



[REDACTED]

Copy no. \_\_/6

Bilag	AJ
Kammeradvokaten	



Outgoing No.:	O.096.390-0477
Date:	2004-11-22

(Please quote by correspondence)

To  
Cf. Distribution list

Subject:  
**Target folder – Op GREEN DESERT**

Enclosure:  
Target folder – Operation GREEN DESERT.

[REDACTED]

FOR THE COMMANDER

[REDACTED]

Maj  
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(S2) - INTEL section  
Target Folder

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# OPERATION GREEN DESERT

**Disposition:**

**1. Target Pack**

- 1.1. Introduction
- 1.2. Threat Assessments
- 1.3. Justification
- 1.4. Target list
- 1.5. Additional Information
- 1.6. Sources
- 1.7. Report References

**2. Battlefield Evaluation**

- 2.1. Terrain (main)

**3. Targets**

- 3.1. Target 1
- 3.2. Target 3
- 3.3. Target 4a
- 3.4. Target 4b
- 3.5. Target 2

## 1. Target Pack.

### 1.1. Introduction

① There have in the past 6 month been several reports about both local insurgent as well as foreigners coming to AZ ZUBAYR to conduct attacks on ING and MNF.

② Within the last month indirect and direct fire attacks have been targeting ING and MNF in AZ ZUBAYR itself.

③ The reporting contained within this target pack covers both suspected foreign fighters (FF) linked to Al Zarqarwi and Al Qaida as well as suspected local insurgents and their weapons caches.

The targets are all located within the urban areas of AZ ZUBAYR itself, presenting some challenges to containment and force protection during operations.

④ If the Intelligence is correct, it is most likely that there will be some resistance from the target groupings in response to the operation. This resistance could materialize as SAF and IEDs.

The operation includes both searches for documents, trying to link some of the suspects to known Terrorist groups, as well as [REDACTED]

The houses in targets: 1 and 4a, 4b are family residences.

### 1.2 Threat Assessment

Threat assessment is medium/high. It is very likely that targets: 1 and 4a, 4b have weapons, but there are no indications that they will use them to resist arrest if the operation is conducted during night time. Experience from former similar operations show they surrender or flee rather than to use their weapons. But there have been examples in BASRAH of insurgents taking up the fire fight with CF in order to avoid arrest.

#### 1.2.1 ECOA 1 (most likely)

1. It is not accessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search
2. The suspects will attempt to flee into the surrounding urban area
3. A large number of children and adults will gather at the cordon or CP – some will try to interfere, especially when we block main traffic lines within the city.



**1.2.2 ECOA 2 (worst case)**

1. As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from their houses
2. If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
3. Supporters could try to hit outer cordon with direct and indirect fire or perhaps even a VBIED if we actually do have a grip on a C2 cell from an international terrorist organisation.
4. Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawing of troops from target areas.

### 1.3.1. Short/Long Term Consequences

#### *Short term:*

- ⑤ DANBN will disrupt the planed and ongoing attacks on MNF and ISF within and around AZ and detain the suspects. This will immediately have effect in the entire AOR – as this will show the capabilities of local ISF. And disrupt the capabilities of AIF/Anti MNF groupings within AZ.

If the operation is unsuccessful and collateral damage is sustained to surrounding areas due to resistance, local political and religious rhetoric might turn more anti MNF / anti IIG within wider arrears of DANBAT AO.

#### *Long term:*

If the suspects are set free the attacks will continue after a while.

- ⑥ It will have given the ING a valuable lesion on operations planning and intelligence gathering which will strengthen their future operations.

If the operation is successful it will have established ING as a capable local security force within Az Zubayr. Which will increase their future freedom of operations and help make [REDACTED] AO more secure.

If the operation is unsuccessful it will have a bad effect on morale within ING and hamper the SSR and CIMIC projects within AZ urban. Which might lead to a worsen security situation in [REDACTED] AO.

### 1.4 Justification

The targets have been reported by on [REDACTED] and can not as yet be confirmed by other sources.

1.5. Target List

1.5.1 Target Locations (A) and persons (B)

All B are wanted in connection to insurgency activity

B	A	NAME	GRID	MEMBERS OF FAMILY	REMARKS
1	1			30 (5 brothers with family)	3 bodyguards
2	1			10	
3	1				 Might have links to a similar organisation in Falluja Most likely to have a few bodyguards (2-4)
4	1				The owner of Target 2, might be in the house
5	3				Reportedly 30-50 armed FF within the hotel
6	4b			10-15	Supporter of former regime, might be connected to PLO

\*B's could move around – therefore check all names during the area search

1.5.2 Target Vehicles

None reported, but any car within target 1, 4a and 4b should be approached with caution as it could be prepared VBIED.

