in +242. He had among others three disciples, whom Porfurios names, Herennios, Origenes (not the Christian church father), Plotinos (life v. Pl., 18). - Longinos (+210/ +273), another disciple of Ammonios, spread his teachings at Pergamon (Syria), while Plotinos propagated them to Rome, in +244.

One can divide the Neo-Platonists into three main schools and a subject-scholarly-Aristotelian subcurrent.

(i)**a.** Plotinos thinks in mystical direction, engaging in speculative metaphysics;
(i)**b.** Jamblichos supplements this mystical thinking with theurgy;
(i)**c.** Proklos synthesizes Plotinos’ mysticism and Jamblichos’ magism in an encyclopedic grasp.

(ii) Porphyrios introduces Aristotelianism (logic especially) at Rome, which Themistios (/+390) at Constantinople, Ammonios, son of Hermias and pupil of Proklos, at Alexandria and Simplikios at Athens do. -

These **a1/** mystical speculative, **a2/** mystical-magical, **a3/** encyclopedic and **b/** vocational Aristotelian directions will long endure.

AI. The mysticism of Plotinos and its speculative metaphysics.

Plotinos of Lukopolis (Eg.) (+203/ 269/70). -

“Plotinos, the philosopher who lived in our time, was of the kind of people who are ashamed of being in the body: on the basis of such a mentality, therefore, he did not want to communicate anything about his origin, his parents or his homeland. He would not tolerate a painter or a sculptor around him, indeed to Amelios, who asked him for permission to make a statue of him, he said: “It is not enough, then, to wear the ‘eidolon’, the image, with which nature has clothed us; no, you are asking me to agree voluntarily that an eidolon, an image of the image, remains of me, a more durable one, as if such an image were a thing of beauty! : Thus he refused and did not go to the artist.” (R. Harder, Uebers. *Plotins Schriften, Neubearbeitung mit griechischem Lesetext und Anmerkungen*, (Writings, new edition with Greek reading text and notes.), Bd. Vc (Porphyrios, *Ueber Plotins Leben und über die Ordnung seiner Schriften*), (About Plotinus’ life and about the order of his writing), Hamburg, 1958, S. 1).

This contempt for the body, resembling Gnosticism, expressed itself as follows: although he suffered greatly from colic (pain in the large intestine), he tolerated neither rinses (an old man like him, he said, could not tolerate such a cure!) nor theriacal (from wild animals) antidotes (he did not even tolerate those nutrients that came from the body of animals, he said, that were tame);

Taking public baths he avoided, but, instead, had himself massaged daily at home, but, as his general sickness increased, and his masseurs died, he also abandoned this bodily care, with the result that gradually a malignant angina (elephantiasis graeca (?), tuberculosis (?)) set in: his voice became hoarse, the eyes weakened, hands and feet festering, so that his pupils, whom he used to greet with a kiss, shunned him. (Ibidem, S. 4/5), --

A peculiarity was the following: as a schoolchild he ran school but still went to his suckler (min) until he was eight years old to bare her breast and suck her milk; only when he heard that he was a poor boy (because he still did so at that age), he became ashamed of it and left his suckler alone. (Th. Wolfe, the great American novelist did the same thing until he was three and a half years old.) -

In Campania (outside Rome) Plotinos dies, saying that he tried to raise the divine in us to the divine in the (whole) all: at that moment a snake crawled under the bedspread, on which he lay, and slipped into an opening in the wall, giving up the ghost (Porf., o.c., 9),

M. de, Gandillac, o.c., 17, says that the physician told this for the superstitious pupils (with the frog the snake (drakon) belonged to the ogdoas of Hermopolis, adds steller); yet R. Herder, o.c., 82, says that this is a ‘Seelenschlange natürlich’ (a soul serpent, of course): the creature that leaves the dying is his soul (which is common folk belief, says steller), not a special devil (Brehier).

It should be noted that B. Tanghe, *De slang bij de Ngbandi*, (The snake at the Ngbandi), Brussel, 1919, blw. 11vv, mentions that Saint Viridiana, a Franciscan, in the last days of her life, repeatedly found two snakes in her room, - giant snakes that startled her every time; - yes, that he himself, a missionary in Zaire (Ubangi), between May 9 and 19, 1919, saw an oversized snake; that crawled away when it was discovered, until she was shot with a gunshot. The author says that this event gave him an understanding of the snake worship among the Ngbandi there, especially with regard to twins. This is one example of snake religion among many, yes, very many. - O.i. the soul serpent of Plotinos points to his unconscious soul layer and what black magic is present in it; - which cannot be explained here.

The Plotinism. - We do say "Plotinism," for Platonism is not Plotinos' system; but a curious attempt to elucidate, with Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Pythagorean elements, the theosophical problems of the time of Plotinos.

(i) **Logic (epistemology).** - E. Dodds, *Der Fortschr.*, Zürich / Munich 1194: S. 153, claims that Plotinos traditionally thinks Greek rationalistically. Which one can assume with great limitation.

(i)a. **Plotinos (Enneaden 5:1,8)** says that his own teachings are exègèseis, commentaries, interpretations of Platonic teachings. - Like, incidentally, Platon himself, he sees an analogy between mythology and the intellectual thought of philosophy. Indeed, as O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id., I*, 693, observes, the Plotinians forge the word theo.muthia, god-story in order to capture verbatim the divine content of the myths.

Philosophy is - as Proklos will say - exegesis or interpretation of myths: the first stage is the speech of the 'inspired' seer (divine inspiration); the second, the figurative-mythical proclamation (which is already a less inspired, more intellectual speech); the third, the speech in abstract (mental) images (which is already philosophical); the fourth, 'scientific' speech (which is full philosophy). -

So that Plotinians, like the great Socratics (Platon, Aristotle) and the Stoics, hark back to the primordial traditions of the Hellenes and even of other peoples, because they understand themselves as the commentators of one long, developing tradition, a philosophia Perennis, an eternal thought, which, across all ages and peoples, forms one unbroken 'chain'.

