

# Clarté


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## Imperialism and the Militarization of Africa

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**Key words:** Colonialization, Extraction, Geopolitics, Imperialism, Neo-Colonialism, Militarization, Wagner group.

**Abstract<sup>1</sup>:** Africa is host to multiple interventions by major powers. The US, EU (France), China, Russia, UK, India and Arab states compete for influence through investment and aid, market access and lenient borrowing terms. In addition, military cooperation is augmented by covert operations. The present militarization of Africa is articulated through old-fashioned and new-fangled imperialism but also as an expansion of domestic military forces that have played a strong political role throughout the post-colonial era. This is examined through, 1. Outside interference in internal conflicts, 2. Peacekeeping and conflict resolution, 3. African military expenditures, 4. Outside military assistance and bases, 5. Military suppliers and arms trade, 6. Private military companies, and 7. Alliances and affiliations.

The paper tallies military resource deployment by the different parties. If militarization is going on, is it then due to domestically increased expenditures or outside assistance or interventions?

The face-off between Western and other external powers reflects the renewed recognition of Africa's importance. Increasingly, African countries fight for their own cause but are hampered in reclaiming full autonomy by the perpetuation of their heavy debt burden.

This calls for a new determination of 'imperialism' as a conflictual and contradictory struggle about power and self-determination.

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## Introduction

A relatively strong African military is the legacy of the fight against colonialism and particularly of the conflicts that broke out after independence which in turn can be divided into three waves. The first wave took place in the 1960's in most of the Anglophone and Francophone countries. The second wave brought independence for the Portuguese colonies obtained through long struggles in 1974-1975. The third wave consists of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and Eritrea (1993). Moreover, after independence civil war or guerrilla warfare erupted in many places. Factions fought against the winning parties, such as happened in Angola, Sudan (a long fight that led to a new state in 2011, South Sudan), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire/DR Congo and Uganda, to mention a few.

Therefore, it is not surprising that military budgets made up a large percentage of frail and unsatisfactory government budgets in the capital and finance-poor newly independent countries. As a percentage of GNP, in 1960 Africa as a whole spent 0.9, in 1986 3.2 percent.<sup>2</sup> This means that at independence the military inherited from the colonialists was weak.<sup>3</sup> The impact of the Cold War fuelled conflicts and furthered outside intervention, sometimes because these forces were welcomed by the local powers-that-be. In addition, opposition groups or guerrillas have sought refuge in neighbouring countries from where they have waged attacks in their home countries, more or less supported by their host governments.

The end of the Cold War led to lessened military investment and involvement from major powers. Nevertheless, conflicts did not diminish significantly, if at all.

Peace is fragile in Africa. Regimes considered to be stable may fall by a coup or be undermined by internal discontent. Outside forces, also those that are intended as peacekeeping, may not help or may even worsen the situation. Not to mention the outright intervention in favour of one of the major warring parties by foreign powers.

Another type of civil war, targeting natural-resource transnationals or governments, has been waged by Islamist and dissatisfied indigenous/marginalized people in recent years driving hard attacks, sometimes of a terrorist nature, against select population groups, leaders or companies.

Underlying this is the dependent state of African economies and their fragile basis that is worsened by climate and nature-destructive activities. At this time a renewed 'cold war' or rather, scramble for Africa is emerging. Africa is too large a continent to be ignored. It has immense potential, but it is still underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure. Its industrial base never really got off the ground before it nearly vanished, but the continent has a rapidly growing population. Today Sub Sahara Africa has a population of close to 1.2 billion people, or almost 15% of the world's population. Also, new claims for real independence, volatile international alliances or more stable cooperative regional or inter-state arrangements are making countries more interesting to major powers fearing to lose their long-held dominance per entitlement.

<sup>2</sup> Conteh-Morgan (1993, 34).

<sup>3</sup> Herbst (2000, 105) states that the number of soldiers per 1000 citizens in the average African state quadrupled from 0.73 to 3.1 between 1963 and 1979.

The paper is organized as follows. The second chapter defines and determines the concept of imperialism today, both in the light of the classical definitions and a more encompassing and modern version. It is not identical with mere domination by military power, rather military power is brought in to cement imperialist relations although often in an indirect way. The modern version has to do with rent extraction and not just goods and resources procurement, yet resources are at the bottom of the particular version of imperialism that develops in Africa today, seen through the prism of emerging geopolitical and geostrategic formations.

Next, in chapter three, some historical facts need to be worked up. We trace much of what is going on today as a continuation and evolution of what happened around independence, which in turn has roots further back. Many struggles recur today in new garb – despite attempts to get beyond or outright denying them. The legacy from precolonial times particularly concerns property regimes and lineage loyalties.

The fourth chapter draws upon the presentations of chapter three, by cutting across countries and assembling the material around the main themes to approach an analysis of the actual armed conflicts and militarization. The main themes are, 1. Outside interference in internal conflicts, 2. Peacekeeping and conflict resolution, 3. African military expenditures, 4. Outside military assistance and bases, 5. Military suppliers and arms trade, 6. Private military companies, and 7. Alliances and affiliations.

The fifth chapter grapples with political and economic imperialism vs. colonialism and concludes as regards the degree and type of imperialism experienced in a dissolving world order.

Throughout this paper, by 'Africa' is meant Sub Sahara Africa (SSA). The Northern African states, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt are only discussed inasmuch as they impact on SSA countries or territories.

The paper is information-heavy as it is one of the intentions to gather the recording of events and facts, many of which forgotten in the public mind. General information about countries to a large extent stems from Wikipedia and Britannica. Information that is somewhat surprising is annotated. Also theoretical material is referenced. Errors, omissions of important material and faulty understanding are solely the responsibility of the author.

## 2. Imperialism

A concept to be examined is that of imperialism. Is it applicable today and in which way?

Imperialism is in dictionaries defined in terms of 'countries seeking domination over others through territorial acquisition by military force, or control by political and economic means'.<sup>4</sup> A more Marxist definition concentrates on expansion of the capitalist system and particularly of large corporations who want ownership or access to cheap raw materials, labour power

and products by financial/economic, political or military means. The difference lies in the role of the state as either having the leading or the supporting role. If economic means would be sufficient, the result would be the perfect capitalist exploitation of other parts of the world, i.e. western capitals or whole countries obtaining surplus value in the form of rent from parties in the countries subjected to imperialist domination. Some Marxists maintain that this rent is based on superexploitation of labour power in the Global South, i.e. labourers working at wages below their reproduction costs.<sup>5</sup> In the view of this author it is also based on the fact that other costs than labour are cheaper in the Global South, such as land and access to resources,<sup>6</sup> whereas the sales values of raw materials or finished goods are determined in international markets. This access can, now as before, be enforced by military means or through exploitation of conflicts. Subimperialism is defined as an intermediary stage in the form of 'emerging' economies which are in fact exploiting those poorer than themselves while still being subservient to the centre.<sup>7</sup> BRICS countries are often mentioned as a new power configuration. Are China and Russia as the most prominent among them subimperialist, imperialist or something else?

The colonial direct domination of the late nineteenth century was led by military might but also by 'peaceful treaties'. The domination of the 'empire' in the colonial countries was often weak though, particularly in the interiors of countries.<sup>8</sup> Mostly the colonists ruled through local leaders, chiefs, while establishing themselves in the newly constructed capitals. After independence the new states thus had to assure their territories, which however led to new conflicts with ethnic groups that were different from the dominant ones, not because of ethnicity per se, but often as a consequence of the instrumentalization of ethnicity that colonial powers had deployed, favouring some by using them for particular services, forcefully displacing peoples from vast tracts of land and giving them to others (Whites, although not only), developing urban areas while neglecting rural ones. Ironically, the later left-leaning freedom fighters were highly educated and in many instances the rural population did not feel that they represented them.

Internationally, the arms competition and rebuilding of armies that developed after the Second World War held the Soviet Block and the Western Powers in some sort of balance, 'mutually assured destruction' as it was called when nuclear arms had reached a certain stage. The reciprocal threat was afterwards reduced by rolling back nuclear weapons a bit, and especially by trying to ensure that such weapons were not spread to poorer or unstable countries. This world corresponded to the politically divided interest spheres of the West and the East, with their concomitant economically differentiated systems.

The countries fighting for their independence already in 1955 formed the so-called nonaligned countries or the Third World at the Bandung Conference, which declared that "colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end."

But militarization in Africa continued after the colonial powers formally retired. The new

<sup>5</sup> Higginbottom (2018) in a debate against David Harvey.

<sup>6</sup> If one goes further back in the analysis, these phenomena can also be related to human labour. But here we are not engaging with the most fundamental level of value theory.

<sup>7</sup> Higginbottom (2018) in a debate against David Harvey.

<sup>8</sup> A major point in Herbst (2000).

<sup>4</sup> A transcription of the Britannica definition.



leaders did not fight against the country borders drawn at the Berlin Conference 1884-1885 but rather defended them and strove to build a sense of nationhood and nationstate among the very diverse peoples that inhabited the new independent states.

### 3. Liberation and its aftermath

The liberation struggles led to formal independence of most countries in the sixties or late fifties, starting with Sudan in 1956 and Ghana in 1957.

The exception to this was the former Portuguese colonies, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde and São Tomé & Príncipe who through struggles gained independence in 1974-1975. Djibouti, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Eritrea followed in 1977, 1980, 1990 and 1993, in that order. The two latter had been occupied by neighbouring states, South Africa and Ethiopia. Finally, South Sudan split off from Sudan in 2011.

This chapter will review, briefly, the main conflicts, their background and trajectory up to this day, also those that seem to be purely internal or a result of power struggle, in order to better understand the current situation. The overseas departments or territories such as St. Helena and Réunion will not be tabulated whereas the status of Mayotte is still contested. It will review the situation state by state because Africa is very much divided into states with borders, thanks to its colonial heritage. When excluding the five North African states, 50 are left as we also discuss Western Sahara. The analysis is divided into five regions, Eastern Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa and Island Nations. As much as possible the order is contiguous so as to be able to trace border conflicts coherently.

Today a number of cooperation institutions are put in place. First of all the African Union (AU) from 2002, the successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which lived from 1964 to 2002. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) entered into force in 2019 and became operational in 2021. It aims to eliminate tariffs and establish a customs union. Important is also COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) from 1994 which has taken in members outside of its prime area. It comprises 21 member states, including Tunisia and Egypt which will not be discussed here.

#### 3.1 Eastern Africa

Eastern Africa comprises more countries than what is normally understood as East Africa. Here we include members of the IGAD (The Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa from 1996), i.e. Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. In addition, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi are East African. The two latter are now also part of the second East African Community (from 1983) as are the Democratic Republic of Congo (which in this paper is seen as part of Central Africa) and South Sudan besides the core members of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Many of these

countries (minus Tanzania and South Sudan) are also members of COMESA.

*Ethiopia* has had both internal and external strife. Ethiopia boasts never to have been colonized, except for the invasion of Italian forces under Mussolini, leading to five years, 1936-1941, during which Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland were ruled by Italy under the moniker of Italian East Africa. In 1941 Emperor Haile Selassie, which acceded to the throne in 1930, returned to Addis Abeba. He continued previous work on the creation of a modern government by adopting constitutional reforms and elections. Coffee harvests and market conditions were good, and relative peace prevailed. That is, until the independence of Somalia in 1960 which inspired Somalis living in Ethiopia to rebel. Somalia got help from the Soviet Union while Ethiopia was a western ally. Unrest spread, also to the military, which rose and managed to expel Haile Selassie in September 1974. Except in the latter part of the period after the toppling of Haile Selassie and until the election of Meles Zenawi as prime minister in 1991 (the period called the Derg), Ethiopia has been a US ally. Mengistu Haile Mariam instituted a military self-styled communist dictatorship with widespread nationalizations of major sectors, finance and industry during the Derg, and the Soviet Union shifted its allegiance to Ethiopia. In the 1980's the famous 'We are the World' famine hit. This was after the introduction of land reform which made all land public and limited the size of land holdings. In combination with drought, agricultural production plummeted and in the midst of misery the government undertook to move some 600,000 people. Opposition gained strength, the Tigray and Amhara movements combined in the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and at the end, Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe. Later on, Mengistu was tried and convicted to death in absentia, but he still lives in Harare. Meles Zenawi of EPRDF led the path to a new constitution and a federal system in 1994.<sup>9</sup> He became prime minister, in fact remained at the centre of politics until his death in 2012, and the country did progress economically. In 2018 Abiy Ahmed became prime minister,<sup>10</sup> auguring winds of change, i.e. he released prisoners and rapidly negotiated peace with Eritrea. Despite his Nobel Peace Prize he could not or at least did not prevent armed conflict from blowing up (again) in the Tigray region in 2020, Tigray forces and Ethiopian national military blaming each other for starting or causing the hostilities. The brutal war was only stopped by a peace deal at the end of 2022.

The relationship with *Eritrea* looms large. Eritrea was a flourishing Italian colony from 1890 to 1941. When the Italian colonizer was thrown out in 1941, the British took over the administration of the country until 1952 when an agreement was made that Eritrea should enter into a federation with Ethiopia. Geostrategically, Ethiopia's interest in Eritrea was its access to the sea. By 1962 Emperor Haile Selassie had incorporated Eritrea into Ethiopia. The Eritrean resistance took up arms for independence which it obtained in 1991, formalized in 1993. Nevertheless, in 1998 a border war erupted. The arbitration results were not accepted

<sup>9</sup> <https://socialistproject.ca/2023/09/war-breaks-out-in-northern-ethiopia/#more>. September 13, 2023. In the article, 'War breaks out in Northern Ethiopia', by Tikur Netsanet, history is called upon to witness that the US has favoured Tigray and, in addition, Henry Kissinger was instrumental in setting up a federal system based on ethnicities. This is confirmed by other sources, see also <https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2010/02/u-s-foreign-policy-toward-ethiopia-and-somalia-1974-1980/> on the messy policies of the Nixon and Carter administrations. The US did not stop supporting Ethiopia immediately after the fall of Haile Selassie. It took some years and happened under Carter.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., s. 196. Bernsteins fremhævelser.

by Ethiopia which invaded again in 2006. UN sanctions were imposed on Eritrea in 2009, due to claims that it supported Somali rebels and had a border conflict with Djibouti that led to the deployment of Qatari peacekeeping troops. The sanctions were lifted in 2018 when the peace agreement with Ethiopia was reached – as well as a settlement with Djibouti – but reimposed in 2021 for the country's supposed intervention in the Tigray war, on behalf of the Ethiopian government this time.<sup>11</sup> The US has been heavily involved behind the scenes. The major western powers are opposed to Eritrea for ideological reasons (it has Maoist leanings and no private sector) and because of its independent and autarchic stance which no doubt has developed into suppression – not totally unrelated to the attitude of outside powers. Isaias Afwerki, by western powers seen as a grim dictator, has been president since 1993.

*Somalia* is altogether a sad story. Its modern creation is a merger of the two parts of Somalia, British and Italian Somaliland (which after WWII became a UN mandate), as an independent and unified country in 1960. Siad Barre seized power in Somalia through a coup in 1969 and held on to it until 1991 while fighting the north which wanted an independent Somaliland. Barre defended 'scientific socialism'<sup>12</sup> and at first was assisted by the Soviet Union. His troops invaded the fertile and contested Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1977 and nearly captured the whole region until Soviet and Cuban troops came to the aid of Ethiopia (under Mengistu). Barre was pushed out of Ogaden and turned to the US as ally.

After the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, Somaliland declared its independence, a claim that is not recognized internationally to this day. Later on, Puntland did the same, the two secessionists in addition fighting between themselves over border territory. In 1992, in the midst of chaos, UN missions supported by the US were fielded, but were withdrawn in 1995 after not much success in securing peace. Even after the formation of a transitional federation in 2004, the government was unable to control the Somali territory outside of Somaliland and Puntland, particularly not since the creation of Al-Shabaab, which emerged from the previous Islamic courts. Whereas UN peacekeeping forces, the US and Ethiopia had driven these courts out of Mogadishu and central parts of the country, Al-Shabaab could not be held at bay, and the president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, resigned in 2008. A semblance of peace was established in 2012 when the EU mounted several missions and Al-Shabaab appeared to be defeated. One of the costs was a government alliance with various ultrareligious forces. A federal government and a parliament were established and elections held in 2012, 2017 and 2022, the last one bringing in Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Peace has been fragile, however, and Al-Shabaab are not really defeated. AMISOM, an African Union peacekeeping force partially supported by the EU, has not been able to help much and is being withdrawn. The US gives airforce cover and US Special Operations Forces operating on the ground with the Somali army have made major inroads in Al-Shabaab controlled areas in 2022 and 2023.

The country has moreover been plagued by ever more frequent droughts. On the upside it has only one national language, Somali with Arabic as the other official language.

<sup>11</sup> The Eritrea and Tigray liberation movements cooperated until 1991 – with some interruptions. In 1998 when Ethiopia invaded Eritrea, the leadership in Ethiopia was dominated by Tigrayans, which ignited new animosities between Eritrea and Tigray. Abiy Ahmed, who became Ethiopian prime minister in 2018 and quickly made peace with Eritrea, is Oromo.

<sup>12</sup> Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999, 222).

French Somaliland twice voted to stay with France and only became independent as Djibouti after a third referendum in 1977. A small country it has huge strategic importance and is a major commercial hub between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Armed conflict between the two main parties erupted in the nineties but power sharing was agreed in 2000. The border conflict with Eritrea led to the deployment of Qatar peacekeeping forces until 2017. At the time of the Arab Spring, protests also took hold in Djibouti, but not much came of it and the same president has been reelected for a fifth term, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh. He is only the country's second president. IGAD is headquartered in Djibouti. No less than 9 countries have military bases in Djibouti, Germany, Spain, Italy, France, the United States, the UK, China, Saudi Arabia and Japan. The country has a defence cooperation treaty with France. It also serves as port for Ethiopia and became linked with Addis Abeba through a Chinese-built and financed electrified railway in 2018.

Troubles and brutality in Sudan are long-lasting. Sudan became independent in 1956. It has undergone at least four civil wars, the two first between the north and south, 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, and culminating in South Sudan's independence in 2011. Omar al-Bashir, who coup'ed himself to power in 1989, held on to it until 2019. The war in Darfur (the third civil war) started in 2003 when the sedentary, agricultural African population rebelled against the harassment by nomadic (Arabic) outsiders. The Bashir government then sent in the so-called Janjaweed militia, which operated with impunity in support of the invaders. International sanctions were put on Sudan in the period 1997-2017. After cessation of the main hostilities, the Janjaweed militia was enrolled into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under the country's security forces. After 2019 RSF has been headed by General Hemedti.<sup>13</sup> A formal peace settlement in Darfur was only reached in 2020 after al-Bashir had been deposed by a popular uprising in Khartoum demanding democracy. After a stint with a civilian transition government, a military coup took over the Sovereignty Council, and a power-sharing agreement was concluded between the military and the RSF, which in principle should be subservient to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The fourth civil war started in 2023 when RSF broke the agreement and went on a rampage in Khartoum, which together with Obdurman is or was home to 7 million people. Millions have fled.

Sudan has also intervened in Ethiopia. In 2008 it successfully reclaimed the contested Al Fashaga border area containing much fertile land. But strife broke out again during the 2020 Tigray war when Sudan tried to evict the Amharic<sup>14</sup> farmers from their land and supported the Tigray rebellion. There is no solution in sight.

Not long after South Sudan became independent in 2011, it was engaged in a devastating civil war, this time centring around the president, Salva Kiir, versus his former deputy, Riek Machar, whom he ousted accusing him of planning a coup. Presumably a deeper-lying cause was that the dominating group around the president kept oil revenues to themselves. Uganda intervened on behalf of the president. More than two and a half million people fled the country, mostly to Uganda but also Sudan, while others became internally displaced. A fragile peace was brokered in 2018 with Machar as vice president and Kiir as president. Substantial UN forces have been deployed to the country. The country is suffering under the

<sup>13</sup> On the RSF, see [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rapid\\_Support\\_Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rapid_Support_Forces).

<sup>14</sup> Most well-known Ethiopian ethnic group, Oriental Orthodox Christian.



current civil war in Sudan.

*Uganda* was never a colony of Britain but a protectorate. In 1900, Britain concluded an agreement with the Buganda king on land distribution and ownership. The king, the Kabaka, became the first president of Uganda in 1963, with Milton Obote, a northerner, as prime minister. Obote increasingly was at odds with the Kabaka, who in 1966 called in foreign military assistance, upon which his palace was attacked by Idi Amin, tasked with the job by Obote. The Kabaka fled to London. In 1967 a new constitution was adopted, making Uganda a full-blown republic, not depending in any formal way on the various kingdoms. After Obote became president, his next move was to nationalize the land and 'vest' it in the Uganda Land Commission. The Kabaka land (official mailo) was confiscated, but the private mailo land<sup>15</sup> was not. Obote lasted until 1971 when he was overthrown by Amin who subsequently issued a land decree, making all land public. Amin in turn was overthrown in 1979 with the help of Tanzanian troops after he had himself invaded Tanzania. A Military Commission was established. Voting in the elections in 1980 was fraught with fraud and animosities. Although on first count the Democratic Party (DP) won, the Military Commission chief (Obote ally) called for a recount which handed victory to the Obote party, UPC. Obote was back in power. This spurred Yoweri Museveni to organise a National Resistance Army, with basis in the western kingdoms, Ankole and Bunyoro, as well as parts of Buganda. This period is called the Bush War. In 1985 Obote fled the country subsequent to a military coup by his previous ally, Tito Okello, who in turn succumbed to the forces of Museveni in 1986.

Museveni reinstated traditional leaders in Uganda and promised to give the Kabaka his land back. The old king had died in the UK, but his son returned to the Mengo palace in Kampala in 1993 and reclaimed his land. Afterwards, relations have turned sour as Museveni will not fully recognize the rights of the Kabaka over the allocation of land, particularly not the rights to the former Crown Land in Buganda (mailo akenda), which the Kabaka wants administered by the Buganda Land Board.

