

# PESH MERGA

Nos, 14/15 March & June 1979

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- AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ON IRAQ
  
- IRAQI-TURKISH MILITARY  
CO-ORDINATION

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All correspondence to: KDP, Box 2017, 14502 Norsborg, Sweden  
or KDP, Box 129, 00170 Helsinki 17, Finland

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"Pesh Merga" is the Kurdish name for the guerrilla fighters struggling in Iraqi Kurdistan and means "Forward of Death". (Ready to die)

and executed. A new generation is leading a guerrilla war anew.

Our colleagues Klaus Imbeck and Klaus P. Siebahn stayed five harsh weeks with these people and their sad problem, to find a tragedy of a minority persecuted for a long time. The Kurds. Because of the international situation, no one pays them any attention.

Soldiers of the Kurdish guerrillas, the Pesh Merga, blew up the "Voice of Kurdistan" radio station and surrendered. The war for autonomy became hopeless. This was four years ago.

The persecution of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey continues. Arrests, torture and executions continue. Now, the Pesh Mergas prepare for "a new war". And every guerrilla uses the old Kurdish proverb: "welcome by eye and heart".

"Since the Iraqi Army burnt about 500 Kurdish villages in Summer 1978, numerous displaced persons went to the mountains, to the Pesh Merga. There live the guerrillas with their families in caves and in primitive holes.

The Kurds pray to God as do their enemies. The Kurds are the descendants of the 4000 year old "Qurti". "We are the sons of blood and revolution, and our history has always been bloody" says one of their songs.

Half a million displaced persons; thus ended the previous war. On 6 March 1975, the Shah stopped the supply of arms to the Pesh Mergas. In return, Iraq gave him the freedom of navigation in the Shatt-al-Arab... The guerrillas could not continue.

They have told us to be careful. Klaus flew to Ankara and I to Istanbul. We met in Adana at night. From one of the minarets came the loud-speaker shrilling "There is no God but Allah"...

We laughed, each of us knowing why: we were not searched during our entry. I was carrying the address. It was coded and hidden in a way no one could discover. The two letters each the size of a stamp were carried by Klaus in a paper tissue packet in one of his pockets. We did not know what was in the letters. They were folded, wrapped by transparent sellotape and numbered (1) and (2). We have not been asked to be cautious for nothing: four years ago MIT (the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation) kidnapped 'Hurriyet' correspondent "Asis Korkmas" and most probably killed him. And three years ago a film crew were held and their documents, films and equipment were confiscated.

The next day we travelled by bus to Gaziantep. We carried our rucksacks, cameras and travel tickets and were on our way east like many at the end of the year. We had booked tickets for a flight from Tehran to Hamburg to be produced if needed.

*A photograph of painters painting a picture of Barzani and another photograph of Sami and the caption: "Mulla Mustafa Barzani in Exile in Washington." "We shall always be proud of him" said Sami the new 'chief ideologist' of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, a copy of the new programme of the Party in his hand.*

The next morning we went to the mountains... The Turkish border guards do not come here at all, our guide told us. The mountains are very high. At a height of 2600 metres, snow covers everything.

We crossed the Turkish-Iraqi frontiers, and in the next village we saw the houses without roofs... under

a walnut tree sat 100 armed men. When we arrived ~~04-25~~ they all rose to greet and welcome us... This is a Pesh Merga headquarters. Here, in the remote mountains, is the 'new war'. The villages are without roofs, having ~~been~~ <sup>to the guidance</sup> destroyed by the Iraqi army.

With the sunrise the next day we received a ~~comment~~ <sup>to the guidance</sup> comment on the old war; it was a short comment ~~about~~ "We made mistakes, have identified them and learned and benefitted from them" said Muhammad Mahmoud Abdul Rahman, 46 years old, an electrical engineer and the chief theoretician of the new Provisional Leadership. He spoke much about the legendary Kurdish leader and the late President of the KDP Mustafa Barzani. "All Kurds respect and esteem him", said the new man with dark hair, whose nom de guerre is 'Sami'. "He tried his best during half a century. At the end he became old and things were mostly in the hands of others. And finally, many people acted in his name. We shall always remain proud of him—but we are not now of his generation".

"A little bit above" said Sarbast. "Look at the trees forming the shape of the letter 'V', 800 metres to the left..." he was explaining in the military fashion.

Sarbast was an officer in the Iraq Army and in 1972 he went to the mountains. His brother was arrested and executed recently.

I could not see anything even with good binoculars. 800 metres to the left was a Battalion HQ of the Iraqi Army, about 600 soldiers equipped with the most modern weapons.

The Pesh Merga were not many... about 10, with old, light arms, Kalashnikovs of a DDR and Chinese make, and one RPG7 with five rockets.

We must march single file said Sarbast. We sent the guerrillas one at a time at 3 minute intervals around the Iraqi positions. We were not fired on. After three hours we were in Argosh.

The smell of the smoke was cold, but one of the houses was still burning. The Iraqis deported the inhabitants and after three days the 280 houses were blown up.

In the ruins we stumbled on aluminium plates and tea pots which were still in their places. We left them where they were because we had enough of them. There is plenty of them everywhere because the Iraqis have destroyed many villages in these mountains.

Under the walnut trees are still the school desks. There were three schools in Argosh. Beside a desk there was a school book "Where is Yusuf?" on one page and on another page "Where is Laila?" written.

Then came the cats; I tried to count them, but their number increased and increased. Darkness fell. We made a bonfire and entered our sleeping bags. The cats came nearer. "They await the return of the inhabitants of Argosh" said Sarbast. "When the snow falls" he said, "these cats will die". Snow will soon be falling. Next day, we withdrew to our main base, to Sami. There was smoke above the Iraqi positions. "They are probably leaving their positions" said Sarbast, "they no longer need them. The villages have been destroyed, and there are only groups of displaced people living in the valleys".

Among the displaced people was the Mukhtar (Headman) of Argosh. Iraqi soldiers had detained him when he was collecting grass for his goats. "I knew they would beat me", said the village Mukhtar, who is 50 years old, "but I no longer felt anything". He was accused of receiving letters from Barzani from Washington. "I am a simple man", said the Mukhtar. "I have seen Barzani only once in my life and that was years ago". He was thrown into prison, beaten, given electric shocks and a pistol barrel was put into his mouth. "In a small room in Kirkuk prison there are

25-40 prisoners. Women prisoners were screaming so agonisingly that we could not help crying" said the Mukhtar. After six months he was released and fled to the mountains. Where else could he go? There is nothing left of Argosh but the traces of destruction. One of his sons has fallen in battle and the other is getting training on a Doshka at the main HQ. He is one of 12 youths getting the training. With this Doshka the Pesh Merga shot down 5 helicopters. The gun was made in 1945 and now guards the radio station which was bought in Sweden... it has a 400 watt power...

Despite the general optimism in the main HQ, Sami said "We cannot open a front, but we can make the


lives of the Iraqis hell with the guerrillas"... Every day pieces of paper carrying despatches flood into the main HQ; they are about battles, the deported Kurds, the 'cluster villages', the ill treatment etc...

The displaced men have decided to fight but they have no weapons. A Kalashnikov on the Black Market in Beirut costs 1000 dollars.

New men will come.  
New men will die.  
New snow will fall.

(Refer to the press cutting section for the original article.)

The following six photographs in this issue of Pesh Merga are from GEO magazine, No.3/March 1979 (West Germany).




Kurdish infants: the sky is their roof. What future is the Iraqi regime letting them have?




The new Kurdish guerrilla fighters.



An Iraqi helicopter shot down by the Pesh Mergas near Argosh last summer.



All that was left of a school in Argosha when the Iraqi army displaced and forcibly evicted its inhabitants.



Families displaced and forcibly evicted by the Iraqi regime, their houses, villages, fields, orchards destroyed and livestock killed or taken away by the Iraqi authorities.



Mr. Klaus Imbeck, writer, and Mr. Klaus P. Siebah, photographer, in Kurdistan, Iraq.

## IRAQI REGIME INTENSIFIES ITS OPPRESSION OF THE SHI'A

After the triumph of the revolution in neighbouring Iran, the Iraqi regime increased to the maximum the state of alert of its security and intelligence forces in the Shi'a areas of the country, mainly central and southern Iraq. These forces had instructions to move swiftly and harshly against any attempts at expressing support for the Iranian revolution by the Shi'a and others. Harassment of the Shi'a religious leaders, especially Ayatollah al-Kho'i and Haj Sayed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, in the holy city of Najaf and Kerbala in central Iraq and al-Kadhimayn near Baghdad is intensified.

These orders to deal with the Shi'a with force is not confined to inside Iraq only, but also abroad. During a rather big demonstration in London at the beginning of April, Iraqi Embassy intelligence operatives and Ba'th Party thugs attacked the demonstrators with clubs and fists, wounding a number of them. Three Iraqi 'diplomats', two of them 'Second Secretaries' attacked an Iranian postgraduate student, Mohamed Ali Heshmati, 26, punching on the face, shouting at him and bullying him.

The harassment of Shi'a religious leaders has recently increased to the degree that Haj Sayed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr has been contemplating leaving Iraq. This situation has prompted His Eminence Ayatollah Khomeini to send him a telegram stating that, "We understand that Your Eminence intends to leave Iraq because of certain incidents. I do not think you should leave Najaf, centre of Islamic studies, and am concerned about this..." (Tehran in Arabic for Abroad, 1900 gmt, 29th May 1979).

This is further evidence to the Iraqi regime heavy-handed policy against expression of popular sentiments unless it is for the regime itself.

## DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE SHI'A IN IRAQ

At 9 o'clock on Wednesday 13th June 1979, there were simultaneous demonstrations in the Shi'a holy cities of Najaf, Karbala, Kufa and Kadhimiyah and in the al-Thawra quarter of Baghdad. The demonstration in al-Thawra occurred in al-Chiwadir area near al-Thawra Republican Hospital; the demonstrators clashed with police and security forces. Fifty people

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

## IRAQI BA'ATHISTS INTIMIDATION OF AYATOLLAH AL-SADR



Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr

**AYATOLLAH MOHAMMAD BAIQIR AL-SADR IS THE GRAND LEADER OF THE MASSES IN IRAQ.** The Ayatollah's leadership of the people's revolution against the Ba'th regime means to put an end to the treacherous Ba'th regime. The Ba'thists have never ceased harassing the Ayatollah. On 11th June 1979 the Ba'thists clique enforced a savage home arrest on the Ayatollah. Twenty hours later **THE BA'ATHISTS BRAZENLY ARRESTED THE AYATOLLAH** in Najaf and took him to Baghdad. Under pressure of public anger and massive protest demonstrations, in which twelve people were killed and many injured, the Ayatollah was released on 13th June 1979. These intimidations of the Ayatollah will not pass the Iraqi masses unnoticed. **THE BA'ATH REGIME OF IRAQ IS NOW FACING PUBLIC DEMANDS TO OFFER FULL EXPLANATION OF THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE AYATOLLAH.**

ISLAMIC LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAQ (EUROPE)

THE GUARDIAN Tuesday June 19 1979

from al-Thawra were arrested and a curfew from midnight to morning was imposed. During this demonstration, Abd al-Rachman Obaid Musa, the Ba'thist Secretary of the General Union of Cigarettes and Beverages (workers) was, among others, killed.

The so-called "Popular Army" roam the streets, carrying their arms, and are more wanton and reckless than ever. They enter the mosques and coerce their keepers and attendants to pledge themselves not to hold any other activities than prayers in the mosques. Large gatherings are strictly forbidden.

However, there is widespread indignation at the Iraqi government's and the Ba'th Party's bitter and vicious attack on the Iranian revolution because it has done nothing against the Iraqi people and have actually taken real steps in support of the Arab peoples; why then does the government attack them, the general public ask.

In the predominantly Shi'a town of Emara and in al-Chibayish in Southern Iraq, several citizens have thrown away the television sets sent to them by Saddam al-Tikriti, the Vice-President, to placate them, saying that they will not be duped by such trivial gestures.

## IRAQI REGIME "RELIEVED" TWO MINISTERS AND REPRESSION OF THE ICP CONTINUES

On 25th April 1979, a republican decree 'relieved' Amir Abdullah from his post of 'Minister of State'. No reason was given for this measure.

And on 5th May, another republican decree "relieved" Muktaram al-Talabani from his post of 'Minister of Transport'. Again, no reason was given for this measure.

The former is a member of the Central Committee and of the Politburo of the Iraqi Communist Party and the latter a Candidate Member of the Central Committee of the Party.

The Iraqi authorities have recently intensified their repressive measures against the ICP members and leadership, press (the ICP daily, *Tariq al-Sha'ab* has been closed for more than two months) and its editorial boards detained, two members of the so-called 'Legislative Council' of the 'autonomous area' who sympathise with the party, have been arrested.

Latest news is that 21 Iraqi democrats and communists, Arabs and Kurds, men and women, were detained in mid-May, i.e. during the holding of a forum on 'Human Rights and Democratic Liberties in the Arab World'. They are:

1. Su'ad Khairy (Dr. of International Relations, journalist and prominent communist)
  2. Najiya Hussain (a teacher)
  3. Khanim Zuhdi (a teacher)
  4. Margaret Philip (a nurse)
- (All the above are prominent figures in the Iraqi women's democratic movement).
5. Sabah al-Durra (Dr. of Economics, Assistant Lecturer at Baghdad University)
  6. Safa al-Hafidh (Dr. of Law, ex-Professor at Baghdad University, member of World Peace Council, publisher of *al-Thawafa al-Jadida* monthly journal)
  7. Ali al-Nouri (a teacher and journalist)
  8. Ra'ouf Daibus (a prominent lawyer)
  9. Hadi Ubaid (a communist activist)
  10. Hashim Ubaid (a communist activist)

11. Abd al-Salam al-Nasiri (a member of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party)
12. Muhammad Karim Fathalla (a journalist)
13. Muhammad Hussain Idan (worker)
14. Khidhir Abbas (Master of Science in International Relations, a communist activist)
15. Adnan Akif (Dr. of Geological Engineering)
16. Shirwan Ali (ex-member of the so-called 'Autonomous Area Executive Council')
17. Ahmad Hameed (also ex member of above)
18. Sa'ad Yahya Qaf (a lawyer)
19. Fou'ad Hameed (Dr. of Economics)
20. Zuhair al-Jaza'iri (journalist)
21. Fadhil al-Rubai'i (journalist)

Besides, 7 members of the staff of the al-Rouad Publishing House were arrested in November 1978, they are:

1. Sulaiman Yusif Stegan
2. Kamal Nu'man Thabit
3. Nuh Ali al-Rubai'i
4. Sa'eed Kadhum Mutar
5. Fakhri al-Alusi
6. Hamed al-Khateeb
7. Anwar Taha.

All the above have been and are being subjected to the 'customary' Iraqi regime's brutal physical and psychological torture and humiliation. Their fate – whether they are alive or killed – is not known.

The KDP most strongly condemns the Iraqi regime's terror campaign and terrorist policy inside Iraq and abroad, a policy directed against all democratic critics and opponents of the regime and its policies.

Zaki Kairi, member of the Politburo of the Iraqi Communist Party has said that all the trials in Iraq are being held before special Courts, whose members are Ba'thists but not members of the judiciary in the country. During a press conference he held in Paris on 4th April 1979, Zaki Kairi said that the ICP has told the ruling Ba'th Party that it must find a solution to the problem of democracy and freedom in Iraq before discussing the establishment of a new alliance with ICP to build socialism. The Ba'th Party has, however, refused to hold a dialogue on this basis.

## IRAQ IMPORTS MORE FOREIGN LABOUR WHILE UNEMPLOYMENT IS WIDESPREAD

1 While unemployment is still a problem in Iraq, especially for the Kurdish – most particularly among the forcibly uprooted, displaced and resettled Kurds in the 'cluster villages' – the Iraqi regime has been importing large numbers of foreign labour – paying much higher wages and salaries than Iraqi citizens earn. Tens of thousands of Egyptians and thousands from the Indian sub-continent are presently employed in Iraq in various fields.

2 Besides this imported labour, the semi-official Baghdad weekly, *Alif Ba*, No. 551, 18th April 1979, stated, under the headline "After the success of the Egyptian Farmers Experiment, Moroccan Farmers [are imported] to work in Iraq on Mr. President's Directives", that, " 'Alif Ba' is informed that, in implementation of Mr. President Ahmad H. al-Bakr's directives it has been decided to form a committee to prepare prerequisites to bring farmers from the fraternal Moroccan country and settle them in the vacant and reclaimed lands...".

3 Furthermore, at the end of his visit to Brazil, the Iraqi ceremonial Vice-President, Ma'ruf, said in a press

conference on 17th May 1979, that "he expected the number of Brazilian technicians, workers and administrative cadres working in Iraq to reach 10,000 at the end of this year". (Iraqi News Agency, 0810 gmt, 17th May, 1979).

4 On 11th June 1979, the Iraqi RCC ratified an agreement with Bangladesh on the movement of labour between Iraq and Bangladesh signed on 3rd March. In practice, this is an agreement to import Bangladesh labour into Iraq. (Such importation of labour commenced a few years ago).

Meanwhile, a large scale unemployment problem among the Kurds, especially in the 'cluster villages', remains unsolved. The 'Iraqi Minister of State for Co-ordination with the Autonomous Bodies', admitted in an interview in the semi-official daily *al-Jumhuriyah* 17th April 1979, that 52,000 Kurds were unemployed in these 'villages' alone, this figure being only a part of the total.

These people have been given a 'monthly allowance' until they find employment. When signs of unrest among them were becoming more pronounced and more militant, the Iraqi president decided to give each of these families a television set, later a coloured television set; the Minister calls these official bribes "noble deeds".

## ANTI-DEMOCRATIC "LAWS" IN IRAQ: AN EXAMPLE

In 1969, a new Penal Code was promulgated by the Iraqi (self-appointed legislative, executive and judiciary) Revolution Command Council (RCC).

Article 200 of the Code reads: "Everyone who spreads or propagates any of the doctrines that aim at changing the principles of the constitution or the basic systems of society or (bringing about) the supremacy of one social class over other classes, or the destruction of a social class, or the overthrow of the fundamental and economic systems of the state, or the destruction of any one of the basic systems of society, will be punished by a term of not shorter than seven years' imprisonment, whenever the use of force or terror or any other illegitimate methods is noticeable".

However, subsequently, four paragraphs were added to this Article, these paragraphs read:

### "Will be punished with execution:

A. Everyone who joins the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, and who intentionally hides his previous party and political affiliations and ties;

B. Everyone who has joined or joins the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, and who can be proved to have links with any other party or political side, or works for it or in its interests during his [Ba'th] party affiliation;

C. Everyone who has joined or joins the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, and who can be proved to have joined any other party or political side or works for it or in its interests, after severing his relationship with the [Ba'th] party;

D. Everyone who wins over to any party or political side a person *having* an organisational relationship with the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, or wins him over in any form to that side, *after* he [that person] has severed his relationship with the [Ba'th] party, having knowledge of that relationship."

Paragraphs A and B were added to Article 200 on 22nd August 1974, paragraph C on 9th December 1976, and paragraph D on 7th June 1978. (All these additions have been published in the official gazette.)

It should be pointed out that Iraq became in 1968 a signatory to the International Covenant on Human, Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966; on 29th September 1970, the Covenant was made by Law No. 193, part of the legal system in Iraq; and it was ratified by Iraq on 25th January 1971.

However, Article 200, with its paragraphs A, B, C and D, are in violation of Articles 7, 10, 18 and 26 of the Covenant.

It is also in violation of Article 22 of the Iraqi Interim Constitution and of Article 94 of the Penal Procedure Code.

Moreover, Iraqi citizens are tried and sentenced to imprisonment and death by an "extraordinary court", called "the Revolution Court", the majority of its "judges" are military men; its decisions are final and are not subject to appeal.

This Article is not the same one that sentences to death everybody, other than the Ba'th Party, engaged in political activities in the armed forces.

The crux of this Article is that anybody quitting the ruling Ba'th party can never join any other political organisations and that nobody can win a current or an ex-Ba'thist to other political organisations, even the legal ones, lest it be considered "winning him over in any form to that" organisation. Besides, these paragraphs are phrased so vaguely and ambiguously that they can, at will, be applied to any situation.

## SOME OF THE METHODS OF TORTURE IN IRAQ

Torture, intimidation and bribery, including, for example:

beating with truncheons and fists and kicking;  
beating with a special truncheon made of metal;  
whipping with thin wires;  
burning with cigarettes and electrical devices, especially sensitive parts of the body, including genitals;  
electric shocks;  
applying heavy pressure on the genitals;  
applying pressure, using a pressing device called locally "mangana", on the abdomen and chest until blood is vomited;  
hanging from ceiling fans either by feet or hands which have been tied to the back and then switching on the fans, or hanging from the ceiling;  
sinking the head into water basins or basins filled with faeces and urine;  
pushing bottles (broken and whole) into the anus and the tearing of the anus;  
pushing detainees down stairs after torturing them;  
undressing detainees in open spaces and connecting rubber pipes from gas cylinders to their body

openings and opening the gas taps in order to inflate their bodies;  
forcing detainees to do things that hurt their pride, dignity and humanity, such as barking, cleaning toilets with their bare hands, drinking their own urine and eating their own faeces, shining scores of shoes or licking shoes and so on;  
keeping detainees in closed rooms and injecting gas into the room until they faint;  
pulling out fingernails and toenails;  
undressing detainees and threatening them with sexual assault and taking photographs during the act – many sexual assaults or threats of such assaults have been committed against male and female detainees; threats to male detainees that if they refuse to "co-operate" their wives, mothers or sisters will be brought in and sexually assaulted in front of them; kidnapping people and taking them to the outskirts of the towns or cities and assaulting them – beating and kicking them – firing above their heads and threatening them with death;  
torturing detainees until they faint or need treatment and then resuming torture when they regain consciousness or receive treatment. Several detainees have been tortured and re-tortured in this manner.

## IRAQ: THE CRUSHED REVOLUTION

A barrier of silence surrounds the international politics and domestic events of Iraq, a country which represents one of the political-economical poles of the Arab world. The strategy as regards developments in Iraq is a form of state capitalism. Oil is the main resource of the country (oil reserves are the second in the Middle East, after Saudi Arabia). But oil is also a further cause of divisions between Arabs and Kurds. The oil extracted in Kurdistan represents 75% of Iraqi oil production, and Kurds have no power to decide on the matter. Oil resources are invested mainly on the Arab areas.

In spite of the economic policies which aspire to raise the social-economic level of the population and the efforts to attain popular consent, the contradictions inherent in the regime were liable to surface again. This was deduced by the coup d'état attempts (June 1973, January 1976 and perhaps also in January 1977).

The Ba'th power is based on the army and popular army (ba'thist troops, about 50,000 men, with heavy equipment).

In spite of the rapid rise in industrialisation and the agrarian reform which are both based on petroleum revenues, it seems that the working class is not related to this development. The Minister of Industry was quoted saying to the newspaper *al-Giumurriyyah* (10.9.76): "the output of the Iraqi worker is the lowest among all of the developing countries". This can also be seen as the reaction that the Iraqi working class takes vis-a-vis the domestic politics which are based on state-bureaucratic structure and terror.

The Iraqi internal and international situation deteriorated in Spring 1978, when the contradictions between the Ba'th Party and Iraqi Communist Party became very acute. Mass arrests of Communists took place. Even some members of the Central Committee were arrested and 21 Communists were executed under the accusation of having formed clandestine cells in the army. Even before these facts the prisons were crowded with Communists, but only now is repression officially admitted.

At least 11 diplomats and 38 professors at Baghdad University, who are considered progressives, have been dismissed.

Through this repression the Ba'th wants to increase its domination in the country and to repress the criticisms made by the ICP. ICP criticised the Ba'th's political and economic choices very much, as well as the strong reductions as regards relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. ICP asks more freedom and democracy in Iraq as well as more space and action for non-ba'thist forces. ICP doesn't make very deep criticisms of the government policies against the Kurds. But these criticisms have caused an anti-communist offensive. These facts have obliged some Communists to seek refuge in Kurdistan and to fight with the Kurds.

The crisis between the Ba'th and ICP is in the cadre of the review of international alliances. Saddam Hussein upheld in the last few years the necessity for Iraq to import more technology, which is possible only with closer relationships with the West. In fact, trade and economic co-operation with the Western countries have increased, while relations with the Soviet Union have deteriorated to such an extent that there have been rumours about a possible abrogation of "The Treaty of friendship" between the two countries.

The Iraqi Government tries to get military supplies from France and other Western countries. The disagreements between the Iraqi Government and the PLO have come out with violence during summer 1978. The PLO denounces the killing of Palestinian leaders made by the Abu Nidal group. This group, supported by Iraq, killed Said Hammami in London and Ali Nasser Yassin in Kuwait. The conflict has been generated by

the Iraqi Government policy which aims at controlling the whole Palestinian movement.

In consequence of these domestic and international tensions Iraq tries to go out from its isolation, especially after the Iranian revolution's victory. It strengthens the ties with the authoritarian regimes of the area. The Iraq-Syria unification is an effort against the threats of change after the Iranian events. The Iraqi leadership fears that the Iranian revolution can spill over the country.

In consequence of the Algiers Agreement of 6 March 1975, Iran stopped aiding the Kurdish revolution in Iraq and since that time the two countries co-operated for the control of the area. Iranian troops assisted by the Iraqi army against the Pesh-merga, to such a point that the Interior Ministers of the two countries signed an agreement of co-operation in July 1977.

Iraq is perhaps among the Middle Eastern countries most exposed to change where the Iranian events may have deep consequences and influences. It is possible that there will be co-operation among Kurdish guerillas, Shi'ili dissatisfaction (Khomeini lived more than ten years in Iraq. The shi'is have participated in some demonstrations against the government in Kerbela in 1977 and in more recent times), and Communist opposition.

The Iraqi regime replies by increasing terror and repression, by leaving no way open even to the opposition's leaders who have sought refuge abroad. In 1976 an attempt was made against Vanly's life in Lausanne. In July 1978 the ex-Iraqi leader, General Abd ar-Razzaf an-Naif was killed in London. In January 1979 Masud Barzani—son of the great Kurdish leader—escaped an attempt in Vienna.

These totalitarian politics are very evident after the Iranian revolution's victory. The Iraqi government fears are so great that it tries to create problems for Iran, "supporting" Iranian Arabs in Khuzistan after selling them out to the Shah in the Algiers Agreement, bombing Kurdish villages in Iranian Kurdistan, shooting against the Iranian army at the frontiers. Saddam Hussein and his gang are afraid that Khomeiny can use all his influence and knowledge of the country to keep the Iraqi unpopular regime under the sword of Damocles.

"Seagull"\*

\*The identity of the writer is known to the Editor of *Pesh Merga*. It is indicative of the repression practised by the Ba'th regime of Baghdad that even a foreign writer feels compelled to seek anonymity.

## REPRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IN IRAQ

Recent information indicates that the repression against the Christian community, especially the Assyrians, is mounting to include not only political repression but also more intense religious discrimination. A number of people have been detained on the pretext that they held 'inappropriate' religious meetings.

Amnesty International newsletter, March 1979, Volume IX, No. 3, page 5, published under the heading "Iraq: Christians arrested", contained a report stating that "Nearly 200 Christians are reported to have been arrested in Iraq in mid-November 1978; earlier unconfirmed reports put the figure at 600. There has been no official explanation for the arrests and all access to the detainees was denied while they were being interrogated.

"Those arrested included members of Iraq's Assyrian Christian community, of an evangelical society and of a Bible study group in the town of Basra". (The full text of this report is published elsewhere in this issue of *Pesh Merga*.) (See Amnesty International reports in *Pesh Merga*.)

## THE IRAQI REGIME AND KURDISH CULTURE

The Iraqi regime's propaganda has been claiming that Kurdish culture is under no restrictions—it further claims that the regime tries to promote it. However, a look at the actual measures adopted, and policies pursued by the regime, refute this claim.

According to the 11th March 1970 Agreement between the present government and the Kurdish revolution led by the KDP, the medium of instruction in schools in the Kurdish area must be Kurdish; the regime's own so-called "Law of Autonomy" of March 1974 stipulates the same thing. Nevertheless, at the end of 1977, the use of the Kurdish language was greatly curtailed—by 40%—in schools in the "autonomous area", and further restrictions were imposed on it, such as the withdrawal of books written in Kurdish from schools and libraries. Moreover, at the end of 1978, an RCC (Revolution Command Council) decision dissolved the Kurdish Academy, established many years ago, and whose task it was to study the Kurdish language, literature and culture.

There are only about three "newspapers" published in the Kurdish language, two by the Ministry of Information and a dual weekly paper—half Arabic, half Kurdish—by 'al-Fikr al-Jadid'. All of them are published in Baghdad. A tiny proportion of literature published annually is in Kurdish or about the Kurds.