For example, Plotinos joined Emperor Gordian III (+238/ +244), following his campaign against Persia (+242/ +243), to learn the 'wisdom' of Iranians and Indians (this campaign failed, - prompting Plotinos to move to Rome).

Anaximandros, Puthagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitos, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, Platon, Aristotle, the Stoa, the Praeneoplatonists, -- they all act as commentators on an ancient tradition, to which Plotinos and the Plotinians join.

(i)b. As O. Willmann, o.c., says, this sense of tradition is constrained by a subjective mysticism: unification with the primordial principle of the universe (called the One or the Good), according to Porphyrios, Life 120/131 (23), was the overall pursuit of Plotinos, - which he succeeded four times (where until +301 Porphyrios had succeeded only once).

Here we clearly feel the transrational, theosophical side of Plotinian thinking: this is why we maintain that Plotinos does not unquestionably represent so-called 'rational' philosophy, although it is true what Dodds says, that he saw ethical 'pure' living and logical finally thinking as the preparation for unification (with the One) par excellence and always upheld that style of thinking in his expositions.

(i)c. To "explain" something, says E. Bréhier, *Plotin, Ennéades II*, Paris, 1964, p. 49, is for Plotinos not, as with Aristotle for example, the analytic method, but the situating of something (e.g. the matter, the ideas, the understanding of the universe or whatever) in reality in so far as it 'arises' from the One (Good) in a naturally necessary manner in a typical 'genesis' (the ancient Hellenic word, which already occurs with Homer and the Milesians, meaning related to 'fusus') or becoming. -

This is a scheme of thought that will be emulated (one thinks of Hegel's view: "To deduce something means for Hegel: to show that it cannot exist and cannot be thought of outside of wider dialectical coherence; - that it is indispensable as a moment (i.e. moving part) of, a greater whole." Thus A. van den Bergh van Eysinga, *Hegel*, The Hague, s.d., p. 68).

(ii) (Meta)physical. - The theosophical duality (interval) also governs Plotinism.

P. Sertillanges, *Le problème du mal (L'histoire)*, (The problem of evil (The story)), Paris, 1948, p. 123, quotes a telling text: "Since the Good does not remain alone, it is necessary that evil exists by removal from the Good, i.e., by the relative inferiority of the beings who, while deriving one from the other, move more and more away from the Good. Or, if one prefers: by the decline and exhaustion of the divine power (meant that of the One or Good) this, in the series of successive outflows, weakens from level to level. There is a final level of being, after which nothing can be produced. That is evil." (*Enneaden* 1:1,8).

-- The interval may yet, with Sertillanges, be typified as follows:

(a) there is an upper side, the One or the Good, which acts as the primal principle of everything (Plotinos even suggests that it is not a 'being', so above all being it can be situated!); there is a lower side, evil, in which no form of thought or idea can yet be found;-see the interval;

(b) in between are situated the being, which we shall now describe in more detail (o.c., 124). "Between the One and the Substance lie three descending levels of reality, the Universe mind (Nous), the world soul (psuche) and nature (fusus)." (E. Dodds, in *The oxf. Classic Dict.*, Oxford, 1950, p. 705)

(ii)a. The One is the principle of all existence (cf. Platon's Parmenides) as the Good that One is the principle of all value (cf. Platon's Politeia). The One is sole; (there is no second One), impersonal (one does not therefore compare it with the First Person, the Father, of the Christian Trinity) and incorporeal (immaterialism).

(ii)b1. All that exists (is valuable), exists thanks to the expansion of the One (Good). This takes place in two movements, firstly the pro.odos, the exit, the emergence, comparable to a midpoint (the One) around which concentric circles (the multiplicity of being which emerges from the One) arise;

Two properties occur at that outflowing event (ekroè, emanatio):

1/ the unity, i.e. the concentration or density of being, which characterizes the One, becomes a growing multitude (dilution);

2/ the singularity (individuatio) increases (seen from the generality of the One, the disengaged are poorer singularities, individual realities). -

This expansion of the One is not a temporary or historical event but a timeless (eternal), transcendental event (purely logical relation of causality). The outer circle of exiting beingness is the substance, the limit of all possible expansion (therefore so poor and unified and ungood).

Conclusion:

a/ The Bible with its creation story differs thoroughly from the "genesis" (the outgoing becoming) that Plotinos advocates, for, in the Biblical creation, a free will act of Yahweh is at work;

b/ with Plotinos, the One simply runs involuntarily and indifferently-unpersonally into its expansions.-

Above all, there is no interaction between the One and its expanded being: the One is not changed or affected in any way by the expanded being: Not so in the Bible: Yahweh is personally involved (though standing above it as an infinite being) in creation; thereby a mutual relationship arises between Creator and creature, however dissimilar they may be among themselves (1/ which in the processual theology of a contemporary like Ch. Hartshorne is abundantly clear; 2/ what R. Guardini, *Le sérieux de l' amour divin*, (The seriousness of divine love), in *Dieu Vivant*, No. 11 (Paris, 1948), pp 15/26, already wrote: "For God, creation has become a (viz. his) destiny" (p. 25), because he loves his creation). This points to the abyss that separates Plotinism and Biblical revelation.

(ii)b2. The second "movement" is the epi.strofè, the return. Is the exit outward and downward, the return is inward and upward.

If this return is true for the Universe Mind (Nous) and the Universe Soul (Psuchè), it is especially true for the individual who is human: this one possesses a will which is directed towards his true being, and which can realize this orientation (cf. *Faidros*).

This return is not a spatial event (the soul's flight through the cosmos), nor a turn provoked by God's grace (Bible), nor a turning point negotiated by "gnosis" (Gnosticism); it is a spontaneous act of man himself.