Meanwhile conflict continued in 18 northern districts. Okello's troops had withdrawn to the north where his soldiers hailed from – Acholis mostly – and formed the Uganda People's Democratic Army. The Uganda People's Defense Force, the new military, followed and fought the remnants of the UPDA as well as Acholis in general. This rebellion was overshadowed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which commenced a reign of terror under a Christian heading, also fighting local people such as the Acholi, abducting civilians and in general conducting atrocities. LRA supported the Sudanese government in its civil war against Southern Sudan, which LRA invaded. However, this was put to an end, by and large, when Sudan and South Sudan entered the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 that led to South Sudan's independence in 2011. Various attempts at peace with Joseph Kony of the LRA failed and finally, the Ugandan army attacked his camp in DR Congo. By 2008 the war in the north was declared to be over. Now, conflicts centred around the ageing and

<sup>15</sup> The word 'mailo' is a Luganda form of 'mile', the land measurement of the 1900 Buganda Agreement concluded with the British, who generously 'gave' the Baganda their land in different allotments. There is both private and official mailo, but the common feature is the double nature of the land as owned and leased by different parties. Often just the word mailo is used, leaving open which type. The British also operated Crown Land, which became public land after independence, also known as 'mailo akenda' today.

autocratic Museveni are gaining force.

*Kenya's* fight for independence is for many non-Africans emblematic of the continent's struggle for liberation. The Mau Mau uprising targeted white settlers but also other Africans whom the colonial government and settlers had shuffled around the country and placed in 'native reserves' or as squatters on 'white' land so as to secure labour in the good old days of the White Highlands and Happy Valley parties – Whites had altogether 30,000 km<sup>2</sup> of the best farm land. The response of the colonial government to the Mau Mau fighters was brutal.<sup>16</sup> When Jomo Kenyatta took over the presidency, he performed a volte face and let settlers who had not fled during the uprisings keep their landed property. Also, a good number of Kikuyus said to be his cronies got substantial swaths of land for practically nothing. On the other hand, Kenyatta also established a number of settlement schemes for individual and group farms. All of this has continued to pit various ethnicities against each other but has also had the effect that much of Kenyan land is private or at least owner-registered property. It has created what the World Bank dreams of, land markets, making access to land expensive and, in combination with the various group jealousies, made for potential and actual conflicts that are spilling into the hastily growing urban areas. Kenyatta died in 1978 and was followed by his vice president, Daniel arap Moi, who remained until 2002. His reign was marred by suppression and persecution of opponents.

In many ways Kenya is considered a success, it is rapidly growing, has a lot of investments, is an East Africa hub and centre for international organizations and multinationals' African headquarters. But poverty is rampant and large slums scar Nairobi, slums that however show a surprising dynamism and are a breeding ground for political election-related violence. The current president, William Ruto, succeeded Uhuru Kenyatta (2013-2022) in 2022. Ruto was deputy president to Uhuru but the two fell out during the elections and Uhuru threw his weight behind Raila Odinga, son of another prominent politician of long standing, Oginga Odinga. Both Uhuru and Ruto were accused of having instigated post-election violence in 2007 before the International Criminal Court but charges were dropped. Al-Shabaab have attacked Kenya from time to time, in retaliation for Kenya's involvement in Somalia. It stood behind the Nairobi mall raid in 2013.

*Tanzania* became a British colony after WWI when the British and Germans engaged in an exhausting proxy (or copycat) war for the warring parties in Europe. At the end of WWI, the last German troops surrendered and after the war, the British took over. Zanzibar obtained independence in 1963, before Tanganyika, and shortly afterwards a leftist popular uprising directed against the Arab influence began in the island state. This movement was allied with the TANU party of Julius Nyerere in mainland Tanganyika. The two entities formed the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964 with Nyerere as first president. His leftist leanings proceeded to anger both the West and fellow Africans. The first East African Community (1967-1977) thus collapsed not least due to Tanzania's disaffection with Idi Amin, among others. Instead, at the end of the 1970's, Nyerere supported the deposed Milton Obote and sent troops to Kampala after Amin had invaded Tanzania. Nyerere is particularly famous for his Ujamaa policy, the collectivization of agriculture, a premature, badly planned and

<sup>16</sup> 'A Very British Way of Torture', is a recent reminder. The Rogan Productions documentary is directed by Edward McGown and was released on Channel 4 in 2022.

executed policy that was met with resistance by the population. The years of reign of Nyerere were characterized by falling raw materials prices and the two oil shocks, though. Various problems added to the economic woes, and Zanzibaris started to reignite their claims for independence and a more overt pro-Islamic identity – becoming member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Nyerere resigned voluntarily in 1985 and was followed by Zanzibari Ali Hassan Mwinyi who welcomed the IMF and its policies into Tanzania. A new constitution in 1992 allowed for multiparty elections. The next president, Benjamin Mkapa, nevertheless came from the hitherto single party allowed, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). So have the following presidents, Jakaya Kikwete and John Magufuli, who died in office, followed by his vice president Samia Suluhu Hassan, a Zanzibari woman. Chadema is a strong opposition party.

In *Rwanda* the long-standing feud between Tutsis and Hutus blew up in April 1994 when the Hutu president, Juvénal Habyarimana, signed a peace accord with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) but was killed – together with the president of Burundi – in a plane crash caused by surface-to-air missiles.

The animosity goes back to precolonial times, where Hutus were the sedentary agriculturalists, while the Tutsis were nomadic cattle holders. Tutsis established several kingdoms, and in the 18th century one of them became dominant. When the Germans colonized the country, they favoured the Tutsis and at first so did the Belgians who took over in 1917 and proceeded to classify the population into distinct ethnic groups, minority Tutsis (15%), majority Hutus (84%) and a small Twa population. Hutus were favoured by the Catholic church and resentment against the Tutsi 'upper class' grew. A Hutu leader was attacked, the Tutsis were blamed and the revolution of 1959 was a fact. The Belgian government changed their preference to the Hutus and when independence was reached in 1962, a Hutu became president while many Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries. Habyarimana was president, and increasingly authoritarian, from 1973 to his death in 1994. Meanwhile, in 1980 Tutsis organized in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had started to attack Rwanda from Uganda, at first unsuccessfully but when Paul Kagame took over the leadership and organised a full-blown invasion of Rwanda in 1990, things changed. He also got help from Museveni who had profited from RPF support during the 1980's Bush War (see above under Uganda). Peace negotiations began in 1992 and a government of both parties was formed in Kigali. But many on the Hutu side would not accept it. The day after the plane crash in April 1994, the well-prepared mass killings of Tutsis began. The rampage lasted until July when RPF had gained the upper hand. Peace was not assured, though. In 1996 Rwanda took up arms against fleeing Hutu rebels into Zaïre as DR Congo was called then.

UN peacekeeping forces had arrived in 1993 but the warnings by their leader, Roméo Dallaire, went unheeded, and they played rather a role as bystander. The French also played a role along with the UN and Belgian troops and were afterwards accused of not doing anything to prevent the genocide, if not directly aiding in it. The French has helped in training the Hutu-dominated army between 1990 and 1993. The killing of Habyarimana was generally thought to be orchestrated by Hutu militias, but later on it was ventured that Paul Kagame might have been responsible. When the genocide was over, Paul Kagame became vice president and president since 2000, suppressing the differentiation Hutu/Tutsi.

Kagame grew up in Uganda and had even participated in the Bush war. When in power he changed the official language in Rwanda from French to English. He is accused of having staged attacks on refugee camps in Zaire and was involved in removing Mobutu (First Congo War) in 1997. In the Second Congo War (1998-2003) Kagame launched a direct attack on Kinshasa, but was pushed back. He is also accused of profiting from mineral wealth in DR Congo. As president he is credited with advancing health, education and, generally, to be realizing ambitious development goals in Rwanda, but also accused of ruling with an iron fist.

*Burundi*, also first colonized by Germany, is in many ways a mirror image of Rwanda. It has the same population composition and was ruled by Belgium from the end of WWI until independence in 1962 when it started out as a kingdom that was however abolished some years later. The military was dominated by Tutsis, the police by Hutus. Two prime ministers were killed before 1962 and civil war and genocide ensued. Atrocities were committed by both sides, in 1972 predominantly by the Tutsis, in 1993 by the Hutus, roughly speaking. Altogether 250,000 people died between independence and 1993 when civil war broke out again, lasting until 2005. Various African leaders and even Bill Clinton have tried to broker peace, and the UN took an active role from June 2004. In 2005 a new constitution was adopted and various elections took place. Nevertheless, intermittently rebel groups have reignited war and the security situation remains fragile. The same president, Pierre Nkurunziza (former Hutu rebel), held on to power for 15 years, from 2005 to his death in office in 2020. His elected successor is Evariste Ndayishimiye. The country is extremely poor and overwhelmingly agricultural, exporting coffee and tea.

### 3.2 West Africa

In principle there are sixteen countries in West Africa, of which fifteen are members of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), all except Mauritania. Eight are members of WAEMU in English, UEMOA in French, the West African Economic and Monetary Union, umbrella organisation of the CFA franc in West Africa. Except one, Guinea-Bissau, they are all Francophone, Côte d'Ivoire, Bénin, Togo, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sénégal. Guinea and Mauritania are Francophone and not members.

Here we also include Western Sahara, which is not an independent country but a non-self-governing territory, split in two. Most of it is ruled, more or less incorporated, in Morocco, but its status is still disputed. Western Sahara tends to be overlooked as being in between West and North Africa.

Nigeria is the dominating power in West Africa. It is by far the most populous country in Africa and economically dynamic too. But its history of oil and gas exploitation has been dramatic and in many ways unfortunate, inviting major oil companies in and letting them run with much of the revenue – although a fair number of Nigerians also have enriched themselves along the way, among others through the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) which partners in all oil and gas developments. Major problems include the pollution caused by oil extraction which especially in former days took place without environmental regard, destroying the Niger delta and the livelihood of its population. Oil



production began in a major way in the 1950's and 1960's. Disaffected rebels – or just people – have revenged themselves and blown up pipelines and undertaken other sabotage activities. Also, Nigeria has had civil war, the Biafra war, which was immensely cruel, from 1967 to 1970. Religious, ethnic, political and economic (oil) issues all blended into a poisonous cocktail. After the military dictatorship (1966-1999) ended, the split north-south (Muslim-Christian) only intensified. Some northern states introduced sharia legislation, which was fought by the southern-dominated federal government. Boko Haram stems from 2002 and made itself particularly felt in 2009 when it kidnapped some 200 schoolgirls as a violent manifestation of its opposition to western education. It has spread out and gained influence in Niger, Chad and Cameroon and operates in northern Mali. It is affiliated with Islamic State. President Bola Tinubu, elected in 2023, has announced that he will privatize the oil and gas industry, arguing that this will diminish graft and assist in the country's development efforts! Nigeria is a leading force in ECOWAS whose headquarters is in Abuja.

*Benin*, formerly Dahomey, consisted of highly developed kingdoms in precolonial times which have left a rich treasure trove of artefacts. Its religious practices were brought with the forcefully removed population as slaves to Latin America (voodoo). The French cajoled and subdued the Dahomey kingdom in the late nineteenth century. A convention between the French and British determined the border with Nigeria in 1898 and, to the west, conventions with Germany in 1885 and 1899 drew the border towards Togo. Later on, the northern borders to Upper Volta (today Burkina Faso) and Niger were decided. Like other French colonies Dahomey became part of the French Community in 1959 and gained independence in 1960. It developed into a very unstable country, however, split between various regional/political groupings with coups d'état becoming the order of the day. Mathieu Kérékou's in 1972 resulted in major changes as he declared Dahomey, renamed People's Republic of Bénin, to be Marxist-Leninist. However, Kérékou himself abandoned the policy in 1989 and promoted liberalization of the economy. A new constitution was adopted following a national conference of major stakeholders and elections were held in 1991. Nicéphore Soglo became the new president. He was defeated by Kérékou in 1996 and again in 2001. From 2006 to 2016 a more finance-savvy president, Thomas Boni Yayi, held on to power amid protests and attempts at his life, claimed to be masterminded by a former collaborator, Patrice Talon. Nevertheless, in 2016 Talon managed to be elected president, which he is to this day, among increasing claims that he is dictatorial and does not respect human rights. Benin has for many years been a badly governed country from the point of view of public finances and its economy is slack. Cotton makes up 40% of exports. Its largest economic asset is the port of Cotonou which serves Niger, Burkina Faso and even Nigeria.

*Togo* was colonized by Germany as the protectorate Togoland. After World War I British and French troops occupied it upon which the League of Nations gave the east to France and the west to Britain to govern. After WWII Britain and France handed Togoland over to UN trusteeship but later, Britain incorporated its part in the Gold Coast (Ghana) while the French 'share' eventually became independent Togo. Togo's polity is entirely dominated by one family. The first Gnassingbé (the family), Eyadéma, governed from 1967 to 2005, to begin with as military dictator, later as president of a one-party state, and, finally, from 1992 as constitutionally elected president. Throughout his reign, massive protests and violent incursions of opposition forces from Ghana tried but never managed to throw Eyadéma off his seat. After his death, his son, Faure Gnassingbé, took over but was forced to accept

presidential elections plus made a Global Political Agreement to form a transition government leading up to democratic elections. He not only won the presidential election, but Faure is now in his fourth term. Accusations of fraud and corruption abound. Despite this, the two Gnassingbés are part of the armoury of Françafrique's African patrons.<sup>17</sup> Phosphate is the major export article from Togo which also has other minerals and in addition, the same agricultural raw materials as Bénin plus an important port in Lomé. It is somewhat richer, though.

*Ghana* has had its share of conflict. The first, internationally acclaimed president, Kwame Nkrumah, was ousted in 1966, accused of being dictatorial after he had instituted a one-party state. Although working for African socialism, he pursued major projects to rapidly industrialize the country, especially the Akosombo Dam with US financial backing and corporate interests in aluminium production. This also laid the seed to its indebtedness to the west. Jerry Rawlings got into power by means of a coup after a period of mostly military rule and held on to it for 20 years, from 1981 to 2001. Ghana, which is now lauded for its democratic credentials, has had relatively peaceful relations with its neighbours, except for a maritime border case with Côte d'Ivoire, decided in favour of Ghana. It also maintains strong traditional kingdoms and chiefdoms. The current president, Nana Akufo-Addo, was first elected in 2016 and is now in his second term. He has called for reparations to the African continent for slavery and, as a first thing, an apology. Although in many ways an economically dynamic country, Ghana is mired in debt and its currency is nearly constantly depreciating. Part of that is due to the fact that investments from the outside also mean financial outflow.

*Côte d'Ivoire*<sup>18</sup> has been in political trouble since the founding father, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, left this earth in 1993. Part of the problem is that what is now Burkina Faso and was Upper Volta in colonial days was governed together with Côte d'Ivoire under the federation of French West Africa. Many people (were) moved from Upper Volta to the south, particularly to work in cocoa plantations where some acquired land (without title).

The outcome of colonial and postcolonial expansion of cocoa growing was a lot of internal displacement, which became translated into a fight between the south and the north, Christian vs. Muslim and newly settled (foreign) versus original population. Two civil wars (2002-2007 and 2010-2011) ensued that involved border closings to Mali and Burkina. In the first war a major theme was keeping Alassane Ouattara, who had held top posts in the BCEAO (West African CFA zone central bank) and the IMF and was prime minister in the last Houphouët government, from getting elected as president, claiming that he was not even Ivorian, but Burkinabè. This was bolstered by an 'Ivoirité' movement. France intervened to protect the substantial number of French citizens in the country (20,000) by deploying up to 2,500 troops. In practice it came to be seen as being in favour of the southern-based government. At any rate its intervention caused criticism of neo-colonialism. ECOWAS tried to act as peacemaker and sent troops and UN also intervened, but peace was only concluded

<sup>17</sup> Two Togolese opposition figures wrote this opinion piece in *Le Monde en Commun*, 'Togo, pillar of Françafrique, fights for its freedom', seeing France as a helpmate to the family of Gnassingbé and thus contributing to the Togolese misery. <https://lemondeencommun.info/le-togo-pilier-de-la-francafrique-lutte-pour-sa-liberte/>. June 2, 2020.

<sup>18</sup> The country's name is correctly Côte d'Ivoire, also in English.



in Ouagadougou in 2007. Elections should be held but were postponed by the incumbent southern-based president, Laurent Gbagbo, until 2010. When Ouattara won the presidential election, Laurent Gbagbo refused to recognize the outcome because of some technicality, thus inciting the second civil war. In the end Ouattara's forces and French troops captured Gbagbo and Ouattara was recognized as the legitimate winner. He has remained president ever since.

In fact, Ouattara was much more a man of the West and neoliberalism than of ethnic and religious affiliations, but many opposing and contradictory forces were at play.

*Liberia* was never colonized. It was created by freed US slaves who acquired the land of what is now Liberia in 1847. It lived relatively peacefully until 1989. The two ensuing Liberian civil wars were brutal. Despite intervention by ECOWAS through ECOMOG<sup>19</sup> the first war lasted from 1989 to 1997, the second from 1999 to 2003. The cause of the wars was dissatisfaction with the Samuel Doe reign, which Charles Taylor had served until he was imprisoned for embezzlement. Taylor managed to flee from prison and sought refuge in Libya where he obtained backing for an invasion of Liberia through Côte d'Ivoire. After his capture, Doe was liquidated by a splinter faction of Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and Taylor himself was elected president. 'Peace' only lasted until 1999 when a rebel group supported by the Guinea government and another rebel group entering from the south took up arms against him. This was par for the course as Taylor had supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and an insurgency in Guinea. Taylor eventually submitted to peace negotiations in Ghana and has since been convicted of aiding and abetting in war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone, serving his 50-year sentence in a UK prison. The first president elected after Taylor was ousted was Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf who stayed on through two periods, followed by long-time foe, former top professional football player, George Weah.

*Sierra Leone*, which gained independence from Britain in 1961, had a number of military rulers until the first republic of 1971, in 1978 becoming a one-party state. A new multiparty constitution was adopted in 1991. At the same time a civil war began in the east that lasted for no less than 11 years. The government forces had difficulty dealing with RUF that dominated in the diamond-rich parts of the country. Charles Taylor supported the RUF rebels and got diamonds for the child soldiers and what else he supplied RUF with.<sup>20</sup> To strengthen its forces, the government hired the South African mercenaries, Executive Outcomes. When newly elected president, Ahmad Kabbah, signed a peace accord in Abidjan in 1996, he had to disband Executive Outcomes. This in turn reignited hostilities in 1997, this time instigated by army officers in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Forces who deposed Kabbah. RUF had joined in. Subsequently, ECOWAS intervened and sent its ECOMOG forces that retook Freetown and reinstated Kabbah in 1998. UN peacekeeping forces were also deployed to secure the new peace, which brought RUF into government and allowed it to continue to dominate in the diamond-rich areas. Hostilities were foisted again in 2000 after a year of 'peace'. With the support of the UN (UNAMSIL), Guinean air support and British forces, RUF was defeated and president Kabbah could finally be restored to power in 2002.

<sup>19</sup> Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group. This was ECOMOG's first intervention.

<sup>20</sup> It is from this war that the term 'conflict diamonds' was coined.

The ECOWAS and UN intervention in Sierra Leone was considered a major victory for peacekeeping. Today's president is Julius Bio who was reelected in June 2023.

*Guinea's* first ruler, Sékou Touré, took a different path from his Francophone neighbours and induced his fellow citizens to vote against joining the French Community. As a consequence, the country did not adopt the CFA franc. This happened already in 1958 when the fourth French republic broke down. Sékou Touré, former trade union leader and socialist, took the path of large-scale development and started bauxite mining in the country, besides nationalizations. Touré died in 1984 – just before a conference of the Organization of African Unity was to be held in Conakry. His successor became Lansana Conté who took over by a coup. Because he declared a non-socialist and market-oriented stance, he started out on good terms with western-dominated financial institutions such as the World Bank. He also declared that he would ensure the respect of human rights but over time he became more authoritarian, inept and corruptible. It was also rumoured that he opened the doors to narco barons. After his death in 2008 he was followed by two military rulers who accessed power through coups. However, in 2010 the first 'free' elections were held and Alpha Condé, a civilian, was elected. By means of an amendment he changed the constitution so that he could be elected for a third term. This he was, but in September 2021 a military coup was staged by Mamadi Doumbouya, a young military leader, who took over, claiming that Alpha Condé was corrupt. The latter had otherwise been supported by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change with respect to mining law and concessions. Doumbouya has entered an agreement on transition to civilian rule, but ECOWAS is getting impatient and has imposed economic sanctions (non disbursement on two energy projects) besides suspending Guinea from ECOWAS. Despite these political upheavals, the long-awaited finalization of the agreement to build the Transguinean railway and a major port for the evacuation of iron ore from the vast Simandou mine has just been concluded.