There is a "Kurdish Channel" on Kirkuk's (now Ta'mim) television—although Kirkuk is a Kurdish area, it is, nevertheless, not included in the so-called "autonomous area"—but the bulk of its televising time of 5 hours daily, is occupied by the showing of foreign films (third grade or lower), including Egyptian (Arabic), Indian (Hindi or Urdu). The reason for filling television time with such films is due to either restrictions imposed on, or neglect of, Kurdish artistic, literary, singing, dancing and musical talents that could, if allowed and encouraged, contribute to television programmes. A surprising feature is that the channel sometimes shows children's films or cartoons—mostly foreign (i.e. in a foreign language)—without dubbing them in Kurdish which, in reality, means that children watching them do not understand or comprehend anything of these films. This is in sharp contrast to the rest of the country where such films are dubbed to Arabic. Therefore, this channel is, to all intents and purposes, a failure and the overwhelming majority of Kurds do not watch its programmes. Maybe this is one of the reasons why the government has recently decided to give each deportee Kurdish family—22,000 families in Sulaimaniya alone according to official statements—a television set.

At the beginning of this year, the Iraqi government signed an agreement with foreign interests to build two additional channels in the Mosul television area—again outside the so-called "autonomous area"—which is planning to start a Kurdish programme. But one may assume, from the experience of Kirkuk television, that this programme will not be any better.

The government is very eager to pursue its barrage of propaganda on the Kurdish population and to achieve this, uses the written word (newsprint), the spoken word (radio) and now pictures (television). But, its propaganda campaign, based on a very narrow nationalistic outlook and pronouncements, is bound to backfire, and indeed is already doing so, because it is diametrically contradictory to its measures—which the Kurdish people are experiencing every day—and which is hostile to Kurdish hopes, aspirations and sentiments.

## DISCRIMINATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN IRAQ

In 1978, the total number of applicants to universities and other institutions of higher education in Iraq was more than 40,000. The total number of students admitted to these institutions was 26,400, i.e. 66 per cent or two-thirds of the total.

However, the striking point in this context is that some students or, to be frank, Ba'thist students, have been admitted not on the basis of their academic performances, as regulations require, but rather on the basis of 'special admission'. Admission to the following institutions of higher education is strictly based on 'special admission': colleges of education, colleges of physical education, teachers institutes, Academy of Fine Arts, the Institute of Fine Arts and some departments in a number of colleges. Those students admitted on the 'special admission' basis numbered more than 5,000, which means about one-fifth of the total number admitted to universities and other institutions of higher education. This unfair method of admission has harmful effects on the academic standard and other students, because 'special admission' is not based on the academic or school performance of the students, but on their affiliation with the Ba'th party; moreover, non-Ba'thist students who would like to study at the above-mentioned colleges and institutes have absolutely no chance of admission—however high their school performance happens to be. This in turn constitutes a clear violation of equality and equal opportunity among Iraqi citizens and constitutes obvious discrimination based on political opinion and party affiliation.

A number of applicants who were refused admission to their fields of choice at university, colleges and institutions not covered by 'special admission'—despite their high school performance—referred to the Central Bureau of Admission asking that their cases be reviewed. They were given forms to fill in, which included questions having nothing whatsoever to do with the matter of admission. These questions included a question about the student's political tendency, a question about the newspaper(s) he or she reads, a question on his or her participation in certain student activities, and so forth. Then, these students met some senior officials who told them that they would not be admitted to colleges despite their good school performances, they (the students) were furthermore told either to attend other institutions of higher education or quit university studies altogether.

Thus, the regime gives further evidence that, despite being a signatory to the 1966 United Nations Covenant on Human, Political and Civil Rights and the Covenant on Cultural, Economic and Social Rights, it violates the spirit and letter of these covenants and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, the regime's action is in violation of the Interim Constitution and the university admission regulations. It is also a direct interference with universities.

## CARRYING PLACARDS IN KURDISH IS A CRIME IN TURKEY

According to the Turkish Anatolia Agency (1445 gmt, 4th May 1979) "Izmir police took 29 people into custody for carrying placards in Kurdish, shouting Kurdish slogans and attending illegal rallies", i.e. taking part in the May Day rally in the city.

## IRAQI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES ASSASSINATE AN IRAQI PROFESSOR IN PDRY

1 Tawfiq Rushdi, Professor of Philosophy at the College of Higher Education in Aden, was assassinated by Iraqi Intelligence operatives based at the Iraq Embassy in PDRY on 2nd June 1979.

Professor Tawfiq was born in Sulaimaniya (Kurdistan-Iraq) in 1927. He was married with two children. He graduated from the College of Philosophy, Baghdad University and completed his postgraduate studies in the Soviet Union in the 1960s.

He was several times persecuted and had to leave Iraq to work abroad because of his political convictions. He was a member of the ICP.

2 According to *al-Rabi-ashar min Uktobet* of Aden, three 'diplomats' at the Iraqi Embassy in Aden have admitted assassinating Dr. Tawfiq Rushdi—see PR in *Pesh Merga*. These 'diplomats' are: Abd al-Ridha Sa'id Hameed, a Consular official; Ibrahim Muhammad, a security official at the Embassy, and Hassan Abd al-Adhim Mkhelif, a security guard.

The paper adds that "it is known that quantities of arms—machine guns, revolvers, hand grenades and thousands of rounds of ammunition—were found in their possession, which they intended to use in the implementation of the criminal designs which had been drawn up for them..." (Aden Home Service, 1230 gmt, 8th June 1979, BBC's SWB Second Series ME/6138/A/6, 11th June 1979).

3 Abd al-Fattah Ismai'l, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party said, in a speech on the 10th anniversary of the 22nd June corrective movement, that: "... the assassination of the lecturer, Dr. Tawfiq Rushdi, by security men of the Iraqi Embassy is deemed to be an unacceptable violation of the sovereignty and security of Democratic Yemen, and interference in its affairs. It is also deemed to be a dangerous precedent, which we cannot understand except by regarding it as part of a plan to unleash a secondary battle between Democratic Yemen and Iraq... We believe that the political assassination of prominent leaders of the Arab Liberation movement by certain groups within the movement is not a solution to the crisis of democratic action... Also the assassination of a citizen who chose Democratic Yemen as a homeland, for sacrifice and creativity, is regarded as a violation of the charters of international law and national sovereignty." (Excerpts from relay of the speech by Aden home service 1635 gmt, 21st June 1979, BBC's Summary of World Broadcasting, Second Series ME/6151, 26th June 1979, pp 2-3). (See KDP's Press Release in *Pesh Merga*.)

## ASSASSINATION OF ADIL ABD al-MAJEED WASFI BY IRAQI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES IN BEIRUT

Iraqi intelligence operatives assassinated Iraqi national Adil Abd al-Majeed Wasfi in Beirut on 20th June 1979. He was 35 years of age, a member of the ICP and Deputy Editor of *Filastin al-Thawra* magazine, the official organ of the PLO. The Palestinian resistance accused the Iraqi regime agents of murdering Wasfi.

This crime against humanity is a link in the chain of similar acts of murder, assassination, assassination attempts, assaults, harassment, intimidation, espionage and open acts of aggression perpetrated by the Iraqi Ba'th regime abroad—such acts which were carried out from January to June 1979 are referred to in this issue of *Pesh Merga* and in the press cuttings it contains.



Tawfiq Rushdi

## FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT IRAQI EMBASSIES ARE CENTRES OF ESPIONAGE AND MURDER

The following is the text of Aden (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) home service 1230 gmt, 3rd June 1979 (BBC's SWB, 5th June 1979, Second Series ME/6133, page ME/6133/A/3):

"Brother Muhammad Salih Muti, member of the Political Bureau and Foreign Minister, this afternoon summoned Fa'iz Awni, the Iraqi Ambassador in Aden, and delivered to him a protest Note from the PDRY Government to the Government of the Republic of Iraq following the action of a group of security men at the Iraqi Embassy in Aden who assassinated Comrade Tawfiq Rushdi, professor at the Higher Education College. At 2020 [local] on Saturday night, 2nd June 1979, a group of Iraqi security men based at the Iraqi Embassy in Aden and riding in a car bearing diplomatic registration plates 15/2, shot dead the Iraqi professor, Comrade Tawfiq Rushdi, near his home in Mansurah quarter of Aden. The Government of the PDRY has requested the Government of Iraq to surrender the criminals so that they might go before the courts to answer for the criminal act they have perpetrated."

## SWEDEN EXPELS IRAQI 'DIPLOMATS' ENGAGED IN ESPIONAGE

The Swedish Government declared, on 5th February 1979, five 'diplomats' at the Iraqi Embassy in Stockholm persona non grata for engaging in espionage. They were able to enlist the services of a senior police officer in Stockholm who had access to the dossiers of these refugees and residents. The Swedish Government made an official protest against these espionage activities.

The senior police officer was actually engaged in similar unlawful spying activities on foreign residents and Swedish citizens for the United States Embassy in Stockholm from 1965 to 1973, providing the CIA with information on these residents and citizens. The Swedish Foreign Ministry, according to *The Guardian*, 24th February 1979, lodged a "severe protest" with the American Embassy in Stockholm on 23rd February 1979. (See KDP Press Release in *Pesh Merga*.)

## IRAQI-TURKISH MILITARY/ INTELLIGENCE CO-ORDINATION AGAINST THE KURDS

During recent months, the Turkish Chief of Intelligence (MIT), the Chief of General Staff, a Deputy Prime Minister and the Governor of the Province of Hakkari, paid official visits to Iraq.


Since mid-May 1979, Turkey's involvement in, and co-ordination with the Iraqi regime in attempts to contain and eventually crush the Kurdish guerrillas in Iraq have become more obvious.

During the Iraqi attack on the Pesh Mergas in the Merga-Soor sector on 18th May, Turkish helicopters carried out reconnaissance flights over the area, 18 helicopters have recently been transferred to the Province of Hakkari bordering Iraq, and troop concentrations have been observed in Semdinli, Uludere (in Hakkari) and Cizre (in Mardin). There are close contacts and communications between the two countries' intelligence apparatus—between Cizre and Zakho, Uludere and Amadiya, and Semdinli and Merga-Soor centres (see map).

Turkey's involvement became more pronounced during the large scale Iraqi attack on the Kurdish guerrillas in the area between Zakho and Amadiya during 25th-27th May. A Turkish helicopter did actually strafe Pesh Merga positions, but was driven away by Doshka fire. And Turkish troops positioned at the peak of the mountain overlooking Mt. Asos, where the guerrillas' command post is located, acted as spotters for Iraqi artillery. Besides, large numbers of Turkish troops and gendarmerie were deployed along the frontier, especially in and near the border villages, the inhabitants of which were sternly warned not to render any form of help to the guerrillas, threatening them with reprisals and mass punishment.

However, this co-operation and co-ordination between the two regimes shall not succeed in destroying the Kurdish national liberation movement, although it may make things more difficult for the Pesh Mergas, because of the determination of our people, Party and guerrillas and the consciousness of our Kurdish nation and their political parties.

*The Guardian* of 2nd June 1979, published a report from Ankara by John Torode, stating that "... And the fear of a revival of Kurdish secessionism fuelled by Iranian Kurdish unrest, is growing. Already the army and the police have made contact with their opposite numbers in Iraq to discuss the possibility of joint action to put down any rising." (See press cutting section for further comments.)



## BETWEEN ANKARA AND BAGHDAD

**Iraqi Military-Intelligence Machine Further Closes Ranks with the Turkish Generals and MIT against the Kurdish Nation**

1 The boss of the Turkish National Intelligence Organisations (Milli Istihbarat Taskilati—MIT) visited Baghdad, at the head of an official delegation from MIT, for six days ending on 3rd April 1979. Ali Haider Ozkan, MIT's boss, emphasised that his talks with his Iraqi opposite number, officials from the Interior Ministry and others were "positive and dominated by an atmosphere of friendship and love", stressing that this visit of his "will be a strong milestone in the friendship between the two countries".

2 On 13th April, the Turkish Chief of General Staff, General Evren, started a three-day official visit to Baghdad, aimed at consolidating "co-operation in the military spheres between the armed forces of the two countries".

It is not incidental that the General went from Baghdad directly to the Kurdish Province of Diyarbakir to observe a huge military manoeuvre called "SEL" (Flood) which is the same name given to the military operations that crushed the Dersim (now Tunceli) uprising in 1937.

3 During April, six ministers in Ecevit's cabinet (formerly from Demirel's party) threatened the Prime Minister with resignation if he did not tighten his policies against so-called "separatism" in the East (the Kurdish area). Ecevit surrendered to the pressure brought to bear upon him by internal (the Generals, MIT, the six and other right wingers) and external (chiefly the Iraqi regime) forces and prolonged the period of the Martial Law by two months and extended it to cover six more Kurdish Provinces.

4 On 20th April, the Turkish Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister, Hikmet Cetin, visited Baghdad and declared at the airport that "relations between Turkey and Iraq are at the stage of rapid development".

5 On 8th June 1979, the Governor of Hakkari Province in sout-eastern Turkey—on the Iraqi and Iranian frontiers—arrived in Dahok Governorate in Iraq at the head of a delegation for a visit lasting several days.

All these visits, pressure and inter-state official economic bribery aim at the buying off of the Turkish regime's more active co-operation with the Iraqi authorities to crush the 26th May revolution in Iraqi Kurdistan. They have, according to press reports, tried, but failed, to draw Iran into this scheme of destroying the Kurdish National Liberation Movement. The Iraqi regime is trying to repeat its "coup" with the Shah of 6th March 1975 which resulted in the collapse of the September revolution. But conditions, experience and power politics are now different from 1975.

What the Iraqi regime temporarily accomplished by its agreement with and concessions to, the then strong Shah of Iran in 1975 cannot be achieved by an agreement with a much weaker and unstable Turkish regime in 1979, despite its machinations and close co-operation with the Generals, MIT and all the reactionary, chauvinist and fascist Turkish forces and elements.

The London based weekly *Al-Hawadith* stated in its 27th April issue that "Contacts have begun between Baghdad and Ankara, on the one hand, and Teheran on the other, to co-ordinate a unified policy towards the Kurds after Iraq and Turkey agreed on this co-ordination during the visit to Baghdad by the Turkish Chief of General Staff, General Evrin. The Iranian circles have stated that they do not hurry in this co-

## THE TALABANI GROUP ATTACK KDP GUERRILLAS ONCE AGAIN

The Kurdish, as well as the Iraqi general public, insist on an end to fratricide in Iraqi Kurdistan and the opening of a new page of co-operation among Kurdish forces in order to mobilise the masses of our people for the purpose of extracting their national and democratic rights and the establishment of democracy in Iraq.

But the Talabani group, led by Jalal Talabani himself, insists on continuing this fratricide and the shedding of Kurdish blood whenever and wherever they can.

On the occasion of Newroz, the Kurdish national 'New Day', the KDP—Provisional Leadership—issued a statement calling on all national and progressive forces in Kurdistan to form a broad national front, as well as a progressive Iraqi national front, to face up to the Iraqi regime and its terror; this statement was repeatedly broadcast from 'Voice of Kurdistan' radio station.

But, at that very time, the Talabani group were planning to launch an attack on our Party's bases in Hawraman (in the Halabja area, about 80 km. south-east of Sulaimaniya). They assembled all their forces and weapons in Nokan, (inside Iran) from which they set out towards KDP bases in the said area.

They out-numbered and were better armed than the KDP guerrillas, and their plan was to encircle and destroy these guerrillas by attacking them from the rear. However, the KDP guerrillas resisted the attackers and the ensuing battle, which took place in mountains overlooking the village of Dazli and which lasted for two days, resulted in the death of 73 (43 of whom were left on the battleground) and more than 35 of the Talabani group wounded. KDP losses were 3 guerrillas killed and 2 wounded. The attackers then withdrew, leaving behind a quantity of weapons and ammunition. This was Talabani's Newroz present to the Kurdish people.

The reason for the defeat of the Talabani attack in Dazli, was the same as in Bazi last June (1978), namely the role played by the masses and the help they offered to the KDP guerrillas.

Many of the commanders of the units, sectors and squads of the attacking Talabani group were the very same persons whom our Party took prisoner during the 1978 Bazi fight and who were subsequently released by our Party.

The Kurdish masses wonder—as we do—WHEN will Jalal Talabani wake up from his day-dreams, wishful thinking and self-deception—the day-dreams and wishful thinking and self-deception of monopolising political activity in Kurdistan.

While reiterating our call for the establishment of a broad national front in Kurdistan, and of an Iraqi national front as well, we join our voice to the voice of the indignant masses of Kurdistan, condemning the unabated efforts to continue the internal bleeding of the Kurdish people and denouncing the fratricide and the spilling of Kurdish blood at the altar of the wishful thinking, whims, imagination and narrow selfishness of some individuals.

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ordination, awaiting the approval of the constitution which gives national minorities a kind of autonomy which the Kurdish leaders have approved".

Now that SAVAK is defunct and their 'good friend', the Shah is on the run, the Iraqi regime has been looking for new allies; SAVAK has been replaced by MIT and the Shah by Turkish Generals and right-wing and fascist politicians and groups. (See press cutting section in *Pesh Merga*.)

## LIBERATION condemns Iraqi regime's terror

The Annual General Meeting (AGM) of *Liberation* (incorporating the Movement for Colonial Freedom) of London, held on 30th June 1976, passed the following resolution:

### Resolution No. 3. IRAQ. Submitted by London Area Council

THIS AGM STRONGLY CONDEMS the continuing vicious campaign of repression and terror in Iraq, waged by the ruling Baath Party and its notorious Security Apparatus against people from all walks of life: democrats, independents and communists amongst Arabs, Kurds and other national minorities. Since May 1978 more than 15,000 people have been arrested and subjected to brutal torture.

#### THIS AGM DEMANDS:

1. The immediate halt of the campaign of repression waged by the ruling Baath Party and its security apparatus.
2. The immediate halt of barbaric physical and psychological torture as a result of which dozens of detainees have already died.
3. The release of all political detainees, and that the Baathist authorities immediately reveal the fate of the detainees who have "disappeared" after arrest.
4. The abolishing of all repressive laws and penal codes, flagrantly violating fundamental human and democratic rights, under which hundreds of people have been executed, in particular the notorious "New Legal Provisions in Penal Code No. 111 of 1969—Article 200" where the only penalty is capital punishment.
5. The halt of mass extermination and national oppression, "Arabisation" of the Kurdish people in Iraqi Kurdistan.
6. The immediate release of Kamal Shakir, the General Secretary of Iraqi Democratic Youth Federation, who has been imprisoned since 1975 under flimsy charges.
7. The halt of repression and terror directed against academics, teachers and students, and the halt of discrimination in education on political and national bases.

#### THIS AGM

- Endorses the aims of the Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI) and calls for the widest support for its activities of solidarity with the Iraqi people.
- Mandates the Central Council to send letters of protest and condemnation, in line with this resolution, to the Iraqi President and Iraqi Embassy, and to organise a delegation to the Iraqi Embassy for the same purpose.

### MUHAMMAD AMIN MUHAMMAD ALI 1924-1979

On the night of 10th May 1979, Muhammad Amin Muhammad Ali died of cancer in a London clinic. He was born in 1924 in Sulaimaniya Province.

- He had been a member of KDP since 1946.
- From 1964 to 1967 he was a member of the Central Committee.
- During the same period, he was a Politburo member for a time.
- He became a member of the Revolution Command Council from 1965 until it was dissolved in 1970.
- From 1965 to 1967, he was a member of the Executive Bureau of the Council.
- From 1970 until 1974, he was a member of Branch Five Committee of the Party.
- Became the General Director of the Department of the Reconstruction of the North in 1970 and stayed in this post until 1974.
- After the collapse of the September revolution in March 1975, he became a refugee in Iran and, since then and until his death, he devoted most of his time to work on humanitarian matters related to the refugees.

## **AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: Political Prisoners and Executions in Iraq**

### **1. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER, November 1978.**

On 26th September, Amnesty International wrote to the Iraqi Minister of Justice, Munzer AL SHAWI, about the large scale amnesty announced in Iraq on 16th July and the execution in Iraq of 21 "communists" in May.

In addition to several thousand criminal prisoners who benefitted from the amnesty, 226 out of the 317 political prisoners said to be imprisoned in Iraq were also to be included. Amnesty International asked Minister Al Shawi for the names of all the 317 and details about those who would remain in prison.

Also included in the amnesty were prisoners held on charges which were not covered by the amnesty categories where these prisoners "have changed their basic attitudes towards the thinking about the revolution and its pan-Arab and national aims". Amnesty International also asked for details on these prisoners.

At the same time, Amnesty International expressed concern at the execution of 21 "communists" who had been condemned for forming secret cells within the armed forces. In Iraq, this is a capital offence. Amnesty International regretted the Iraqi government's decision to carry out the executions two, three or four years after the sentences had been passed, rather than to commute the sentences.

The 21 concerned had been tried at various times since 1974.

Amnesty International urged the Iraqi government to abolish the death penalty for this offence and commute all pending death sentences.

### **2. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR THE ABOLITION OF TORTURE Monthly Bulletin, November 1978**

Ma'ruf Abdullah FATTAH, 29 years old and married with two children, was a Kurdish teacher living in Zawita, a small town in Northern Iraq, when on 10th June he was arrested with others on suspicion of setting up a cell of the illegal Kurdish Democratic Party.

Torture during interrogation reportedly included having his head enveloped for several days in a type of hood which was filled with flying ants. As a result of this treatment he is reported to have become insane.

He was subsequently brought to trial in November 1977, and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment.

Kurdish hostilities against the Iraqi armed forces, which in effect stopped after the 1975 agreement between Iraq and Iran, were renewed early in 1976 and intensified following arrests, deportations and executions of Kurds by the Iraqi government. Amnesty International receives frequent allegations of torture in Iraq and there have been several reports of deaths under torture.

Please send courteously worded letters appealing for the immediate release of Ma'ruf Abdullah Fattah on humanitarian grounds, to:  
His Excellency Field Marshall Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr, President, Baghdad, Republic of Iraq;  
and to:  
His Excellency Saddam Hussein Taktiri, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Baghdad, Republic of Iraq.

### **3. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER December 1978**

Amnesty International asks Iraq for details of prisoners who will not benefit from an announced large scale amnesty and express concern at the execution of 21 "communists" earlier in the year.

### **4. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER January 1979**

#### **Father of twelve 'tortured to death'**

Haji Sayyid Ma'rouf, a 67-year-old Iraqi Kurd is reported to have been tortured to death in July 1977 according to delayed information reaching Amnesty International. A father of twelve, he was arrested for questioning after his son had left home to join the Pesh Mergas (the Kurdish forces engaged in armed opposition to the Iraqi government).

Amnesty International groups are now asking the Iraqi government to initiate an investigation into the circumstances of Haji Ma'rouf's death.

Amnesty International received a number of reports of deaths under torture in Iraq. The mutilated corpse of Reber Mulla HUSAIN, a 19-year-old student responsible for the Kurdistan Students Union in Zakho, was returned to his family on 26th April 1976 less than a week after his arrest. Nine nails were reportedly found in his body, one eye was gouged out and his penis had been cut off.

Sayyid Muhammad ISMAIL, an 80-year-old Iraqi Kurd who was arrested in May 1977 in connection with his son's alleged involvement in blowing up a secret police car in Arbil, reportedly died in custody soon after as a result of torture.

In both these cases Amnesty International has asked the government to investigate the allegations but, as far as is known, no investigation has been undertaken.

### **5. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER February 1979**

#### **Former Ambassador charged**

A former Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, Abdul Karim Sattar AL SHEIKHLY is reported to have been sentenced to 6 years imprisonment on charges of "conspiracy against the state".

A prominent member of the ruling Iraqi Ba'th Party and, most recently, Iraq's ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Al Sheikly was one of 22 Iraqi ambassadors summoned to the capital, Baghdad, ostensibly to attend a conference in February 1978.

Five of the ambassadors are reported to have been arrested and tried in Baghdad, but only Al Sheikly is known to have been imprisoned.

Precise information about his detention and trial are not available, since all political cases in Iraq are tried in camera by special courts.

Amnesty International is investigating his case.

### **6. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER March 1979**

#### **Christians arrested**

Nearly 200 Christians are reported to have been arrested in Iraq in mid-November 1978; earlier unconfirmed reports put the figure at 600. There has been no official explanation for the arrests and all access to the detainees was denied while they were being interrogated.

Those arrested included members of Iraq's Assyrian Christian community of an evangelical society, and of a Bible study group in the town of Basra.

Among the Christian foreign nationals who were also arrested were citizens of the United Kingdom, Norway, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Switzerland, the Arab Republic of Egypt and Lebanon.

According to Amnesty International information, the Christians were arrested for holding religious meetings which the government considered "irregular", for evangelising, and for having illegal contact with

foreigners. However some were later charged with espionage.

Iraq's Christian community consists of about 500,000 people, or four per cent of the country's population. Most of the Assyrian Christians were apparently arrested at a weekly meeting where their national language, Syriac, is taught. Sixty members of the evangelical society were arrested when security police broke into a home where a foreign national was preaching.

On 16 January, Amnesty International asked President Ahmed Hassan Al BAKR to confirm a recent report that all the Iraqi Christians had been released, or to supply details about the detainees, the charges against them, and pending trials, if any. Amnesty International also expressed concern about detention proceedings and allegations of torture during interrogation. Amnesty International now understands that a considerable majority of those detained have been released.

#### Communists arrested and tortured

Members of the Communist Party of Iraq—whose activities are not illegal—are being arrested in growing numbers and subject to torture, according to reports reaching Amnesty International during recent months. Unofficial sources claim that several thousand have been arrested.

Amnesty International so far received the names of 42 of those arrested. They include members of the central committee of the party, trade union activists, members of a publishing house, teachers, students, artists and poets.

In many cases torture is apparently being used to force detainees to leave the Communist party or to become informers against the party which, since it was founded in 1934, has been frequently persecuted. Its activities were legalised in 1972 though prohibited in the armed forces—when it joined in the Progressive National Front with the ruling Ba'th Party and various Kurdish parties.

Two prisoners are reported to have died as a result of torture. Hameed 'Ati, a member of the Communist Party who was married with two children, died on 3 September 1978. 'Ati is reported to have been suspended from a ceiling fan while it was in motion, beaten all over his body with wire truncheons and electrocuted. Adnan Abdul AL JABBAR, a Communist party sympathiser, died in a Baghdad hospital on 1 October 1978. He is reported to have been beaten with truncheons, suspended by his feet and had a wire baton inserted into his anus. This treatment led to a kidney failure and death. Another, Suleiman Yousef ISTIFAN, a member of the central committee of the Communist Party who has now been released, is reported to be in a severely weakened condition because of his treatment in prison.

Torture techniques reported to be currently in use include:

- Beating with rubber truncheons and hoses;
- electric shocks;
- extraction of finger and toenails;
- application of pressure on the chest and stomach by means of a machine called mangana
- suspension by hands or feet from a ceiling fan in motion;
- sexual assaults, or threats of rape, on the detainee or female relatives;
- burning with cigarettes;
- submersion of the head in water;
- filling the prisoner's room with gas until he faints;
- psychological torture involving the threat of death.

Please send courteously worded letters expressing concern at reports that large numbers of alleged Com-

munist Party supporters have been detained and subjected to torture in recent months. Urge the unconditional release of all those detained for their non-violent political beliefs or activities. Seek assurances that all those detained are protected from ill-treatment. Request an open and impartial investigation of the deaths of Hameed 'Ati and Adnan Abdul Al Jabbar.

Write to:

Field Marshall Ahmad Hassan Al BAKR, President of the Republic of Iraq, Baghdad, Republic of Iraq; and to:

General Saddam Hussein, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Baghdad, Republic of Iraq.

#### 7. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER April 1979

##### Iraq—Government Responds

Iraqi embassies have responded to letters from Amnesty International members sent on behalf of Ma'rour Abdullah FATTAH (November 1978 CAT Bulletin). The 29-year-old Kurdish teacher who was arrested in June 1978, was reported to have become insane following interrogation in which his head was enveloped for several days in a hood filled with flying ants.

The Iraqi embassies responded to Amnesty International appeals with the information that Fattah is serving a sentence of 5 years and one month for "violating the national security of Iraq".

Amnesty International members who receive a reply from Iraqi embassies should write thanking them for their response, stressing once again Amnesty International's concern at the torture allegations and urging an official enquiry into the prison treatment of Ma'rour Abdullah Fattah.

#### Bribes to buy off the Kurdish people's acquiescence!

In our Communiqué No. 20, item 35, we referred to the 25th January demonstration which took place in Kas-Nazan 'cluster village' in Arbil, (where Kurds forcibly displaced are resettled) in protest against the arrest of Khidhir Mulla Aziz, during which the authorities used force injuring many demonstrators.

After this demonstration and similar ones by forcibly displaced and resettled Kurds, especially in Harir of 25th December 1978, the Iraqi regime, realising that 'the stick' was counter-productive, has recently resorted to 'the carrot', offering bribes to the displaced Kurds a 'coloured television set' to each displaced family in an attempt to buy their acquiescence. The *London al-Arab* daily (reflecting Iraqi official views and attitudes) of 7th June 1979, reported that "the Iraqi President has given 144 families, in the Kas-Nazan village in Arbil, each a 'gift' of a TV set and that another 200 families from the same village have received similar 'gifts'."