(ii)c1. The two-worlds doctrine of Platon

(kosmos noëtos, mundus intellegibilis, thought-content world/ kosmos aisthetos, mundus sensibilis, sense-content world) shifts: where, for Platon, this dark pictorial world referred to the light-filled general world of ideas of images, there is, for Plotinos, this time-bound and spatial world a caricatural image of a totum simul, as Dodds says (*Fortschr.*, 160), the space- and time-free paragon of this world. The transcendental world is like a translucent accumulation of what is opaque and pulled apart this world shows.

(ii)c2. The three levels of reality and value. -

(A) As already indicated, the Nous, Intellectus, the (World or Universe) Mind, is the first necessary corollary of the indeterminate One (cf. Anaximandros' a.peiron). The Mind is to be compared with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover (which is pure energieia, actus, realization): a thinking that thinks itself in an eternal clarity; the thinking content are the Platonic ideas, which are conceived as a poikilia dunameon, varietas virtutum, a set of forces that, mutually very diverse, nevertheless form a unified coherence, viz. the (total) Mind itself (which spreads itself therein in a purely logical way), which in that set of ideas grasps everything (totum) at once (simul).

(B) The Psuchè, Anima, (World or Universe) soul, which, in itself, is eternal and space-free, is also a thinking (and of the same set of ideas as above), though dianoetically, discursively; the ideas are thought, by that soul, a/ one after another and b/ apart (in space). Thus time and space are created.

(C) The third main corollary of the indeterminate, all-transcending One and Good is Fusis, Natura, Nature: this resembles the World-Soul present in fusis as conceived by the Stoa (note: do not confuse this Stoic World-Soul with the Plotinian Psuchè, even though there are similarities).

As M Ambacher, *Les philosophies de la nature*, (The philosophies of nature), Paris, 1974, pp. 44/45, says;

a/ Plotinos, of course, rejects the mechanistic model of Demokritos (Epikouros, Lucretius) with his materialism;

b/ but he, too, rejects Aristotle's artificialist model (substance taking shape thanks to the formative activity of a purposeful cause of work). Nay, as

a/ the Mind, which thinks of itself as an idea coherence at once and space-free and

b/ like the soul which thinks that same coherence of ideas spatially and temporally,

c/ so the Fusis, Nature, as the third creative agency, thinks the \neg same ideas coherence yet "vaguely" (Enneaden 3:8) and dreamily such that the ideas take shape in the substance (which is the passive Apeiron or indeterminate).

Nature thinks, dreamy-vague, apart in time and space, in the substance, the things and their movements, which surround us and so they 'are', come into being (genesis) they. Plotinos compares the theama, visio, vision, of Nature with geometers, who, while thinking, draw lines (in order to draw their object): Nature, however, thinks and, without the labor of drawing lines, material things come into being as projections.

(ii)d1. Humanities. -

Man is body, but above all soul. The souls of men belong to the (World) Soul, which is the universal soul that carries and brings about all individual souls; yes, with that World Soul, the individual soul thinks the world along (and thus creates it): -

As a soul, man includes two aspects:

(a) ho ego, ego, the I (also used in the plural ‘hemeis’, nos, we.), i.e. the earthly consciousness that characterizes each of us (surface soul);

(b) the psuche, the (depth) soul which only reveals the actual dimension of man as soul-in-the-world soul; as depth soul, man, unconscious with his earthly surface consciousness, reaches from the One (via the Mind (with its concentrated ideas) about the World-Soul) to the Substance (of nature). -- The surface soul, characterized by sun.aisthèsis, parakolouthèsis heautoi, i.e. self-consciousness or perception, is only a partial soul of the overall depth soul, which is present (mostly unconsciously).

a/ Physical acts of work such as breathing or digestion, as well as unconscious perceptions escape the surface soul (and its limited awareness or consciousness).

b/ The transcendental world (up to and including the One, which is everywhere and nowhere) also escapes the surface soul. - Yet the depth soul ‘grasps’ (‘thinks’) all this, below and above it as a human individual, in one way or another;

c/ moreover, thanks to an effort of will, the surface soul can, through repentance, identify with the depth soul in the rapture, through unification. Cf. Dodds, *Fortschr*, 162/165. Often, when I awaken from the slumber of corporeality, come to myself (i.e. to the depth soul), turn away from the outer world and introspect, I behold a wonderful glory; then I am sure that I realize the better part of myself; that in the true life I am active, I am united with the Divine and grounded in it, I acquire the strength to rise above the transcendental world.” (*Enneaden* 4:8,1). By the latter Plotinos denotes the contact with the One, which is transcendent, all-pervading. -

To summarize:

a/ the self is habitually with the World Soul in the time- and space-bound world of thought;

b1/ the depth soul, meanwhile, is vaguely dreaming with Nature in the fabric;

b2/ the depth soul also thinks time- and space-free with the Mind all at once;

b3/ yes, it achieves - however seldom - henosis, unio (unificatio), unification with the One Good, with which it is, in essence, always one somewhere, - unity that breaks through in the rapture to the surface soul. -

Then she recovers the fact that she, once, was detached from the World-Soul connection (from daredevilry (tolma), becoming (genesis), first detachment (protè heterotès, first self-alienation), will to belong only to herself, - according to Plotinos himself).

By leaving the “great” (i.e. World) Soul to live in this Natural World, in the dust, dream lost, she resembles the child who early separated from its parents and raised far from them, does not know down who it is.

One point of doctrine bears mentioning (because it lives on for so long, to our days): the World Soul,

a/ which, as a “theoretical”, i.e. contemplative, soul, is called the better (“higher”) one and contemplates the ideas in the Nous (World Spirit)

b/ but which, as a demiürgic (i.e. nature-creating) soul, is called the ‘fusikè’ (physical) or ‘gennetikè’ (generative) soul and forms this world, in which there is one great life (arising from it), in which all beings, however they may be, participate, causes three ‘images’ of itself to arise in order: (a) the reasonable soul, (b) the sensuous or sensitive soul, and (c) the vegetative or vegetative soul.