What is now *Guinea-Bissau* was not easy for the Portuguese to truly dominate. As late as 1936 the Portuguese were still engaged in 'pacification' missions. In 1956 a liberation movement under the famous revolutionary Amílcar Cabral, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC), started a campaign to free not only Portuguese Guinea but also Cabo Verde – the two had in earlier times been ruled together. The party organised a regular army (1963) and gained control of most of the country. Independence was declared in 1973 – after Cabral had been killed – and formalized by Portugal in 1974. The first president was Cabral's brother who was unseated in 1980 by a coup staged by his military commander/prime minister, João Bernardo Vieira. This led to a split with the Cabo Verde comrades. The country spiralled downward economically. Multiparty democracy was introduced in the early nineties, but Vieira still won. After joining the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, UEMOA in French), Vieira got into conflict with his military chief, leading to intervention by Guinea and Senegal.<sup>21</sup> In 1999 he left for exile. No less than five presidents/military committee chairmen followed in short succession. The result was that Vieira was returned to power in 2005, duly elected. He was killed in 2009 as was a number of other military and political figures. Another major coup took place in 2012. This time ECOWAS and the African Union intervened and sanctions were imposed. At the

<sup>19</sup> There were accusations about one or another of the Guinea-Bissau warring parties smuggling weapons to Casamance.

elections in 2014 PAIGC was back in the running, and its candidate, Mário Vaz, won. However, this did not lead to much progress and the next election was for a long time contested by both top candidates. In 2022 another coup was attempted but the president elected in 2019, Umaro Sissoco Embaló of the Movement for Democratic Alternation Group of 15 (MADEM G-15), is still in place. Guinea-Bissau is reputed to be a major drug smuggling hub.<sup>22</sup>

*The Gambia* is just a small strip of land around the Gambia River which the British made part of the British Empire in 1765. Independence came exactly 200 years later. Years of increasing autocratic and strict Muslim rule was introduced by Yahya Jammeh in 1994, who among others declared that Gambia was an Islamic state. He lost the election in 2016 but refused to cede. At the end, and after intervention by ECOWAS, he did so, and Adama Barrow became president with reelection in 2022. The Gambia has a proportionally large tourism sector and a significant community of expatriates. Otherwise, farming and fishing are mainstays. The Gambia exited the Commonwealth of Nations in the period 2013 to 2018 and was temporarily in a confederation with Sénégal, Senegambia, from 1982 to 1989.

*Senegal*, which is otherwise known to be peaceful and with relatively good and competent presidents, even statesmen such as Léopold Senghor (1960-1980) and Abdou Diouf (1981-2000), has seen a secessionist movement emerge in Casamance in 1982, which is partly separated from Senegal by The Gambia and bordering Guinea-Bissau to the south. It has a certain degree of Portuguese heritage and a larger portion of Catholics than the rest of Senegal. But most importantly, the rebels want to protect their traditionalist land regime which deviates from that of Senegal as a whole, in particular after Senegal nationalized all land in 1990. Opposition to incumbent president Macky Sall, who is a staunch western ally, has led Sall to abandon plans to change the constitution's two-term limit.

*The Islamic Republic of Mauritania* eschews some of the traditional ex-colonial traps. Arab tribes invaded Mauritania before the Portuguese arrived and various distinctions to this day are connected with Arabs (nomads) and Africans respectively, as well as to their skin colour. France first secured dominance by treaties with emirs and included it as a protectorate in French West Africa in 1903. Although the country proved difficult for France to 'pacify', it was so vast that unless there was open revolt, everybody did their own. In 1958 Mauritania joined the French Community prior to independence in 1960. Mauritania has vacillated between its Arab and African identities and alliances, leaving the West African currency (FCFA) zone in 1973 and ECOWAS in 1999. It became the first African member of the Arab League in 1973.

After independence, Morocco kept invading but in 1969 it accepted Mauritania's status in order to gain an ally in its claim on Western Sahara. Although Mauritania for a time also wanted a share of Western Sahara, in 1979 it signed a treaty with the liberation movement Polisario, bringing itself into fresh conflict with Morocco. A new president, Ould Taya, took power through a coup and normalized relations with Morocco (1985). Mauritania and Senegal had a very potent border conflict 1989-1992, expelling each other's citizens, closing

<sup>22</sup> See 'Still a narco-state? Guinea-Bissau's illegal drug economy', by Lorraine Mallinder, posted on 27 March 2018 by Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.

<sup>23</sup> Baum (2023).

the border etc. Nevertheless, Ould Taya held on to power for many years, 1984-2005. A couple of years of instability were followed by a new constitution and elections. The first elected president did not sit for long. Instead General Ould Abdel Aziz staged a coup and was subsequently elected president (2009). Despite being shot he continued his presidency after a brief medical interval, engineered constitutional changes, resigned and handed over power to his duly elected former close collaborator Ould Ghazouni in 2019. Ould Abdel Aziz was indicted and convicted of corruption afterwards.

*Western Sahara* including the *Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic* (SADR) is still disputed. The huge, very sparsely populated territory was occupied by Spain until 1975. Afterwards the UN renamed it from Spanish Sahara to Western Sahara. It has been listed as a non-self-governing territory by the UN since 1963. Morocco has claimed it since 1957. For a while after 1975 Morocco and Mauritania ruled it jointly but Mauritania gave up its claims in 1979. The UN keeps promising the right of the Sahrawi people to vote on its future, but this is forever postponed. The difficulty has proved to be the determination of who has the right to vote. A ceasefire was concluded in 1991 according to which Morocco governs about two thirds of the territory along the coast, the rest is in the hands of the Polisario movement ruling the rest under the name of SADR, governing from a refugee camp in Algeria. It is member of the African Union. In 2020 the ceasefire broke down, and the US recognized Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara that same year, followed by Israel in 2023.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, some 50 states recognize SADR. Some African governments support the Moroccan claim, though. Fisheries and phosphate mining are the two important resources. However, exploiting the rights without the acceptance of the Western Sahara people was deemed illegal as per international law by the UN in 2004, which has diminished activities.

In the wake of the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 through NATO military intervention in Libya, first *Mali* and later Burkina Faso succumbed to Islamist globalized and internal armed rebellion. In 2012 a military coup took place in Mali in response to the government's lack of success at quelling a Tuareg conflict, which was supported by soldiers who had fought in Libya on Gaddafi's side. Moreover, at that time AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb) had started destabilizing northern Mali. Various attempts at bringing order failed and the coup government remained in place. In the course of 2013 civilian rule was reinstated, however, and seasoned politician Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was elected president. A peace accord was signed with the rebels (Tuaregs notably) in Algiers in 2015. Keïta lasted until 2020 when he was felled by a coup and resigned. Involvements by former colonial power France and the UN to ensure peace in Mali proved highly unsuccessful. A follow-up coup then was orchestrated in 2021 by vice president Assimi Goïta<sup>25</sup> against the interim president, Bah Ndaw. To this day (August 2023) Goïta is still interim president. Condemnations of the coup by ECOWAS (and suspension of membership), France, the UN and the US followed. France even suspended cooperation with the Malian military in the north. Things developed further and French and other western troops were forced to leave the country. Instead, the Wagner Network was invited in. The fighting in the north is not abating. Now, two jihadist groups are fighting each other, one is Al-Qaeda affiliated, JNIM, the other, Islamic State in the

<sup>24</sup> The Trump deal was that Morocco would take up diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for Western Sahara.

<sup>25</sup> Goïta was also the coup leader in 2020.



Greater Sahara, is, as the name says, related to Islamic State. The latter is gaining ground.

In *Burkina Faso* Blaise Compaoré was felled in 2014 by a popular uprising. He was not least unpopular because of persistent claims that he was behind the killing of national icon and revolutionary father, Thomas Sankara, who had practically transformed the economy during his short reign from 1983 to 1987. Compaoré became president in 1991 and ruled in a relatively benign fashion, although – even if he seemed to try – unable to solve the country's major problems of poverty and declining environmental conditions. Instead, he favoured both major mining companies and artisanal gold mining. He was also an ally of Gaddafi and was helping Charles Taylor in his endeavours, possibly laundering diamonds smuggled out of Sierra Leone.<sup>26</sup> After he was disempowered, he took domicile in Côte d'Ivoire and has been convicted in absentia for the murder of Sankara. His successor, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, an economist and former prime minister, was elected president in 2015 and 2020, i.e. he represented no real break with the Compaoré policies, and in January 2022 he also fell by a coup. Already by that time Burkina had been rolled into the Mali conflicts, which magnified its own problems so that up to 2 million people had been internally displaced. Jihadist militancy is strengthened by conflicts around gold mining and peasant land rights or evictions from land.<sup>27</sup> A second military coup took place at the end of September 2022 by Ibrahim Traoré who has aligned himself with Mali and now Niger. Burkina Faso is also suspended from ECOWAS.

*Niger* only became a French colony under the French West Africa Federation in 1922 as not least the Tuaregs resisted subjugation. Most of its life as an independent nation after 1960 has been under military rule, interspersed with Tuareg rebellion. In the 1990's and again after 2011 civilian rule was restored but, once again, in 2023 a military coup threw over the government, which had become the last Western bastion in the Sahel. African refugees or migrants had for a long time taken the route through Niger to Libya, but this was struck down or seriously diminished some years back. Niger had received considerable fresh Western aid before the coup in July 2023 and harbors US drone bases. For many years French Areva, now Orano, has mined uranium in the far north. Oil is exploited by Chinese companies. Given the size of the possible production, a 2,000 km oil pipeline from Agadem in Niger to a Benin port is under construction, but its fate is uncertain under the circumstances. The coup leader, Abdourahmane Tchiani, was head of the presidential guard and possibly wanted to forestall being dismissed by the former president Mohamed Bazoum.

### 3.3 Central Africa

Liberation struggles in many instances morphed into conflicts related to natural resources, oil, gas and minerals. Central Africa is the least internationally known part of Africa, except for the broad notion of the Congo – in fact two countries. Belgian Congo was colonized by king Leopold II of Belgium and Equatorial Guinea by Spain, but most of the rest came to be

<sup>26</sup> Numerous references testify to this. Among others Chatham House which here sums the score card of Blaise Compaoré: [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field\\_document/Burkina%20Faso%20Beyond%20Compaore%20summary\\_JM\\_0.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/Burkina%20Faso%20Beyond%20Compaore%20summary_JM_0.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> Raineri (2020, 107).

dominated by the French, eventually. Thus four of today's countries, Congo-Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Chad and Gabon were assembled in French Equatorial Africa 1910-1958. With French Cameroon they formed the core of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community<sup>28</sup> as it is now called, harbouring the Central African CFA franc. DR Congo is not participating. Later Equatorial Guinea joined in. All of these countries are overwhelmingly extractive economies, be it mining of base or rare metals, timber, diamonds or oil and even gold.

In 1960 when *Congo* became independent from Belgium, the copper-producing Katanga region and Kasai declared secession. In fact, the mineral-dominating white (Belgian) interests were behind. Peace-keeping forces were deployed by the UN but were not given sufficient instruments to be of real help. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba then called in assistance from the Soviet Union and was killed shortly afterwards. Katanga continued to claim secession under Moïse Tshombe. This lasted until 1964 when an enlarged UN peacekeeping force (UNOC) succeeded in quelling the Katangese independence rebellion. In this it probably went beyond its mandate. Subsequently, in 1965, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, previously Army Chief of Staff and – with Belgian officers – behind the Lumumba killing,<sup>29</sup> orchestrated a coup to bring himself to power and renamed the country Zaire. Mobutu Seke Seko as he now called himself enjoyed the blessing of western powers until just before his death in 1997. To such an extent that he got help from both Belgium and France to subdue the two Shaba (formerly Katanga) rebellions in 1977 and 1978 which continued the fight for secession from Zaire, supported this time by the Soviet Union. Mobutu was ousted in 1997 by a liberation army led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila that had for years been gathering forces in Eastern Congo. He cooperated with Rwanda in fomenting the first Congo War and afterwards headed to Kinshasa via Lubumbashi, Katanga. Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and followed by his son, Joseph, who had received military training in China. Joseph concluded peace with the foreign-backed rebels in the second Congo War, but was never able to ensure peace, relying heavily on UN forces, MONUSCO, which however are also subject to criticism. Joseph Kabila finally agreed not to run for president in 2019 and was followed by his preferred candidate, Félix Tshikédi, who since then has distanced himself from Kabila. Who may again run for president.

There is continuous trouble in the east where Rwandan-supported M23 rebels<sup>30</sup> are a heavy presence fighting the government. Now rare earth minerals are the cause of much trouble in the – in 1997 again renamed – Democratic Republic of Congo.

North of the Congo river, Brazzaville, today the capital of the *Republic of Congo* (1969-1992 the People's Republic of Congo), became the capital of French Equatorial Africa in 1908. It was the centre of the Free French forces during WWII. Thus, it was in Brazzaville that Charles de Gaulle proclaimed that decolonization should be undertaken after the war. A few

<sup>28</sup> In French: Communauté Economique et Monétaire des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), not to be confused with CEEAC-ECCAS which stands for the Economic Community of Central African States and which includes as members the six from CEMAC plus Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda and São Tomé and Príncipe.

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/story/how-did-patrice-lumumba-die>.

<sup>30</sup> The Congolese Revolutionary Army, also called M23, founded in 2012. It consists of soldiers opposed to the government.



years after independence in 1960, Marien Ngouabi, a Marxist-Leninist and for many a revolutionary hero, took over and ruled from 1969 until he was assassinated in 1977. Altogether Congo has seen a lot of unrest, but one man has ruled with a tough hand for most of the time since 1979, Denis Sassou-Nguesso. He was elected out for a few years in the nineties but forced himself back in 1997. Ever since, he has presented himself at presidential elections and won, more or less legitimately, the last time for a fourth term in 2021 (not counting the period before 1997). He has now reinvented himself as elder statesman in African conflicts, but without much success (Central African Republic, DR Congo/Rwanda and Libya). What is behind this besides personal ambition, is hard to see. Sassou is – or has been – firmly in the French camp. Congo nearly entirely depends on oil production. Prior to 2014 it reached middle-income status but by 2020 it was back in the low-income category.

*Central African Republic (CAR)* is probably the closest to a failed state on the continent. It has had a troubled history throughout independence, experiencing the mad 'Emperor' Bokassa and civil strife fuelled by diamonds and timber. Political rivalries, coups and botched elections have made for very unstable governance. Since 2012 the two factions, the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka, have been fighting over land and resources, the Séléka in many ways corresponding to the Janjaweed in Sudan while the Anti-Balaka are the sedentary population. Since 2018 CAR has become one of the main clients of the Wagner Network, which is propping up the regime of the incumbent president since 2016, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, and directing his upcoming election campaign.

*Chad* has had troubles ever since independence from France in 1960. From 1965-1979 the conflict was between rebels from the north against the southern-based regime. In 1979 Hissène Habré (northern-based) won. At the same time, Libya under Gaddafi intervened militarily in Chad with the purpose of capturing the northern strip of Chad, Aouzou. Libya was stopped in 1987 by French forces and subsequently a peace was brokered.

In 1990 Habré was overturned by his deputy Isiss Déby. FACT (Front pour l'alternance et la concorde au Tchad) was established in 2016 in the north. Originally opposed to the Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar (Tobruk-based and supported by Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt), it later became allied with it. Déby, who was elected six times, was killed by FACT rebels in 2021 after which his son, Mahamat, set up a Transitional Military Council by a coup. Meanwhile there are claims that FACT was trained by the Wagner Network. Elections are scheduled for 2024, but many are worried by Déby fils' open attempt at securing his own power. To be noted that Isiss Déby was considered an ally of the US and France.

Relations with Sudan have also been conflictual, with Chad interchangeably supporting both the indigenous population which spanned the border between the two countries, as well as the invaders. After war broke out in Darfur, Chad felt the impact through fleeing refugees and was even involved in the hostilities. In 2010 Déby and Al-Bashir settled their disagreements, but the deputy of the Sovereignty Council in Sudan, Hemedti (leader of RSF) started to reignite troubles with Chad after the fall of Bashir. Thus the fourth civil war in Sudan is spilling over into Chad where what is left of FACT is allied with RSF. A warning from 2019 seems prophetic, "Already, tribalism and Arab supremacism, influenced by Sudanese and Libyan politics, increasingly affect Chad, with Arab attacks against non-Arab

civilians taking place in both eastern Chad and in gold mining areas straddling the Chad-Libya border."<sup>31</sup>

*Cameroon* was subject to mixed colonial blessings. After decline of the slave trade, British and American traders and missionaries set up coastal stations but by 1884 Germans made serious inroads into the interior and established plantations. This lasted until after WWI, when the country was split into two League of Nations mandates, British and French Cameroon. The former was by far the smallest, being made up of a narrow strip along the border with Nigeria where cultivation of coffee, cocoa and bananas took hold. Larger developments were furthered in French Cameroon, including better health, education and infrastructure. When independence neared, British Cameroon was split in two, the north voting to join Nigeria, the south going to Cameroon.

In the two English-speaking regions of the country, Northwest and Southwest, problems came to a head in 2016 and separatists even declared secession and a new state by the name of Ambazonia. The minimum demand is a return to the federal system that lasted from 1961 to 1972. Meanwhile, the brutal military fighting against the separatists has left many dead. In addition, so-called Mbororo Fulani (nomadic in origin) claim that they are persecuted by the secessionists. Boko Haram is making inroads in the north.<sup>32</sup>

The first president of united Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, combined authoritarianism with the launching of major projects, many of which failed, but some remain to this day. He ruled until 1982. Paul Biya who has been president ever since is a hardline Françafrique acolyte. A conflict with Nigeria over the peninsula Bakassi starting in 1993 was only resolved in 2008 after it had been decided in Cameroon's favour by the International Court of Justice in the Hague in 2002.

*Gabon* was gradually dominated by the French at the end of the 19th century and became a colony within French Equatorial Africa. Despite opposing French colonialism, Gabon has retained close ties with France since independence in 1960. A mutiny during the first president, Léon M'ba, was quenched by de Gaulle's forces and in the wake of this, Omar Bongo became strongman – from 1967 until his death in 2009.<sup>33</sup> He even instituted multiparty democracy but ensured that he kept winning. Accusations of corruption and the siphoning off of the country's oil revenues in favour of the first family have not really impacted on the country's direction and in particular, its dynastic tendencies. The French links persist, the Bongo family is if any stalwarts of 'Françafrique'. Omar procured several mansions around the world. Some of those in France have since been seized. Omar's son Ali Bongo who took over from his father in 2009, was later on elected and reelected in 2016 but faced strong opposition. He ran again in 2023 after the presidential term limit was lifted, purported to win, but was overthrown in a well-orchestrated military coup immediately thereafter. The coup reflects deep-seated discontent with the uninterrupted and self-serving Bongo rule. Ali made major efforts at large-scale infrastructure developments and took 'green' initiatives,

<sup>31</sup> Tubiana & Verjee 2019.

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cameroon/History> and <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/cameroon>.

<sup>33</sup> Omar Bongo married, as his last wife, the daughter of Denis Sassou-N'Guesso, 40 years his junior. At this time their son, Omar Jr., is said to contend for the presidency, supported by Sassou.

making himself palatable to 'progressive' western liberals. In oil TotalEnergies has traditionally been dominating, but now plays a less prominent role, having divested itself of some assets while renewing production sharing agreements with the government in others. The government set up the Gabon Oil Company in 2011 in order to get more revenue to itself, claiming ownership interest in all petroleum developments.

*Equatorial Guinea* is split between the mainland and the insular part, the largest of which is Bioko (previously Fernando Po) with the capital Malabo. It became independent from Spain in 1968 after a referendum. The first president was Francisco Macías Nguema who declared himself president for life, but in 1979 he was overturned by his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who is still president. Obiang has made various manoeuvres to make the country look more democratic, but he rules with a heavy hand. An attempted coup in 2004 to install opposition politician Severo Moto was nearly comical.<sup>34</sup> The enormous oil riches that have accrued to the small country since the mid 1990's has created some wealthy people and generated prestige construction projects, but generally the population remains poor and dependent on agriculture. Obiang has appointed one of his sons – a legendary lover of luxury cars – as his successor. Both Obiangs are involved in highly publicized financial scandals and subject to international corruption investigations. ExxonMobile and Hess Corporation are complicit. A new capital city named Ciudad de la Paz is being built on the mainland. Equatorial Guinea in 1984 acceded to the Central African FCFA zone.

### 3.4 Southern Africa

Southern Africa here encompasses 10 countries, as the Indian Ocean nations in the region are assembled in a special category. Politically, in modern times, Southern African countries have to a large extent been formed in contrast and interaction with South Africa which for years intervened in neighbouring countries to prevent their liberation. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was set up in 1980 by the 'frontline states' Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland (now Eswatini), Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia joined in 1990. SADCC changed name to Southern African Development Community (SADC), with South Africa joining after 1994. Later on, the four Indian Ocean island nations, Madagascar, the Comoros, the Seychelles and Mauritius became members.<sup>35</sup>

Strife in *Angola* lasted for more or less 27 years, 1975 to 2002 as the independence movement developed into civil war, eventually concentrated around and fortified by its major export articles, oil and diamonds, until agreement was reached between the major movements in 2002. In reality the left-leaning MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola), in control of the oil resources, won. UNITA dominated diamonds. Major powers were heavily involved too. The Soviet Union was behind the winning faction MPLA, with Cuba up front, while UNITA was supported by the US, and more directly by apartheid South Africa (also

<sup>34</sup> The Boeing 727 bound for Equatorial Guinea was intercepted in Harare and the main financier, Mark Thatcher, was later on detained and convicted in South Africa. An advance team was arrested in Equatorial Guinea.

<sup>35</sup> Tanzania, still a member, belongs to Eastern Africa in our classification.

linked to diamonds). As a subplot the FNLA (Frente Nacional para la Libertação de Angola), a rightist movement, had support from Mobutu who among others impeded the passage through Zaire of MPLA troops training in Congo-Brazzaville. Also China was in FNLA's camp. The war is therefore often seen as a proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union and, to a smaller degree, China, but corporate interests were not far behind. A number of dirty deals, later litigated through court cases, among others against major French oil company ELF Aquitaine (now merged into Total Energies) for its role in the war, the Angolagate – arms-for-oil – scandal, ensued. The first president and liberation hero, Marxist-Leninist Agostinho Neto heading the MPLA, ruled for four years until his death. He was followed by José Eduardo dos Santos, who stayed in power nearly without interruption from 1979 until 2017 when he stepped down. The new president, João Lourenço, has followed an independent agenda and took down the two most prominent of dos Santos' children, not least the ultrarich Isabel dos Santos who had been named chairman of the oil company Sonangol shortly before her father's resignation.

Cabinda is an enclave bordered by DRC and Congo but part of Angola. It is also very oil-rich. Its status is the following: An 1885 treaty granted Cabinda a separate status as a Portuguese protectorate. Angola annexed it at independence which prompted resistance from the Front of the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). In 2006 a peace agreement was concluded but intermittent fighting has erupted since then, albeit not instigated by FLEC.