The total number of TV 'gifts' given to forcibly displaced and resettled Kurdish families is 2244. However, the paper failed to mention that immediately after the June-July 1978 forcible displacement and resettlement drive, the Iraqi President sent each 'family' a 'tea cup' (istikan) and a square metre of material!

Such methods, which are in the best traditions of tribal chiefs and of the former Shah of Iran, have only decreased the prestige of the regime among the Kurds, and are bound to backfire sooner or later.





## Kurdenführer Barsani gestorben

LONDON (reuter). Der seit 1976 in den USA im Exil lebende Führer der kurdischen Widerstandsbewegung im Irak, Mullah Mustafa Barsani, ist im Alter von 76 Jahren in einem Spital in Washington einem Herzinfarkt erlegen.

# VOLKS STIMMEN

Nr. 51

Samstag,

3. März 1979

## Barsani gestorben

LONDON. Der seit 1976 in den USA im Exil lebende Führer der kurdischen Aufständischen im Irak, Mullah Mustafa Barsani, ist Freitag früh in einem Spital in Rochester (US-Bundesstaat Minnesota) einem Herzinfarkt erlegen.

Kronen Zeitung

Samstag, 3. März 1979

Mustafa Barzani, der legendäre Kurdenführer, ist im Exil in Washington gestorben.

# KURIER

SONNTAG, 4. MÄRZ 1979

Mullah Mustafa Barzani, legendärer Kurdenführer im amerikanischen Exil, ist Freitag an Krebs gestorben. Dreißig Jahre lang hatte er den Widerstandskampf im Irak geführt.

Het Volk  
3.3.1979

nel mondo

Avera 76 anni ed era malato di cancro ai polmoni

## È morto negli USA Barzani leader della resistenza curda

WASHINGTON. 2 — Mullah Mustafa Barzani, principale esponente della resistenza curda che per 30 anni in Iraq si è opposta al governo di Bagdad, è morto nelle prime ore di stamane negli Stati Uniti.

Barzani, che aveva 76 anni, è morto in seguito ad un infarto cardiaco che lo ha colpito a due sulli giorni dalla sua progettata partenza per Teheran.

Un portavoce del partito democratico curdo ha detto che Barzani, che si trovava in gravissime condizioni per un cancro ai polmoni, aveva espresso il desiderio di passare i suoi ultimi giorni tra la sua gente.

Mustafa Barzani era partito dall'Iraq pochi giorni dopo la firma dell'accordo iraniano iracheno del 6 marzo 1975 che poneva praticamente fine alla sua lotta per l'indipendenza del suo popolo.

Barzani era nato all'inizio del secolo a Barzani, nell'Iraq del Nord. Dal 1931 partecipò al movimento nazionalista e nel 1943 tentò di organizzare una amministrazione autonoma curda nell'Iraq. Successivamente dovette fuggire nell'Iran e poi nell'Oman. Si ritirava dove rimase dodici anni. Dopo la tregua instaurata dal generale Abdol Karim Kassem, che rovesciò la monarchia irachena nel 1958, Barzani riprese la lotta nel 1961. L'unico marzo 1970 Barzani firmò l'accordo con il partito Baath che concedeva l'autonomia dei curdi nell'ambito della Repubblica Irachena. Ma l'accordo fu di breve durata perché tra le due parti si

stabilì di nuovo l'incomprensione. Il 29 settembre del 1971 Barzani sfuggì di misura ad un attentato.

L'11 marzo 1974 il conflitto riprese con la proclamazione unilaterale, da parte del potere centrale di Bagdad, della legge di autonomia del Kurdistan. Condannato dall'Unione Sovietica Barzani continuò a ricevere aiuti solo dall'Iran. Ma anche il Governo iraniano non riuscì a cessare di sostenere i due accordi di Bagdad del 1973. Mustafa Barzani lasciò dunque il suo paese per l'Iran e, in settembre, si trasferì negli Stati Uniti dopo aver abbandonato completamente la scena politica.

2 / sabato 3 marzo 1979 manifesto

**KURDISTAN. Morto negli Usa Mustafa Barzani, leggendario capo della resistenza curda in Iraq**

WASHINGTON. Un infarto ha ucciso ieri in un ospedale di Washington Mullah Mustafa Barzani, 76enne e da tempo sofferente per un cancro ai polmoni. Barzani aveva guidato per più di 40 anni la lotta del popolo curdo per l'indipendenza dal regime irakeno, alternando lunghi anni di esilio a momenti di lotta armata violentissima, negli anni '60 e poi di nuovo nel '74-'75. Proprio nel 1975, il blocco improvviso degli aiuti da parte dello scià (l'unico che aveva fino allora sostenuto il movimento curdo, per indebolire l'Iraq) provocò il crollo della resistenza e l'ultimo esilio per Barzani. Lo scià aveva preferito stringere un accordo con gli irakeni, e questi lo ripagaroni bloccando le attività di un altro esule, l'ayatollah Khomeini, che in quegli anni stava gettando le basi, a partire dall'Iraq, della rinascita dell'islamismo sciita.

## Barzani stierf ver van zijn volk

LONDEN. — Het mag een wonder heten dat Mullah Moestafa Barzani de 76 heeft gehaald. Hij stierf in een ziekenhuis in Rochester (Minnesota, VS) aan longkanker, nadat hij zijn hele leven lang aan de ene aanslag op de andere was ontsnapt. Barzani, de onbetwiste leider der Koerden, vecht dertig jaar lang voor afscheiding van Irak. Deze strijd kende "stille" perioden, doch telkens de Koerden iets dwars zat sloegen zij gewapenderhand aan het midden tegen de centrale Iraakse regering. Barzani wilde graag zijn laatste levensdagen onder de Koerden doorbrengen, maar de dood was sneller dan de jet die hem naar zijn volk zou terugbrengen.

ZIE BLZ. 4



Da tempo rifugiato negli Usa, aveva 76 anni

## Morto Barzani, capo dei curdi in cerca di una patria unita

WASHINGTON — Mullah Mustafa Barzani, principale esponente della resistenza curda che per trent'anni in Iraq si è opposta al governo di Bagdad, è morto ieri mattina a Washington. Barzani, che aveva 76 anni, soffriva di cancro ai polmoni: ma è morto di attacco cardiaco, a due giorni dal suo progettato rientro a Teheran. (ANSA)

Da tre anni Barzani viveva negli Stati Uniti. Vi si era rifugiato nel settembre '75, pochi mesi dopo che lo scià — ultimo sostentore della sua lotta contro il regime di Bagdad — aveva firmato con l'Iraq un trattato di buon vicinato. Fino a quel momento, con alterne ricadute, il nome del mullah Mustafa al-Barzani era stato alla bandiera di un popolo che aveva sempre sognato l'unificazione indipendente del Kurdistan, la regione divisa fra Iran, Iraq, Siria, Ussr e Turchia.

Anche se l'attuale ripresa delle ostilità favorita dai caos post-rivoluzionario dell'Iran, è dichiaratamente intesa a ottenere diritti nazionali nel contesto iraniano, e se i giorni leva dei separatisti curdi lo considerano ormai troppo conservatore e legato a concerti tribali, ma soprattutto macchiatu a uno stretto rinculo con Reza Pahlavi. Barzani non ha cessato di rappresentare fino all'ultimo le aspirazioni del suo popolo, calandosi della sua figura carismatica di religiosa-guerriera di indubbi presa sulle masse.

Nato verso il 1902 era fratello minore dello sceicco Ahmed, un religioso eccentrico che condusse la lotta nazionale curda dalla prima guerra mondiale alla fine degli anni Trenta, quando decise di abbandonare la lotta politica per dedicarsi interamente alla religione.

Nel 1945 Mustafa Barzani divenne capo del Rdp, il partito democratico curdo appena fondato; e nel 1946 fu a capo dell'esercito che difese con armi fornite dai sovietici la Repubblica curda di Mahabad, una striscia di territorio iraniano al confine con l'Iraq e con la Turchia. Ancora oggi Mahabad è la capitale spirituale dei curdi, o spicata il quartier generale dei nuovi insorti.

Quando le truppe sovietiche si ritirarono dall'Iran

anche la Repubblica di Mahabad scomparve: Barzani con gli altri capi trovò rifugio in Ussr. Vi rimase circa 12 anni, tornò in Iraq nel 1954 quando Kusem rovesciò la monarchia. Ma era bloccato a Bagdad: solo nel 1960 riuscì a fuggire e trovò rifugio nelle montagne, per riprendere la lotta.

Le forze curde attribuiscono sostanzialmente alla caduta di Kusem (settembre 1963), ma in breve si lavorarono nuovamente osteggiando dagli eredi del doppio dittatore. Due accordi con il governo Baath, nel '68 e nel '70 (autonomia dei curdi nell'ambito della repubblica irachena), non superarono le tensioni, anzi, proprio l'accordo che Bagdad non avesse rispettato l'ultimo accordo, in particolare che non avesse incluso i pozzi petroliferi di Kirkuk nella nuova regione autonoma, portò a nuove tensioni.

Nel 1971 Barzani scampò a un attentato: un Corano imbottito di dinamite esplosa nella sua tenda, nel villaggio di Dalm, dove aveva il quartier generale.

L'11 marzo 1974, quando Bagdad proclamò unilateralmente la "voce di autonomia del Kurdistan", fu pronto a riprendere la guida dei suoi combattenti. Ma, condannato dall'Unione Sovietica, dovette recarsi dei soli aiuti di Pahlavi. Quando anche Reza Pahlavi gli fece mancare il suo appoggio, la lunga querula si dissolse. Barzani andò in America. L'indipendenza curda raffigurò il sogno che era sempre stato.

Fabio Galvano

Koerdenleider Barzani in VS overleden

LONDEN (Reuter). — Mullah Moestafa Barzani, koerdenleider che 30 anni lang het verzet tegen de regering van Irak heeft geleid, gisteren in Rochester, Minnesota, aan longkanker overleden. Hij is 76 jarig geworden. Dit is meegedeeld door een woordvoerder van de Koerdenstaat Democratische Partij in Londen. Men had hem naaandig voor vliegtuig naar Teheran willen brengen, want hij wilde graag zijn laatste levensdagen onder Koerden doorbrengen. Sinds 1976 woonde hij in de VS. In 1975 hielp Iran op de Koerden in Irak te steunen, waardoor hun opstand tegen de Iraakse heersers niet meer was vol te houden.

de morgen  
3.3.1979

Morto  
Il leader curdo  
Barzani

LONDRA — Mullah Mustafa Barzani, principale esponente della resistenza curda che per 30 anni in Iraq si è opposta al governo di Bagdad, è morto nelle prime ore di ieri negli Stati Uniti: non ha dato notizia a Londra un portavoce del Partito Democratico del Kurdistan di cui Barzani era leader.

Barzani, che aveva 76 anni, è morto in seguito ad un infarto cardiaco che lo ha colpito a due soli giorni dalla sua progettata partenza per Teheran.

AVVENIRE - Pag. 4

3.3.1979



Barzani ai tempi della guerra

Samstag, 3. März 1979

## Kurdenführer Barsani im Exil gestorben

**London.** — Der seit 1976 in den USA im Exil lebende Führer der kurdischen Widerstandsbewegung im Irak, Mullah Mustafa Barsani ist freitags früh in der Universitätsklinik in Washington einem Herzinfarkt erlegen.

London. — Mullah Mustapha Barzani, qui fut pendant trente ans le chef du Mouvement national kurde en Irak, est décédé vendredi 2 mars aux Etats-Unis, a annoncé à Londres un porte-parole du parti démocratique du Kurdistan. Il a précisé que Barzani, qui était âgé de soixante-seize ans, a succombé à une crise cardiaque dans une clinique de Rochester (Minnesota), où il était soigné.

A atteint d'un cancer au poumon, le leader kurde devait finir sa dimanche pour l'Iran, où il souhaitait finir ses jours parmi ses fils.

La vie de Barzani aura été tout entière dédiée au combat pour l'indépendance du Kurdistan. Il était prêt à passer alliance avec quiconque pour parvenir à ses fins.

C'est en 1932 qu'il participe, dans la partie irakienne de son pays, à la première tentative des Kurdes pour former les forces des Bandar, alors organisées par les Anglais. C'est un échec. En 1933, Barzani est à la tête du nouveau soulèvement, qui connaît une toute autre ampleur. Il jouera près de deux ans aux soûfis, mais aussi contre les forces britanniques, Renan, pour des bombardiers de la R.A.F. Barzani gagne alors, durant l'été 1935, la « République de Mehabad » dont Joseph Staline avait encouragé la création, en vue de gérer les puissances occidentales en procédant à un démembrage de l'Iran. Lorsque, en 1946, sous la pression américaine, les Russes doivent évacuer l'Iran, Barzani se réfuge en Union soviétique avec le cause, vaincu par le retourlement de l'Union soviétique, qui prend fait et cause pour Bagdad, devient son meilleur allié dans la région. Dès lors, Barzani était pieds et poings liés entre les mains du Shah d'Iran. Ce jeu de 1946 au Tchétchénie, il appelle à l'indépendance de la voie révolte des Kurdes, c'est l'affrontement du vieux rite de l'indépendance. Depuis lors, Barzani vit réfugié à Téhéran, capitale qu'il ne quitte que pour aller se faire soigner aux Etats-Unis et y mourir.

Un coup très dur qui sort de la cause, vaincu par le retourlement de l'Union soviétique, qui prend fait et cause pour Bagdad, devient son meilleur allié dans la région. Dès lors, Barzani était pieds et poings liés entre les mains du Shah d'Iran. Ce jeu de 1946 au Tchétchénie, il appelle à l'indépendance de la voie révolte des Kurdes, c'est l'affrontement du vieux rite de l'indépendance. Depuis lors, Barzani vit réfugié à Téhéran, capitale qu'il ne quitte que pour aller se faire soigner aux Etats-Unis et y mourir.

Le Monde, 3.3.1979

## Kurdenchef Barzani gestorben 50 Jahre im Freiheitskampf

Eigenbericht der „Presse“

WIEN (red.). Wie die Agentur Reuters berichtet, ist der seit 1976 in den USA lebende Kurdenführer Mullah Mustafa Barzani Freitag in der Universitätsklinik in Washington an den Folgen eines Herzinfarkts gestorben. Barzani, der im Alter von 76 Jahren stand, litt seit geraumer Zeit an einer unheilbaren Krebskrankung und wünschte sich auch zur Behandlung in die USA gegeben zu haben. Sein letzter, am Sonntag geäußerter Wunsch, in den Iran zu fliegen, um auf kurdischer Heimaterde zu sterben, ging nicht mehr in Erfüllung.

Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg vertraten die Briten den Kurden einen eigenen Staat, hielten jedoch ihre Zusage nicht ein, was seither immer wieder zu Aufständen gegen die Briten und dann gegen die irakische Regierung führte. Die erste große Erhebung 1932 wurde niedergeschlagen, Barzani zu 12 Jahren Zwangsarbeit verurteilt, aus der er 1943 fliehen konnte.

Unter Duldung der Sowjetunion kam es 1945 in Westpersien zur Gründung der kurdischen „Republik von Mahabad“, deren Streitkräfte Barzani befahlte. Der Shah liquidierte sie und Barzani mußte in die Sowjetunion flüchten. Als 1958 in Bagdad die Monarchie gestürzt worden war, rief ihn der neue Machthaber Kassam in die Heimat zurück.

Die Hoffnungen, die Moskau in Barzani gesetzt hatte, realisierten sich nicht, dieser strebte vielmehr eine Autonomie innerhalb des Iraks an, was Kassam und dessen Nachfolger zwar versprachen, aber nie erfüllten. 1961 brach der zweite große Kurdenaufstand aus, der mit Unterbrechungen bis 1975 andauerte. Damals verriet der Shah Barzani, dieser mußte ins Exil gehen.

Neue Zürcher Zeitung

2. Sonntag/Montag, 4./5. März 1979 Fernsehaugabe Nr. 52

## Tod des Kurdenführers Barzani

H. E. T. Washington, 1. März

Der Kurdenführer Mullah Mustafa Barzani ist in einem Spital in Washington im Alter von 76 Jahren an Lungenkrebs gestorben. Barzani hatte die Kurden seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in langjährigen Kämpfen angeführt, in denen er seinem Volk wenig nicht die Unabhängigkeit, so doch die Autonomie hatte sichern wollen. Er hatte bei der während der sowjetischen Besetzung eines Teils von Iran im Zweiten Weltkrieg unter sowjetischem Schutz erfolgten Errichtung der Republik Kurdistan seine Hand im Spiel. Die Republik wurde 1946 aufgelöst. Barzani blieb jahrelang im Exil in der Sowjetunion. Er kehrte 1960 in seine Geburtsheimat zurück und bekämpfte nun die Gleichschaltungsbehünen der irakischen Regierungen. Die CIA ließte ihm auf Schlechthand über Iran erbeutete sowjetische und chinesische Waffen. 1975 wurde Barzani von seinen Helfern im Stich gelassen. Iran schloss ein Grenzabkommen mit dem Irak. Der Aufstand der Kurden brach mangels Nachschub zusammen. Barzani floh nach Iran und wurde von dort nach Washington gebracht. Höhere amerikanische Regierungsstellen vermittelten jeden Kontakt mit ihm. Seine Krankheit erwies sich als unheilbar. Vor seinem Tod erlebte er noch den Sturz des Schahs, der ihn vertraten, und das Misserfolg einiger junger Amerikaner, die ihn im Stich gelassen hatten.

In Iran regt sich jetzt aufs neue der Unabhängigkeitswillen der Kurden, die im Gegensatz zu den schiitischen Kurden grundsätzlich Sunnitent sind.

## ANCIEN DIRIGEANT KURDE IRIKIAN

### Barzani est mort aux États-Unis

Londres (Reuters). — Mullah Mustapha Barzani, qui fut pendant trente ans le chef du Mouvement national kurde en Irak, est décédé vendredi 2 mars aux Etats-Unis, a annoncé à Londres un porte-parole du parti démocratique du Kurdistan. Il a précisé que Barzani, qui était âgé de soixante-seize ans, a succombé à une crise cardiaque dans une clinique de Rochester (Minnesota), où il était soigné.

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C'est en 1932 qu'il participe, dans la partie irakienne de son pays, à la première tentative des Kurdes pour former les forces des Bandar, alors organisées par les Anglais. C'est un échec. En 1933, Barzani est à la tête du nouveau soulèvement, qui connaît une toute autre ampleur. Il jouera près de deux ans aux soûfis, mais aussi contre les forces britanniques, Renan, pour des bombardiers de la R.A.F. Barzani gagne alors, durant l'été 1935, la « République de Mehabad » dont Joseph Staline avait encouragé la création, en vue de gérer les puissances occidentales en procédant à un démembrage de l'Iran. lorsque, en 1946, sous la pression américaine, les Russes doivent évacuer l'Iran, Barzani se réfugie en Union soviétique avec le cause, vaincu par le retourlement de l'Union soviétique, qui prend fait et cause pour Bagdad, devient son meilleur allié dans la région. Dès lors, Barzani était pieds et poings liés entre les mains du Shah d'Iran. Ce jeu de 1946 au Tchétchénie, il appelle à l'indépendance de la voie révolte des Kurdes, c'est l'affrontement du vieux rite de l'indépendance. Depuis lors, Barzani vit réfugié à Téhéran, capitale qu'il ne quitte que pour aller se faire soigner aux Etats-Unis et y mourir.

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Le Monde, 3.3.1979

## Kuijpers vraagt steun voor Koerden

VU-kamerlid Kuijpers verzoekt de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, de commissie voor de mensenrechten in Straatsburg en de VN in New York tussenbeide te komen voor de Koerden in het Midden-Oosten.

Kuijpers deed dit in zijn hoedanigheid van lid van de commissie Buitenlandse Zaken, de commissie voor de mensenrechten in Straatsburg en de VN in New York tussenbeide te komen voor de Koerden in het Midden-Oosten.

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Kuijpers deed dit in zijn hoedanigheid van lid van de commissie Buitenlandse Zaken, de commissie voor de Menschenrechten in Straatsburg und de VN in New York zwischenbeide zu kommen für die Kurden in Irak.

Kuijpers deed dies in seiner Rolle als Abgeordneter des Partei demokratischen Kurdistans (PDK) in Straatsburg, um die Kurden in Irak zu unterstützen.

Kuijpers war ein ehemaliger Kämpfer der Kurden in Irak.

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lektueller gegen Barzani bleibt, daß dieser im März 1975 statt den Kampf in bewährter Männer als Guerillakrieg fortzusetzen, aufgab und sich mit kurdischer Armee und 300.000 Flüchtlingen in den Iran absetzte.

Es sei dagegen gestellt, wie weit der angekündigte Krieg 1975 tatsächlich noch dauerte.

Bild: dem Jahre 1963.  
W. Petrow istreift, S. 88-63. „Die frakischen  
Bürokraten sind ein Amalgam von Bourgeoisie,  
bourgeoisen, freud-antihistorischen und  
irrationalistischen Agenten der Oligarchie“  
oder  
„Präuer vom 16.6.63: „Die baptistischen  
Namby-Namwangs ... sind nach dem Muster  
der faschistischen SS-Banden gebildet wor-

卷之三

eine führende Rolle im kurischen Widerstand gegen die Unterdrückung seines Volkes gespielt. Kurisches Panzer und Kämpfer wird als kurdischer Panzer und Kämpfer um kurische Selbstbestimmung in die Geschichte eingehen.

**Baßthien**: „Des Vertrages von Mitternacht beschuldigt die ‚Tass-Doppelei‘, 16.6.63 verhandeln, während sie militärische Kräfte für den Angriff auf die Kurdenregion aufbauen“

Zu dieser Phase seien nochm. Nr. 2530, 1974, Sommerausgabe, Kunstdaten - Berlin-Brandenburg, die Publizität und Jürgen Röhr, „Gespräche der Unterdrückten“, Innen, DKA 10/80 = erneutes Vergriffen, kann nur als Fotokopie aufgerufen werden, zu DM € 1,- letzteres vorliegt.

Bartan, geprägt durch die konservative, traditionelle, bauerliche Welt des Kurdistan sei-

Saddam Hussein al-Tekriti tritt sich mit Bierzen an  
Haarschärfen über der Döber in Neumarkt (in der Schule)

Gbv.-postrom-Versand  
Brammerschl. 200

ner Jugendjahre, hat ein halbes Jahrhundert

del Ocio)

450) Öselnburg

Die letzte militärische Auseinandersetzung  
der beiden Parteien fand 1945 zwischen neuen russischen Truppen  
und den überwiegend polnischen Einheiten der Streitkräfte  
Jugoslawiens statt.

auch die Errichtung der Großindustrie schneidet. Im Frühjahr 1972 schüttet der irakische Fonds für wissenschaftliche Forschung mit der Unterstützung der DDR einen Betrag von 100 Millionen DM in die nationale Front"; um KDP und KPK zu einer nordirakischen

# Death threat to Iraqi youth leader

Morning Star Reporter

Iraq's democratic youth leader Kamal Shakir is again under threat of death at the hands of the country's Ba'athist regime which has again dragged him before a court-martial in Baghdad.

The phoney trial is apparently part of a new campaign by the Ba'athist leaders against Communists and other Iraqi democrats.

Officially arrested in 1973, Kamal Shakir faced trumped up charges and was sentenced to death in December 1975. But following pressure from progressive and democratic forces, the sentence was commuted to 20 years' imprisonment.

But following the executions that took place last May, new

phoney charges have been brought against him and he was due to face court-martial in Baghdad yesterday.

Information that rescued London from Baghdad yesterday indicated that the Iraqi authorities were now determined to liquidate Kamal Shakir.

## Body dumped

The case comes at a time when the Iraqi secret police have been making savage attacks on progressive women, many of whom have been arrested and tortured to death.

It is now known that three progressive women, Jokak Abdulla of Mosul, Ilseca Karim of Kirkuk and Maniba Seewa have died following torture by police.

MORNING STAR, Monday March 8 1979

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 15 APRIL 1979

# Turks fear Kurds

TURKEY'S martial law commanders, who virtually rule 13 of the country's 67 provinces, are now deeply concerned about unrest among the Kurdish minority caused by upheaval in Iran.

Security forces recently found large caches of arms, some allegedly Soviet-made, in south-eastern Kurdish strongholds.

The Kurdish factor, which Turkish officials usually dismiss as irrelevant, is believed to be behind today's visit to Baghdad of General Kenan Evren, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, for talks with Iraqi military leaders. The Turks hope to concert measures to contain Kurdish separatism.

Most of Turkey's seven million Kurds have been assimilated in the modern Turkish state. A repetition of the 1925 revolt seems out of the question. But the Army is taking no chances. (K.M.)



MINUTE DERNIERE MINUTE

## Kurdes: attentat contre le fils de Barzani

■ Deux hommes armés non identifiés ont apparemment tenté d'abattre lundi soir à Vienne le fils du mollah Moustafa Barzani, chef légendaire de l'insurrection des Kurdes d'Irak jusqu'à son effondrement en 1975 à la suite d'une entente entre irako-iranienne.

Journal de Genève  
10.1.1979.

Austrian police are holding a suspect in the murder attempt on 8 January of Masoud Barzani, a leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and son of Kurdish nationalist leader Mustafa Barzani. Two men were wounded when attackers opened fire on several Kurds leaving a block of flats in a Vienna suburb after a meeting with Barzani, who has accused Iraqi intelligence agents of trying to kill him. The Barzani embassy in Vienna said the charge was a lie.

Middle East Economic Digest, London

19 JAN 1979

Daily Telegraph, London

10 JAN 1979

## REFUGEE KURDS

### SHOT IN VIENNA

The son of a Kurdish national leader has escaped unharmed from a Vienna ambush in which two Kurdish refugees were shot and injured.

The man who escaped was Masoud Barzani, a leader of the exiled Kurdish Democratic party, and son of Mullah Mustapha Barzani, who led a revolt against Iraq in 1975.

Exiled party officials in Vienna, London, yesterday accused the Iraqi government of sending agents to Europe to assassinate leading exiles. The charge was denied by the Iraqi embassy in Vienna. —Reuter.

Syndication

Scotsman, Edinburgh

10 JAN 1979

## Kurds shot

THE SON of Kurdistan's most prominent nationalist leader escaped unhurt in what Kurdish exiles yesterday claimed was a major attempt by Iraqi secret agents.

Two Kurdish refugees were shot and injured in the attack on Monday night as they left a block of flats in a Vienna suburb after a secret rendezvous with Mr Masoud Barzani, a leading figure in the exiled Kurdish Democratic Party and son of the legendary Mullah Mustapha Barzani, who led a Kurdish revolt against Iraq 15 years ago.

Mr Barzani was reported to be visiting Vienna to meet some of the 160 Kurdish exiles working or studying in Austria, and police said they assumed the attack had been directed at him. In the assault, two assailants had apparently thought that he was one of the men leaving the flat.

VIENNE (Reuter) — Deux hommes armés non identifiés ont apparemment tenté d'abattre lundi soir à Vienne, le fils du mollah Moustafa Barzani, chef légendaire de l'insurrection des Kurdes d'Irak jusqu'à son effondrement en 1975 à la suite d'une entente entre irako-iranienne.

Membre de la direction du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK), M. Masoud Barzani, qui est âgé de 35 ans, a échappé aux balles des deux tireurs mais la fusillade a fait deux victimes. Deux exilés kurdes avec lesquels il venait de s'entretenir dans un appartement de la banlieue viennoise.



Il s'agit de MM. Nagib Azaz et Ahmad Ibrahim Pirot, qui ont été blessés mais sont tous deux considérés à l'hôpital comme hors de danger. «Deux hommes ont commencé à tirer au pistolet alors que nous sortions. On a tiré sept ou huit coups de feu avant de s'enfuir. Barzani n'était pas là», a précisé un troisième exilé kurde, M. Mohamad Arif, qui a assisté à l'attentat.

«Ils ont d'abord tiré sur Pirot parce qu'il est petit et qu'ils l'ont pris pour Barzani», a aussi estimé un autre émigré, M. Michael Wimmer.

Le PDK, dont M. Arif est le porte-parole, met en cause sans ambiguïté les services secrets irakiens. «Nous sommes sûrs qu'il s'agit soit d'un attentat contre le fils de Barzani (G. UPI), organisé en liaison avec les services secrets irakiens», a dit M. Arif.

A Londres, un autre porte-parole du PDK a indiqué que l'organisation était en possession d'informations dignes de foi indiquant que le gouvernement irakien avait dépêché en Europe des bandes armées pour surveiller le parti et assassiner ses dirigeants en vue.

En octobre 1976, le représentant du PDK en Suisse avait été grièvement blessé par balles à son domicile de Lausanne.

WORLD THIS WEEK

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 11 MARCH 1979

# Iran's Kurds demand home rule

"WE WANT autonomy for the Kurds and all minorities in Iran," Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini said tucking his feet underneath him and reaching for a piece of chicken. "We will use peaceful means but if that fails we will fight for our rights."