“When the generating Soul passes into man, it forms there an image of itself, the reasonable soul; when it passes into the animal, it forms there another image of itself, the sensitive (or sensory) soul; if it passes into the plant, it forms there yet another image, the Vegetative soul.” (*Enneaden* 5:2,2).

In other words, a/ thinking, b/ sensing and c/ living are three levels which the demiurgean World Soul passes through in the necessary “exit” (proödos) of beings who “live” (on three levels). - One understands this only correctly, if one knows that this triple life is one life and that all (human, animal and plant) souls constitute only one Soul, which ‘lives’ and ‘exits’ into other life forms (Enn. 6:5,7). - In this sense, one can speak of panpsychism (all-soul vision). And the people we are are embedded in an all-soul reality.

(ii)d2. Unity theory (henology, monism). -

Platon sees a freely acting, personal Demiourgos at work who is Agathos, bonus, good, and, as good, is free from phthonos, invidia, zealotry (evil eye), (*Timaios* 29); he harmoniously orders (Puthagoras’ harmonia) the co-eternal substance by imprinting on it, as seals, the ideas (in that substance, in one of its forms: earth, water, air, fire). -

How different is Plotinos: the One (‘God’, but impersonal (‘it’) and indifferent) constantly radiates involuntarily in waves, which make up the ‘being’ outside him and take the forms of heavenly body, man, animal, plant, stone. - Monism: one reality expanding in waves in a fatal way instead of Platon’s duality of a Demiurge and ideas, which ‘form’ matter. Henology: to them, unum, the one, blessing out,- that is Plotinism, - unity theory.

(ii)d3. Harmony Theory. -

“The whole (to pan), subj.: of reality, - is one (hen) and one harmony (mia harmonia) (...). All being are mutually ordered, are, mutually, dependent the one on the other and conspire for the purpose of one objective (sumpnoia mia).” (Ennead. 2:3,3; 2:3,7). V. Decoster, *Des antécédents du néoplatonisme*, (Antecedents of neoplatonism,), Bruxelles, 1872, p. 40 - an old book but with solid pages - points out that the whole Alexandrian cosmology (universe theory) is governed by this theory of harmony, which, somewhat as in the Stoa, is understood in terms of sumpatheia, agreement).

This theory of harmony, based on *sumpatheia* and *antipatheia*, is the basis of Plotinos' teaching on magic.

V. Decoster, o.c., 41/42, says "On this *sumpatheia* the efficacy of the art of arousing love (love-stover) by acts of magic is supported." *Enneaden* 4:4, 40 says, "The magicians bring together those natures which cherish an innate love one for another; they unite a soul with a soul, as one couples plants removed from each other. By using certain forms, which possess its own powers, by assuming certain attitudes, they silently appropriate the powers of the other beings and make them conspire for the sake of unity, and this all the easier since they themselves are in unity."

Indeed, all beings are attracted or repelled by virtue of their nature: from this nature-given attraction or repulsion among themselves, the magicians draw their ability to make talismans to "work" through words or chants or, also, attitudes.

All that, in the cosmos, is body or comes into contact with body is subject to magical influences. Only the soul, in a state of repentance and rising in *theoria*, contemplation, resists the temptations of magic. (*Enn.* 4:4,4 and following).

This explains why Plotinos, although believing in magic, in his ethics emphasizes contemplation and union with the One and is rather dismissive of magic.

The same theory of harmony underlies astro(theo)logy. The celestial bodies are part of the attraction and repulsion whole that makes up the *fusis*: therefore they exert influence on the human *fusis*: "The movement of the heavenly bodies acts, by modifying in various ways the earthly beings, of which it modifies not only the bodies but also the souls." (*Enn.* 4:4,31).

But note that this celestial influence is supported on the nature of the celestial bodies, as a kind of radiation (*Enn.* 4:4,13), not on their free deliberation or free decision. To invoke heavenly gods and think, in that way, to obtain from them favors, which do not depend on the unchangeable world order, is to fall into superstition and falsehood. (*Enn.* 4:4, 42). Hence Plotinos' critical attitude towards the naive astrology of his time: "The beauty and ugliness of children come, evidently, from their parents and not from the course of the heavenly bodies. In the other place: it is probable that at the same time a multitude of men and other living creatures are born; they should therefore all have the same nature, since they are born under the same constellation." (*Enn.* 3:1,5). -

Divination, whether supported by star divination or bird divination (*Enn.* 3:3, 3) relies, in its best case, on the same sympathetic or antipathetic coherence of the universe.

Conclusion: the soul of man, at least in its higher part, escapes the laws of sympathy or antipathy. This explains Plotinos' emphasis on intellectual and moral mysticism.

Excerpt 1. - *Porfurios, Life, 53/55*, tells of a magical incident in Plotinos' life, typical of the atmosphere of the time. Olumpios of Alexandria, former pupil of Ammonios, could hardly stand Plotinos: he magically directed (mageusas) the (harmful) influence of the heavenly bodies on him. Plotinos sensed this and said that his body contracted: like a purse of money when one closes it, so his limbs contracted (the closing of the 'aura', as one would say nowadays in occult circles).

Olumpios, however, became aware that his magical attack on Plotinos, like a boomerang, returned to himself (the magical rebound, when the one attacked is magically more powerful than the attacker) and said to his acquaintances that the 'dunamis tès psuchés', the soul power of Plotinos was impressive, since it was capable of repelling and returning to the attacker. Victimized himself, Olumpios stopped. Here black magic punished itself!

Excerpt 2. - *Porfurios, Life, 56/59*, tells of an Egyptian priest, who, on a certain day, in Rome, through a friend, comes into contact with Plotinos and proposes to him to furnish proof of his 'sophia', summoning art, by making Plotinos' personal daimon (guardian spirit) appear, thanks to klèsis, summoning (epi thean) cf. p. 287 supra -.