*Namibian* independence in 1990 became intertwined with Angola's when a *quid pro quo* was made in 1988 that would diminish Soviet and Cuban influence in Angola against South Africa accepting Namibia's independence. The colonization by Germany of Namibia, or South West Africa as it was called, was brutal, involving genocide of the Herero and Nama peoples. In addition, an apartheid regime was introduced where the 'natives' were relegated to reserves. South African Boers invaded at the end of WWI and De Beers set up diamond mining. South Africa even usurped the League of Nations mandate over Namibia that Britain had let it administer on its behalf and deployed its apartheid techniques of homeland administrations and contract labour. After WWII the UN took back its mandate, but this did not deter South Africa. The liberation movement SWAPO was created in 1958, with its origin in Ovamboland. Fighting went on for many years. South African defeat was caused by its being hammered back when it, in 1988, for a second time invaded Angola. Politically, SWAPO has been dominating ever since. Sam Nujoma, its leader, became president, a post he held on to until 2004. Since then, two SWAPO presidents have been elected, the latest one is Hage Geingob who is now in his third term.

*South Africa* is still a major factor in Africa although it is itself being weakened. ANC's long struggle for freedom and racial equality led to the end of apartheid with a new constitution and the accession to power of Nelson Mandela in 1994. However, the hopes for a better life for the majority of the population have been disappointed. Relative poverty of Blacks is still high and no substantial structural change has taken place in the economy. One president, Jacob Zuma (2009-2018), decidedly abused his power. There is widespread disappointment with the ANC among its supporters – also with the current president, Cyril Ramaphosa – and new parties and coalitions are being formed. The sad fact is that today many social and infrastructural systems do not function, such as the electricity supply, health and education.



South Africa has continued to play a major role in many African conflicts, fortunately not the role that it played during the apartheid days in not least Angola, Namibia and Mozambique. Whether it has been a major factor in peacekeeping is another question. What can be said is that the former president Thabo Mbeki's (1999-2008) dreams of African Renaissance, a resuscitation of a 1960 Senegalese writer's ideas, have not exactly come to fruition. South Africa was active in creating the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001, now under the AU Development Agency.

*Mozambique* obtained independence in 1975 after FRELIMO (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique) had fought the Portuguese for independence since 1962. The liberation leader and self-declared Marxist-Leninist, Samora Machel, was leader of FRELIMO and first president. The constitution was effectively for a one-party state and Machel proceeded to nationalize rental housing and take over main social institutions. Seventeen years of rebellion by opposition forces in RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), supported by South Africa and even by Malawi, followed. During this time FRELIMO was involved in ZANU's fight in Zimbabwe. After a meeting in Zambia on the situation in Southern Africa (Angola, Zaïre) Machel died in a plane crash in 1986. He was succeeded by Joaquim Chissano who concluded a comprehensive General Peace Agreement in 1992, which involved 'no prosecution, no punishment'. UN peacekeeping helped in demobilizing the forces of both parties and their integration into the national army. Chissano won presidential elections in both 1994 and 1999. Afterwards he has become a generally praised international statesman. RENAMO opposition forces are rearing their head from time to time. In 2017 troubles started in the northern province, Cabo Delgado, where the exploitation of large gas deposits and the construction of a gas pipeline to be built by TotalEnergies threatened local livelihoods. This conflict became intertwined with opposition to a ruby mine. Professional Islamist configurations such as Al-Shabaab and Al-Sunnah Wal-Jamâa joined in.<sup>36</sup> The Wagner Network was called upon by the government in 2019 but proved ineffective and left. Rwandan forces proved to be more effective. The current president is Felipe Nyusi.

Independence of *Zimbabwe* not only pitted the black population against the white settlers, but also had a significant element of warring factions. ZANU vs. ZAPU, Robert Mugabe vs. Joshua Nkomo, Shona vs. Ndebele. Going back in history, the subduing of Southern Rhodesia – as it came to be known – by the private company of Cecil Rhodes in 1902, was fraught with opposition. It was not until 1923 that Southern Rhodesia got a constitution as a self-governing colony of Britain. Large areas of the country became reserved for white settlers while the sedentary population got the marginalized areas. The UK consolidated Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi) to one Central African Federation in 1953 but unity did not hold. Opposition grew, the federation was dissolved in 1963 and Zambia and Malawi became independent in 1964. But Southern Rhodesia still had no majority rule and UK would not grant it independence before that. This prompted prime minister Ian Smith to declare unilateral independence of Rhodesia (UDI) in 1965. The UK raised the issue in the UN, which imposed sanctions. Civil war ensued with ZAPU and ZANU also fighting against each other. Both were left-leaning, but ZAPU more

<sup>36</sup> Sozinho Francisco Matsinhe, 'An Overview of the Conflict in Cabo Delgado: Narratives, causes and strategies on the way forward' April 19, 2021. URL: <https://www.acCORD.org.za/analysis/an-overview-of-the-conflict-in-cabo-delgado-narratives-causes-and-strategies-on-the-way-forward/>.

aligned with the Soviet Union, ZANU with China. Finally, a settlement was reached with the Lancaster House Agreement. Elections in 1980 were won by ZANU leader Mugabe, who stayed on as president until 2017. Matabeleland protests were quenched brutally by the president who consolidated his power. Nevertheless, Nkomo's party (ZAPU) merged with that of Mugabe in 1987 to ZANU-PF. Land reform was not settled in the Lancaster Agreement, and Mugabe delayed it until, suddenly in 2000, a fast-track land reform was adopted which evicted many white farmers from their land and divided it up on small farmers – and Mugabe cronies. Whatever the justification, the result was falling maize production where Zimbabwe had hitherto been immensely successful. Also, support systems were not in place for the new farmers. The country was sanctioned, had to leave the Commonwealth and the US froze funding to the government. In this way the economy spiralled down and has gone through hyperinflation and multiple currency regimes. Zimbabwe is still not back in the fold of the Commonwealth although it has started the process to rejoin under president Emmerson Mnangagwa, reelected in 2023, who followed Mugabe when he was forced to resign.

*Zambia*, formerly Northern Rhodesia, was colonized by Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company, who received a charter by the British Government to stake out what is now Zambia. At first it was mainly used as a source of labour to work in the mines in neighbouring colonies. The best land was reserved for the Whites and some set up commercial farms, primarily maize-growing. Copper and lead mining started – the Copperbelt has to a large extent been Zambia's destiny ever since. Mine workers improved their conditions during WWII and immediately afterwards, setting up trade unions, even with encouragement from the British Labour government. The Central African Federation, the attempt in 1953 by the Conservative UK government to unite the Whites of its southern African dependencies, lasted until 1963 when all and sundry (Whites and Black) had become disaffected. But not only that, the new leader, Kenneth Kaunda, organized civil obedience. Elections gave his ZANU/UNIP majority in the parliament elected under a new constitution as the prelude to the country becoming independent in 1964. Zambia has very much been a victim of its neighbours ever since. UDI in Zimbabwe hurt it economically and politically. As a countermeasure China stood for the financing and construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad (TAZARA) to ensure an alternative transport corridor.<sup>37</sup> Troubles affecting Zambia continued to the west and south. Kaunda, who in turn became more dictatorial, got into trouble with the IMF over food subsidies which he granted in response to food riots in the eighties. Finally, more parties were allowed and Kaunda lost the 1991 election. He tried to come back but was unsuccessful or prevented from it. But the country was no better off and public sector strikes were damaging. Ever since, the economy is skirting along and remains plagued by debt, not least related to copper. On the plus side, better infrastructure has been secured. Elections have been troubled and contested, but basically respected. The current president, since 2021, is Hakinde Hichelema.

What is now *Malawi* became a protectorate of Britain in 1893 and later on was known as Nyasaland. British colonizers settled early on and started to develop cash crops. A nationalist

<sup>37</sup> It has not functioned too well and in addition, it ceased to be in demand after the independence of Zimbabwe and the new dispensation in South Africa. However, Tanzania and Zambia have agreed to reconstruct it as a standard-gauge railroad through a public-private partnership.



movement under Hastings Banda grew up and without much todo the country gained independence in 1963 at the dissolution of the Central African Federation. Banda became increasingly single-minded and declared himself president for life in 1971. He favoured cash crops such as tobacco and had a solid hand in the direction of the country. However, in the 1980's the economy went south and opposition started to gather. In 1994 multiparty elections were held. Banda lost to Bakili Muluzi who won a second, albeit not undisputed, term. His successor, Bingu wa Mutharika, held on to power despite all types of accusations at the end. He died in office and was followed by Joyce Banda who restored relations with the IMF and donors. Anyway, the story continues, and Peter Mutharika, brother of the deceased Mutharika, came to power until a rerun election in 2020 which saw a new president, Lazarus Chakwera. There have been many corruption charges over the years and Malawi has had shaky relations with donors who in all likelihood are harsher on Malawi than other countries because of its small size.

*Botswana.* The British made sure to keep a corridor open between the Germans in South West Africa and the Boers of Transvaal. The British South Africa Company first took over Bechuanaland upon which it became a protectorate and staging ground for incursions into what is now Zimbabwe. The protectorate was administered from Mafeking in South Africa. In fact, it was assumed that Bechuanaland would be handed over to South Africa, with which it had close ties (labour migration), but as diamonds were found, the clamours for independence grew along with opposition to the South African-style apartheid that had been introduced. Independence came in 1965. The first president was a royal who ruled until 1980. Botswana was a founding member of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, now only SADC, which was at the time a vehicle for opposition to apartheid among the frontline states (as they came to be called). Botswana was drawn into the conflicts of Namibia in the 1980's, suffering some raids. It has since then had problems with Namibia on the subject of the Caprivi strip from where refugees fled to Botswana.<sup>38</sup> The country is generally lauded for low corruption and good governance and an improving standard of living of the population. Mokgweesi Masisi is the president since 2018.

*Eswatini,* formerly Swaziland, is a kingdom bordering on South Africa and Mozambique. It owes its independence to having been a British High Commission territory since 1903. Further back, in 1881 the British had in principle recognized its independence, formalized by a treaty. The British ruled very indirectly but had skirmishes over land. The king of the day, Sobhuza II, played a major role in ensuring that Eswatini was not rolled into South Africa and in securing more land for the Swazi. He ruled for 83 years, before and after independence in 1968, until his death in 1982. The current king, Mswati III, is in place since 1986. The country is ranked as an absolute monarchy – although it got a constitution prescribing elections in 2005 and also had had one for a short period previously. The name Eswatini was adopted in 2018. Major unrest broke out in 2021.<sup>39</sup> Not much seems to have happened since then, but parliamentary elections are to be held on September 29, 2023. Eswatini has diplomatic ties with Taiwan and uses them actively, e.g. recently to ensure a

<sup>38</sup> Botswana won its border claim against Namibia regarding Caprivi at the ICJ in the Hague, thus getting back a river island.

<sup>39</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/us/africa-monarchy-eswatini-protests-swaziland.html>

strategic oil facility.

*Lesotho* has been a kingdom since 1822. A British protectorate in 1868, it became a crown colony in 1884. King Moshoeshoe II ruled until 1996 after the country became independent in 1966 although he did not govern without interruptions and, in fact, always had limited powers. A conflict broke out when the Basotho National Party (BNP) refused to recognize the victory of the Basotho Congress Party in 1970, which made BNP go underground and fight from outside. The king went into exile for a short period. In 1990 the country became a constitutional monarchy. The king was dethroned in favour of his son, Letsie III, but came back in 1995. Letsie III succeeded his father Moshoeshoe II after his accidental death in 1996 and is king to this date. The major political figure has been Leabua Jonathan of the BNP, until 1986. The country of today has an abundance of political parties. No recent major problems have been detected. Lesotho is a major water tower for South Africa.

### 3.5 Island Nations

There are six island nations, four in the Indian Ocean, two in the Atlantic. The four states in the Indian Ocean have very different origins and cultures in addition to geographies. Two were French colonies, the Comoros and Madagascar, but also Mauritius and the Seychelles had a French past albeit ending up as British colonies. The two latter were inhabited by colonists (and their slaves) whereas the Comoros is an ancient Swahili culture and Madagascar was first populated in a major way by Indonesian-Polynesian people. The Malgache language is thus Austronesian in origin.

The two states in the Atlantic were colonized by the Portuguese and remained so until independence.

France finally wrested *Madagascar* from the British in 1896 and proceeded to install large plantations for the export of coffee and vanilla. The capital, Antananarivo, had already been developed to a certain extent by the Merina kingdom and the colonialists proceeded to put in modern infrastructure. Otherwise, the rule was harsh and corvée labour<sup>40</sup> was used on the plantations. After independence in 1960 it has had a number of domestic political problems and has never really had a stable government unless one considers the harsh rule of Didier Ratsiraka 1975-1993 and 1997-2002 stable. Madagascar's political life is very much divided into cliques. The major ones are from the highland Merina kingdom and, as a subdistinction, belong to the Andriana (nobility). The current regime of Andry Rajoelina first came to power in 2009 through a coup, sending the president, Marc Ravalomanana, into exile in South Africa. One reason for the coup was Ravalomanana's conclusion of a contract with Daewoo Logistics for planting oil palm trees and maize on 1.3 million ha for use in South Korea. Rajoelina ruled for five years under a transition government heading. The presidential election at the end of 2018 was won by Rajoelina, who had spent the years after 2014 in France, defeating Marc Ravalomanana who had been allowed to come back to Madagascar from exile and even to run for president. Rajoelina will present himself for a third term in

<sup>40</sup> Labourers have to work for a certain amount of time per year for a minimum pay.

2023, effectively, but second term as president in a formal constitutional sense. His main opponent is thought to be Sinty Randrianasoloniaiko, who is named as a Russian (Wagner) proxy.<sup>41</sup> A number of other candidates have announced themselves though, among others Ravalomanana. Poverty defined in World Bank terms as less than USD 2.15 per capita per day attained nearly 80% of the population in 2023, i.e. increasing rather than the opposite. Drought and environmental exhaustion is part of the explanation, but inability of the government, any government, to handle the country's problems also counts. Two major foreign-dominated mining projects produce respectively nickel and cobalt, jointly, and ilmenite (titanium). It also has major export processing zones, particularly for textile manufacture.

*The Union of Comoros* has had its share of unrest and even of private military companies (PMC). The current president is Azali Assoumani who is also the 2023 president of the African Union. The union consists of three islands, Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli of the Comoros Archipelago. According to the constitution of 2001 each island had its own semi-autonomous government with the presidency rotating between them. Over and above the three regional governments, a union government is located on Grande Comore. The Comoros only became an overseas territory of France in 1947, having been ruled together with Madagascar until then. It declared itself independent in 1975 after a vote in 1974 where the fourth island, Mayotte, voted to remain French. The UN did not recognize that decision and continued to see the archipelago as one country. To the colourful history of the country belongs the intervention by the French mercenary Robert Denard – in favour of the president in 1978 and to depose another in 1995, unsuccessfully. In the 1990's secessionist movements in Anjouan and Mohéli caused trouble, and theatrical coups were staged from time to time. In 1997 both Anjouan and Mohéli declared themselves independent. The situation was defused by a new coup president in 1999, Azali Assoumani, who managed to make peace with Anjouan and Mohéli and have the new constitution of 2001 adopted. Assoumani was duly elected president in 2002. Anjouan rebelled again in 2007 but was overcome by AU and Comorian forces. In 2016 when Assoumani was elected again, he proceeded to suspend the Constitutional Court (abolished in 2018) and abandoning the rotating presidency that he himself had promoted in 2001. These changes were adopted by a new constitution in 2018, which also states that Sunni Islam is the source of national identity. In 2019 Assoumani was reelected but not without being challenged afterwards. The Comoros has a special currency agreement with France, which resembles that of the CFA zone.

*Réunion* is a French overseas department as is Mayotte, which again voted on its future in 2011 and chose to continue to avoid the destiny of being part of the Comoros. Comoros and the African Union refused to recognize the outcome and it has not been approved by the UN either. Mayotte has become a destination for Comorians fleeing the Union.

Today the *Seychelles* is reputed to be peaceful and prosperous, but this was not always so, not even in recent times. It was first inhabited by the British and slaves – and relatively late in historical time. The British administered the islands together with Mauritius as of the Treaty of Paris in 1814 where the French surrendered their claim. The smallest country in Africa, it

<sup>41</sup> Institute for Security Studies, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/rajoelina-and-the-extreme-personalisation-of-power>, June 2, 2023.

only became independent in 1976. In the period 1979-1991 it was declared socialist and a one-party state by left-leaning France Albert René. In 1981 opponents of the president living in South Africa, following up on a failed US coup of 1979, felt justified in attempting a coup to be carried out by 45 mercenaries led by 'Mad Mike' Hoare. It failed spectacularly. Five years later, under the same René regime, Seychelles got help from India to avert another, this time internally generated coup. A new constitution was adopted in 1993 but the same party kept ruling until 2020 when the long-time opposition leader, Wavel Ramkalawan, became president. The Seychelles consists of a number of islands. Today it mostly serves as a luxury ecotourism destination and also is a more or less shady financial hub.

*Mauritius* is by all measures a successful African country but it has a checkered history. It was at the centre of the Indian Ocean slave trade and at the same time receptor of slaves for its sugar plantations. Mauritius does not have an army, only a coast guard, which has also saved it from its share of military coups. The population is a mix of nearly every ethnicity in the world, but the dominant group is of East Indian heritage. There is also a significant Black, Arab and Chinese population, plus Whites. The main language practiced is Creole, an English/French patois with Hindi and other languages mixed in. The first real colonizers were Dutch, then came French who, at the end of the 18th century, introduced sugar plantations – and African slaves. In 1814 it was ceded to the British. When slavery was abolished in 1835, indentured labourers<sup>42</sup> were encouraged to come from India. Since independence in 1968 its political life has been relatively peaceful, although its political parties have names such as Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) and Militant Socialist Movement (MSM) interspersed with the Mauritius Labour Party (MLP). The island state reengineered its economy in the 1980's away from its heavy dependence on sugar. Not all benefited and in 1999 social-discontent riots broke out. Since then, the country has focused more on financial services and tourism, which also sows seeds of discontent. Mauritius has opened its courts to the trial of pirates. Interesting is the 2019 ruling of the International Court of Justice in the Hague that Mauritius retains the rights to the Chagos Archipelago, but Britain has not paid heed to it and is not formally obliged to do so.<sup>43</sup> It was only in 1992 that Mauritius ceased to have the British monarch as head of state. It has had a good number of short-lived presidents since then. The current president, Prithvirajsing Roopun of MSM, has been in office since 2019.

*Cabo Verde*<sup>44</sup> is a volcanic archipelago with nine inhabited islands. It is dry and particularly suffers from a lack of water resources. Due to its central location in the Atlantic it played an important role in the Transatlantic slave trade. Portugal governed Cabo Verde and Guinea Bissau jointly until 1879. This affinity spilled over into the archipelago's liberation forces that joined up with those of Guinea-Bissau as was seen in the PAICG party. The first leaders after independence in 1975 were those who cooperated with revolutionary forces in Guinea-Bissau. After the unity was broken, a homegrown successor party was formed, PAICV, along the same political lines. In 1991 and in the wake of democratisation, new leadership from the Movement for Democracy emerged. 10 years later, Pedro Pires of PAICV won the

<sup>42</sup> Labourers who paid for their travel by having to work in plantations as forced labour a certain number of years.

<sup>43</sup> Some 2,000-3,000 inhabitants of Chagos were resettled in Mauritius at independence when Britain took over the archipelago and transformed one of the islands, Diego Garcia, to a US naval and air support base.

<sup>44</sup> The country insists on being called by its Portuguese-spelled name.



presidency, lasting for two periods. Politics has been relatively undramatic since then and the country has prospered, especially via tourism, with a corona downturn. The current president is from PAICV again, José Maria Neves.

*São Tomé & Príncipe* was settled continuously by the Portuguese until independence in 1975. Sugar plantations were already introduced in São Tomé around 1500 from where exports to Europe blossomed. Early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the cocoa bean was brought to the islands from Brazil as the first port of entry in Africa. A mix of peoples make up the population, stemming from the formerly enslaved, Portuguese and other settlers, workers and traders. Even after slavery was abolished, forced labour was practiced. A liberation movement emerged in the 1950's, leading to independence in 1975 in the wake of the Portuguese 'carnation revolution'. A democratic constitutional reform was approved in 1990 after which the country is formally called the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe. There have been some unsuccessful attempts at coups d'état – the last one in November 2022 – but basically political power has been transferred without major problems. The current government is centre-right with Carlos Vila Nova as president.

### 3.6 Conclusion

As Herbst writes, "The fundamental problem with the boundaries in Africa is not that they are too weak but that they are too strong. It is not that they are artificial in light of current political systems but that they are too integral to the broadcasting of power in Africa. It is not that they are alien to current African states but that African leaders have been extraordinarily successful in manipulating the boundaries for their own purposes of staying in power rather than extending the power of their states."<sup>45</sup> And further, on the next page, "It is striking that, at the turn of the twentieth century, no large African country can be said to have consolidated control over its entire territory."<sup>46</sup> This lack of control was particularly over the hinterland in major countries, thus opening up for the helter skelter of attempts at control that we have seen since independence. Add to this that major outside economic interests are becoming more rather than less of an issue. At the same time, the rulers are trying to tighten their grip on populations, often through new means of populist demagoguery and downright inhumane legislation such as seen in the LGBT+ rhetoric that is gripping the continent. Uganda, Nigeria, Mauritania and Somalia are in front with respect to death penalties for same-sex consensual activities.

The very prominent role of presidents is striking. Power in Africa is vested in presidents, except in a few cases, among them Ethiopia. This power is in truth 'vested' in the traditional way of understanding it: the president exudes, represents and distributes power. In that way perhaps the many military coups can be understood as presidents losing their lustre in the eyes of the insurgents and thus not deserving their post anymore.

Around 1990 a wave of constitutionalism hit the continent. Many of those who had until then had one-party constitutions or otherwise restricting democracy got new constitutions and

<sup>45</sup> Herbst (2000, 253).