The men sitting around the simple supper spread out on the carpeted floor nodded their approval. Among them was the shohsh, only son — a graduate in computer sciences from Tehran University—a respected bookshop owner and publisher, the nephew of Ghazi Mohammad, president of the shortlived Republic of Kurdistan and executed here in 1947, and a hand of tenured Kurdish warriors in bugle coats, brilliant sashes and enough weaponry to equip a platoon of infantry.

"We are not separatists," said the sheikh, in a voice hoarse from long hours of talking. "We are Iranians. We want a federal republic. Iran will not break up if the Kurds, Turks and Baluchis get autonomy; on the contrary, the country will be happier and more united."

The sheikh, now in his sixties but a man of incisive speech and manner, is the Khomeini of Iran's five million Kurds. He belongs to no political party but, as a recognized leader and Kurdish nationalist, he holds the allegiance of the vast majority of the Kurds who live in

this mountainous and starkly beautiful corner of Iran. Following rumours of separation activities, the government in Tehran recently despatched a delegation to take the shohsh and other Kurdish leaders. The Kurds outlined their demands in an eight-point plan which amounts to home rule, leaving foreign affairs, defence and national economic planning in the hands of the central government.

## Sympathetic

The delegation gave the Kurds a sympathetic hearing but made no promises. The Kurdish leaders are worried about the new Iranian constitution currently being drafted in the capital. Whether they may or not, the other Iranian ethnic minorities have been consulted about its contents.

Such is the concern of the Kurds that they are sending their own delegates to Tehran soon to meet with Ayatollah Khomeini and his Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan.

"We will not accept a constitution without consulta-

tions," said the sheikh, adjusting his white turban with a surprisingly youthful hand. "What we want immediately is a statement of principle on the Kurdish problem from the Ayatollah."

Whether the Kurds will get it is another matter. The centrifugal potential of Iran's ethnic minorities has always been a sensitive issue in Tehran. The Kurds, descendants of the ancient Medes and tragically split between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Soviet Union, present the biggest challenge.

But whatever happens, the Kurdish will have a significant impact on the country's other ethnic groups. The Turkish speaking people of Azerbaijan in the north—they also had a butterfly republic in the Second World War—share similar devolution aspirations. And in the east along the border with Pakistan there is a history of Baluchi irredentism.

Outside the sheikh's house snow was falling, whitening the chequered turbans and thick mustaches of the guards. Ghazi Mohammad's nephew told me how, as a boy of 11, he had watched his uncle on a similar winter night go to the gallows, crying "Long live Kurdistan." "We have nothing against an Islamic republic in Iran but we must have autonomy too. We have been Muslims for 1,400 years but Kurds for 3,000 years."

Kurdistan, always a centre of opposition to the Shah's imperial and centralized rule, has turned the same wheel at the cost of the rest of the country. Revolutionary committees, patterned on Khomeini's in Tehran, have sprung up with the same combination of local guerrillas and soldiers reporting and responsive to the Ayatollah rather than to the formal Bazargan Government.

## Clandestine

There is also the Kurdish Democratic Party founded by Ghazi Mohammad 32 years ago and above ground for the first time. Its leader, an anti-communist capitalist called Abdol-Bahram Ghazi semlou who retained claim to his four months ago after 20 years in exile in Czechoslovakia and France.

He echoes Sheikh Ezzedin's plea for an autonomous Kurdistan and will be going to Tehran with the religious leader to press the Kurds' demands. As we were leaving a young man in traditional dress came in and was introduced as the head of the "Pesh Merga" (Kurdish irregulars). He and a 50-man unit with 20 regular soldiers run the local garrison which like most of the bases in Kurdistan is staffed with the Shah's expensive and highly lethal weaponry. A thought that occurred to me in Mahabad, the young man carried a brand new Kalashnikov G from the party, he grimly said, and had the grip of a blacksmith.

Later, after a long journey on a mud road that snors and dips through snow-covered mountains under a peyster sky, I arrived in Baneh, a town a dozen miles from the Iranian-Turkish border no man's land and although individuals manage to cross, the local leaders deny there is any political link with the Iraqi Kurds.

Every Kurd, one suspects, has a dream of a greater Kurdistan but for the moment Iranian Kurds, perhaps 40 per cent of the total, are preoccupied with the heaven-sent opportunity to have a little more freedom in their own patch.

The vision, nevertheless, refuses to go away. For the man who as a child watched his uncle hang in Mahabad the historical perspective is clear. "First I am a Kurd," he said, "then a Muslim and last Iranian."

THE GUARDIAN Wednesday, March 7, 1979

## How Iraqi students are made to toe the Ba'athist line

Sir, — The publicity given by David Hirst to the recent activities of the Iraqi Government (February 27 and 28) is most welcome. Over the past two years, at a time when it has been making substantial and costly efforts in Britain and elsewhere to present itself as a bulwark of progress and democracy, the Iraqi Government has enacted a series of laws and undertaken a rafting of measures, which amount to the erosion of many of the most basic human rights.

One particularly pernicious area in which the government is also active at the moment is education, which is being turned into a preserve of members of the Ba'ath Party. Pressure is put on even the most moderate children to join pioneer and youth organisations affiliated to the party, and students are not admitted to institutions of higher education unless they agree to become Ba'athists.

Nearly 3,000 students were prevented from enrolling at universities last October in spite of having well above average qualifications. In contrast, 5,000 Ba'athists with qualifications below the stated requirements were admitted. The effect of this

on an already extremely deficient higher educational system can be imagined.

In addition, any student accepting a scholarship from a foreign country without the consent of the Ba'athist Revolutionary Command Council — which will not of course be given to non-Ba'athists — is liable to between five and 15 years' imprisonment.

All teachers and lecturers at educational institutions are forced into becoming members of the Ba'ath Party. They are made to sign statements pledging their loyalty to the party, and those who refuse are dismissed, as well as being imprisoned or tortured.

In December, Mosul University was invaded by the "People's Militia" and 500 students and staff were arrested, many of whom are still in prison. Staff members of other universities and institutions have been beaten up by the secret police in front of their classes.

The Guardian is doing a considerable service by bringing recent events in Iraq to the notice of a wider audience. — Yours faithfully,

Peter Sliglett,  
School of Oriental Studies,  
University of Durham,  
Durham.

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Morning Star, London

10 JAN 1979

## Iraqis accused

Masoud Barzani, son of the exiled Kurdish nationalist leader, escaped unhurt in Vienna on Monday, in what Kurdish exiles yesterday claimed was a major attempt by Iraqi secret agents. Two Kurdish refugees were shot and injured as they left a secret rendezvous with him.

demorgen  
10.1.1979

## Aanslag op zoon Koerdenleider Barzani te Wenen

WENEN (Reuter) — Twee onbekenden hebben in Wenen een poging gedaan de zoon van Koerdenleider Mustapha Barzani, een leidende figuur in Koerdistanse demokratische partij, te vermoorden. Het doelcht was kennelijk Masoud Barzani, een leidende figuur in Koerdistanse partij.

Hij bewoont een flat in een buitenwijk van Wenen. De twee onbekenden openden de voordeur en schoten volledig volledig. Barzani had daardoor schotwonden aan zijn voorhoofd.

Koerden in Wien had opgeroepen dat Barzani niet mocht worden vermoord. De politie heeft de zaak overgenomen.

Funktionarissen van de Koerdenstaanse demokratische partij reggen dat de regering van Irak gewapende agenten naar Europa heeft gestuurd om leidende Koerdenstaanse partij (KDP).

Enig politie van dat oktober om skotten avlossades na Iraks agenten om te praten met Koerdenstaanse ballingen die daar werken of studeren. De Weense politie neemt aan dat de kogels voor Barzani besteld werden.

Barzani's vrienden intussen betrokken bij de langdurige strijd die de Koerden voor hun nationale rechten in het noorden van Irak voerden. Daarna kwam in 1975 een einde toen Iran zijn militaire steun aan de opstandelingen beëindigde; Mustapha Barzani, die nu 77 jaar is, week uit naar de VS.

din's plea for an autonomous Kurdistan and will be going to Tehran with the religious leader to press the Kurds' demands. As we were leaving a young man in traditional dress came in and was introduced as the head of the "Pesh Merga" (Kurdish irregulars).

He and a 50-man unit with 20 regular soldiers run the local garrison which like most of the bases in Kurdistan is staffed with the Shah's expensive and highly lethal weaponry.

A thought that occurred to me in Mahabad, the young man carried a brand new Kalashnikov G from the party, he grimly said, and had the grip of a blacksmith.

Later, after a long journey on a mud road that snors and dips through snow-covered mountains under a peyster sky, I arrived in Baneh, a town a dozen miles from the Iranian-Turkish border.

There is also an anti-government committee, patterned on Khomeini's in Tehran, have sprung up with the same combination of local guerrillas and soldiers reporting and responsive to the Ayatollah rather than to the formal Bazargan Government.

## Clandestine

There is also the Kurdish Democratic Party founded by Ghazi Mohammad 32 years ago and above ground for the first time. Its leader, an anti-communist capitalist called Abdol-Bahram Ghazi semlou who retained claim to his four months ago after 20 years in exile in Czechoslovakia and France.

He echoes Sheikh Ezzedin's

24

TIME APRIL 1979

The revolution in Iran has been a cause for some concern in the ruling Baath Party. Its leadership is Sunni, while 52% of Iraq's 3.12 million people are Shiites. As in Iran, the military have a tradition of political activism, and there have been violent clashes between religious dissidents and the regime's 120,000-strong all-Sunni popular army. Although government corruption and mismanagement of wealth are not major issues, General Saddam Hussein runs a tough police state. dissent is ruthlessly suppressed and Iraqi jails hold thousands of political prisoners. The government's greatest worry is a revival of unrest among the 2 million Kurds who share with their ethnic cousins in Turkey and Iran a desire for autonomous Kurdistan of their own. — (Page 82)

ARAB REPORT | 14 FEBRUARY 1979

## THE KURDS Shah's fall rekindles rebel hopes

Kurdish rebel activity against Iraq's Baathist regime was suddenly ended in 1975 when Iran shut off the insurgents' supply lines. But the Kurds are as militant as ever in their demands for a genuine autonomy and many see in Iran's instability the chance to review their challenge to the repressive government.

BY AMANDA CUTHEBERT

Events in Iran are giving rise to excitement among many minorities in the Middle East. For the Kurds of Iraq it is an incentive to morale. "The Baathist regime is not as strong as the Shah," they say living in the streets of Irbil.

The Baath Party is, of necessity, weakening its grip on its critics in Iraq — Communists, Shiites and Kurds are being watched for the slightest sign of unrest. There have been frequent reports of arrests and executions of Communists who fall foul of the Baath often goes unreported.


Even opposition groups working outside Iraq, Iraq is not safe. An incident in Vienna last month focused new attention on the Kurdish population of Iraq, whose claims for autonomy have preceded successive governments with their biggest headache. One of the sons of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, near-rebel leader of the balance, especially since Iraq expelled the Kurdish rebellion for over 30 years, paid the price. In a Nahr at the request of the Shah last year Vienna Beck Street. He accused the Iraqi Government of having sent specially-trained Squads to Europe to kill Kurdish visiting delegation he would give escape route for the Iranian guerrilla forces and eliminate their leaders and eliminate their movement.

Naturally the government has little to mean autonomy, the result would be a fragmented Iraq, for if the Kurds were to get autonomy, so too should Iran's other ethnic minorities, the Turkomans, the Baluchis and the Iranian Arabs.

### Autonomy plan heavily amended

The Kurds in Iraq, who constitute approximately 25 per cent of the population, seemed near to achieving total autonomy in 1970. The two-year commissioners from Iraq on the rights to and protection of the Iranian border.

At the time, the Iranian government had established a border agreement with Barzani and the Democratic Party (KDP). The agreement offered the Kurds



Iraq have been arrested and subjected to physical and psychological torture since May 1978. According to information just received in London, thousands of Kurds have been held for several weeks and the fate of dozens of have political prisoners is still unknown. All these arbitrary acts of apparently in detention include arrest without any legal basis. Some 200,000 Kurds have been tortured, beaten, maimed, or even killed. Communist, independent or for Abul-Karim Al-Kazazi, a law student, and Sadiq, a Basra Socialist Party, have been victims.

Dozens of have political prisoners are still detained, according to latest reports, are oil workers

Yousif Iskandar, and Abu Ali, their fate being unknown.

Prominent Communists still apparently in detention include

Bashir Ismail, a carpenter, and

Saleh, a secondary school teacher, still detained, according to latest reports, are oil workers

Mohammed Amin Al-Awadi, a

lawyer, Abdul Razak Al-Kazazi, a

student, poet and artist under

arrest have also been received

in London, as have the names of

students, poets and artists under

arrest have also been received

in London, as have the names of

Dians, five kilometres north of Rawanduz,

at the beginning of December, and Digr,

in the same region, on 13 September.

Similar demonstrations took place in

the British Communist Party

recently sent a deputation to the

Iraqi embassy in London to protest

against the repression, which

is known to have included the execution of many people during

the past year.

Feature: Shah's fall rekindles rebel hopes

14 FEBRUARY 1979 | AP-AFP-PHOTO

5

# 10,000 Were tortured in Iraq

MORNING STAR January 15 1979

Troops fire on Kurdish demonstrators

Six people were killed and 38 injured during a peaceful demonstration by Kurdish deportees in the town of Haini, Arbil province (Christian Day).

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) communists and 29 January

The Kurds were protesting against the harsh conditions they were living under in "cluster villages" where they have been "resettled". The mayor of Haini, acting on orders from Baghdad, ordered

paramilitary units to open fire on the unarmed demonstrators, the communists

had been victims.

Similar demonstrations took place in

Dians, five kilometres north of Rawanduz,

at the beginning of December, and Digr,

in the same region, on 13 September.

14 FEBRUARY 1979 | ARAB REPORT

5

## Worldwide Repression growing in Iraq

MOONLIGHT

MONDAY

21

IRAQ'S ruling Baath party has continued its campaign of repression against Communists and democrats with a new wave of arrests. Leading Communists Abdal Salam Al-Nasiri, a Central Committee member, and the Communist Party's chairman of the executive committee, Dr. Ahmad Hussein Al-Tikriti, were arrested on April 30. Muhammad Karim Farhan, a member of the editorial board of Al-Fajr, Al-Jadid and Al-Hussein weekly, and another on the party's Al-Thikra monthly cultural magazine, was arrested on April 30.

The PUK has severely hit by the 1975 defeat, and Barzani was discredited as a result of his alliance with Iran and the US. Many leaders split from the party to form their own groupings, or opted out of politics altogether.

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# IRAQI 'FACES HANGING' IF HE IS DEPORTED

Sedan förra våren pågår i Irak en allt intensivare kampanj, med avrättningar, förföljelser och trakasserier mot Iraks komunistiska parti.

Bakom kampanjen står landets myndigheter som i sin tur helt kontrolleras av Baathpartiet. Förföljelserna riktar också mot kurder och mot demokrater som inte vill gå med i Baathpartiet.

Flera tusen personer har arresterats sedan i maj förra året i dena kampanj mot kommunisterna och andra demokratiska organisationer. Fortfarande finns flera tusentals kommunister fängslade.

I somras avrätrades 21 medlemmar och sympatisörer till komunistpartiet anklagade för att ha bedrivit politisk propaganda inom de vapnade styrkorna. Det är förbjudet enligt lagar för alla utom för Baathpartiet, som har monopol på politisk aktivitet inom armén.

Lagen, som har skrivits av Baathpartiet, förbjöd också därför militärer att bedriva politisk aktivitet i något annat parti än Baath. Det är också belagt med dödsstraff, liksom att försöka varva en däf i medlemmar i Baathpartiet till ett annat parti.

Med hjälp av terror, tortyr och

onsråder och där ingår bara Baathpartiet.

Året innan, 1972, hade Irak slutat en vänstervänlig och samarbetsavtal med Sovjetunionen, och strax därefter hade man nationalisering hela oljedistriktet. En relativt omfattande jordreform inleddes och en viss statsvärldshandel för kurderna planerades.

## Kritik

Efterhand har dock dessa åtgärder urholkats, menar kommunistpartiet, som grundades 1934 och som sedan länge anses vara ett av de starkaste kommunistpartierna i arabvärlden. Efter ett centralrådsbeslut i mars 1978 offentliggjordes partiet kritik mot Baathpartiets politik och framförde även avväkande synpunkter när det gällde treestrafkåren, Palestinafrågan och kurdernas nationella rättigheter, vilka partiet ansåg vara mycket dåligt tillgodosedd.

A YOUNG Iraqi tailor who has been refused political asylum in Britain fears being hanged if sent back to his country, a court heard last Friday.

"A deportation order would effectively be sentencing him to death," said Mr John Caudle, defending the 24-year-old tailor, who

lives in Camden and asked for his name not to be published for fear of his family in Iraq being fined £5 after admitting overstaying.

Markingham Street magistrate Mr St John Hammard did not recommend deportation but said the final decision was for the Secretary of State.

"From what I have read, it is

highly improbable that he will

be deported," he said, after reading a letter from the Kurdish Students Society about the tailor's reasons for wanting refugee status.

The court heard that the

tailor came to England as a tourist in June 1977, enrolled as a student and was allowed a visa extension.

He was later refused political asylum, lost an appeal and was allowed to stay only until January 18 last year.

Mr Caudle said his client came from Kurdistan in Northern Iraq and had been a party to his political beliefs. Since Kurdistan gained political independence in 1959, a number of Kurds had been beaten, imprisoned, tortured and even hanged, said the lawyer.

"His cousin and six of his

friends were hanged three or four months ago and he feels that his own life is in jeopardy."

"The tailor, who has been studying English in London, said after the hearing: "I came here as a tourist to escape. If I could, I would go back tomorrow, but I haven't got a choice."

"I am seriously in danger. There would do anything against us. We are not even allowed to speak our own language. My sister has told me not to go back or I will be killed."

The Kurds are one of the largest races in the world to be denied an independent state. Cal McCrystal of The Sunday Times reports.

## The Kurds: nation without a state



Kurdish rebels, betrayed in the past

### END REPRESSION IN IRAQ

## Kommunister och kurder förföljs

förföljelser försöker Baathpartiet att sakra sin maktsättning i landet. Förhållandet tycks vara likartat inom själva partiet där hovförlagan styrt allt mer.

### Pånyttfödelse

Baathpartiet är ett smårörligt socialistiskt parti som grundades 1947 i Syrien. Åren sedan sitter partiet, men en annan falang, vid makten. Smärre Baathpartier finns i flera arabländer. Dessa fullständiga namn är Arabiska socialistiska Baathpartiet. Baath betyder pånnyttfödelse på arabiska och det är också ett av partiers viktigaste mål, att ens hela arabvärlden — från Marocko till Saudi-Arabien — och skapa en arabisk pånnyttfödelse.

I Irak kom partiet senast till makt i en kup i september 1968. 1973 skapades en Nationell Front där Baath och kommunistpartiet ingår, men även en del mindre kurdgrupper. Kommunisterna fick nu också möjligheter att arbete legit och fick även fåva ministrar i regeringen, vilka förförande tycks sitta i kvar.

Regeringens makt är dock starkt begränsad eftersom de avgorande beslutene fattas i revolutionen.

BJÖRN AHRÉN

Baathpartiets politik har fått negativa konsekvenser inom flera av samhällslivets områden, menar kommunistpartiet, men särskilt svårt har det blivit i Kurdistans där ca en tredjedel av landets befolkning på drygt 10 milj invånare bor. Där tvångar kurder att flytta från sina hemorter och till olika bosättningar som saknar förutsättningar för att arbeta och leva, säger partiet.

### Ständiga lokaler

Det var efter att kommunistpartiet under våren 1978 hade gått ut med sin kritik, som Baathpartiet drog i gäng sin kampanj. Kommunisternas ledning, Tareek-al-Shab, får nu inte spridas framtill partiers lokaler uppges vara helt stängda.

Det blir allt mer uppbettat att Baathpartiet, eller åtminstone högerkommunister inom det, nu betraktar kommunistpartiet som ett förlitligt parti. Målet tycks vara att antingen twanga det till att hälja Baathpartiets politik, eller också att krossa det.

Iraks kommunistparti väldjar nu till den internationella solidariteten för att stoppa förföljelserna mot parti och mot alla demokratiska krafter i landet.

BJÖRN AHRÉN

When that most famous Kurd, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, marks the faintest glimmer which might grow there was consolidation in the know ledge of timing. He waited in exile in the United States until his erstwhile protector and subsequent betrayer, the Shah of Iran, was himself exiled. Then, according to some reports, given Kurds hope of autonomy. These reports suggest that Kurdish rebels are seeking

outre exile, the Ayatollah Khomeini

and another exile, the Ayatollah Khomeini, had been unjacketed by both Iran and Iraq, had –

according to some reports, given Kurds

affairs. However, he would be foolish optimist induced who would predict that even

if Khomeini's regime was willing to

grant a degree of formal local control

that would lead to the realisation of a

wilder, and already blood-spattered,

dream. Optimism has not served the Kurds so well in the past. In Iraq, where their long Barzani-led war against the Baathist regime was finally betrayed

by the 1975 peace kiss between the

Shah and Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the

Kurds had hoped that if the military

solution to the Kurdish problem bogged

down, there could always be a change of government, in Baghdad, on a drastic

and fundamental level.

The Kurds have always maintained

that the Baathist regime is detested by a vast majority of the Arabs in Iraq, so

they concentrated their hopes on a

popular rising overthrowing

the Baathist regime. These hopes have not much to stimulate them so far. Similarly, in Iran

the Kurds may be relying too much on

the Kurdish refugees in Britain, being hanged if sent back to his country, a court heard last Friday.

"A deportation order would effectively be sentencing him to death," said Mr John Caudle, defending the 24-year-old tailor, who

lives in Camden and asked for his name not to be published for fear of his family in Iraq being fined £5 after admitting overstaying.

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## The Kurds: nation



Kurdish rebels, betrayed in the past

### END REPRESSION IN IRAQ

Since the fall of Baathist rule in Iraq, the Kurds have been subjected to an increasing barrage of state nationalism, revolution and reactionary monarchist and socialist

elements. The Baathist regime has

been received by our Party organisa

tions revealing that the Iraqi gov

ernment has despatched many armed

groups to European countries to keep

surveillance on TUSA members, with

orders to assassinate its leading figures

If the KDP is still very much active

inside and outside Kurdistan, inci-

pents of varying degrees of seriousness

have been taken to KRG, and we

have done it to reawaken and swell

parallel feelings among the Kurds.

In the division of the Ottoman

Empire after the First World War the

Kurds were offered the prospect of inde-

pendence under the Treaty of Sevres of

1920. But largely as a result of the

actions of the Baathists in the Middle East, the Kurdish cause offered

but was reluctant to withhold its support for Baschir for fear of losing a

very valuable oil-rich client. Iraq was

seen as Russia's key to the Gulf and

Worthington for the Middle East

and particularly Iran. Some Kurds

are Shiites. Many are very

orthodox. They share the view of Edmund Burke: "Whenever our neighbours are on fire, it cannot be amiss to put them out."

To share the view that the successes of the engines to play a little on our own,"

recent years Iraq and Iran have been

near to full-scale war while Iran was

giving material and moral support to

the Kurdish autonomy movement in

Iran. But Iran's motives were to divert

attention from its own internal problems.

Over the past few decades a Kurdish

intelligence has been building up,

mostly in voluntary exile. Graduates from universities in the Middle East, Europe and North America. They have played an increasing role in Kurdish national movements, particularly during the conflict with Iraq. The women of Kurdish movement are generally less restricted than the women of many communists in the Middle East. They work the farms alongside their menfolk and they do not wear veils. There are active and prominent women members of the Kurdish movement in Iraq and some are in the Pesh Miera, the Kurdish army.

In Turkey, the authorities have tended to identify the Kurds have a separate ethnic identity. They are not Kurds but "Mountain Turks." Nor were Kurds in Iran encouraged directly to think of an independent state, but their

proximity to Russia gave them early

Turkish and Persian empires in one state. But, predictably, the revolt of Oberdullah of Shandurian was crushed by the coming together of Turkey and Persia to eliminate this common

geographical expression known as Kurdistan is marked as a mountainous region stretching from south-east Tur-

key across the north-eastern areas of Iraq into Syria, northern Saudi, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This area totals some 300,000 sq km — as large as France, and their populations are hard to measure.

Figures range from 10 million to 25 million. Iran is the largest, followed by Iraq, with 15,500,000-25,000,000. Syria 320,000-600,000. USSR 80,000-300,000; Lebanon 40,000-70,000. Which means the total Kurdish population is anywhere between about seven million and 16.5 million.

Most Kurds have followed Islam since the region was converted by the Arals in the seventh century AD. Today most of them belong to the Sunnis sect but in Iraq and particularly Iran, some Kurds are Shiites. Many are very poor. Kurdish villages form heretic Jewish communities, and there are small Persian and Yezidi groups who follow a form of Zoroastrianism.

contact with Soviet ideology (short-lived Soviets were set up in parts of Iran) Azerbaijan, the other the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, which from Iraq, Turkey and Syria came to form part of the Russian zone of occupation. The Kurds there were encouraged to effectively rule themselves for four years until in December 1945 they established two republics.

One was the Democratic Republic of (Iranian) Azerbaijan, the other the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. Kurds from Iraq, Turkey and Syria came to command the armed forces and the commander of the armed forces was Mullah Mustafa Barzani. But in 1946, the Russians withdrew under the Allied Treaty with Iran and the Mahabad republic soon ran into trouble. By December 1946 the Iranian army reached and occupied Tabriz, the capital of Iranian Azerbaijan. The Russians made no attempt to intervene. A US-led coalition, ending what had started out to be a unique experiment in modern Kurdish history.

The recent history of the Kurds in Iraq is more familiar. But their present plight is not relatively documented. Undoubtedly there is at least some truth in some of the allegations mentioned earlier in this article. The trouble is that frequently the Iraqi government does not bother to answer them. For the Iraqi leaders the Law for Autonomy, such Pashayi Bakr introduced in March 1974 stands as their fulfilment of a 1970 peace agreement to alleviate the injustices caused to the sons of our Kurdish people and the fraternal minorities during the dictatorial and reactionary regimes and under-chauvinistic and tyrannical policies.

But what sort of autonomy does it offer? The law which Al Bakr introduced does not specify.

In Syria, the government publicly proclaims that Kurds should be enabled to participate wholly in the development of the state by accepting up to 40% of the seats in Kurdish areas. This led to seven Syrian members of the KDP (Leader of the Red Mullah), but in fact no escape route was left for the Kurdish people.

In Syria, the government publicly proclaims that Kurds should be enabled to participate wholly in the development of the state by accepting up to 40% of the seats in Kurdish areas. This led to seven Syrian members of the KDP (Leader of the Red Mullah), but in fact no escape route was left for the Kurdish people.

Barzani was a name not title, but the warrior, except that what led to the twelve years he spent in the Soviet Union never turned him into a recruit. "I look to the US project my people," said Barzani, and it was on his return to Barzani's home town of Sulaymaniyah that he was given the honorary rank of general in the Red Army.

The Barzan district of Kurdistan is the old mould His son was born with inside the borders of Iraq, and it was the social and economic problems which deportation – though it is likely that many left the country voluntarily along with others who lived in Lebanon, as the country descended into chaos.

## Exporters turn to Iraq

The crisis in Iran is having a marked impact on Iraq: overseas exporters are paying the country far more attention than they did when business was better in Teheran. Iraq is now the second largest exporter of oil outside Saudi Arabia and with over 12 million people is a bigger potential market than the Gulf oil states.

Iraq's budget for 1979, which has increased by 27 per cent over the previous year, earmarks \$11.1bn for development, primarily in agriculture, irrigation, sewerage, housing, electricity and communications. Major emphasis will be given to the construction of low income housing and in mid-February a \$8.1m contract to build homes for 4,500 people near the Haditha dam on the Euphrates was awarded to a Canadian company. Danish firms have also shown a keen interest in the housing sector.

Major dealings with British companies are banned – a reprisal for the expulsion of Iraqi diplomats from London last summer – but the Iraqi authorities are permitting small orders of up to \$676,000. Though the US has no diplomatic relations with Baghdad, Iraqi airlines are completely supplied by Boeing Brown and Root have built a major oil terminal on the Gulf and Lummus, with West Germany's Thyssen, are working on a petro-chemical plant at Khor al Zubair.

Japan's Nippon Engineering, Marubeni, and Kawasaki have all secured contracts recently. Yugoslavia has 10,000 nationals in Iraq, working on projects worth \$2,000m. Brazil concluded a deal last month to supply \$500m worth of arms in return for Iraqi crude oil.

Meanwhile, Iraq has paid the first payments agreed by the Baghdad summit. Over \$91m has gone to Syria, \$62m to Jordan and \$14.8m to the PLO.

## An old-style nationalist



Barzani & Garibaldi, not a Geneva

In their mountain fastnesses, the eight million Kurds have usually been as and welcomed by Barzani. This would surely have given the Kurdish representation as the old class of the Scottish Highlands, government services the armed forces, but twice in this century they and universities in proportion to their population. But again, a few presidents who could, with strength in the population, bring down in principle, claim to the paper, for example following a ceasefire in February 1964 but more often brief periods, when the bombing of Kurdish villages has been regular practice.