To which Plotinos gladly acceded. The 'incantation' (klèsis) took place in the Ision (Isi temple) because, according to the priest-caller, this was the only place in Rome that was 'typos katharos', pure place.

It is said, according to Porphyrios, that the 'autopsia' (seeing with one's own eyes) of the daimon showed that not a daimon of lower class, but a god(theos) accompanied Plotinos. -

An incident prevented one from approaching the appearing god to ask questions or to take a closer look at him, namely the friend who was also watching and who held the birds (chickens?) in his hands for protection, squeezed the little animals' throats (either from 'phthonos' (zealotry, evil eye) or from fear. The latter is controversial among scholars (cf. E. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1966, pp. 289/291).

Porfurios says that Plotinos' 'theion omma', (divine eye, his high attention) was uninterruptedly focused on his high ((divine)) daimon and refers to Plotinos' little work 'On the daimon that is ours', which talks about the types of guiding spirits. -

So much for these remarks to those who want to isolate Plotinos' at all costs from any magic (theurgy) or astrology or divination, to make it a purely 'rational' thinking Greek. Which is only partly true: syncretism is also Plotinos' own, though it is 'healthy' syncretism (// Stoa).

Thus Dodds, *The Greeks*, 286, claims that Plotinos, during his lifetime, extricated his disciples from the 'fog' of superstition (W. Kroll dixit), but that later Neo-Platonism is, under many a point of view, a 'retrogression', a relapse, into the spineless syncretism from which Plotinos sought to escape - which can be taken with a grain of salt.

(iii) Ethics/Politics.-

To begin with, a remark that avoids all misunderstanding:

a/ the ideas are the mesa, media, means of connection, between the One and what emerges from the One (Mind, Soul, Nature); thus the Plotinians valorize:

- (1) the ideas of Platon
- (2) the akinèta orekta, the immobile goals or forms, of Aristotle and
- (3) the logoi spermatikoi, the seed-like principles, of the Stoa,

b/ the ideas are also the binders between our thinking and the being as a whole and come to fruition in science;

c/ the ideas are, thirdly, the binder between physical and ethical-political reality: “The logos (reason) of all is like the mind that establishes the order and law of the state and is familiar with the actions of the citizens and with their motives, and according to this regulates everything by law, interweaving the inclinations (pathè) and the work-deds (erga) with the commandment, the honors and the disapprovals with the work-deds, so that everything comes to agreement automatically (hodoi automatei).” (Enn. 4:4, 39). Cf. O.Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 663.

-- “Yet Platon’s idea that community life should take shape according to heavenly tone is not included. The primacy of the mystical element does not allow the law element to come into play here. That is why the measure of actions is not the law but inner harmony. (...)”

The basis of the Neo-Platonic ethics is the system of (initiatory) purifications worked out in the Mysteries.” (o.c., 684). This implies that the political virtues, so considered in Platon, occupy only a very secondary place and that ethics supplants poli-tics. The theosophical individual is first-rate!

(iii)a. E. Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsged*, 158/159, notes that all “proletarian Platonism” is here barred:

- (a)1** the Corpus Hermeticum (with its magic, astrology, and alchemy),
- (a)2** the Neo-Pythaeoreans (with their conception of the body in the Orphic sense),
- (b)1** Philonism (with its mediating Logos or Wisdom),
- (b)2** Gnosticism (with its emphasis on a special gnosis, on a Mediator, and its exaggerated human-pessimism), all of them are criticized because of Plotinos. - The “return” of the soul is internal and a matter of free choice of the individual. This we now specify.

(iii)b. N. de Gandillac, *La sagesse de Plotin*, (The wisdom of Plotinus), Paris, 1952, sketches the gradualism (p. 127), i.e. the sense of gradual increase which characterizes the ethics of Plotinos both ethically and intellectually.

(iii)b1. Starting point is Platon’s *Faidros* (248d), where it is said that the souls, who, inattentive as they are, “fall” (i.e. reincarnate) into (the sperm of) a human body, do so in this order: **(1)** sophists and bigots, **(2)** magicians, poets, and craftsmen, **(3)** politicians and long-suffering people, **(4)** law-abiding princes and brave warriors, **(5)** **a/** mousikoi, muse-friends, **b/** erotikoi (minstrels), **c/** sages.

Of these ascending ranks Plotinos retains three.-

(a) The muse-friend (who here is more than one who has learned myths and sagas or choral-lyrics) sees the beauty in things (reasonless nature, plants, animals, people); that beauty here is more and different from the Pythagorean harmony-bound beauty which always connects a multiplicity of elements (to a number different from 1): gold, lightning, the stars in the night, a simple sound, - they are all “beautiful” not as a collection of elements (arithmos), but in themselves, separated!

“Doubt we not: if a body becomes clean, it is thanks to its interlocking with a ‘reason’ that comes from the gods” (*Enn.* 1:6,2). The presence of the thought-content, which comes from the One via Fysis, Psyche and Nous, behold the beauty (which can be, among other things, harmony of elements, of course. In other words, Plotinos clearly broadens the concept of beauty.

(b) The lover (erotikos) starts from a higher level than the philokalos, the beauty-loving or musical man: “The lover has a dose of memory (anamnesis) of beauty. Isolated from it, he cannot know it fully, but struck by the beautiful things that present themselves to his gaze, he is affected by them.

One should therefore teach him that he is not moved by the sight of the first body, but lead him to love all bodies - by reasoning - by showing him what is identical in all of them and, immediately, making it clear that this identical is foreign to the bodies and to the body itself. to the bodies and comes from elsewhere and is better in other realities, - so e.g. the beautiful pastimes and the beautiful laws (among the disembodied things he should situate the object of his love) and in the arts, sciences and virtues.” (*Enn.* 1:312). –

It should be noted at once that Plotinos is more austere on the subject of sexuality, but accords a higher rank to procreation (thus differing greatly from the Gnostics among others). The love of beauty is surpassed by the love of love because love wants, instead of mere affliction, union with beauty - which anticipates the henosis, unio, union, of the mysticism of the One.