<sup>46</sup> Herbst (2000, 254).

free and fair elections. It worked sometimes but most often not for a long time and not without a successful coup interspersed. And not without a good deal of manipulation which ensured the reelection of a strong president.

## 4. Conflicts and military forces

Annex 1 gives a synthesis in tabular form of all countries with respect to constitutionality, conflicts and civil war, long-term presidents (indicating that a certain group or clique may be sitting on power and resources), alliances and outside intervention. With respect to alliances, there is a shift going on right now. As an indicator of a non-aligned stand, of embracing a multipolar world order or of a rapprochement with Russia, the vote in the UN Assembly on ES-11/6 of February 23, 2023, the resolution which once again called for cessation of hostilities in Ukraine and Russian withdrawal, can be used. Voting against or abstaining is an indicator of a more friendly attitude to Russia and perhaps, turning away from the West. This helps to broaden the analysis of militarization.

### 4.1 Outside interference in internal conflicts

This general heading groups outside powers siding with or helping one of the parties in a conflict, not peacemaking or conflict-reducing efforts. Although the line can sometimes be hard to draw, here the cut is between a state or rebel group intervening in favor of one or more parties in conflict as distinct from an international or regional body called upon by several parties to take action after undertaking a deliberative, institutionalized process. Outside powers interfering can be extracontinental or African, but mostly they are from neighbouring countries, and they can be defensive or offensive.

The instances of interference are so numerous that it is difficult to mention them all. In Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990's, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Burkina Faso got involved, or at least their president/military because as often as not, the decisions to intervene have not followed any constitutional process. The role of Blaise Compaoré in propping up Charles Taylor, for example, was clandestine. And the assistance was not so much military as it consisted of helping Taylor to launder his blood diamonds.

The crude interventions from major powers seen for example in the Seychelles in 1979 (the US), 1981 (South Africa hiding behind mercenaries) or 1986 (South Africa supporting the main opponent of the president) perhaps belong to days gone by but there are still a number of border wars and sometimes, greater powers lurk in the wings. They may be invited, such as the Wagner Network/Russia. Also, the ruling powers may be calling on old friends to assist them in new problems. But often the unrest is instigated from the outside (Rwanda in DR Congo).

In the past France has intervened actively in many instances. Between 1997 and 2002 France intervened militarily 33 times on the African continent. Ten of those had UN mandates.



Between 1962 and 1995, France intervened militarily 19 times in African states.<sup>47</sup>

France had so many citizens in Côte d'Ivoire that it intervened in its first civil war in order to protect or evacuate them but also to help determine the outcome. It supported the southern-based government although it was rather the man of the north, Alassane Ouattara, who was the right one for them.

#### 4.2 Peacekeeping and conflict resolution

Have the West and the instances of the global order been successful in bringing peace to Africa? Numerous are the UN missions that have been sent. First of all to Congo, later on to Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Mali etc. Some missions aimed to keep peace, others to make peace or securing that agreements would hold.

The first UN missions were in Congo/Zaire/DR Congo. They could or would not protect Lumumba but helped in quenching the secessionist fires in Katanga in 1964 (UNOC). Later on, under Laurent and Joseph Kabila, first MONUC of 1999 and later MONUSCO of 2010 should help in securing peace but were heavily criticized by the population for not stopping the fighting in the east or at least protecting civilians. Nevertheless, MONUSCO's mandate was renewed for one year at the end of 2022, this time lifting the notification requirement for military assistance and equipment.

The UN mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) directly engaged in fighting one of the warlords (General Aidid) in 1993 but although at one time a semblance of peace was restored, the enormous amount of forces deployed, costs and lost lives both on the UN and Somali sides proved too costly. The US special troops which should support the UN suffered severe losses and public exposure, which gave US politicians a scare regarding UN-led interventions in years to come. There had been up to 28,000 personnel under UNOSOM II, withdrawn in 1995. The African Union stepped in to assume an important role, fielding its own force, AMISOM, from 2007 to 2022 with the aim of training and supporting security forces, and combating Al-Shabaab, following a Security Council mandate. Uganda sent a significant contingent of soldiers. AMISOM is now replaced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia. EU has helped in the funding. Since 2007 the US has deployed heavy air power in Somalia, for a while more or less withdrawn but renewed since 2022 in order to combat Al-Shabaab.

UN helped with peacemaking in Mozambique after the civil war ended in 1992.

The Malian government requested the termination of peacekeeping missions to Mali led by the UN (MINUSMA) by the end of 2023. The intervention started in 2013 and had been up to 13,000 soldiers large, plus 2,000 police. This is not to be confounded with the French-led

<sup>47</sup> Zoe Alexandra and Vijay Prashad, 'Is This the End of French Neo-Colonialism in Africa?' published on September 23, 2023 (URL: <https://panafricanvisions.com/2023/09/is-this-the-end-of-french-neo-colonialism-in-africa/>). The information on the number of interventions stems from Benneyworth (2011) and Gregory (2000). The 19 interventions do not include participation in UN missions in Angola and Somalia and the support to Biafra. France also assumed a military role in former Belgian colonies, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi.

operation Barkhane.

The African Union managed to get an agreement in 2007 with the once-again Comorian rebellious island, Anjouan. But AU also refuses to recognize that Mayotte is an overseas French department according to its vote in 2011.

In recent times especially ECOWAS has become active in West African conflict resolution and more than that, in trying to restore constitutional order. A success was recorded in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. It was not very effective in Côte d'Ivoire's first civil war.

After the 2021 coup in Guinea, ECOWAS negotiated the schedule and conditions of transition to constitutionality. The plan is not followed. In Niger today (September 2023) the power of the institution – or lack thereof – is being played out in full daylight, first threatening military intervention if the president was not restored, then backing off.

As of this time (September 2023) ECOWAS has suspended four members, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

SADC plays a conflict-resolution role in Southern Africa. It brokered a deal about the return of the deposed Madagascar president, Marc Ravalomanana, in 2013. In 1998 South Africa intervened in Lesotho on behalf of SADC to avoid a coup.

Some important international judicial interventions can be mentioned. First of all, the three rulings of the International Court of Justice regarding the Caprivi Strip (Namibia vs. Botswana), Bakassi Peninsula (Cameroon vs. Nigeria) and Chagos Archipelago (Mauritius vs. UK). Botswana, Cameroon and Mauritius won, but the last verdict has not been carried out, no doubt because it is a major US navy base. Also to be mentioned the still somewhat fragile status of Cabinda and the non-resolved Western Sahara problem. With respect to crimes against humanity, Charles Taylor was convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was set up in Arusha, Tanzania, and over its 20-year period some 60 convictions were handed out.

#### 4.3 African military expenditures

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes) tabulates military expenditures. Data from the period 2009-2022 have been excerpted. The Comoros and São Tomé and Príncipe are not included and there are no data from Djibouti and Eritrea either. Some data sets are incomplete, i.e. years are missing. The numbers are in current US dollars. The data cover budgetary expenditures, recurrent and capital. Outright equipment grants are excluded.

Over the period 2013 to 2022 military expenditures decreased from a total of USD 21.753 billion in 2013 to USD 19.917 billion in 2022 – when excluding Sudan and Equatorial Guinea. When in addition taking out Benin, Burundi, Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Somalia, Zimbabwe and adding Equatorial Guinea back in, we get an increase over the years 2009-2022 by 26%, from USD 14.659 billion to USD 18.492 billion. This is by no means shocking. See Annex 2 for

details.

Looking at the country numbers, Angola stands out as having vastly lowered its military spending, from USD 3.3 billion in 2009 to USD 1.6 billion in 2022. Chad also reduced its budget, from USD 739 million in 2009 to USD 357 million in 2022. South Africa, South Sudan and Sudan all have diminished budgets, South Africa by 16.6% 2009-2022, from nearly USD 3.6 billion to just under USD 3 billion. South Sudan records a budget of USD 379 million in 2022, down from USD 610 in 2009 (before it was even independent). Sudan in fact cut its budget between 2015 and 2021 by 84%, but with highly varying numbers over the years, almost USD 4.4 billion in 2017 and USD 375 million in 2021.

Those with large, increased budgets include DR Congo (203% from 2009 to 2022), Ethiopia (204% from 2009 to 2022), Kenya (97% from 2009 to 2022), Mali (257% over the same period), Mozambique (234%), Nigeria (107%, from to USD 1.5 billion in 2009 to USD 3.1 billion in 2022), Senegal, also more than 100% in the period 2009-2022, Somalia (342% from 2013 to 2022). Togo is a high flier, augmenting its budget by more than 500% from 2009 to 2022, and also Tanzania has sped up rearmament dramatically, by 279%, but only landing on USD 832 million in 2022 while Uganda in 2022 spent USD 923 million on the military, up by 215% as of 2009. Zimbabwe's budget is relatively modest, in 2022 USD 182 million. Although this would be an increase from 2010, it is a decrease from a high point of USD 547 million in 2017. SIPRI also mentions both figures as uncertain.

Looking at the last two years, Nigeria's budget dropped from nearly USD 4.5 billion to USD 3.1 billion between 2021 and 2022. South Africa similarly saw a drop, from USD 3.4 to USD 3 billion. Angola and Ethiopia both went up. Angola's budget increased from USD 981 million to USD 1.6 billion and Ethiopia's from nearly USD 500 million to over USD 1 billion (with some caveat as to the quality of the numbers). For all of Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) minus 4 small countries and Sudan, the expenditures fell globally by 2.2%. SIPRI attributes this to budgetary shortages.<sup>48</sup>

As a share of GDP in 2022, Togo jumps to the first place (5.4%), followed by Burkina Faso (3.1%), South Sudan (3%), Namibia (3%), Chad (nearly 3%), Mali (2.8%), Burundi (2.8%) and Botswana (2.7%). But many countries have quite low percentages, Angola, (1.3%), South Africa (0.7%), Nigeria (0.6%), DR Congo (0.6%) and Ghana (0.4%) among the more important countries. The overall average for Africa including the high military spenders in North Africa was 1.6% in 2021 so it would be well below 1.5% for SSA.<sup>49</sup>

#### 4.4 Outside military assistance and bases

The importance of Djibouti is clear, not least to the major powers. Half the oil shipped to China passes this tip of the Horn of Africa, and in 2017 it established a military base there. At

the same time the US decided to invest USD 1 billion in its facilities in Djibouti.<sup>50</sup> Seven other countries have bases: France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the UK, Saudi Arabia and Japan.<sup>51</sup> China has since 2021 set up a naval base in Equatorial Guinea. Furthermore, it has supported the African Union with a military stand-by force (USD 100 million).

Russia has concluded a number of security cooperation deals in Africa, more than 20. A prominent part is the access to ports and bases in the Red Sea. It has thus access to Berbera (Somaliland), Massawa and Assab (Eritrea) and Port Sudan after 2017 when Sudan reached out to Russia and let the Wagner Network in. Further south, Russia has sought military rapprochement with Mozambique and South Africa.<sup>52</sup>

The US Africa Command (Africom) was created in 2007 under the presidency of George W. Bush. Africom has offices in 38 African countries and 2,000 personnel, most of them in Stuttgart, the US or UK. Its task is to keep track of the whole continent. Among others it engages in maritime security in West Africa. The US has 13 enduring bases in Africa and 16 temporary ones (without counting Diego Garcia which serves multiple continents and Djibouti which is labelled as permanent). The annual US security spending on the continent has been in the range of USD 450 to 600 million from 2015-2019. Today, it quite openly states that its security cooperation with African partners also serves to limit Chinese influence.

US special operations are covered by legal provisions. A 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force extended until now is used against terror groups. Title U.S.C. 10 (on the armed forces) §127e "authorizes the Department of Defense to provide "support" to foreign forces, paramilitaries and private individuals who are in turn "supporting" U.S. counterterrorism operations."<sup>53</sup> In practice this is equal to giving green light for covert operations.

US has more than 1,000 troops in Niger, even after the July 23 coup, and it has its second-largest base there, in fact it has two drone bases in Niger, one in Niamey, the other in Agadez. France who had posted 1,500 soldiers reduced them to 1,000 after the coup and Italy has 550 military personnel. Germany had chosen Niger as its Sahel hub. Denmark just a couple of months before the putsch approved nearly DKK 1 billion in development – not military though – aid for the period 2023-2027.

France until the advent of Lionel Jospin to the presidency in 1997 had about 8,000 troops stationed in Cameroun, Djibouti, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, CAR and Chad. President Jospin cut the number to 5,500 and reduced the countries of deployment to five: Chad, Gabon, Djibouti, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal.

Years later, France expanded its African interventions again, particularly in the Sahel. Operation Barkhane was launched in 2014. It was headquartered in Chad and should help combat jihadist militants in the Sahel, being particularly active in Mali. Mauritania, Burkina

<sup>50</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/africa/us-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html>.

<sup>51</sup> <https://politicstoday.org/djibouti-surrounded-by-military-bases-of-china-us-france-uk-germany-others/>.

<sup>52</sup> Joseph Siegle, 'Russia's strategic goals in Africa', May 6, 2021. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. <https://africacenter.org/experts/joseph-siegle/russia-strategic-goals-africa/>.

<sup>53</sup> Ebright (2022, 3).

<sup>48</sup> <https://www.ecofinagency.com/public-management/2604-44463-africa-military-spending-dropped-5-3-in-2022-sipri>.

<sup>49</sup> These figures do not come near those of 1986 where e.g. Angola spent 12% of national income on the military (see Conteh-Morgan 1993, 33).



Faso, Mali, Niger and Chad were participating. It was supported by a number of European countries and altogether had some 3,000 troops involved. Mali withdrew in 2022 and ordered the troops to retreat. Some of the French troops were presumably afterwards moved to Niger. After the July coup in Niger heavy anti-French sentiments exploded, and France succumbed to the pressure, announcing that its troops would be withdrawn. Altogether, it has left Mali, Burkina Faso, CAR and Niger and downsized in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon. Traditionally having had 5,500 troops posted, it now has no more than 3,500.

The EU CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) has many activities of a civilian, paramilitary and military nature to prevent refugees from entering Europe, to enforce arms embargoes and generally to protect European interests, also through peacekeeping initiatives. All is well hidden in partnership speak. The EU uses the European Peace Facility (EPF) to supply weapons to Africa. Two CSDP military missions in Somalia (EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta and EUTM Somalia) are set up so as to secure one of the EU's vital trade routes. The first one is a counter-piracy force, the second is a military training mission (since 2010).

The EUCAP (crisis management program) Sahel Mali has been extended to 2025. Its additional budget of EUR 73 million is funded under EU External Action. There are also EUCAP missions in Niger, Somalia, CAR and Mozambique. Their aim is to help authorities to restore constitutional order and the conditions for lasting peace, through training, inter alia.

EU has supported the African Union's Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) since 2008, at first through the EU's African Peace Facility (APF), then, since 2021, through the EPF, which not only encompasses Africa. The EPF funded the Rwandan military intervention in Cabo Delgado to the tune of EUR 20 million in 2021. In three months' time, by July 2021, the situation was under control.

For 2022-2024 it has approved EUR 600 million for Africa to be allocated to, among others: EUR 120 million for Somalia, EUR 130 million to AU peace support operations (this dates from 2021 and still formally under APF), EUR 10 million for continued support to the Multi-National Joint Task Force against the Boko Haram, which was launched in 2016, EUR 50 million for Mozambique Rapid Reaction Forces (among others to assist in establishing security in Cabo Delgado) and EUR 25 million for Niger's army.

Among the more curious interventions can be mentioned Denmark's sending its frigate Esbern Snare to the Gulf of Guinea to chase pirates at the end of 2021. It ended in disaster.<sup>54</sup> This was clearly in order to secure Danish merchant navy interests.

Is this military assistance or peacekeeping or making, military assistance or arms trade?

<sup>54</sup> A supposed pirate ship was identified, shot at, and four dead 'pirates' taken on board where they were put in a freezer for two months until a solution was found and they were handed over to Nigerian authorities. Three live pirates – if that is what they were – were released in a boat and shuffled off to Nigeria. However, the eighth man who was wounded was taken to Denmark, had his leg amputated and was charged for piracy. He was acquitted though and applied for asylum. The first mistake of Denmark was not to have secured an agreement with coastal states in advance.

#### 4.5 Military suppliers and arms trade

The arms trade is shifting rapidly. Some years back China was the most important supplier of arms to SSA but has now been overtaken by Russia, that is, without considering the possible implications of the Ukraine war on Russian arms production capabilities. In 2018-2022 Russia's market share increased to 26% from 21% in the previous five-year period. But SIPRI which is behind these assessments also states that Russia probably has not exported more than an average of USD 1 billion per year. The top three importers from Russia are Nigeria, Angola and Mali. Especially Mali has expanded its purchases, to the point that the US and EU now will no longer sell weapons to it.<sup>55</sup> Consulting the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Russia has sold/delivered weapons, particularly helicopters and other aircraft, to Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire (vehicle engine), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan (quite a lot but mostly years back, around 2009-2013), Togo and Zambia.

The US has in 2023 sold advanced equipment to Nigeria for USD 500 million, including "12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft, precision munitions and world-class training, including in air-to-ground integration to make airstrikes more accurate and thereby mitigate the risk of civilian harm."<sup>56</sup> In 2021 however Congress blocked the sale of attack helicopters to Nigeria and A-29 Super Tucano is built for 'light attack'.

But Africa is also producing arms. South Africa developed an important arms industry after 1984 which grew strongly until the end of apartheid and which also included high exports, to African countries in conflict, among others. Today, some 120 companies all in all produce armoured vehicles, air systems, guns, bombs, naval systems, ships, small arms etc. In 2010 it exported for USD 243 million, in 2020 down to USD 111 million and in 2022 only USD 48 million, according to SIPRI. One reason for the downturn is the declining defense budget in South Africa itself, but also mismanagement, corruption and a lack of direction. South Africa has exported to a number of countries all over the world and still have the contacts. There is also an important military industry in Nigeria. Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) produces licensed equipment, guns, handgrenades, rifles. Another company ProForce has exported 20 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to Chad and entered into a production agreement with Belarus, even exporting the PF Viper (light-weight multiterrain vehicle) to it. Small arms are also produced in Kenya, Ethiopia and not least Sudan. Uganda is setting up a helicopter maintenance, repair, and overhaul facility at its air force base.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>55</sup> [https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/03/28/russia-overtakes-china-as-leading-arms-seller-in-sub-saharan-africa\\_6021018\\_124.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/03/28/russia-overtakes-china-as-leading-arms-seller-in-sub-saharan-africa_6021018_124.html), dated March 28, 2023.

<sup>56</sup> <https://www.africom.mil/article/35195/us-and-nigerian-officials-join-to-celebrate-38-million-in-kainji-air-force-base-improvement>.

<sup>57</sup> See IPIS (International Peace Information Service), Africa and the Arms Trade, 2022. Dec. 19, 2022. URL: <https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/africa-and-the-arms-trade-2022/>

#### 4.6 Private military companies

Executive Outcomes was established in 1989 in South Africa after the South African army had to withdraw from Angola and Namibia. It was hired by the MPLA government in Angola to fight against UNITA in 1992 and was called upon by the Sierra Leone government to protect diamond interests against RUF. Also, major mining multinationals have been clients, De Beers, Chevron, Rio Tinto. Ironically, it was instrumental in the adoption of the South African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act in 1998 upon which it dissolved itself. It has been revived recently.<sup>58</sup>

Another South African outfit that came to play a certain role, this time in the Seychelles in 1986, was Longreach, a front company for the South African Police Security Branch.<sup>59</sup> It was also active some ten years later in Angola, i.e. after apartheid, protecting mining and commercial interests. Some of the purely private adventures, such as the Mark Thatcher cofunded coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea in 2004 are probably a thing of the past when Africa was considered to be a playground for the entitled.<sup>60</sup>

A number of private security firms bordering on heavily armed gangs protect gold mining interests in the Sahel. Some cooperate with government security, others are on their own or fighting the government.<sup>61</sup>

Today, larger, organized private military companies (PMC) have become serious business and they are allowed to act cruelly in carrying out their missions assigned by military coup leaders or politicians in need of domestic security strengthening.

The US State Department funds the Bancroft Global Development, which offers a broad range of security services, also in health and education. It has been very active in Somalia. Interestingly, it has been contacted by the president of CAR to enter into some sort of cooperation agreement, supported by the US government because it could thwart the Wagner Network.<sup>62</sup> On its website it boasts that it "holds special consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council."<sup>63</sup>

Most well-known today is the Wagner Network (the term used in the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report from July 2023), which was founded in 2014 by the now-famous Yevgeny Prigozhin together with Dmitry Utkin, formerly of the GRU, the military intelligence service in Russia. It started its operations in Ukraine after the Russian take-over of Crimea and spearheaded its intervention in Donetsk and Luhansk. To be noted that Wagner received funding and equipment from Russia for these operations. It is only later that it procured its own means through minerals concessions, self-help to resources and smuggling.

<sup>58</sup> Based on Wikipedia, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive\\_Outcomes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Outcomes) (consulted on August 25, 2023).

<sup>59</sup> Information can be found in *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*. Edited by Abdel Fatau-Mussa and J. 'Kayode Fayemi. London: Pluto Press. 2000, s. 47.

<sup>60</sup> Mark Thatcher was convicted and fined in South Africa for his organizing role.

<sup>61</sup> Raineri (2020).

<sup>62</sup> Published by Africa Intelligence on October 3, 2023.

<sup>63</sup> <https://www.bancroftglobal.org/bancroft-global-development/>.

In Africa Wagner is highly and verifiably involved in the Central African Republic, Sudan, Mali, Mozambique and Libya. In Sudan it gets gold for its efforts, in CAR gold and diamond mining rights. Through a shell company, Bois Rouge, it in 2021 obtained a rich forest concession (137,000 exploitable ha) in the very same area where it helped push out the opposition forces, Séléka (Muslim, 'Arab') but not least the indigenous anti-Balaka, which some claim support the return of former president Bozizé (2003-2013).<sup>64</sup>

The network is also in all likelihood involved in DR Congo, Madagascar, South Africa and Zimbabwe. In these settings it is particularly operating through the Association for Free Research and International Cooperation (AFRIC), giving direct support to governments or election contenders, delivering propaganda, disinformation etc. through sophisticated cyber hacking, trolling and what else.