In 1970 an agreement between Brigham and the Kurds was announced by President Ahmed Hassan el Bakr. In their mountain fastnesses, the eight million Kurds have usually been as and welcomed by Barzani. This would surely have given the Kurdish representation as the old class of the Scottish Highlands, government services the armed forces, but twice in this century they and universities in proportion to their population. But again, a few presidents who could, with strength in the population, bring down in principle, claim to the paper, for example following a ceasefire in February 1964 but more often brief periods, when the bombing of Kurdish villages has been regular practice.

"De kallar sig Al Mukhabarat," berättar "lyssnareposter" – men mest har de gjort sig kända för mord och terror.

Från Pakistan i öster till Irak, England i väster och fin tråks spionorganisation och dess medhjäljare till Bagdad-regimets motverkande och tillfänktika fiender.

"Lyssnareposten" är skräck för Säddam Hussein, och för de oppositionsgrupperna i Irak, som har förturat många av dem och praktiskt lärts verka med.

Med oljeintresset så 45 miljarder kronor per år och med Kürdistan näst sista objektet under foterna att Husein av världens mätteska och på samma gång mest okända slutsatsen huvudet.

Tack varje olefinrikorna har Bagdadregimen stabilitet i nästan annan arabisk rikedom medan världen i nationen.

Hätska rörelsen har sedan många medeltycker i hela världen, underhållit, underhållit och underhållit, underhållit och underhållit.

Men det är faktat att kurderna och deras krigare är det enda som kan få fram till en viss seger.

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Sveriges riksdagsförbund

great significance if the ruling group in Iraq were possessed of a solid social, ethnic or religious base in the country. Unfortunately for them, this is not the case. The leading state élite not only come from the Sunni minority but also, being based around Tariq, the home town of both President Bakr and Saddam Hussein, constitutes a minority within that minority.

The overwhelming majority of the Iraqi population – some 65 per cent – are Muslim Shiites. Many of them took to Khomeini as an example of a Shi'a triumph over autocratic rule. Messages from Iraqi emigre groups have been sent to the ayatollah, calling for assistance against the "Ture version of Savak." There are even those who look forward to nostalgic days of the repressive regime of Nuri al-Said, believing it to have been more benevolent than that of Saddam Hussein.

Even if the Shiites are able to square the circle and maintain good relations with the new regime in Iran, they must be extremely concerned at the outbreak of Kurdish nationalism that is already troubling the Iranian administration.

Kurds do not make any distinction between the different branches of their national movement, whether it is in Iran, Turkey or Iraq. Added to this is the discontent within the working class, formed by the growing disillusionment of the Communist Party, and, most important of all, the rising militancy of the Shi'a majority. This explosive mixture could put even more destructive pressure on the Iraqi regime than that which so effectively muted the Pahlavi dynasty.

In these circumstances it is to be expected that the Iraqi will be forced into a series of unsound alliances.

Already they have entered a security arrangement with the previously exiled Shiites. For some time they have been making overtures to the US which probably have come at the time when

Iran's foreign policy – which ended with the call for organic unity with Syria, member Russia, nor the USSR was internationally threatened by events in Iran. However, one government that must be facing this is the Iraqi Baathist Regime. With a somewhat lack of justification, it has been accused of being autocratic and responsible, due to its foreign policy and – in particular interests in the Kremlin. Even so, whatever distresses the great powers may experience from the upset in long-established global formulas, the feed with Yasser Arafat, which left many dead men all over the world, was not such.

Today, Washington, with no

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# Wien: Im wilden Kurdistan

Die Hintergründe des Mordanschlags auf den Kurdenführer Masoud Mustafa Barzani (Seite 10)

WOCHENPRESSE

Nr. 3 17. Januar 1972

TITELGESCHÄFT

Seite 10

Wortes Kurdistan im tiefsten Meidling.

Montag, 8. Jänner, eine halbe Stunde vor Mitternacht. Ort der Handlung: eine Zinskaserne in der Pöhlgasse im 12. Wiener Gemeindebezirk. Eine Gruppe dunkelhaariger Männer verläßt das Haus. Zwei gehen voraus, vorsichtig um sich blickend. Da kracht aus einem vor dem Haus geparkten roten Fiat eine Salve von Schüssen aus automatischen Waffen.

Die beiden „Späher“ brechen schwer verwundet zusammen. Der Fiat braust mit aufheulendem Motor davon.

Kurz darauf sind Rettung und Funkstreife zur Stelle. Die beiden Verwundeten werden ins Spital gebracht. (Zum Wochenende befanden sich bereits außer Lebensgefahr.)

Der Exekutive wird sofort klar, daß es sich um einen politischen Anschlag handelt. Die Opfer sind Flüchtlinge aus dem irakischen Kurdistan. Ein Verdächtiger wird angeblich der Polizei übergeben. Zwei Stunden später erinnern nur noch die Einschlußstellen an der Hauswand an den nachtlichen Spuk.

Ziel des Anschlags war der 32jährige Kurdenführer Masoud Barzani, 32, Vater von vier Kindern und Sohn des legendären Kurdenhäuptlings Mullah Mustafa Barzani, der Jahrzehntlang den Kampf seines Volkes gegen die irakische Fremdherrschaft geführt hatte. Der letzte große Kurdenaufstand war 1975 zusammengebrochen, nachdem der Schah seine einstigen Schützlinge („Die Kurden sind der reine Stamm der arabischen Völkerfamilie“), hatte Mohammed Reza Pahlavi noch ein Jahr zuvor bei seinem Besuch in Wien erklärt an die Irakis „verkauft“ hatte.

Heute lebt Mullah Mustafa Barzani, an schwerem Lungenkrebs leidend, in den Vereinigten Staaten. Sein Sohn Masoud blieb bei dem Anschlag vom 8. Jänner, dank des Muttes seiner Freunde, unverletzt. Am vergangenen Donnerstagabend saß er der WOCHENPRESSE gegenüber.

## Wie in einem Thriller

Das Treffen war in der Manier eines Agententhrillers zustande gekommen. Um 21 Uhr am Donnerstagabend läutete in der Redaktion der WOCHENPRESSE das Telefon. „Mein Name ist Asis“, meldete sich eine Stimme in gutem, aber nicht akzentfreiem Deutsch. „Sie wollten unseren Führer, Herrn Barzani, sprechen. Ich kann Sie zu ihm führen.“

„Wo sollen wir einander treffen?“

„In einer halben Stunde vor der Oper.“

„Draußen ist es sehr kalt. Treffen wir einander lieber in der Jonas-Grotte.“

„Dort sind zu viele Leute. Also vor der Oper.“

„Wie erkennen ich Sie?“

„Ich werde die Zeitung „Le Monde“ in der Hand halten.“

„Gut, Sie erkennen mich an der WOCHENPRESSE.“

Asis ist pünktlich zur Stelle. Er entpuppt sich als freundlicher junger Mann, der nicht nur den „Monde“, sondern ein ganzes Bündel von Zeitungen mit sich trägt. (Mit den Berichten über den Anschlag.)

Von der Oper geht die Fahrt nach Meidling. Nicht in die Pöhlgasse, sondern in eine Seitenstraße hinter der Stadtbahnstation Meidlinger Hauptstraße. Im dritten Stock eines modernen Hauses warten fünf stämmige Kurden auf den Besucher. „Wir sind Freunde Barzans“, versichern sie, „nicht Leibwächter!“ Und: „Wir tragen im Ausland niemals Waffen. Wir sind keine Terroristen.“

Wenige Minuten später betrifft Barzani das Zimmer, ein kleiner Mann mit geweittem schwarzen Haar. Alle erheben sich höflich. Über süßen Tee, in gläsernen Stampfern serviert („Eine kurdische Spezialität“), schildert der Kurdenführer den Verlauf und die Hintergründe des Anschlages vom 8. Jänner.

In Verirrung seines Vaters versucht Masoud Barzani humanitäre Hilfe für seine Land Leute zu mobilisieren. „Politisch hilft uns kein Land. Wir sind froh, wenn wir humanitäre Hilfe erhalten.“

In Wien befindet sich der Kurdenführer, der Österreich am vergange-



Mullah Mustafa Barzani während des letzten Kurdenaufstandes: Wildost in Meidling

Irak, sondern von allen Ländern der Region verweigert. Nach Angaben aus Ankara gibt es überhaupt keine Kurden in der Türkei, sondern nur „Bergtürken“. Im Iran arbeiteten vergangene Regierungen mit Zuckerbrot und Peitsche, je nachdem, wie sehr oder wie wenig man die Unterstützung der Kurden benötigte. Als Reaktion auf den „Verrat“ von 1975 stehen die persischen Kurden heute im Lager der Gegner des Schahs, erwarten sich aber keine Besserung von diesen potentiellen Nachfolgern. Besonders für den Schatten Khomeini zeigen die sunnitischen Kurden wenig Sympathie.

Als Realist fordert Masoud Barzani von den Irakis keinen eigenen Staat, sondern lediglich eine echte und garantierte Autonomie. Eine Autonomie, die den Kurden einen Teil des Orients ihres Landes sichern würde.

Auf höherer Ebene beanspruchen die Kurden jedoch nationales Selbstbestimmungsrecht. Barzani: „Alle sprechen vom Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Palästinenser. Warum nicht vom Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Kurden?“

Trotz des gewaltigen Drucks von außen — oder vielleicht gerade deswegen — blieben die Kurden von politischen Spaltungstendenzen nicht verschont. Nahostexperten sind sich jedoch darüber einig, daß Barzans „Demokratische Partei Kurdistans“ die überwältigende Mehrheit der Bevölkerung vertritt.

Behauptungen, seine Partei sei kommunistisch unterwandert, weist er empört zurück. „Wir sind eine unabhängige Partei, deren Programm auf Gerechtigkeit und Demokratie ruht. Auf keinen Fall wollen wir zum Spielball fremder Staaten und Ideologien werden.“

Tatsächlich ist die Partei weder links noch rechts, sondern national-kurdisch.

Nicht alle Mitglieder des Barazaniklans sind dieser Meinung. Masouds eigner Bruder Obedullah ist vor einiger Zeit zu den Irakis übergegangen. „Das Leben eines Kämpfers war ihm zu hart“, strafft ihn Masoud mit Verachtung.

Für die kurdische Bewegung sei sein Abfall indes bedeutungslos. „Wir sind kein Familienbetrieb. Jeder Kurde, der für sein Land kämpft, ist ein echter Sohn Mustafa Barzans.“

Bekämpft wird die „Demokratische Partei Kurdistans“ auch von einer Splittergruppe, der „Patriotischen Union“ des kurdischen Politikers und ehemaligen irakischen Ministers Jalal Talabani. Auch für ihn hat Masoud nur ein zynisches Lächeln: „Er kooperierte jahrelang mit der irakischen Regierung. Dann mit den Türken und Persern.“

Trotz dieser Gegensätze glaubt Masoud Barzani nicht, daß der Anschlag auf sein Leben von rivalisierenden Kurden durchgeführt wurde. „Das war der irakische Geheimdienst. Darüber besteht für mich kein Zweifel.“


Er bedauert lediglich, daß das Attentat die österreichische Bevölkerung, „die soviel für kurdische Flüchtlinge getan hat“ (in der Bundeshauptstadt leben rund 120 Kurden), beunruhigt haben könnte. „Dafür möchte ich mich durch Ihre Zeitung entschuldigen.“

LUCIAN O. MEYSELS

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David Hirst, in the first of two reports, examines the pragmatic terrorism wielded by Baghdad's rulers

## After the Shah: How do Iraq's Ba'athists survive?

"Which state will be next after Iran?" asked a jubilant Yasser Arafat was asked at his press conference in Tehran last week. If he had replied, "Egypt," no one would have been particularly surprised. Many of those who describe themselves as "revolutionaries" or "progressives" now ritually forecast the approaching doom of "the Egyptian Shah" (as the far-from progressive Sudanese Opposition leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, was the first to dub him).

It requires no great insight to see that the collapse of his most powerful ally in the Middle East is a grievous blow to President Sadat's own movement and its leader. But Arafat contented himself with a platitude: "As with the Iranians themselves, it is the people who will decide."

The evasion was more than mere tact. It is a part of that language of nuance and indument which, especially these days, means so much more than official postures, however emphatically espoused. By so jettisoning the most shrill of anti-Sadat abuse, Arafat was signalling that there are others, perhaps ostensible allies of the moment, who are just as close to the abyss as Sadat is.

After the Baghdad summit last November, neither Palestinians, Syrians nor even the PLO could openly try to answer the question which everyone is privately asking. But few would strenuously dispute the private answer that if any country has all the makings of the next domino, it is Iraq.

If mere survival is the prime

gimes, none has proved itself readier to go to extremes of repression and pragmatism to ensure survival than that of Iraqi Ba'athists. In their 11-year rule they have had their ups and downs, and in periods of relative security they have made as little as possible to ease their iron grip.

After the diabolical but abortive plot, in June, 1973, of Nazim Kzar, the Beria of Baghdad, there came semi-official admissions that "embarrassing mistakes" — Kzar's liquidations and assassinations — had been made. The Ba'athist strongman, Saddam Hussein Takriti, ordered the execution of Kzar in the Palace of the End. But the Ba'athists have rarely felt more insecure than they do today. It is, therefore, no surprise that repression and pragmatism are asserting themselves with a vengeance.

That the scale of the repression is only now beginning to filter through to the outside

### Some victims are the people closest to their oppressors

world is, at least in part, because of the self-restraint of some of its victims, for they are the very people who, officially at least, are closest to their persecutors. According to a secret memorandum which the Ba'athists delivered to the Iraqi Communist Party in September, 1978, it — along with three lesser groupings — is entitled to "complete freedom to work, organise and express

themselves in the Democratic Movement

in Europe. According to one,

heard in the Democratic

Movement, which is the princi-

pal expression of most Arab re-

gionists, it does not want to

make more enemies in the diplomatic

Arab world, it is already on the

verge of being persecuted, with

that in recent years the Iraqi

Ba'athists have been moving

more and more away from that

progressive character which

they initially adopted in the

Communist framework, which

they have always claimed

to have. In their own way, then

Sadat's American-like slogan

that the Shah would prevail

against Arafat, Khomeni

and the like, has been

more and more adopted by

Communist parties in the

Arab world, and even by

some of the Arab

Communists themselves.

No sooner had they expelled

him from his sanctuary in

Kuwait than Saddam Hussein

personally secured

Iranian support for his

own coup d'état.

It is, however, not only

the Communists who

have adopted this policy

of pragmatism, but also

the Arab Nationalists

and the like. They too

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# The Iranian warning to the Arab world

**Most Arab regimes are alarmed by the convulsions in Iran. DAVID HURST reports**

WHATEVER the United States' specific purpose in sending a squadron of F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia's purpose in receiving them, the show of solidarity highlights a fact of world history: Saudi Arabia, once a kingdom in name, now a kingdom in name only, in both its strength and its weakness, is almost alone in being aware of the united will of its neighbours to let it be known that it would tolerate no threat to the integrity of the Saudi kingdom itself.

There is no such direct threat to the kingdom today. But, of course, here little has been lost between the two monarchies. Saudi Arabia has resent the tauntly superior strength of its neighbour and its readiness, as the self-styled "guardian of the Gulf", to strike at will against those who would threaten the downfall of the Shah. There has, however, been little love lost between the two monarchies. Saudi Arabia has in the path of an approaching force, like the West, making the last series of its battles in the Persian Gulf, turned its back on the West and turned to the East, to the arch-conservative regime on one side of the water saw in its Persian counterpart in the other, mightily dismaying all its religious believers, stand with the atheistic Shah against the "religious" movement in Iran.

Strangely, because no government has more anti-democratic elements in its ranks, the Shah and Afghanistan are bound to exploit chaos in Iran to further their present of dictatorship, although, as the Shah daily "how all real supporters, believers or self-styled believers, stand with the atheistic Shah against the religious movement in Iran".

Strangely, because no government has more anti-democratic elements in its ranks, the Shah and Afghanistan are bound to exploit chaos in Iran to further their present of dictatorship, although, as the Shah daily "how all real supporters, believers or self-

strengthening, in the last few days, the show of support from the army, engaged on the frontiers and in the interior, has been almost complete. Saudi-backed royalists in Iraq will greatly affect their own future.

Not since 1963 has the United States made such a gesture. Its purpose, like the show of solidarity, highlights a fact of world history: Saudi Arabia, once a kingdom in name, now a kingdom in name only, in both its strength and its weakness, is almost alone in being aware of the united will of its neighbours to let it be known that it would tolerate no threat to the integrity of the Saudi kingdom itself.

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Keiner gehorcht

Die Kurden, eines der ältesten Völker im Mittleren Orient, seit Jahrhunderten in Freiheitskämpfe verstrickt, hoffen jetzt auf Autonomie.

**A**us dem Irak, aus der Türkei waren sie nach Persien gekommen, legten und illegal, um ihren letzten Kämpfer in Eschnioje zur letzten Ruhe zu betten. Hunderte kurdische Geiselle, Tausende Männer, Frauen und Kinder.

Lautes Wenktagen und Gesänge gleiteten die Zeremonie bei Sonnenuntergang, selbst die Männer in ihren literisch bunten Trachten weinten.

Dann beschwore er die Trauernde „Beseitigt eure Differenzen, und vereinigt alle Kräfte, um unser Ziel zu langen.“ Überall wo Kurden leben, heißt das Ziel zumindest Selbstbestimmung und kulturelle Autonomie. Doch zuoberst prangt das Traumziel: freies Kurdistan.

Seit der Schiitenführer Ayatollah Chomeini dem Schreckensregime des Schah-in-Schah ein Ende gesetzt hat, keimte in den drei kurdischen Provinzen des Iran — Urmia, Kurdistan und Kermanschah — die Hoffnung, nun auch die Unterdrückung der ethnischen Minderheit aufhöre, die zudem auch noch zu 75 Prozent dem sunnitischen Islam anhängt.

Das Shah-Regime hatte sich stets geweigert, die Kurden als eigene Völker anzuerkennen. Die kurdische Sprache war als Amts- und Schulsprache abgeschafft. Weit mehr als andere Gegenden des Iran waren Kurdengebiete wirtschaftlich unterentwickelt. Ein großer Teil der Bevölkerung lebt von der Landwirtschaft.

ein Zehntaches unter dem Gesamt-  
Irans. Und sie waren stärker militäri-  
siert. Das Volk wurde streng kontrol-  
liert, der Aufenthalt jedes Fremden  
mußte beim Bürgermeister oder bei  
der Gendarmerie angemeldet werden.

war. Barsani wurde einer von vier ost-Gruppe von einer haben Million. Len kurdischen Armeegenerälen der neuen diglich die Sowjet-Union, die Ihnen i Republik und Verteidigungsminister. der Republik Aserbaidschan lebende Gegen die Zusicherung, sie würden Kurden kulturelle Autonomie gewährleisten an den persischen Ölvorkommen be gibt ihre Zahl mit 89 000 glaubwürdig teiligt, räumten die Sowjets wenige an!

60 000 Kinder der Kurden-Region erhalten überhaupt keinen Unterricht, weil Lehrer fehlen. Die Analphabetenrate in der Türkei liegt insgesamt bei 43 Prozent, unter den Kurden jedoch bei 75 Prozent.

Nachdem der Schah Persien verlassen hatte, war eine Reihe exilierter Kurdenführer in den Iran geeilt. Und kaum war Barsani unter der Erde, da stellten die Kurden das neue Regime des Ayatollah Chomeini auf seine bis-

Monate später die besetzten Gebiete, und die persische Regierung entsandte Reichtes Truppen nach Mahabad — angeblich, blüthen um die im ganzen Kaiserreich stattfindenden Wahlen zu sichern.

General Barsani trautte dem Frieden nomie zu

Seit dem Zerfall des Osmanischen Reiches zu Beginn dieses Jahrhunderts trümmerte Unabhängigkeit kurdische Träume, und in der Tat sicherte Ihnen der Vertrag von Sèvres 1920 Autonomie.

Eine kleine gebildete Schicht der nachwachsenden Kurden-Generation liest deshalb Lenin und Mao, und nicht wenige, die von „Azadi bo Kurdistan“ Freiheit für Kurdistan, träumen, wollen einen Befreiungskampf nach anglo-

In Sarandsadsch, der Hauptstadt der Provinz Kurdistan, kam es zu tagelangen blutigen Gefechten zwischen kurdischen Kriegern und Revolutionstruppen Chomeinis, nachdem die sich geweigert hatten, den Kurden Munition lang gefährlichste Belastungsprobe.

nicht, er setzte sich mit 500 Kriegern in die Sowjet-Union ab.

Den anrückenden persischen Mili- tärs ging aber Ghasi Mohammed am 16. Dezember 1946 mit seinen Ministrern und Beamten nach Sitz des Landes bis vor die Tore der Stadt entgegen, Kurden der Türkei. Als Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, der Vater der modernen Autonomie der Kurden keine Rech-

Das bittere Erwachen traf zuerst die Kurden der Türkei. Ihre Sprache wurde verboten, s

„Für die türkischen Kurden“, meint der Frankfurter Schriftsteller Jürgen Roth, der vor gut zwei Jahren bei Recherchen für die Gefangenенhilfsorganisation Amnesty International in Kurdistan festgenommen wurde,

nach offiziellen, 500 nach inoffiziellen Berichten, die Zahl der Verletzen ging in die Hunderte. Ein Arzt: „Ein Idiot, wer das hier nicht vorausgesehen hat.“

um sie zu begrüßen. Die Kurden wurden offiziell nur noch „Bergrücken“ genannt. Aufstände in den Jahren 1925, 1930 und 1936/37, die Hundertausende Kurden das Leben kosteten ausgerufen worden war, öffentlich ge- nahmen Atatürks Truppen zum Anlaß

„scheint die Zeit vorbei, wo sie gelähmt auf die Aktivitäten der irakischen Kurden schauen.“

Zunächst drohte die provisorische Regierung in Teheran, sie werde den Aufstand der Kurden „erbarmungslos“ niederschlagen, dann jedoch entsandte sie den Innenminister Hadsch-Sajad Dschawadi sowie einen der höchsten Geistlichen, Ajatollah Taleghani, in die autonome Provinzhauptstadt.

Kein Jahr hatte dieser Kurdenstaat überdauert — das erste und einzige kurdische Staatsgebilde eines der ältesten Völker der Erde, das in sumerischen Schriftfunden zum ersten Mal 23000 vor Christus erwähnt wird. Obwohl kulturell verbunden durch

neuk. die Region nachhaltig zu verwüsten.

Wenn auch der derzeitige sozialdemokratische Ministerpräsident Büller Ecevit in einem SPIEGEL-Gespräch schon von „Kurden“ statt von „Berlin-türken“ spricht, hat sich an der Situation der Kurden seit Ataturk doch nicht viel geändert.

die schließliche Niederlage für General Barzani — all das hat den Kampfgeist der irakischen Kurdenkrieger, „Peshmerga“ (Vor uns der Tod), nicht brechen können.

Immer häufiger in letzter Zeit strahlte die „Stimme Kurdistans“ (5900 Kilometer auf dem 10 Meter Band) mit

So wenige Tage vor der Volksabstimmung über Chomeinis „Islamische Republik“, brauchten die neuen Herren einen Waffenstillstand, und den er wirkten sie, indem sie den Kurden einen „semi-autonomen“ Status, „ähnlich wie in den USA“, zusicherten.

Obwohl Kulturen verbündet durch nicht sehr viel geändert. Ihre Sprache und sozial zusammengehörende Freiheitskämpfe gegen Mongolen, Türken und Perser, blieben die Kurden doch immer zersplittert in Fürstentümer und Stämme. „Die Kurdenstämme“, berichtete schon eine alte dendronik, „halten untereinander Überfälle der paramilitärischen Spättruppe, der „Jandarmas“, Folter und Vergewaltigungen kurdisch-frauen und Kinder durch Türkinnen — vielfach belegt. Feudalistische Verhältnisse — in über 800 Dörfern herrschte Agas immer noch gibt es Leit- eigene — und gezielte wirtschaftlich

heit aus dem 49-Meter-Band wieder Meldungen aus wie diese vom 23. Februar: „Heute mittag um 12.30 Uhr haben unsere tapferen Kämpfer einer Polizeistation der irakischen Faschisten in Birkama überfallen. Während des einstündigen Kampfes wurden drei Soldaten getötet und 15 weitere verletzt.“

1958, nach General Kassims Putsch

stillstand aufgebaut auf einem allzu  
vagen Versprechen, kann nicht lange halten. Denn Kurden wissen aus leid-  
voller Erfahrung, was sie von der Zusis-  
chertung einer Autonomie zu halten ha-  
ben, vor allem die Kurden in Iranisch-  
Kurdistan.

Unter dem Schutz der Sowjet-Union,  
die seit Herbst 1941 Nordpersien be-  
setzt hielt, wurde dort am 23. Januar

nicht zusammen; keiner will dem ande-  
ren gehorchen und untertan sein.“  
Bis heute siedeln die Kurden von den  
Taurusausläufern im Westen der Türkei kommen —  
bis zum iranischen Hochplateau im kurdischen Osten, vom biblischen Berg Ararat im  
Norden bis zu den Ebenen Mesopota-  
mien im Süden: ein Territorium von  
fast doppelter Größe der Bundesrepu-  
blik, mit wahrscheinlich an die 16  
Mio. Einwohnern. „Von hier aus“, er-  
klärt Hämäläinen, „wollen wir nicht  
nur dort, wo die finanziellen Aufwen-  
dungen dem Westen der Türkei zugute-  
kommen — prägen nach wie vor die  
Regionen Anatoliens.“

gegen die Haschemiten-Monarchie war Mustafa Barsani nach zwölfjährigem Exil aus der Sowjet-Union in seine irakische Heimat zurückgekehrt. Anfängliche Autonomieversprechungen Kassins wurden nicht eingehalten. Unruhen in kurdischen Gebieten bei antwortete Kassim 1961 mit Bombenangriffen.

1946 die kurdische Republik von Mahabad ausgerufen. Zum Präsidenten gewählt wurde der oberste religiöse Richter in Mahabad, Ghazi Mohamed. Der hieß bald darauf den Mustafa Barsani willkommen, der mit 30000 Kämpfern vor den irakischen und britischen Truppen stand.

Millionen Menschen. Gern geben die be herrschenden Staaten geringere Zahlen an.

Das gilt für die Türkei, wo acht Millionen Kurden leben, für den Iran mit fast fünf ein halb Millionen, für Syrien mit seiner politisch unbedeutenden Bevölkerung müssen bis zu 150 Kilometer laufen oder reisen, um einen Arzt zu finden. Die Hälfte aller Kinder stirbt, bevor sie in die Schule gehen könnten.

er nächsten Jahre mehr Anteil in den Administrativen bekamen und — auf dem Papier — kulturelle Rechte genießen sollten, wechselten immer neue Versprechungen mit immer neuen Vertragsbrüchen von Seiten der ebenso häufig wechselnden Herrscher in Bagdad.

dad. Attentatsversuche auf Barsani, Verhaftungen, Verschleppungen und Ermordung von Kurden schufen neue Feindschaft.

In einer Washingtoner Klinik, wo er sich einer Krebsbehandlung unterzog, hatte der 76jährige Barsani ein knappes Jahr vor seinem Tod verkündet, sein größter Fehler sei gewesen, den USA zu vertrauen. Denn auf dem Höhepunkt seiner kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen mit den überlegten, gerüsteten irakischen Streitkräften hatte er Geld und Waffen von der CIA und von Schah von Persien genommen, um innere Unruhe im Staat der Baath-Sozialisten zu erzeugen.

Am 6. März 1975 ereignete sich, was von den Kurden als der „Dolchstoß des Schah“ bezeichnet wird. Auf der Opec-Konferenz in Alger fielen sich der Schah und der stellvertretende Vorsitzende des irakischen Revolutionskomitees, Saddam Hussein, in die Arme, nachdem sie ihnen alten Grenzstreit auf dem Rücken der Kurden beigelegt hatten. Vertragspunkte waren:

▷ Der Schah erhält Schiffahrtsrechte auf dem Schatt el-Arab und damit

Militeren

Torsdag 15 februari 1979

ANHÄFTENSKRIFT

# Vad ska nu häända?

AUPER WENDEL  
Ulfhållningspolisen.  
levade oss att de uppgifter  
vi lämnade skulle vara  
hemliga.  
— Min slaktningar och  
vänner kan räka mycket  
lätt ut om dessa uppger  
lämnats vidare till den  
hemliga polisen i Irak.  
Det siger en kurisk  
flykting, som är mycket  
örlig efter avslöjandet  
om att chechen för utilin-  
nespolisen sätts upp gif-  
ter till en iransk agent.  
Han är 30 år gammal. För tre  
år och ett halvt år sedan kom

han till Sveriges tillståndsmannsmed  
sin hustru och sön två barn, med  
norr Irak. Han var också aktiv i  
den kurdiske befriningsfronten. Men han blev förföljd. Någon  
ärav honom för den fruktade  
hemligpolisen.