(c) The philosophos, the sage, is again a higher level.

a/ The Epicurean ethic, which excludes pain, is valuable, but insufficiently positive.

b/ The Stoic will prefers the virtuous (conscientious) to the pleasurable (which the Epikourean prefers), yet clings to an overly material conception of the universe.

c/ The Aristotelian mediocrity (as a golden mean between two extremes) is too little oriented towards the higher.

d/ Plotinos is intellectualist like Platon, but in a more mystical way. -

All these ethics are stages in a higher ascending development which Plotinos advocates: the (sensory) experience is the starting point, to which 1/ opinion (doxa); 2/ imagination (fantasia) and 3/ discursive reason (dianoia, logizomenon) connect.

Yet all this is not the real intellectual life of man.

Above the (double, external and internal) aisthesis, (sensory) experience and its processing (in opinion, fantasy and reason) extends the nous, intellectus, reason.

For this mind knows no distinction between subject and object: it thinks itself and, at once, in itself, the ideas of all (general and also concrete) things, -ideas that as powers, (forms and 'reasons' (logoi) or principles of things, unlock those things themselves. Our mind is at once separated and yet one with the Universe Mind. Thus the contemplative or theoretical life arises, in a 'dialectic' that extends beyond experience and its processing.

(iii)b2. The theoria, contemplation, is not the highest level: the henosis, unio, unification, with the One in the rapture, - such is the summit of the gradual developmental progression.

This requires a double purification (catharsis) an intellectual and an ethical one.

a/ The intellectual one consists in reducing the multiplicity to unity by seeing, beyond reason (and the understanding of the Universe, at once), that all that is not the One is not equal but unequal to the One and can be situated beneath it.

This higher rising to the unequal One is the result of

(1) apophasis, negatio (= remotio), negation and

(2) transcendence (excellencia) e.g. the One is 'clean' but not (negation) like the clean things we meet, but infinitely higher (transcendence), here: infinitely 'cleaner' than anything clean.

(b) The ethical purification is the detachment from everything that is not the One, including the world-sense, but, of course, first of all from the material of the fuis, which is only "image" and "phantom" (Enn. 3:6, 5). The soul has to be detached, especially from its own body - see above p. 318 (Plotinos' asceticism) -: all the life of the impulses, all the pleasures (except those which are necessary for healing pain and sorrow, for resting from fatigue and so on) have to disappear from the soul in order to allow it to withdraw into itself (repentance) and, there, to meet the One as a primordial light which suddenly appears in it

1/ as being identical with her

2/ though infinitely transcending it.

Thus the surface soul coincides with the depth soul which, in its most intimate self, is the One which, however, infinitely transcends it. Here, therefore, no pathological states: on the contrary, eupatheia (Enn. 6:7, 34), bliss in high inner peace, characterizes this rapture in the One, this henosis with the One.

Also no psychic experiences in the ordinary sense (levitation or lifting), stigmata; also no "revelations" or soul conversations). Also no gracious self-revelation of the Trinity as in Christianity.

No, progression, through the gradual development until the One breaks through, suddenly! Yet the unification is truly psychic only four times fully and perhaps more times partially was Plotinos "alone with the One alone" (monos pros monon) in an indiscernible "touch" (as he still puts it). (Enn. 4:8, 1; 5:3, 17; 6:7, 34).

AIIa. The more religious interpretation of Plotinism among Amelios and Porfurios.-

(a) ***Amelios Gentilianos***, an Etrurian, is known for his introduction of a triad of hypostases, after Noumènios of Apameia's model, somewhat, within the universe understanding of Plotinos, - which will have an after effect; further for his religionism introducing celebrations and sacrifices into Plotinism, which sought to be as internal and intellectual as possible.

(b) ***Porphyrios of Turos*** (Syria) (+233/ +305). - If Amelios was a disciple of Plotinos from +246, Porfurios was only from +263. The élitism (privileging of the few in terms of mysticism) of his teacher he improved by more secular sense: e.g. he married at a later age, - which was a 'concession' to this world'; similarly, he was more engaged in the religious struggle of his day than Plotinos against the Hellenistic lower-class religion (with its obnoxious and immoral practices) and against the non-Hellenistic religions (so Gnosticism and Christianity, (against which he wrote fifteen volumes)), except for the pagan theosophies, even including the theurgy, against which he was less opposed, being concerned for the great masses and their salvation, as well as vegetarianism (about which he wrote a book).

- Indeed, A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition (A Study in Post - Plotinian Neoplatonism)*, The Hague, 1974, shows that Porphyry was particularly concerned about the soul:

a/ its connection to the body through a lower dunamis (force), its release from the body, both before death and at death, and its fate after death (the series of reincarnations and even the escape from that series of reincarnations);

b/ its relation to the world mind. -

Two offshoots confirm this soul perspective:

(1) *the greater interest of Porfirios in the intermediate beings,*

gods, daimones or whatever are called, who, through, theurgy especially, but also through oracles and revelations, play a role that concerns the soul, especially in its lower part (i.e. insofar as it is bound to an ochema (vehicle) or pneuma, 'spirit', which is (fine) material);

(2) *the greater interest in theürgie as a trade-off solution*

for the failure of the purely intellectual ('philosophical') redemption of the soul, which Plotinos already advocated (and which Porphyrios thoroughly preserves): Porphyrios establishes that his Plotinism is not intended for the great masses and sees various forms of religion (among which Christianity certainly, but e.g. also the Chaldean sayings (oracles)) achieving results with the masses; they help the soul only in its lower part (vehicle- or spirit-bound soul).