Furthermore, the House of Commons committee thinks that the network helped in the build-up to the second coup in Burkina Faso in 2022,<sup>65</sup> bringing Captain Ibrahim Traoré to power. It apparently uses Cameroon as a corridor for smuggling out diamonds and other minerals from CAR through the Douala port.

Mostly Wagner is operating with governments in trouble. It is thus unquestionable that it saved the government of Faustin-Archange Touadéra against rebels in CAR, and it can be claimed that it has become so important to the country that it justifies the label 'state capture', as the House of Commons committee writes. In fact, although Wagner originally should save Touadéra against the Séléka, it also struck a deal with them about resource exploitation. Moreover, the Russian government has been directly involved in support of Wagner, obtaining exemption from a UN arms embargo to deliver arms and military instructors to CAR in 2017.<sup>66</sup> It can be estimated that the returns from gold mining in CAR alone could yield a benefit of USD 1 billion over the coming years. This gain, in turn, may revert to Russia and help finance its war efforts.

In Mali and Mozambique Wagner has fought against jihadist rebels. It had to give up in Cabo Delgado in 2019. The network has not been successful in Mali either. Rather than subduing jihadist fighters, it has killed civilians. But it is still there.

According to both the House of Commons committee and the International Crisis Group, Wagner is not only a proxy for Russia but also gives Russia a shield of 'plausible deniability', i.e. Wagner furthers Russia's interests without appearing to be too directly linked with it.<sup>67</sup> What the relations are after the Wagner march on Moscow and the death of Prigozhin and Utkin two months later is impossible to foresee.

The House of Commons report is scathing of the UK government's lack of understanding

<sup>64</sup> All Eyes on Wagner, 'Come follow the redwood trees – tracking Wagner's forestry business in CAR'. 26 July 2022. Bois Rouge has since then been renamed Wood International Group.

<sup>65</sup> Al-Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/podcasts/2022/10/12/why-burkina-faso-just-had-its-second-coup-in-8-months>, which among others brings the statement that, "They [Wagner] also do these social media videos on TikTok, making war fun, trying to attract young African soldiers."

<sup>66</sup> House of Commons (2023, 25).

<sup>67</sup> Pauline Bax in a statement to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa on July 18, 2023. URL: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/pauline-bax-speaks-house-foreign-affairs-about-role-wagner-russia> (accessed August



and investigation of the Wagner network in Africa. It even states that, “Professor Blazakis told us last November that the Wagner Network had “become instrumental in Putin’s ambitions in gaining access to natural resources throughout Africa”, adding: “whether gold, oil or diamonds, the Russian Federation has acquired fungible assets that keep the war machine churning in Ukraine”.<sup>68</sup>

#### 4.7 Alliances and affiliations

Commercial, financial and political interests may conflict. South Africa benefits highly from the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Its exports to the U.S. under the act are worth about USD 1.75 billion per annum according to Pauline Bax of the International Crisis Group (see footnote referenced above). This is used as an argument that South Africa is highly interested in being on good terms with the US despite its open alliance with Russia in BRICS and its abstention of voting in favour of condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the UN (Resolution ES-11/6). Eritrea and Mali voted against it while Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe abstained. One could be surprised by Gabon (then still under Ali Bongo as president), Togo and Uganda, perhaps Congo, and this pattern is certainly of newer date.

Some were absent: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Tanzania.

China is increasing its soft power, hardening it. The Chinese Communist Party has thus established a training school in Tanzania for participants from Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, all countries where the old ‘revolutionary’ party is still in power. They will learn how to fuse the party and the state.<sup>69</sup>

The Arab League has five SSA members, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan.

#### 4.8 Increasing militarization?

If militarization is increasing, it is rather foreign powers that are driving it. Africom, establishment of bases, military support, arms transfer on obscure terms, European Peace Facility, a good deal of the peacekeeping forces leave a significant weapons trace. Weapons do not just disappear. And here we are not dealing in arms smuggling which no doubt is significant. However, until 2022 the domestic armaments did not increase significantly if one can trust the SIPRI numbers. With the events of 2023 there may well be a new build-up underway. Since conflicts are on the rise in this world, generally, so is militarization. And it

<sup>68</sup> House of Commons (2023, 38). Blazakis is professor at Middlebury College, California, and a specialist in terrorist financing.

<sup>69</sup> <https://www.axios.com/2023/08/21/chinese-communist-party-training-school-africa>.

<sup>70</sup> <https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in-africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/>

is spreading to Africa, fueling its own internal conflicts.

China has only been mentioned to a very limited extent above. This expresses the fact that China has not interfered militarily or gotten overtly involved in conflicts on the African continent to this day. It only has two military bases, Djibouti (2017) and, in Equatorial Guinea, a naval one (announced at the end of 2021).<sup>70</sup>

Absurdly, western powers are spending much more than eastern ones on military and peacekeeping/making efforts. As seen, Russia makes itself be paid for what it does via the Wagner network. Although it is still an open question what will happen post the death of Prigozhin, it stands to reason that Russia will take over Wagner’s interests.

At the same time western powers are losing hearts and minds. First of all, France is falling from grace. It has admitted its defeat in as much as it has withdrawn its troops from Mali, Burkina Faso and CAR, but otherwise it is still stubborn in its support for the regimes that were thrown out, without showing any ability to adapt to a possible new configuration, or really comprehending that an epoch is over.

A sign of softening to African demands is the willingness to lift the notification requirement for military purchases by DR Congo. In the same direction goes the changing US stance on exports to Nigeria of attack aircraft. Not much in and of themselves, these shifts augur a different type of engagement by the UN and western powers.

As a final remark, the UN has played and still plays a very important role through its interventions and buffer role. Very often, the results are not obvious or spectacular, but UN operations have no doubt contributed to calm down many situations.

#### 4.9 Implications

What stands out is the impotence of western powers to influence political developments in a democratic direction in Africa and this despite their good and proclaimed intentions and considerable funds disbursed. Why does the West carry so little weight politically? One reason is obviously the amount of undemocratic leaders that western powers have supported over the years. The hypocrisy of it. France has consistently closed its eyes to the worst autocrats in its CFA perimeter. Other – European – powers have through development aid insisted on spreading democracy and human rights, claiming that China has no such agenda. Given this overview of politics, conflicts and outright civil war, allies and foes, the question is if economic interests are at play which may show another picture.

## 5. Political and economic imperialism

### 5.1 Imperialism in the Marxist tradition

This paper has so far eschewed the classical discussions of imperialism from around year 1900 as being caused by central capitalist powers' (or capitalism's own innate) needs to expand in order to realize the surplus value produced (Rosa Luxemburg), because of chronic underconsumption at home and the need to find new investment outlets (J.A. Hobson), financial capital's domination of industry and overseas conquest by state military means to protect its position (Rudolf Hilferding), and Lenin's concept of imperialism as the highest or latest stage<sup>71</sup> of capitalism where finance capital will split the world up among imperial powers in their quest for world domination. One thing is obviously true, the carving up of Africa was concomitant with the formation of distinct industrial states in Europe<sup>72</sup> and therefore the theories tended to stress the role of state protection, competition and warfare. It has definitely taken a long time to get out of the 'highest' stage of capitalism. In the meantime, various powers have dominated the world, first the UK in early colonial days, then the US in fierce competition with the Soviet Union after the Second World War militarily and politically, but with the US firmly in the economic driver's seat. When it came to Africa there were other powers present as we know, old powers such as Portugal and Spain plus not least France and Germany (until the end of WWI). But all of these theories ignore the recipients. What happened in the dominated countries?

Marx did not write about imperialism or colonialism in the terms of his would-be successors. Capitalist expansion was a given for him. He never dealt with African colonies directly. However, he saw the British destruction of Indian cotton manufacture as well as the fabric of Indian society as a result of British wilful policy and also saw the way in which trade finance was used to extract tribute globally.<sup>73</sup> This can be extended to have been the African destiny of colonization too: destruction of previous relationships and destitution. But the destruction, violent as it was, was only near-total at the end of colonialism despite a few disjointed attempts at raw materials and surplus extraction. The road to capitalism was far from being completed, had barely begun.

It is necessary to see what happened in Africa and not start out from a veil of a theory. This is why the paper began with history and the military aspects. What I see today is the continuous, messy integration of Africa in capitalism, but also as forging its own way.

When imperial conquest – in the sense of conquest by major empires – of Africa started, new markets were certainly not there, money economies not reaching beyond coastal trading stations. Capitalism is expansionist, certainly, but capitalism has a drive and not a plan (here I quote myself). Colonialism in Africa was a concrete subduing of peoples in far-away territories who inhabited land they only exploited sparsely, simply because population also was sparse, but which enclosed a huge potential, both agriculturally and in terms of riches

<sup>71</sup> There is disagreement among writers about the right word. It is, I believe, the 'highest' that is the correct term.

<sup>72</sup> See Desai (2009).

<sup>73</sup> See Petersen (2021).

inherent in the ground. These riches could serve the colonizers, and they were aware of it, but it took a lot more effort than they had foreseen or were willing to spend to get the full benefit from it. After two thirds of a century they let the colonies free to govern themselves albeit advice was simultaneously offered. In fact, they wanted to get the best out of the newly independent countries. The French calculation was the most undisguised in this regard. So imperialism in an economic sense, when it comes to Africa, in terms of getting a surplus out of it, really only started after independence when the colonies were transformed into dependent economies in a national shell.

Later imperialism theories such as Samir Amin's stressed the particular ways of exploitation that the dependent nations were exposed to. One can also refer to Ruy Mauro Marini, "In other words, through its incorporation in the world market for wage goods, Latin America fulfils a significant role in the increase of relative surplus value in the industrialized countries."<sup>74</sup> Similarly, African raw materials entering mass consumption in the global north came to play an important role in the consumption of the 'masses' along with mineral and oil resources in industrial and energy expansion.

Marxism has also been applied to Africa in terms of development models. Could independent Africa advance directly to socialism, without developing private ownership? Theories of jumping stages (Trotsky and Mao's Great Leap Forward from 1958) and bypass capitalism were popular with early liberation thinkers. But the perspectives of revolution were eventually dimmed, it being generally considered that the first goal, liberation, was achieved and that the countries' destiny was now in their own hands, partly fortified by western promises of 'development' aid. The incipient socialist visions vanished in more concrete battles although Soviet and Chinese influence – and financing – did play a role in some countries' development plans, but only until the neo-liberal wave took over nearly everywhere. The exception is Eritrea.

At any rate, the countries became part of the world economic order, delivering raw materials to the world but always being in a dependent position, begging for better terms, debt forgiveness, getting 'aid' and so on. The purpose of the centre was purportedly to see the countries fully 'developed', but the means used were to always defend measures (and theories!!) that would ensure that they did not get too far out of hand.

This will be looked at more closely in the next section.

### 5.2 Economic imperialism today

Economic imperialism in Africa is characterized by the following ways of siphoning off of 'value' by corporations supported by public institutions and investments.

1. By ensuring the supply of agricultural raw materials, cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar and cotton with most of the value being added outside and only paying a small

<sup>74</sup> Marini (1991, 5).



proportion of the final prices to the producers.

2. By mineral-resource extraction. Oil and mining companies are underpaying for the resources they are allowed to exploit. The less sophisticated the host countries and their administration, the better the deals, except of course if people rebel, such as in Nigeria. These extractive industries also leave massive environmental disasters in their wake.
3. By land grabs, allying themselves with country leaders so that land can be granted at low prices, displacing the users (who do not have formal rights) or perhaps hiring them back as farm labourers on land they previously cultivated. In this process the investors also change crops from subsistence to export and thus make local people more vulnerable to importation of foodstuff.
4. By outsourcing industries, particularly labour-intensive ones to poorer countries with low labour costs and lack of safety and security for workers. Such industries are now also coming to Africa in the wake of infrastructure improvement.
5. By ensuring that major equipment and technologies have to be purchased from the outside. Because the disadvantaged countries have not accumulated sufficient capital by themselves, they are dependent on finance (loans) or investment from the outside. If 'developing' countries want to initiate major infrastructure investments themselves, they have to raise debt on more onerous terms than outside investors, thus they are increasingly dependent on the terms of finance they can get.
6. Foreign direct investment in manufacturing also tends to be directed to sectors where the investors have developed the technologies. In addition they take out profits that impinge on countries' balance of payments and endanger their exchange rate.
7. Selling military equipment has the double advantage for the sellers that it maintains the technological subservience of the buyer but also that it can be combined with military cooperation with the exporting country's military. Therefore, there is often an element of military aid in equipment supplies.<sup>75</sup>
8. Patents and trademarks are other barriers, but many IT projects are developed locally.

*Agricultural raw materials.* The world economy is so structured that basic inequities are 'normalized'. Or rather, the dependency is interdependency bordering on economic integration and 'value chains'. Therefore in many 'chains' military might is unnecessary because the parties are basically interested in upholding the relations. The fight is about the value split. With respect to agricultural goods, especially coffee, tea, cocoa and cotton come to mind. But developing them has had serious social implications that have furthered conflict and thereby militarization.

Cocoa farming is a case in point. Farms are small because there are no economies of scale or significant technological advancement possible in cocoa farming. It is by its very nature

<sup>75</sup> This ambiguity is covered by the term 'transfer', which ingeniously hides who pays.

labour-intensive. Since soil fertility declines over a relatively short period of time, forests have been destroyed systematically in Côte d'Ivoire in order to allow for ever more production.<sup>76</sup> The civil wars in that country have a lot to do with colonial and post-colonial labour migration and letting workers toil under harsh conditions, creating animosities between the indigenous population and the migrants, later showing up in the north vs. the south aggression.

The two major cocoa producers in the world, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire count for more than 60% of global production. But the farmgate payments only amount to some 6% of the value of the finished chocolate bar. Even if for example the Ghana Cocoa Board raises producer prices, such as it did in October 2022, this is in local currency which has a tendency to depreciate.

The two countries cooperate and have tried to introduce the Living Income Differential policy, which will fix a minimum price for cocoa FOB and give an extra premium to producers of USD 400 per ton. It amounts to a levy. The much stronger and well-organized buyers have been able to circumvent it so far.

Today though, the emphasis is on local value added. Downstream transformation of cocoa beans is only now starting in Côte d'Ivoire, a bit late in the day considering that cocoa processing is not dependent on advanced technology.

*Oil and minerals.* More importantly, oil extraction is probably the most important outside interest. Not only is it still going full throttle in Africa, but it is being expanded. Some players are new. Africa Finance Corporation, headquartered in Lagos, assembles public and private investors and capital funds, in order to fund infrastructure projects, but it is also heavily involved in oil and gas projects. It was founded by African sovereign states so they are keenly interested in these developments. Has imperialism changed its face? Does it disappear if the states themselves garner the rent?

There are other aspects. Gabon produces close to 200,000 barrels per day, down from 350,000 around 2000. However, it is going full steam ahead, having made access to its reserves of 2 billion barrels of oil easier and more favorable to oil companies in 2019.<sup>77</sup> Oil sales make up 70% of exports.<sup>78</sup> Gabon is heavily dependent on oil companies and its – until recently – leading family has allowed itself to benefit grandly from it.

Cameroon has increased its hydrocarbon exports, including LNG, to France dramatically over the last two years, from just USD 45 million to around USD 800 million.

Looking at new oil exploration coming on stream (Uganda, Senegal), it is doubtful that Africa will exit its raw materials curse anytime soon although leaders are becoming much tougher on mining companies.

<sup>76</sup> Adam Tooze (2023a).

<sup>77</sup> <https://www.gabonreview.com/gabon-le-marche-du-petrole-et-du-gaz-sur-la-voie-dune-croissance-de-08-entre-2022-2031/>.

<sup>78</sup> The World Bank in Gabon: Overview, update March 30, 2023.

The question is if African countries are digging – with full compliance and complicity of their long-term leaders – their own grave by oil exploration and exploitation which does nothing for the poorer, displaces them and ruins the environment?

The Sahel countries are increasingly gold diggers and exporters. Gold is getting ever more important. In Sudan it became a crucial export article after South Sudan, sitting on the oil, broke off. Adam Tooze practically attributes the recent political changes in the whole northern Sahara/Sahel belt to the finding in 2012 of a major gold vein, which made gold mining in the Sahel countries practically explode.<sup>79</sup> Whereas the failed states, CAR and Sudan, have given the Wagner network direct access to the mines, in the other countries larger mining companies, also from the West, still operate. Prominently in Burkina Faso. Although African gold mining is far behind China, Australia, Russia and Canada in quantities produced, Burkina Faso accounts for 2% of the world's newly 'minted' gold, which makes up 70% of the country's export value.<sup>80</sup> For Mali it is over 70%. According to Raineri, the gold extracted from just Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger can be estimated at 150 tons in one year. But more important for the people, artisanally mined gold has grown in importance in recent years in the whole Sahara/Sahel region, from Mauritania to Sudan, and may make up one third of the total.<sup>81</sup> And has added to the security problems.

Other minerals are iron ore, bauxite, copper, manganese, cobalt, nickel, lithium, ilmenite, graphite, chromium, uranium, rare earth... All of them fraught with tension.

Iron ore is of increasing importance in Liberia and Guinea. The latter is just about to embark, finally, on the realization of the Simandou project, a very rich mine with high-quality ore, but which has been incurring a lot of problems. The final deal is that two different ownership structures will cooperate on the construction of the necessary railway and deep-water port. The SMB Winning Consortium consisting of Winning International Group (Singapore), China Hongqiao and UMS Guinea is one such structure. The other is Rio Tinto Simfer, consisting of 15% held by the Guinea government and 85% by Simfer Jersey, split between Rio Tinto (Australia) (53%) and Chalco Iron Ore Holdings (China) (47%). This shows how many different commercial and also state-related interests are involved. Guinea is furthermore probably the world's largest or at least second-largest bauxite producer, making up 24% of bauxite delivered. It is also the supplier of half of the bauxite imports of China, which correspondingly controls most of the mining in Guinea. All these potent interests in iron ore and bauxite that also include Arab, Indian, US, European etc. companies, could easily explode. And antagonize the populations. At this time rulers try to prevent unrest by claiming more levies and royalties and 'social investments'.

*Land grabs* or, to put it more diplomatically, land acquisition for large agricultural projects, have largely been to the detriment of the population. They have been in order to plant palm

<sup>78</sup> The World Bank in Gabon: Overview, update March 30, 2023.

<sup>79</sup> The coup in Sudan in 2021 was, according to Tooze, directly related to the felt need to control gold resources (the Jebel Amir mine in North Darfur) and therefore to the bringing-in of Russians to fight the democracy-craving civilians. See Tooze (2023b).

<sup>80</sup> There is some indication that Ibrahim Traoré paid Wagner out of gold purchases. In February of this year, the government bought 200 kilos of gold from Endeavour's mine Mana.

<sup>81</sup> Raineri (2020, 103).

oil trees (Uganda). But one project did not take off, Daewoo's in Madagascar. Rather it led to the fall of Marc Ravalomanana. Other failed projects include two in Mozambique, a Brazilian-Japanese endeavor, ProSavana, covering 35 million hectares that should produce soybeans, maize and cotton, and a more modest one, Procana, where 30,000 hectares were destined for sugarcane growing.

The basic problem is that land rights in Africa are still to such a small extent codified. And even less are the judicial systems ready to handle the questions. Traditional chiefs still play an important role even in Ghana. In Uganda systems are in place, they are just enormously complicated. Numerous projects on the continent try to register and attribute land, but before that monied interests have often come in and bought land that in principle was not for sale but where the parties have found ways to monetize long-term user rights. Some progressives have ideas that traditional communal land rights should be formally titled as such. Not to forget that in Darfur, CAR, Cameroon, many places in the Sahel, people are fighting and invading each other's land and grabbing it. Nigeria which has a number of violent incidents each year is setting up a committee to propose solutions for cattle management.

*Outsourcing* has come to Africa through export processing zones. Madagascar has for a long time had textile production in such zones. Kenya and others as well. Ethiopia is developing industrial parks, particularly catering to Chinese entrepreneurs, who are interested because labour is cheaper there than in China. Besides, a lot of the production is for the local African market. It now has 12 such parks, having created 100,000 jobs.

*Technology purchasing.* It is obvious that e.g. infrastructure projects depend on outside technology, so do industrial projects. Africa is not alone in being indebted for its development projects, and it gets a lot of project financing on soft terms, but even so, it has been in a number of debt crises and debt rescheduling exercises. In early postcolonial days foreign soft loans were going to state-owned enterprises, such as cement factories, that were later privatized or shut down. At that time accelerated industrialization was on the agenda and there were no local funds. It is no longer true that capital is not accumulated and invested locally. Aliko Dangote is a major capital investor in Nigeria in cement, oil refining, sugar refining, fertilizer. Timidly, machinery is also being built. The basic problem is the age-old one of competitiveness, Africa is not necessarily a low-cost producer, all told, but many parameters of production are changing with the new geostrategic configurations in the world.

It is generally the case that major complicated projects, in mining obviously, but also in industry, particularly new ones, will be both funded and managed from the outside. It started in the 1960's with the aluminium smelter in Ghana, Valco, that should justify the Akosombo Dam, and which made Ghana beholden to American interests for years to come.

*Foreign direct investment* is a continuation of the above. It normally takes place in natural-resource development or projects to bring raw materials to market. Investment in infrastructure can also be FDI inasmuch as infrastructure construction increasingly is privately funded with government or other institutional guarantees. Energy for example is a highly marketable product. The problem with foreign investors is that they do not reinvest their profits in the countries but transfer them out.



In modern times African leaders are getting wiser and demand higher value-added in their countries on the minerals dug up. This is prominently the case in Guinea where Doumbouya is forcing bauxite miners to stand by their commitment to build alumina refineries.