Han har räddat för att dessa  
uppger lämnats vidare till den  
hemliga polisen i Irak. Kanike  
har handat i politiken. Så han  
var varförd, ble omvänt  
bombar av irakiska militärplan.

Ljekedrägt  
till Sverige

Familjen som är radikal för re-  
pressionsrätten har dömts till  
fängelse för drygt 12 års tids-  
sum när vi kom hit, säger man-

nen. PA Arlanda ansökte vi om  
politisk asyl.  
Som vi lämnade sållt att alla uppgifter  
som vi lämnade skulle vara  
hemliga. Därför berättade jag att både  
är nu också att jag inte kan  
svara om mina vänner i Irak  
berättar om mina vänner i Irak.

När jag räddat för att dessa  
uppger lämnats vidare till den  
hemliga polisen i Irak. Kanike  
tarde nu hämmad på mina slaktin-  
gungsföräldrar till Sverige.

Han berättar att den hemliga  
polisen i Irak krog bröderna ett  
par minuter efter det att han  
dannat sitt uppdrag till dem

iranska utländingspolisen.  
Först polisjästarna som har  
kontroll över politiken i Iran är politi-  
ska utländingspolisen.

— Det är fruktansvärt att en

svensk polisjästare som har  
kontroll över politiken i Iran är politi-  
ska utländingspolisen.

— Många kurder har flytt från

Irak sedan 1973 då kurdernas

uppdrag under ledning av Barzani

är nu över 150 000 kurder i Irak

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# IRAQ

## Massacre and Torture continues

One Middle East dictatorship may have crumbled this year, in Iran, but in neighbouring Iraq the government campaign of terror has been stepped up.

The ruling Ba'ath Party has embarked on a course of executing, torturing and imprisoning all those opposed to it.

Many trade unionists are among those who have been arrested. In Britain, a Campaign Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq has been formed to mobilise support for the Iraqi people. Sponsored by Labour M. P.'s including Joan Maynard, Dennis Skinner, Frank Allsop, Stan Thorne, Martin Flannery, and Dennis Canavan it is also supported by Welsh Miners leader Emlyn Williams, AUEW TASS Secretary Ken Gill, Scottish TUC General Secretary James Milne and Alex Kitson of the T. G. W. U.

This special report by Mr. C. Fayed gives an informed viewpoint on the situation in his country.



Although overshadowed by the events of the Iranian revolution that has overthrown the despotic and extremely repressive Shah's regime, there has been a host of reports from newspapers and radiobroadcasts in this and other countries for more than a year now revealing the campaign of executions, torture and persecution waged in Iraq.

The Iraqi Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party which controls the political power, with its security apparatus has waged this action against thousands (more than 10,000) of democrats, independents, and communists although the main target has been and still is the Iraqi Communist Party (its organisations, supporters, masses and its press).

Arbitrary arrests, barbaric physical and psychological torture physical liquidation of communists and their supporters, democrats and patriots, Arabs, Kurds and other national minorities.

All this is part of a concerted, hidious and escalating campaign for which the Ba'ath Party leadership is responsible and which constitutes a flagrant violation of the basic human, civil and political rights and to every manifestation of democracy.

In a vicious campaign to impose its 'Ba'ath national socialist ideology' and 'absolute loyalty to the Ba'ath revolution' 38 patriots have been executed in May 1978 and there is real danger of further executions.

Although sharp changes of ideological and political stances are not uncommon with petit-bourgeoisie parties and forces, wide circles of the world public opinion - democrats, progressives and communists - have followed with shock and anger this savage campaign of terror and repression.

They have also been asking 'Why is the sudden changes of the course by the ruling Ba'ath Party in Iraq, a country in the Middle East which was following the road of social progress resolutely against imperialism and reaction?

To deal with the question of the so sudden changes in the course of the Ba'ath Party, it has to be emphasised:

Firstly: That in Iraq's society, as in some other countries of the so-called Third World, where the tasks of the national democratic revolution are to be solved through pursuing the road of the anti-imperialism, deep socio-economic transformations, there is a complicated process of class differentiation and class polarization.

Secondly: That anti-imperialist

and to a certain extent anti-capitalist measures cannot be pursued irreversibly and consistently without establishing an active alliance between the working class, the peasantry, progressive intellectuals, the petit-bourgeoisie in town and progressive elements within the nation bourgeoisie.

The alliance between the working class and the peasantry represents the main driving force and this class alliance is reflected politically through a Front that includes the political vanguard of these classes and social strata, based upon an anti-imperialist, revolutionary and democratic programme.

Thirdly: That the fundamental and basic condition for this Front to be established, let alone to be active and of solid mass base, is the ideological, political and organisational independence of its constituent parties.

Interconnected with this is the important question of the political democracy, i.e. democracy for the people, for the working class, peasants and all the toilers and their trade unions and organisations, for the progressive parties and forces (in the decision making process) which participate in such a Front and uphold the aims of its programme and struggle for the socialist future.

Also, the establishment of a national assembly after general elections in the conditions of complete political freedom, the preparation of a draft constitution and submitting it to the elected national assembly for discussion and approval, the removal of the extraordinary laws, penal codes and the establishment of constitutional, legislative, and executive institutions and the implementation of the formula of local government and elected people's councils in all administrative units in Iraq.

*Straight Left, June 1979*

The above quotations were agreed upon and written in the programme of the Front. The National Action Charter signed in July 1978 after more than a year of dialogue between the Iraqi Communist Party and the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party.

Political democracy - as democratic freedoms and rights and as a system of government - provides the necessary condition to unfold the energies of the people it is one of the main weapons of defending the achieved people's gains (along the road of social progress) and their further development, and also in dealing resolutely with the schemes and intrigues of imperialism and internal reaction.

Fourthly: the importance of strengthening the relations with the socialist community in general and with the Soviet Union in particular, as a reflection of the alliance of world socialism with the contemporary national liberation movement.

This alliance may assume various forms. And also the importance of strengthening relations with the forces of peace and progress, especially the working class movement in the advanced capitalist countries. Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie.

In Iraq, the class struggle was and still is intensifying in the fields connected with the above mentioned fields, for while the working class grew numerically and qualitatively because of the rapid economic development (mainly because of the multiple increases in oil revenues, which constitute 80% of the net national income), the parasitic bourgeoisie (merchants, speculators and large estate owners) and bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the state apparatus have also increased considerably their influence.

Together with the rural bourgeoisie (capitalist relations of production have and still are flourishing in the countryside) they constituted the social base for counter-revolution.

These (old and new) reactionary forces were trying their best in the conditions of retreats from the road of social progress and absence of political democracy (let alone in the conditions of savage repression organised and directed by the Ba'ath Party leadership) to put Iraq along the road capitalist development and appendage to imperialism.

Although the state sector in Iraq constitutes 77.2% in the formation of fixed capital (1976 statistics) and 74% in that of the local output the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie overtakes the cream of the sector and take not less than 10% of the contracts value with the multi-nationals (mainly U.S. West German, French, and Japanese) as Commissions.

The multi-nationals are currently executing 86.5% of the development programme in Iraq.

Taking into account that leading cadres of the Ba'ath Party are at the head of the state enterprises, it could be imagined what role this bourgeoisie can play inside the Ba'ath Party at the highest level.

With the deepening of class differentiation and polarisation in society one could also imagine its effect on the social composition of the Ba'ath Party, on its ideological and political stands, as this bourgeoisie is against the demands for democratisation of the social and political life of the country. It is also fiercely anti-communist.

In the technological field, there was and still is escalation in the imports from advanced capitalist countries for the economic projects and regarding 'western technology' as the only one suitable for Iraq. Also, impelling the socialist countries which co-operate with Iraq in establishing economic projects to import specific parts for those projects from the advanced capitalist countries, and replacement of the technological hardware which have been imported from the socialist countries with those from the advanced capitalist countries.

This contrast would consolidate the growing internalising of the Iraqi economy with that of world capitalism. (i.e. imports from capitalist countries amounted to 77% and from socialist countries 11% in 1976).

There are 296 contractors (of a total of about 5,000), the contract value of each is between 21.5 million to 36.5 million, and have strong relations with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the state power and the royal bourgeoisie. Their field

of activities is a fertile soil for corruption and despotism; and obviously they are strongly for Iraq to follow the road of capitalist development and vehemently against any manifestation of real political democracy in the country.

Taking into account also that the private sector was (and still is) rapidly growing in estates, contract agriculture and industrial production at the expense of the state sector, especially in the years 1977 and 1978, the conclusion is clear that contrary to the Ba'ath Party's social demagogic, Iraq is not building socialism, as the measures which have been taken by the Ba'ath leadership through its 'Revolutionary Command Council' (the latter rules by decree) run opposite to the pursuance of the road of social progress to say the least.

The Ba'ath Party's statements and propaganda try to give a picture that each of the political parties constituting the Front work in a democratic atmosphere. In reality the Ba'ath Party calls for 'single ideology' and 'absolute loyalty' let alone arresting, torturing to death, harassing and massacring members and supporters of another political party in the Front - i.e. The Iraqi communist Party, contrary to and in flagrant violation of the National Action Charter which emphasized the mutual respect of ideological, political and organisational independence of the parties of the Front, and also extreme violation of the fundamental human, civil and political rights.

They have imposed so-called laws that are especially notorious, whereby the punishment by death would be for anyone who:

1. Joins the Ba'ath Party having concealed any previous membership of other parties and organisations, or relationships with other parties or organisations.

2. Leaves the Ba'ath Party in order to join another party or organisation.

3. Attempts to persuade a member or former member of the Ba'ath Party to join another party or to adopt the ideology of another party.

4. Among military personnel retiring or leaving the army for any other reason, after July 17, 1968 to have a political relationship with any party other than the Ba'ath Party; this is retroactive from July 1968.

### New Legal Provisions.

These New Legal Provisions in Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, (together with the torture centres) which have been put into practice and led to torturing to death and executions of people, trade unionists, peasants, teachers, students, retired soldiers and junior army officer are not the only 'laws in Iraq to-day. There is a law prohibiting the setting up of vocational and democratic mass organisations, except ones belonging to the Ba'ath Party, and specifying harsh penalties against whoever joins vocational democratic organisations are permitted by the authorities.

The life of Kamal Shakir, the Gen. Secretary of the Iraqi Democratic Youth Federation, is in extreme danger as his fate is unknown after the set up of his 're-trial' on March 4th, 1979, by court whose decisions do not carry the right of appeal. He is languishing in jail since 1975. Also the lives of the Al-Roudat's publishing Ilbuse staff are in extreme danger. They are junior army officers (retired since 1963); Sulaiman Yousef Stephan, Kamal Nu'man Thabit, Sa'd Kadhim Matar, Nuh Ali Al-Kubay'i, Fahri Al-Alousi and Hamid Al-Khatib; and their fate is unknown since their arrest in mid-Nov. 1978.

Another law, prohibiting Iraqi citizens from studying outside Iraq, except for those approved by the official authorities and the official National Union of Iraqi Students, exposes anyone who contravenes it to harsh penalties of imprisonment for 5-15 years. Hind Jalil Al-Sawadi (a prominent trade unionist among port workers in Basra) and Abdulla Hassan (worker from Iraqi Kurdistan) are among the trade unionists who have been tortured to death in the latest wave of the campaign of repression. A railway worker, Badran Khalaf, burnt himself and died in mid-Sept. 1978 after horrific physical and psychological torture at the hands of the Ba'ath Party's notorious security

apparatus (commonly called 'SAVAK' of Iraq. Women are equal to men in torture and persecution, and among those who have been tortured to death are Jakool Abdulla, Haseeba Karim and Maniba Seewa. Some of the techniques of torture currently in use in Iraq by the Ba'ath Party and its repressive organs have been reported by the Amnesty International appeal (March 1979); they include: electric shocks; burning the sensitive parts of the body; hanging from ceiling electric fans; pulling out nails of hands and toes; raping of women....etc.

Numerous types and methods of persecution and repression have been used by the Iraqi authorities led by the Ba'ath Party and its security apparatus against the Kurdish people, which is the second largest nationality in Iraq. Over 1,000 Kurdish citizens have been executed since mid-1975 and the campaign of arrests, tortures and kidnapping has not stopped and it encompasses people of different convictions and ages. The sum total of the burnt down and destroyed villages in Iraqi Kurdistan is 240. A flagrant manifestation of the policy of national oppression which the Kurdish people is suffering from in recent years is the inhuman campaign of evictions. In the last months of 1978 alone, the Iraqi authorities transferred 150,000 Kurds to remote regions called 'housing complexes'. They are similar to the 'strategic villages' once introduced in South Vietnam by US aggressors, and to the 'concentration camps' created by the French colonists during the national liberation war in Algeria. In 1978-1979 academic year the Iraqi authorities adopted a resolution which states that 50% of the curricula in Kurdish schools must be taught in Arabic, and the campaign against literacy in Iraqi Kurdistan is being conducted in Arabic, of which the ordinary Kurdish people have no knowledge at all. It is also worth mentioning that there is no Kurdish daily newspaper at all, taking into account that the Kurdish people in Iraq is at least 25% of the Iraqi population - Iraq's population is 12.2 million.

### Solidarity.

Given the brief picture about the latest developments in Iraq and the Ba'ath Party's change of its course (which also has manifestations in foreign policy: co-ordination of security apparatus agreement in Feb. 1979 with Saudi Arabia reactionary regime - (Guardian 26/2/1979); Ba'ath Party's support for the repressive despotic Shah's regime in Iran till its last days, and the co-ordination between its security apparatus and the SAVAK, and last but not least the ambiguity of its stand concerning the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, calling for the troops of both sides to withdraw), it is of vital importance that there is international solidarity. The British trade union movement, true to its long tradition of international solidarity against fascism and dictatorship, and people who support and work for red human and democratic rights, should be active in calling and acting for the immediate halt of the campaign of barbaric repression against democrats, independents and communists in Iraq and to expose the Ba'ath Party notorious security apparatus (its SAVAK) and other repressive organs who have committed thousands of crimes of physical torture and liquidation of trade unionists, peasants, teachers, students, lawyers, engineers, retired soldiers and junior army officers: Arabs, Kurds and other national minorities men, women and even children, who have been taken as 'hostages' for their parents who have fled the country or went into hiding to escape physical liquidation at the hands of the Ba'ath Party repressive organs.

Every voice raised in protest would be effective, every act of solidarity would help ending the campaign of batonic repression against the honest and dedicated daughters of the Iraqi working class and the Iraqi people.

Telegrams, letters of protest and resolutions to: President Al-Bakr, Baghdad, Iraq.

Delegations to: The Iraqi Ambassador, 21, Queen's Gate, London, S.W. 7.

Please send copies of telegrams, letters and resolutions to: CNDRI, c/o 40 Chalcots Street, London S. W. 6.

# The Kurdish people in Turkey

Turkey Today, April-May 1979

by Suleyman Sakal

Belfast Telegraph - 6 JUN 1979

## Iran protests over attacks on Kurdish villages

IRAN'S provisional Government has protested to neighbouring Iraq over last Monday's air raid on three Iranian villages in which it said six people died.

The incident happened in a Kurdish area of Western Azerbaijan province, and informed sources said four Iraqi planes had bombed and strafed the villages after crossing the border in hot pursuit of Kurdish guerrillas.

News of the protest, lodged last night and accompanied by a brief Ministerial statement of the incident, was the first official confirmation that the raid had taken place.

Relations between the two Middle East neighbours have been tense in recent days because of fighting in the southern border province of Khuzestan involving autonomy-seeking Arabs

and Persian militiamen.

Each side accused the other of massing troops along the border and Iran's official radio said Iraqi helicopters had flown reconnaissance flights along the frontier.

While waging war against Kurdish rebels, the Ottoman Empire, which incorporated all Kurdish regions with the exception of Persia, all attempts by the Kurdish people to establish a national union were rudely put down. In 1915, the Kurdish principality became part of the Ottoman Empire. I concluded with the Kurdish princes against Persia. But, in return for this "service" and for strategic reasons (i.e. they should form a buffer region between the Ottoman Empire and Persia), the Kurdish principalities enjoyed autonomy. They were independent in their internal affairs. This situation, however, lasted only until 1919, in 1930 the Ottomans concluded a treaty with Persia, secured their eastern frontiers and started to eliminate the Kurdish principalities one by one. This lasted until 1937 when the last Kurdish principality, Dersim because they refused to how to Persia. The last principality of Persia, Karsistan disappeared in 1961.

Various uprisings against this national oppression during the 19th century were all crushed. This was done until 1947 when by the coming together of Turkey and Persia putting aside mutual animosity

to eliminate the common "menace".

During the national liberation

movement, the Kurds fought together. The Republic of Turkey was established, followed by promises of equal rights for every body. At the Conference of many diverse parts of the country,

(1) The text includes all Kurds in Turkey, i.e. includes those who live outside Turkish Kurdistan. (2) Mustafa Kemal's death.

(3) Related to Tuncer Yavuz, "Survey of the National Question of Turkish Kurdistan with Historical Background" Published by HAYRA, p. 32.

THE GUARDIAN

Tuesday June 5 1979

**Divariakir, Sirt, Adiyaman, Mardin and Hakkari**

In addition to the inclusion of 6 new provinces in the east ... Tunçeli, Niğde, Erzurum, Erzincan, Van, Diyarbakır, Şırnak, Mardin and Hakkari "divisionism" has been made a crime.

Divariakir, Sirt, Adiyaman, Mardin and Hakkari



# Kurdistan Democratic Party

-Provisional Leadership-  
International Relations Committee

PRESS RELEASE

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norsborg  
SWEDEN

22 January 1979

PRESS RELEASE

29th January, 1979.

## THE KURDISH PEOPLE AND THE PRESENT REGIME IN TEHRAN

On 16 January 1979, the press reported the present Iranian Chief-of-Staff and Regency Council member General Qarabagh making certain claims about "international plots and referred to what he misleadingly named as the independence of the Kurds of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria...". These claims are, in reality, the echo of the Shah's and Bakhtiar's allegations.

These claims and allegations are nothing but the old, and now worn out, tactic of diverting the attention of the masses of the people of Iran from the real and pressing issues facing them and channelling their attention towards secondary and, in this case, imaginary, matters. They are also poor attempts at making the Kurdish people the scape-goat for the current wide anger and contempt felt by the Iranian people towards the Shah, his regime and system. They are, furthermore, a pretext for justifying and intensifying the regime's attacks on demonstrators.

Not surprisingly, very shortly after Qarabagh made his allegations public, the Talabani clique clashed with an Iranian gendarme border guard post 2 kms. inside Iran, on 17th January. It is not a coincidence that this clash is the first of its kind ever since this clique set up their headquarters in NORAN, a village one kilometre inside Iran, at the end of 1977 after handing over to SAVAK the two Iranian anti-Shah Kurds, Karim Nistani and Ahmad Nistani (who were living secretly in Iraqi Kurdistan) in return for 36 000 Iraqi Dinars (about £ 64 000). Thus, the Talabani clique are serving the policy -and propaganda- objectives of the Shah's regime by their action which provides the weapon needed by this regime to tighten its grip on the people and abort their uprising.

Nevertheless, we are confident that the people of Iran and their leaders and progressive forces are better acquainted with this and similar manoeuvres of the Shah, his men and his imperialist and reactionary backers, to be deceived by them. We are also certain that the real conspirators will not be successful in this plot of theirs. The Iranian people, no doubt, will emerge victorious.

Our Kurdistan Democratic Party -Provisional Leadership- firmly believes that the struggle of the Kurdish people for their national and democratic rights forms part of the struggle of the people of Iran. We also firmly believe that every victory achieved by the Iranian People is at the same time a triumph for the Kurdish people in Iran and for the entire Kurdish nation.

## THE GUARDIAN Saturday June 2 1979 17 JOHN TORODE, in his final report from Ankara,

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
- PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP -

International Relations Committee  
-Provisional Leadership-

And the fear of a revival of Kurdish secessionism, fuelled by the Iranian Kurdish unrest, is growing. Already the army and the police have made contact with their opposite numbers in Iraq to discuss the possibility of joint action to put down any rising.

Re-settled deportee Kurds and the inhabitants of Harir, a small town situated about 17 km south-west of Rawanduz, Arbil Province, went out in a big, peaceful demonstration against the government for keeping them under very harsh conditions in the "cluster villages". The demonstration took place on Christmas Day, the 25th December 1978 and men, women and even children participated in it.

Instead of investigating and alleviating their grievances, the mayor (Mudir al-Nahiya) of Harir, acting on orders from Baghdad, ordered the mercenaries (paramilitary units in the pay of the government) to attack and open fire on the demonstrators, who had nothing to fight back with but their bare hands.

As a result of the attack, the following demonstrators fell martyrs:-

1. Shirin Shito Piran, female, who fought back heroically until she fell,
2. Safar Jawhar Pisiawi,
3. Azad Aziz Rostai,
4. Zubair Mirhan Pisiawi,
5. Ahmad Khalid Wazha,
6. Jawhar Asi.

Another 38 men, women and children were wounded, some severely.

A similar demonstration took place in Diana, 5 km north of Rawanduz, at the beginning of December 1978, and another in Digla, in the same region, on the 13th September 1978.

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norsborg  
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# Kurdistan Democratic Party

-Provisional Leadership-

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PRESS RELEASE

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norrtorp  
SWEDEN

6th February, 1979

IRAQI EMBASSIES : CENTRES FOR ESPIONAGE

## THE UNCOVERING OF AN IRAQI ESPIONAGE NETWORK IN SWEDEN

According to official and press accounts, the Swedish Government has declared the First Secretary, Second Secretary and Military Attaché at the Iraqi Embassy in Stockholm, persona non grata for engaging in espionage activities in Sweden relating to the surveillance, harassment and intimidation of Iraqi refugees living in Sweden. Moreover, a Third Secretary at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, who has been on a "visit" to the Swedish capital, and five Swedish citizens have been arrested; one of the detained Swedes is a high ranking police officer having access to the dossiers of Iraqi citizens living in Sweden as refugees or applying for political asylum.

These Iraqi espionage activities are directed against Iraqi citizens, especially the Kurds living in Sweden, no doubt with the aim of silencing them through harassment, intimidation, bribery and infiltration by informers, who have come to Sweden pretending to be "persecuted" and who have asked for, and got, refugee status.

However, these espionage activities are not the first, and will not be the last to be carried out by the Iraqi embassies abroad. Last summer Britain declared 11 Iraqi "diplomats" persona non grata and expelled them. At the beginning of January 1979, Iraqi intelligence operatives carried out an assassination attempt in Vienna against KDP's Provisional Leadership member Masoud Barzani, wounding two Kurdish refugees in the attempt. In May 1978, three Lebanese Kurds were abducted and murdered by the Military Attaché at the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut. Canada also expelled an Iraqi "diplomat" in 1977 for spying on the Kurds there. There was an attempt on the life of a KDP spokesman in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1976. Moreover, our Party some time ago received reliable information that the Iraqi government had despatched to Europe "packs" of professional killers to carry out acts of espionage and murder of activist Kurds, especially leading figures.

The surveillance, harassment and intimidation of Kurds and attempts to buy off some of them or recruit or infiltrate informers among them, has been going on in Europe for some time now, especially in the Nordic countries - sometimes with the assistance of certain officials at the police and aliens' departments of these countries.

These activities by Iraqi embassies must be seen within the context of the dictatorial nature of the Iraqi regime and its fascist laws and methods. Arbitrary arrests, torture (sometimes to death), and executions without the right of appeal or access to legal help, not only of all opposition forces but also of people belonging to political parties that are partners in the government and in the "national front" such as the communists; the forcible deportation and displacement of Kurds en masse, their re-settlement against their will in the "cluster villages" and the gradual destruction of the Kurdish language and culture, and subsequently, of Kurdish nationalism, are all component parts of the same dictatorial system of government reigning in Iraq at present.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
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-PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP-

# Kurdistan Democratic Party

-Provisional Leadership-

International Relations Committee

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norrtorp  
SWEDEN

12th February, 1979

## THE IRAQI REGIME DISPLACES 22,000 KURDISH FAMILIES IN THE SULAIMANIA GOVERNORATE

The Iraqi authorities have publically admitted (see the interview with the Governor of Sulaimania on 7th February 1979 published in the Iraqi and foreign press), that they have recently carried out a new wave of forcible deportation and displacement of Kurds en masse. The number of families affected by this latest measure in the Sulaimania Governorate alone, is 22,000 - since an average Kurdish family has more than 6 members, the number of Kurds displaced totals at least 132,000. As this forcible deportation, displacement and resettlement is greatly resented by the Kurdish people in general and the deportees in particular, and because the Kurds re-settled in the "cluster villages" are idle and unemployed - there is no possibility of employment in or around these villages; each family is allowed to pacify them with television sets which are to be distributed to them shortly, according to the Governor of Sulaimania. The distribution of television sets is also an attempt to bombard the re-settled Kurds with government propaganda.

Moreover, the Iraqi authorities are presently making preparations in the Governorates of Sulaimania, Arbil and Dahok for the further deportation and displacement of Kurds in the near future. Meanwhile, the government has increased its efforts to re-settle Arabs in the places from which their Kurdish population has been evicted, such as Selavani, Shaikhan and Atrosh. While forcibly evicting and resettling the Kurds, the government offers lucrative financial, and other, incentives to Arabs, especially tribesmen, to re-settle in the Kurdish area.

We must recall that the Iraqi government has admitted that during the period from mid-June to mid-July 1978, more than 28,000 families, i.e. over 168,000 Kurds, were deported (see the semi-official Bagdad daily "al-Thawra", 18th September 1978).

We appeal to all humanitarian and international organisations and persons, and to all progressive and democratic forces, to help the Kurds in their present predicament by making representations and sending protests to the Iraqi government and its missions abroad, urging it to put an end to these deportations and evictions.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
-PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP-

## Kurdistan Democratic Party

-Provisional Leadership-

International Relations Committee

### PRESS RELEASE

#### THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAN IS VICTORY FOR OUR KURDISH NATION

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norrtorp  
SWEDEN

After more than a year of very widespread popular struggle, the masses of the people of Iran won their victory over the despotic, terroristic and suppressive regime of Muhammad Reza Pehlavi, over foreign domination headed by U.S. imperialism, over the biggest arms arsenal, the largest armed forces and the most vicious intelligence and secret police apparatus (SAVAK) in the Middle East, and over the arrogance, vanity and tyranny of the ex-Shah and his foreign backers. This great victory of the people of Iran was won under the guidance of His Eminence Aytoollah Khomeini and his wise, firm and uncompromising leadership; by the unity of the people, their patriotic forces and various nationalities and by the great sacrifices offered by the toiling people.

The revolution of the people - all the social classes and progressive and revolutionary forces and all fraternal nationalities - is, indeed a unique revolution not only in the history of Iran, but also in the history of all the national liberation movements in the world; it is unique in its forces, characteristics, course and victory. The revolution began a little over a year ago although its roots belong to an earlier time, and began to polarise the masses, especially the poor and toiling classes, the Moslem clergy and the national bourgeoisie; it has come to embrace the overwhelming majority of the people, except some corrupt elements and others whose interests are linked to the bloody regime of the Shah and/or to foreign interests. The patriotic Moslem clergy have played a prominent leading role in the revolution and the mosques have become centres and bases of opposition and resistance.

The popular revolution faced and won victory over the ex-regime and its backers without resorting to armed struggle; the people's victory was won by popular and organised action, national unity and wise leadership. The "arms" of the masses was their firm belief in the justness of their cause, the unity of their ranks, and their readiness to offer sacrifices for the sake of achieving their rights and liberating their country from foreign domination.

The revolution of the people of Iran will, no doubt, inspire the oppressed peoples everywhere, particularly in the Middle East. This revolution offers living and undisputable evidence that the might of despotic and dictatorial regimes will crumble in the face of the determined will of the people, no matter how great the weaponry, armed forces, intelligence apparatus and funds of these regimes.

The revolution of Iran will, at the same time, certainly shake the nerves of these despotic and dictatorial regimes - such as the Iraqi regime - and rob them of their sleep.

Our Kurdistan Democratic Party and the entire Kurdish people salute and congratulate the heroic people of Iran, their national leadership, their Provisional Revolutionary Government and all their patriotic and progressive forces and parties. We reiterate our complete solidarity with, and support for them.

The victory of the revolution of Iran is a victory for our Kurdish people and nation and for all peoples, especially the oppressed ones.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
-PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP-

## Kurdistan Democratic Party

-Provisional Leadership-

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### PRESS RELEASE

#### THE DEATH OF THE MOST PROMINENT KURDISH LEADER MUSTAFA BARZANI

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norrtorp  
SWEDEN

It is with great and deep grief and sorrow that we announce the death of Mr. Mustafa Barzani, president of our Kurdistan Democratic Party and leader of the Kurdish national movement, of a heart attack in the late hours of Thursday, the 1st of March 1979.

Barzani's death is a tremendous loss to our Party, national movement and Kurdish people and nation. From 1961 until 1975, he led the September revolution against dictatorship and injustice and for the national and democratic rights of the Kurdish people and democracy in Iraq. After the 8th February 1963 coup by the Ba'th Party, Barzani opened the liberated areas of Kurdistan before the democratic, patriotic and progressive forces and personalities, and supported them by every means within his power.