-- St.-Augustine (*de civitate dei*) criticizes Porfurios by claiming that Christianity advocates a soul salvation that seeks to save all people of all times and peoples and, above all, can save all people to all parts, including their bodies. Which Plotinism with its one-sided spiritualism cannot handle.

All b1. The Platonizing - theürgic interpretation by Jamblichos. -

Jamblichos of Chalkis (Koilesuria) (+283/+330) studied in the East, came to Rome with Porfurius, whom he succeeded, until he settled in Syria, causing Neo-Platonism to move East (Athens, Pergamon, Syria, Alexandria). -

He is an apologetic-polemical theologian (cf. A. Smith, o.c., xviii), who, in opposition to victorious Christianity above all, seeks to establish a complete pagan theology, based on:

1/ a freely interpreted Platonism and

2/ the Oracula Chaldaica (Chaldean sayings) which formed the framework.

Central is the utterly ineffable One and the One that is identical with the Good and turned toward multiplicity and the finite. Between this high agency and this material world stand, already metabasis, transition, the mesai ousiai, mediae essentiae, the intermediate beings and this on ever different levels of life and operation:

Triadically Jamblichos sees.

1/ the unity as identity or henosis, union,

2/ the duality (dyad) as proödos, exit (appearing towards the many and finite) and

3/ the trinity (trias) as epistrophè, return, something with which the twofold movement of Plotinos is now understood triadically (threefold).

Cf. O. Willmann, *Gesch. d.Id.*, I, 670/671. -

As intermediate beings in the theosophical interval, Jamblichos sees:

(a) gods (transcendental sparkling in appearance), who promote the pure insight and virtue in the soul, as well as archangels and angels (pure luminous), who, in a lesser degree, perform the same and, contiguous to these three classes, the pure souls (mixed radiating), who perform an analogous function;

(b) heroes (mixed fiery radiating), who initiate noble deeds;

(c) demons (wildly shaking, unmixed fiery radiating), who suck out the soul and bring it to vice and darkened understanding, to which the unclean souls join (also with mixed fiery radiating) to help them. -

It is not surprising, then, that A. Smith, o.c., 92 et al. notes that Jamblichos has a much more nuanced understanding of theürgie there is higher theürgie, which is and works intellectually (as the philosophy at Plotinos and Porfurius); there is lower theürgie which works infra-intellectually (which Plotinos and Porfurius also assumed where they excluded the higher); There is also degenerate theürgie, in which demons, unclean souls, and evil men are involved.

Thus, in “On the Mysteries” (secret teachings), 4:3, he says: “The whole theurgy has a double appearance:

(1) insofar as it is practiced by men (maintaining our place in the universe);

(2) insofar as it is empowered by divine passwords and, thus launched, is in communication with the powerful (gods), taking a place in their ranks harmoniously, so that, quite naturally, it can also assume the attitude. of the gods. According to this distinction, 1/ the theürg calls upon the powers of the universe as placed above him, in so far as the summoner is man and, conversely, 2/ he commands them, since he,

somewhat, thanks to the secret formulas, assumes the sacred form of the gods". (Cf. K. Latte, *Die Religion der Römer und der Synkretismus der Kaiserzeit*, (The religion of the Romans and the syncretism of the imperial period), Tübingen, 1927, S. 53 (Philosophische Begründung der Zauberbewirkungen).

In this way the magic coercion of theurgy goes hand in hand with the omnipotence of the gods, - who apparently put at the disposal of the theurg a 'power' emanating from them fluidly - call that, with the Old Testament, an angel', i.e. fine material representative - who is linked with them by filia, friendship. -

This relationship of friendship explains why Jamblichos lays such emphasis on prayer, especially at sacrifices (o.c., 52/53), to the higher intermediate beings, who, all of them, apart from their incorporeal spirit, have a fine material body, with which, in this world, they are active. -

Unclear comes over the fact that he conceives of these as insubstantial (impervious to anger, 'love', sadness, 'gladness'; etc.), yet this is antique: gods and dgl. are at home in a passionless sphere. Prayer they 'answer' in the improper sense (apparently bypassing their 'soul-body'). -

J. Poortman, *Ochêma, (History and meaning of hylic pluralism)*, Assen, 1954, 53/64; 8/169 (delta position), says that the Neo-Platonici a/ not only conceive of the Supreme Principle of the Universe ('God'), the One, as incorporeal, b/ but also the soul of man (and certainly the 'spirit' of the higher intermediate beings), while it possesses an ochêma, vehiculum, vehicle, of (fine) material nature mediating between pure incorporeal 'spirit' ('soul') and earthly body. -

The point made by e.g. D. Barbedette, *Platon et le Neo-Platonisme*, in Dict. pr. V, 625, noted, related to modern spiritualism, phenomena induced by theurgy (moving objects, limb shaking, auditions, visions, hypnotic states, mediums (people in ecstasy), etc.), Jamblichos discusses in *De mysteriis*, 3:4v. (K. Latte, o.c., 51/52), where he emphasizes that the summoner should see the greatness and the nature of the summoned spirit that sails within him (and grants e.g. refractory or whatever):

"Those, however, who summon spirits without this beatific look, grope around in the dark and do not know what they are doing apart from some signs in the body of the possessed person and other clearly visible phenomena, yet they remain denied the full understanding of the divine." Cf. also V. Decoster, o.c., pp. 66/68 (Jamblique).

- Together with his disciples Theodoros of Asine (triadology), Sopatros of Apameia (cf. Emperor Constantine (+306/+337)), Jamblichos forms the Syrian school.

AIIb2. The practical-theoretical interpretation by Aidesios the Cappadocian

(the Pergamese school). - This pupil of Jamblichos founds at Pergamon a theurgic school in the Neo-Platonic spirit. However, Maximos of Smurna (+371), became the theurgist of praxis par excellence in Ephesos: there, in countless séances, he performed "miracles" and this miraculousness he combined with learning, generosity, subtle mind and penetrating gaze.