1.6. Additional Information

All targets contains large amount of people, including Women and children.

All targets are located in close proximity to mosques. Within residential arrears.

1.7. Sources.

Removed from this paper.

1.8. Report references.

None.

## 2.0 Battlefield Evaluation.

### 2.1 Terrain

- The Terrain where the targets are located is all in the urban area of Az Zubayr.

⑦

- Target 1 on the most trafficated roundabout in downtown Az Zubayr
- Target 2 in rural area SW of Az Zubayr
- Target 3 on one of the main streets of Az Zubayr
- Targets 4a and 4b close to main road to Basrah
- All targets within heavily populated arrears
- All targets are located near mosques
- All targets have large areas to search
- All targets and inner/outer cordons can be targeted from neighbouring houses and their roofs
- Wiring and power cables to houses in target areas is strung in low height
- Targets 1 and 3 are located on paved surfaces; however target 4a and 4b are located in a dirt surfaced area.

### 3.0 Targets

#### 3.1. Target 1.

##### a. Target type:

- ⑧ - Insurgent grouping
- ⑨ - Weapons caches; 107mm rockets, mortar systems and AKs.
- Launchers for 107mm rockets
- Igniter systems to IEDs and rockets (motorcycle and car batteries, keyless car entry systems)
- Documents incriminating the organisation
- Explosives
- Detonators
- Anti MNF/anti IIG propaganda

##### b. Available target information:

- Reportedly HQ of: Insurgent group called [REDACTED] (historic warlord)
- [REDACTED] is reportedly the local leader of the organisation and lives near the AL- BARAQ mosque with his family and 3 bodyguards
- [REDACTED] lives in AZ and is reportedly financing operations
- [REDACTED] who is reportedly the supreme leader of this organisation disappeared about 4 months ago. It is not known if he is within the complex.
- AIF in Fallujah allegedly houses the same organisation and links is thought to exists
- [REDACTED]

##### c. Suspects:

See. Pkt. 1.5.1

##### d. Other residents:

The housing complex is reportedly inhabited by 5 brothers and their families which might bring the number of pax within the complex to as much as 50 pax. Including many women and children.

Most likely there will be dogs within the complex.

##### e. Target buildings:

- One and two store brick buildings.
- Numerous windows
- Numerous small adjacent buildings
- Outer walls with small gateway entrances

f. Threat manifestation:


**ECOA 1 (most likely)**

- (10)
- It is not assessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search
  - The suspects will attempt to flee into the surrounding urban area
  - A large number of children and adults will gather at the cordon or CP – some will try to interfere, especially when we block main traffic lines within the city.

**ECOA 2 (worst case)**

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from their houses
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
- Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawing of troops from target areas.



g. Picture gallery:




[REDACTED]

(S2) - INTEL section

Target Folder







### 3.1. Target 2.

#### a. Target type:

- ⑧ - Insurgent grouping, training facility
- ⑨ - Weapons caches
- 3 x Dimitroff 30 guns
- 107mm rockets, mortar systems and AKs.
- Launchers for 107mm rockets
- Igniter systems to IEDs and rockets (motorcycle and car batteries, keyless car entry systems)
- Documents incriminating the organisation
- Explosives
- Detonators
- Anti MNF/anti IIG propaganda

#### b. Available target information:

- Allegedly a training facility for the organisation of [REDACTED]
- Owned by [REDACTED]
- Syrians, Saudis and Iraqis from Fallujah and Ramadi allegedly stays there for insurgency training
- Allegedly 3 x Dimitroff 30 guns are located there (observed personally by SO1/S2/602)
- During Najaf offensive, 7-8 vehicles were observed bringing weapons and people.



c. Suspects:

See. Pkt. 1.5.1

d. Other residents:

The farms are reportedly inhabited by families which might bring the number of pax within the complex to as much as 50 pax. Including many women and children. Most likely there will be dogs and other domestic animals within the farms.

e. Target buildings:

- One store brick and clay buildings.
- Numerous windows
- Numerous small adjacent buildings
- Outer walls with small gateway entrances

f. Threat manifestation:



**ECOA 1 (most likely)**

- It is not accessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search

**ECOA 2 (worst case)**

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from their houses
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
- Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawing of troops from target areas.

g. Picture gallery:



### 3.2. Target 3.

a. Target type:

- ⑧ - Al Qaida operatives
- ⑧ - Documents
- ⑨ - Explosives
- Detonators

- Anti MNF/anti IIG propaganda

b. Available target information:

- Hotel: [REDACTED]
- Reported to house FF
- Reportedly 30-50 pax armed with SA (AL Qaida linked)
- SO1/S3/601 links hotel with FF related to Al Qaeda and Zarqawi grouping based in Az Zubayr.
- Two weeks ago a former Lt. Col. entered the hotel. He is from Fallujah and served with the army engineers during Saddam. This was reported to [REDACTED] by an [REDACTED] officer who served in the intelligence service during the former regime
- 10 NOV 04 [REDACTED] reported an increase of people, allegedly from Fallujah, checking into the hotel

c. Suspects:

See. Pkt. 1.5.1

d. Other residents:

- Probably other guests and employees in hotel

e. Target buildings:

- See picture, no inside information available.

f. Threat manifestation:



**ECOA 1 (most likely)**

- It is not accessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search
- The suspects will attempt to flee into the surrounding urban area
- A large number of children and adults will gather at the cordon or CP – some will try to interfere, especially when we block main traffic lines within the city.

**ECOA 2 (worst case)**

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from the hotel
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
- 5. Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawing of troops from target areas.

g. Picture gallery:



**3.2. Target 4a.**

**a. Target type:**

- ⑧ - Insurgent grouping
- Hidden basements
- ⑨ - Weapons caches; 107mm rockets, mortar systems and AKs.
- Launchers for 107mm rockets
- Igniter systems to IEDs and rockets (motorcycle and car batteries, keyless car entry systems)
- Documents incriminating the organisation
- Explosives
- Detonators
- Anti MNF/anti IIG propaganda

b. Available target information:

- Reportedly HQ of Al-Taqyas (sufi religious organisation)
- Tribe: [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] (senior advisor to Pres. Saddam) reportedly supported the place during former regime.
- Allegedly there are hidden cellars concealing weapons and explosives

c. Suspects:

See. Pkt. 1.5.1

d. Other residents:

- Families might bring the number of pax within the building to as much as 15 pax. Including women and children.
- Most likely there will be dogs within the complex.

e. Target buildings:

- See picture, no inside information available. →

f. Threat manifestation:

**ECOA 1 (most likely)**

- It is not accessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search
- The suspects will attempt to flee into the surrounding urban area
- A large number of children and adults will gather at the cordon or CP – some will try to interfere, especially when we block main traffic lines within the city.

[REDACTED]


(S2) - INTEL section


Target Folder

**ECOA 2 (worst case)**

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from the house
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
- Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawal of troops from target areas.

g. Picture gallery:





**3.2. Target 4b.**

**a. Target type:**

- ⑧ - Insurgent grouping
- Hidden basements
- ⑨ - Weapons caches; 107mm rockets, mortar systems and AKs.
- Launchers for 107mm rockets
- Igniter systems to IEDs and rockets (motorcycle and car batteries, keyless car entry systems)
- Documents incriminating the organisation
- Explosives
- Detonators
- Anti MNF/anti IIG propaganda

**b. Available target information:**

- Reportedly HQ of Al-Taqqas (sufi religious organisation)
- Tribe: [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] (senior advisor to Pres. Saddam) reportedly supported the place during former regime.
- Allegedly there are hidden cellars concealing weapons and explosives

**c. Suspects:**

See. Pkt. 1.5.1



d. Other residents:

- Families might bring the number of pax within the building to as much as 15 pax. Including women and children.
- Most likely there will be dogs within the complex.

e. Target buildings:

- No picture, and no inside information available.

f. Threat manifestation:

**ECOA 1 (most likely)**

- It is not accessed that we will meet any resistance during the house and area search
- The suspects will attempt to flee into the surrounding urban area
- A large number of children and adults will gather at the cordon or CP – some will try to interfere, especially when we block main traffic lines within the city.

**ECOA 2 (worst case)**

- As inner cordons are placed some of the suspects might open fire from the house
- If possible the suspects will try to create as much delay as possible on our search, allowing them to draw attention and reinforcements to the targets.
- Locals and anti MNF elements from within AZ might try to interfere with the redrawing of troops from target areas.


g. Picture gallery:



[REDACTED]

(S2) - INTEL section  
Target Folder

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NO FURTHER PHOTOS AVAILABLE



## Hæren

### Hærens Operative Kommando

Bilag	AK
Kammeradvokaten	



#### Operation Green Desert var vel begrundet og understøttes af Target Folderen

**IRAK, Operation Green Desert: Hærens Operative Kommando finder det af medier og kommentatorer offentliggjorte og refererede både mangelfuldt og fejlagtigt**

11-06-2013 - kl. 17:47

Det overordnede grundlag for operationen var på plads, og understøttes af den samlede Target Folder.