Barzani concluded the 11th March 1970 agreement with the Iraqi government in order to bring democracy to Iraq and autonomy for Kurdistan - despite the numerous plots hatched by the Shah of Iran and his imperialist masters to undermine it.

After the collapse of the September revolution as a result of the U.S.-A.-Shah-Iraqi regime conspiracy of 6th March 1975, Barzani lived in Iran for a short while, under many restrictions imposed by the Shah's regime. Because of his distrust of the Shah and due to his deteriorating lung-cancer, he went to America for medical treatment, which he underwent at regular and short intervals.

Barzani strongly supported the Iranian people's revolution and was very happy for its victory. Following the flight of the Shah and the triumph of the revolution, he decided to return to Iran, where he was due to arrive on the 4th March 1979.

Barzani and his memory will remain the symbol of our people's determination and steadfastness in their struggle for their rights and against their oppressors.

We pay the late President of our Party and leader of our national movement our most solemn respects and vow to our people and Party that we will carry on the struggle which Barzani led for nearly half a century, and will take it to its victorious end.

Barzani's body will arrive in Tehran on Sunday evening, 4th March, to be buried later in the town of Shno (Oshnoviyeh) in Kurdistan-Iran.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
-PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP-

Letters of condolence may be sent to the above address.

## Kurdistan Democratic Party

- Provisional Leadership -

International Relations Committee

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norsborg  
SWEDEN

PRESS RELEASE

INACCURATE REPORT - DENIAL

The Daily Telegraph of London published on 3rd March 1979, an article by Stephen Barber on the death of the prominent Kurdish leader, Mustafa Barzani, alleging that the U.S.A. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "has had to pick up his hospital bills".

While vehemently and categorically denying this allegation, we confirm that the costs of Barzani's living and treatment in the U.S.A. were not paid either by the CIA or any other source, but from the funds of the Provisional Leadership of the Kurdish Democratic Party and of the Kurdish revolution. The funds required to cover these costs were transferred to the late Barzani from outside the U.S.A. by his son, Idris. We have the details of the bills, numbers of the cheques by which these bills were paid and of the overseas drafts by which the money was transferred from outside the U.S.A. The bill covering the costs of the last treatment which Barzani underwent at the Mayo Clinic on 2nd February 1979, was paid by cheque No. 326 dated 27th February 1979, and drawn on the American Security Bank in Washington, D.C.

As for what Barber calls "Mysterious" provided funds" to the Kurdish refugees in the U.S.A., we refer him to an article by Jack Anderson in The Washington Post of 11th March 1978. Anderson states that, "The Kurds who arrived in the United States were granted no special privileges. They were sponsored by international refugee organisations, which gave them personal loans to pay their air fares and expenses. Some were thrown into resettlement camps in San Diego. Later, they were actually asked to pay for their 'care and maintenance' at the camps.... Nevertheless, they are receiving dun letters from their sponsoring organisations.....".

Moreover, in a "Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on Human Rights and the Kurds" of 23rd February 1978, Bal Harbour, Fla. states that, "As soon as they (Kurdish refugees in the U.S.A.) become employed, they are obliged to repay the cost of their transatlantic passage to the International Committee for European Migration and the cost for final settlement to the various U.S. Voluntary Agencies.....".

If the writer of the article was seeking the truth of the matter, he could have enquired about the facts either from us or from the Mayo Clinic, from whom he still can check regarding who paid the bills.

We consider the publication of inaccurate reports, such as that referred to above, as disinformation aiming at the defamation of the late President of our Party and of our national liberation movement, disinformation which only began to "surface" after our Party adopted a more clearly independent and progressive course.

The International Relations Committee wrote a letter to the Daily Telegraph on the 3rd March 1979 denying the above allegation, but the paper has not published it, nor acknowledged its receipt.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
-PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP-

14th March, 1979

## Kurdistan Democratic Party

- Provisional Leadership -

International Relations Committee

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norsborg  
SWEDEN

PRESS RELEASE

22 January 1979  
PRESS RELEASE An Iraqi Kurd Killed and Another Wounded in the Anti-Shah Demonstrations

On 16 January 1979, Abu Bakir Pirrot Pisardi was killed and Ali Khosinaw wounded during the anti-Shah demonstrations in ARAK, western Iran. These, and other, Iraqi Kurds living in Iran, as guests of the people of Iran, since the collapse of the Kurdish revolution in 1975, were taking part in the demonstration which was shot at by troops and SAVAK agents.

Our Kurdistan Democratic Party -Provisional Leadership- reiterates its full support of and solidarity with the struggle of the people of Iran. Our Party considers every victory achieved by the people of Iran a victory for the Kurdish people and nation.

International Relations Committee  
Kurdistan Democratic Party  
-Provisional Leadership-

## Kurdistan Democratic Party

- Provisional Leadership -

International Relations Committee

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norsborg  
SWEDEN

PRESS RELEASE

DENIAL OF A FALSE REPORT

Two Teheran daily newspapers, 'Ettela'at' and 'Ayendigan', of 9th April 1979, published a report, which was relayed by some news agencies, on so-called "secret negotiations between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and an Iraqi delegation, under Saddam Husain Tikriti, held in Sidakan in Kurdistan.....".

The Kurdistan Democratic Party -Provisional Leadership- categorically denies that it has held negotiations with the chauvinist and dictatorial regime of Iraq, whether in Sidakan or anywhere else.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
-PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP-

10th April, 1979.

## Kurdistan Democratic Party

-Provisional Leadership-

International Relations Committee

PRESS RELEASE

### THE IRAQI DICTATORSHIP MAKES PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW DRIVE OF FORCIBLE DEPORTATION OF KURDS

The Iraqi chauvinist and dictatorial regime has recently been making preparations for a fresh drive of forcible deportation and displacement of Kurds en masse. Among these preparations: a) the building of new "cluster villages" and the expansion of existing ones; b) bringing more Arab tribesmen to re-settle in evicted Kurdish villages and in new settlements built of concrete, in such places as Selaivani, Sheikhan, Mariba, Atrosh, Zinawa, Za'idha, al-'Asi, Batofa, where tribesmen of the tribes of al-Hadid, al-Taiyawi, Jiboor and of Shirqat, are being re-settled; and c) giving notice to the inhabitants of villages in new areas covered by the deportation drive to prepare themselves for eviction next summer - areas such as Sidakan, Dinarta, Garda-Sin, Jojar (all near Agra), and Bela (in the Barzan area), and many other areas.

This new drive is the continuation of the racist and dictatorial policy of the Iraqi regime, directed against the entire Kurdish people in Iraq, and against democratic forces in the country.

Every family covered by the deportation drive must fill in a form, a sample - with its English translation - is given over.

All humanitarian and human rights, as well as all democratic and progressive organisations and individuals, are called upon to perform their duty of solidarity with our Kurdish people and raise their voices against the massive eviction and displacement of Kurds in Iraq.

During mid-June to mid-July 1978, the Iraqi regime evicted 28,000 Kurdish peasant families and at the begining of 1979, another 22,000 Kurdish peasant families were evicted in the Province of Sulaimaniya alone (according to the regime itself - see the semi-official daily "al-Thawra" of 18th September 1978 and the London Arab language daily "al-Arab" of 8th February 1979). Since an average Kurdish family has 5-6 members at least, the number of Kurds evicted and displaced on these two occasions alone is between 250,000 and 300,000.

VILLAGE

MAP 1:100 000

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norrborg  
SWEDEN

Mukhtar  
(Village  
Head)

Tribe

Degree of  
loyalty at  
present

Degree of  
loyalty  
previously

Birth

Profession

Remarks

1. Name of Head of Family

2. Name of his Wife

3. Names of his brothers

4. His Children Age Profession  
Those of his  
family who are  
still in the  
ranks of the  
agent pocket

Property in his possession

|                   |          |
|-------------------|----------|
| السيارات          | 1.....   |
| الموارد الطبيعية  | 2.....   |
| الارض             | 3.....   |
| المنشآت الصناعية  | 4.....   |
| المنشآت الزراعية  | 5.....   |
| السكنى            | 6.....   |
| الآلات والمعدات   | 7.....   |
| الآلات والتجهيزات | 8.....   |
| الآلات والتجهيزات | 9.....   |
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| الآلات والتجهيزات | 100..... |

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
-PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP-

17th April, 1979.

## Kurdistan Democratic Party

- Provisional Leadership -  
International Relations Committee

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norsborg  
SWEDEN  
30th May 1979

### PRESS-RELEASE

#### IRAQI-TURKISH MILITARY CO-ORDINATION AGAINST THE KURDS

On 18th May 1979, an Iraqi large infantry force, supported by helicopter gun-ships and artillery, launched an attack on KDP guerrillas near the village of DARI, Sub-District of SHIRWAN, District of MERGA-SOOR, ARBIL Governorate. After a battle, the enemy withdrew, leaving 20 bodies on the battleground. A helicopter was hit.

On the very same day, Turkish air force planes carried out reconnaissance flights over the area and Turkish troops and intelligence forces in the Iraqi-Turkish border section near the attacked area were re-inforced. This is the first sign of the implementation of the agreements between the Iraqi and Turkish regiments reached during the official visit to Baghdad by the Turkish Chief of General Staff, General Fvrin, on 13th April 1979 (which was preceded by an official visit to Baghdad by the chief of the "National Intelligence Organisation"-MIT- from 29th March to 3rd April 1979) to co-ordinate their joint efforts, particularly in the military and intelligence fields, to contain and eventually destroy the Kurdish national liberation movement.

Recently, 18 helicopters have been transferred to Hakkari for the purpose of transporting Commando troops to the border areas more quickly and of increasing reconnaissance flights there. Troop concentrations are taking place at Uludere (Hakkari) and Cizre (Mardin), Ciglik (Hakkari) and Sembdinli (Hakkari) in Turkey, across the border from Zakho, Amadiya (Dahok) and Merga-Soor (Arbil) respectively, in Iraq. These troops and intelligence and security personnel are being re-inforced almost daily. Besides, military and gendarme check-points and outposts are being increased as well.

International Relations Committee  
Kurdistan Democratic Party  
- Provisional Leadership -

## Kurdistan Democratic Party

- Provisional Leadership -  
International Relations Committee

PRESS RELEASE

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norsborg  
SWEDEN

### IRAQI GOVERNMENT TROOPS KILL THEIR OWN EMPLOYEES

Further to our Press Release of 30th May 1979, the Pesh Mergas in reply to the onset of the Iraqi government's spring offensive, which coincides with the approach of the 3rd anniversary of the 26th May revolution, carried out an attack at 23.00 hours on 19th May on a military unit stationed in Gorito Sub-district, Merga-Soor, Arbil Governorate, building military roads in the Merga-Soor sector. The attack resulted in the destruction of several vehicles and other equipment and the capture of 5 engineers and 4 local employees. The unit was guarded by an infantry regiment and the mercenaries of Muhammad Tahir Sarokani - in addition to a brigade which has recently been transferred to the area to clear it of the Pesh Mergas.

The names of the engineers captured are:

1. Muhammad Abd al-Khalil Abdullah, Egyptian, born in 1948 from Manufiya, married with 1 child, passport No. 305697, Civil Engineer. His duty was supervision of the military project.
2. Ahmad Muhammad Ismail, Egyptian, born in 1949, from El Arish, Single, Supervising Engineer.
3. Mahmoud Muhammad Murad, Jordanian, born in 1950, Mechanical Engineer, Graduate of Mosul University (Iraq) in 1976, Single, Mechanical Engineer of the military projects of the sector.
4. Sa'ad Abd al-Hadi, Iraqi, born in 1951, from al-Karradaah al-Sharqiyah, Baghdad, Single, graduate of Baghdad University in 1975, Supervising Engineer.
5. Saeed Qadir Hasan, Iraqi, born in 1954, Civil Engineer, Single, graduate of Sulaimaniya University, Assistant Manager of Road Projects in the Merga-Soor sector.

The captured engineers and employees were taken to Mt. Piran in the same area that night.

The following morning, the Iraqi army despatched infantry and mechanised troops and mercenaries, in addition to 10 helicopters (7 troop carrying and 3 gun-ships) in pursuit of the guerrillas. At 1745 hours two columns of the pursuing troops established contact with the guerrillas and a fierce fight ensued. The army used rifle, machine-gun, mortar and R.P.G. fire from close range against the guerrillas and the engineers, without discrimination. During the first minutes of the attack, fear engrosses and one local employee hit by Iraqi fire were killed. The engineers killed are those mentioned under 1-4 above, and the employee is Idris Haj Hasan from the village of Balkan, Rawanduz, Arbil.

The guerrillas divided into three groups and engaged the pursuers in a 90 minute battle from a distance ranging from 10 to 50 metres. Enemy dead and wounded seen falling were counted as 27 dead and 14 wounded. Total losses sustained by the Iraqi army is preliminarily estimated at 130 dead and wounded.

The Pesh Mergas then managed to disengage, withdraw and return with the surviving engineer - Saeed Qadir Hasan and 3 local employees to base.

The KDP expresses its regret and sorrow for the killing of the four engineers and the local employee by the Iraqi army and extends its condolence to their families and relatives.

31st May, 1979

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
- PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP -

# Kurdistan Democratic Party

- Provisional Leadership -

International Relations Committee

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norrtorp  
SWEDEN

PRESS RELEASE

FURTHER EVIDENCE: IRAQI EMBASSIES CENTRES OF ESPIONAGE AND MURDER

## An Iraqi Kurdish Democrat Murdered in Aden by Iraqi Intelligence Agents

1- At 2020 hours, local time, on 2nd June 1979, Prof. R. Tawfiq was shot dead near his home in the Mansurah quarter in Aden. The assassins, a group of Iraqi intelligence operatives based at the Iraqi Embassy in Aden, then made their escape in a car belonging to the Iraqi Embassy.

Professor Rushdi Tawfiq, in his late forties, married with children, is a Kurd from the town of Sulaimaniye, Iraq; he obtained a PhD. degree in philosophy in 1965 and has worked at the University of Sulaimaniya at the beginning of the seventies. But the Iraqi regime began to harass him and closed all opportunities of employment in his face because of his political opinion. He had been a teacher at the College of Higher Education in Aden since 1975.

The culprits took refuge in the Iraqi Embassy which refused to allow PDRY authorities to interrogate them.

This gangster-like conduct by the Embassy and by the authorities in Baghdad is by no means surprising and is completely in line with the pattern of conduct and behaviour which know no respect for laws and diplomatic norms, followed by Iraqi diplomatic missions abroad.

2- The KDP referred, in its Press Release (PR) of 9 Jan. 1979, to the attempt on the life of M. Barzani, member of the Provisional Leadership, in which two Kurdish patriots were injured; this attempt was carried out by Iraqi Intelligence operatives based at the Iraqi Embassy in Vienna.

3- KDP also referred, in its PR of 6 Feb. 1979, to the espionage operations carried out, against Kurds and other Iraqis, by 'diplomats' at the Iraqi Embassy in Stockholm and which led to the expulsion of 5 Iraqi 'diplomats' from Sweden.

4- The murder of the former Iraqi Premier, Abd al-Razzaq al-Naif, in London last summer and the expulsion of 11 Iraqi 'diplomats' from the U.K. is well known and received wide press coverage.

5- On 15 April 1979, the Sunday Telegraph reported the assault on -and punching on the face of- an Iranian postgraduate student, Mohammed Ali Heshmati, by three Iraqi 'diplomats' near the Iraqi Embassy in London, because he was distributing political leaflets critical of the Iraqi regime.

6- The Observer reported on 20 May that members of the so-called 'National Union of Iraqi Students' (NUIS) (the Iraqi government's puppet student union), according to National Student, June 1979, p. 16) attacked other Iraqi students in Manchester and Swansea in the UK during April. These acts of aggression have prompted the UK National Union of Students to "decide to immediately end recognition of NUIS".

7- On 4 June, a number of Iraqi Air Force planes strafed and bombed four villages in Iranian Kurdistan, killing at least 8 and wounding 6 people and causing much damage. This unprovoked act of aggression against a sovereign state is blatant disregard of innocent people's lives and property.

All these incidents and the similar ones in Paris, Karachi, Australia, Canada, Italy, Romania and others, are very glaring evidence to the real natures of the Iraqi regime and to the fact that Iraqi embassies abroad are centres of espionage, intimidation and murder, exploiting 'diplomatic immunity' to escape punishment. Our Party most strongly condemns and denounces these acts of aggression by the Iraqi regime and asks the PDRY to punish the culprits and expose their directors in Baghdad and not be black-mailed by oil and trade, threats to which some other governments have actually succumbed.

International Relations Committee  
Kurdistan Democratic Party  
Provisional Leadership

# Kurdistan Democratic Party

- Provisional Leadership -

International Relations Committee

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norrtorp  
SWEDEN

14th June 1979

## AN IRAQI BIG OFFENSIVE, HELPED BY TURKISH FORCES,

ON KDP GUERRILLAS

On 25th May, the Iraqi army launched a big offensive, throwing the entire 11th Division, supported by artillery and helicopter gunships, into a three day battle against KDP guerrillas and positions in the area between ZAKIYO and AMADIYA.

The attack began with a barrage of artillery and gunship fire, which lasted from 0600 to 0800 hours, followed by an advance by infantry on Mt. ASOS and the (destroyed) villages of NEZOR, HARRIB, and BELIMBEER, a range of mountains running parallel to the borders with Turkey. The twin objectives of the attack were the annihilation of the Peshmergas and the capture/destruction of the guerrillas' command post in the area.

However, the attackers started to pull back on 27th and by 29th May they completed their withdrawal. The 11th Division was later transferred to and redeployed in the southern section of the Iraq-Iran borders. This Division is normally stationed in NASIRIYAH in the south of Iraq.

The army sustained at least 100 troops killed (apart from the occupants of a Zeel truck who drowned in the KHABUR when their vehicle fell into the river) and two helicopters shot down -one crashed in SEWARA DEMI facing Mt. SELEVANI KE and the other near BATOFFA. The guerrillas captured good quantities of ammunition, equipments, supplies and tents.

The attack has, however, failed to achieve either of its objectives. But, during the course of the attack Turkish helicopters flew reconnaissance flights over the area -one of them actually strafing Peshmerga positions but driven away by Doshka fire. Turkish troops acted as spotters for Iraqi artillery from positions at the peak of a mountain, in turn, overlooking Mt. ASOS from the north -wearing red apprals and carrying white flags to identify themselves to the Iraqi troops. Meanwhile, Turkish troop concentrations in CIZIK, ULUDERE and SEMPINLI were deployed along the frontiers and more gendarme were sent to the border villages, the inhabitants of which were sternly warned against helping the guerrillas in any way threatening them with harsh reprisals and mass punishment.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
-PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP-



# Kurdistan Democratic Party

-Provisional Leadership-

International Relations Committee

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norrtorp  
SWEDEN

## COMMUNIQUE NO. 19.

### THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUERRILLA FORCES AGAINST THE DICTATORIAL REGIME OF IRAQ AND THE OPPRESSIVE MEASURES PERPETRATED BY THIS REGIME AGAINST THE KURDISH PEOPLE

October - December 1978

- \* KDP guerrillas achieve success in Sulaimaniya Governorate.
- \* Guerrillas annihilate a military committee responsible for the implementation of parts of the 6th March 1975 agreement with the Shah.
- \* Defeat of a big offensive and the shooting down of a helicopter in Baiyara, Halabja.
- \* Tawilia is controlled by the guerrillas for several hours.
- \* Attack on Barkchak settlement.
- \* Demonstrations in the "cluster villages".
- \* The killing of 7 demonstrators by government forces in Harir.
- \* A campaign of terror against the Iraqi Communist Party.
- \* The execution of 14 KDP members.
- \* Operations for which nobody has claimed responsibility.
  - \* \* \* \* \*

#### 1. The guerrillas annihilate a military committee responsible for the implementation of some of the provisions of the 6th March 1975 agreement with the Shah:

On 17th October 1978, a guerrilla squad waited in ambush on the Tawilia road, in Halabja District, Sulaimaniya Governorate - at a point between Soskan police post and Tawilia. At 0700 hours, a command jeep, heading towards Tawilia, was intercepted and came under heavy fire. Three officers were killed; a staff Lieutenant-Colonel, a staff Brigadier and a staff Major; another officer and the jeep driver were wounded. These officers were members of the Border Joint Committee between the Iraqi and Shah regimes, whose duty was to exchange intelligence reports and information and co-ordinate efforts against opposition groups' activities, more especially against the Kurdish revolution. A rescue force, comprising a truck loaded with troops, was sent to the area; it was intercepted, suffering 12 casualties, one soldier dead and 11 wounded. The guerrilla squad returned safely to base.

#### 2. A big attack on government troops defeated and a helicopter shot down in Baiyara, Halabja District, Sulaimaniya:

On 27th November 1978, at about 0800 hours, a large government force launched an attack on our guerrillas in the Baurman area, near Baiyara sub-district, Halabja District.

A brigade and a number of mercenary formations took part in the attack which was reinforced by artillery and armoured helicopters. After a four hour battle, government troops withdrew, suffering 20 casualties. The guerrillas then counter-attacked - having been reinforced by another guerrilla force at 1200 hours - and fighting continued until 19.30 hours. On the following morning, government troops launched a counter attack which lasted the whole day, without succeeding in dislodging the guerrillas and occupying their positions. Thereafter, the area was pounded with artillery shells until the third day, when government troops withdrew, suffering the following losses:

- a) a Super Frelon helicopter which crashed on Mt. Sidar, near the village of Ahmad-Awa;
- b) 39 troops and mercenaries killed, among them an officer;
- c) 80 troops and mercenaries wounded, who were subsequently transported to Khormal sub-district by the army.

Our guerrillas captured large quantities of ammunition and military supplies, 2 Kalashnikovs, a pistol and 60mm gun shells.

#### 3. The guerrillas control Tawilia sub-district centre for several hours and fire R.P.G.'s at the police station:

On the night of 30th November 1978, a guerrilla squad entered Tawilia and opened R.P.G. fire on the local police station, killing 8 policemen and damaging a wall of the station. The guerrillas were in control of the town for three hours, marching and shouting slogans for the Party, the revolution and Barzani.

#### 4. An attack on the Barkchak settlement in Shakhan:

On the night of 8th September 1978, a squad of guerrillas launched an attack on the Barkchak settlement, situated between Shalihun and Mosul, with P.R.G. rockets, machine guns and light weapons. Heavy damage was inflicted. Next morning, the settlers of Barkchak and of three other nearby settlements visited the mayor of Shakhan and demanded that they be transferred to their original places of residence. When the mayor tried to persuade them to stay in the settlements, they replied that "today it is Barkchak and tomorrow tie rest". This attack had a widespread effect on the other settlements in the area, and it came as further evidence of the inability of the regime to protect these settlements.

It should be noted that Barkchak and the other settlements referred to, are places from which the original Kurdish inhabitants had been driven away and displaced, and Arab tribesmen brought from other areas of Iraq and settled in their places.

#### 5. The execution of 14 Kurds and the imprisonment of 2 on charges of belonging to the Kurdistan Democratic Party:

We have reliable information that 14 Kurds were executed in April 1978 on charges of belonging to our Kurdistan Democratic Party, among them: Ahmad Kakamini, Ahmad Hama Abdulla, both from Qala Diza, Ahmed Abdulla Mahmoud from Bilkot Village, Qala Diza District, and Hama Kaka Bikha from Barkhak Village, Qala Diza District. They were detained in October 1977 and their whereabouts remained unknown until we received confirmed information that they had been executed by the regime. They were members of the Local Committee of the KDP organisation in Qala Diza. We have also received confirmed information that another 10 Kurds from various areas of Iraqi Kurdistan have been executed with the aforementioned four, on similar charges; we shall publish their names and particulars when a complete report is received.

We are obliged to publish the names of Kurds executed by the Iraqi government somewhat late because these executions are carried out in the greatest secrecy, thus the regime can deny them when international humanitarian organisations ask about them. Therefore, we do not publish names unless we are sure of the information received.

These Kurds have been "tried" by "The Special Court" which sits at the H.Q. of the Military Division in Kirkuk, and which constantly consults with both al-Bakr and Saddam Tirkiti before passing its sentences.

6. 16 government troops killed and 51 wounded and 2 guerrillas committed suicide in a battle in North-western Salah al-Din:

On 27th November 1978, a guerrilla squad engaged a government regiment and the mercenaries of Saeed Koora Soorchi and Muhammad Qadir Agha in a location between the Soorchi and Ziraya areas, north-west of Salah al-Din. The battle lasted from 1100 hours until 1500 hours. Government troops suffered 16 deaths and 51 injured, some of whom later died. The troops then withdrew to Spike, situated between Harir and Gali Ali-Beg. Two guerrillas Nam Hamza and Saeed Ahmad, committed suicide when they ran out of ammunition, in order to avoid being captured alive. Nam Hamza was known for the firmness of his national ideology, very great courtesy and honour.

7. The guerrillas capture the notorious agent Hussain Hameed al-Lami:

Our Party learnt that Younis Zakholi, an assistant pharmacist at Dabok Hospital and his comrade, were executed in 1977 due to information provided by Hussain Hameed al-Lami, a member of the Northern Area Intelligence Station. The commands of our Party have been tracking his movements first in Dabok, then in Kirkuk and finally in Sidakan, where he has recently been captured. He has revealed many things, among them the names of the following government agents in Dabok:

Hameed Hallaq, Republican Hospital Street;

Adil Muhammad Ali, a student at the Kawa Secondary School;

Khorsid, a tea shop owner near Dabok Transport, and

Salmi, a labourer at the Fruits and Vegetables Administration. He also revealed details of the organisational structure of the intelligence service in Kurdistan:

(1) Dabok Intelligence Station: It is situated in a two-storey building opposite Oredi Bag in Dabok. The Chief of Station is Captain Muhsin Sabri from Haditha, Ramadi Governorate, and its staff consist of NCO Abdul Sabir from al-Hurriya, Baghdad; NCO Saeed from Semaiji; Corporal Ahmad from Hammam al-Shaykh and Corporal Hashim Muhammad from Hillah.

(2) Centre of the Northern Area Intelligence in Kirkuk: It is situated in the street leading to the Air Force Base in the town. Chief of Centre is Staff Brigadier Qais from al-Khalis, whose assistant is Major Abd al-Sabir. His staff consist of: First Lieutenant Abd Ali and First Lieutenant Saad from Khalis. The Interrogation Committee includes Major Ata, Captain Ahmad and NCO Basan Jasim.

(3) Sidakan Intelligence Station: Includes Station Chief First Lieutenant Latif Abdulla from al-Baqa, Baghdad; NCO's Muhammad Hanafi, Salim Sulaiman, Ahmad Saleem, Salih Mekhlis, Ibrahim Hassouni and Murtadha, and Privates Najim al-Din Abdulla, Mehdii Bussin, Ali Hasan Sulaiman, Ali Hussain Sulaiman, Abd al-Rusain Yasir and Nour al-Suh.

The Northern Area Intelligence was established at the beginning of the 1960's in order to fight the Kurdish revolution and the KDP.

8. An attack on a government regiment in Barwari Bala:

At 1600 hours on 11th October 1978, a government force of regimental strength assembled near the village of Sefarya in Barwari Bala. While setting up tents and taking up positions, the force was surprised by our guerrillas with R.P.G., machine gun and light arms fire. Fighting continued for about 90 minutes, during which the force suffered heavy casualties. Confirmed reports indicate that the losses inflicted on the force include: 40 troops killed and 17 wounded and three Eva type lorries burned. Among the

dead was a First Lieutenant, nick-named "Abu Nawaf" from Najaf. Another force, transported in 60 Zeal trucks despatched to the area from Baqqa H.Q. in Bazifa near Zakho, opened aimless fire in all directions until next morning, when the regiment withdrew and the wounded were transported to Batofa and Zakho.

9. Attack on Sheikh Salam's mercenaries inside Dabok:

Avenching the death of Mahmoud Yousif and Yousif Ahmad, killed by the mercenaries of Sheikh Salam on the eve of 2nd January 1978, our commandos decided to track down this traitor and his men. The mercenaries suffered 3 dead and a number of wounded in two attacks by the guerrillas on their headquarters in the village of Banjiki, and as a result, they moved to the town of Dabok. Close to the first anniversary of the death of the two aforementioned guerrillas, a KDP commando threw a hand grenade inside a room where about 20 of these mercenaries were meeting. The grenade wounded 14 of them - the injuries of 4, including Sheikh Salam himself, being severe.

10. On the evening of 23rd September, 1978, one of our squads attacked the Sari Bakirman sangar with R.P.G. and light arms fire, inflicting losses on the sangar troops. Subsequently, at 2000 hours, the troops opened fire first on the village of Bakirman, causing terror among its inhabitants, and then on the mountain overlooking it.