*Military equipment* has been discussed extensively in this paper. It is obvious that the dependency on the transfer of military equipment is pronounced. The main technology for that which is produced locally will also be procured from the outside, so far.

*Trademarks and patents.* This is particularly a problem in the pharmaceutical industry. 70-90% of drugs are imported. The pharmaceutical industry is nevertheless growing rapidly. However, it is only to a very limited degree based on own basic research and the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) but consists mainly of drug-product manufacturers. South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya have sizeable pharmaceutical companies. Ghana has an API producer, South Africa two such companies.<sup>82</sup> Under covid-19 not only direct covid-related supplies were late in coming but also the supply of other drugs suffered due to the breakdown of supply chains. Through exceptions to WTO rules as per the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement certain vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics are being produced locally, but always as an exception.<sup>83</sup> There are now ambitious plans of improving intra-African planning and collaboration in drugs manufacturing. An African Medicines Agency is being set up in Kigali, Rwanda. Also to be noted that North Africa (Morocco) has an important pharmaceuticals production and exports to SSA.

IT solutions are also being developed by smart startups in Nairobi, Accra, Lagos and Kigali.

### 5.3 The new public (and private) scramble for Africa

Western powers have for a long time – and increasingly eastern ones also – set out to ‘aid’ the poor countries. Development aid in grant form has withered away and has been replaced by various forms of ‘blended finance’ to business cooperation, trade and infrastructure construction.

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative comes to mind as the prime example of major investment efforts. The G7 Build Back Better World (B3W) of 2021 should catalyze billions of dollars to climate, health, digital technology and gender equity and equality with the express purpose to show the Global South that the BRI is not the only way forward.

The US launched Prosper Africa in 2019, which claims to have supported private investment deals for USD 50 billion. A fact sheet from the White House announces, “Since 2021, the U.S. Government has helped close more than 800 two-way trade and investment deals across 47 African countries for a total estimated value of over \$18 billion, and the U.S. private sector

<sup>82</sup> ‘Should Sub-Saharan Africa make its own drugs?’, January 10, 2019. URL: <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/should-sub-saharan-africa-make-its-own-drugs>

<sup>83</sup> [https://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/news22\\_e/trip\\_08jul22\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/trip_08jul22_e.htm).

has closed investment deals in Africa valued at \$8.6 billion.”<sup>84</sup> Under Prosper Africa, the Africa Trade & Investment Program which works to develop partnerships was launched to the tune of USD 464 million for the period 2021-2026.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (private sector orientation) has financed USD 8 billion since 2004, and USAID and the US Department of State provided USD 8.5 billion in fiscal year 2021 to 47 countries and 8 regional programs.<sup>85</sup> Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) from 2000 allows African goods dutyfree entry into the US if certain conditions are fulfilled.

Post-Brexit UK also wants to participate in the new generosity and easy money with a USD 6 billion allocation through the British International Investment Agency.

EU has for a long time had large programs but is expanding – until 2027 it will provide EUR 150 billion through the Global Gateway Africa program (various modalities and not all additional money). One of the initiatives is the furtherance of Strategic Corridors to the benefit of African and European industries. After a lengthy process of advanced microeconomic/statistical treatment of indicators and measurements 11 corridors were short-listed. A paper analyzes them with respect to mining developments, particularly high-technology critical raw materials.<sup>86</sup> Although by far the only stated intent of the Global Gateway, mining interests will probably be a major driver.

Russia is still not a big player in terms of donating funds or financing projects, but figures are hard to come by. It was, however, announced that it had written off USD 23 billion worth of African countries’ debt at the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in July 2023. It is favouring Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Ethiopia when it comes to direct assistance. Now it is promising free grain, up to 50,000 tons to six countries, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, CAR and Eritrea. It is not clear if it is a maximum for each country or jointly, supposedly the latter.

But first of all, China is looming large. Its huge infrastructure building projects under the general heading of BRI are changing the face of the continent. China’s around USD 170 billion investments since 2000 include gargantuan infrastructure projects such as the controversial Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is 90% finished but already delivers electricity to the tune of 750 MW out of the 5-6 GW of the eventually installed capacity. Very close to the border with Sudan, it also risks to further destabilize the fragile political and social relations with the downstream countries, Sudan and Egypt. Altogether Chinese lenders have given around 1,250 loans to 49 African governments and seven regional institutions. The latest development is that the Chinese infrastructure investments are declining, in 2021 and 2022 only projects to the tune of USD 2 billion were launched.<sup>87</sup> *China Eximbank* is a prominent lender of soft credit. Very often the project vehicle is the contractor/construction firm in charge of project development and implementation, such as the China

<sup>84</sup> <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/14/fact-sheet-u-s-africa-partnership-in-promoting-two-way-trade-and-investment-in-africa/>. Dated Dec. 14, 2022.

<sup>85</sup> <https://www.usaid.gov/about-us/organization/bureau-africa>.

<sup>86</sup> Baranzelli et al. (2022).

<sup>87</sup> <https://www.bu.edu/gdp/research/gci/> published by Boston University’s Global China Initiative.

International Water & Electric Co.

One third of Chinese investments are for transport (rail, roads, ports), one third for energy. Hydropower electricity stations loom large in the portfolio. Karuma in Uganda, Kaléta and Souapiti in Guinea are recent major hydropower projects, ...

The loose organization BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) seems to be firming up and is enlarging its membership, among others by Ethiopia. Its New Development Bank, headed by Dilma Rousseff, expects to increase its part of loans that are not denominated in dollars, to 30%.

When it comes to Indian, Turkish, the Arab states' investments, they are not state-driven. Or not exclusively. There tends, however, to be state agreements lurking in many deals. In 2020/21 India's trade with Africa reached, according to the International Institute of Sustainable Development, USD 47 billion against USD 254 billion for China. Its cumulative investments 1996-2021 amounted to USD 74 billion in Mauritius, Sudan, Mozambique, Egypt and South Africa.<sup>88</sup> It is furthermore strong in generic pharmaceuticals which is also one of its most prominent investment areas in Africa. India is cooperating with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in a number of initiatives. The UAE is the strongest investor in Africa from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. It is particularly investing in infrastructure, transport, and logistics. Altogether it has invested USD 60 billion, targeting Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa and Tanzania. DP World (supply chain logistics and solutions) is very active. A deal between Adani Ports (India) and AD Ports (Abu Dhabi) on investments in Dar-es-Salaam to make it a major transport hub fell apart because of the Adani Group's financial difficulties.<sup>89</sup>

#### 5.4 A dissolving world order

Over the years, African governments have been requested to protect foreign oil and other mining interests. Or the major powers have themselves entered militarily as we have seen in this paper, on many different pretexts. But there is also a heavy dose of African resistance. Until now it has often manifested itself in internal conflict, but of late new coup leaders use antiwestern rhetoric both against the 'imperialist lackeys' that are governing them and the foreign economic interests they are perceived as being too closely allied with.

Gabon is the latest example, Guinea clearly so. The situation in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger is so highly 'militarized' that major conflict can be expected if outside regional powers will try to restore the previous regime. They have announced that they will form a military alliance. Some new rulers even renege on projects that could have beneficial effects for the population such as is the case in Niger.

This is the dire result of the previous world order. Add to this, the French dominance

<sup>88</sup> <https://www.iisd.org/articles/news/india-strengthen-ties-africa> and <https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/march-2023/india-uae-joint-investment-africa>.

<sup>89</sup> <https://northafricapost.com/70236-uae-leads-investment-charge-into-lucrative-african-market.html> and <https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/march-2023/india-uae-joint-investment-africa>.

through a misconstrued and colonial currency system that has so turned the head of France that it persists in closing its eyes to the writing on the wall. The conclusion is inevitably that these rulers and their outside allies deserve to be turned out.

The colonized peoples were not passive and never entirely subdued. The fierce resistance to subjugation is impressive and continuously underestimated. The resistance also often turns opposing local forces against each other. This has continued too.

#### 5.5 Emerging patterns

The balance of the world is upset. The major powers cannot continue to act as they have done hitherto. Africa requests its own place, possibilities and advancement in the world order. As a sign of acceptance of this, Africa as a whole, through the African Union, has become a permanent member of the G-20.

'Imperialism' is changing. In a way it is receding, in as much as the picture is getting so murky that the term does not say much, but rather obscures underlying tendencies.<sup>90</sup> The US cannot rule the world or determine what happens, nor can Russia and China. They have to appeal for allies. And although they are exploiting resources, their access is not granted with the same facility as before. It is ironic, in a certain sense, that finally Africa has become the market that imperialist thinkers had conjured up more than 100 years ago.

The militarization that is taking place may in a way be a last-ditch effort to preserve dominance. What we have seen is, on the one hand, that outside forces are coming to the 'assistance' of one or other party in a conflict (Sudan, CAR, etc.) or, on the other, active peacemaking (Somalia today) that often comes to look like war. It is not as if there are major disturbing outside interventions, in favour of own interests (except anti-piracy activities) or to stir up internal conflicts. Nevertheless, the US Africom has various potentialities and seems to be watching over China and Russia in Africa. Some of the interventions that are undertaken, such as by the EU, are meant to aid the African Union – in order for it to remain in the western camp? A danger is the introduction on African soil of war and conflict from elsewhere. News is out that Ukraine has attacked Wagner/Russian troops in Sudan (September 20). This augurs badly. Many relations are turned on their head. Western forces were standing haplessly by during the Niger coup. It was carried out by the military they had trained themselves.

So, the question if China and Russia are imperialist or subimperialist has to be answered with a 'difficult to say'. There is definitely competition, about hearts and souls, of getting investments accepted. But with respect to raw materials there is both cooperation between unlikely partners and some for everyone. The quest for raw materials is driven by companies and some are not so tenacious as others, western ones for example. Therefore, China tends to win that race by sticking it out. But also, as said, outside interests cannot so easily get the conditions they want as they used to. But yes, if one insists on imperialism as being economic

<sup>90</sup> See Robinson (2007).



intrusion bolstered by the military there are definitely signs of imperialism. The highest fraction of military deployed as per aid and investments of all sorts would probably belong to Russia although it knows how to get paid in 'cash'.

Africa used to have exclusively vertical relations to the outside world, exports to Europe or the US. Now relations are getting more 'horizontal' with cooperation across African countries and across the Red Sea to the Middle East and Asia. Vide all the regional and subregional organizations that are sprouting up.

Conflictual and contradictory struggles about power and self-determination are taking place. Clearly, power relations are changing, but whether economic relationships will do the same is more difficult to detect. To a large extent this will depend on Africa itself. Despite coups and dramatic politics, much that is driving the world's agenda forward is also happening, cultural and business innovation, logistics etc.

This paper has been mute on today's opposition movements aiming at fundamentally changing power relations in a socialist direction, or at changing social relations by fighting for gender equity and full liberation of women and minorities, or movements that oppose ecological destruction and abuses. Some of those movements are merged into the fight for the right to ancestral land against outside forces, of which the paper examines a great number. However, the relative impact of these opposition forces remains to be assessed.

One thing seems certain. Nations are still important. Africa consists of nations, but the outside actors discussed here also very much articulate themselves as nations although they are cooperating much more than in earlier times. The link between private and public national interests is also getting stronger. Businesses get financial support and all types of guarantees from their home countries. The positive spin is 'partnerships'.

## 5.6 Conclusion

The main conclusions are

1. Imperialism in an economic sense only really started after independence, until then colonialism was mainly a question of conquest and consolidation of power
2. African resistance to outside powers has been fierce and still is – outsmarting colonial powers and now the Global North
3. Revolutionary hopes about jumping stages after independence vanished quickly – but Soviet Union and China had a certain influence on economic policies and gave military support
4. African countries' role continued to be the furnishing of raw materials to the world and they became dependent on foreign aid for development expenditures, but now they are defining tougher terms and want domestic value added
5. Africa is being integrated in capitalism – a messy process

6. Despite adversity, domestic accumulation and innovation are going on
7. A new scramble for Africa by all major powers is notable – many resources are being invested, mostly 'blended' finance, a mix of private and public funds (US, China, EU, UK, India, UAE,...)
8. The recent coups in Francophone Africa are a sign that the dominance of France over its ex colonies is waning, but France has not fully realized it yet
9. Africa is rising in international significance, now becoming collective member of G20 and the major powers are pleading for access
10. All of this is accompanied by conflict – and peacekeeping missions – all of this is stoking militarization
11. Major powers are increasing their military involvement
12. Conflictual and contradictory struggles about power and self-determination are taking place, including about the system of governance in addition to control over resources.

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Annex 1: Table over governance, conflicts and allies

|                    | Democratic elections   | Coups d'état or civil war   | Long-time leader(s)                                  | Affiliations/allies  | Outside intervention (in and out)  |
|--------------------|--|---|--|--|--|
| <b>East Africa</b> |  |   |  |  |  |
| Ethiopia           | After 1991   | 2020-2022 civil war with Tigray   | Mengistu 1974-91, Haile Selassie 1930-74             | US except 1974-1991, abstaining from voting on ES-11/6 (UN resolution of Feb. 23, 2023 calling on Russian withdrawal from Ukraine). Ethiopia is becoming member of BRICS | Eritrea fought for its independence. Border war afterwards, which Ethiopia started. Eritrea support to Ethiopian state in Tigray civil war. Somalia intrusion in Ogaden 1977. E. intervening in Somalia 2006-2009. |
| Eritrea            | No   | Reportedly very suppressive regime – creating a lot of refugees, also subjected to sanctions                      | Isaias Afwerki since 1993                            | Russia and recently, Ethiopia. Voted against ES-11/6   | UN sanctions 2009-2018 and again since 2021. Western ideological opposition to Eritrea.  |
| Somalia            | Federal republic in 2012. Elections in 2012, 2017 and 2022   | Somaliland & Puntland claiming independence, Al Shabaab still does, mining large tracts of land, punctual attacks | Siad Barre 1969-1991                                 | US. Member of the Arab League  | UN, AMISOM (EU&AU), US peacemaking, Ethiopian intervention with UN and US  |
| Djibouti           | Opposition parties allowed since 1992 but only elected in 2013   | Unrest until 2000 and later also, protesting Guelleh's long run and lack of                                       | Ismail Omar Guelleh since 1999                       | Defense cooperation w. France and 9 military bases. Member of the Arab League  | Border conflict with Eritrea in 2008. Qatar peacekeeping till 2017. Normalization w. Eritrea 2018  |
| Sudan              | Until 1989   | Four civil wars, 2 related to South Sudan, one in Darfur and after 2023 all-out civil war                         | Omar al-Bashir 1993-2019, but took power in 1989     | Today Russian ally. Member of the Arab League. Abstaining from voting on ES-11/6   | Wagner & Russia summoned to assist. A lot of skirmishes with Chad and CAR  |
| South Sudan        | Elections have been postponed and are now scheduled for 2024   | Civil war from 2013 to 2020, peace deal in 2018   | Salva Kiir has held power since independence in 2011 | Western  | Uganda has intervened, problems with Sudan persisting, especially over oil (Heglig field)  |
| Uganda             | Held regularly but not free and fair, particularly opposition leaders Kizza Besigye and Bobi Wine persecuted | After 1986 fighting in the north and LRA terror. Uganda has received many South Sudan refugees                    | Yoweri Museveni since 1986                           | In the western fold, but abstained from voting on ES-11/6  | Intervention in Rwanda and South Sudan.  |
| Kenya              | Held regularly but often election violence, first multiparty election 1992                                   | None that succeeded, in 1982 failed attempt   | Daniel arap Moi 1978-2002                            | Western ally   | Has had forces in Somalia and been attacked by Al-Shabaab  |
| Tanzania           | From 1992 multiparty elections but same party winning  | Zanzibar rising from time to time   | Julius Nyerere 1964-1985                             | Has come into the western fold after Nyerere. Absent from voting on ES-11/6  | Has intervened in Uganda years back and vice versa   |
| Rwanda             | Multiparty elections since 2003  | No coups or civil war since the genocide in 1994  | Paul Kagame since 2000                               | Museveni during revolution. Western ally   | Has intervened in Zaire/DRC, today <del>prob'ly</del> supporting M23. Uganda helped the Tutsis in 1990. France and UN criticized for inaction under genocide   |

|                    | Democratic elections   | Coups d'état or civil war  | Long-time leader(s)  | Affiliations/allies   | Outside intervention (in and out)   |
|--------------------|--|--|--|---|---|
| Burundi            | New constitution 2005  | Civil war 1993-2005. Serious unrest again in 2015. Nkurunziza ruled harshly  | Nkurunziza 2005-2020   | For a long period isolated. Abstained from voting on ES-11/6  | Interference from Rwanda  |
| <b>West Africa</b> |  |  |  |   |   |
| Nigeria            | Dictatorship ended 1999  | Multiple insurrections, Presidents deposed, resigned or assassinated 1966-1999, Boko Haram threat from 2009, earlier: Biafra War | Longest term: Muhammadu Buhari 2015-2023, Olusegun Obasanjo 1999-2007                                | One of the top importers of Russian weapons in Africa but Western-oriented  | Nigeria major force in ECOWAS and is often sending troops   |
| Benin              | Democratic rejuvenation in 1991  | Frequent coups in early days   | Mathieu Kérékou 1972-1991, 1996-2006   | Western camp, French influence  |   |
| Togo               | Transition after Eyadéma's death 2005, but son Faure won. Since 2005 term limit lifted   | Massive intermittent protests  | Faure Gnassingbé since 2005, Gnassingbé Eyadéma 1967-2005  | Traditionally <del>Françafrique</del> , but abstained from voting on ES-11/6  | Incursions by opposition forces from Ghana. Has an astonishing high military budget   |
| Ghana              | Constitutionalism respected after Rawlings   | Nkrumah deposed, Rawlings got to power through a coup  | Jerry Rawlings 1981-2001   | Western   |   |
| Côte d'Ivoire      | Constitution 2000  | Civil wars 2002-2007 and 2010-2011, multifaceted animosities   | Alassane Ouattara since 2010, Félix Houphouët-Boigny 1960-1993                                       | Françafrique, western camp  | Intervention in second civil war by France, UN, ECOWAS. C&I was involved in Liberia civil war   |
| Liberia            | After 2003 constitutional elections  | Civil wars 1989-1997 and 1999-2003   | In recent times: Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf 2006-2018   | Western, trying to develop resources (iron ore)   | Liberia intervened in Sierra Leone. Rebels from Guinea, C&I and SL intervened in  |
|                    |  |  |  |   | Liberia. Burkina helped Taylor during civil wars  |
| Sierra Leone       | First constitution in 1971 after years of civil unrest. First republic until 1992. Third republic from 1998                      | Civil war 1991-2002  | Ahmad Kabbah 1996-1997 and 1998-2007. Before him Siaka Stevens had been president from 1971 to 1985. | Western   | Govt: Hired Executive Outcomes, ECOWAS/ECOMOG helped Kabbah. UN, Guinea and UK joined to secure an end to the war. Liberia (Taylor) intervention in favour of RUF |
| Guinea             | First 'free' presidential election in 2010. Constitution suspended since 2021, transition government                             | Coups in 1984, 2008 (2), 2021  | Alpha Condé 2010-2021, Lansana Conté 1984-2008, Sékou Touré 1958-1984,                               | Increasingly anti-western today, suspended from ECOWAS, allying itself with Mali, BF, Niger. Abstained from voting on ES-11/6 | Guinea was involved in Liberian war and was subject to incursions from Guinea-Bissau in 1970 to overthrow Sékou Touré   |
| Guinea-Bissau      | Multiparty elections 1994  | 1998 civil war, coup in 1999. Trouble in 2009 (Vieira killed), 2012 coup   | João Bernardo Vieira 1980-1999 and 2005-2009   | Absent from vote on ES-11/6   | Interventions by Guinea and Senegal to assist government of Vieira. ECOMOG peacekeeping. ECOWAS and AU and sanctions in 2012                                      |
| The Gambia         | Jammeh was elected president in 1996 and until 2017 where he refused to recognize results. Accusations of human rights violation | Jammeh came to power through a military coup in 1994. Coup attempt against Jammeh in 2006  | Yahya Jammeh 1996-2017   | Western now. Jammeh named republic Islamic. Senegambia alliance failed (1982-1989). Exited Commonwealth 2013-2018             | ECOWAS sent in 4,000 troops to make Jammeh leave. 2,500 troops remain to train security forces on request by president Barrow                                     |

