


DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

CLOUD FORENSIC READINESS


Cloud Related Case

SOLORIGATE ATTACK


Stage 3: Hands-on-keyboard attack in the cloud







CLOUD FORENSIC STAGES



TEKNISKA HE



CLOUD FORENSIC CHALLENGES (NIST IR 8006)

○ Architecture

OUD FORENSIC Rnt8006)

Incident first responders


o Role Management

o Legal

• Standards


○ Training

FC ID	Short Title	Challenge	Description	Result of Overcoming Challenge		
FC-01	1 Deletion in the cloud Recovering data deleted from the cloud (by either the Provider, Consumer, or attacker) and attributing that data to a specific user		Deletion in the cloud is often based on the deletion of nodes pointing to information in virtual instances. Pathways for retrieval of the deleted information are dependent on cloud Providers offering sufficiently sophisticated mechanisms for access. Once the data is recovered, it remains a challenge to attribute specific data items to an individual user given the fact that cloud-based storage is a shared service in a multi-tenant environment.	If this challenge were overcome, it would be easier to recover deleted data and to attribute that recovered data to a specific user.		
FC-02	Recovering overwritten data	Recovery of deleted data that has been overwritten by another user in a shared virtual environment	Recovery of data marked as deleted (i.e., for which the nodes pointing to it are deleted) is difficult if the data is overwritten by another user in a shared virtual environment. Note: Data can be overwritten by the same user or another user. If the latter, attributing ownership is difficult.	If this challenge were overcome, it would be easier to recover deleted data that has been overwritten and to attribute that recovered data to a specific user.		



CLOUD FORENSIC READIN

- $_{\odot}$ Technical Factors
 - Cloud Infrastructure
 - Cloud Architecture
 - Forensic Technologies
 - Cloud Security
- \circ Legal Factors
 - SLA
 - Regulatory
 - Jurisdiction
- $_{\odot}$ Organisational Factors
 - Management Support
 - Readiness strategy
 - Governance
 - Culture



FORENSIC READINESS MODELS


	Forensics Readiness Factors												
Study	Technical Factors				Legal Factors			Organizational Factors					
	Infrastructure	Architecture	Technologies	Security	SLA	Regulatory	Jurisdiction	Management support	Strategy	Governance	Culture	Training	procedure
Grobler et al. [19]	V		V			1	V			V	V	V	V
Elyas et al [20]		\checkmark	V			V		~		V	V	V	
Elyas et al. [21]	\checkmark	V	V			1		V		V	1	V	
Sibiya et al. [25]	\checkmark		\checkmark	V									
Makutsoane & Leonard [27]			V		1		V		V				V
Kebande & Venter [28]		V	V	V			V						
Moussa et al. [29]			V	V			V		V	V		V	V
Ab Rahman et al. [30]	1		V	1		1	V		1				
ACPO [31]												1	V
CSA [32]		V		V	1	1	V						V
ENISA [33]			V		1		V						V
ISO [34]		1		1			1						1








AZURE




TEE FACTORS


- Cerember for Croud \$0.02/Server/nour
- Defender for Storage \$0.02/10K transactions
- Network Watcher
- \circ Monitor Data Retention \$0.143 per GB/m
- Log Analytics \$3.28 per GB
- \circ Sentinel








AZURE SECURITY MONITORING







EKNISK

ALERT EXAMPLE


Security incident with shared process of Incident Detected	detected		Suspicious P	s Powershell Activity Detected				
🗢 Investigate				🗢 Investigate (Å) Run playbooks				
The incident which started on 2017-11-17 17:46:20 UTC and recently detected on 2017-11-17 23:58:53 UTC indicates that an attacker has abused resource in your resource SAIPROD					DESCRIPTION	Analysis of host data detected a powershell so running on SAIPROD that has features in com known suspicious scripts. This script could eith	mon with	
DETECTION TIME	riday, Novemb	ber 17, 2017 9:46:20 A	м			legitimate activity, or an indication that one of machines has been compromised		
SEVERITY	👂 High			DETECTION TIME	Friday, November 17, 2017 9:47:36 AM			
STATE #	Active				SEVERITY	1 High		
ATTACKED RESOURCE	AIPROD			STATE	Active	Active		
SUBSCRIPTION	MSTIC Forensic	ts Prod		ATTACKED RESOL	IRCE SAIPROD			
DETECTED BY	Microsoft			SUBSCRIPTION	MSTIC Forensics Prod (-		
ENVIRONMENT	Azure				DETECTED BY	Microsoft		
					ACTION TAKEN	Detected		
Alerts included in this incident					ENVIRONMENT	Azure		
DESCRIPTION	COUNT	DETECTION TIME	ATTACKED RESOURCE	SEVERITY	RESOURCE TYPE	Virtual Machine		
G Suspicious Powershell Activity Detected	1	11/17/17 09:47 AM	SAIPROD	🛛 High		"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\ \powershell.exe" -noprofile -executionpolicy	v1.0	
Detected the disabling of critical services	1	11/17/17 09:49 AM	SAIPROD	🔺 Medium	SUSPICIOUS SCRI			
Suspicious Account Creation Detected	1	11/17/17 09:49 AM	SAIPROD	🔺 Medium		('https://testsaikaam.org/Sai_Test.bat'))"		
Windows registry persistence method detect	ed 1	11/17/17 09:49 AM	SAIPROD	0 Low	PARENT PROCESS	c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1. \powershell.exe	.0	
Potential attempt to bypass AppLocker detect	ted 1	11/17/17 09:49 AM	SAIPROD	0 High	ACCOUNT SESSIO	N ID 0x144a52		







EXAMPLE OF SUGGESTED





SNAPSHOTTING DISKS IN THE

a ا

AZURE Source Azure Account GenerateSASLink() Snapshot(Disk1 Disk1-Snapshot SAS link to snapshot Import snapshot into container Destination Azure Account CreateStorageAccount() CreateContainer() CreateDiskFromURI() Disk1-copy Storage account and container





AWS


AWS TOOLS




- AWS Organisations allows you to create separate accounts along business lines or mission areas which also limits the "blast radius" should a breach occur; for governance, you can apply policies to each of those sub accounts from the AWS master account.
- Security Groups enables isolation of Amazon EC2 instances.
- AWS CloudTrail provides a history of AWS API calls that can assist in response and trigger automated detection and response systems.
- VPC Flow Logs enables you to capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in your VPC.
- Amazon GuardDuty is a managed threat detection service that continuously monitors for malicious or unauthorised behaviour.
- Amazon CloudWatch Events triggers different automated actions from changes in AWS resources including CloudTrail.
- AWS Step Functions coordinates a sequence of steps to automate an incident response process.
- **AWS Cloud Formation** automates the creation of trusted environments for conducting deeper investigations.
- Amazon S3 stores snapshots and related incident artefacts.




SNAPSHOTTING DISKS IN THE AWS





DISK FORENSIC AUTOMATION






https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/ho w-to-automate-forensic-disk-collection-inaws/





EC2 AUTO CLEAN ROOM FORENSIC



OUR TRAINERSUR EXPERIENCE



BlackEnergy
LockerGoga
NotPetya

0...



Dr. Anders Carlsson is an expert with more than 30years of experience in cybersecurity, forensic investigations, and network security.



Dr. Oleksii Baranovskyi is an experienced cyber security expert with a demonstrated history of working in the academic as well as the financial industry.