11. On 27th September 1978, a guerrilla squad was on the move in the Miroz area, Shirwan sub-district, Mezga Soor District. At 0900 hours a military patrol of company strength was approaching the village of Spindara. The Guerrillas took position and opened fire on the patrol, 8 of whom died and a further number were wounded. At about 1000 hours, a rescue force from nearby sangars arrived at the scene, supported by 3 helicopters. Fighting continued until 1400 hours, with government troops sustaining more losses.

12. On 5th October, government troops were landed on the mountain overlooking the villages of Swati-Jamaliki, Bani and Sidari, in Shaikhan; armoured helicopters strafed the areas before the landing was made. The objective was to annihilate guerrillas in the area, but the troops were unable to establish contact with them.

13. At 2130 hours on 11th October, a guerrilla unit, using explosive charges, managed to put out of action a quantity of machines used in opening a military road linking the villages of Briski and Karmali in Kani-Mesi sub-district.

14. On the evening of 13th October, an encounter between a guerrilla squad and a government military force took place near the village of Rashaqa, in the Nihail area, Andiya, resulting in the death of one and the wounding of two soldiers. Unable to inflict harm on the guerrillas, the government force opened fire on the inhabitants of the village, killing a woman, then the troops assembled the villagers, beat them with fists and rifle butts and insulted them; houses were looted and 3 men detained - their whereabouts and fate are not yet known.

On the evening of 15th October, another skirmish between the guerrillas and troops took place near Rashaqa, the troops sustaining a number of casualties.

15. At 2030 hours on the night of 19th October, a guerrilla squad ran into the "Maghamir" (Shock Troops) in the Nisra village of Atrech sub-district, Shaikhan District. Five members of the "Shock Troops" were killed and 2 wounded. A guerrilla, Waisi Bani, was also killed.

Although the skirmish occurred accidentally, the authorities nevertheless arrested Siddiq Hameed, the village Mukhtar, Headman, Muhammad Azzo and Ismail Waisi, inhabitants of the village. Their fate and whereabouts are not yet known.

16. At 0200 hours on 24th October, a guerrilla squad, using R.P.G. and light arms, fired at close range on the Barchi sangar - forming part of the Jizi village military camp - in Andiya. Most of the troops manning the sangar were either killed or wounded and the sangar destroyed.

27. Operations for which nobody has claimed responsibility:

(1) At 1700 hours on 23rd September 1978, a bomb exploded in Abu Neas Park in Baghdad, killing a score of people and wounding many more.

(2) In mid-August 1978, many explosions occurred in Baghdad, amongst them in Cinema al-Nasr, Cinema Babil, and the Central Railway Station, causing casualties and damage. An explosive charge planted in Bab al-Sharqi Tunnel was defused before going off.

(3) On 30th September 1978, a member, Sameer Tariq al-Shakarchi, of the Ba'th organisation in Bab Lagash in the city of Mosul, was killed. Security agent Ghaidan Abd al-Ridha - 30 years old - was killed on the night of 2nd October 1978 in the railway station in Mosul. Rumours have it that an underground organisation calling itself "The Free Officers" is responsible for both of these killings.

28. Deported Kurds demonstrate against harsh conditions:

Protesting against the harsh conditions under which they are kept, deportee Kurds re-settled in the "cluster villages" have been demonstrating against the authorities. For example, the following demonstrations have taken place in the "cluster villages" in:

- a) Kesirizan, near Arbil on 13th August 1978 in which the authorities used violence;
- b) Batofa, in Zakho, in mid November 1978, in which the authorities used violence;
- c) Diana, near Rawanduz, Arbil on 27th November 1978 in which the authorities used violence;
- d) Harir, near Rawanduz, Arbil, on 25th December 1978, where the authorities used violence, leading to the death of 7 Kurds and the wounding of 38 more, among the dead are:

Safar Jawhar Pirsawi, Azad Aziz Rostani, Zubair Mirkhan, Ahmad Khalid Wazba, Jawhar Asi Pirsawi and Miss Shirin Sito Piran - all of whom had been forcibly deported from the Barzan area.

29. Two Kurdish Refugees wounded in an attempt on the life of Masoud Barzani

On 8th January 1979, Iraqi intelligence operatives attempted to assassinate Masoud Barzani and his companions at a place in Vienna. He was unhurt, but two refugees were wounded. The Iraqi regime has despatched a number of its intelligence agents and operatives and "packs" of killers to Europe to track down, to move the movements and kill KDP leaders and other oppositionist Iraqis and non-Iraqis. The record of the Iraqi regime in this field is very "rich" indeed. we mention their espionage and terrorist operations abroad: in England, France, Libya, Pakistan, Lebanon, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria, to name but a few.

Operations not published earlier:

25. On the night of 13th July 1978, a large military force left the village of Daryasor heading towards Milbadini and Shanasra villages in Sidakan, in order to burn both of them. A regiment of this force headed towards Shanasra; two of its battalions took guarding positions, while the third battalion and a company of the corps of engineers moved to the village. Guerrillas had already quietly taken positions on both sides of the road from Milbadini to Shanasra. At 0100 hours, the guerrillas suddenly opened fire on the third battalion and the battalion of the corps of engineers; firing continued for an hour until enemy fire ceased. A large number of government troops were killed and wounded. The two guard battalions continued firing their mortars and R.P.G's without causing losses amongst the guerrillas, who captured some supplies.

26. On 11th July, an anti-personnel mine exploded at Sari-Hishika in Agra, killing one soldier and wounding another.

There is news that a number of communists were executed in Mosul on the 3rd and 4th January 1979.

A meeting of Communist and Workers parties in the Arab countries in Damascus in December 1978 discussed, in detail, and condemned the terror campaign being waged against ICP.

Our Party condemns and denounces this terror campaign against ICP and against other patriotic and progressive Iraqi forces and individuals.

31. The Iraqi regime plans more racist schemes:

The Iraqi authorities are currently building new settlements in Atrosh and Mariba sub-districts, in Shaihan District, to settle Arab tribesmen in them. These tribesmen have been promised weapons, financial incentives and the fertile lands, farms and orchards of the Kurds from which they had been forcibly deported.

32. Deportation of the Kurds has not ceased:

Reliable information reaching us indicates that the authorities are planning to build another 450 houses in Shiladiji "cluster village" in Amadia. This indicates that they aim at deporting more Kurds.

On 26th August 1978, a governmental committee arrived in Dinar, Agra, and announced to the public that the regime is intent on deporting the inhabitants of the surrounding villages. This announcement indicates that the deportation of Kurds is actually not confined to a 10-20 km strip on the borders as Iraq's rulers claim, but rather from a 50 km strip, in this area, at least.

Moreover, the Governor of Sulaimaniya has recently admitted that 22000 families have recently been deported in the Governorate of Sulaimaniya alone.

33. Economic blockade on the border districts and sub-districts:

The regime has imposed an economic blockade on most of the districts and sub-districts of the border areas; the blockade includes sugar, tea, dairy products, rice, oil and fat, petrol and flour. It is being imposed on the pretext that these goods get to the guerrillas. This blockade has caused widespread discontent among the inhabitants of these areas, and these goods are difficult to buy, when available, without bribes and/or contacts.

34. Some government troops are withdrawn from Kurdistan:

The regime withdrew some of its troops from Kurdistan in autumn 1978, after carrying out the forcible deportation of Kurds from the border areas. There are many reasons for this withdrawal, among them guerrilla activities; discontent among the troops caused by posting them in mountain top sangars for long periods of time, without achieving any tangible results or reducing the activities of the guerrillas; the inability to crush the guerrillas; the approaching winter.

35. Books in Kurdish or on the Kurds are still being withdrawn:

The withdrawal of books in Kurdish, that discuss the Kurdish question objectively, from public and school libraries, is continuing. These books are usually replaced by books containing the speeches of Saddam Tikriti, whose speeches portray dictatorship as "popular democracy", bureaucratic capitalism as "socialism" and racism as "modernisation".

36. The Talabani clique are still in contact with the regime:

The Talabani clique do not let an opportunity pass without getting in touch with the Iraqi dictatorial regime, expressing their willingness to negotiate and reach an understanding (in exchange for limited gains for its group), and to carry arms against the KDP. After the stunning defeat they suffered in June 1978, Jalal Talabani sent three envoys to the regime, which has refused to offer him anything more than "amnesty". To boost the

morale of their group, the clique spread rumours that they were conducting "negotiations" with the regime; this prompted the regime to warn them, through its agent and Jalal Talabani's envoy, Hamza Bapir Agha, to stop spreading such rumours. In October and November 1978, this clique made other attempts at negotiating, this time sending word to the Governor of Sulaimaniya. They received the same reply - nothing but "amnesty".

37. Another "amnesty": the last after the last ... and the very last:

Since the outbreak of the Kurdish revolution, there have been so many "amnesties". Two years ago, when one of these "amnesties" was announced, the regime said it was "the last one". This was followed by other "amnesties" - the last one before the last was called "the last that will not be renewed". But on 10th January 1979, another "amnesty" lasting for two months was announced. However, we confidently predict that it will not be "the last" as similar "lasts" have not been the last!

38. To PUK guerrillas come over to the KDP side:

Four PUK guerrilla squads - numbering about 70 guerrillas - have recently joined the KDP forces. They decided to come over to the KDP because they maintain they could no longer tolerate the acts of aggression committed by the Talabani clique and the extortion of money they resort to, especially from the poor; the clique's contracts with the regime, the falsehoods the clique spread, the surrender to the regime of their leading figures and advanced cadres, such as Shams al-Jin Mufri, Qadir Hano and Qadira Soor and others; and the realisation that the main force that really fights the regime is the KDP and the revolution it leads.

5th March, 1979.

PRESS STATEMENT

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
-PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP-

# Kurdistan Democratic Party

-Provisional Leadership-

International Relations Committee

COMMUNIQUE NO. 20.

9th May, 1979

KDP  
Box 2017  
145 02 Norsborg  
SWEDEN

-2-  
An Attack on the Brigade H.Q. in Batofa Stuns the Enemy:

At 2000 hours on 2nd January 1979, our guerrilla forces launched a big attack on the Brigade H.Q. and other positions in Batofa, Zakho Sub-District, lasting until 0100 hours on 3rd January. The guerrillas fought the enemy inside Batofa too, from street to street and from house to house; he suffered heavy casualties and the guerrillas withdrew safely from Batofa.

- \* The enemy sustains more than 500 casualties within two months;
- \* Another crime committed by the former Shah regime against 4 Kurdish patriots;
- \* 14 Kurdish patriots are executed and a further number sentenced to life imprisonment;
- \* You're in Sweden and not in Tikrit, Mr. Ambassador!
- \* 83 enemy troops killed and 34 wounded in the Gali-Rashava battle;
- \* A surprise attack on the Brigade H.Q. in Batofa;
- \* Armasht Regimental Assistant Commander and 40 troops are killed;
- \* An attack on enemy positions in Margish;
- \* Miroz Regimental H.Q. is attacked;
- \* Badlian Regimental H.Q. near Diana comes under fire;
- \* Enemy positions in Shiran Sub-District are attacked;
- \* The planned assassination attempt in Vienna to kill three Kurdish patriots, is avenged.

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## 1. Enemy Sustains 117 Casualties in the Gali-Rashava Battle:

Enemy forces have, since 12th October 1978, been conducting regular shows of strength in the Nihail area, Amadiya District, in order to intimidate the population. The inhabitants of the said area have been threatened and those suspected by the authorities of aiding the Pesh Merga guerrillas were caused various kinds of harm. The womenfolk's jewellery, money, radio sets and tape-recorders belonging to the populace were looted by government troops.

In reply to this unbearable situation and in an attempt to put an end to it, a number of our guerrilla squads carried out the following operation:

On 17th December 1978, an enemy force in 32 Zeel-type troop carriers and 2 command jeeps belonging to the "Special Troops", approached Nihail from two directions: the first column approaching by way of Gali-Rashava and the second through Gali-Sargali (Gali = George). At 1700 hours the first column surrounded the village of Rashava, entering it the following day to carry out a combing operation. Afterwards, the two columns were assembled together in the village of Bachchiya. However, at 1530 hours on 18th December, a section of these troops came under Pesh Merga guerrilla fire. The guerrillas were waiting in ambush on a mountainous road running parallel to a section of the Greater Zab (river). The enemy's advance was halted and he was encircled, as he had the river at his back and the mountains at his front. Most of the troops were annihilated, with many of the dead falling into the river. Eye-witnesses say that government troops used fishing nets to collect some of the bodies of the dead troops (at least four of them).

Enemy losses were 83 dead and 34 wounded. Many of the corpses were left on the battlefield, along with a quantity of R.P.G. rockets, mortar shells, ammunition and other supplies.

The following day, the enemy imposed a six hour curfew on Bambari, Amadiya and Dashedzi, in order to prevent the inhabitants of the area from seeing the transportation of his dead and wounded troops to the hospitals of Amadiya and Sharash.

The enemy carried out a large search operation the same evening after the withdrawal of the Pesh Mergas. All houses in Batofa were searched, some of them as many as three times. Metal detectors were used during these searches.

Enemy losses were:

- a) 1st Lt. Talib, killed. Before being transferred to the Brigade H.Q., he was a Battalion Commander in the Avhali Sangar.
- b) 26 troops killed.
- c) A further number of troops wounded.

The following day, the enemy burned all the places where his troops fell, in order to hide all traces of blood, and then used bulldozers to remove the earth as a further measure to erase all evidence.

Later, a military committee, composed of officers from Dahok and Mosul, headed by a Division Commander, inspected the battleground. Upon its recommendation, all trees and bushes on both sides of the road passing through Batofa were felled (while felling the trees, four more enemy corpses were discovered).

The battle was recorded by scores of Batofa's inhabitants on cassette tape recorders.

## 3. Operation to Avenge the Victims of the Attempt in Vienna on the Life of Masoud Barzani and Two Other Patriots:

At 1630 hours on 1st February, a Pesh Merga squad waited in ambush on the road between Diana and Merga Soor, in the Rawanduz Basin, near the village of Shikawtan. An enemy command jeep later came under fire resulting in:

- a) Shikawtan Regimental Commander, Staff Brigadier Abd al-Khalil was wounded, both his arms and his thigh were fractured (news indicated that he died later).
- b) Regimental Assistant Commander, Captain Muhammad, was gravely wounded (he was earlier on the staff of Argoosh Regiment).
- c) Lt. Majed suffered bad wounds.
- d) Two troops killed.

Enemy wounded and dead were transported to Diana Hospital and traffic to Merga-Soor was stopped for the remainder of the day.

### The battlefield is surrounded by several sangars and the regimental H.Q. is only a few kilometres away.

This operation was carried out as a specific reply to the attempt on the life of Masoud Barzani in Vienna on 8th January, in which two patriots, Mazi Barwari and Pirot Ahmad, were injured.

## 4. The Assistant Commander and 40 Troops Killed in an Attack on Armasht Regimental H.Q.:

At 1815 hours on 16th January 1979, a guerrilla squad launched a surprise attack on the regimental H.Q., located at Armasht, Zakho District, while the troops were lining up. The Pesh Merga guerrillas used R.P.G. rockets, machine guns and light arms. The surprise achieved created disorder and chaos among the enemy, who later began an aimless bombardment until the next day.

Enemy losses are estimated at 40 dead, among them the Assistant Commander of the Regiment and a Sergeant Major called Jabbar from Diwanja, with more than 17 wounded. Enemy casualties were seen being transported next morning, towards the town of Zakho.

5. Enemy Positions in Mangish Sub-District Centre Come Under Fire:

At 2000 hours on 19th January 1979, a combined force of our Pesh Merga guerrillas launched a surprise attack on enemy positions inside Mangish Sub-district Centre, in Dabok district. The targets of the attack were the local office of the Ba'th Party, the house of the local head of the Party, Abu Hamed, the house of the Sub-District Security Officer, and the houses of a number of security and intelligence personnel. These targets were attacked simultaneously with R.P.G. rockets, machine guns and hand grenades. The operation lasted 30 minutes and caused great fear in the enemy ranks. Surrounding enemy sangars opened fire at random.

Our information indicates that 15 enemy personnel were killed and a number wounded in this operation.

6. An Attack on a Sangar Followed by an Assault on Miroz Regimental H.Q. in Merga-Soor:

On 27th February 1979, two guerrilla squads went out to attack enemy forces at Miroz Regimental H.Q. and the surrounding sangars, in Merga-Soor. One squad approached Milani sangar, located between the villages of Miroz and Bizzyan, while the other waited in ambush. At 1730 hours, the first squad opened R.P.G. and light arms fire on Milani sangar, destroying it and causing losses to the enemy.

Hearing the sound of shooting, many officers and troops at the Regimental H.Q. began to assemble to know what was happening. The second Pesh Merga squad then opened fire on one of these assemblies with R.P.G. and light arms, causing heavy casualties.

Afterwards, the enemy bombarded the whole area until 2000 hours, and three helicopter gunships hovered above in search of the guerrillas. However, the two squads managed to return safely to base.

7. Badlian Regiment Commander and 40 Troops are Casualties on the Anniversary of 6th March:

On the fourth anniversary of the 6th March 1975 agreement between the Tikriti clique and Iran's ex-Shah, a guerrilla squad attacked Badlian Regimental H.Q., near Diana, with R.P.G., machine guns and light arms fire, from positions less than 200 metres away. The attack took place during the first minutes of 6th March 1979. Two halls caught fire. There were electric failures in Badlian, Diana, Rawanduz and Hawdian. Enemy troops opened fire only after the withdrawal of the Pesh Mergas and then army sangars in the area, as far away as Mt. Zozik and Mt. Hasan Beg, opened fire. According to the information reaching us, the enemy suffered about 40 casualties, among them the Regiment Commander. Two halls were destroyed, 6 Zeal-type military trucks put out of action and other damage was inflicted. The next day, the inhabitants of Badlian and nearby villages were rounded up.

8. An Attack On Enemy Positions Inside Shirwan:

During the evening of 2nd March 1979, a guerrilla force attacked enemy positions inside Shirwan Sub-District Centre, Merga-Soor District. The force, divided into four groups, attacked the following targets: The Ba'th Party local office, Shirwan military camp and the headquarters of the mercenaries of Bakirkhan Bayi. The attack lasted about an hour, after which the guerrillas returned safely to base. Enemy casualties are put at 4 dead, among them a corporal and one soldier, and a mercenary wounded.

9. An Ambush On the Outskirts of Dahok:

At 1210 hours on 5th February 1979, a Pesh Merga squad lay in ambush near the village of Avrik, in Galik-Kurtak, on the outskirts of Dahok. A military Eva vehicle, loaded with troops, approached and the guerrillas opened fire on it for about 20 minutes. The vehicle was destroyed and its occupants either killed or wounded. Three corpses were seen falling from the truck, one of them being Corporal Atiya Muhammad Ahmad from the Qa'qa, "Maghawir" I.D. Card No. 10841, born in 1947. Another was conscript Private "Maghawir" Mahmoud Khidir Alyas, No. 44509 of the same unit, born in 1952.

10. A Military Vehicle Ambushed Resulting in 14 Casualties:

On 22nd January 1979, a guerrilla squad lay in ambush on the main road from Batofa to Zakho, near the village of Birsiyi. At 1700 hours, a military Eva vehicle approached and the Pesh Mergas opened fire with machine guns. Within minutes, the truck was destroyed and burnt and its occupants of 14 troops annihilated. The aim of this truck was to join enemy forces setting up an ambush for the guerrillas in the area. While the vehicle was under attack, an enemy force left Avani camp and another force from nearby sangars came to its rescue. The guerrillas engaged these forces for 30 minutes, and were then able to withdraw safely to base.

The inhabitants of the area saw the destroyed vehicle and the corpses of enemy troops on the main road the following day.

11. Artis Battalion H.Q. Comes Under R.P.G. Fire:

At 1800 hours on 12th February 1979, a guerrilla squad attacked the army battalion H.Q. situated on the mountain overlooking Artis village; this battalion is part of the regiment stationed in the village of Kalakshil in Amadiya District. The guerrillas, operating from close range, opened R.P.G. and light arms fire. Two barrack sleeping wards received direct hits by R.P.G. shells and were destroyed, leading to casualties among its occupants.

The following day, a force from the regiment came to the scene of the battle to rescue and help the battalion. A helicopter was seen transporting the dead and wounded troops, and further helicopters hovered over the area on 13th and 14th February in search of the guerrillas, who returned safely to base.

12. A Military Canteen Truck is Ambushed in Gali Ali Beg:

On 15th February, a guerrilla squad set an ambush in Gali Ali Beg; a military canteen truck later approached and came under fire. 7 troops were killed and 2 wounded.

This is the first operation by the Pesh Mergas in Gali Ali Beg for a number of years, due to the heavy fortifications and large numbers of troops in and around this strategic zone.

13. A Sangar on the Outskirts of Amadiya Attacked:

In the evening of 7th January 1979, a guerrilla squad attacked the sangar overlooking the main western entrance to the Amadiya Sub-District Centre with R.P.G. and light arms fire. The sangar was destroyed and its occupants killed or wounded. The same evening, the same squad attacked a store house belonging to the Directorate of Tourism and Summer Resorts inside the deserted Solaf summer resort. The authorities increased the number of sangars and fortifications around Amadiya after this operation.

14. An Ambush In Salah al-Din:

On 28th January, a guerrilla squad penetrated deeply behind enemy lines and laid an ambush near Salah al-Din, north-east of Arbil. At 1300 hours, an enemy unit was ambushed and after a fierce exchange of fire, 4 enemy troops were killed and 5 more wounded.

15. An Enemy Position in Sidakan Attacked:

At 2030 hours on 20th February 1979, a Pesh Merga squad opened R.P.G., machine gun and light arms fire on an army position at Harji bridge and the sangar overlooking it. Both are a few kilometres from Sidakan. The upper floor of the position was destroyed, but it did not open fire, whereas distant positions bombarded the area with mortar shells. Reliable reports indicate that at least two soldiers were killed (Private Saleh Ahmad from Mosul and Private Husain Sultan from Kirkuk). 8 were wounded, some severely. The squad returned safely to base.

16. At 1600 hours on 6th March 1979, five soldiers sent out to collect fuel wood, were ambushed and killed by the Pesh Mergas near the sangars overlooking Shirwan Sub-District Centre.

17. At 1630 hours on 29th November 1978, a guerrilla squad opened fire on a number of troops gathered round a bonfire near the sangar in Kani Masi, Amadiya. 8 troops were killed and 4 wounded, who were transported the next day to the 109 Brigade H.Q.

18. At 0230 hours on 14th February 1979, a combined force of the guerrillas attacked the sangar overlooking the village of Beenzee, situated 17 Kilometres from Zakho, with R.P.G. and light arms fire for 20 minutes, destroying the sangar and causing casualties among its occupants. Thereupon, the Armasch regiment opened artillery and other arms fire on the place for two days, and helicopters flew over the White Mountain, firing at everything moving. The squad returned safely to base.

19. At 1600 hours on 8th February 1979, a Pesh Merga squad carried out a daring attack on the battalion H.Q. situated between the villages of Karé and Binoor, in Bibo Sub-District, Amadiya. Seven enemy troops were killed and a number wounded.

20. At 0900 hours on 28th January 1979, 8 troops were ambushed by the guerrillas near the sangar located behind the evicted village of Hadina in Kani Masi. The guerrillas opened fire for 10 minutes, killing 3 troops and wounding one more. The bodies of the wounded and dead were transported by helicopter to 109 Brigade H.Q. the following day.

21. On 5th March 1979, a guerrilla squad approached the army sangars built by the Merga-Soor — Shirwan road, and at 1745 hours, 2 troops ventured out of one of the sangars, the guerrillas opened fire, killing both of them.

22. On the evening of 14th February 1979, a Pesh Merga unit opened fire on enemy sangars built in Sari Bardi, between Sidakan and Diana and engaged them for 2 hours, inflicting a number of casualties among his troops.

23. On 18th February 1979, a guerrilla squad launched an attack on Lilkhan Battalion H.Q. in Sidakan Sub-District, during the day. The Battalion Commander was wounded and the battalion opened mortar fire on the outskirts of Lilkhan and nearby villages.

24. On 22nd January 1979, there was a skirmish between a guerrilla squad and the mercenaries of Saddam Ba'ath Mardi in the village of Khoran, Salah al-Din Sub-District. 2 mercenaries were wounded.

#### 25. The Iraqi Espionage Scandal in Sweden:

On 9th February 1979, the Swedish Police detained a "Third Secretary" at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, as well as a Swedish police officer in charge of Aliens' Affairs in the Stockholm Police Department. Investigations showed the Iraqi "diplomat" was paying the Swedes \$3,000 for providing copies of confidential dossiers of Kurdish, Iraqi and Palestinian refugees and residents in Sweden. The investigation also showed that the so-called "diplomat" is a professional well-trained intelligence officer; he and three more "diplomats", First and Second Secretaries and a Third Secretary (actually a military intelligence officer) were declared persons non grata and expelled from Sweden.

The purpose of the espionage operation by the Iraqi regime was to know the identity and activities of these refugees in order to intimidate them and their families in Iraq (for the Iraqis). If intimidation proved inadequate, they would then try to kill them, as has happened in Vienna (Austria), Lausanne (Switzerland), London (England) and Paris (France), for example.

<sup>1</sup> ~~SECRET~~ Intelligence reports received by the Iraqi espionage organs were, according to the <sup>2</sup> ~~SECRET~~ <sup>3</sup> ~~SECRET~~ <sup>4</sup> ~~SECRET~~ Swedish press, passed on to the intelligence apparatus of other countries. Moreover, the Swedish police officer recruited by the Iraqi intelligence service had been before putting himself at the service of the Iraqi espionage operations, a CIA man, providing it with similar information on Swedes and foreign refugees in Sweden. This fact has prompted the Swedish government to send a strong protest note to the U.S. government.

Illegal activities and interference in the affairs of other countries by the Iraqi regime have been noticed and reported by the media in Canada, Finland, the aforementioned countries, and others.

On 10th February 1979, hundreds of Kurds, Palestinians, Iranians, Swedes, Moroccans and others, demonstrated at the Iraqi Embassy in Stockholm against its espionage activities.

The Iraqi Ambassador, Abd al-Jabbar al-Haddawi, lost his nerve at the sight of the peaceful demonstration and came out of the embassy building and began swearing and yelling and making obscene signs at the demonstrators, who looked on saying "Ambassador, you are in Sweden and not in Tikrit's Iraq!".

#### 26. Three Kurds Executed Because of the Harir Demonstration:

The demonstration in Harir on Christmas Day by deportee Kurds, and the killing of 7 of them and the wounding of 38 more by the police, were referred to in Communiqué No. 19.

We now have confirmed information that three more Kurds who took part in the peaceful demonstration have been executed. They are:

- a) JABALI SHEED, 18 years, student at the 6th grade secondary school and formerly from Argosh village, Barzan.
- b) OTMAN and his son, formerly from the village of Kalkala, Merga-Soor. More details about their background will be published in the future.

#### 27. Four Iraqi Kurdish Patriots Handed Over by SAVAK to the Iraqi Security, and then Executed:

During October 1978, four Kurds, two of them still under age, secretly visited their relative refugees in Iran. But SAVAK detained them in November and handed them over to the Iraqi security forces in accordance with the 6th March 1975 agreement between the two regimes. They were then sent to the Kirkuk Special Court. After a summary 'trial', they were sentenced to death and executed there. They were:

- a) SALIM AHMAD JASIM, 17 years old, from the village of Kazzo, Zawita, Dahok, who joined the underground Kurdistan Students Union (KSU) while at the second year intermediate school level. When his ties with KSU were uncovered by the authorities, he joined the ranks of the revolution in June 1978, undergoing a course for medics and was an excellent nurse, with good, polite manners and an eagerness to serve the peasants. His father was murdered by the mercenaries, while his cousin, Tariq Jameel, was executed by the Iraqi authorities in 1978.
- b) AZIZ, 17 years old from the village of Gali Raman, Astrosh, Sheikhan. He was a student at the fourth year secondary school level who joined the underground KSU and when uncovered, went to the revolution in June 1978. He underwent a course for medics and was always ready to serve the guerrillas and the inhabitants of the area.
- c) FARHAD, about 20 years old, from Hammam quarters, the town of Dabek. He had been a soldier in the Iraqi army until joining the revolution in the middle of 1977, and was a broadcaster for "The Voice of Kurdistan" radio station.
- d) IBRAHIM al-AMADI, about 25 years old and a graduate of the Secondary School level, from Amadiya. Before joining the revolution in March 1977, he was a clerk in Kani Masi. He was a medic and clerk in the revolution.

#### 28. Four Kurds Executed:

Four Kurds were detained in March 1978. Reliable reports confirm that they have been tried by the 'Special Court' in Kirkuk, sentenced to death and executed in Mosul. They were:

- a) CORPORAL HUSAIN ALI, from Sidakan on 'charges' of supporting the revolution.
- b) QIRTAS MIRO, from the village of Gorato, Merga-Soor, on 'charges' of possessing a 'fire arm'.
- c) HASAN SOFI, from the village of Kalalaki, Merga-Soor, on 'charges' of possessing a 'fire arm'.
- d) ABDULLA AZZO, from the village of Gorato, Merga-Soor, on 'charges' of possessing a 'fire arm'.