Emperor Ioulianos the renegade (+332/+363)

He discovered, after being raised as a Christian, in Maximos the extra- and supernatural, which he had not found in his Christian midst and which he found in Homeric religion in only literary form: the polytheistic gods were not imaginary but miraculously working powers! He therefore wished to restore them to honor (cf. E. Fleury, *S. Grégoire de Nazianze et son temps*, (Gregory of Nazianzus and his time), Paris, 1930, pp. 139/155). - Furthermore, Salloustios and Eunapios of Sardeis can be noted. -

In 363 Christianity returns politically powerful and the school is closed, to live on, in hiding, as a secret society.

Allc The encyclopedic interpretation (the Athenian school).-

At the beginning of the fifth century the Academy becomes Neo-Platonic: Jamblichian Neo-Platonism will live on there for two centuries, under Christian rule. - Ploutarchos of Athens (+ in +451) is succeeded, as head of the school, in +431, by Surianos, teacher of Proklos of Constantinople (+410/ +485), who, after his studies at Alexandria, comes to Athens (which all Alexandrians tried to do), where, in +450, he succeeds Surianos. His *Stoicheiosis theologikè, Institutio theologica*, is a theological-philosophical-theurgical textbook, which encyclopedically records all philosophies and all religions in a comprehensive summary.

He is therefore called the great scholasticist of Neo-Platonism. His influence on Byzantine, Arabic, and Latin mid-century thinkers is therefore great.

a/ Initiated by Asklepigeneia, the daughter of Ploutarchos, into theurgy, he cured it, full of fear that it would leak out (Christian law forbade theurgy!), and engaged in rainmaking and the summoning of luminous soul bodies from Hekate, the underworld goddess.

b/ Yet he was a virtuous, deeply religious, indeed mystical man and scholar (A. Smit o.c., 144). - His philosophical method was the triadic (see Syrian sch.) reality is an interval between

a/ the Henas, Unity (cf. Plotinos' One) and

b/ the fuis (material world) animated by the World Soul. In between again the gradualism of the intermediate beings and gauges of life: this he understands as a 'dialectical process', which is at the same time logical (intellectually) and (meta)physical-ethical, namely in 1/ singleness (monos), 2/ exit (proödos) and 3/ return (epiotrophè) (cf. Plotinos). -

A/ From the Primordial Being, the Henas, the unity, about which one can only be silent - so unknowable and ineffable is it -.

B/ The henads come forth, i.e. a multitude of gods, whom Proklos all worshipped (except the deity of the Christians) as personal gods, who mediate on the matter of theurgy, in one way or another.

C/ Below were the souls, which are partly divine, partly demonic and partly human. Their being is eternal yet their activity is time-bound. (Cf. O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id., I*, 671/672). - The "dialectic" law of everything is that everything, except the Henos, is triadic: 1/ form (péras, finis, boundary) 2/ formlessness (apeiron, infinitum; indeterminacy) and 3/ mixture of forms (formless) substance, i.e. beingness or mikton, mixture of the two aspects. -

Of course, the hylic pluralism is also present here: “As for Neo Platonism, so Proclus expressly speaks of the ochêma, the fine material vehicle of the soul) as a.(h)ulon (= immaterial, incorporeal), - which is thus meant relatively: ‘immaterial’ with respect to the gross matter of the ordinary human body (J. Poortman, o.c.,33).

Cf. also A. Smith, o.c. pp. 152/158, on the pneuma or ochêma, with Plotinos and Porfurios, as 1/ substratum of the lower soul, 2/ organ of perception, 3/ subject of magical (yes, theürgic) rites and 4/ ‘body’ of daimones (not to mention the connection between fantasia (imagination) and fine material body (with Porfurios)). -

Pupils: Marinos of Shechem, biographer of Proklos, Isidoros of Alexandria, Damaskios, Simplikios. Under Damaskios, in +529, Keizer Justinian I closes the school, because of its polytheism.

B. The Aristotelian interpretation of Neo - Platonism.-

One can distinguish two shades in this. - As A. Armstrong, *Neoplatonism*, in *Encyclop. Britannica*, 1967, 16, pp. 217/220, says, there is a very broad influence of Aristotle in Plotinos’ thinking, although he disparaged Aristotle’s logic (unless as an introduction to thought).

Porfurios, however, in His *Eisagogè* (Introd. to the Categories of Ar.), sets forth the Aristotle tradition (the book will have great success and function as a textbook in the Middle Ages, here). One thinks of the ‘tree’ (diagram) of Porfurios:

a self is either non-lichanic or corporeal; as corporeal it is either non-living or living; as living it is either non-animal (plant) or animal; as animal it is either non-redeemable reasonable (human) (= concept pyramid). So much for the Roman school. -

Themistes (+ in +390), coming from the Jamblichian school, is a logician; he turns away from theurgy and mysticism and founds at Constantinople a school, which in the eyes of the Byzantine emperors should become the representation of Alexandria and Athens. His teaching caused him to be called ‘euphrates’, the eloquent one; he was a great Aristotle commentator.

-- The Alexandrian school, narrowly linked on a personal level with the Athenian, is professionally scientific-oriented, averse to mysticism and theurgy. She is therefore not or less hostile to Christianity. Hupathia, a female philosopher, murdered by agitated Christian monks, in a riot, burned in +415; Sounesion of Kurene, ll. of Hupathia (later bishop of Ptolemaios); Hierokles of Alexandria, especially Ammonios, son of Hermeias, teacher of Simplikios; John Philoponos (sixth e.); Stefanos of Alexandria, - all of them belong to that school. Ammonios Hermeiou was pupil of Proklos. -- Simplikios, pupil of Damaskios and Ammonios II, is Aristotelian in the Athenian school. - In the West, Boöthius (+480/ +525) in particular can be named among a number of Aristotelianizing Neo-Platonists and as ... “the last Roman and the first scholastic”.

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