|                       | Democratic elections  | Coups d'état or civil war   | Long-time leader(s)   | Affiliations/allies  | Outside intervention (in and out)   |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|--|---|
| Senegal               | Constitutional but not without abuses   | Casamance secessionist movement, MDFC (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance) started in 1982                                 | Abdou Diouf 1981-2000, Léopold Senghor 1960-1980                            | Françafrique but strong internal political and intellectual opposition against the dominance of France through the FCFA etc. Absent from vote on ES-11/6 | Jammeh supported MDFC. Border conflict with Mauritania 1989-1992  |
| Mauritania            | Constitution in 1991, amended in 2006   | Coups in 1978, 1984 and 2008 – military rule lasting until 1992 and again 2008-2009   | Ould Taya 1984-2005   | Rejected the FCFA in 1973 and ECOWAS in 1999. Member of Arab League since 1973   | Border conflict with Senegal 1989-1992. Renounced claims on Western Sahara in 1979  |
| Western Sahara/SADR   | Still disputed, governed partly by Morocco, partly by POLISARIO   | POLISARIO backed by Algeria, fighting against Morocco   | Brahim Ghali, long-term leader and president since 2016, reelected in 2023  | Algeria  | Fighting Morocco who claims the whole of Western Sahara. US and Israel have recognized Morocco's sovereignty  |
| Mali                  | Mali is currently living outside of a constitutional frame under transitional government  | Coups in 2012, 2020 and 2021 but also before 2012. Tuareg rebellion 1963, 1990 and 2005 and Tuareg (MNLJA)/jihadist rebellion from 2012 | Moussa Traoré 1968-1991 (deposed). Elected twice                            | Russia. Among top importers in Africa of Russian weapons. Voted against ES-11/6. Suspended from ECOWAS   | Interventions by UN, France, Denmark, Germany etc. in jihadist war since 2013. First welcomed then rejected in 2022 & 2023. Wagner Network since 2021 |
| Burkina Faso          | No constitutional order at this time  | Coups in 1983 (Sankara to power), 1987 (Sankara killed), 2014 (Compaoré deposed), two coups in 2022 deposing Roch Marc Kaboré           | Blaise Compaoré 1991-2014   | Part of Françafrique under Compaoré who however made many underhanded plays. Absent from vote on ES-11/6. Now suspended from ECOWAS                      | Under Compaoré intervention in favour of Charles Taylor and in favour of Ouattara   |
| Niger                 | Intermittent civil rule but now outside of the constitution   | Coups in 1974, 1987, 1996, 1999, 2010 and 2023  | Hamadi Diori 1960-1974  | Russia, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso but also has western bases and forces. Suspended from ECOWAS   | Suspended from ECOWAS which threatens to intervene  |
| <b>Central Africa</b> |   |   |   |  |   |
| DR Congo              | Sixth constitution in 2006, expressly multiparty  | 1965 and 1997 coups, continuous trouble in the east   | Joseph Kabila 2001-2019, Mobutu Sese Seko 1965-1997                         | Western  | Rwanda, Uganda. Peacemaking: MONUSCO, 1-year renewal in 2023. In 1964: UNOC which helped quell Katanga separatism                                     |
| Congo                 | 1969-1992 a one-party state, People's Republic of the Congo. Constitution of 1997, revised 2015, still dominated by one man                 | 1968, 1977, 1979 and 1992 where presidents were deposed   | Dénis Sassou-Nguesso 1979-1992 and since 1997                               | Françafrique. Abstained from voting on ES-11/6   | Not many direct interventions. Sassou now called in as conflict mediator elsewhere in Africa  |
| CAR                   | Constitutions not respected. New constitution of 2023 removing term limits. Only one president has voluntarily stepped down, André Kolingba | Civil war Séléka-Anti-Balaka since 2012   | Andre Kolingba 1981-1993, Bokassa 1966-1979 of which 1976-1979 as 'emperor' | Russia. Abstained from voting on ES-11/6   | Intervention by Wagner in 2018. Sudan crossborder movements, refugees   |
| Chad                  | Currently transitional government after coup by Mahamat Déby in 2021 following his father's death   | 1965-1979 northern rebels against regime. 1990 Habré overturned by Idriss Déby who was killed by FACT (northern rebels) in 2021         | Idriss Déby 1990-2021   | US and France. The latter has not challenged the 2021 coup.  | Libya invaded in 1979, stopped by France in 1987. Chad intervention in Sudan (Darfur). Peace with Sudan 2010-2019, FACT allied with RSF               |

|                        | Democratic elections   | Coups d'état or civil war  | Long-time leader(s)  | Affiliations/allies   | Outside intervention (in and out)   |
|------------------------|--|--|--|---|---|
| Cameroon               | English-speaking regions want return to federal state given up in 1972   | Secessionists in the western Anglophone regions met by military/police violent repression  | Paul Biya since 1982 (more than 40 years!), Ahmadou Ahidjo 1960-1982,                                  | Françafrique. Absent from vote on ES-11/6   | Border claims with Nigeria resolved by ICJ and respected after a time   |
| Gabon                  | Multiparty democracy instituted by constitutional change in 1991 after 30 years of one-party state. First free (?) general election in 2023. No presidential term limit (since 2003) | France helped subdue mutiny in 1964. Coup in August 2023 deposing Ali Bongo  | Ali Bongo since 2009, claimed to have been reelected in 2023, but was overturned. Omar Bongo 1967-2009 | Françafrique upholder but abstained from voting on ES-11/6                                  |   |
| Equatorial Guinea      | Term limits imposed on presidency as of 2021   | Obiang came to power through a coup  | T. Obiang since 1979   | Western but Chinese naval base being established. Absent from vote on ES-11/6               | Coup attempt against Obiang in 2004, plane intercepted in Harare  |
| <b>Southern Africa</b> |  |  |  |   |   |
| Angola                 | Third constitution in 2010. President no longer elected directly, limited to two terms   | Civil war 1975-2002 between MPLA and UNITA. Cabinda conflict settled in 2006 – sort of   | Eduardo dos Santos 1979-2017   | Top importer of Russian weapons. Abstained from voting on ES-11/6                           | Soviet Union, Cuba, US and South Africa during civil war  |
| Namibia                | Constitutional, no president overturned by coup  | Namibia was born in a long drawn-out civil war to obtain independence from South Africa (1990)   | Sam Nujoma 1990-2004   | Abstained from voting on ES-11/6  | After 1994 no longer problems with South Africa   |
| South Africa           | After 1994 fully constitutional  | After 1994 intermittent social unrest, strikes and   | Jacob Zuma 2009-2018 (resigned),   | Part of BRICS. Abstained from voting on ES-11/6   | After 1994 participation in various peacemaking efforts   |
|                        |  | disaffection with state functioning  | Thabo Mbeki 1998-2008 (resigned)   |   |   |
| Mozambique             | First multiparty elections in 1994, held every 5 years, not entirely free and fair   | Civil war 1975-1992 Cabo Delgado troubles since 2017, not resolved, social (land issues) plus jihadist rebellion. Wagner Group not helpful | Joaquim Chissano 1986-2005   | Abstained from voting on ES-11/6  | UN helped in peacemaking in 1990. EU support to Rapid Reaction Forces in Cabo Delgado (EFP/AFSA). Rwanda assistance in Cabo Delgado in 2021 helped in stabilizing the situation |
| Zimbabwe               | Multiparty constitution in 2013, but questionable if elections are free and fair although opposition is running  | Matabeleland protests after 1980, subdued, ZANU and ZAPU merged to ZANU-PF in 1987   | Robert Mugabe 1987-2017  | Left Commonwealth in 2003, negotiating reentry since 2018. Abstained from voting on ES-11/6 | Mugabe helped DR Congo in 2003 (Laurent Kabila) against Uganda and Rwanda rebel support   |
| Zambia                 | Multiparty elections as of 1991, since then constitutional change in 2010 and 2016   | No president of Zambia has been deposed  | Kaunda 1964-1991   | Western camp  | Troubles in neighbouring countries impacting negatively on Zambia   |
| Malawi                 | Multiparty elections as of 1994  | Intermittent accusations of corruption and troubles with donors  | H. Banda 1966-1994   | Western camp  |   |
| Botswana               | Constitutional government  | No coups, no civil strife  | Seretse Khama 1966-1980  | Western camp  | Namibian attacks before its independence. Had conflict with Namibia re Caprivi strip, resolved by ICJ in 1999 to Botswana's advantage   |



|                     | Democratic elections  | Coups d'état or civil war  | Long-time leader(s)   | Affiliations/allies   | Outside intervention (in and out)  |
|---------------------|---|--|---|---|--|
| Eswatini            | Absolute monarchy, but has parliamentary elections  | Major unrest in 2021   | King Mswati III since 1986  | Diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Western. Absent from vote in ES-11/6                        |  |
| Lesotho             | Constitutional monarchy since 1990 but also elections and parties before that   | Various conflicts between two parties, Leboa Jonathan major political figure till 1986   | King Letsie III since 1996, King Moshoeshoe II 1966-1996 but not uninterrupted                  | With South Africa in most foreign policy matters but did vote for ES-11/6                     | 1998 South Africa intervened in Lesotho on behalf of SADC on rumours of a coup. South Africa gets water from Lesotho. Some are proposing that Lesotho should become a Free State in South Africa   |
| Island Nations      |   |  |   |   |  |
| Madagascar          | Fourth Republic 2013  | Madagascar has had a tumultuous political life. Most presidents have not sat out their term or got to power through a coup. Ravalomanana elected twice. 2009 coup led to four years of the High Transitional Authority | Didier Ratsiraka 1975-1993 and 1997-2002  | Significant French influence, but Russia winning influence. Wagner Group cooperation rumours. | After the ousting of Ravalomanana, SADC negotiated his return to Madagascar in 2013. Neither candidate could run for office in 2013, but both ran in 2018 and both will run again in 2023  |
| The Comoros         | New Union constitution adopted in 2001 to pacify islands. In 2018 constitution the constitutional court was abolished and the | Secessionist tendencies by islands Anjouan and Mohéli 1997-2002  | Azali Assoumani 1991-2002, 2002-2006 and from 2016. Reelected in 2019. 2023 president of the AU | Member of the Arab League   | AU intervened against Anjouan independence in 2007. The Union refuses to recognize vote of Mayotte of 2011 to become French overseas department – it is even in constitution   |
|                     | rotating presidency modified.   |  |   |   |  |
| Seychelles          | Socialist one-party state 1979-1991. New constitution in 1993, but same party ruled until 2020                                | René came to power through a coup in 1977. Two coup plots by minister of defense Ogilvy Berloufs in 1986   | James Michel, 2004-2016, France-Albert René 1977-2004   | Western   | US initiated plot in 1979 against René. South Africa promoted a coup against René in 1981 led by 'Mad Mike' Hoare and some 45 mercenaries. Kenya also in support of coup. Some mercenaries were captured, sentenced and handed to South Africa which punished those returning. In 1986 a complicated plot where SA mercenary group Longreach played a double role. India came to the help of René to avoid coup. |
| Mauritius           | Multiparty constitutional. Presidents only since 1992.  | Social-discontent riots broke out in 1999. A number of short-lived presidents  | Longest term in office: Sir Anerood Jugnauth 2003-2012  | Western   | ICJ ruling in 2019 that Mauritius has the rights to the Chagos Archipelago but not respected by UK   |
| Cabo Verde          | Until 1991 one-party state. All presidents duly elected   |  | Aristide Pereira 1975-1991  | Western   | Cooperation with revolutionary forces in Guinea-Bissau 1975-1980   |
| São Tomé & Príncipe | Constitutional reform in 1990 – is now called Democratic Republic   | Some unsuccessful coup attempts  | Manuel Pinto da Costa 1975-1991   | Western   |  |

Annex 2: Military expenditures 2009-2022

| Annex 2: Military expenditures 2009-2022   | 2009     | 2010     | 2011     | 2012     | 2013     | 2014     | 2015     | 2016     | 2017     | 2018     | 2019     | 2020     | 2021     | 2022     | Change % | From     | To       |       |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------|
| Angola   | 3311,19  | 3500,79  | 3639,50  | 4144,63  | 6090,74  | 6846,25  | 3608,30  | 2764,05  | 3062,87  | 1983,61  | 1470,94  | 993,59   | 981,45   | 1622,76  | -51,0%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Benin  |          |          |          | 78,22    | 86,00    | 92,99    | 90,90    | 79,58    | 116,14   | 90,21    | 68,11    | 71,82    | 97,42    | 97,18    | 24,2%    | 2012     | 2022     |       |
| Botswana   | 330,15   | 348,67   | 363,32   | 326,87   | 306,44   | 346,28   | 383,74   | 514,46   | 522,43   | 498,09   | 514,72   | 499,03   | 536,63   | 489,32   | 48,2%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Burkina Faso   | 127,33   | 123,70   | 138,85   | 147,73   | 166,14   | 177,17   | 147,93   | 149,47   | 191,07   | 305,78   | 357,92   | 382,46   | 458,28   | 562,58   | 341,8%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Burundi  |          |          |          | 58,97    | 60,86    | 62,18    | 66,16    | 66,46    | 63,91    | 65,44    | 84,69    | 67,47    | 68,38    | 101,43   | 72,0%    | 2012     | 2022     |       |
| Cameroon   | 343,27   | 354,05   | 347,48   | 354,45   | 392,84   | 401,53   | 353,82   | 387,44   | 408,16   | 429,89   | 422,29   | 393,30   | 443,34   | 416,64   | 21,4%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Cabo Verde   | 8,40     | 8,24     | 9,76     | 9,74     | 9,82     | 10,05    | 8,92     | 10,17    | 9,35     | 10,71    | 9,73     | 11,28    | 11,21    | 10,25    | 22,0%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| CAR  | 35,99    | 51,59    | 49,87    | 42,75    | 47,92    | 38,41    | 26,70    | 26,83    | 27,52    | 30,52    | 40,78    | 44,35    | 55,52    | 42,00    | 16,7%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Chad   | 738,90   | 615,82   | 609,71   |          | 726,46   | 392,38   | 220,98   | 309,57   | 219,08   | 253,17   | 234,71   | 322,87   | 331,00   | 357,40   | -51,6%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Congo, DR  | 122,38   | 183,68   | 238,79   | 332,49   | 374,48   | 341,22   | 491,28   | 395,73   | 295,24   | 295,35   | 352,71   | 362,09   | 306,08   | 371,08   | 203,2%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Congo, Republic  | 218,39   |          |          | 367,06   | 704,89   |          |          |          | 501,81   | 371,94   | 292,26   | 299,95   | 298,38   | 313,06   | 265,8%   | 2010     | 2022     |       |
| Côte d'Ivoire  | 420,06   | 387,69   | 357,33   | 407,60   | 430,00   | 521,26   | 569,67   | 602,54   | 501,58   | 607,85   | 535,95   | 607,16   | 637,66   | 607,25   | 44,6%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Djibouti   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |       |
| Equatorial Guinea  | 371,93   |          |          |          |          | 166,54   | 137,26   | 139,20   | 136,21   | 149,50   | 148,64   | 162,37   | 162,81   | 156,79   | -6%      | 2014     | 2022     |       |
| Eritrea  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |       |
| Ethiopia   | 339,63   | 303,62   | 332,44   | 366,54   | 345,06   | 414,48   | 442,53   | 490,18   | 513,83   | 516,98   | 535,98   | 504,07   | 487,85   | 1031,40  | 203,7%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Gabon  | 268,74   | 265,97   |          | 278,14   | 282,16   | 208,12   | 170,37   | 202,82   | 267,43   | 261,22   | 266,88   | 263,47   | 311,45   | 277,67   | 3,3%     | 2010     | 2022     |       |
| Gambia   | 7,10     |          |          | 11,17    | 10,38    | 14,60    | 14,29    |          |          | 11,49    | 14,46    | 14,81    | 15,87    | 15,21    | 36,1%    | 2012     | 2022     |       |
| Ghana  | 118,29   | 122,48   | 234,33   | 337,26   | 255,00   | 252,65   | 190,54   | 161,75   | 189,13   | 218,44   | 233,32   | 239,89   | 298,35   | 229,28   | 93,8%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Guinea   |          |          |          | 168,91   | 196,82   | 196,95   | 221,41   | 161,86   | 181,64   | 197,08   | 197,75   | 206,99   | 244,56   | 441,26   | 161,2%   | 2012     | 2022     |       |
| Guinea-Bissau  | 13,74    | 17,13    | 17,52    | 24,49    | 21,71    | 21,47    | 17,04    | 15,73    | 19,02    | 21,20    | 22,57    | 24,17    | 25,67    | 24,54    | 78,6%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Kenya  | 578,07   | 622,05   | 646,68   | 840,07   | 860,56   | 819,04   | 843,67   | 933,10   | 1015,38  | 1113,65  | 1116,87  | 1115,32  | 1191,04  | 1138,34  | 96,9%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Lesotho  | 47,40    | 70,66    | 58,17    | 53,24    | 47,94    | 47,69    | 44,03    | 41,49    | 52,59    | 51,06    | 44,85    | 38,62    | 37,04    | 34,67    | -26,9%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Liberia  | 6,74     | 8,98     | 12,54    | 15,18    | 15,11    | 14,53    | 14,80    | 14,71    | 13,34    | 13,23    | 12,90    | 12,90    | 14,74    | 18,70    | 177,4%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Madagascar   | 70,99    | 56,92    | 71,99    | 68,64    | 71,88    | 69,68    | 58,93    | 59,39    | 66,91    | 73,26    | 76,58    | 87,36    | 99,19    | 97,97    | 38,0%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Malawi   | 58,80    | 49,98    | 52,80    | 46,16    | 62,93    | 49,45    | 40,79    | 35,75    | 47,42    | 58,37    | 85,18    | 98,86    | 92,57    | 75,83    | 29,0%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Mali   | 144,43   | 146,79   | 161,06   | 148,87   | 153,83   | 218,12   | 309,17   | 362,40   | 460,20   | 481,73   | 475,64   | 593,87   | 652,88   | 515,07   | 256,6%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Mauritania   | 114,82   |          |          | 142,30   | 144,22   | 144,84   | 132,93   | 136,06   | 143,77   | 159,01   | 162,40   | 198,53   | 230,94   | 225,35   | 96,3%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Mauritius  | 15,32    | 14,87    | 17,51    | 16,66    | 23,20    | 19,74    | 17,09    | 23,00    | 22,63    | 23,02    | 22,13    | 18,48    | 19,74    | 20,26    | 32,2%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Mozambique   | 84,30    | 99,19    | 118,87   | 139,10   | 157,89   | 173,75   | 134,03   | 110,46   | 129,26   | 196,54   | 217,45   | 288,26   | 310,00   | 281,87   | 234,4%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Namibia  | 299,52   | 296,54   | 443,59   | 412,16   | 389,96   | 537,46   | 518,20   | 425,39   | 456,08   | 455,57   | 414,06   | 368,22   | 400,20   | 369,11   | -23,2%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Niger  | 53,00    | 66,89    | 83,95    | 148,87   | 106,06   | 145,60   |          |          | 166,19   | 200,18   | 229,64   | 247,63   | 238,27   | 202,40   | 242,51   | 357,6%   | 2009     | 2022  |
| Nigeria  | 1504,49  | 1990,10  | 2384,94  | 2319,48  | 2418,76  | 2357,67  | 2065,56  | 1723,20  | 1621,22  | 2043,05  | 1860,26  | 2567,92  | 4466,40  | 3109,38  | 106,7%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Rwanda   | 75,28    | 74,51    | 75,38    | 79,79    | 82,48    | 90,94    | 103,56   | 107,28   | 115,72   | 118,96   | 124,07   | 147,87   | 167,84   | 177,19   | 135,4%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Senegal  | 214,82   | 195,73   | 230,19   | 196,66   | 236,74   | 239,89   | 214,83   | 304,76   | 305,44   | 385,13   | 356,82   | 345,64   | 483,22   | 431,45   | 101,8%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Seychelles   | 8,65     | 7,16     | 8,71     | 9,92     | 13,77    | 30,91    | 18,10    | 21,92    | 22,29    | 21,56    | 23,50    | 19,41    | 40,11    | 26,07    | 201,4%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Sierra Leone   | 26,41    | 25,06    | 25,48    | 29,76    | 31,68    | 48,81    | 39,23    | 37,41    | 39,58    | 29,62    | 27,43    | 22,37    | 27,27    | 24,50    | -7,2%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Somalia  |          |          |          | 26,05    | 60,26    | 46,61    | 47,71    | 61,81    | 76,56    | 71,72    | 98,16    | 111,03   | 115,10   | 341,8%   | 2013     | 2022     |          |       |
| South Africa   | 3592,69  | 4188,17  | 4594,15  | 4489,59  | 4118,21  | 3892,49  | 3488,87  | 3139,31  | 3591,51  | 3622,92  | 3435,43  | 3211,02  | 3393,86  | 2995,33  | -16,4%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| South Sudan  | 609,90   | 650,91   | 1052,72  | 988,23   | 981,98   | 1301,53  | 1151,92  | 135,34   | 72,39    | 149,09   | 186,50   | 128,92   | 213,22   | 378,84   | -37,9%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Sudan  | 3140,48  |          |          |          |          |          | 2279,62  | 2748,51  | 4383,00  | 1047,88  | 722,26   | 934,31   | 375,21   |          | -83,5%   | 2015     | 2021     |       |
| Eswatini   | 75,91    | 102,03   | 106,63   | 90,64    | 86,04    | 81,36    | 73,53    | 80,53    | 87,76    | 95,86    | 86,53    | 76,80    | 83,22    | 74,30    | -2,1%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Tanzania   | 219,48   | 282,73   | 307,47   | 359,74   | 443,38   | 507,29   | 517,08   | 544,22   | 562,70   | 599,97   | 618,94   | 676,41   | 759,49   | 832,23   | 279,2%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Togo   | 55,13    | 56,83    | 59,02    | 62,93    | 72,42    | 83,08    | 89,98    | 82,02    | 88,41    | 104,38   | 170,57   | 163,99   | 198,77   | 336,12   | 510,6%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Uganda   | 293,53   | 608,69   | 607,14   | 351,84   | 300,08   | 325,66   | 306,14   | 318,55   | 346,76   | 408,37   | 647,61   | 984,76   | 1066,56  | 923,12   | 214,5%   | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Zambia   | 220,96   | 280,19   | 309,11   | 346,30   | 381,35   | 443,60   | 372,45   | 299,50   | 339,66   | 378,03   | 292,07   | 212,14   | 217,58   | 326,08   | 47,6%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Zimbabwe   |          | 98,29    | 198,44   | 318,27   | 356,70   | 368,10   | 376,68   | 358,07   | 340,52   | 420,36   | 546,94   | 633,52   | 261,03   | 182,05   | 46,0%    | 2010     | 2022     |       |
| Total A  | 14659,00 | 16497,86 | 18231,41 | 18764,36 | 21753,11 | 23114,37 | 17982,77 | 16347,24 | 17163,87 | 17398,23 | 16987,55 | 17104,75 | 20364,12 | 19917,04 | -8,4%    | 2009     | 2022     |       |
| Total A does not include Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Eq. Guinea  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |       |
| Decrease of total A from 2013 to 2022  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | -8,4%    |          |          |       |
| Total B = total A minus Zimbabwe, Guinea, Somalia, Benin, Gabon, Congo and Burundi plus Eq. Guinea           |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 18491,85 |          |          |       |
| Increase in total B from 2009 to 2022  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 26,1%    |          |          |       |
| Note: Numbers in red are uncertain according to SiPRI, those in bold red are negative numbers that stand out |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |       |
|  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          | 20526,93 | 20073,83 | -2,2% |