En Target Folder er det efterretningsmæssige grundlag, der udarbejdes forud for en operation. Den beskriver, baggrunden for operationen, beskrivelse af målene, trusselsvurderinger og de forventede effekter af operationen. Medier og kommentatorer har de seneste dage offentliggjort og refereret dele af den Target Folder, der var udarbejdet forud for operation Green Desert i Irak november 2004, men udeladt væsentlige dele i offentliggørelsen og vinklet øvrige fakta helt uacceptabelt. Blandt andet er Target Folderens første otte sider med begrundelse og forventet effekt af operationen helt udeladt i det materiale, der er offentliggjort.

Ifølge medierne og kommentatorer, skulle Target Folderen bevise, at der ikke var grundlag for at gennemføre en operation i den pågældende situation, samt dokumentere, at styrkechefen handlede i strid med anbefalingerne i Target Folderen.

Det mener Hærens Operative Kommando ikke er korrekt og offentliggør hermed hele Target Folderen med nedklassificerende overstregninger af persondata.

Af de i medierne udeladte dele af Target Folderen fremgår, at (nummerering refererer til markering i Target Folderen):

1. Der havde de seneste måneder været adskillige rapporter om, at lokale og udefrakommende oprørere med mulig tilknytning til oprørs- og terrorist-grupperingerne Al Zaqarwi og Al Qaeda fra Az Zubair ville rette angreb mod irakiske og multinationale (herunder danske) sikkerhedsstyrker.
2. Der havde i den seneste måned været tilfælde af angreb på irakiske og multinationale styrker i Az Zubair.
3. Modtagne efterretninger sandsynliggør tilstedeværelse af såvel udefrakommende oprørere som våbendepoter i de udpegede mål.
4. Det forudses, at der kan forekomme nogen modstand fra oprørere i målområderne.
5. Formålet med operationen var at forstyrre igangværende og planlagte angreb på irakiske og multinationale sikkerhedsstyrker, tilbageholde mistænkte og vise irakiske sikkerhedsstyrkers evne til at gennemføre planlagte sikkerhedsoperationer.
6. På længere sigt skulle operationen styrke de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrkers evne til at gennemføre operationer samt deres egen og befolkningens tro på deres evne til at gennemføre sådanne operationer. Herved skulle sikkerheden inden for den aktuelle irakiske bataljons område øges.
7. Operationen blev gennemført såvel indenfor bymæssig bebyggelse i Az Zubair, som på landejendomme udenfor byen. Fra de dele af Target Folderen, som medier har offentliggjort, er der refereret så mangelfuldt eller fejlagtigt, at det herfra må fremhæves:
8. I et af målene rapporteredes risiko for, at der kunne opholde sig op til 50 bevæbnede oprørere; i de øvrige mål mindre grupperinger eller enkelte oprørere (s. 14, 11, 13 m.fl.).
9. I flere af målene er der rapporteret risiko for større beholdninger af våben og sprængstoffer, ligesom der advares mod, at biler kan være klargjort til VIED (Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device = Køretøjsbombe) (s. 11, 13 m.fl.).
10. Mistænkte vurderedes at ville forsøge at skjule sig i mængden af civile (s. 9 m.fl.).

Ovenstående (pkt. 8-10) er i flere medier og af kommentatorer refereret som om der udelukkende var forventet "uskyldige civile" i målene.

#### **Irakisk selvstændighed fra juli 2004**

Det bør om situationen i Irak i 2004 fremhæves, at de irakiske myndigheder fra juli 2004 selv overtog ansvaret for sikkerheden i Irak. De multinationale styrkers opgave var derefter at støtte og træne irakerne i dette med to overordnede formål:

- på kort sigt at sikre, at eventuelle oprørere og kriminelle blev forhindret i at undergrave styret og angribe sikkerhedsstyrker og civilbefolkning
- på længere sigt at skabe forudsætninger for, at irakerne selv kunne løse sikkerhedsopgaverne uden støtte.

Et af formålene med de danske styrkers deltagelse i operation Green Desert var således at træne de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker og skabe tillid i den irakiske befolkning til, at de var i stand til at løse sikkerhedsopgaver. Dette var særlig vigtigt i den aktuelle periode, da det var et klart ønske, at irakerne selv skulle kunne løfte sikkerhedsopgaven under valghandlingerne i januar 2005.

Det lykkedes i et sådant omfang, at de danske styrker, om end på højt beredskab, under valget kunne holde sig tilbagetrukket som reserve for irakerne uden at blive indsat.

**Se hele Target Folderen her.**

**Tilbage**